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..
Author SHA1 Message Date
John Roberts dfb0be2c0e migration 2022-03-20 14:50:16 +04:00
John Roberts 2e808192de use server IP addresses 2022-03-20 14:48:09 +04:00
216 changed files with 4331 additions and 37225 deletions
+1 -4
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@@ -1,4 +1 @@
* @epoberezkin @spaced4ndy
/Dockerfile @shumvgolove
/scripts/docker/ @shumvgolove
/scripts/main/ @shumvgolove
* @epoberezkin @efim-poberezkin
+29 -46
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@@ -11,59 +11,34 @@ on:
jobs:
build:
name: build-${{ matrix.os }}-${{ matrix.ghc }}
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- os: ubuntu-20.04
platform_name: 20_04-x86-64
ghc: "8.10.7"
- os: ubuntu-20.04
platform_name: 20_04-x86-64
ghc: "9.6.3"
- os: ubuntu-22.04
platform_name: 22_04-x86-64
ghc: "9.6.3"
runs-on: ubuntu-20.04
steps:
- name: Clone project
uses: actions/checkout@v3
uses: actions/checkout@v2
- name: Setup Haskell
uses: haskell-actions/setup@v2
- name: Setup Stack
uses: haskell/actions/setup@v1
with:
ghc-version: ${{ matrix.ghc }}
cabal-version: "3.10.1.0"
ghc-version: '8.10.7'
enable-stack: true
stack-version: 'latest'
- name: Cache dependencies
uses: actions/cache@v2
with:
path: |
~/.cabal/store
dist-newstyle
key: ${{ matrix.os }}-${{ hashFiles('cabal.project', 'simplexmq.cabal') }}
path: ~/.stack
key: ${{ hashFiles('stack.yaml') }}
- name: Build
shell: bash
run: cabal build --enable-tests
- name: Test
timeout-minutes: 30
shell: bash
run: cabal test --test-show-details=direct
- name: Prepare binaries
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
- name: Build & test
id: build_test
shell: bash
run: |
mv $(cabal list-bin smp-server) smp-server-ubuntu-${{ matrix.platform_name}}
mv $(cabal list-bin ntf-server) ntf-server-ubuntu-${{ matrix.platform_name}}
mv $(cabal list-bin xftp-server) xftp-server-ubuntu-${{ matrix.platform_name}}
mv $(cabal list-bin xftp) xftp-ubuntu-${{ matrix.platform_name}}
stack build --test --force-dirty
install_root=$(stack path --local-install-root)
mv ${install_root}/bin/smp-server smp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64
- name: Build changelog
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && matrix.os == 'ubuntu-20.04'
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
id: build_changelog
uses: mikepenz/release-changelog-builder-action@v1
with:
@@ -74,8 +49,19 @@ jobs:
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Extract release candidate
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
id: extract_release_candidate
shell: bash
run: |
if [[ ${GITHUB_REF} == *rc* ]]; then
echo "::set-output name=release_candidate::true"
else
echo "::set-output name=release_candidate::false"
fi
- name: Create release
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && matrix.os == 'ubuntu-20.04' && matrix.ghc == '9.6.3'
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1
with:
body: |
@@ -83,13 +69,10 @@ jobs:
Commits:
${{ steps.build_changelog.outputs.changelog }}
prerelease: true
prerelease: ${{ steps.extract_release_candidate.outputs.release_candidate }}
files: |
LICENSE
smp-server-ubuntu-${{ matrix.platform_name}}
ntf-server-ubuntu-${{ matrix.platform_name}}
xftp-server-ubuntu-${{ matrix.platform_name}}
xftp-ubuntu-${{ matrix.platform_name}}
smp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64
fail_on_unmatched_files: true
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-50
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@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
name: Build and push Docker image to Docker Hub
on:
push:
tags:
- "v*"
jobs:
build-and-push:
name: Build and push Docker image
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- app: smp-server
app_port: 5223
- app: xftp-server
app_port: 443
steps:
- name: Clone project
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Log in to Docker Hub
uses: docker/login-action@v2
with:
username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_PASSWORD }}
- name: Extract metadata for Docker image
id: meta
uses: docker/metadata-action@v4
with:
images: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}/${{ matrix.app }}
flavor: |
latest=auto
tags: |
type=semver,pattern=v{{version}}
type=semver,pattern=v{{major}}.{{minor}}
type=semver,pattern=v{{major}}
- name: Build and push Docker image
uses: docker/build-push-action@v4
with:
push: true
build-args: |
APP=${{ matrix.app }}
APP_PORT=${{ matrix.app_port }}
tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
-7
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@@ -4,10 +4,3 @@
*.session.sql
tests/tmp
dist-newstyle/
cabal.project.local
cabal.project.local~
.hpc/
*.tix
.coverage
-1
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
- ignore: {name: "Use underscore"}
-320
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@@ -1,321 +1,9 @@
# 5.4.0
Migrate to GHC 9.6.3
Agent:
- database improvements:
- track slow queries.
- better performance.
- "busy" error handling.
- create parent folder when needed.
- support closing and re-opening database.
- SMP agent improvements
- streaming for batched SMP commands.
- fix asynchronous JOINing connection.
- handle repeating JOINs without failure.
- api to get subscribed connections.
- return simplex:/ links as invitations.
- fix memory leak.
- XFTP improvements:
- suspend when agent is suspended.
- support locally encrypted files.
- fixes - create empty file, prevent permanent error treated as temporary.
- upgrade HTTP2 library (fixes error handling and flow control).
- Remote control protocol (XRCP)
SMP server:
- control port commands for GHC threads introspection.
- allow creating new queues without subscriptions (required for iOS).
XFTP server:
- allow 64kb file chunks.
NTF server:
- faster startup.
# 5.3.0
Agent:
- improve performance, track slow database queries.
- support delivery receipts.
SMP server:
- control port
# 5.2.0 (NTF server 1.5.0)
Agent:
- treat agent INACTIVE error as temporary - fixes failed message delivery in some race conditions.
- restore connection confirmations after client restart - fixes failed connections.
- ratchet resynchronization protocol and API.
- increase connection version to mutually supported by both peers on each received message.
Client:
- make timeout for batched functions dependent on the number of batches - fixes expiry on large batches.
Servers:
- add timeout in case of sending TCP traffic and in case of partial delivery of requested blocks to avoid resource leaks.
# 5.1.2, 5.1.3 (NTF server 1.4.1, 1.4.2)
Agent:
- ACK message on decryption error (fixes stuck message delivery bug)
- more robust connection switching logic, API to abort switching the address
Notification server:
- batch subscriptions to SMP servers
# 5.1.1 (NTF server 1.4.0)
Agent:
- store and check hashes of previous encrypted messages to differentiate between duplicates and decryption errors
Server:
- larger processing queues
- expire messages when restoring them
# 5.1.0
XFTP client:
- check encrypted file exists when uploading
- remove user ID from deletion API
Agent:
- vacuum database on migrations
SMP server:
- configure message expiration time in INI file
# 5.0.0
SimpleX File Transfer Protocol (XFTP):
- XFTP server
- XFTP CLI
- support XFTP in the agent
Other changes:
- preserve retry interval for sending messages on agent restarts
- support IPv6 in the servers and in the agent
- support for 32-bit platforms
Read more about XFTP in this post: https://simplex.chat/blog/20230301-simplex-file-transfer-protocol.html
# 4.4.1
SMP agent:
- fix handling of server addresses.
- prevent message delivery getting stuck on IO error in SMP client.
# 4.4.0
SMP agent:
- support multiple user profiles with transport session isolation.
- support optional transport isolation per connection.
- batch connection deletion
- improve asynchronous connection deletion it may now be completed after the client is restarted as well.
- improve subscription logic to retry if initial attempt fails.
- end SMP client connection after a number of failed PINGs (default is 3).
# 4.3.0
SMP server:
- additional server usage statistics.
SMP agent:
- increase retry interval when sending messages after ERR QUOTA.
# 4.2.0
SMP agent and server:
- reduce sender traffic in cases when queue quota is exceeded:
- server sends quota exceeded message to the recipient when sender receives ERR QUOTA.
- recipient sends QCONT message to the send once the queue is drained (via reply queue).
- sender retry delays are increased, reducing traffic, but sender instantly resumes delivery where QCONT is received.
SMP server:
- increase internal queue sizes.
SMP agent:
- deduplicate connection IDs in connect/disconnect responses.
- unit tests for Crypto.hs.
- fix connection switch to another queue: correctly set primary send queue.
Notification server (v1.3.0):
- check token status when sending verification notification.
# 4.1.0
SMP agent and server:
- option to toggle TLS handshake error logs (disabled by default).
SMP agent:
- include server address in BROKER error.
- api to get hash of double ratchet associated data (for connection verification).
- api to get agent statistics.
# 4.0.0
SMP server:
- Basic authentication. The server address can now include an optional password that is required to create messaging queues, so the contacts who message you will not be able to receive messages via your server, unless you share with them the address with the password. It is recommended to enable basic authentication on all private servers by adding `create_password` parameter into AUTH section of server INI file (the previously deployed servers do not have this section, you need to add it).
- Disable creating new queues completely with `new_queues: off` parameter in AUTH section of INI file - it can be used to simplify migrating the existing connections to another server.
- Updated server CLI with changed defaults:
- interactive server initialization, use -y flag to initialize the server non-interactively.
- store log is now enabled by default, so messaging queues and messages are restored when the server is restarted (to restore undelivered messages the server needs to be stopped with SIGINT signal).
- a random password is now generated by default during the server initialization.
SMP agent:
- API to test SMP servers. It connects to the server, creates and deletes a messaging queue. The new SimpleX Chat client uses this API to allow you to test that you have the correct server address, with the valid certificate fingerprint and password, before enabling the new server.
# 3.4.0
SMP agent:
- increase concurrency with connection-level locks
- fix issues identified in security assessment (see the announcement: https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/stable/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website.md)
- manual connection queue rotation
- optional client data in connection requests links
SMP server:
- specialize monad stack to improve performance
- log slow commands
# 3.3.0
SMP server:
- allow repeated KEY command with the same key (to avoid failures on retries)
SMP agent:
- enable/disable connection notifications
- asynchronous commands that retry on network error
- use SQLCipher
# 3.2.0
SMP agent:
- Support multiple server hostnames (including onion hostnames) in server addresses.
- Network configuration options.
- Options to define rules to choose server hostname.
# 3.1.0
SMP server and agent:
- SMP protocol v4: batching multiple server commands/responses in a transport block.
# 3.0.0
SMP server:
- restore undelivered messages when the server is restarted.
- SMP protocol v3 to support push notification:
- updated SEND and MSG to add message flags (for notification flag that confirm whether the notification is sent and for any future extensions) and to move message meta-data sent to the recipient into the encrypted envelope.
- update NKEY and NID to add e2e encryption keys (for the notification meta-data encryption between SMP server and the client), and update NMSG to include this meta-data.
- update ACK command to include message ID (to avoid acknowledging unprocessed message).
- add NDEL commands to remove notification subscription credentials from SMP queue.
- add GET command to receive messages without subscription - to be used in iOS notification service extension to receive messages without terminating app subscriptions.
SMP agent:
- new protocol for duplex connection handshake reducing traffic and connection time.
- support for SMP notifications server and managing device token.
- remove redundant FQDN validation from TLS handshake to prepare for access via Tor.
- support for fully stopping agent and for temporary suspending agent operations.
- improve management of duplicate message delivery.
SMP notifications server v1.0:
- SMP notifications protocol with version negotiation during handshake.
- device token registration and verification (via background notification).
- SMP notification subscriptions and push notifications via APNS.
- restoring notification subscriptions when the server is restarted.
# 2.3.0
SMP server:
- Save and restore undelivered messages, to avoid losing them. To save messages the server has to be stopped with SIGINT signal, if it is stopped with SIGTERM undelivered messages would not be saved.
# 2.2.0
SMP server:
- Fix sockets/threads/memory leak
SMP agent:
- Support stopping and resuming agent with `disconnectAgentClient` / `resumeAgentClient`
# 2.1.1
SMP server:
- gracefully close sockets on client disconnection
- CLI warning when deleting server configuration
# 2.1.0
SMP server:
- configuration to expire inactive clients in ini file, increased TTL and check interval for client expiration
# 2.0.0
Push notifications server (beta):
- supports APNS
- manage device tokens verification via notification delivery
- sending periodic background notification to check messages (not more frequent than every 20 min)
SMP server:
- disconnect inactive clients after some period
- remove undelivered messages after 30 days
- log aggregate usage daily stats: only the number of queues created/secured/deleted/used and messages sent/delivered is logged, as one line per day, so we can plan server capacity and diagnose any problems.
SMP agent:
- manage device tokens and notification server connection
- DOWN/UP events to the agent user about server disconnections/reconnections are now sent once per server
# 1.1.0
SMP server:
- message TTL and periodic deletion of old messages
- configuration to prevent creation of the new queues
SMP agent:
- asynchronous connection handshake
- configurable SMP servers at run-time
- use TCP keep-alive for connection stability
- improve stability of connection subscriptions
- auto-vacuum DB to remove deleted records
# 1.0.3
SMP server:
- Reduce server message queue quota to 128 messages.
SMP agent:
- Add "yes to migrations" option.
- Make new SMP client attempt to reconnect on network error.
- Reduce connection handshake expiration to 2 days.
@@ -325,29 +13,24 @@ JSON encoding of types used in simplex-chat, some other minor adjustments.
# 1.0.2
General:
- Enable TLS 1.3 parameters for TLS handshake (server and client).
- Switch from hs-tls fork to original repo now that it supports getFinished and getPeerFinished APIs for both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
SMP server:
- Perform TLS handshake in a separate thread per-connection.
SMP agent:
- Cease attempts to send HELLO after one week timeout.
- Coalesce requests to connect to SMP servers, to have 1 connection per server.
# 1.0.1
SMP server:
- Explicitly set line buffering in stdout/stderr to log each line when output is redirected to files.
# 1.0.0
Security and privacy improvements:
- Faster and more secure 2-layer E2E encryption with additional encryption layer between servers and recipients:
- application messages in each duplex connection (managed by SMP agents - see [overview](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/overview-tjr.md)) are encrypted using [double-ratchet algorithm](https://www.signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/), providing forward secrecy and break-in recovery. This layer uses two Curve448 keys per client for [X3DH key agreement](https://www.signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/), SHA512 based HKDFs and AES-GCM AEAD encryption.
- SMP client messages are additionally E2E encrypted in each SMP queue to avoid cipher-text correlation of messages sent via multiple redundant queues (that will be supported soon). This and the next layer use [NaCl crypto_box algorithm](https://nacl.cr.yp.to/index.html) with XSalsa20Poly1305 cipher and Curve25519 keys for DH key agreement.
@@ -360,16 +43,13 @@ Security and privacy improvements:
- Server identity verification via server offline certificate fingerprints included in SMP server addresses.
New functionality:
- Support for notification servers with new SMP commands: `NKEY`/`NID`, `NSUB`/`NMSG`.
Efficiency improvements:
- Binary protocol encodings to reduce overhead from circa 15% to approximately 3.7% of transmitted application message size, with only 2.2% overhead for SMP protocol messages.
- More performant cryptographic algorithms.
For more information about SimpleX:
- [SimpleX overview](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/overview-tjr.md).
- [SimpleX chat v1 announcement](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/master/blog/20220112-simplex-chat-v1-released.md).
-62
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@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
ARG TAG=22.04
FROM ubuntu:${TAG} AS build
### Build stage
# Install curl and git and simplexmq dependencies
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl git build-essential libgmp3-dev zlib1g-dev llvm-12 llvm-12-dev libnuma-dev libssl-dev
# Specify bootstrap Haskell versions
ENV BOOTSTRAP_HASKELL_GHC_VERSION=9.6.3
ENV BOOTSTRAP_HASKELL_CABAL_VERSION=3.10.1.0
# Install ghcup
RUN curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://get-ghcup.haskell.org | BOOTSTRAP_HASKELL_NONINTERACTIVE=1 sh
# Adjust PATH
ENV PATH="/root/.cabal/bin:/root/.ghcup/bin:$PATH"
# Set both as default
RUN ghcup set ghc "${BOOTSTRAP_HASKELL_GHC_VERSION}" && \
ghcup set cabal "${BOOTSTRAP_HASKELL_CABAL_VERSION}"
COPY . /project
WORKDIR /project
ARG APP
ARG APP_PORT
RUN if [ -z "$APP" ] || [ -z "$APP_PORT" ]; then printf "Please spcify \$APP and \$APP_PORT build-arg.\n"; exit 1; fi
# Compile app
RUN cabal update
RUN cabal build exe:$APP
# Create new path containing all files needed
RUN mkdir /final
WORKDIR /final
# Strip the binary from debug symbols to reduce size
RUN bin=$(find /project/dist-newstyle -name "$APP" -type f -executable) && \
mv "$bin" ./ && \
strip ./"$APP" &&\
mv /project/scripts/docker/entrypoint-"$APP" ./entrypoint
### Final stage
FROM ubuntu:${TAG}
# Install OpenSSL dependency
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y openssl libnuma-dev
# Copy compiled app from build stage
COPY --from=build /final /usr/local/bin/
# Open app listening port
ARG APP_PORT
EXPOSE $APP_PORT
# simplexmq requires using SIGINT to correctly preserve undelivered messages and restore them on restart
STOPSIGNAL SIGINT
# Finally, execute helper script
ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/local/bin/entrypoint" ]
+18 -169
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@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ If you have a server deployed please deploy a new server to a new host and retir
## Message broker for unidirectional (simplex) queues
SimpleXMQ is a message broker for managing message queues and sending messages over public network. It consists of SMP server, SMP client library and SMP agent that implement [SMP protocol](./protocol/simplex-messaging.md) for client-server communication and [SMP agent protocol](./protocol/agent-protocol.md) to manage duplex connections via simplex queues on multiple SMP servers.
SimpleXMQ is a message broker for managing message queues and sending messages over public network. It consists of SMP server, SMP client library and SMP agent that implement [SMP protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md) for client-server communication and [SMP agent protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/agent-protocol.md) to manage duplex connections via simplex queues on multiple SMP servers.
SMP protocol is inspired by [Redis serialization protocol](https://redis.io/topics/protocol), but it is much simpler - it currently has only 10 client commands and 8 server responses.
@@ -27,19 +27,17 @@ SimpleXMQ is implemented in Haskell - it benefits from robust software transacti
### SMP server
[SMP server](./apps/smp-server/Main.hs) can be run on any Linux distribution, including low power/low memory devices. OpenSSL library is required for initialization.
[SMP server](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/apps/smp-server/Main.hs) can be run on any Linux distribution without any dependencies, including low power/low memory devices.
To initialize the server use `smp-server init -n <fqdn>` (or `smp-server init --ip <ip>` for IP based address) command - it will generate keys and certificates for TLS transport. The fingerprint of offline certificate is used as part of the server address to protect client/server connection against man-in-the-middle attacks: `smp://<fingerprint>@<hostname>[:5223]`.
To initialize the server use `smp-server init` command - it will generate keys and certificates for TLS transport. The fingerprint of offline certificate is used as part of the server address to protect client/server connection against man-in-the-middle attacks: `smp://<fingerprint>@<hostname>[:5223]`.
SMP server uses in-memory persistence with an optional append-only log of created queues that allows to re-start the server without losing the connections. This log is compacted on every server restart, permanently removing suspended and removed queues.
To enable store log, initialize server using `smp-server -l` command, or modify `smp-server.ini` created during initialization (uncomment `enable: on` option in the store log section). Use `smp-server --help` for other usage tips.
Starting from version 2.3.0, when store log is enabled, the server would also enable saving undelivered messages on exit and restoring them on start. This can be disabled via a separate setting `restore_messages` in `smp-server.ini` file. Saving messages would only work if the server is stopped with SIGINT signal (keyboard interrupt), if it is stopped with SIGTERM signal the messages would not be saved.
> **Please note:** On initialization SMP server creates a chain of two certificates: a self-signed CA certificate ("offline") and a server certificate used for TLS handshake ("online"). **You should store CA certificate private key securely and delete it from the server. If server TLS credential is compromised this key can be used to sign a new one, keeping the same server identity and established connections.** CA private key location by default is `/etc/opt/simplex/ca.key`.
SMP server implements [SMP protocol](./protocol/simplex-messaging.md).
SMP server implements [SMP protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md).
#### Running SMP server on MacOS
@@ -62,21 +60,20 @@ Now `openssl version` should be saying "OpenSSL". You can now run `smp-server in
### SMP client library
[SMP client](./src/Simplex/Messaging/Client.hs) is a Haskell library to connect to SMP servers that allows to:
[SMP client](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/src/Simplex/Messaging/Client.hs) is a Haskell library to connect to SMP servers that allows to:
- execute commands with a functional API.
- receive messages and other notifications via STM queue.
- automatically send keep-alive commands.
### SMP agent
[SMP agent library](./src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent.hs) can be used to run SMP agent as part of another application and to communicate with the agent via STM queues, without serializing and parsing commands and responses.
[SMP agent library](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent.hs) can be used to run SMP agent as part of another application and to communicate with the agent via STM queues, without serializing and parsing commands and responses.
Haskell type [ACommand](./src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Protocol.hs) represents SMP agent protocol to communicate via STM queues.
Haskell type [ACommand](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Protocol.hs) represents SMP agent protocol to communicate via STM queues.
See [simplex-chat](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat) terminal UI for the example of integrating SMP agent into another application.
[SMP agent executable](./apps/smp-agent/Main.hs) can be used to run a standalone SMP agent process that implements plaintext [SMP agent protocol](./protocol/agent-protocol.md) via TCP port 5224, so it can be used via telnet. It can be deployed in private networks to share access to the connections between multiple applications and services.
[SMP agent executable](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/apps/smp-agent/Main.hs) can be used to run a standalone SMP agent process that implements plaintext [SMP agent protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/agent-protocol.md) via TCP port 5224, so it can be used via telnet. It can be deployed in private networks to share access to the connections between multiple applications and services.
## Using SMP server and SMP agent
@@ -90,155 +87,7 @@ You can either run your own SMP server locally or deploy using [Linode StackScri
It's the easiest to try SMP agent via a prototype [simplex-chat](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat) terminal UI.
## Deploy SMP/XFTP servers on Linux
You can run your SMP/XFTP server as a Linux process, optionally using a service manager for booting and restarts.
Notice that `smp-server` and `xftp-server` requires `openssl` as run-time dependency (it is used to generate server certificates during initialization). Install it with your packet manager:
```sh
# For Ubuntu
apt update && apt install openssl
```
### Install binaries
#### Using Docker
On Linux, you can deploy smp and xftp server using Docker. This will download image from [Docker Hub](https://hub.docker.com/r/simplexchat).
1. Create directories for persistent Docker configuration:
```sh
mkdir -p $HOME/simplex/{xftp,smp}/{config,logs} && mkdir -p $HOME/simplex/xftp/files
```
2. Run your Docker container.
- `smp-server`
You must change **your_ip_or_domain**. `-e "pass=password"` is optional variable to password-protect your `smp` server:
```sh
docker run -d \
-e "ADDR=your_ip_or_domain" \
-e "PASS=password" \
-p 5223:5223 \
-v $HOME/simplex/smp/config:/etc/opt/simplex:z \
-v $HOME/simplex/smp/logs:/var/opt/simplex:z \
simplexchat/smp-server:latest
```
- `xftp-server`
You must change **your_ip_or_domain** and **maximum_storage**.
```sh
docker run -d \
-e "ADDR=your_ip_or_domain" \
-e "QUOTA=maximum_storage" \
-p 443:443 \
-v $HOME/simplex/xftp/config:/etc/opt/simplex-xftp:z \
-v $HOME/simplex/xftp/logs:/var/opt/simplex-xftp:z \
-v $HOME/simplex/xftp/files:/srv/xftp:z \
simplexchat/xftp-server:latest
```
#### Using installation script
**Please note** that currently, only Ubuntu distribution is supported.
You can install and setup servers automatically using our script:
```sh
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/stable/install.sh -o simplex-server-install.sh \
&& if echo 'b8cf2be103f21f9461d9a500bcd3db06ab7d01d68871b07f4bd245195cbead1d simplex-server-install.sh' | sha256sum -c; then chmod +x ./simplex-server-install.sh && ./simplex-server-install.sh; rm ./simplex-server-install.sh; else echo "SHA-256 checksum is incorrect!" && rm ./simplex-server-install.sh; fi
```
### Build from source
#### Using Docker
> **Please note:** to build the app use source code from [stable branch](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/tree/stable).
On Linux, you can build smp server using Docker.
1. Build your images:
```sh
git clone https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq
cd simplexmq
git checkout stable
DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build -t local/smp-server --build-arg APP="smp-server" --build-arg APP_PORT="5223" . # For xmp-server
DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build -t local/xftp-server --build-arg APP="xftp-server" --build-arg APP_PORT="443" . # For xftp-server
```
2. Create directories for persistent Docker configuration:
```sh
mkdir -p $HOME/simplex/{xftp,smp}/{config,logs} && mkdir -p $HOME/simplex/xftp/files
```
3. Run your Docker container.
- `smp-server`
You must change **your_ip_or_domain**. `-e "pass=password"` is optional variable to password-protect your `smp` server:
```sh
docker run -d \
-e "ADDR=your_ip_or_domain" \
-e "PASS=password" \
-p 5223:5223 \
-v $HOME/simplex/smp/config:/etc/opt/simplex:z \
-v $HOME/simplex/smp/logs:/var/opt/simplex:z \
simplexchat/smp-server:latest
```
- `xftp-server`
You must change **your_ip_or_domain** and **maximum_storage**.
```sh
docker run -d \
-e "ADDR=your_ip_or_domain" \
-e "QUOTA=maximum_storage" \
-p 443:443 \
-v $HOME/simplex/xftp/config:/etc/opt/simplex-xftp:z \
-v $HOME/simplex/xftp/logs:/var/opt/simplex-xftp:z \
-v $HOME/simplex/xftp/files:/srv/xftp:z \
simplexchat/xftp-server:latest
```
#### Using your distribution
1. Install [Haskell GHCup](https://www.haskell.org/ghcup/), GHC 8.10.7 and cabal:
```sh
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://get-ghcup.haskell.org | sh
ghcup install ghc 8.10.7
ghcup install cabal
ghcup set ghc 8.10.7
ghcup set cabal
```
2. Build the project:
```sh
git clone https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq
cd simplexmq
git checkout stable
# On Ubuntu. Depending on your distribution, use your package manager to determine package names.
apt-get update && apt-get install -y build-essential libgmp3-dev zlib1g-dev
cabal update
cabal install
```
- Initialize SMP server with `smp-server init [-l] -n <fqdn>` or `smp-server init [-l] --ip <ip>` - depending on how you initialize it, either FQDN or IP will be used for server's address.
- Run `smp-server start` to start SMP server, or you can configure a service manager to run it as a service.
- Optionally, `smp-server` can be setup for having an onion address in `tor` network. See: [`scripts/tor`](./scripts/tor/). In this case, the server address can have both public and onion hostname pointing to the same server, to allow two people connect when only one of them is using Tor. The server address would be: `smp://<fingerprint>@<public_hostname>,<onion_hostname>`
See [this section](#smp-server) for more information. Run `smp-server -h` and `smp-server init -h` for explanation of commands and options.
[<img alt="Linode" src="./img/linode.svg" align="right" width="200">](https://cloud.linode.com/stackscripts/748014)
[<img alt="Linode" src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/master/img/linode.svg" align="right" width="200">](https://cloud.linode.com/stackscripts/748014)
## Deploy SMP server on Linode
@@ -249,11 +98,11 @@ Deployment on Linode is performed via StackScripts, which serve as recipes for L
- Create a Linode account or login with an already existing one.
- Open [SMP server StackScript](https://cloud.linode.com/stackscripts/748014) and click "Deploy New Linode".
- You can optionally configure the following parameters:
- SMP Server store log flag for queue persistence on server restart, recommended.
- [Linode API token](https://www.linode.com/docs/guides/getting-started-with-the-linode-api#get-an-access-token) to attach server address etc. as tags to Linode and to add A record to your 2nd level domain (e.g. `example.com` [domain should be created](https://cloud.linode.com/domains/create) in your account prior to deployment). The API token access scopes:
- read/write for "linodes"
- read/write for "domains"
- Domain name to use instead of Linode IP address, e.g. `smp1.example.com`.
- SMP Server store log flag for queue persistence on server restart, recommended.
