fix markdown error in crypto rfc (#167)

This commit is contained in:
Efim Poberezkin
2021-07-09 04:27:07 +10:00
committed by GitHub
parent 5ebb546d58
commit 9f945492dd
+4 -4
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@@ -145,9 +145,9 @@ For each message, the agent performs the following actions to encrypt it:
3. Encrypt the message using this AES256 key with [AES-GCM-SIV](https://hackage.haskell.org/package/cryptonite-0.28/docs/Crypto-Cipher-AESGCMSIV.html) (AEAD scheme) using the function `encrypt` with a random nonce.
4. Encrypt the AES256 key with public encryption key for the queue using RSA-OAEP [encrypt](https://hackage.haskell.org/package/cryptonite-0.28/docs/Crypto-PubKey-RSA-OAEP.html#v:encrypt) function parameterized with [SHA256](https://hackage.haskell.org/package/cryptonite-0.28/docs/Crypto-Hash-Algorithms.html#t:SHA256) algorithm.
5. The message to send is concatenation of:
1. encrypted AES256 key,
2. AuthTag from encryption in step 3,
3. encrypted message (in this order)
1. encrypted AES256 key,
2. AuthTag from encryption in step 3,
3. encrypted message (in this order).
As there is no additional data that is sent e2e in clear text, we potentially need some simpler algorithm, possibly the one implemented in the tutorial, that implements authenticated encryption without additional (unencrypted) data.
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ Or we could use this algorithm to allow some data that is sent e2e in clear text
### Message decryption
Agent decrypt the message following the same steps in the opposite order
Agent decrypts the message following the same steps in the opposite order:
1. Split encrypted message to AES256 key, AuthTag and encrypted message - tag and key have fixed size (?).
2. Decrypt AES256 key using the decryption key (the private key that recipient has).