- [Linode API token](https://www.linode.com/docs/guides/getting-started-with-the-linode-api#get-an-access-token) to attach server address etc. as tags to Linode and to add A record to your 2nd level domain (e.g. `example.com` [domain should be created](https://cloud.linode.com/domains/create) in your account prior to deployment). The API token access scopes:
- read/write for "linodes"
- read/write for "domains"
- Domain name to use instead of Linode IP address, e.g. `smp1.example.com`.
- Choose the region and plan, Shared CPU Nanode with 1Gb is sufficient.
- Provide ssh key to be able to connect to your Linode via ssh. If you haven't provided a Linode API token this step is required to login to your Linode and get the server's fingerprint either from the welcome message or from the file `/etc/opt/simplex/fingerprint` after server starts. See [Linode's guide on ssh](https://www.linode.com/docs/guides/use-public-key-authentication-with-ssh/) .
- Deploy your Linode. After it starts wait for SMP server to start and for tags to appear (if a Linode API token was provided). It may take up to 5 minutes depending on the connection speed on the Linode. Connecting Linode IP address to provided domain name may take some additional time.
@@ -262,7 +111,7 @@ Deployment on Linode is performed via StackScripts, which serve as recipes for L
Please submit an [issue](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/issues) if any problems occur.
[<img alt="DigitalOcean" src="/img/digitalocean.png" align="right" width="300">](https://marketplace.digitalocean.com/apps/simplex-server)
[<img alt="DigitalOcean" src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/master/img/digitalocean.png" align="right" width="300">](https://marketplace.digitalocean.com/apps/simplex-server)
## Deploy SMP server on DigitalOcean
@@ -290,12 +139,12 @@ smp-server init [-l] -n <fqdn>
## SMP server design
![SMP server design](./design/server.svg)
![SMP server design](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/master/design/server.svg)
## SMP agent design
![SMP agent design](./design/agent2.svg)
![SMP agent design](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/master/design/agent2.svg)
## License
[AGPL v3](./LICENSE)
[AGPL v3](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/LICENSE)
-18
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@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
module Main where
import Control.Logger.Simple
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Main
cfgPath :: FilePath
cfgPath = "/etc/opt/simplex-notifications"
logPath :: FilePath
logPath = "/var/opt/simplex-notifications"
logCfg :: LogConfig
logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
main :: IO ()
main = do
setLogLevel LogDebug -- change to LogError in production
withGlobalLogging logCfg $ ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath
+2 -23
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@@ -5,40 +5,19 @@
module Main where
import Control.Logger.Simple
import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Server (runSMPAgent)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite (MigrationConfirmation (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (defaultNetworkConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (TLS, Transport (..))
cfg :: AgentConfig
cfg = defaultAgentConfig
agentDbFile :: String
agentDbFile = "smp-agent.db"
agentDbKey :: ScrubbedBytes
agentDbKey = ""
servers :: InitialAgentServers
servers =
InitialAgentServers
{ smp = M.fromList [(1, L.fromList ["smp://bU0K-bRg24xWW__lS0umO1Zdw_SXqpJNtm1_RrPLViE=@localhost:5223"])],
ntf = [],
xftp = M.empty,
netCfg = defaultNetworkConfig
}
cfg = defaultAgentConfig {initialSMPServers = L.fromList ["smp://bU0K-bRg24xWW__lS0umO1Zdw_SXqpJNtm1_RrPLViE=@localhost:5223"]}
logCfg :: LogConfig
logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
-- Warning: this SMP agent server is experimental - it does not work correctly with multiple connected TCP clients in some cases.
main :: IO ()
main = do
putStrLn $ "SMP agent listening on port " ++ tcpPort (cfg :: AgentConfig)
setLogLevel LogInfo -- LogError
Right st <- createAgentStore agentDbFile agentDbKey False MCConsole
withGlobalLogging logCfg $ runSMPAgent (transport @TLS) cfg servers st
withGlobalLogging logCfg $ runSMPAgent (transport @TLS) cfg
+309 -16
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@@ -1,26 +1,319 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
module Main where
import Control.Logger.Simple
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main
import System.Environment
import Control.Monad.Except
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Either (fromRight)
import Data.Ini (Ini, lookupValue, readIniFile)
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Data.X509.Validation (Fingerprint (..))
import Network.Socket (HostName, ServiceName)
import Options.Applicative
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Server (runSMPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog (StoreLog, openReadStoreLog, storeLogFilePath)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport (..), TLS, Transport (..), simplexMQVersion)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (loadFingerprint)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets (WS)
import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing, doesDirectoryExist, doesFileExist, removeDirectoryRecursive)
import System.Exit (exitFailure)
import System.FilePath (combine)
import System.IO (BufferMode (..), IOMode (..), hGetLine, hSetBuffering, stderr, stdout, withFile)
import System.Process (readCreateProcess, shell)
import Text.Read (readMaybe)
defaultCfgPath :: FilePath
defaultCfgPath = "/etc/opt/simplex"
cfgDir :: FilePath
cfgDir = "/etc/opt/simplex"
defaultLogPath :: FilePath
defaultLogPath = "/var/opt/simplex"
logDir :: FilePath
logDir = "/var/opt/simplex"
logCfg :: LogConfig
logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
iniFile :: FilePath
iniFile = combine cfgDir "smp-server.ini"
storeLogFile :: FilePath
storeLogFile = combine logDir "smp-server-store.log"
caKeyFile :: FilePath
caKeyFile = combine cfgDir "ca.key"
caCrtFile :: FilePath
caCrtFile = combine cfgDir "ca.crt"
serverKeyFile :: FilePath
serverKeyFile = combine cfgDir "server.key"
serverCrtFile :: FilePath
serverCrtFile = combine cfgDir "server.crt"
fingerprintFile :: FilePath
fingerprintFile = combine cfgDir "fingerprint"
main :: IO ()
main = do
setLogLevel LogDebug
cfgPath <- getEnvPath "SMP_SERVER_CFG_PATH" defaultCfgPath
logPath <- getEnvPath "SMP_SERVER_LOG_PATH" defaultLogPath
withGlobalLogging logCfg $ smpServerCLI cfgPath logPath
getEnvPath :: String -> FilePath -> IO FilePath
getEnvPath name def = maybe def (\case "" -> def; f -> f) <$> lookupEnv name
getCliCommand >>= \case
Init opts ->
doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
True -> exitError $ "Error: server is already initialized (" <> iniFile <> " exists).\nRun `smp-server start`."
_ -> initializeServer opts
Start ->
doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
True -> readIniFile iniFile >>= either exitError (runServer . mkIniOptions)
_ -> exitError $ "Error: server is not initialized (" <> iniFile <> " does not exist).\nRun `smp-server init`."
Delete -> cleanup >> putStrLn "Deleted configuration and log files"
exitError :: String -> IO ()
exitError msg = putStrLn msg >> exitFailure
data CliCommand
= Init InitOptions
| Start
| Delete
data InitOptions = InitOptions
{ enableStoreLog :: Bool,
signAlgorithm :: SignAlgorithm,
ip :: HostName,
fqdn :: Maybe HostName
}
deriving (Show)
data SignAlgorithm = ED448 | ED25519
deriving (Read, Show)
getCliCommand :: IO CliCommand
getCliCommand =
customExecParser
(prefs showHelpOnEmpty)
( info
(helper <*> versionOption <*> cliCommandP)
(header version <> fullDesc)
)
where
versionOption = infoOption version (long "version" <> short 'v' <> help "Show version")
cliCommandP :: Parser CliCommand
cliCommandP =
hsubparser
( command "init" (info initP (progDesc $ "Initialize server - creates " <> cfgDir <> " and " <> logDir <> " directories and configuration files"))
<> command "start" (info (pure Start) (progDesc $ "Start server (configuration: " <> iniFile <> ")"))
<> command "delete" (info (pure Delete) (progDesc "Delete configuration and log files"))
)
where
initP :: Parser CliCommand
initP =
Init
<$> ( InitOptions
<$> switch
( long "store-log"
<> short 'l'
<> help "Enable store log for SMP queues persistence"
)
<*> option
(maybeReader readMaybe)
( long "sign-algorithm"
<> short 'a'
<> help "Signature algorithm used for TLS certificates: ED25519, ED448"
<> value ED448
<> showDefault
<> metavar "ALG"
)
<*> strOption
( long "ip"
<> help
"Server IP address used as Subject Alternative Name for TLS online certificate, \
\also used as Common Name if FQDN is not supplied"
<> value "127.0.0.1"
<> showDefault
<> metavar "IP"
)
<*> (optional . strOption)
( long "fqdn"
<> short 'n'
<> help "Server FQDN used as Common Name and Subject Alternative Name for TLS online certificate"
<> showDefault
<> metavar "FQDN"
)
)
initializeServer :: InitOptions -> IO ()
initializeServer InitOptions {enableStoreLog, signAlgorithm, ip, fqdn} = do
cleanup
createDirectoryIfMissing True cfgDir
createDirectoryIfMissing True logDir
createX509
fp <- saveFingerprint
createIni
putStrLn $ "Server initialized, you can modify configuration in " <> iniFile <> ".\nRun `smp-server start` to start server."
printServiceInfo fp
warnCAPrivateKeyFile
where
createX509 = do
createOpensslCaConf
createOpensslServerConf
-- CA certificate (identity/offline)
run $ "openssl genpkey -algorithm " <> show signAlgorithm <> " -out " <> caKeyFile
run $ "openssl req -new -x509 -days 999999 -config " <> opensslCaConfFile <> " -extensions v3 -key " <> caKeyFile <> " -out " <> caCrtFile
-- server certificate (online)
run $ "openssl genpkey -algorithm " <> show signAlgorithm <> " -out " <> serverKeyFile
run $ "openssl req -new -config " <> opensslServerConfFile <> " -reqexts v3 -key " <> serverKeyFile <> " -out " <> serverCsrFile
run $ "openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -extfile " <> opensslServerConfFile <> " -extensions v3 -in " <> serverCsrFile <> " -CA " <> caCrtFile <> " -CAkey " <> caKeyFile <> " -CAcreateserial -out " <> serverCrtFile
where
run cmd = void $ readCreateProcess (shell cmd) ""
opensslCaConfFile = combine cfgDir "openssl_ca.conf"
opensslServerConfFile = combine cfgDir "openssl_server.conf"
serverCsrFile = combine cfgDir "server.csr"
createOpensslCaConf =
writeFile
opensslCaConfFile
"[req]\n\
\distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name\n\
\prompt = no\n\n\
\[req_distinguished_name]\n\
\CN = SMP server CA\n\
\O = SimpleX\n\n\
\[v3]\n\
\subjectKeyIdentifier = hash\n\
\authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always\n\
\basicConstraints = critical,CA:true\n"
-- TODO revise https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3, https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3279#section-2.3.5
-- IP and FQDN can't both be used as server address interchangeably even if IP is added
-- as Subject Alternative Name, unless the following validation hook is disabled:
-- https://hackage.haskell.org/package/x509-validation-1.6.10/docs/src/Data-X509-Validation.html#validateCertificateName
createOpensslServerConf =
writeFile
opensslServerConfFile
( "[req]\n\
\distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name\n\
\prompt = no\n\n\
\[req_distinguished_name]\n"
<> ("CN = " <> cn <> "\n\n")
<> "[v3]\n\
\basicConstraints = CA:FALSE\n\
\keyUsage = digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyAgreement\n\
\extendedKeyUsage = serverAuth\n"
)
where
cn = fromMaybe ip fqdn
saveFingerprint = do
Fingerprint fp <- loadFingerprint caCrtFile
withFile fingerprintFile WriteMode (`B.hPutStrLn` strEncode fp)
pure fp
createIni = do
writeFile iniFile $
"[STORE_LOG]\n\
\# The server uses STM memory to store SMP queues and messages,\n\
\# that will be lost on restart (e.g., as with redis).\n\
\# This option enables saving SMP queues to append only log,\n\
\# and restoring them when the server is started.\n\
\# Log is compacted on start (deleted queues are removed).\n\
\# The messages in the queues are not logged.\n"
<> ("enable: " <> (if enableStoreLog then "on" else "off # on") <> "\n\n")
<> "[TRANSPORT]\n\
\port: 5223\n\
\websockets: off\n"
warnCAPrivateKeyFile =
putStrLn $
"----------\n\
\You should store CA private key securely and delete it from the server.\n\
\If server TLS credential is compromised this key can be used to sign a new one, \
\keeping the same server identity and established connections.\n\
\CA private key location:\n"
<> caKeyFile
<> "\n----------"
data IniOptions = IniOptions
{ enableStoreLog :: Bool,
port :: ServiceName,
enableWebsockets :: Bool
}
-- TODO ? properly parse ini as a whole
mkIniOptions :: Ini -> IniOptions
mkIniOptions ini =
IniOptions
{ enableStoreLog = (== "on") $ strict "STORE_LOG" "enable",
port = T.unpack $ strict "TRANSPORT" "port",
enableWebsockets = (== "on") $ strict "TRANSPORT" "websockets"
}
where
strict :: String -> String -> T.Text
strict section key =
fromRight (error ("no key " <> key <> " in section " <> section)) $
lookupValue (T.pack section) (T.pack key) ini
runServer :: IniOptions -> IO ()
runServer IniOptions {enableStoreLog, port, enableWebsockets} = do
hSetBuffering stdout LineBuffering
hSetBuffering stderr LineBuffering
fp <- checkSavedFingerprint
printServiceInfo fp
storeLog <- openStoreLog
let cfg = mkServerConfig storeLog
printServerConfig cfg
runSMPServer cfg
where
checkSavedFingerprint = do
savedFingerprint <- loadSavedFingerprint
Fingerprint fp <- loadFingerprint caCrtFile
when (B.pack savedFingerprint /= strEncode fp) $
exitError "Stored fingerprint is invalid."
pure fp
mkServerConfig storeLog =
ServerConfig
{ transports = (port, transport @TLS) : [("80", transport @WS) | enableWebsockets],
tbqSize = 16,
serverTbqSize = 64,
msgQueueQuota = 128,
queueIdBytes = 24,
msgIdBytes = 24, -- must be at least 24 bytes, it is used as 192-bit nonce for XSalsa20
caCertificateFile = caCrtFile,
privateKeyFile = serverKeyFile,
certificateFile = serverCrtFile,
storeLog
}
openStoreLog :: IO (Maybe (StoreLog 'ReadMode))
openStoreLog =
if enableStoreLog
then Just <$> openReadStoreLog storeLogFile
else pure Nothing
printServerConfig ServerConfig {storeLog, transports} = do
putStrLn $ case storeLog of
Just s -> "Store log: " <> storeLogFilePath s
Nothing -> "Store log disabled."
forM_ transports $ \(p, ATransport t) ->
putStrLn $ "Listening on port " <> p <> " (" <> transportName t <> ")..."
cleanup :: IO ()
cleanup = do
deleteDirIfExists cfgDir
deleteDirIfExists logDir
where
deleteDirIfExists path = doesDirectoryExist path >>= (`when` removeDirectoryRecursive path)
printServiceInfo :: ByteString -> IO ()
printServiceInfo fpStr = do
putStrLn version
B.putStrLn $ "Fingerprint: " <> strEncode fpStr
version :: String
version = "SMP server v" <> simplexMQVersion
loadSavedFingerprint :: IO String
loadSavedFingerprint = withFile fingerprintFile ReadMode hGetLine
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@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
module Main where
import Control.Logger.Simple
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Main
cfgPath :: FilePath
cfgPath = "/etc/opt/simplex-xftp"
logPath :: FilePath
logPath = "/var/opt/simplex-xftp"
logCfg :: LogConfig
logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
main :: IO ()
main = do
setLogLevel LogDebug -- change to LogError in production
withGlobalLogging logCfg $ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath
-6
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@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
module Main where
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Main
main :: IO ()
main = xftpClientCLI
+2 -26
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@@ -1,30 +1,6 @@
packages: .
-- packages: . ../direct-sqlcipher ../sqlcipher-simple
-- packages: . ../hs-socks
-- packages: . ../http2
-- packages: . ../network-transport
index-state: 2023-12-12T00:00:00Z
package cryptostore
flags: +use_crypton
source-repository-package
type: git
location: https://github.com/simplex-chat/aeson.git
tag: aab7b5a14d6c5ea64c64dcaee418de1bb00dcc2b
source-repository-package
type: git
location: https://github.com/simplex-chat/hs-socks.git
tag: a30cc7a79a08d8108316094f8f2f82a0c5e1ac51
source-repository-package
type: git
location: https://github.com/simplex-chat/direct-sqlcipher.git
tag: f814ee68b16a9447fbb467ccc8f29bdd3546bfd9
source-repository-package
type: git
location: https://github.com/simplex-chat/sqlcipher-simple.git
tag: a46bd361a19376c5211f1058908fc0ae6bf42446
location: git://github.com/simplex-chat/aeson.git
tag: 3eb66f9a68f103b5f1489382aad89f5712a64db7
-3
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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
# Streamlined NTRU Prime: sntrup761
The implementation of sntrup761 is the _exact_ copy from this [Internet draft](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-josefsson-ntruprime-streamlined-00.html).
-9
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@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include "sha512.h"
void crypto_hash_sha512 (unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in,
unsigned long long inlen)
{
SHA512(in, inlen, out);
}
-3
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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
void crypto_hash_sha512 (unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in,
unsigned long long inlen);
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-33
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@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
/*
* Derived from public domain source, written by (in alphabetical order):
* - Daniel J. Bernstein
* - Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup
* - Tanja Lange
* - Christine van Vredendaal
*/
#ifndef SNTRUP761_H
#define SNTRUP761_H
#include <string.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#define SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE 1763
#define SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE 1158
#define SNTRUP761_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE 1039
#define SNTRUP761_SIZE 32
typedef void sntrup761_random_func (void *ctx, size_t length, uint8_t *dst);
void
sntrup761_keypair (uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk,
void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
void
sntrup761_enc (uint8_t *c, uint8_t *k, const uint8_t *pk,
void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
void
sntrup761_dec (uint8_t *k, const uint8_t *c, const uint8_t *sk);
#endif /* SNTRUP761_H */
-30
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@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
indentation: 2
column-limit: none
function-arrows: trailing
comma-style: trailing
import-export-style: trailing
indent-wheres: true
record-brace-space: true
newlines-between-decls: 1
haddock-style: single-line
haddock-style-module: null
let-style: inline
in-style: right-align
single-constraint-parens: never
unicode: never
respectful: true
fixities:
- infixr 9 .
- infixr 8 .:, .:., .=
- infixr 6 <>
- infixr 5 ++
- infixl 4 <$>, <$, $>, <$$>, <$?>
- infixl 4 <*>, <*, *>, <**>
- infix 4 ==, /=
- infixr 3 &&
- infixl 3 <|>
- infixr 2 ||
- infixl 1 >>, >>=
- infixr 1 =<<, >=>, <=<
- infixr 0 $, $!
reexports: []
+1 -1
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@@ -1 +1 @@
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-144
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@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env sh
set -eu
# Links to scripts/configs
bin="https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/releases/latest/download"
bin_smp="$bin/smp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64"
bin_xftp="$bin/xftp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64"
scripts="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/stable/scripts/main"
scripts_systemd_smp="$scripts/smp-server.service"
scripts_systemd_xftp="$scripts/xftp-server.service"
scripts_update="$scripts/simplex-servers-update"
scripts_uninstall="$scripts/simplex-servers-uninstall"
scripts_stopscript="$scripts/simplex-servers-stopscript"
# Default installation paths
path_bin="/usr/local/bin"
path_bin_smp="$path_bin/smp-server"
path_bin_xftp="$path_bin/xftp-server"
path_bin_update="$path_bin/simplex-servers-update"
path_bin_uninstall="$path_bin/simplex-servers-uninstall"
path_bin_stopscript="$path_bin/simplex-servers-stopscript"
path_conf_etc="/etc/opt"
path_conf_var="/var/opt"
path_conf_smp="$path_conf_etc/simplex $path_conf_var/simplex"
path_conf_xftp="$path_conf_etc/simplex-xftp $path_conf_var/simplex-xftp /srv/xftp"
path_systemd="/etc/systemd/system"
path_systemd_smp="$path_systemd/smp-server.service"
path_systemd_xftp="$path_systemd/xftp-server.service"
# Defaut users
user_smp="smp"
user_xftp="xftp"
GRN='\033[0;32m'
BLU='\033[1;34m'
YLW='\033[1;33m'
RED='\033[0;31m'
NC='\033[0m'
logo='
____ _ _ __ __
/ ___|(_)_ __ ___ _ __ | | ___\ \/ /
\___ \| | '"'"'_ ` _ \| '"'"'_ \| |/ _ \\ /
___) | | | | | | | |_) | | __// \
|____/|_|_| |_| |_| .__/|_|\___/_/\_\
|_|
'
welcome="Welcome to SMP/XFTP installation script! Here's what we're going to do:
${GRN}1.${NC} Install latest binaries from GitHub releases:
- smp: ${YLW}${path_bin_smp}${NC}
- xftp: ${YLW}${path_bin_xftp}${NC}
${GRN}2.${NC} Create server directories:
- smp: ${YLW}${path_conf_smp}${NC}
- xftp: ${YLW}${path_conf_xftp}${NC}
${GRN}3.${NC} Setup user for each server:
- xmp: ${YLW}${user_smp}${NC}
- xftp: ${YLW}${user_xftp}${NC}
${GRN}4.${NC} Create systemd services:
- smp: ${YLW}${path_systemd_smp}${NC}
- xftp: ${YLW}${path_systemd_xftp}${NC}
${GRN}5.${NC} Install stopscript (systemd), update and uninstallation script:
- all: ${YLW}${path_bin_update}${NC}, ${YLW}${path_bin_uninstall}${NC}, ${YLW}${path_bin_stopscript}${NC}
Press ${GRN}ENTER${NC} to continue or ${RED}Ctrl+C${NC} to cancel installation"
end="Installtion is complete!
Please checkout our server guides:
- smp: ${GRN}https://simplex.chat/docs/server.html${NC}
- xftp: ${GRN}https://simplex.chat/docs/xftp-server.html${NC}
To uninstall with full clean-up, simply run: ${YLW}sudo /usr/local/bin/simplex-servers-uninstall${NC}
"
setup_bins() {
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$bin_smp" -o "$path_bin_smp" && chmod +x "$path_bin_smp"
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$bin_xftp" -o "$path_bin_xftp" && chmod +x "$path_bin_xftp"
}
setup_users() {
useradd -M "$user_smp" 2> /dev/null || true
useradd -M "$user_xftp" 2> /dev/null || true
}
setup_dirs() {
# Unquoted varibles, so field splitting can occur
mkdir -p $path_conf_smp
chown "$user_smp":"$user_smp" $path_conf_smp
mkdir -p $path_conf_xftp
chown "$user_xftp":"$user_xftp" $path_conf_xftp
}
setup_systemd() {
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$scripts_systemd_smp" -o "$path_systemd_smp"
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$scripts_systemd_xftp" -o "$path_systemd_xftp"
}
setup_scripts() {
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$scripts_update" -o "$path_bin_update" && chmod +x "$path_bin_update"
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$scripts_uninstall" -o "$path_bin_uninstall" && chmod +x "$path_bin_uninstall"
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$scripts_stopscript" -o "$path_bin_stopscript" && chmod +x "$path_bin_stopscript"
}
checks() {
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
printf "This script is intended to be run with root privileges. Please re-run script using sudo."
exit 1
fi
}
main() {
checks
printf "%b\n%b\n" "${BLU}$logo${NC}" "$welcome"
read ans
printf "Installing binaries..."
setup_bins
printf "${GRN} Done!${NC}\n"
printf "Creating users..."
setup_users
printf "${GRN} Done!${NC}\n"
printf "Creating directories..."
setup_dirs
printf "${GRN} Done!${NC}\n"
printf "Creating systemd services..."
setup_systemd
printf "${GRN} Done!${NC}\n"
printf "Installing stopscript, update and uninstallation script..."
setup_scripts
printf "${GRN} Done!${NC}\n"
printf "%b" "$end"
}
main
+29 -99
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: simplexmq
version: 5.5.0.4
version: 1.0.3
synopsis: SimpleXMQ message broker
description: |
description: |
This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,
<./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Client.html client> and
<./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Agent.html agent> for SMP protocols:
@@ -20,120 +20,64 @@ category: Chat, Network, Web, System, Cryptography
extra-source-files:
- README.md
- CHANGELOG.md
- cbits/sha512.h
- cbits/sntrup761.h
dependencies:
- aeson == 2.2.*
- aeson == 2.0.*
- ansi-terminal >= 0.10 && < 0.12
- asn1-encoding == 0.9.*
- asn1-types == 0.3.*
- async == 2.2.*
- attoparsec == 0.14.*
- base >= 4.14 && < 5
- base >= 4.7 && < 5
- base64-bytestring >= 1.0 && < 1.3
- case-insensitive == 1.2.*
- bytestring == 0.10.*
- composition == 1.0.*
- constraints >= 0.12 && < 0.14
- containers == 0.6.*
- crypton == 0.34.*
- crypton-x509 == 1.7.*
- crypton-x509-store == 1.6.*
- crypton-x509-validation == 1.6.*
- cryptostore == 0.3.*
- cryptonite >= 0.27 && < 0.30
- cryptostore == 0.2.*
- data-default == 0.7.*
- direct-sqlcipher == 2.3.*
- direct-sqlite == 2.3.*
- directory == 1.3.*
- filepath == 1.4.*
- hourglass == 0.2.*
- http-types == 0.12.*
- http2 >= 4.2.2 && < 4.3
- ini == 0.4.1
- iproute == 1.7.*
- generic-random >= 1.3 && < 1.5
- iso8601-time == 0.1.*
- memory == 0.18.*
- mtl >= 2.3.1 && < 3.0
- network >= 3.1.2.7 && < 3.2
- network-info >= 0.2 && < 0.3
- network-transport == 0.5.6
- network-udp >= 0.0 && < 0.1
- optparse-applicative >= 0.15 && < 0.17
- process == 1.6.*
- memory == 0.15.*
- mtl == 2.2.*
- network == 3.1.*
- network-transport == 0.5.*
- QuickCheck == 2.14.*
- random >= 1.1 && < 1.3
- simple-logger == 0.1.*
- socks == 0.6.*
- sqlcipher-simple == 0.4.*
- sqlite-simple == 0.4.*
- stm == 2.5.*
- temporary == 1.3.*
- time == 1.12.*
- time-manager == 0.0.*
- tls >= 1.7.0 && < 1.8
- transformers == 0.6.*
- template-haskell == 2.16.*
- text == 1.2.*
- time == 1.9.*
- tls >= 1.5.7 && < 1.6
- transformers == 0.5.*
- unliftio == 0.2.*
- unliftio-core == 0.2.*
- websockets == 0.12.*
- yaml == 0.11.*
flags:
swift:
description: Enable swift JSON format
manual: True
default: False
use_crypton:
description: Use crypton etc. in cryptostore
manual: True
default: True
when:
- condition: flag(swift)
cpp-options:
- -DswiftJSON
- condition: impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
dependencies:
- bytestring == 0.11.*
- template-haskell == 2.20.*
- text >= 2.0.1 && < 2.2
- condition: impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
dependencies:
- bytestring == 0.10.*
- template-haskell == 2.16.*
- text >= 1.2.3.0 && < 1.3
- x509 == 1.7.*
- x509-store == 1.6.*
- x509-validation == 1.6.*
library:
source-dirs: src
c-sources:
- cbits/sha512.c
- cbits/sntrup761.c
include-dirs: cbits
extra-libraries: crypto
executables:
smp-server:
source-dirs: apps/smp-server
main: Main.hs
dependencies:
- ini == 0.4.*
- optparse-applicative >= 0.15 && < 0.17
- process == 1.6.*
- simplexmq
ghc-options:
- -threaded
- -rtsopts
ntf-server:
source-dirs: apps/ntf-server
main: Main.hs
dependencies:
- simplexmq
ghc-options:
- -threaded
- -rtsopts
xftp-server:
source-dirs: apps/xftp-server
main: Main.hs
dependencies:
- simplexmq
ghc-options:
- -threaded
- -rtsopts
smp-agent:
source-dirs: apps/smp-agent
@@ -142,31 +86,17 @@ executables:
- simplexmq
ghc-options:
- -threaded
- -rtsopts
xftp:
source-dirs: apps/xftp
main: Main.hs
dependencies:
- simplexmq
ghc-options:
- -threaded
- -rtsopts
tests:
simplexmq-test:
smp-server-test:
source-dirs: tests
main: Test.hs
dependencies:
- simplexmq
- deepseq == 1.4.*
- generic-random == 1.5.*
- hspec == 2.11.*
- hspec-core == 2.11.*
- hspec == 2.7.*
- hspec-core == 2.7.*
- HUnit == 1.6.*
- QuickCheck == 2.14.*
- silently == 1.2.*
- main-tester == 0.2.*
- timeit == 2.0.*
ghc-options:
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
sequenceDiagram
participant A as Alice
participant AA as Alice's<br>agent
participant AS as Alice's<br>server
participant BS as Bob's<br>server
participant BA as Bob's<br>agent
participant B as Bob
note over AA, BA: status (receive/send): NONE/NONE
note over A, AA: 1. request connection<br>from agent
A ->> AA: NEW: create<br>duplex connection
note over AA, AS: 2. create Alice's SMP queue
AA ->> AS: NEW: create SMP queue
AS ->> AA: IDS: SMP queue IDs
note over AA: status: NEW/NONE
AA ->> A: INV: invitation<br>to connect
note over A, B: 3. out-of-band invitation
A ->> B: OOB: invitation to connect
note over BA, B: 4. accept connection
B ->> BA: JOIN:<br>via invitation info
note over BA: status: NONE/NEW
note over BA, BS: 5. create Bob's SMP queue
BA ->> BS: NEW: create SMP queue
BS ->> BA: IDS: SMP queue IDs
note over BA: status: NEW/NEW
note over BA, AA: 6. establish Alice's SMP queue
BA ->> AS: SEND: Bob's info and sender server key (SMP confirmation with reply queues)
note over BA: status: NEW/CONFIRMED
AS ->> AA: MSG: Bob's info and<br>sender server key
note over AA: status: CONFIRMED/NONE
AA ->> AS: ACK: confirm message
AA ->> A: CONF: connection request ID<br>and Bob's info
A ->> AA: LET: accept connection request,<br>send Alice's info
AA ->> AS: KEY: secure queue
note over AA: status: SECURED/NONE
AA ->> BS: SEND: Alice's info and sender's server key (SMP confirmation without reply queues)
note over AA: status: SECURED/CONFIRMED
BS ->> BA: MSG: Alice's info and<br>sender's server key
note over BA: status: CONFIRMED/CONFIRMED
BA ->> B: INFO: Alice's info
BA ->> BS: ACK: confirm message
BA ->> BS: KEY: secure queue
note over BA: status: SECURED/CONFIRMED
BA ->> AS: SEND: HELLO: only needs to be sent once in v2
note over BA: status: SECURED/ACTIVE
note over BA, B: 7a. notify Bob<br>about connection success
BA ->> B: CON: connected
AS ->> AA: MSG: HELLO: Alice's agent<br>knows Bob can send
note over AA: status: SECURED/ACTIVE
AA ->> AS: ACK: confirm message
note over A, AA: 7a. notify Alice<br>about connection success
AA ->> A: CON: connected
AA ->> BS: SEND: HELLO: only needs to be sent once in v2
note over AA: status: ACTIVE/ACTIVE
BS ->> BA: MSG: HELLO: Bob's agent<br>knows Alice can send
note over BA: status: ACTIVE/ACTIVE
BA ->> BS: ACK: confirm message
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ sequenceDiagram
AS ->> AA: MSG: Bob's info and<br>sender server key
note over AA: status: CONFIRMED/NONE
AA ->> AS: ACK: confirm message
AA ->> A: CONF: connection request ID<br>and Bob's info
A ->> AA: LET: accept connection request,<br>send Alice's info
AA ->> A: REQ: connection request ID<br>and Bob's info
A ->> AA: ACPT: accept connection request,<br>send Alice's info
AA ->> AS: KEY: secure queue
note over AA: status: SECURED/NONE
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
sequenceDiagram
participant M as mobile app
participant C as chat core
participant A as agent
participant P as push server
participant APN as APN
note over M, APN: get device token
M ->> APN: registerForRemoteNotifications()
APN ->> M: device token
note over M, P: register device token with push server
M ->> C: /_ntf register <token>
C ->> A: registerNtfToken(<token>)
A ->> P: TNEW
P ->> A: ID (tokenId)
A ->> C: registered
C ->> M: registered
note over M, APN: verify device token
P ->> APN: E2E encrypted code<br>in background<br>notification
APN ->> M: deliver background notification with e2ee verification token
M ->> C: /_ntf verify <e2ee code>
C ->> A: verifyNtfToken(<e2ee code>)
A ->> P: TVFY code
P ->> A: OK / ERR
A ->> C: verified
C ->> M: verified
note over M, APN: now token ID can be used
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
sequenceDiagram
participant M as mobile app
participant C as chat core
participant A as agent
participant S as SMP server
participant N as NTF server
participant APN as APN
note over M, APN: register subscription
alt register existing
M -->> A: on /_ntf register, for subscribed queues
else create new connection
A -->> S: NEW / JOIN
note over A, S: ...<br>Connection handshake<br>...
S -->> A: CON
end
A ->> S: NKEY nKey
S ->> A: NID nId
A ->> N: SNEW tknId dhKey (smpServer, nId, nKey)
N ->> A: ID subId dhKey
N ->> S: NSUB nId
S ->> N: OK [/ NMSG]
note over M, APN: notify about message
S ->> N: NMSG
N ->> APN: APNSMutableContent<br>ntfQueue, nonce
APN ->> M: UNMutableNotificationContent
note over M, S: ...<br>Client awaken, message is received<br>...
S ->> M: message
note over M: mutate notification
note over M, APN: change APN token
APN ->> M: new device token
M -->> C: /_ntf_sub update tkn
C -->> A: updateNtfToken()
A -->> N: TUPD tknId newDeviceToken
note over M, N: ...<br>Verify token<br>...
+51 -104
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
- [Subscribe to queue](#subscribe-to-queue)
- [Secure queue command](#secure-queue-command)
- [Enable notifications command](#enable-notifications-command)
- [Disable notifications command](#disable-notifications-command)
- [Acknowledge message delivery](#acknowledge-message-delivery)
- [Suspend queue](#suspend-queue)
- [Delete queue](#delete-queue)
@@ -51,8 +50,6 @@ It's designed with the focus on communication security and integrity, under the
It is designed as a low level protocol for other application protocols to solve the problem of secure and private message transmission, making [MITM attack][1] very difficult at any part of the message transmission system.
This document describes SMP protocol versions 3 and 4, the previous versions are discontinued.
## Introduction
The objective of Simplex Messaging Protocol (SMP) is to facilitate the secure and private unidirectional transfer of messages from senders to recipients via persistent simplex queues managed by the message broker (server).
@@ -149,61 +146,61 @@ To create and start using a simplex queue Alice and Bob follow these steps:
1. Alice creates a simplex queue on the server:
1. Decides which SMP server to use (can be the same or different server that Alice uses for other queues) and opens secure encrypted transport connection to the chosen SMP server (see [Appendix A](#appendix-a)).
1. Decides which SMP server to use (can be the same or different server that Alice uses for other queues) and opens secure encrypted transport connection to the chosen SMP server (see [Appendix A](#appendix-a)).
2. Generates a new random public/private key pair (encryption key - `EK`) that she did not use before for Bob to encrypt the messages.
2. Generates a new random public/private key pair (encryption key - `EK`) that she did not use before for Bob to encrypt the messages.
3. Generates another new random public/private key pair (recipient key - `RK`) that she did not use before for her to sign commands and to decrypt the transmissions received from the server.
3. Generates another new random public/private key pair (recipient key - `RK`) that she did not use before for her to sign commands and to decrypt the transmissions received from the server.
4. Generates one more random key pair (recipient DH key - `RDHK`) to negotiate symmetric key that will be used by the server to encrypt message bodies delivered to Alice (to avoid shared cipher-text inside transport connection).
4. Generates one more random key pair (recipient DH key - `RDHK`) to negotiate symmetric key that will be used by the server to encrypt message bodies delivered to Alice (to avoid shared cipher-text inside transport connection).
5. Sends `"NEW"` command to the server to create a simplex queue (see `create` in [Create queue command](#create-queue-command)). This command contains previously generated unique "public" keys `RK` and `RDHK`. `RK` will be used to verify the following commands related to the same queue signed by its private counterpart, for example to subscribe to the messages received to this queue or to update the queue, e.g. by setting the key required to send the messages (initially Alice creates the queue that accepts unsigned messages, so anybody could send the message via this queue if they knew the queue sender's ID and server address).
5. Sends `"NEW"` command to the server to create a simplex queue (see `create` in [Create queue command](#create-queue-command)). This command contains previously generated unique "public" keys `RK` and `RDHK`. `RK` will be used to verify the following commands related to the same queue signed by its private counterpart, for example to subscribe to the messages received to this queue or to update the queue, e.g. by setting the key required to send the messages (initially Alice creates the queue that accepts unsigned messages, so anybody could send the message via this queue if they knew the queue sender's ID and server address).
6. The server sends `"IDS"` response with queue IDs (`queueIds`):
6. The server sends `"IDS"` response with queue IDs (`queueIds`):
- Recipient ID `RID` for Alice to manage the queue and to receive the messages.
- Recipient ID `RID` for Alice to manage the queue and to receive the messages.
- Sender ID `SID` for Bob to send messages to the queue.
- Sender ID `SID` for Bob to send messages to the queue.
- Server public DH key (`SDHK`) to negotiate a shared secret for message body encryption, that Alice uses to derive a shared secret with the server `SS`.
- Server public DH key (`SDHK`) to negotiate a shared secret for message body encryption, that Alice uses to derive a shared secret with the server `SS`.
2. Alice sends an out-of-band message to Bob via the alternative channel that both Alice and Bob trust (see [protocol abstract](#simplex-messaging-protocol-abstract)). The message must include:
- Unique "public" key (`EK`) that Bob must use for E2E key agreement.
- Unique "public" key (`EK`) that Bob must use for E2E key agreement.
- SMP server hostname and information to open secure encrypted transport connection (see [Appendix A](#appendix-a)).
- SMP server hostname and information to open secure encrypted transport connection (see [Appendix A](#appendix-a)).
- Sender queue ID `SID` for Bob to use.
- Sender queue ID `SID` for Bob to use.
3. Bob, having received the out-of-band message from Alice, connects to the queue:
1. Generates a new random public/private key pair (sender key - `SK`) that he did not use before for him to sign messages sent to Alice's server.
1. Generates a new random public/private key pair (sender key - `SK`) that he did not use before for him to sign messages sent to Alice's server.
2. Prepares the confirmation message for Alice to secure the queue. This message includes:
2. Prepares the confirmation message for Alice to secure the queue. This message includes:
- Previously generated "public" key `SK` that will be used by Alice's server to authenticate Bob's messages, once the queue is secured.
- Previously generated "public" key `SK` that will be used by Alice's server to authenticate Bob's messages, once the queue is secured.
- Optionally, any additional information (application specific, e.g. Bob's profile name and details).
- Optionally, any additional information (application specific, e.g. Bob's profile name and details).
3. Encrypts the confirmation body with the "public" key `EK` (that Alice provided via the out-of-band message).
3. Encrypts the confirmation body with the "public" key `EK` (that Alice provided via the out-of-band message).
4. Sends the encrypted message to the server with queue ID `SID` (see `send` in [Send message](#send-message)). This initial message to the queue must not be signed - signed messages will be rejected until Alice secures the queue (below).
4. Sends the encrypted message to the server with queue ID `SID` (see `send` in [Send message](#send-message)). This initial message to the queue must not be signed - signed messages will be rejected until Alice secures the queue (below).
4. Alice receives Bob's message from the server using recipient queue ID `RID` (possibly, via the same transport connection she already has opened - see `message` in [Deliver queue message](#deliver-queue-message)):
1. She decrypts received message body using the secret `SS`.
1. She decrypts received message body using the secret `SS`.
2. She decrypts received message with [key agreed with sender using] "private" key `EK`.
2. She decrypts received message with [key agreed with sender using] "private" key `EK`.
3. Even though anybody could have sent the message to the queue with ID `SID` before it is secured (e.g. if communication is compromised), Alice would ignore all messages until the decryption succeeds (i.e. the result contains the expected message format). Optionally, in the client application, she also may identify Bob using the information provided, but it is out of scope of SMP protocol.
3. Even though anybody could have sent the message to the queue with ID `SID` before it is secured (e.g. if communication is compromised), Alice would ignore all messages until the decryption succeeds (i.e. the result contains the expected message format). Optionally, in the client application, she also may identify Bob using the information provided, but it is out of scope of SMP protocol.
5. Alice secures the queue `RID` with `"KEY"` command so only Bob can send messages to it (see [Secure queue command](#secure-queue-command)):
1. She sends the `KEY` command with `RID` signed with "private" key `RK` to update the queue to only accept requests signed by "private" key `SK` provided by Bob. This command contains unique "public" key `SK` previously generated by Bob.
1. She sends the `KEY` command with `RID` signed with "private" key `RK` to update the queue to only accept requests signed by "private" key `SK` provided by Bob. This command contains unique "public" key `SK` previously generated by Bob.
2. From this moment the server will accept only signed commands to `SID`, so only Bob will be able to send messages to the queue `SID` (corresponding to `RID` that Alice has).
2. From this moment the server will accept only signed commands to `SID`, so only Bob will be able to send messages to the queue `SID` (corresponding to `RID` that Alice has).
3. Once queue is secured, Alice deletes `SID` and `SK` - even if Alice's client is compromised in the future, the attacker would not be able to send messages pretending to be Bob.
3. Once queue is secured, Alice deletes `SID` and `SK` - even if Alice's client is compromised in the future, the attacker would not be able to send messages pretending to be Bob.
6. The simplex queue `RID` is now ready to be used.
@@ -217,21 +214,21 @@ Bob now can securely send messages to Alice:
1. Bob sends the message:
1. He encrypts the message to Alice with "public" key `EK` (provided by Alice, only known to Bob, used only for one simplex queue).
1. He encrypts the message to Alice with "public" key `EK` (provided by Alice, only known to Bob, used only for one simplex queue).
2. He signs `"SEND"` command to the server queue `SID` using the "private" key `SK` (that only he knows, used only for this queue).
2. He signs `"SEND"` command to the server queue `SID` using the "private" key `SK` (that only he knows, used only for this queue).
3. He sends the command to the server (see `send` in [Send message](#send-message)), that the server will authenticate using the "public" key `SK` (that Alice earlier received from Bob and provided to the server via `"KEY"` command).
3. He sends the command to the server (see `send` in [Send message](#send-message)), that the server will authenticate using the "public" key `SK` (that Alice earlier received from Bob and provided to the server via `"KEY"` command).
2. Alice receives the message(s):
1. She signs `"SUB"` command to the server to subscribe to the queue `RID` with the "private" key `RK` (see `subscribe` in [Subscribe to queue](#subscribe-to-queue)).
1. She signs `"SUB"` command to the server to subscribe to the queue `RID` with the "private" key `RK` (see `subscribe` in [Subscribe to queue](#subscribe-to-queue)).
2. The server, having authenticated Alice's command with the "public" key `RK` that she provided, delivers Bob's message(s) (see `message` in [Deliver queue message](#deliver-queue-message)).
2. The server, having authenticated Alice's command with the "public" key `RK` that she provided, delivers Bob's message(s) (see `message` in [Deliver queue message](#deliver-queue-message)).
3. She decrypts Bob's message(s) with the "private" key `EK` (that only she has).
3. She decrypts Bob's message(s) with the "private" key `EK` (that only she has).
4. She acknowledges the message reception to the server with `"ACK"` so that the server can delete the message and deliver the next messages.
4. She acknowledges the message reception to the server with `"ACK"` so that the server can delete the message and deliver the next messages.
This flow is show on sequence diagram below.
@@ -347,7 +344,7 @@ Simplex messaging server implementations MUST NOT create, store or send to any o
- Snapshots of the database they use to store queues and messages (instead simplex messaging clients must manage redundancy by using more than one simplex messaging server). In-memory persistence is recommended.
- Any other information that may compromise privacy or [forward secrecy][4] of communication between clients using simplex messaging servers (the servers cannot compromise forward secrecy of any application layer protocol, such as double ratchet).
- Any other information that may compromise privacy or [forward secrecy][4] of communication between clients using simplex messaging servers.
## Message delivery notifications
@@ -358,22 +355,18 @@ To protect the privacy of the recipients, there are several commands in SMP prot
The clients can optionally instruct a dedicated push notification server to subscribe to notifications and deliver push notifications to the device, which can then retrieve the messages in the background and send local notifications to the user - this is out of scope of SMP protocol. The commands that SMP protocol provides to allow it:
- `enableNotifications` (`"NKEY"`) with `notifierId` (`"NID"`) response - see [Enable notifications command](#enable-notifications-command).
- `disableNotifications` (`"NDEL"`) - see [Disable notifications command](#disable-notifications-command).
- `subscribeNotifications` (`"NSUB"`) - see [Subscribe to queue notifications](#subscribe-to-queue-notifications).
- `messageNotification` (`"NMSG"`) - see [Deliver message notification](#deliver-message-notification).
[`SEND` command](#send-message) includes the notification flag to instruct SMP server whether to send the notification - this flag is forwarded to the recepient inside encrypted envelope, together with the timestamp and the message body, so even if TLS is compromised this flag cannot be used for traffic correlation.
## SMP Transmission structure
## SMP Transmission and transport block structure
Each transport block (SMP transmission) has a fixed size of 16384 bytes for traffic uniformity.
Each transport block has a fixed size of 16384 bytes for traffic uniformity.
From SMP version 4 each block can contain multiple transmissions, version 3 blocks have 1 transmission.
Some parts of SMP transmission are padded to a fixed size; this padding is uniformly added as a word16 encoded in network byte order - see `paddedString` syntax.
In places where some part of the transmission should be padded, the syntax for `paddedNotation` is used:
```abnf
```
paddedString = originalLength string pad
originalLength = 2*2 OCTET
pad = N*N"#" ; where N = paddedLength - originalLength - 2
@@ -383,42 +376,32 @@ paddedNotation = <padded(string, paddedLength)>
; paddedLength - required length after padding, including 2 bytes for originalLength
```
Each transmission/block for SMP v3 between the client and the server must have this format/syntax:
Each transmission between the client and the server must have this format/syntax:
```abnf
```
paddedTransmission = <padded(transmission), 16384>
transmission = signature signed
signed = sessionIdentifier corrId queueId smpCommand
transmission = [signature] SP signed
signed = sessionIdentifier SP [corrId] SP [queueId] SP smpCommand
; corrId is required in client commands and server responses,
; it is empty in server notifications.
corrId = length *OCTET
queueId = length *OCTET
corrId = 1*32(%x21-7F) ; any characters other than control/whitespace
queueId = encoded ; max 32 bytes when decoded (24 bytes is used),
; empty queue ID is used with "create" command and in some server responses
signature = length *OCTET
signature = encoded
; empty signature can be used with "send" before the queue is secured with secure command
; signature is always empty with "ping" and "serverMsg"
length = 1*1 OCTET
encoded = <base64 encoded binary>
```
`base64` encoding should be used with padding, as defined in section 4 of [RFC 4648][9]
Transport block for SMP v4 has this syntax:
```abnf
paddedTransportBlock = <padded(transportBlock), 16384>
transportBlock = transmissionCount transmissions
transmissionCount = 1*1 OCTET ; equal or greater than 1
transmissions = transmissionLength transmission [transmissions]
transmissionLength = 2*2 OCTET ; word16 encoded in network byte order
```
## SMP commands
Commands syntax below is provided using [ABNF][8] with [case-sensitive strings extension][8a].
```abnf
smpCommand = ping / recipientCmd / send / subscribeNotifications / serverMsg
recipientCmd = create / subscribe / secure / enableNotifications / disableNotifications /
recipientCmd = create / subscribe / secure / enableNotifications /
acknowledge / suspend / delete
serverMsg = queueIds / message / notifierId / messageNotification /
unsubscribed / ok / error
@@ -519,42 +502,22 @@ Once the queue is secured only signed messages can be sent to it.
This command is sent by the recipient to the server to add notifier's key to the queue, to allow push notifications server to receive notifications when the message arrives, via a separate queue ID, without receiving message content.
```abnf
enableNotifications = %s"NKEY " notifierKey recipientNotificationDhPublicKey
enableNotifications = %s"NKEY " notifierKey
notifierKey = length x509encoded
; the notifier's Ed25519 or Ed448 public key public key to verify NSUB command for this queue
recipientNotificationDhPublicKey = length x509encoded
; the recipient's Curve25519 key for DH exchange to derive the secret
; that the server will use to encrypt notification metadata (encryptedNMsgMeta in NMSG)
; using [NaCl crypto_box][16] encryption scheme (curve25519xsalsa20poly1305).
```
The server will respond with `notifierId` response if notifications were enabled and the notifier's key was successfully added to the queue:
```abnf
notifierId = %s"NID " notifierId srvNotificationDhPublicKey
notifierId = %s"NID " notifierId
notifierId = length *OCTET ; 16-24 bytes
srvNotificationDhPublicKey = length x509encoded
; the server's Curve25519 key for DH exchange to derive the secret
; that the server will use to encrypt notification metadata to the recipient (encryptedNMsgMeta in NMSG)
```
This response is sent with the recipient's queue ID (the third part of the transmission).
To receive the message notifications, `subscribeNotifications` command ("NSUB") must be sent signed with the notifier's key.
#### Disable notifications command
This command is sent by the recipient to the server to remove notifier's credentials from the queue:
```abnf
disableNotifications = %s"NDEL"
```
The server must respond `ok` to this command if it was successful.
Once notifier's credentials are removed server will no longer send "NMSG" for this queue to notifier.
#### Acknowledge message delivery
The recipient should send the acknowledgement of message delivery once the message was stored in the client, to notify the server that the message should be deleted:
@@ -602,9 +565,7 @@ Currently SMP defines only one command that can be used by senders - `send` mess
This command is sent to the server by the sender both to confirm the queue after the sender received out-of-band message from the recipient and to send messages after the queue is secured:
```abnf
send = %s"SEND " msgFlags SP smpEncMessage
msgFlags = notificationFlag reserved
notificationFlag = %s"T" / %s"F"
send = %s"SEND " smpEncMessage
smpEncMessage = smpPubHeader sentMsgBody ; message up to 16088 bytes
smpPubHeader = smpClientVersion ("1" senderPublicDhKey / "0")
smpClientVersion = word16
@@ -746,11 +707,9 @@ See its syntax in [Create queue command](#create-queue-command)
The server must deliver messages to all subscribed simplex queues on the currently open transport connection. The syntax for the message delivery is:
```abnf
message = %s"MSG " msgId encryptedRcvMsgBody
message = %s"MSG " msgId SP timestamp SP encryptedMsgBody
encryptedMsgBody = <encrypt paddedSentMsgBody> ; server-encrypted padded sent msgBody
paddedSentMsgBody = <padded(sentMsgBody, maxMessageLength + 2)> ; maxMessageLength = 16088
encryptedRcvMsgBody = <encrypt rcvMsgBody> ; server-encrypted meta-data and padded sent msgBody
rcvMsgBody = timestamp msgFlags SP paddedSentMsgBody
msgId = length 24*24OCTET
timestamp = 8*8OCTET
```
@@ -776,19 +735,10 @@ See its syntax in [Enable notifications command](#enable-notifications-command)
The server must deliver message notifications to all simplex queues that were subscribed with `subscribeNotifications` command ("NSUB") on the currently open transport connection. The syntax for the message notification delivery is:
```abnf
messageNotification = %s"NMSG " nmsgNonce encryptedNMsgMeta
encryptedNMsgMeta = <encrypted message metadata passed in notification>
; metadata E2E encrypted between server and recipient containing server's message ID and timestamp (allows extension),
; to be passed to the recipient by the notifier for them to decrypt
; with key negotiated in NKEY and NID commands using nmsgNonce
nmsgNonce = <nonce used in NaCl crypto_box encryption scheme>
; nonce used by the server for encryption of message metadata, to be passed to the recipient by the notifier
; for them to use in decryption of E2E encrypted metadata
messageNotification = %s"NMSG"
```
Message notification does not contain any message data or non E2E encrypted metadata.
Message notification does not contain any message data or meta-data, it only notifies that the message is available.
#### Subscription END notification
@@ -820,7 +770,7 @@ The syntax for error responses:
```abnf
error = %s"ERR " errorType
errorType = %s"BLOCK" / %s"SESSION" / %s"CMD " cmdError / %s"AUTH" / %s"LARGE_MSG" /%s"INTERNAL"
cmdError = %s"SYNTAX" / %s"PROHIBITED" / %s"NO_AUTH" / %s"HAS_AUTH" / %s"NO_ENTITY"
cmdError = %s"SYNTAX" / %s"PROHIBITED" / %s"NO_AUTH" / %s"HAS_AUTH" / %s"NO_QUEUE"
```
Server implementations must aim to respond within the same time for each command in all cases when `"ERR AUTH"` response is required to prevent timing attacks (e.g., the server should perform signature verification even when the queue does not exist on the server or the signature of different size is sent, using any RSA key with the same size as the signature size).
@@ -842,7 +792,6 @@ ok = %s"OK"
Both the recipient and the sender can use TCP or some other, possibly higher level, transport protocol to communicate with the server. The default TCP port for SMP server is 5223.
For scenarios when meta-data privacy is critical, it is recommended that clients:
- communicating over Tor network,
- establish a separate connection for each SMP queue,
- send noise traffic (using PING command).
@@ -850,14 +799,12 @@ For scenarios when meta-data privacy is critical, it is recommended that clients
In addition to that, the servers can be deployed as Tor onion services.
The transport protocol should provide the following:
- server authentication (by matching server certificate hash with `serverIdentity`),
- forward secrecy (by encrypting the traffic using ephemeral keys agreed during transport handshake),
- integrity (preventing data modification by the attacker without detection),
- unique channel binding (`sessionIdentifier`) to include in the signed part of SMP transmissions.
By default, the client and server communicate using [TLS 1.3 protocol][13] restricted to:
- TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 cipher suite (for better performance on mobile devices),
- ed25519 and ed448 EdDSA algorithms for signatures,
- x25519 and x448 ECDHE groups for key exchange.
+2 -2
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,6 @@ Change controller: Evgeny Poberezkin <ep@simplex.chat>
References:
The syntax for connection requests in the latest version of SimpleX Agent Protocol:
https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/agent-protocol.md#connection-request
https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/v5/protocol/agent-protocol.md#connection-request
SimpleX Messaging Protocol:
https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md
https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/v5/protocol/simplex-messaging.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -13,4 +13,4 @@ Change controller: Evgeny Poberezkin <ep@simplex.chat>
References:
The syntax for message queue URIs in the latest version of SimpleX Messaging Protocol:
https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#smp-queue-uri
https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/v5/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#smp-queue-uri
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
# SMP confirmation timeout recovery
## Problem
When sending an SMP confirmation a network timeout can lead to the following race condition:
- server receives the confirmation while the joining party fails to receive the server's response;
- joining party deletes the connection together with credentials sent in the confirmation for securing the queue;
- initiating party will receive the confirmation from the server and secure the queue;
- on subsequent attempt to join via the same invitation link initiating party will generate new credentials and fail authorization.
This renders the joining party permanently unable to join via that invitation link and complete the connection.
## Solution
A possible solution is to keep and try to reuse same credentials on subsequent attempts:
- joining party has to remember invitation link when saving the connection;
- if SMP confirmation fails due to network timeout joining party doesn't delete the connection and keeps the credentials;
- when joining, joining party checks whether such invitation link was already used for a connection, if yes:
- joining party tries to send SMP confirmation with the same credentials;
- if this SMP confirmation fails with authorization error (for example it can happen due to race condition explained above) joining party tries to send HELLO message;
- if HELLO message fails with authorization error (it can happen if connection was deleted or secured with different credentials), the recovery is no longer possible and connection can be deleted.
-160
View File
@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
# SimpleX File Transfer protocol
## Problem
Sending files as currently implemented in SimpleX Chat is inefficient for these reasons:
1. Slow: message delivery requires acknowledgement for each message before the server sends the next message.
2. Not fully asynchronous:
a. SMP queue size is limited, so the whole file cannot be sent/stored in server memory.
b. Recipient needs to accept the file before it is sent.
3. No broadcast: sending the same file to multiple recipients requires sending it multiple times.
## Possible solutions
These problems could be solved within SMP protocol:
- streaming messages without waiting for acknowledgements.
- bigger queue sizes stored on hard drive and accepting large files without waiting for the recipient confirmation.
- adding broadcast to SMP servers.
These solution are complex and they do not scale well.
Another approach would be adopting some open-source file storage, possibly S3-compatible, to host files while "in transit". The downsides are:
1. Missing features. S3-compatible file servers require a service layer that we would need to develop to manage user accounts and permissions. There are solutions that allow self-registering users and uploading files without service layer, but they are not flexible enough in managing policies for these files.
2. Limited meta-data protection, both on the application and on transport layer: same address for sending and receiving a file, file size is known to the server, etc.
3. More difficult to self-host for the users when the server has 2 components (a 3rd party solution with our service component).
We are not considering P2P solutions because of their bad meta-data privacy and requirement of having a single network - the same reason why P2P design is not used for SimpleX messaging network.
A proposed solution is to develop a file hosting service (SimpleX File Transfer service) that would have better meta-data protection and functionality than the alternatives, using the ideas from SMP protocol design.
The parameters of the solution would be:
1. The server does not have knowledge of the users and actual files only anonymously uploaded fixed-size chunks (considered 8Mb, maybe we should allow 2 sizes, e.g. 1Mb and 8Mb).
2. The server should allow broadcast, so that a chunk can be downloaded by multiple recipients.
3. There should be no identifiers and ciphertext in common inside TLS between sender and recipient traffic, and between the traffic of different recipients of the same file. This approach can be extended to support public chunks that have persistent identifiers.
4. The server should prevent multiple uploads of the same chunk. This can be extended to allow multiple downloads from the same persistent address.
5. Clients can send the chunks from the same file via multiple servers, both by splitting chunks between them and for redundancy.
## Design approach
File transfer servers will be chosen by file senders. The servers will allow senders to anonymously upload fixed-size file chunks.
### Transport protocol
- binary-encoded commands sent as fixed-size padded block in the body of HTTP2 POST request, similar to SMP and notifications server protocol transmission encodings.
- HTTP2 POST with a fixed size padded block body for file upload and download.
Block size - 4096 bytes (it would fit ~120 Ed25519 recipient keys).
The reasons to use HTTP2:
- avoid the need to have two hostnames (or two different ports) for commands and file uploads.
- compatibility with the existing HTTP2 client libraries.
The reason not to use JSON bodies:
- bigger request size, so fewer recipient keys would fit in a single request
- signature over command has to be outside of JSON anyway.
The reason not to use URI segments / HTTP verbs / REST semantics is to have consistent request size.
### Required server commands:
- File sender:
- create file chunk record.
- Parameters:
- Ed25519 key for subsequent sender commands and Ed25519 keys for commands of each recipient.
- chunk size.
- Response:
- chunk ID for the sender and different IDs for all recipients.
- add recipients to file chunk
- Parameters:
- sender's chunk ID
- Ed25519 keys for commands of each recipient.
- Response:
- chunk IDs for new recipients.
- upload file chunk.
- delete file chunk (invalidates all recipient IDs).
- File recipient:
- download file chunk:
- chunk ID
- DH key for additional encryption of the chunk.
- command should be signed with the key passed by the sender when creating chunk record.
- delete file chunk ID (only for one recipient): signed with the same key.
### Storage model
Same as for SMP and notifications server - in-memory storage of the records, with adding to append-only log, restored and compacted on server restart.
### Sending file
To send the file, the sender will:
- compute SHA512 digest
- pad the file to match the whole number of chunks in size,
- encrypt it with a randomly chosen symmetric key and IV (e.g., using NaCL crypto_secretbox),
- split into fixed size chunks
- upload each chunk to a randomly chosen server.
The sending client should generate more per-recipient keys than the actual number of recipients, possibly rounding up to a power of 2, to conceal the actual number of intended recipients.
Then the sending client will combine addresses of all chunks and other information into "file description", different for each file recipient, that will include:
- an encryption key that was used to encrypt the file (the same for all recipients).
- file SHA512 digest
- list of chunk descriptions; information for each chunk:
- private Ed25519 key to sign commands for file transfer server.
- chunk address (server host and chunk ID).
- chunk sha512 digest
To reduce the size, chunk descriptions will be grouped by the server host.
This "file description" itself will be sent as a small file over an authenticated channel, to prevent file description modification. To estimate its size:
- each chunk \* redundancy per chunk, assuming chunks are grouped per server:
- 1-based chunk number in the file - 8 bytes (including any overhead)
- Ed25519 key (different for each recipient / chunk combination) - 32 bytes \* 4/3 (base64, assuming text encoding)
- chunk ID (different for each recipient) - 64 bytes \* 4/3
- optional (only in the first chunk occurence) chunk sha512 digests - 64 bytes \* 4/3
- server addresses - say, 128 bytes per server
- sha512 digest - 64 bytes \* 4/3
- encryption key - 32 bytes \* 4/3
- IV - 32 bytes \* 4/3
- encoding overhead - say, 256 bytes
For 1gb file, sent via 4 different servers, in 8Mb chunks, with redundancy 2, the size of "file description", assuming text encoding, will be ~45kb (`128 * (8 + 32 + 64) * 2 * 4/3 + 128 * 64 * 4/3 + 128 * 4 + (64 + 32 + 32) * 4/3 + 256`).
File description format (yml):
```
name: file.ext
size: 33200000
chunk: 8mb
hash: abc=
key: abc=
iv: abc=
parts:
- server: xftp://abc=@example1.com
chunks: [1:abc=:def=:ghi=, 3:abc=:def=:ghi=]
- server: xftp://abc=@example2.com
chunks: [2:abc=:def=:ghi=, 4:abc=:def=:ghi=:2mb]
- server: xftp://abc=@example3.com
chunks: [1:abc=:def=, 4:abc=:def=]
- server: xftp://abc=@example4.com
chunks: [2:abc=:def=, 3:abc=:def=]
```
This file description is sent to all recipients via normal messages, split to 15780 byte chunks if needed.
### Receiving file
Having received the description, the recipient will:
- download all chunks falling back to secondary servers, if needed
- combine the chunks into a file
- decrypt the file
- un-pad it
- validate file digest
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# SMP and SMP agent protocol extensions to manage queue quotas
## Problem
SMP servers define a limit on the number of messages that can be stored on the server. When the sender reaches this limit, they continue trying to send the message with exponential back off, until the server allows it. To reduce the traffic we added expiration on unsent messages of 2 days that:
- adds its own set of problems because of expired control messages - e.g., group fragmentation.
- doesn't solve problem of traffic in active groups with many inactive members - there are still too many retries in queues that reached capacity.
## Solution
Sending agent permanently stops trying to send messages having received `ERR QUOTA` (or, for the period of clients migration, increases TTL much more than in cases of network errors).
Add SMP server event that means "quota reached" (e.g. `QTA` or `MSG QUOTA`) - it will be delivered to the recipient once all messages are retrieved at the same point in message stream where the sender received `ERR QUOTA`. Alternatively, it could be a message flag that is set on the last message in the queue at a point the sender received `ERR QUOTA`.
Add SMP agent message that means "quota available, resume sending" (e.g. `A_QTA` or `A_RESUME`) the receiving agent will send it via the reply queue to the sending agent that will resume sending messages at this point.
Possibly, increase TTL for local messages to 30 days. That might require separately addressing the problem of permanently failing servers.
We discussed a possible solution of merging all messages to one server into one delivery queue, so that having multiple failing queues on this server will not result in multiple connection attempts, and this proposal also answers the question what to do with the messages when quota is exceeded - the whole queue can be marked as suspended, and processed separately from others - TBD.
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# Re-sync encryption ratchets, queue rotation, message delivery receipts
This is very unfocussed doc outlining several problems that seem somewhat related, and some possible solution approaches.
## Problems
When old database backup is used, the sending client encrypts the messages in a way that the receiving client cannot decrypt them, because it does not store the old keys, and does not try to decrypt ratchet headers using the old keys. When receiving the messages, the client that uses the old database is unable to decrypt them, either the header or the message itself (if more than 500 messages are skipped, or if root ratchet step happened).
The same symptoms happen during the queue rotation, unfortunately, as we do not keep the history of received messages once they are acknowledged, so the client reports these error to the users.
While these are two different problems, to the users they manifest in the same way, so it is difficult to differentiate.
Another ratchet problem that should be solved as well is not deleting unused skipped keys after some time or some number of events, possibly it should be considered at the same time.
While it is tempting to consider delivery receipts as an isolated problem, it is somewhat coupled, as the requests to re-sync ratchets and to re-deliver skipped messages are effectively delivery receipts.
A naive solution to delivery receipts when each message is responded to with a confirmation has two downsides:
- it doubles the traffic.
- in the absense of delays, it also leaks some information about the network latency, that can be used to track user's location.
Both problems can be mitigated by sending delivery receipts with a random delay, to confirm all messages sent, not each one. But this would only reduce the traffic when the sender sends many messages. Alternatively, we could think how to reduce the block size for SMP commands. The challenge is profile pictures and image previews, so to reduce traffic we need to start sending them as XFTP files, potentially with a smaller 64kb chunks (that would also increase preview quality).
## Solution for queue rotation
We need to:
- store and show the rotation status in the UI to prevent attempts to rotate the queue multiple times.
- process multiple message delivery events while there is a redundancy, to avoid errors in terminal.
- differentiate between decryption errors during queue rotation - that would require keeping the messages for some time, at least keeping their IDs and hashes together with some additional status. In this case when duplicate or old message arrives, we can check whether this message was already processed, and do not show error if it was.
## Solution to re-sync ratchets
When we establish that the receiving client is indeed unable to decrypt messages, we should:
- notify the user - it is already happening, but it happens in case of rotation as well.
- optionally, notify another client that message was not decrypted - this effectively becomes a delivery receipt. That could be a separate command triggered by the user in the UI.
- clients can get into this state at the same time, how do we handle concurrent requests? Possibly, we could design these messages so this is irrelevant whether the message is sent in response or not, and calculate the new ratchet keys once the clients have both the sent and received messages. After that both clients can send "ratchet reset" message:
- EKEY - message containing a new set of keys to initialize the ratchets
- EREADY - message confirming that the ratchet is ready, already e2e encrypted
The downside of this approach, is that unlike the initial handshake, where the second ratchet key is sent in e2e encrypted response, this message will be sent only encrypted with queue key. We could change this protocol by adding EREPLY message, and the clients would know to ingnore EKEY with bigger hash of the keys, so that the client who sent keys with smaller hash would be processing response from another client (that is if EKEY is received after EKEY is sent).
```
A B
EKEY 1 -> <- EKEY 2 (e2e encrypted with per-queue key only)
EKEY 2 <- -> EKEY 1
1 < 2, wait 2 > 1, reply EREPLY 3 (e2e encrypted with ratchets)
ratchet: 1, 3 ratchet: 3, 1
```
Once ratchets are re-synched the clients could additionally request delivery of skipped messages. As ratchets being out of sync is not the only problem when messages can be lost, it may be managed independently from the ratchet re-sync. This problem seems tied with delivery receipts too, as requesting to re-deliver some messages automatically confirms that some other messages were delivered.
Alternatively, the request for ratchet sync can already contain the ID of the first failed message - that would allow the agent:
- stop sending messages until ratchets are in sync.
- re-deliver failed messages first.
- only then deliver any pending messages.
This approach would probably result in a better UX (no out of order delivery), but requires tracking pending messages that are not attempted to deliver and to also insert old messages in the delivery queue with the old IDs.
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# Delivery receipts
## Problems
User experience - users need to know that the messages are delivered to the recipient, as this confirms that the system is functioning.
The downside of communicating message delivery as it confirms that the recipient was online, and, unless there is a delay in confirming, can be used to track the location via the variation in network latency. So delivery receipts should be delayed with a randomized interval and should be opt in or opt out.
Another problem of message receipts is that they increase network traffic and server load. This could be avoided if delivery receipts are communicated as part of normal message delivery flow.
Some other existing and planned features implicitely confirm message delivery and, possibly, should depend on message delivery being enabled:
- agent message to resume delivery when quota was exceeded (implemented, [rfc](./2022-12-27-queue-quota.md))
- agent message to re-deliver skipped messages or to re-negotiate double ratchet.
## Solution
There are three layers where delivery receipts can be implemented:
- chat protocol. Pro: logic of when to deliver it is decoupled from the message flow, Con: extra traffic, can only work in duplex connections.
- agent client protocol. Pro: can be automated and combined with the protocol to re-deliver skipped messages. Con: extra traffic.
- SMP protocol. Pro: minimal extra traffic, Con: complicates server design as it would require pushing receipts when there is no next message.
The last approach seems the most promising for avoiding additional traffic:
- modify client ACK command to include whether delivery receipt should be provided to sender, and, possibly, any e2e encrypted data that should be included in the receipt (e.g., that the receiving client already saw this message in case we use "feedback" variant of roumor-mongering protocol for groups).
- server would manage delaying of the receipts, by randomizing the time after which the receipt will be available to the sender, and by combining the receipts when possible.
- modify response to SEND command to include any available delivery receipts.
- add a separate delivery receipt that will be pushed to the sender in the connection where the message was received by the server.
## SMP protocol changes
```haskell
data Command (p :: Party) where
-- ...
ACK :: MsgId -> Maybe ByteString -> Command Recipient
-- the presense of ByteString in ACK indicates that the delivery needs to be confirmed.
-- the protocol does not define the format of this confirmation, it is application specific, and can be -- an empty string.
-- And open question is how to e2e encrypt information in this string - this probably can be handled on Agent client protocol level, and could be the same ratchet key that was used to encrypt and decrypt the message. The downside of this approach is that this key currently is not stored, and storing it requires additional logic to clear these keys if unused after some time.
-- TODO consider what could be a better approach.
SENT :: MsgId -> [(MsgId, UTCTime, ByteString)] -> Command Sender
-- or
-- SENT :: MsgId -> Command Sender
-- in case we just batch
-- this response will be sent to SEND command and will include a sender's message ID generated by the server (currently it does not exist), and posibly an empty list of delivery receipts with the same message IDs as in responses to SEND, timestamps when these receipts became available, and e2e encrypted ByteString passed in ACK command.
-- The ID in this response should be different from the ID used in MSG, to keep the promise of not having shared identifiers in sent/received traffic even inside TLS tunnel.
-- Keeping the quality of shared ciphertext also requires adding additional encryption layer between the server and the sender, this can be achieved in one of two ways:
-- 1) passing a separate DH key in each SEND command, and server including additional DH key in each SENT response, with computed DH secret per message later used to encrypt and decrypt the delivery receipt payloads. This is probably a bad idea as it would increase a cryptographic load on both the server and the client.
-- 2) agree a key per queue, in the same way it is done for the recipient. Possibly, it requires additional DH key in confirmation message that the recipient then uses to secure the queue, and passing this key in KEY (secure queue) command. The response to this secure command would the include server's DH key returned to the recipient that would be passed to the sender in HELLO message. Even though recipient could observe both public DH keys, they won't know the computed shared secret. Recipient that controls the server could perform MITM attack on this key exchange, but it doesn't give any benefit over what recipient can do when they have access to the server - the threat model remains the same. The downside of this approach is that it also requires additional changes in client protocol level (confirmation message format and HELLO message).
-- 3) also agree on a key per queue, but via separate commands between the sender and the server, once the sender was notified that the queue is secured. This approach is probably better, and the server would simply delay the delivery of delivery receipts until the shared secret is agreed.
SKEY :: C.PublicKeyX25519 -> Command Sender
SBKEY :: C.PublicKeyX25519 -> BrokerMsg
-- these are the command and response to agree secret to encrypt delivery receipt payloads for option 3
SSUB :: Command Sender
-- subscribe to receive delivery receipts for a given queue - will be sent when the conversation is opened (unless there is an active subscription already), not all queues at once, and won't be re-subscribed on losing the server connection (TBC).
RCVD :: MsgId -> UTCTime -> ByteString -> Command Recipient
-- delivery receipt. UTCTime is the time when it became available, not the time when ACK was sent by the recipient, to avoid leaking location via network latency.
```
Possibly, there is no need to include delivery receipts into SENT response and instead just use batching of responses that is already supported. As server responses are not signed, there is no per-response overhead that is substantial, and a lot of receipts that are available can be packed into one block (depending on the size of payload that has to be fixed not to leak metadata).
This all seems rather complicated for SMP protocol, and the approach of doing it on a higher level seems more attractive than initially. Possibly we should reconsider, and reduce traffic by reducing block sizes... Reducing block sizes unfortunately requires supporting variable block sizes, and would leak some metadata during the transition period.
## Another approach
Above represents substantial complexity, and at least doubles server code complexity for the feature that is definitely not doubling the value of server software. Moving to variable block size is simpler, but also has a lot of complexity, reduces metadata privacy (at least for the duration of migration period), reduces image preview quality, and requires postponing this feature for multiple releases, until all clients migrate.
Given that the main traffic is generated by the groups, and direct messages do not create a lot of traffic, a much simpler and better solution is to simply send delivery receipts as the message, in direct conversations only, either as chat protocol message or as agent client protocol message (either on the message or on the envelope layer).
### Comparison of these two approaches:
**Chat protocol message**
Pros:
- simpler, more contained change - SMP layer is not aware of this feature
- easier to extend protocol with additional application specific payload, e.g. references to group DAG
Cons:
- ?
```json
// ...
"x.msg.delivered": {
"properties": {
"msgId": {"ref": "base64url"},
"params": {
"properties": {
"msgId": {"ref": "base64url"},
},
"optionalProperties": {
"data": {} // possibly the initial protocol does not need it, with JSON can be added later
}
}
}
},
// ...
```
**Agent client protocol envelope**
Pros:
- possibility of using it in a wider range of the applications
- possibility to include received message hash to increase communication integrity - the sending client would be then notified, and it can be exposed in the UI, that the received message is not the same as sent.
Cons:
- additional implementation complexity - requires additional events to communicate between chat and agent.
```haskell
data AMessage =
-- ...
| A_RCVD AgentMsgId MsgHash ByteString -- references to the received message
-- ...
```
The weirdness of the above design is that it refers to the data present in the header of another message, the alternative would be to have a separate envelope for delivery receipt:
```haskell
data AgentMessage =
-- ...
AgentMessageRcvd APrivHeader AgentMsgId MsgHash ByteString -- references to the received message
-- ...
```
But probably the first one is a bit better, TBC.
In any case there should be an additional event to notify chat client:
```haskell
data ACommand (p :: AParty) (e :: AEntity) where
-- ...
RCVD AgentMsgId MsgMeta ByteString -> ACommand Agent AEConn
-- ...
```
On the balance of things, implementing on the level of Agent Client protocol seems better, as the additional complexity is marginal, but it allows for wider range of applications, and also allows for additional delivery integrity validation. The format for payload still requires chat protocol message encoding once we want to add it, but initially it could be just an empty string.
## Implementation plan
Currently, we delete sent messages once delivered to the server. It would be helpful if we could keep the records in snd_messages table, and then use them to process delivery receipts, although it may be insufficient (we could add fields). Probably it is not possible to keep them as there is a foreign key constraint with `on delete cascade`.
The new table will be used to track sent message hashes to correlate their IDs with delivery receipts (that will also be stored in messages/rcv_messages). Receipts need to be processed in chat in the same way as normal messages, so they would be sent to chat with MsgMeta, and the chat will need to ack them once processed.
Agent ackMessage function will be also used to automatically schedule sending delivery receipts if they are enabled for connection, only for normal messages - no sending receipts to receipts.
There can be receipt re-delivery to the chat in the same cases as when normal message can be re-delivered (in case of AGENT A_DUPLICATE when it was not ack'd by the user).
## Other considerations
### How clients decide whether to send delivery receipts
Two options are possible - local settings per conversation or chat preferences framework, that allows to have mutual on/off. The latter seems preferable as without knowing whether the other party is sending receipts, it is not possible to uderstand what the absense of the receipt means - network malfunction or receipts disabled.
Groups are a special case, as while some groups may enable sending the delivery receipts, the group members should be able to disable it locally. This should probably be done via a separate conversation setting in the same way as enabling notifications or favourites. In this case the receipt would only be sent to the group if it is enabled in the group and not disabled by the member. The toggle may be located in the same page as chat preferences, but it should be a separate setting. We might want though to communicate somehow whether a given member sends delivery receipts so that other members know whether to expect them or not.
### How this functionality is released
5.2:
- support for sending and receiving delivery receipts preference, both in direct messages and in groups (for forward compatibility).
- support for sending and receiving delivery receipts in direct chats only, but disable sending them
5.3:
- show receipt preferences in the UI
- enable sending receipts in direct chats where they are enabled
A separate question is how to enable this functionality for the existing contacts. Possible options are:
1. Enable (as per default) for all contacts, show notification to the user when they open the app for update that delivery notifications are now sent by default to all contacts. Pro: no extra logic to implement. Con: may be perceived as a privacy violation, as to some contacts the delivery receipts will be sent before the user had chance to disable them.
2. Ask the user when the new version first runs whether they want to use delivery receipts and offer these options:
1) keep enabled for all profiles (and for all contacts)
2) enable for all profiles in ~12 or in ~24 hours giving users the chance to review all contacts / profiles and disable some of them. The problem here is also in possibility of the correlation in case they all start sending receipts at the same time. Possibly the option could be to set a random time in 12-15 or 24-30 hours range to avoid the possibility of such correlation.
3) disable for all profiles it will require sending profile updates to all contacts, so the delivery receipts should be kept disabled and profile updates should be sent after random intervals, one by one (not scheduled all at once, as the time may pass while the app is off).
3. Offer an option to enable globally later - we could keep it as a one-off option, available only to existing users, and visible on the top level of the Settings - once enabled, the option will disappear and it won't be possible to disable again. The downside here is that the new contacts would be receiving the profile with enabled notifications but they still won't be delivered...
4. Another option is to have all new contacts decided based on a global user default (that can be set in the settings and in the dialog on first start), but for the existing contacts keep in unset state that is not interpreted as either on or off, but interpreted as unknown until the user makes a choice... That might be an optimal solution for the users but it would probably require changing the preferences framework or some ad-hoc hacks. That still keeps the question open how to avoid correlation between profiles.
5. That might be the case for version agreement too - the availability of the option per contact will depend on the version. It doesn't answer the question what to do with global defaults though...
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# SMP and XFTP delivery relays
## Problem
SimpleX network relies on SMP relays to hold sent messages while the recipient is offline. This design provides many advantages over pure p2p designs [1]. The threat model for relays is covered in [2].
The problem with this design is that the relays are chosen by the recipients, and they as a result can be used to record transport addresses of the senders.
Similar problem, but reversed, exists with XFTP design - XFTP relays are chosen by the senders and also can be modified to record transport addresses of the recipients.
The current solution to this problem is to use onion routing to access relays, and many users do it already. The downside is that it requires additional configuration and can be complex to some users.
## Solution approach
Add a second type of relays to the network design.
For SMP protocol, these relays would accept messages from the senders and deliver them to the recipients. If the recipient were to modify the relay used to receive the messages to also records senders' IP addresses, then they would only succeed in recording the IP address of the relay, not the sender.
Similar relay can be introduced for XFTP protocol.
The additional advantage of using the relays is the reduced number of network connections that need to be used, and reduced traffic.
Compared with Tor this approach has:
- lower latency
- no centralized components or the registry of the servers
- still no visibility of the whole network to the relays, as sending relays do not need to randomly choose the next relay, but would forward the messages directly to the destination relay.
The downside of this approach is that relays will have more visibility of the network than in the current design.
## Implementation considerations
1. Should this new relays be included in the existing SMP and XFTP protocols and servers, or should they be designed as separate protocols and servers?
2. Should the client aim to choose the same host for delivery relay as the destination server (to reduce the traffic), if possible, or should it aim to choose a different host (to reduce metadata available to single host)? The answer to this would affect the answer to the first question.
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# Re-sync encryption ratchets
## Problem
See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/pull/743/files for problem and high-level solution.
## Implementation
### Diagnosing ratchet de-synchronization
Message decryption happens in `agentClientMsg`, in `agentRatchetDecrypt`, which can return decryption result or error. Decryption error can be differentiated in `agentClientMsg` result pattern match, in Left cases, where we already differentiate duplicate error (`AGENT A_DUPLICATE`).
Question: Which decryption errors can be diagnosed as ratchet de-synchronization?
Possibly any `AGENT A_CRYPTO` error. Definitely on `RATCHET_HEADER`, TBC other. See `cryptoError :: C.CryptoError -> AgentErrorType` for conversion from decryption errors to `A_CRYPTO` or other agent errors. We're only interested in crypto errors, as other are either other client implementation errors, internal errors, or already processed duplicate error.
Proposed classification of crypto errors, based on `AgentCryptoError`:
`DECRYPT_AES` -> re-sync allowed (recommended/required?)
`DECRYPT_CB` -> re-sync allowed (recommended/required?)
`RATCHET_HEADER` -> **re-sync required**
`RATCHET_EARLIER` -> re-sync allowed
`RATCHET_SKIPPED` -> **re-sync required**
Ratchet re-synchronization could be started automatically on diagnosing de-synchronization, based on these errors. As a potentially dangerous feature (e.g., implementation error could lead to infinite re-sync loop causing large traffic consumption), initially it will be available via agent functional api for client to call. Ratchet de-synchronization will instead produce an event prompting client to re-synchronize.
Diagnosing possible ratchet de-synchronization also will be recorded as connection state - `ratchet_desync_state` field in `connections` table. Client should be prohibited to start ratchet re-synchronization unless `ratchet_desync_state` is set.
Event should not be repeated for following received messages that can't be decrypted - based on `ratchet_desync_state`. If a received message can be decrypted, `ratchet_desync_state` should be set to NULL and a new event sent, indicating ratchet has healed.
New event - `RDESYNC :: RatchetDesyncState -> ConnectionStats -> ACommand Agent AEConn`
```haskell
data RatchetDesyncState
= RDResyncAllowed
| RDResyncRequired
| RDHealed
```
New field should be added to `ConnectionStats` - `ratchetDesyncState :: Maybe RatchetDesyncState`, based on `ratchet_desync_state`.
> On `RDESYNC` events chat should create chat item, prompting ratchet re-synchronization or notifying it has healed.
> If connection has diagnosed ratchet de-sync, chat item should have a button to start ratchet re-sync.
> We'd have to get `ConnectionStats` on chat level for this instead of chat info.
> This wouldn't work for groups. One option is to add `ConnectionStats` to `GroupMember` type and update on events.
> Same could be done for `Contact` then.
To consider - allow to start ratchet re-synchronization at any time regardless of this field as an experimental feature. In chat it could be behind "Developer tools" + additional "Experimental" toggle. Agent api would have `force :: Bool` as parameter, allowing to bypass `ratchet_desync_state`. Should `ratchet_resync_state` (see below) still be honored in this case?
### Re-synchronization process
\*\*\*\*\*
Basic idea is the following:
Both agents send new ratchet keys and compute a new shared secret. Agent that starts re-synchronization should record this fact in the connection state. Agent that receives a new key should respond with a key of its own, unless it has recorded that it itself started re-synchronization in the connection state.
It can happen that both agents start re-synchronizing simultaneously. In this case they both would record it in the connection state and would not respond with a new message - instead they would use each other's already sent keys.
Agent has both keys if:
- It initiates with the first key, and then receives the second key;
- It receives the first key and then generates its own in response.
After agent has both keys, it initiates new ratchet depending on keys ordering. The agent that sent the lower key should use `initRcvRatchet` function, the agent that sent the greater key should use `initSndRatchet` (or vice versa - but they should deterministically choose different sides).
\*\*\*\*\*
State whether the ratchet re-synchronization is in progress should be tracked in database via `connections` table new `ratchet_resync_state` field.
New functional api:
```haskell
resyncConnectionRatchet :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> m ConnectionStats
```
or if we want to allow re-synchronizing ratchet at any time even if de-synchronization wasn't diagnosed:
```haskell
resyncConnectionRatchet :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> Bool -> m ConnectionStats
resyncConnectionRatchet c connId force = ...
```
Possibly client command?
``` haskell
data ACommand (p :: AParty) (e :: AEntity) where
...
RESYNC_RATCHET :: Bool -> ACommand Client AEConn
```
New event - `RRESYNC :: RatchetResyncState -> ConnectionStats -> ACommand Agent AEConn`
```haskell
data RatchetResyncState
= RRStarted
| RRAgreedSnd
| RRAgreedRcv
| RRComplete
```
New `ConnectionStats` field - `ratchetResyncState :: Maybe RatchetResyncState`.
When called, it should:
- Generate new keys.
- Update database connection state.
- Set `ratchet_desync_state` to NULL.
- Set `ratchet_resync_state` to `RRStarted`.
- Delete old ratchet from `ratchets` (is it safe?), create new ratchet.
- Send `AgentRatchetKey` message.
- Return updated `ConnectionStats` to client.
> On `RRESYNC` events chat should create chat item, and reset connection verification.
> Parameterized `RRESYNC` allows to distinguish: start and end of re-synchronization for initiating party; chat item direction - `RRESYNC RRStarted` is snd, `RRESYNC RRAgreedSnd/Rcv` and `RRESYNC RRComplete` are rcv (`RRESYNC RRAgreedSnd/Rcv` chat item could be omitted).
AgentRatchetKey is a new message on the level of AgentMsgEnvelope - encrypted with queue level e2e encryption, but not with connection level e2e encryption (since ratchet de-synchronized).
```haskell
data AgentMsgEnvelope
= ...
| AgentRatchetKey
{ agentVersion :: Version,
e2eEncryption :: E2ERatchetParams 'C.X448,
info :: ByteString -- for extension
}
```
On receiving `AgentRatchetKey`, if the receiving client hasn't started the ratchet re-synchronization itself (check `ratchet_resync_state`), it should:
- Generate new keys and compute new shared secret, initializing ratchet based on keys comparison.
- Update database connection state.
- Set `ratchet_resync_state` to `RRAgreedSnd/Rcv` (depending on whether ratchet was initialized as sending or receiving).
- Delete old ratchet from `ratchets`, create new ratchet.
- Reply with its own `AgentRatchetKey`.
- Notify client with `RRESYNC RRAgreedSnd/Rcv`.
- If ratchet was initialized as sending, send `EREADY` message, notifying other agent ratchet is re-synced.
New agent message:
```haskell
data AMessage
= ...
| -- ratchet re-synchronization is complete, with last decrypted sender message id
EREADY PrevExternalSndId
```
On receiving `AgentRatchetKey`, if the receiving client started re-sync:
- Compute new shared secret, initializing ratchet based on keys comparison.
- Update database connection state.
- Set `ratchet_resync_state` to `RRAgreedSnd/Rcv` (depending on whether ratchet was initialized as sending or receiving).
- Update ratchet.
- Notify client with `RRESYNC RRAgreedSnd/Rcv`.
- If ratchet was initialized as sending, send `EREADY` message.
After agent receives `EREADY` (or any other message that successfully decrypts):
- Reset `ratchet_resync_state` to NULL.
- Notify client with `RRESYNC RRComplete`.
- If ratchet was initialized as receiving, send reply `EREADY` message.
### State transitions
For initiating party:
```
+------------+
| Ratchet ok |
+------------+
|
| message received, decryption error
* ---->|-----------------------------------+
| |
V new (clarifying) V
+-----------------+ error +------------------+
| Re-sync allowed |--------------->| Re-sync required |
+-----------------+ +------------------+
| |
|-----------------------------------|
| | alternative - message received,
| re-sync started by client | successfully decrypted
V V
+-----------------+ +------------+
| Re-sync started | | Ratchet ok |
+-----------------+ +------------+
|
| other party replied with new ratchet key
V
+----------------+
| Re-sync agreed |----> * message received, decryption error
| snd / rcv | (should remember agreed state for reply EREADY?)
+----------------+
|
| message received, successfully decrypted
| (can be, but not necessarily, EREADY)
V
+------------+
| Ratchet ok |
+------------+
```
For replying party:
```
+------------+
| Ratchet ok |
+------------+
|
| other party sent new ratchet key
V
+----------------+
| Re-sync agreed |
| snd / rcv |
+----------------+
|
| message received, successfully decrypted
| (can be, but not necessarily, EREADY)
V
+------------+
| Ratchet ok |
+------------+
```
### Ratchet state model
#### 2 state variables
Above we considered model with separate de-sync and re-sync state.
| Desync \ Resync | Nothing | RRStarted | RRAgreedSnd | RRAgreedRcv |
| --- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| **Nothing** | 1 | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| **RDResyncAllowed** | 2 | | 5 | 5 |
| **RDResyncRequired** | 2 | | 5 | 5 |
1: Ratchet is ok.
2: Re-sync diagnosed, not in progress.
3: Rs-sync started, diagnosing de-sync is prohibited.
4: Re-sync agreed.
5: Re-sync agreed, new de-sync is diagnosed.
Combination 5 is possible in case de-sync was diagnosed before message that could be decrypted is received, for example if `EREADY` failed to deliver and no other decryptable message followed. We shouldn't prohibit diagnosing de-sync in this case, because agent may never exit "Agreed" state (if new decryptable message is never received). We also shouldn't overwrite/forget state of re-sync, even if we diagnose new possible de-sync, because if the decryptable `EREADY` is received and ratchet is in `RRAgreedRcv` state, it should respond with reply `EREADY`.
Some combinations should be impossible:
- `RDResyncAllowed` with `RRStarted`.
- `RDResyncRequired` with `RRStarted`.
`RDHealed` is equivalent to `Nothing` and only used for `RDESYNC` event, `Maybe RatchetDesyncState` can be replaced with `RatchetDesyncState`, with single new constructor `RDNoDesync` replacing `Nothing` and `RDHealed`.
`RRComplete` is equivalent to `Nothing` and only used for `RRESYNC` event, `Maybe RatchetResyncState` can be replaced with `RatchetResyncState`, with single new constructor `RDNoResync` replacing `Nothing` and `RRComplete`.
#### Single state variable
Another option is two have a single state variable describing ratchet.
```haskell
data RatchetState
= RSOk
| RSResyncAllowed
| RSResyncRequired
| RSResyncStarted
| RRResyncAgreedSnd
| RRResyncAgreedRcv
-- When `resyncConnectionRatchet` is not prohibited. Can override with `force`.
-- Currently we check:`(isJust ratchetDesyncState || force) && ratchetResyncState /= Just RRStarted`.
resyncConnectionRatchetAllowed :: RatchetState -> Bool
resyncConnectionRatchetAllowed = \case
RSOk -> False
RSResyncAllowed -> True
RSResyncRequired -> True
RSResyncStarted -> False -- `force` shouldn't override
RRResyncAgreedSnd -> False
RRResyncAgreedRcv -> False
-- When we register and notify about ratchet de-synchronization.
-- Currently we check: `(isNothing ratchetDesyncState && ratchetResyncState /= Just RRStarted)`.
-- We should also allow to update from Allowed to Required.
shouldNotifyRDESYNC :: RatchetState -> Bool
shouldNotifyRDESYNC = \case
RSOk -> True
RSResyncAllowed -> False -- only if new error implies Required
RSResyncRequired -> False
RSResyncStarted -> False
RRResyncAgreedSnd -> True
RRResyncAgreedRcv -> True
-- When we prohibit connection switch, for `checkRatchetDesync`.
-- Currently we check: `(ratchetDesyncState == Just RDResyncRequired || ratchetResyncState == Just RRStarted)`
-- Also use in `runSmpQueueMsgDelivery` to pause delivery?
ratchetDesynced :: RatchetState -> Bool
ratchetDesynced = \case
RSOk -> False
RSResyncAllowed -> False
RSResyncRequired -> True
RSResyncStarted -> True
RRResyncAgreedSnd -> False
RRResyncAgreedRcv -> False
```
Having a single state variable limits differentiation described for combination 5 in matrix. It also limits possible differentiations in client between events when ratchet is healed on its own, and when ratchet re-sync is completed after agents negotiation. Overall, since matrix is not very sparse and allows for more fine-grained decision-making, having separate state variables for de-sync and re-sync seems preferred.
#### Single state variable simplified (final version)
```haskell
data RatchetSyncState
= RSOk
| RSAllowed
| RSRequired
| RSStarted
| RSAgreed
-- event
RSYNC :: RatchetSyncState -> ConnectionStats -> ACommand Agent AEConn`
-- ConnectionStats field
ratchetSyncState :: RatchetSyncState
```
Updated design decisions:
1. Single constructor for "Agreed" state. Differentiating `RRResyncAgreedSnd` and `RRResyncAgreedRcv` allowed for easier processing of `EREADY` by helping to determine whether reply `EREADY` has to be sent. However, it duplicated information already present in ratchet's state, and can be instead worked around by remembering and analyzing ratchet state pre decryption.
2. Prohibit transition from "Agreed" state to "Desync" states. This would make possible edge-cases that leave ratchet in de-synchronized state without ability to progress (e.g. failed delivery of `AgentRatchetKey`), but would simplify state machine by removing dedicated "Desync" variable. Besides, there's still a recovery way with a `force` option.
3. Treat "Agreed" as unfinished state - prohibit new messages to be enqueued, etc. Reception of any decryptable message transitions ratchet to "Ok" state.
Possible improvements:
- Repeatedly triggering re-synchronization while in "Started"/"Agreed" state re-sends same keys and EREADY.
- Cooldown period, during which repeat re-synchronization is prohibited.
### Skipped messages
Options:
1. Ignore skipped messages.
2. Stop sending new messages while connection re-synchronizes (can use `ratchet_resync_state`).
- Initiator shouldn't send new messages until receives `AgentRatchetKey` from second party.
- Second party knows new shared secret immediately after processing first `AgentRatchetKey`, so it's not necessary to limit?
3. 2 + Re-send skipped messages first.
- Add `last_external_snd_msg_id` to `AgentRatchetKey`? + see link above
4. Re-send only messages after the latest ratchet step. \*
It may be okay to ignore skipped messages, or at most implement option 2, as ratchet de-synchronization is usually caused by misuse (human error) - the most common cause of ratchet de-sync seems to be sending and receiving messages after running agent with old database backup. In this case user has already seen most skipped messages, and it can be expected to not have them after switching to an old backup. So in this case the only "really skipped" messages are those that were sent during the latest ratchet step and failed to decrypt, triggering ratchet re-sync (\* another option is to only re-send those).
Besides, depending on time of backup there may be an arbitrary large number of skipped messages, which may consume a lot of traffic and may halt delivery of up-to-date messages for some time.
It may be better to have request for repeat delivery as a separate feature, that can be requested in necessary contexts - for example for group stability.
Can servers delivery failure lead to de-sync? If message is lost on server and never delivered, ratchet wouldn't advance, so there's no room for de-sync? If yes, re-evaluate.
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# Protecting IP addresses of the users from their contacts
## Problem
SMP protocol relays are chosen and can be controlled by the message recipients. It means that the recipients can find out IP addresses of message senders by modifying SMP relay code (or by using proxies and timing correlation), unless the senders use VPN or some overlay network. Tor is an audequate solution in most cases to mitigate it, but it requires additional technical knowledge to install and configure (even installing Orbot on Android is seen as "complex" by many users), and reduces usability because of higher latency.
The lack of in-built IP address protection is the main concern of many users, particularly given that most people do not realise that it is lacking by default - without transport protection SimpleX is not perceived as a "whole product".
Similarly, XFTP protocol relays are chosen by senders, and they can be used to detect file recipients' IP addresses.
## Possible solutions
1. Embed Tor in the client.
Pros:
- no changes in the protocols/servers
- acceptable threat model for most users
- removes complexity of installing and configuring Tor
- probably, the most attractive option for Tor users
Cons:
- higher latency and error rate
- higher resource usage
- requires us updating Tor client regularly
- restriction on Tor usage in some networks, so it would require supporting bridges in the app UI
- legislative restrictions on Tor usage, so it may require supporting multiple app versions, and won't solve the problem where Tor is not embedded
2. Thin clients with hosted accounts.
Host some part of the current client on the server and have another part running on the devices.
Pros:
- substantially reduces the traffic for mobile clients
- probably the most attractive option for mass market users who expect to have an account on the server and be able to access it from multiple devices and via web.
Cons:
- a lot of design and development
- makes accounts visible to the server
- the new protocol design to protect connections graph and message content from the hosting server.
- quite different threat model
Overall, this is not a viable or even appropriate option for the current stage.
3. SMP / XFTP proxy.
Introduce SMP and XFTP protocol extenstions to allow message senders and file recipients to delegate the tasks of sending messages and receiving files to the proxies, so that peer-chosen relays can only observe IP addresses of the proxies and not of the users.
Pros:
- no dependency on and lower latency than via Tor
- reduces client traffic, both due to retries handled by these proxies and due to the smaller number of connections to the peer-chosen relays. The flip side is that additional commands (and traffic) are needed to create the sessions with relays.
- higher transport privacy: protects IP addresses from peers and makes transport correlation harder.
- additional function: retrying pending messages, while the queue is not secured yet, without extra traffic for the clients.
- improves current threat model by preventing session-based correlation of the traffic by the destination relay (assuming no information sharing with the proxies), as there will be one session between proxy and destination relay, mixing traffic from multiple users.
Cons:
- design and development cost
- can undermine delivery stability
This seems an attractive option, both from technical (reasonable complexity) and positioning (moving SimpleX closer to mix networks, while still avoiding server list visibility) points of view, and it is in the middle between embedding Tor, which would make the product more niche and has downsides and development costs too, and thin clients, which is 10x+ more work, and also creates a different threat model, that is not very attractive for the current stage and users.
Below considers this design.
## SMP/XFTP proxy design
### Design requirements
1. To avoid increasing the complexity of self-hosting, we should not create additional server types, and existing SMP and XFTP servers should be extended to provide proxy functions.
2. SMP proxy should not be able to observe queue addresses and their count on the destination relays. This requirement is not needed for XFTP proxies, as each file chunk is downloaded only once, so there is no need to hide its address.
3. There must be no identifiers and cyphertext in common in outgoing and incoming traffic inside TLS (the current designs have this quality).
4. Traffic between the client and destination relays must be e2e encrypted, with MITM-by-proxy mitigated, relying on the relay identity (certificate fingerprint), ideally without any additional fingerprint in relay address.
5. SMP proxy should implement retry logic and hold messages while they are delivered. They also should return relay replies to the client. To avoid any additional traffic the client should just add "sent to proxy" status and only show "sent" once proxy returns the response from the destination relay - there should be no additional response from the proxy confirming acceptance to delivery.
This would also reduce the difference in how the traffic looks to the observer - sending via proxy may look similar to sending to the usual server (which can be further supported by friendly destination relays that could add latency for direct requests and reply quickly when response came via proxy and be undermined by hostile relays that would introduce some latency pattern to help traffic correlation. The latter problem can be mitigated by having a fixed response latency from proxy that may be "come back later for destination response").
6. Sending messages to groups have to be batched in the client to avoid multiple requests for destination relay sessions - such requests can be batched to proxy, even though it leaks _some_ metadata - which destination relays are used by a given sender's IP address, it also reduces the overhead from proxies it could be an option based on the privacy slider.
6. SMP proxy may also increase utility and privacy of the platform:
- holding messages and retrying them for the new connections while the receiving queue is not secured yet.
- add delays in message delivery to make traffic correlation harder (same can be done in SMP relays).
### Implementation considerations
1. Block size. Possibly, there is not enough spare capacity in the current 16kb block to fit additional headers, any necessary metadata and encryption authentication tags, in which case we cannot send SMP and SMP-proxy traffic in the same transport connection (in case the same server plays both roles). In which case we will need to negotiate role during connection handshake and define a different (sub-)protocol for SMP-proxy.
2. To be decided if we see it as extension of SMP protocol or as another protocol, irrespective of whether it's provided by the same or another server. Given different roles and block size it may be simpler to see it as a separate protocol, and which protocol is provided in the connection is determined during handshake.
3. We probably should aim to avoid changing agent/client logic and see it instead as transport concern that can be dynamically decided at a point of sending a message, based on the current configuration.
4. Configuration should probably allow to choose between not using proxies (particularly, during testing, when it would be the default), using proxies only for unknown relays, and using proxies for all relays (extra traffic, but more complex transport correlation - although randomizing this choice can be more beneficial to the transport privacy). The clients can aim to use proxy from another provider, to reduce the risks of sharing the information.
### SMP-proxy protocol
The flow of the messages will be:
1. Client requests proxy to create session with the relay by sending `server` command with the SMP relay address and optional proxy basic AUTH (below). It should be possible to batch multiple session requests into one block, to reduce traffic.
2. Proxy connects to SMP relay, negotiating a shared secret in the handshake that will be used to encrypt all sender blocks inside TLS (proxy-relay encryption). SMP relay also returns in handshake its temporary DH key to agree e2e encryption with the client (sender-relay encryption, to hide metadata sent to the destination relay from proxy).
3. Proxy replies with `server_id` command including relay session ID to identify it in further requests, relay DH key for e2e encryption with the client - this key is signed with the TLS online private key associated with the certificate (its fingerprint is included in the relay address), and the TLS session ID between proxy and relay (this session ID must be used in transmissions, to mitigate replay attacks as before).
A possible attack here is that proxy can use this TLS session to replay commands received from the client. Possibly, it could be mitigated with a bloom filter per proxy/SMP relay connection that would reject the repeated DH keys (that need to be used for replay), and also with DH key expiration (this mitigation should allow some acceptable rate of false positives from the bloom filter).
With 32 bits per key there will be ~1/1,000,000 false positives (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloom_filter), and the filter would use ~32mb per each proxy connection if we reset relay key every 1000000 messages or more frequently. Given that the only commands accepted via relay would be SEND, replaying it would be interpreted by the receiving client as duplicate message delivery, so a small number of replayed messages won't cause any problems. But without mitigation it could be used to flood the receiving SMP relay queues with repeated messages, effectively causing DoS on these queues, even in case when SMP relays require basic auth to create queues.
Given that the client chooses proxy it has some trust to, maybe this replay attack risk can be accepted.
It is important that the same public key from destination relay is returned to all clients, so proxy does not need to repeat this request to know relays while the key did not expire, as using different keys for different clients would allow destination relays to correlate requests to the clients. A proxy that colludes with the destination relay can pass different public keys to the same client, but it is not changing threat model as colluding proxy can share information as well. It is also important that the client uses a new random key for each command, as using the same key would allow the destination relay to identify these commands as comming from the same user, and using a different key for each queue while would protect privacy of the user from the destination relay, would make it visible to the proxy how many different queues the client has on destination relay.
*Unrelated cosideration for SMP protocol privacy improvement*: instead of signing commands to the destination relay, the sender could have a ratchet per queue agreed with the destination relay that would simply use authenticated encryption with per-message symmetric key to encrypt the message on the way to relay, and this encryption would be used as a proof of sender.
4. Now the client sends `forward` to proxy, which it then forwards to SMP relay, applying additional encryption layer.
5. SMP relay sends `response` to proxy applying additional encryption layer, which it then forwards to the client removing the additional encryption layer.
Effectively it works as a simplified two-hop onion routing with the first relay (proxy) chosen by the sending client and the second relay chosen by the recipient, not only protecting senders' IP addresses from the recipients' relays, but also preventing recipients relays from correlating senders' traffic to different queues, as TLS session is owned by the proxy now and it mixes the traffic from multiple senders. To correlate traffic to users, proxy and relay would have to combine their information. SMP relays are still able to correlate traffic to receiving users via transport session.
Sequence diagram for sending the message via SMP proxy:
```
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
| sending | | SMP | | SMP | | receiving |
| client | | proxy | | relay | | client |
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
| `server` | | |
| -------------------------> | create TLS session, get keys | |
| | ------------------------------> | |
| `server_id` | (if doesn't exist) | |
| <------------------------- | | |
| | | |
| TLS(F:s2r(SEND(e2e(msg)))) | | |
| -------------------------> | TLS(F:p2r(s2r(SEND(e2e(msg))))) | |
| | ------------------------------> | |
| | | |
| | TLS(R:p2r(s2r(OK/ERR))) | |
| TLS(R:s2r(OK/ERR)) | <------------------------------ | |
| <------------------------- | | TLS(MSG(r2c(e2e(msg)))) |
| | | -----------------------> |
| | | |
| | | TLS(ACK) |
| | | <----------------------- |
| | | |
| | | |
```
Below diagram shows the encrypttion layers for `forward` and `response` commands:
- s2r (added) - encryption between client and SMP relay, with relay key returned in server_id command, with MITM by proxy mitigated by verifying the certificate fingerprint included in the relay address.
- e2e (exists now) - end-to-end encryption per SMP queue, with double ratchet e2e encryption inside it.
- p2r (added) - additional encryption between proxy and SMP relay with key agreed in the handshake, to mitigate traffic correlation inside TLS. This key could also be signed by the same certificate, if we don't want to rely on TLS security.
- r2c (exists now) additional encryption between SMP relay and client to prevent traffic correlation inside TLS.
```
----------------- ----------------- -- TLS -- ----------------- -----------------
| | -- TLS -- | | -- p2r -- | | -- TLS -- | |
| | -- s2r -- | | -- s2r -- | | -- r2c -- | |
| sending | -- e2e -- | | -- e2e -- | | -- e2e -- | receiving |
| client | MSG | SMP proxy | MSG | SMP relay | MSG | client |
| | -- e2e -- | | -- e2e -- | | -- e2e -- | |
| | -- s2r -- | | -- s2r -- | | -- r2c -- | |
| | -- TLS -- | | -- p2r -- | | -- TLS -- | |
----------------- ----------------- -- TLS -- ----------------- -----------------
```
When proxy connects to SMP relay it would indicate in the handshake that it will use proxy protocol and the SMP relay would expect the same `forward` commands and reply with `response`s.
Below syntax aims to fit in 16kb block using spare capacity in SMP protocol.
```abnf
proxy_block = padded(proxy_transmission, 16384)
proxy_transmission = corr_id relay_session_id proxy_command
corr_id = length *8 OCTET
proxy_command = server / server_id / forward / response / error
server = "S" address [relay_basic_auth] ; creates transport session between proxy and relay
server_id = "I" relay_session_id tls_session_id signed_relay_key ;
; session_id is the TLS session ID between proxy and relay, it has to be included inside encrypted block to prevent replay attacks
forward = %s"F" random_dh_pub_key encrypted_block ; it's important that a new key is used for each command, to prevent any correlation by proxy or by destination relay
response = %s"R" encrypted_block; response received from the destination SMP relay
relay_session_id = length *8 OCTET
error = %s"E" error
```
The overhead is: 1+8 (corrId) + 1+8 (relay_session_id) + 1 (command) + 1+32 (random_dh_pub_key) + 2 (original length) + 16 (auth tag for e2e encryption) + 16 (auth tag for proxy to relay encryption) = 86 bytes. The reserve for sent messages in SMP is ~84 bytes, so it should about fit with some reduced bytes somewhere.
Another possible design is to allow mixing sent messages and normal SMP commands in the same transport connection, but it can make fitting in the block a bit harder, additional overhead would be: 1 (transmission count) + 2 (transmission size) + 1 (empty signature) = 4 bytes.
The above assumes that the client can only send one message to an SMP relay and then has to wait for response before sending the next message. Missing the response would cause re-delivery (further improvement is possible when proxy detects these redelieveries and not send them to relays but simply reply with the same response).
### Threat model for SMP proxy and changes to threat model for SMP
#### SMP proxy
*can:*
- learn a user's IP address, as long as Tor is not used.
- learn when a user with a given IP address is online.
- know how many messages are sent from a given IP address and to a given destination SMP relay.
- drop all messages from a given IP address or to a given destination relay.
- unless SMP relay detects repeated public DH keys of senders, replay messages to a destination relay within a single session, causing either duplicate message delivery (which will be detected and ignored by the receiving clients), or, when receiving client is not connected to SMP relay, exhausting capacity of destination queues used within the session.
*cannot:*
- perform queue correlation (matching multiple queues to a single user), unless it has additional information from SMP relay.
- undetectably add, duplicate, or corrupt individual messages.
- undetectably drop individual messages, so long as a subsequent message is delivered.
- learn the contents of messages.
- learn the destination queues of messages.
- distinguish noise messages from regular messages except via timing regularities.
- compromise the user's end-to-end encryption with another user via an active attack.
- compromise the user's end-to-end encryption with destination relay via an active attack.
#### SMP relay accessed via SMP proxy
*still can:*
- perform recipients' queue correlation (matching multiple queues to a single recipient) via either a re-used transport connection, user's IP Address, or connection timing regularities
*no longer can:*
- perform senders' queue correlation (matching multiple queues to a single sender) via either a re-used transport connection, user's IP Address, or connection timing regularities, unless it has additional information from SMP proxy.
- learn a sender's IP address, track them through other IP addresses they use to access the same queue, and infer information (e.g. employer) based on the IP addresses, even if Tor is not used.
The rest of the threat model for SMP relays remains the same as in [overview](../protocol/overview-tjr.md#simplex-messaging-protocol-server).
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# SimpleX Remote Control protocol
Using profiles in SimpleX Chat mobile app from desktop app with minimal risk to the security/threat model of SimpleX protocols.
## Problem
Synchronizing profiles that use double ratchet for e2e encryption is effectively impossible in a way that tolerates partitioning between devices without reducing security of double ratchet.
We are not considering replacing (or weakening) double ratchet to allow profile synchronization, as some other messengers did (e.g., Session). We are also not considering Signal model, when profile is known to the server and adding devices results in changing security code and no visibility of conversation history, as it would be substantially different from the current model, and also effectively weakens the security, as in practives most users don't revalidate security codes when they change.
## Solution
The proposed solution is a new remote access/control protocol, when the application on host device (usually mobile) acts as a server, and application on another device (usually desktop) acts as a controller usually running in the same local network.
Existing service discovery and remote control protocols known to us are vulnerable to spoofing, spamming and MITM attacks. This design aims to solve these problems.
## Requirements
- Strong, cryptographically verified identity of the controller device, with the initial connection requiring out-of-band communication of public keys (QR code or link).
- Identity verification of the host device during session handshake.
- Protection against malicious "controllers" trying to make host connect to them instead of valid controller on the same network.
- Protection against replay attacks, both during discovery and during control session.
- Additional encryption layer inside TLS, with post-quantum algorithm in key agreement.
- Protect host device from unauthorized access in case of controller compromise.
- Post-compromised security - that is, even if long term secrets were copied from the controller, and host device was made to connect to malicious controller device, prevent malicious controller from accessing the host device data.
- Allow general high-level interactions common for many applications:
- RPC pattern for commands executed by the host application.
- Events sent by host to update controller UI.
- Uploading and downloading files between host and controller, either to be processed by the host or to be presented in the controller UI.
This design will allow application-level protocol that is quite close to how SimpleX Chat UI interacts with SimpleX Chat core - there is a similar RPC + events protocol and support for files. The application-level protocol is out of scope of this specification.
## Protocol phases
Protocol consists of four phases:
- controller session invitation
- establishing session TLS connection
- session verification and protocol negotiation
- session operation
### Session invitation
The invitation to the first session between host and controller pair MUST be shared out-of-band, to establish a long term identity keys/certificates of the controller to host device.
The subsequent sessions can be announced via an application-defined site-local multicast group, e.g. `224.0.0.251` (also used in mDNS/bonjour) and an application-defined port (SimpleX Chat uses 5227).
The session invitation contains this data:
- supported version range for remote control protocol
- application-specific information, e.g. device name, application name and supported version range, settings, etc.
- session start time in seconds since epoch
- if multicast is used, counter of announce packets sent by controller
- network address (ipv4 address and port) of the controller
- CA TLS certificate fingerprint of the controller - this is part of long term identity of the controller established during the first session, and repeated in the subsequent session announcements.
- Session Ed25519 public key used to verify the announcement and commands - this mitigates the compromise of the long term signature key, as the controller will have to sign each command with this key first.
- Long-term Ed25519 public key used to verify the announcement and commands - this is part of the long term controller identity.
- Session X25519 DH key and sntrup761 KEM encapsulation key to agree session encryption (both for multicast announcement and for commands and responses in TLS), as described in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-josefsson-ntruprime-hybrid/. The new keys are used for each session, and if client key is already available (from the previous session), the computed shared secret will be used to encrypt the announcement multicast packet. The out-of-band invitation is unencrypted. These DH public key and KEM encapsulation key are always sent unencrypted. NaCL Cryptobox is used for encryption.
Host device decrypts (except the first session) and validates the invitation:
- Session signature is valid.
- Timestamp is within some window from the current time.
- Long-term key signature is valid.
- Long-term CA and signature key are the same as in the first session.
- Some version in the offered range is supported.
OOB session invitation is a URI with this syntax:
```abnf
sessionAddressUri = "xrcp://" encodedCAFingerprint "@" host ":" port "#/?" qsParams
encodedCAFingerprint = base64url
qsParams = param *("&" param)
param = versionRangeParam / appInfoParam / sessionTsParam /
sessPubKeyParam / idPubKeyParam / kemEncKeyParam / dhPubKeyParam /
sessSignatureParam / idSignatureParam
versionRangeParam = "v=" (versionParam / (versionParam "-" versionParam))
versionParam = 1*DIGIT
appInfoParam = "app=" escapedJSON ; optional
sessionTsParam = "ts=" 1*DIGIT
sessPubKeyParam = "skey=" base64url ; required
idPubKeyParam = "idkey=" base64url ; required
dhPubKeyParam = "dh=" base64url ; required
sessSignatureParam = "ssig=" base64url ; required, signs the URI with this and idSignatureParam param removed
idSignatureParam = "idsig=" base64url ; required, signs the URI with this param removed
base64url = <base64url encoded binary> ; RFC4648, section 5
```
Multicast session announcement is a binary encoded packet with this syntax:
```abnf
sessionAddressPacket = dhPubKey nonce encrypted(unpaddedSize sessionAddress packetPad)
dhPubKey = length x509encoded ; same as announced
nonce = length *OCTET
sessionAddress = largeLength sessionAddressUri ; as above
length = 1*1 OCTET ; for binary data up to 255 bytes
largeLength = 2*2 OCTET ; for binary data up to 65535 bytes
packetPad = <pad packet size to 1450 bytes> ; possibly, we may need to move KEM agreement one step later,
; with encapsulation key in HELLO block and KEM ciphertext in reply to HELLO.
```
### Establishing session TLS connection
Host connects to controller via TCP session and validates CA credentials during TLS handshake. Controller acts as a TCP server in this connection, to avoid host device listening on a port, which might create an attack vector. During TLS handshake the controller's TCP server MUST present a self-signed two-certificate chain where the fingerprint of the first certificate MUST be the same as in the announcement.
Host device presents its own client certificate chain with CA representing a long-term identity of the host device.
### Session verification and protocol negotiation
Once TLS session is established, both the host and controller device present a "session security code" to the user who must match them (e.g., visually or via QR code scan) and confirm on the host device. The session security code must be a digest of tlsunique channel binding. As it is computed as a digest of the TLS handshake for both the controller and the host, it will validate that the same TLS certificates are used on both sides, and that the same TLS session is established, mitigating the possibility of MITM attack in the connection.
Once the session is confirmed by the user, the host device sends "hello" block to the controller. ALPN TLS extension is not used to obtain tlsunique prior to sending any packets.
Block size should be 16384 bytes.
Host HELLO must contain:
- new session DH key - used to compute new shared secret with the controller keys from the announcement.
- encrypted part of hello block (JSON object), containing:
- chosen protocol version.
- host CA TLS certificate fingerprint - part of host long term identity - must match the one presented in TLS handshake and the previous sessions, otherwise the connection is terminated.
- KEM encapsulation key - used to compute new shared secret for the session.
- additional application specific parameters, e.g host device name, application version, host settings or JSON encoding format.
Hello block syntax:
```abnf
hostHello = unpaddedSize %s"HELLO " dhPubKey nonce encrypted(unpaddedSize hostHelloJSON helloPad) pad
unpaddedSize = largeLength
dhPubKey = length x509encoded
pad = <pad block size to 16384 bytes>
helloPad = <pad hello size to 12888 bytes>
largeLength = 2*2 OCTET
```
Controller decrypts (including the first session) and validates the received hello block:
- Chosen versions are supported (must be within offered ranges).
- CA fingerprint matches the one presented in TLS handshake and the previous sessions - in subsequent sessions TLS connection should be rejected if the fingerprint is different.
JTD schema for the encrypted part of host HELLO block `hostHelloJSON`:
```json
{
"definitions": {
"version": {
"type": "string",
"metadata": {
"format": "[0-9]+"
}
},
"base64url": {
"type": "string",
"metadata": {
"format": "base64url"
}
}
},
"properties": {
"v": {"ref": "version"},
"ca": {"ref": "base64url"},
"kem": {"ref": "base64url"}
},
"optionalProperties": {
"app": {"properties": {}, "additionalProperties": true}
},
"additionalProperties": true
}
```
Controller should reply with with `hello` or `error` response:
```abnf
ctrlHello = unpaddedSize %s"HELLO " kemCyphertext nonce encrypted(unpaddedSize ctrlHelloJSON helloPad) pad
; ctrlHelloJSON is encrypted with the hybrid secret,
; including both previously agreed DH secret and KEM secret from kemCyphertext
unpaddedSize = largeLength
kemCyphertext = largeLength *OCTET
pad = <pad block size to 16384 bytes>
helloPad = <pad hello size to 12888 bytes>
largeLength = 2*2 OCTET
ctrlError = unpaddedSize %s"ERROR " nonce encrypted(unpaddedSize ctrlErrorJSON helloPad) pad
; ctrlErrorJSON is encrypted using previously agreed DH secret.
```
JTD schema for the encrypted part of controller HELLO block `ctrlHelloJSON`:
```json
{
"properties": {},
"additionalProperties": true
}
```
JTD schema for the encrypted part of controller ERROR block `ctrlErrorJSON`:
```json
{
"properties": {
"message": {"type": "string"}
},
"additionalProperties": true
}
```
Once controller replies HELLO to the valid host HELLO block, it should stop accepting new TCP connections.
### Сontroller/host session operation
The protocol for communication during the session is out of scope of this protocol.
SimpleX Chat will use HTTP2 encoding, where host device acts as a server and controller acts as a client (these roles are reversed compared with TLS connection).
Payloads in the protocol must be encrypted using NaCL cryptobox using the hybrid shared secret agreed during session establishment.
Commands of the controller must be signed after the encryption using the controller's session and long term Ed25519 keys.
tlsunique channel binding from TLS session MUST be included in commands (included in the signed body).
The syntax for encrypted command and response body encoding:
```
commandBody = encBody sessSignature idSignature (attachment / noAttachment)
responseBody = encBody attachment; should match counter in the command
encBody = nonce encLength32 encrypted(tlsunique counter body)
attachment = %x01 nonce encLength32 encrypted(attachment)
noAttachment = %x00
tlsunique = length 1*OCTET
counter = 8*8 OCTET ; int64
encLength32 = 4*4 OCTET ; uint32, includes authTag
```
If the command or response includes attachment, it's hash must be included in command/response and validated.
## Key agreement for announcement packet and for session
Initial announcement is shared out-of-band (URI with xrcp scheme), and it is not encrypted.
This announcement contains only DH keys, as KEM key is too large to include in QR code, which are used to agree encryption key for host HELLO block. The host HELLO block will containt DH key in plaintext part and KEM encapsulation (public) key in encrypted part, that will be used to determine the shared secret (using SHA256 over concatenated DH shared secret and KEM encapsulated secret) both for controller HELLO response (that contains KEM cyphertext in plaintext part) and subsequent session commands and responses.
During the next session the announcement is sent via encrypted multicast block. The shared key for this announcement and for host HELLO block is determined using the KEM shared secred from the previous session and DH shared secret computed using the host DH key from the previous session and the new controller DH key from the announcement.
For the session, the shared secred is computed again using the KEM shared secret encapsulated by the controller using the new KEM key from the HOST hello block and DH shared secret computed using the host DH key from HELLO block and the new controller DH key from the announcement.
To describe it in pseudocode:
```
// session 1
hostHelloSecret(1) = dhSecret(1)
sessionSecret(1) = sha256(dhSecret(1) || kemSecret(1)) // to encrypt session 1 data, incl. controller hello
dhSecret(1) = dh(hostHelloDhKey(1), controllerInvitationDhKey(1))
kemCiphertext(1) = enc(kemSecret(1), kemEncKey(1))
// kemEncKey is included in host HELLO, kemCiphertext - in controller HELLO
kemSecret(1) = dec(kemCiphertext(1), kemDecKey(1))
// multicast announcement for session n
announcementSecret(n) = sha256(dhSecret(n'))
dhSecret(n') = dh(hostHelloDhKey(n - 1), controllerDhKey(n))
// session n
hostHelloSecret(n) = dhSecret(n)
sessionSecret(n) = sha256(dhSecret(n) || kemSecret(n)) // to encrypt session n data, incl. controller hello
dhSecret(n) = dh(hostHelloDhKey(n), controllerDhKey(n))
// controllerDhKey(n) is either from invitation or from multicast announcement
kemCiphertext(n) = enc(kemSecret(n), kemEncKey(n))
kemSecret(n) = dec(kemCiphertext(n), kemDecKey(n))
```
If controller fails to store the new host DH key after receiving HELLO block, the encryption will become out of sync and the host won't be able to decrypt the next announcement. To mitigate it, the host should keep the last session DH key and also previous session DH key to try to decrypt the next announcement computing shared secret using both keys (first the new one, and in case it fails - the previous).
To decrypt multicast announcement, the host should try to decrypt it using the keys of all known (paired) remote controllers.
## Other options
The proposed design has these pros/cons:
Pros:
- mobile host that has sensitive data doesn't act as TLS server.
- multicast is optional - all sessions can happen via QR code only.
Cons:
- reversing of client/server roles between TLS and HTTP2.
- in the first session mobile host TLS client credentials are verified after TLS connection is accepted.
- cannot be used with host that runs in VM.
The alternative design will use mobile host device as TLS server. The session negotiation process:
- desktop shares its initial credentials via QR code, only for the first session
- mobile sends encrypted multicast with session address, TLS CA fingerprint, DH key in clear text
- desktop connects to mobile
- session tlsunique presented to users on both devices - either user would have to confirm session on both devices or the mobile would have to send an additional "ready" block.
Pros:
- no reversing server role between TLS and HTTP2
- TLS credentials are exchanged before TLS, so invalid credentials can be rejected during the handshake of the first session.
- if some other way to pass data from host to controller is added, then it can be used with host running in VM.
Cons:
- multicast is mandatory, as there is no efficient way to communicate from mobile to desktop.
- still needs hello or confirmation on both devices
- mobile is now acting as TLS server creating additional attack vector
In both proposed and alternative design mobile host has chat data, acts as HTTP2 server, commands are signed with desktop key presented out-ofband, and both commands and responses are encrypted inside TLS session.
Other considered options:
- SSH - more work integrating it.
- use SMP connection to negotiate TLS session - it seems wrong to require Internet connection to negotiate a local network connection between desktop and mobile.
- other multicast service discovery protocols - quite insecure.
## Threat model
#### A passive network adversary able to monitor the site-local traffic:
*can:*
- observe session times, duration and volume of the transmitted data between host and controller.
*cannot:*
- observe the content of the transmitted data.
- substitute the transmitted commands or responses.
- replay transmitted commands or events from the hosts.
#### An active network adversary able to intercept and substitute the site-local traffic:
*can:*
- prevent host and controller devices from establishing the session
*cannot:*
- same as passive adversary, provided that user visually verified session code out-of-band.
#### An active adversary with the access to the network:
*can:*
- spam controller device.
*cannot:*
- compromise host or controller devices.
#### An active adversary with the access to the network who also observed OOB announcement:
*can:*
- connect to controller instead of the host.
- present incorrect data to the controller.
*cannot:*
- connect to the host or make host connect to itself.
#### Compromised controller device:
*can:*
- observe the content of the transmitted data.
- access any data of the controlled host application, within the capabilities of the provided API.
*cannot:*
- access other data on the host device.
- compromise host device.
#### Compromised host device:
*can:*
- present incorrect data to the controller.
- incorrectly interpret controller commands.
*cannot:*
- access controller data, even related to this host device.
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# Notification server
## Background and motivation
SimpleX Chat clients should receive message notifications when not being online and/or subscribed to SMP servers.
To avoid revealing identities of clients directly to SMP servers via any kind of push notification tokens, a new party called SimpleX Notification Server is introduced to act as a service for subscribing to SMP server queue notifications on behalf of clients and sending push notifications to them.
## Proposal
TCP service using the same TLS transport as SMP server, with the fixed size blocks (256 bytes?) and the following set of commands:
### Protocol
#### Create subscription
Command:
`%s"CREATE " ntfSmpQueueURI ntfPrivateKey token subPublicKey`
Response:
`s%"OK"`
#### Check subscription status
Command:
`%s"CHECK " ntfSmpQueueURI`
Response:
```abnf
statusResp = %s"STAT " status
status = %s"ERR AUTH" / "ERR SMP AUTH" / %s"ERR SMP TIMEOUT" / %s"ACTIVE" / %s"PENDING"
```
#### Update subscription device token
Command:
`%s"TOKEN " ntfSmpQueueURI token`
Response:
`s%"OK" / %s"ERR"`
#### Delete subscription (e.g. when deleting the queue or moving to another notification server)
Command:
`%s"DELETE " SP ntfSmpQueueURI`
Response:
`s%"OK" / %s"ERR"`
### Agent schema changes
See [migration](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Store/SQLite/Migrations/M20220322_notifications.hs)
### Agent code
```haskell
data NtfOptions = NtfOptions
{ ntfServer :: Server, -- same type as for SMP servers, probably will be renamed
ntfToken :: ByteString,
ntfInitialCheckDelay :: Int, -- initial check delay after subscription is created, seconds
ntfPeriodicCheckInterval :: Int -- subscription check interval, seconds
}
data AgentConfig = AgentConfig {
-- ...
initialNtfOpts :: Maybe NtfOptions
-- ...
}
data AgentClient = AgentClient {
-- ...
ntfOpts :: TVar (Maybe NtfOptions)
-- ...
}
```
A configuration parameter `initialNtfOpts :: Maybe NtfOptions` - if it is set or changes the agent would automatically manage subscriptions as SMP queues are subscribed/created/deleted and as the token or server changes.
There will be a method to update notifications configuration in case token or server changes.
All subscriptions will be managed in a separate subscription management loop, that would always take the earliest un-updated subscription that requires some action (ntf_sub_action column) and perform this action - the table of subscription would serve both as the table of existing subscriptions and required actions.
E.g. if the queue is subscribed and there is no notification subscription, it will be created in the table with "create" action, and the loop would create it and schedule "check" action on it.
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# SMP protocol changes to support push notifications on iOS
## Problem
There are already commands/responses to allow subscriptions to message notifications - NKEY/NID, NSUB/NMSG. These commands will be used by SMP agent (NKEY/NID) and by notification server (NSUB/NMSG) to have message notifications delivered to notification server, so it can forward them to APNS server using device token.
There are two remaining problems that these commands do not solve.
1. Receiving the message when notification arrives.
iOS requires creating a bundled notification service extension (NSE) that runs in isolated container and, if we were to use the existing commands, would have SMP subscription to the same SMP servers as the main app, triggering resubscriptions every time the message reception switches between the app and NSE. That would cause a substantial increase in traffic and battery consumption to the users.
2. Showing notifications for service messages.
Users do not expect to see notifications for every single SMP messages - e.g., we currently do not show notifications when messages are edited and deleted, and users do not expect them. NSE requires that for every received push notification there should be some notification shown to the users. So only we would have to show a notification for message deletes and updates, we would have to show it for all service messages - e.g. user accepted file invitation, or file transmission has started, contact profile updates and so on.
We considered differentiating whether notifications are sent per queue, from the recipient side, so we do not send notifications for file queues. But it seems insufficient, particularly if we add such features as message receipts, status updates, etc.
## Proposal
1. To retrieve messages when push notifications arrive, we will add 2 SMP commands:
- GET: retrieve one message from the connection. Resonse could be either MSG (the same as when MSG is delivered, but with the correlation id) or GMSG (to simplify processing) TBC during implementation. If message is not available, the response could be ERR NO_MSG
- ACK or GACK: acknowledge that the message was processed by the client and can be removed - TBC which one is better. The response is OK or ERR NO_MSG if there was nothing to acknowledge (same as with ACK now)
This would allow receiving a single message from the queue without subscription, this way avoiding that the main app is unsubscribed from the queue.
2. The only way to avoid showing unnecessary notifications (status updates, service messages, etc.) is to avoid sending them. That requires instructing SMP server whether notification should be sent both per queue, from the recipient side, and per message - from the sender side. So the notification would only be sent if the queue has them enabled (via NKEY command) and the sender includes an additional flag in SEND command. The same flag should be included into MSG, so when the message is retrieved with GET command, the client knows, on the agent or chat level (or both), whether this message should have notification shown to the user, and if not - retrieve the next one(s) as well.
This is a substantial change to SMP protocol, that would require client and server upgrade for notifications to be supported.
We should consider whether to increase the SMP protocol version number to 2, so that the new clients can connect to the old clients but without notifications, or we could keep the old commands in the protocol and instead of adding flags to the existing commands, create new commands.
We can also consider making commands extensible so that the new flags can be added (and ignored by parsers if not supported) to at least some existing commands.
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# DB access and processing messages for iOS notification service extension
## Problem
The only way to receive/process notificaitons is via a separate NSE process that requires a concurrent DB and network access.
SQLite concurenncy does not work, so we need to sync database access.
The problem is complex, as we do not directly control db access from the app, it can be triggered by the message arriving and it may fail to complete in case the app is suspended in the background.
So we need to prevent db access from starting when we know the app is about to be suspended.
The last problem is how to receive and process messages in NSE - should it use recently added GET command or should it subscribe to the connections that receive messages and process messages normally.
To summarize, 2 problems need to be solved:
1. sync db access between 2 (or more, if we add share extension) processes
2. prevent access from starting when the process is due to suspend, only complete operations.
3. Receiveing and processing agent messages in NSE
## Proposed solution
For problem 1, we can use Posix semaphores from our core code, in the same bracket that manages database connection - it would wait for semaphore to be free and unlock it once the db operation is complete.
For problem 2, we need to communicate from the app when it goes to the background to prevent database access starting and completing before the suspension. This would set some `aboutToSuspend` STM flag (or the opposite) that would prevent operations from progressing (using STM retry, that would block until the flag has the value allowing operation to progress).
Several possibilities can be considered:
- use this flag in the bracket that provides DB connections. While simple, it may lock some operations in the middle and may also lead to the situation when network operation succeeds but database access was blocked, and the database is not updated.
- use this flag to stop network operations that would require database updates - like sending messages, subscriptions and ACK - all these operations would require database access once they succeed.
- use two flags, for both cases above, but set them at different times since going to background - block new network operations as soon as the app goes to the background and block database access once the app is about to be suspended.
The last option seems more robust. To do it, there will be an api allowing the app to communicat its phase:
- app going to the background would trigger blocking new network operations and start a new background task - `background` phase.
- background task receiving completion warning, or, maybe, some time after it is started - probably 20 seconds - or whatever happens earlier - would trigger call blocking db access - `suspended` phase.
- app becoming active would trigger unblocking both flags - `active` phase.
`/_app phase <phase>` where `phase` can be one of the above values.
NSE would also use the same phases:
- sending `active` when it is started (the process starts as active, but it is possible that the new notification arrives to the same process, after the previous one sent background/suspension)
- sending `background + suspended` (or `suspended` should set both flags) once it is finished processing the notification, provided no new notification arrived and started processing - this should be tracked in NSE.
For problem 3, NSE can do one of the following:
- use SUB and process messages normally - the downside is that the app will have to resubscribe and it has to be tracked.
- use GET and process messages by pushing them through the processing function - the downside it that a rewiring of message processing is needed.
- use GET but deliver messages through the same queue as when they arrive normally (in which case getMessage agent function should not return the message, but will return a flag showing whether the message was received, or, possibly, or, possibly will return a message but the message would also be sent to the queue?).
- process messages in agent manually and in chat via the queue.
One of the downside of GET is that it requires calling GET again after ACK. We could have two variants of ACK (or additional ACK parameter) - one that never delivers a new message, and another one that does. In this case, if get needs to process the next message (when the current one has no notification flag), it can call ACK that delivers the next message. But, it is probably a premature optimization, and having general support of batched commands would add more value.
Additional problem is concurrency in NSE - if the new notification from the same queue arrives before the current one finishes processing in the same process one of the following can happen:
- the 2nd notification naively call GET and receives the same message.
- the 2nd notification waits until the first finished processing, in which case it can run out of time.
The problem is that the app won't know it's the same queue, as nId is encrypted, so the agent should handle this scenario when the new call to getMessage is made before the previous one finished processing, and differentiate between calls made for additional messages (possibly, getMessage should include previous message ID, if it is available) and the first call.
EDIT: GETs have to be sent from UI to chat and from chat to agent as function calls, but the agent will have to queue get calls to make sure they return different messages. GET call would return message flags (incl. notification flag), so that the UI can send the next GET if needed without waiting.
Considered alternative: include notification content in the message and have NSE only perform decryption, without any network IO. In this case notification content would be in SEND and in NMSG, e2e encrypted.
While promising, as it solves network coordination issues and makes GET unnecessary, it creates mutliple other problems, so it was rejected:
- message content is exposed to centralized ntf and apns servers, creating additional attack vector.
- it adds complexity in security critical parts of the stack - double ratchet encryption, as it requires either storing message keys and using different IVs for notifications, or initializing completely separate ratchet for notifications content.
- it reduces the size of the message.
- it makes user experience worse, as:
- it would not accelerate handshake for new contacts and for file delivery - this approach only works for content messages.
- it would open the app without the new messages - the users would have to wait until the messages are received. It is also bad for "security optics" - the users might think that the message content was exposed to notifications.
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sequenceDiagram
participant M as iOS message<br>notification
participant S as iOS system
participant N as iOS NSE
participant U as iOS UI
participant C as Core chat
participant A as Core agent
M ->> N: notification
S ->> N: get app pref
note over N: ignore,<br>app is active
note over M, A: app going to background
S ->> U: phase: background<br>(possibly, "will" method)
U ->> S: set app pref "pausing"
U ->> C: /_app phase paused, result CRCmdOk
C ->> A: pauseAgent<br>(no new network IO)
M ->> N: notification
S ->> N: get app pref
note over N: wait/poll for<br>"paused"/"suspending"/"suspended"<br>event/pref
A ->> C: event "IO paused"<br>(after in-flight op completed)<br>PHASE PAUSED
C ->> U: event "IO paused" (CRAppPaused)
U ->> S: set shared pref "paused"
note over M, A: process notification
M ->> N: notification
S ->> N: get app pref<br>continue if<br>"paused"/"suspending"/"suspended"
N ->> S: set NSE pref "active"
N ->> C: /_get message
C ->> A: getMessage
A ->> C: msg flags
C ->> N: msg flags
note over N: get messages<br>until notification flag set
A ->> C: MSG/CONF/INFO
C ->> N: some event
N ->> S: set NSE pref "completed"
N ->> S: show notification
note over M, A: app about to be suspended<br>(or 15-20 sec after background)
S ->> U: background task notice
U ->> S: set app pref "suspending"
U ->> C: /_app phase suspended, response ok
C ->> A: suspendAgent<br>(no new DB)
A ->> C: event "DB paused"<br>(after in-flight op completed)<br>PHASE SUSPENDED
C ->> U: event "DB paused" (CRAppSuspended)
U ->> S: set app pref "suspended"
note over M, A: app about to be activated
S ->> U: phase: active<br>(or inactive?)<br><br>(possibly, "will" method)
S ->> U: get NSE pref
U ->> S: set app pref "activating"
alt nse active?
U ->> C: /_app phase inactive
note over U: poll/wait till NSE pref is "completed"
end
U ->> C: /_app phase active (response result)
C ->> A: activateAgent<br>(allow IO/DB)
A ->> C: result ()
C ->> U: CRCmdOk
U ->> S: set app pref "active"
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# Accessing SMP servers via Tor
## Problem
While SMP protocol is focussed on minimizing application-level meta-data by using pair-wise identifiers instead of user profile identifiers, it is important for many users to protect their IP addresses.
Further, even if IP addresses are hidden by onion routing, clients should be able to choose to use a separate TCP connection to subscribe to each queue, even though it increases traffic and battery consumption, as otherwise the servers can observe multiple queues accessed by the same client.
## Solution and requirements
While some users may want to access SMP servers via tor, some other users (even their contacts) may want the opposite - e.g., if they use the network when accessing Tor would be suspicious (or blocked).
Therefore we need to support the connections when one of the user accesses the same server via Tor (and, possibly, via onion address), while another user accesses this server without Tor.
At the same time the user accessing the server via Tor may not want that their contacts access this server without Tor, and it also may be possible that the server is not available under a normal (not .onion) address.
The proposed options for connecting via Tor are:
1. Access servers via Socks proxy: no/yes (specify port?)
2. Use .onion addresses: no/when available/warn/always
3. Require senders to use .onion addresses: yes/no
4. Use separate TCP connection for each queue
While it should be possible for SMP servers to have two addresses (with and without Tor), the queues should only use one server address - if the queue started being accessed via .onion address it should not be possible to access it via a normal address. Queue addresses in connection invitations should support dual server addresses (when senders are not required ot use .onion address).
At the same time, the queue with the normal addresses can be accessed with and without Tor, depending on the current device settings.
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# SMP queue rotation and redundancy
## Problem
1. Long term usage of the queue allows the servers to analyze long term traffic patterns.
2. If the user changes the configured SMP server(s), the previously created contacts do not migrate to the new server(s).
3. Server can lose messages.
## Solution
Additional messages exchanged by SMP agents to negotiate addition and removal of queues to the connection.
This approach allows for both rotation and redundancy, as changing queue will be done be adding a queue and then removing the existing queue.
The reason for this approach is that otherwise it's non-trivial to switch from one queue to another without losing messages or delivering them out of order, it's easier to have messages delivered via both queues during the switch, however short or long time it is.
### Messages
Additional agent messages required for the protocol:
QADD_ -> "QA"
QKEY_ -> "QK"
QUSE_ -> "QU"
QTEST_ -> "QT"
`QADD`: add the new queue address(es), the same format as `REPLY` message, encoded as `QA`.
`QKEY`: pass sender's key via existing connection (SMP confirmation message will not be used, to avoid the same "race" of the initial key exchange that would create the risk of intercepting the queue for the attacker), encoded as `QK`.
`QUSE`: instruct the sender to use the new queue with sender's queue ID as parameter, encoded as `QU`.
`QTEST`: send test message to the new connection, encoded as `QT`. Any other message can be sent if available to continue rotation, the absence of this message is not an error. Once this message is successfully sent the sender will stop using the old queue. Once this message (or any other message in the new queue) is received, the recipient will stop using the old queue and delete it.
### Protocol
```
participant A as Alice
participant B as Bob
participant R as Server that has A's receive queue
participant S as Server that has A's send queue (B's receive queue)
participant R' as Server that hosts the new A's receive queue
A ->> R': create new queue
A ->> S ->> B: QADD (R'): snd address of the new queue(s)
B ->> S(R) ->> A: QKEY (R'): sender's key for the new queue(s) (to avoid the race of SMP confirmation for the initial exchange)
A ->> S(R'): secure new queue
A ->> S ->> B: QUSE (R'): instruction to use new queue(s)
B ->> S(R') ->> A: QTEST
A ->> S(R): DEL: delete the old queue
B ->> S(R') ->> A: send all new messages to the new queue
```
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# SMP Basic Auth
## Problem
Users who host their own servers do not want unknown people to be able to create messaging queues on their servers after discovering server address in groups or after making a connection. As the number of self-hosted servers is growing it became more important than it was when we excluded it from the original design.
## Solution
Single access password that can be optionally included in server address that is passed to app configuration. It will not be allowed in the existing contexts (and parsing will fail), to avoid accidentally leaking it. Server address with password will look this way: `smp://fingerprint:password@hosts`
## Implementation plan
1. A separate type to include server and password, so it can only be used where allowed.
2. Server password to create queues will be configured in TRANSPORT section of INI file, as `create_password` parameter.
3. The password will only be required in server configuration/address to create queues only, it won't be required for other receiving queue operations on already existing queues.
4. If new command is attempted in the session that does not allow creating queues, the server will send `ERR AUTH` response
5. Passing password to the server can be done in one of the several ways, we need to decide:
- as a parameter of NEW command. Pros: a local change, that only needs checking when queue is created. Cons: protocol version change.
- as a separate command AUTH. Pros: allows to include additional parameters and potentially be extended beyond basic auth. Cons: more complex to manage server state, can be more difficult syntax in the future, if extended.
- as part of handshake (we currently ignore the unparsed part of handshake block, so it can be extended). Pros: probably, the simplest, and independent of the commands protocol establishes create permission for the current session. Cons: the client won't know about whether it is able to create the queue until it tries (same as in case 1).
My preference is the last option. As a variant of the last option, we can add a server response/message that includes permission to create queues - it will only be sent to the clients who pass credential in handshake - that might simplify testing server connection (we currently do not do it). It might be unnecessary, as we could simply create and delete queue in case credential is passed as part of testing connection (and even sending a message to it).
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#!/usr/bin/env sh
confd='/etc/opt/simplex'
logd='/var/opt/simplex/'
# Check if server has been initialized
if [ ! -f "${confd}/smp-server.ini" ]; then
# If not, determine ip or domain
case "${ADDR}" in
'') printf 'Please specify $ADDR environment variable.\n'; exit 1 ;;
*[a-zA-Z]*)
case "${ADDR}" in
*:*) set -- --ip "${ADDR}" ;;
*) set -- -n "${ADDR}" ;;
esac
;;
*) set -- --ip "${ADDR}" ;;
esac
# Optionally, set password
case "${PASS}" in
'') set -- "$@" --no-password ;;
*) set -- "$@" --password "${PASS}" ;;
esac
# And init certificates and configs
smp-server init -y -l "$@"
fi
# Backup store log just in case
#
# Uses the UTC (universal) time zone and this
# format: YYYY-mm-dd'T'HH:MM:SS
# year, month, day, letter T, hour, minute, second
#
# This is the ISO 8601 format without the time zone at the end.
#
_file="${logd}/smp-server-store.log"
if [ -f "${_file}" ]; then
_backup_extension="$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S')"
cp -v -p "${_file}" "${_file}.${_backup_extension:-date-failed}"
unset -v _backup_extension
fi
unset -v _file
# Finally, run smp-sever. Notice that "exec" here is important:
# smp-server replaces our helper script, so that it can catch INT signal
exec smp-server start +RTS -N -RTS
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#!/usr/bin/env sh
confd='/etc/opt/simplex-xftp'
logd='/var/opt/simplex-xftp'
# Check if server has been initialized
if [ ! -f "${confd}/file-server.ini" ]; then
# If not, determine ip or domain
case "${ADDR}" in
'') printf 'Please specify $ADDR environment variable.\n'; exit 1 ;;
*[a-zA-Z]*)
case "${ADDR}" in
*:*) set -- --ip "${ADDR}" ;;
*) set -- -n "${ADDR}" ;;
esac
;;
*) set -- --ip "${ADDR}" ;;
esac
# Set quota
case "${QUOTA}" in
'') printf 'Please specify $QUOTA environment variable.\n'; exit 1 ;;
*GB) QUOTA="$(printf ${QUOTA} | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')"; set -- "$@" --quota "${QUOTA}" ;;
*gb) set -- "$@" --quota "${QUOTA}" ;;
*) printf 'Wrong format. Format should be: 1gb, 10gb, 100gb.\n'; exit 1 ;;
esac
# Init the certificates and configs
xftp-server init -l -p /srv/xftp "$@"
fi
# Backup store log just in case
#
# Uses the UTC (universal) time zone and this
# format: YYYY-mm-dd'T'HH:MM:SS
# year, month, day, letter T, hour, minute, second
#
# This is the ISO 8601 format without the time zone at the end.
#
_file="${logd}/file-server-store.log"
if [ -f "${_file}" ]; then
_backup_extension="$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S')"
cp -v -p "${_file}" "${_file}.${_backup_extension:-date-failed}"
unset -v _backup_extension
fi
unset -v _file
# Finally, run xftp-sever. Notice that "exec" here is important:
# smp-server replaces our helper script, so that it can catch INT signal
exec xftp-server start +RTS -N -RTS
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#!/usr/bin/env sh
set -eu
path_conf_var="/var/opt"
path_conf_smp="$path_conf_var/simplex"
path_conf_xftp="$path_conf_var/simplex-xftp"
path_conf_storelog_smp="$path_conf_smp/smp-server-store.log"
path_conf_storelog_xftp="$path_conf_xftp/file-server-store.log"
date="$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S')"
backup_smp() {
if [ -e "$path_conf_storelog_smp" ]; then
cp "$path_conf_storelog_smp" "${path_conf_storelog_smp}.${date:-date-failed}"
fi
}
backup_xftp() {
if [ -e "$path_conf_storelog_xftp" ]; then
cp "$path_conf_storelog_xftp" "${path_conf_storelog_xftp}.${date:-date-failed}"
fi
}
if [ "$1" = 'smp-server' ]; then
backup_smp
elif [ "$1" = 'xftp-server' ]; then
backup_xftp
else
backup_smp
backup_xftp
fi
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#!/usr/bin/env sh
set -eu
GRN='\033[0;32m'
RED='\033[0;31m'
NC='\033[0m'
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
printf "This script is intended to be run with root privileges. Please re-run script using sudo."
exit 1
fi
printf "${RED}This action will permanently remove all configs, directories, binaries from Installation Script. Please backup any relevant configs if they are needed.${NC}\n\nPress ${GRN}ENTER${NC} to continue or ${RED}Ctrl+C${NC} to cancel installation"
read ans
systemctl stop smp-server
systemctl stop xftp-server
rm -rf /var/opt/simplex /etc/opt/simplex /var/opt/simplex-xftp /etc/opt/simplex-xftp /srv/xftp /etc/systemd/system/smp-server.service /etc/systemd/system/xftp-server.service /usr/local/bin/smp-server /usr/local/bin/xftp-server /usr/local/bin/simplex-servers-update /usr/local/bin/simplex-servers-uninstall
userdel smp && userdel xftp
printf "Uninstallation is complete! Thanks for trying out SimpleX!\n"
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#!/usr/bin/env sh
set -eu
# Links to scripts/configs
bin="https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/releases/latest/download"
bin_smp="$bin/smp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64"
bin_xftp="$bin/xftp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64"
scripts="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/stable/scripts/main"
scripts_systemd_smp="$scripts/smp-server.service"
scripts_systemd_xftp="$scripts/xftp-server.service"
scripts_update="$scripts/simplex-servers-update"
scripts_uninstall="$scripts/simplex-servers-uninstall"
scripts_stopscript="$scripts/simplex-servers-stopscript"
# Default installation paths
path_bin="/usr/local/bin"
path_bin_smp="$path_bin/smp-server"
path_bin_xftp="$path_bin/xftp-server"
path_bin_update="$path_bin/simplex-servers-update"
path_bin_uninstall="$path_bin/simplex-servers-uninstall"
path_bin_stopscript="$path_bin/simplex-servers-stopscript"
path_systemd="/etc/systemd/system"
path_systemd_smp="$path_systemd/smp-server.service"
path_systemd_xftp="$path_systemd/xftp-server.service"
# Temporary paths
path_tmp_bin="$(mktemp -d)"
path_tmp_bin_update="$path_tmp_bin/simplex-servers-update"
path_tmp_bin_uninstall="$path_tmp_bin/simplex-servers-uninstall"
path_tmp_bin_stopscript="$path_tmp_bin/simplex-servers-stopscript"
path_tmp_systemd_smp="$path_tmp_bin/smp-server.service"
path_tmp_systemd_xftp="$path_tmp_bin/xftp-server.service"
GRN='\033[0;32m'
BLU='\033[1;36m'
YLW='\033[1;33m'
RED='\033[0;31m'
NC='\033[0m'
# Currently, XFTP default to v0.1.0, so it doesn't make sense to check its version
local_version="$($path_bin_smp -v | awk '{print $3}')"
remote_version="$(curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L https://api.github.com/repos/simplex-chat/simplexmq/releases/latest | grep -i "tag_name" | awk -F \" '{print $4}')"
update_scripts() {
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$scripts_update" -o "$path_tmp_bin_update" && chmod +x "$path_tmp_bin_update"
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$scripts_uninstall" -o "$path_tmp_bin_uninstall" && chmod +x "$path_tmp_bin_uninstall"
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$scripts_stopscript" -o "$path_tmp_bin_stopscript" && chmod +x "$path_tmp_bin_stopscript"
if diff -q "$path_bin_uninstall" "$path_tmp_bin_uninstall" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
printf -- "- ${YLW}Uninstall script is up-to-date${NC}.\n"
rm "$path_tmp_bin_uninstall"
else
printf -- "- Updating uninstall script..."
mv "$path_tmp_bin_uninstall" "$path_bin_uninstall"
printf "${GRN}Done!${NC}\n"
fi
if diff -q "$path_bin_stopscript" "$path_tmp_bin_stopscript" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
printf -- "- ${YLW}Stopscript script is up-to-date${NC}.\n"
rm "$path_tmp_bin_stopscript"
else
printf -- "- Updating stopscript script..."
mv "$path_tmp_bin_stopscript" "$path_bin_stopscript"
printf "${GRN}Done!${NC}\n"
fi
if diff -q "$path_bin_update" "$path_tmp_bin_update" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
printf -- "- ${YLW}Update script is up-to-date${NC}.\n"
rm "$path_tmp_bin_update"
else
printf -- "- Updating update script..."
mv "$path_tmp_bin_update" "$path_bin_update"
printf "${GRN}Done!${NC}\n"
printf "Re-executing Update script with latest updates..."
exec sh "$path_bin_update" "continue"
fi
}
update_systemd() {
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$scripts_systemd_smp" -o "$path_tmp_systemd_smp"
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$scripts_systemd_xftp" -o "$path_tmp_systemd_xftp"
if diff -q "$path_systemd_smp" "$path_tmp_systemd_smp" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
printf -- "- ${YLW}smp-server service is up-to-date${NC}.\n"
rm "$path_tmp_systemd_smp"
else
printf -- "- Updating smp-server service..."
mv "$path_tmp_systemd_smp" "$path_systemd_smp"
systemctl daemon-reload
printf "${GRN}Done!${NC}\n"
fi
if diff -q "$path_systemd_xftp" "$path_tmp_systemd_xftp" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
printf -- "- ${YLW}xftp-server service is up-to-date${NC}.\n"
rm "$path_tmp_systemd_xftp"
else
printf -- "- Updating xftp-server service..."
mv "$path_tmp_systemd_xftp" "$path_systemd_xftp"
systemctl daemon-reload
printf "${GRN}Done!${NC}\n"
fi
}
update_bins() {
if [ "$local_version" != "$remote_version" ]; then
if systemctl is-active --quiet smp-server; then
printf -- "- Stopping smp-server service..."
systemctl stop smp-server
printf "${GRN}Done!${NC}\n"
printf -- "- Updating smp-server bin to %s..." "$remote_version"
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$bin_smp" -o "$path_bin_smp" && chmod +x "$path_bin_smp"
printf "${GRN}Done!${NC}\n"
printf -- "- Starting smp-server service..."
systemctl start smp-server
printf "${GRN}Done!${NC}\n"
else
printf -- "- Updating smp-server bin..."
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$bin_smp" -o "$path_bin_smp" && chmod +x "$path_bin_smp"
printf "${GRN}Done!${NC}\n"
fi
if systemctl is-active --quiet xftp-server; then
printf -- "- Stopping xftp-server service..."
systemctl stop xftp-server
printf "${GRN}Done!${NC}\n"
printf -- "- Updating xftp-server bin to %s..." "$remote_version"
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$bin_xftp" -o "$path_bin_xftp" && chmod +x "$path_bin_xftp"
printf "${GRN}Done!${NC}\n"
printf -- "- Starting xftp-server service..."
systemctl start xftp-server
printf "${GRN}Done!${NC}\n"
else
printf -- "- Updating xftp-server bin..."
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf -L "$bin_smp" -o "$path_bin_xftp" && chmod +x "$path_bin_xftp"
printf "${GRN}Done!${NC}\n"
fi
else
printf -- "- ${YLW}smp-server and xftp-server binaries is up-to-date${NC}.\n"
fi
}
checks() {
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
printf "This script is intended to be run with root privileges. Please re-run script using sudo.\n"
exit 1
fi
}
main() {
checks
set +u
if [ "$1" != "continue" ]; then
set -u
printf "Updating scripts...\n"
update_scripts
else
set -u
printf "${GRN}Done!${NC}\n"
fi
printf "Updating systemd services...\n"
update_systemd
printf "Updating simplex server binaries...\n"
update_bins
rm -rf "$path_tmp_bin"
}
main "$@"
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@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=SMP server
[Service]
User=smp
Group=smp
Type=simple
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/smp-server start +RTS -N -RTS
ExecStopPost=/usr/local/bin/simplex-servers-stopscript smp-server
LimitNOFILE=65535
KillSignal=SIGINT
TimeoutStopSec=infinity
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
-16
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@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=XFTP server
[Service]
User=xftp
Group=xftp
Type=simple
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/xftp-server start +RTS -N -RTS
ExecStopPost=/usr/local/bin/simplex-servers-stopscript xftp-server
LimitNOFILE=65535
KillSignal=SIGINT
TimeoutStopSec=infinity
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
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@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# <UDF name="enable_store_log" label="Store log - persist notification subscriptions to append only log and restore them upon server restart." default="on" oneof="on, off" />
# <UDF name="api_token" label="Linode API token - enable Linode to create tags with server address, fingerprint and version. Note: minimal permissions token should have are read/write access to `linodes` (to create tags) and `domains` (to add A record for the third level domain if FQDN is provided)." default="" />
# <UDF name="fqdn" label="FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) - provide third level domain name (e.g. ntf.example.com). If provided use `ntf://fingerprint@FQDN` as server address in the client. If FQDN is not provided use `ntf://fingerprint@IP` instead." default="" />
# <UDF name="apns_key_id" label="APNS key ID." default="" />
# Log all stdout output to stackscript.log
exec &> >(tee -i /var/log/stackscript.log)
# Uncomment next line to enable debugging features
# set -xeo pipefail
cd $HOME
# https://superuser.com/questions/1638779/automatic-yess-to-linux-update-upgrade
# https://superuser.com/questions/1412054/non-interactive-apt-upgrade
sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \
apt-get \
-o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confold \
-o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef \
-y --allow-downgrades --allow-remove-essential --allow-change-held-packages \
update
sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \
apt-get \
-o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confold \
-o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef \
-y --allow-downgrades --allow-remove-essential --allow-change-held-packages \
dist-upgrade
# TODO install unattended-upgrades
sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \
apt-get \
-o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confold \
-o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef \
-y --allow-downgrades --allow-remove-essential --allow-change-held-packages \
install jq
# Add firewall
echo "y" | ufw enable
# Open ports
ufw allow ssh
ufw allow https
ufw allow 5223
# Increase file descriptors limit
echo 'fs.file-max = 1000000' >> /etc/sysctl.conf
echo 'fs.inode-max = 1000000' >> /etc/sysctl.conf
echo 'root soft nofile unlimited' >> /etc/security/limits.conf
echo 'root hard nofile unlimited' >> /etc/security/limits.conf
# Download latest release
bin_dir="/opt/simplex-notifications/bin"
binary="$bin_dir/ntf-server"
mkdir -p $bin_dir
curl -L -o $binary https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/releases/latest/download/ntf-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64
chmod +x $binary
# / Add to PATH
cat > /etc/profile.d/simplex.sh << EOF
#!/bin/bash
export PATH="$PATH:$bin_dir"
EOF
# Add to PATH /
# Source and test PATH
source /etc/profile.d/simplex.sh
ntf-server --version
# Initialize server
init_opts=()
[[ $ENABLE_STORE_LOG == "on" ]] && init_opts+=(-l)
ip_address=$(curl ifconfig.me)
init_opts+=(--ip $ip_address)
[[ -n "$FQDN" ]] && init_opts+=(-n $FQDN)
ntf-server init "${init_opts[@]}"
# Server fingerprint
fingerprint=$(cat /etc/opt/simplex-notifications/fingerprint)
# Determine server address to specify in welcome script and Linode tag
if [[ -n "$FQDN" ]]; then
server_address=$FQDN
else
server_address=$ip_address
fi
# Set up welcome script
on_login_script="/opt/simplex-notifications/on_login.sh"
# / Welcome script
cat > $on_login_script << EOF
#!/bin/bash
fingerprint=\$1
server_address=\$2
cat << EOF2
********************************************************************************
SimpleX notifications server address: ntf://\$fingerprint@\$server_address
Check server status with: systemctl status ntf-server
To keep this server secure, the UFW firewall is enabled.
All ports are BLOCKED except 22 (SSH), 443 (HTTPS), 5223 (notifications server).
********************************************************************************
To stop seeing this message delete line - bash /opt/simplex-notifications/on_login.sh - from /root/.bashrc
EOF2
EOF
# Welcome script /
chmod +x $on_login_script
echo "bash $on_login_script $fingerprint $server_address" >> /root/.bashrc
# Create A record and update Linode's tags
if [[ -n "$API_TOKEN" ]]; then
if [[ -n "$FQDN" ]]; then
domain_address=$(echo $FQDN | rev | cut -d "." -f 1,2 | rev)
domain_id=$(curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" https://api.linode.com/v4/domains \
| jq --arg da "$domain_address" '.data[] | select( .domain == $da ) | .id')
if [[ -n $domain_id ]]; then
curl \
-s -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" \
-X POST -d "{\"type\":\"A\",\"name\":\"$FQDN\",\"target\":\"$ip_address\"}" \
https://api.linode.com/v4/domains/${domain_id}/records
fi
fi
version=$(ntf-server --version | cut -d ' ' -f 3-)
curl \
-s -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" \
-X PUT -d "{\"tags\":[\"$server_address\",\"$fingerprint\",\"$version\"]}" \
https://api.linode.com/v4/linode/instances/$LINODE_ID
fi
# / Create systemd service
cat > /etc/systemd/system/ntf-server.service << EOF
[Unit]
Description=SimpleX notifications server
[Service]
Environment="APNS_KEY_FILE=/etc/opt/simplex-notifications/AuthKey.p8"
Environment="APNS_KEY_ID=$APNS_KEY_ID"
Type=simple
ExecStart=/bin/sh -c "exec $binary start >> /var/opt/simplex-notifications/ntf-server.log 2>&1"
KillSignal=SIGINT
Restart=always
RestartSec=10
LimitNOFILE=1000000
LimitNOFILESoft=1000000
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
EOF
# Create systemd service /
# Start systemd service
chmod 644 /etc/systemd/system/ntf-server.service
sudo systemctl enable ntf-server
# ! APNS key file and certificate have to be copied manually
# sudo systemctl start ntf-server
# Reboot Linode to apply upgrades
# sudo reboot
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View File
@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ smp-server init "${init_opts[@]}"
fingerprint=$(cat /etc/opt/simplex/fingerprint)
# Determine server address to specify in welcome script and Linode tag
# ! If FQDN was provided and used as part of server initialization, server's certificate will not pass validation at client
# ! if client tries to connect by server's IP address, so we have to specify FQDN as server address in Linode tag and
# ! in welcome script regardless of creation of A record in Linode
# ! https://hackage.haskell.org/package/x509-validation-1.6.10/docs/src/Data-X509-Validation.html#validateCertificateName
if [[ -n "$FQDN" ]]; then
server_address=$FQDN
else
@@ -153,8 +157,6 @@ Description=SMP server
[Service]
Type=simple
ExecStart=/bin/sh -c "exec $binary start >> /var/opt/simplex/smp-server.log 2>&1"
KillSignal=SIGINT
TimeoutStopSec=infinity
Restart=always
RestartSec=10
LimitNOFILE=1000000
-37
View File
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
1. Install `tor` following [official guide](https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/setup/install/).
2. Modify `/etc/tor/torrc` configuration file:
```sh
...
# Disable anonymous mode for better connectivity
## Needed for HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode
SOCKSPort 0
## Needed for HiddenServiceSingleHopMode
HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1
## Flag to disable anonymous mode
## This option reduces the latency of server connection, but it makes server itself not anonymous,
## it only protects the anonymity of the users connecting to the server.
## In case your server address has both public and onion hostnames it is not anonymous anyway,
## so this is what you want.
HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1
# Specify folder for smp-tor
## Folder for keys, address, etc.
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/simplex-smp/
## Map smp port (5223) to tor
HiddenServicePort 5223 localhost:5223
...
```
3. Restart `tor` system service:
```
sudo systemctl restart tor
```
4. Onion address can be obtained from following file:
```sh
sudo cat /var/lib/tor/simplex-smp/hostname
```
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# systemd has to be configured to use SIGINT to save and restore undelivered messages after restart.
# Add this to [Service] section:
# KillSignal=SIGINT
curl -L -o /opt/simplex/bin/smp-server-new https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/releases/latest/download/smp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64
systemctl stop smp-server
cp /var/opt/simplex/smp-server-store.log /var/opt/simplex/smp-server-store.log.bak
mv /opt/simplex/bin/smp-server /opt/simplex/bin/smp-server-old
mv /opt/simplex/bin/smp-server-new /opt/simplex/bin/smp-server
chmod +x /opt/simplex/bin/smp-server
systemctl start smp-server
+92 -514
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
cabal-version: 1.12
-- This file has been generated from package.yaml by hpack version 0.35.0.
-- This file has been generated from package.yaml by hpack version 0.34.4.
--
-- see: https://github.com/sol/hpack
name: simplexmq
version: 5.5.0.4
version: 1.0.3
synopsis: SimpleXMQ message broker
description: This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,
<./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Client.html client> and
@@ -26,289 +26,90 @@ build-type: Simple
extra-source-files:
README.md
CHANGELOG.md
cbits/sha512.h
cbits/sntrup761.h
flag swift
description: Enable swift JSON format
manual: True
default: False
flag use_crypton
description: Use crypton etc. in cryptostore
manual: True
default: True
library
exposed-modules:
Simplex.FileTransfer.Agent
Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
Simplex.FileTransfer.Client
Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Agent
Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Main
Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Presets
Simplex.FileTransfer.Crypto
Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Control
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Main
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport
Simplex.FileTransfer.Types
Simplex.FileTransfer.Util
Simplex.Messaging.Agent
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Lock
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.NtfSubSupervisor
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.QueryString
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Server
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Common
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.DB
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220101_initial
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220301_snd_queue_keys
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220322_notifications
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220608_v2
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220625_v2_ntf_mode
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220811_onion_hosts
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220817_connection_ntfs
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220905_commands
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220915_connection_queues
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230110_users
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230117_fkey_indexes
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230120_delete_errors
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230217_server_key_hash
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230223_files
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230320_retry_state
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230401_snd_files
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230510_files_pending_replicas_indexes
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230516_encrypted_rcv_message_hashes
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230531_switch_status
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230615_ratchet_sync
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230701_delivery_receipts
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230720_delete_expired_messages
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230722_indexes
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230814_indexes
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230829_crypto_files
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20231222_command_created_at
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20231225_failed_work_items
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.TAsyncs
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.TRcvQueues
Simplex.Messaging.Builder
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220320_server_ips
Simplex.Messaging.Client
Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.Defines
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.FFI
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.RNG
Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Client
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Protocol
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Env
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Main
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Push.APNS
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Push.APNS.Internal
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Stats
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Store
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.StoreLog
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Transport
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Types
Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
Simplex.Messaging.Server
Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Control
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main
Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore
Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.STM
Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore
Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.STM
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats
Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
Simplex.Messaging.TMap
Simplex.Messaging.Transport
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Buffer
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Credentials
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Client
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Server
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.KeepAlive
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets
Simplex.Messaging.Util
Simplex.Messaging.Version
Simplex.RemoteControl.Client
Simplex.RemoteControl.Discovery
Simplex.RemoteControl.Discovery.Multicast
Simplex.RemoteControl.Invitation
Simplex.RemoteControl.Types
other-modules:
Paths_simplexmq
hs-source-dirs:
src
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns
include-dirs:
cbits
c-sources:
cbits/sha512.c
cbits/sntrup761.c
extra-libraries:
crypto
build-depends:
aeson ==2.2.*
QuickCheck ==2.14.*
, aeson ==2.0.*
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
, async ==2.2.*
, attoparsec ==0.14.*
, base >=4.14 && <5
, base >=4.7 && <5
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
, case-insensitive ==1.2.*
, bytestring ==0.10.*
, composition ==1.0.*
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
, containers ==0.6.*
, crypton ==0.34.*
, crypton-x509 ==1.7.*
, crypton-x509-store ==1.6.*
, crypton-x509-validation ==1.6.*
, cryptostore ==0.3.*
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
, cryptostore ==0.2.*
, data-default ==0.7.*
, direct-sqlcipher ==2.3.*
, direct-sqlite ==2.3.*
, directory ==1.3.*
, filepath ==1.4.*
, hourglass ==0.2.*
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
, http-types ==0.12.*
, http2 >=4.2.2 && <4.3
, ini ==0.4.1
, iproute ==1.7.*
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
, memory ==0.18.*
, mtl >=2.3.1 && <3.0
, network >=3.1.2.7 && <3.2
, network-info ==0.2.*
, network-transport ==0.5.6
, network-udp ==0.0.*
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
, process ==1.6.*
, memory ==0.15.*
, mtl ==2.2.*
, network ==3.1.*
, network-transport ==0.5.*
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
, simple-logger ==0.1.*
, socks ==0.6.*
, sqlcipher-simple ==0.4.*
, sqlite-simple ==0.4.*
, stm ==2.5.*
, temporary ==1.3.*
, time ==1.12.*
, time-manager ==0.0.*
, tls >=1.7.0 && <1.8
, transformers ==0.6.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text ==1.2.*
, time ==1.9.*
, tls >=1.5.7 && <1.6
, transformers ==0.5.*
, unliftio ==0.2.*
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
, websockets ==0.12.*
, yaml ==0.11.*
, x509 ==1.7.*
, x509-store ==1.6.*
, x509-validation ==1.6.*
default-language: Haskell2010
if flag(swift)
cpp-options: -DswiftJSON
if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
build-depends:
bytestring ==0.11.*
, template-haskell ==2.20.*
, text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
build-depends:
bytestring ==0.10.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
executable ntf-server
main-is: Main.hs
other-modules:
Paths_simplexmq
hs-source-dirs:
apps/ntf-server
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded -rtsopts
build-depends:
aeson ==2.2.*
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
, async ==2.2.*
, attoparsec ==0.14.*
, base >=4.14 && <5
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
, case-insensitive ==1.2.*
, composition ==1.0.*
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
, containers ==0.6.*
, crypton ==0.34.*
, crypton-x509 ==1.7.*
, crypton-x509-store ==1.6.*
, crypton-x509-validation ==1.6.*
, cryptostore ==0.3.*
, data-default ==0.7.*
, direct-sqlcipher ==2.3.*
, directory ==1.3.*
, filepath ==1.4.*
, hourglass ==0.2.*
, http-types ==0.12.*
, http2 >=4.2.2 && <4.3
, ini ==0.4.1
, iproute ==1.7.*
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
, memory ==0.18.*
, mtl >=2.3.1 && <3.0
, network >=3.1.2.7 && <3.2
, network-info ==0.2.*
, network-transport ==0.5.6
, network-udp ==0.0.*
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
, process ==1.6.*
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
, simple-logger ==0.1.*
, simplexmq
, socks ==0.6.*
, sqlcipher-simple ==0.4.*
, stm ==2.5.*
, temporary ==1.3.*
, time ==1.12.*
, time-manager ==0.0.*
, tls >=1.7.0 && <1.8
, transformers ==0.6.*
, unliftio ==0.2.*
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
, websockets ==0.12.*
, yaml ==0.11.*
default-language: Haskell2010
if flag(swift)
cpp-options: -DswiftJSON
if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
build-depends:
bytestring ==0.11.*
, template-haskell ==2.20.*
, text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
build-depends:
bytestring ==0.10.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
executable smp-agent
main-is: Main.hs
@@ -316,71 +117,51 @@ executable smp-agent
Paths_simplexmq
hs-source-dirs:
apps/smp-agent
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded -rtsopts
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded
build-depends:
aeson ==2.2.*
QuickCheck ==2.14.*
, aeson ==2.0.*
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
, async ==2.2.*
, attoparsec ==0.14.*
, base >=4.14 && <5
, base >=4.7 && <5
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
, case-insensitive ==1.2.*
, bytestring ==0.10.*
, composition ==1.0.*
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
, containers ==0.6.*
, crypton ==0.34.*
, crypton-x509 ==1.7.*
, crypton-x509-store ==1.6.*
, crypton-x509-validation ==1.6.*
, cryptostore ==0.3.*
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
, cryptostore ==0.2.*
, data-default ==0.7.*
, direct-sqlcipher ==2.3.*
, direct-sqlite ==2.3.*
, directory ==1.3.*
, filepath ==1.4.*
, hourglass ==0.2.*
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
, http-types ==0.12.*
, http2 >=4.2.2 && <4.3
, ini ==0.4.1
, iproute ==1.7.*
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
, memory ==0.18.*
, mtl >=2.3.1 && <3.0
, network >=3.1.2.7 && <3.2
, network-info ==0.2.*
, network-transport ==0.5.6
, network-udp ==0.0.*
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
, process ==1.6.*
, memory ==0.15.*
, mtl ==2.2.*
, network ==3.1.*
, network-transport ==0.5.*
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
, simple-logger ==0.1.*
, simplexmq
, socks ==0.6.*
, sqlcipher-simple ==0.4.*
, sqlite-simple ==0.4.*
, stm ==2.5.*
, temporary ==1.3.*
, time ==1.12.*
, time-manager ==0.0.*
, tls >=1.7.0 && <1.8
, transformers ==0.6.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text ==1.2.*
, time ==1.9.*
, tls >=1.5.7 && <1.6
, transformers ==0.5.*
, unliftio ==0.2.*
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
, websockets ==0.12.*
, yaml ==0.11.*
, x509 ==1.7.*
, x509-store ==1.6.*
, x509-validation ==1.6.*
default-language: Haskell2010
if flag(swift)
cpp-options: -DswiftJSON
if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
build-depends:
bytestring ==0.11.*
, template-haskell ==2.20.*
, text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
build-depends:
bytestring ==0.10.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
executable smp-server
main-is: Main.hs
@@ -388,217 +169,56 @@ executable smp-server
Paths_simplexmq
hs-source-dirs:
apps/smp-server
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded -rtsopts
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded
build-depends:
aeson ==2.2.*
QuickCheck ==2.14.*
, aeson ==2.0.*
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
, async ==2.2.*
, attoparsec ==0.14.*
, base >=4.14 && <5
, base >=4.7 && <5
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
, case-insensitive ==1.2.*
, bytestring ==0.10.*
, composition ==1.0.*
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
, containers ==0.6.*
, crypton ==0.34.*
, crypton-x509 ==1.7.*
, crypton-x509-store ==1.6.*
, crypton-x509-validation ==1.6.*
, cryptostore ==0.3.*
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
, cryptostore ==0.2.*
, data-default ==0.7.*
, direct-sqlcipher ==2.3.*
, direct-sqlite ==2.3.*
, directory ==1.3.*
, filepath ==1.4.*
, hourglass ==0.2.*
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
, http-types ==0.12.*
, http2 >=4.2.2 && <4.3
, ini ==0.4.1
, iproute ==1.7.*
, ini ==0.4.*
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
, memory ==0.18.*
, mtl >=2.3.1 && <3.0
, network >=3.1.2.7 && <3.2
, network-info ==0.2.*
, network-transport ==0.5.6
, network-udp ==0.0.*
, memory ==0.15.*
, mtl ==2.2.*
, network ==3.1.*
, network-transport ==0.5.*
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
, process ==1.6.*
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
, simple-logger ==0.1.*
, simplexmq
, socks ==0.6.*
, sqlcipher-simple ==0.4.*
, sqlite-simple ==0.4.*
, stm ==2.5.*
, temporary ==1.3.*
, time ==1.12.*
, time-manager ==0.0.*
, tls >=1.7.0 && <1.8
, transformers ==0.6.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text ==1.2.*
, time ==1.9.*
, tls >=1.5.7 && <1.6
, transformers ==0.5.*
, unliftio ==0.2.*
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
, websockets ==0.12.*
, yaml ==0.11.*
, x509 ==1.7.*
, x509-store ==1.6.*
, x509-validation ==1.6.*
default-language: Haskell2010
if flag(swift)
cpp-options: -DswiftJSON
if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
build-depends:
bytestring ==0.11.*
, template-haskell ==2.20.*
, text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
build-depends:
bytestring ==0.10.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
executable xftp
main-is: Main.hs
other-modules:
Paths_simplexmq
hs-source-dirs:
apps/xftp
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded -rtsopts
build-depends:
aeson ==2.2.*
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
, async ==2.2.*
, attoparsec ==0.14.*
, base >=4.14 && <5
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
, case-insensitive ==1.2.*
, composition ==1.0.*
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
, containers ==0.6.*
, crypton ==0.34.*
, crypton-x509 ==1.7.*
, crypton-x509-store ==1.6.*
, crypton-x509-validation ==1.6.*
, cryptostore ==0.3.*
, data-default ==0.7.*
, direct-sqlcipher ==2.3.*
, directory ==1.3.*
, filepath ==1.4.*
, hourglass ==0.2.*
, http-types ==0.12.*
, http2 >=4.2.2 && <4.3
, ini ==0.4.1
, iproute ==1.7.*
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
, memory ==0.18.*
, mtl >=2.3.1 && <3.0
, network >=3.1.2.7 && <3.2
, network-info ==0.2.*
, network-transport ==0.5.6
, network-udp ==0.0.*
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
, process ==1.6.*
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
, simple-logger ==0.1.*
, simplexmq
, socks ==0.6.*
, sqlcipher-simple ==0.4.*
, stm ==2.5.*
, temporary ==1.3.*
, time ==1.12.*
, time-manager ==0.0.*
, tls >=1.7.0 && <1.8
, transformers ==0.6.*
, unliftio ==0.2.*
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
, websockets ==0.12.*
, yaml ==0.11.*
default-language: Haskell2010
if flag(swift)
cpp-options: -DswiftJSON
if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
build-depends:
bytestring ==0.11.*
, template-haskell ==2.20.*
, text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
build-depends:
bytestring ==0.10.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
executable xftp-server
main-is: Main.hs
other-modules:
Paths_simplexmq
hs-source-dirs:
apps/xftp-server
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded -rtsopts
build-depends:
aeson ==2.2.*
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
, async ==2.2.*
, attoparsec ==0.14.*
, base >=4.14 && <5
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
, case-insensitive ==1.2.*
, composition ==1.0.*
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
, containers ==0.6.*
, crypton ==0.34.*
, crypton-x509 ==1.7.*
, crypton-x509-store ==1.6.*
, crypton-x509-validation ==1.6.*
, cryptostore ==0.3.*
, data-default ==0.7.*
, direct-sqlcipher ==2.3.*
, directory ==1.3.*
, filepath ==1.4.*
, hourglass ==0.2.*
, http-types ==0.12.*
, http2 >=4.2.2 && <4.3
, ini ==0.4.1
, iproute ==1.7.*
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
, memory ==0.18.*
, mtl >=2.3.1 && <3.0
, network >=3.1.2.7 && <3.2
, network-info ==0.2.*
, network-transport ==0.5.6
, network-udp ==0.0.*
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
, process ==1.6.*
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
, simple-logger ==0.1.*
, simplexmq
, socks ==0.6.*
, sqlcipher-simple ==0.4.*
, stm ==2.5.*
, temporary ==1.3.*
, time ==1.12.*
, time-manager ==0.0.*
, tls >=1.7.0 && <1.8
, transformers ==0.6.*
, unliftio ==0.2.*
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
, websockets ==0.12.*
, yaml ==0.11.*
default-language: Haskell2010
if flag(swift)
cpp-options: -DswiftJSON
if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
build-depends:
bytestring ==0.11.*
, template-haskell ==2.20.*
, text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
build-depends:
bytestring ==0.10.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
test-suite simplexmq-test
test-suite smp-server-test
type: exitcode-stdio-1.0
main-is: Test.hs
other-modules:
@@ -606,30 +226,13 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
AgentTests.ConnectionRequestTests
AgentTests.DoubleRatchetTests
AgentTests.FunctionalAPITests
AgentTests.MigrationTests
AgentTests.NotificationTests
AgentTests.SchemaDump
AgentTests.SQLiteTests
CLITests
CoreTests.BatchingTests
CoreTests.CryptoFileTests
CoreTests.CryptoTests
CoreTests.EncodingTests
CoreTests.ProtocolErrorTests
CoreTests.RetryIntervalTests
CoreTests.UtilTests
CoreTests.VersionRangeTests
FileDescriptionTests
NtfClient
NtfServerTests
RemoteControl
ServerTests
SMPAgentClient
SMPClient
XFTPAgent
XFTPCLI
XFTPClient
XFTPServerTests
Paths_simplexmq
hs-source-dirs:
tests
@@ -637,73 +240,48 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
build-depends:
HUnit ==1.6.*
, QuickCheck ==2.14.*
, aeson ==2.2.*
, aeson ==2.0.*
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
, async ==2.2.*
, attoparsec ==0.14.*
, base >=4.14 && <5
, base >=4.7 && <5
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
, case-insensitive ==1.2.*
, bytestring ==0.10.*
, composition ==1.0.*
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
, containers ==0.6.*
, crypton ==0.34.*
, crypton-x509 ==1.7.*
, crypton-x509-store ==1.6.*
, crypton-x509-validation ==1.6.*
, cryptostore ==0.3.*
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
, cryptostore ==0.2.*
, data-default ==0.7.*
, deepseq ==1.4.*
, direct-sqlcipher ==2.3.*
, direct-sqlite ==2.3.*
, directory ==1.3.*
, filepath ==1.4.*
, generic-random ==1.5.*
, hourglass ==0.2.*
, hspec ==2.11.*
, hspec-core ==2.11.*
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
, hspec ==2.7.*
, hspec-core ==2.7.*
, http-types ==0.12.*
, http2 >=4.2.2 && <4.3
, ini ==0.4.1
, iproute ==1.7.*
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
, main-tester ==0.2.*
, memory ==0.18.*
, mtl >=2.3.1 && <3.0
, network >=3.1.2.7 && <3.2
, network-info ==0.2.*
, network-transport ==0.5.6
, network-udp ==0.0.*
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
, process ==1.6.*
, memory ==0.15.*
, mtl ==2.2.*
, network ==3.1.*
, network-transport ==0.5.*
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
, silently ==1.2.*
, simple-logger ==0.1.*
, simplexmq
, socks ==0.6.*
, sqlcipher-simple ==0.4.*
, sqlite-simple ==0.4.*
, stm ==2.5.*
, temporary ==1.3.*
, time ==1.12.*
, time-manager ==0.0.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text ==1.2.*
, time ==1.9.*
, timeit ==2.0.*
, tls >=1.7.0 && <1.8
, transformers ==0.6.*
, tls >=1.5.7 && <1.6
, transformers ==0.5.*
, unliftio ==0.2.*
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
, websockets ==0.12.*
, yaml ==0.11.*
, x509 ==1.7.*
, x509-store ==1.6.*
, x509-validation ==1.6.*
default-language: Haskell2010
if flag(swift)
cpp-options: -DswiftJSON
if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
build-depends:
bytestring ==0.11.*
, template-haskell ==2.20.*
, text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
build-depends:
bytestring ==0.10.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
-556
View File
@@ -1,556 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE ConstraintKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-ambiguous-fields #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Agent
( startXFTPWorkers,
closeXFTPAgent,
toFSFilePath,
-- Receiving files
xftpReceiveFile',
xftpDeleteRcvFile',
-- Sending files
xftpSendFile',
deleteSndFileInternal,
deleteSndFileRemote,
)
where
import Control.Logger.Simple (logError)
import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.Reader
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
import Data.Composition ((.:))
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.List (foldl', sortOn)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Map (Map)
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Data.Text (Text)
import Data.Time.Clock (getCurrentTime)
import Data.Time.Format (defaultTimeLocale, formatTime)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client (XFTPChunkSpec (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Main
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Crypto
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileParty (..), SFileParty (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPRcvChunkSpec (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Types
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Util (removePath, uniqueCombine)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File (CryptoFile (..), CryptoFileArgs)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File as CF
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (EntityId, XFTPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (liftError, tshow, unlessM, whenM)
import System.FilePath (takeFileName, (</>))
import UnliftIO
import UnliftIO.Directory
startXFTPWorkers :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> Maybe FilePath -> m ()
startXFTPWorkers c workDir = do
wd <- asks $ xftpWorkDir . xftpAgent
atomically $ writeTVar wd workDir
cfg <- asks config
startRcvFiles cfg
startSndFiles cfg
startDelFiles cfg
where
startRcvFiles AgentConfig {rcvFilesTTL} = do
pendingRcvServers <- withStore' c (`getPendingRcvFilesServers` rcvFilesTTL)
forM_ pendingRcvServers $ \s -> resumeXFTPRcvWork c (Just s)
-- start local worker for files pending decryption,
-- no need to make an extra query for the check
-- as the worker will check the store anyway
resumeXFTPRcvWork c Nothing
startSndFiles AgentConfig {sndFilesTTL} = do
-- start worker for files pending encryption/creation
resumeXFTPSndWork c Nothing
pendingSndServers <- withStore' c (`getPendingSndFilesServers` sndFilesTTL)
forM_ pendingSndServers $ \s -> resumeXFTPSndWork c (Just s)
startDelFiles AgentConfig {rcvFilesTTL} = do
pendingDelServers <- withStore' c (`getPendingDelFilesServers` rcvFilesTTL)
forM_ pendingDelServers $ resumeXFTPDelWork c
closeXFTPAgent :: MonadUnliftIO m => XFTPAgent -> m ()
closeXFTPAgent a = do
stopWorkers $ xftpRcvWorkers a
stopWorkers $ xftpSndWorkers a
stopWorkers $ xftpDelWorkers a
where
stopWorkers workers = atomically (swapTVar workers M.empty) >>= mapM_ (liftIO . cancelWorker)
xftpReceiveFile' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> Maybe CryptoFileArgs -> m RcvFileId
xftpReceiveFile' c userId (ValidFileDescription fd@FileDescription {chunks}) cfArgs = do
g <- asks random
prefixPath <- getPrefixPath "rcv.xftp"
createDirectory prefixPath
let relPrefixPath = takeFileName prefixPath
relTmpPath = relPrefixPath </> "xftp.encrypted"
relSavePath = relPrefixPath </> "xftp.decrypted"
createDirectory =<< toFSFilePath relTmpPath
createEmptyFile =<< toFSFilePath relSavePath
let saveFile = CryptoFile relSavePath cfArgs
fId <- withStore c $ \db -> createRcvFile db g userId fd relPrefixPath relTmpPath saveFile
forM_ chunks downloadChunk
pure fId
where
downloadChunk :: AgentMonad m => FileChunk -> m ()
downloadChunk FileChunk {replicas = (FileChunkReplica {server} : _)} = do
void $ getXFTPRcvWorker True c (Just server)
downloadChunk _ = throwError $ INTERNAL "no replicas"
getPrefixPath :: AgentMonad m => String -> m FilePath
getPrefixPath suffix = do
workPath <- getXFTPWorkPath
ts <- liftIO getCurrentTime
let isoTime = formatTime defaultTimeLocale "%Y%m%d_%H%M%S_%6q" ts
uniqueCombine workPath (isoTime <> "_" <> suffix)
toFSFilePath :: AgentMonad m => FilePath -> m FilePath
toFSFilePath f = (</> f) <$> getXFTPWorkPath
createEmptyFile :: AgentMonad m => FilePath -> m ()
createEmptyFile fPath = liftIO $ B.writeFile fPath ""
resumeXFTPRcvWork :: AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> Maybe XFTPServer -> m ()
resumeXFTPRcvWork = void .: getXFTPRcvWorker False
getXFTPRcvWorker :: AgentMonad' m => Bool -> AgentClient -> Maybe XFTPServer -> m Worker
getXFTPRcvWorker hasWork c server = do
ws <- asks $ xftpRcvWorkers . xftpAgent
getAgentWorker "xftp_rcv" hasWork c server ws $
maybe (runXFTPRcvLocalWorker c) (runXFTPRcvWorker c) server
runXFTPRcvWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> Worker -> m ()
runXFTPRcvWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
cfg <- asks config
forever $ do
waitForWork doWork
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
runXFTPOperation cfg
where
runXFTPOperation :: AgentConfig -> m ()
runXFTPOperation AgentConfig {rcvFilesTTL, reconnectInterval = ri, xftpNotifyErrsOnRetry = notifyOnRetry, xftpConsecutiveRetries} =
withWork c doWork (\db -> getNextRcvChunkToDownload db srv rcvFilesTTL) $ \case
RcvFileChunk {rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, fileTmpPath, replicas = []} -> rcvWorkerInternalError c rcvFileId rcvFileEntityId (Just fileTmpPath) "chunk has no replicas"
fc@RcvFileChunk {userId, rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, digest, fileTmpPath, replicas = replica@RcvFileChunkReplica {rcvChunkReplicaId, server, delay} : _} -> do
let ri' = maybe ri (\d -> ri {initialInterval = d, increaseAfter = 0}) delay
withRetryIntervalLimit xftpConsecutiveRetries ri' $ \delay' loop ->
downloadFileChunk fc replica
`catchAgentError` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP rcv worker" (retryLoop loop e delay') (retryDone e) e
where
retryLoop loop e replicaDelay = do
flip catchAgentError (\_ -> pure ()) $ do
when notifyOnRetry $ notify c rcvFileEntityId $ RFERR e
closeXFTPServerClient c userId server digest
withStore' c $ \db -> updateRcvChunkReplicaDelay db rcvChunkReplicaId replicaDelay
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
loop
retryDone e = rcvWorkerInternalError c rcvFileId rcvFileEntityId (Just fileTmpPath) (show e)
downloadFileChunk :: RcvFileChunk -> RcvFileChunkReplica -> m ()
downloadFileChunk RcvFileChunk {userId, rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, rcvChunkId, chunkNo, chunkSize, digest, fileTmpPath} replica = do
fsFileTmpPath <- toFSFilePath fileTmpPath
chunkPath <- uniqueCombine fsFileTmpPath $ show chunkNo
let chunkSpec = XFTPRcvChunkSpec chunkPath (unFileSize chunkSize) (unFileDigest digest)
relChunkPath = fileTmpPath </> takeFileName chunkPath
agentXFTPDownloadChunk c userId digest replica chunkSpec
atomically $ waitUntilForeground c
(complete, progress) <- withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
liftIO $ updateRcvFileChunkReceived db (rcvChunkReplicaId replica) rcvChunkId relChunkPath
RcvFile {size = FileSize total, chunks} <- ExceptT $ getRcvFile db rcvFileId
let rcvd = receivedSize chunks
complete = all chunkReceived chunks
liftIO . when complete $ updateRcvFileStatus db rcvFileId RFSReceived
pure (complete, RFPROG rcvd total)
notify c rcvFileEntityId progress
when complete . void $
getXFTPRcvWorker True c Nothing
where
receivedSize :: [RcvFileChunk] -> Int64
receivedSize = foldl' (\sz ch -> sz + receivedChunkSize ch) 0
receivedChunkSize ch@RcvFileChunk {chunkSize = s}
| chunkReceived ch = fromIntegral (unFileSize s)
| otherwise = 0
chunkReceived RcvFileChunk {replicas} = any received replicas
-- The first call of action has n == 0, maxN is max number of retries
withRetryIntervalLimit :: forall m. MonadIO m => Int -> RetryInterval -> (Int64 -> m () -> m ()) -> m ()
withRetryIntervalLimit maxN ri action =
withRetryIntervalCount ri $ \n delay loop ->
when (n < maxN) $ action delay loop
retryOnError :: AgentMonad m => Text -> m a -> m a -> AgentErrorType -> m a
retryOnError name loop done e = do
logError $ name <> " error: " <> tshow e
if temporaryAgentError e
then loop
else done
rcvWorkerInternalError :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> DBRcvFileId -> RcvFileId -> Maybe FilePath -> String -> m ()
rcvWorkerInternalError c rcvFileId rcvFileEntityId tmpPath internalErrStr = do
forM_ tmpPath (removePath <=< toFSFilePath)
withStore' c $ \db -> updateRcvFileError db rcvFileId internalErrStr
notify c rcvFileEntityId $ RFERR $ INTERNAL internalErrStr
runXFTPRcvLocalWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> Worker -> m ()
runXFTPRcvLocalWorker c Worker {doWork} = do
cfg <- asks config
forever $ do
waitForWork doWork
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
runXFTPOperation cfg
where
runXFTPOperation :: AgentConfig -> m ()
runXFTPOperation AgentConfig {rcvFilesTTL} =
withWork c doWork (`getNextRcvFileToDecrypt` rcvFilesTTL) $
\f@RcvFile {rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, tmpPath} ->
decryptFile f `catchAgentError` (rcvWorkerInternalError c rcvFileId rcvFileEntityId tmpPath . show)
decryptFile :: RcvFile -> m ()
decryptFile RcvFile {rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, key, nonce, tmpPath, saveFile, status, chunks} = do
let CryptoFile savePath cfArgs = saveFile
fsSavePath <- toFSFilePath savePath
when (status == RFSDecrypting) $
whenM (doesFileExist fsSavePath) (removeFile fsSavePath >> createEmptyFile fsSavePath)
withStore' c $ \db -> updateRcvFileStatus db rcvFileId RFSDecrypting
chunkPaths <- getChunkPaths chunks
encSize <- liftIO $ foldM (\s path -> (s +) . fromIntegral <$> getFileSize path) 0 chunkPaths
let destFile = CryptoFile fsSavePath cfArgs
void $ liftError (INTERNAL . show) $ decryptChunks encSize chunkPaths key nonce $ \_ -> pure destFile
notify c rcvFileEntityId $ RFDONE fsSavePath
forM_ tmpPath (removePath <=< toFSFilePath)
atomically $ waitUntilForeground c
withStore' c (`updateRcvFileComplete` rcvFileId)
where
getChunkPaths :: [RcvFileChunk] -> m [FilePath]
getChunkPaths [] = pure []
getChunkPaths (RcvFileChunk {chunkTmpPath = Just path} : cs) = do
ps <- getChunkPaths cs
fsPath <- toFSFilePath path
pure $ fsPath : ps
getChunkPaths (RcvFileChunk {chunkTmpPath = Nothing} : _cs) =
throwError $ INTERNAL "no chunk path"
xftpDeleteRcvFile' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> RcvFileId -> m ()
xftpDeleteRcvFile' c rcvFileEntityId = do
RcvFile {rcvFileId, prefixPath, status} <- withStore c $ \db -> getRcvFileByEntityId db rcvFileEntityId
if status == RFSComplete || status == RFSError
then do
removePath prefixPath
withStore' c (`deleteRcvFile'` rcvFileId)
else withStore' c (`updateRcvFileDeleted` rcvFileId)
notify :: forall m e. (MonadUnliftIO m, AEntityI e) => AgentClient -> EntityId -> ACommand 'Agent e -> m ()
notify c entId cmd = atomically $ writeTBQueue (subQ c) ("", entId, APC (sAEntity @e) cmd)
xftpSendFile' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> CryptoFile -> Int -> m SndFileId
xftpSendFile' c userId file numRecipients = do
g <- asks random
prefixPath <- getPrefixPath "snd.xftp"
createDirectory prefixPath
let relPrefixPath = takeFileName prefixPath
key <- atomically $ C.randomSbKey g
nonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
-- saving absolute filePath will not allow to restore file encryption after app update, but it's a short window
fId <- withStore c $ \db -> createSndFile db g userId file numRecipients relPrefixPath key nonce
void $ getXFTPSndWorker True c Nothing
pure fId
resumeXFTPSndWork :: AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> Maybe XFTPServer -> m ()
resumeXFTPSndWork = void .: getXFTPSndWorker False
getXFTPSndWorker :: AgentMonad' m => Bool -> AgentClient -> Maybe XFTPServer -> m Worker
getXFTPSndWorker hasWork c server = do
ws <- asks $ xftpSndWorkers . xftpAgent
getAgentWorker "xftp_snd" hasWork c server ws $
maybe (runXFTPSndPrepareWorker c) (runXFTPSndWorker c) server
runXFTPSndPrepareWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> Worker -> m ()
runXFTPSndPrepareWorker c Worker {doWork} = do
cfg <- asks config
forever $ do
waitForWork doWork
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
runXFTPOperation cfg
where
runXFTPOperation :: AgentConfig -> m ()
runXFTPOperation cfg@AgentConfig {sndFilesTTL} =
withWork c doWork (`getNextSndFileToPrepare` sndFilesTTL) $
\f@SndFile {sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, prefixPath} ->
prepareFile cfg f `catchAgentError` (sndWorkerInternalError c sndFileId sndFileEntityId prefixPath . show)
prepareFile :: AgentConfig -> SndFile -> m ()
prepareFile _ SndFile {prefixPath = Nothing} =
throwError $ INTERNAL "no prefix path"
prepareFile cfg sndFile@SndFile {sndFileId, userId, prefixPath = Just ppath, status} = do
SndFile {numRecipients, chunks} <-
if status /= SFSEncrypted -- status is SFSNew or SFSEncrypting
then do
fsEncPath <- toFSFilePath $ sndFileEncPath ppath
when (status == SFSEncrypting) . whenM (doesFileExist fsEncPath) $
removeFile fsEncPath
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndFileStatus db sndFileId SFSEncrypting
(digest, chunkSpecsDigests) <- encryptFileForUpload sndFile fsEncPath
withStore c $ \db -> do
updateSndFileEncrypted db sndFileId digest chunkSpecsDigests
getSndFile db sndFileId
else pure sndFile
let numRecipients' = min numRecipients maxRecipients
-- concurrently?
-- separate worker to create chunks? record retries and delay on snd_file_chunks?
forM_ (filter (not . chunkCreated) chunks) $ createChunk numRecipients'
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndFileStatus db sndFileId SFSUploading
where
AgentConfig {xftpMaxRecipientsPerRequest = maxRecipients, messageRetryInterval = ri} = cfg
encryptFileForUpload :: SndFile -> FilePath -> m (FileDigest, [(XFTPChunkSpec, FileDigest)])
encryptFileForUpload SndFile {key, nonce, srcFile} fsEncPath = do
let CryptoFile {filePath} = srcFile
fileName = takeFileName filePath
fileSize <- liftIO $ fromInteger <$> CF.getFileContentsSize srcFile
when (fileSize > maxFileSize) $ throwError $ INTERNAL "max file size exceeded"
let fileHdr = smpEncode FileHeader {fileName, fileExtra = Nothing}
fileSize' = fromIntegral (B.length fileHdr) + fileSize
chunkSizes = prepareChunkSizes $ fileSize' + fileSizeLen + authTagSize
chunkSizes' = map fromIntegral chunkSizes
encSize = sum chunkSizes'
void $ liftError (INTERNAL . show) $ encryptFile srcFile fileHdr key nonce fileSize' encSize fsEncPath
digest <- liftIO $ LC.sha512Hash <$> LB.readFile fsEncPath
let chunkSpecs = prepareChunkSpecs fsEncPath chunkSizes
chunkDigests <- map FileDigest <$> mapM (liftIO . getChunkDigest) chunkSpecs
pure (FileDigest digest, zip chunkSpecs chunkDigests)
chunkCreated :: SndFileChunk -> Bool
chunkCreated SndFileChunk {replicas} =
any (\SndFileChunkReplica {replicaStatus} -> replicaStatus == SFRSCreated) replicas
createChunk :: Int -> SndFileChunk -> m ()
createChunk numRecipients' ch = do
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
(replica, ProtoServerWithAuth srv _) <- tryCreate
withStore' c $ \db -> createSndFileReplica db ch replica
void $ getXFTPSndWorker True c (Just srv)
where
tryCreate = do
usedSrvs <- newTVarIO ([] :: [XFTPServer])
withRetryInterval (riFast ri) $ \_ loop ->
createWithNextSrv usedSrvs
`catchAgentError` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP prepare worker" (retryLoop loop) (throwError e) e
where
retryLoop loop = atomically (assertAgentForeground c) >> loop
createWithNextSrv usedSrvs = do
deleted <- withStore' c $ \db -> getSndFileDeleted db sndFileId
when deleted $ throwError $ INTERNAL "file deleted, aborting chunk creation"
withNextSrv c userId usedSrvs [] $ \srvAuth -> do
replica <- agentXFTPNewChunk c ch numRecipients' srvAuth
pure (replica, srvAuth)
sndWorkerInternalError :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> DBSndFileId -> SndFileId -> Maybe FilePath -> String -> m ()
sndWorkerInternalError c sndFileId sndFileEntityId prefixPath internalErrStr = do
forM_ prefixPath $ removePath <=< toFSFilePath
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndFileError db sndFileId internalErrStr
notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFERR $ INTERNAL internalErrStr
runXFTPSndWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> Worker -> m ()
runXFTPSndWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
cfg <- asks config
forever $ do
waitForWork doWork
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
runXFTPOperation cfg
where
runXFTPOperation :: AgentConfig -> m ()
runXFTPOperation cfg@AgentConfig {sndFilesTTL, reconnectInterval = ri, xftpNotifyErrsOnRetry = notifyOnRetry, xftpConsecutiveRetries} = do
withWork c doWork (\db -> getNextSndChunkToUpload db srv sndFilesTTL) $ \case
SndFileChunk {sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, filePrefixPath, replicas = []} -> sndWorkerInternalError c sndFileId sndFileEntityId (Just filePrefixPath) "chunk has no replicas"
fc@SndFileChunk {userId, sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, filePrefixPath, digest, replicas = replica@SndFileChunkReplica {sndChunkReplicaId, server, delay} : _} -> do
let ri' = maybe ri (\d -> ri {initialInterval = d, increaseAfter = 0}) delay
withRetryIntervalLimit xftpConsecutiveRetries ri' $ \delay' loop ->
uploadFileChunk cfg fc replica
`catchAgentError` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP snd worker" (retryLoop loop e delay') (retryDone e) e
where
retryLoop loop e replicaDelay = do
flip catchAgentError (\_ -> pure ()) $ do
when notifyOnRetry $ notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFERR e
closeXFTPServerClient c userId server digest
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndChunkReplicaDelay db sndChunkReplicaId replicaDelay
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
loop
retryDone e = sndWorkerInternalError c sndFileId sndFileEntityId (Just filePrefixPath) (show e)
uploadFileChunk :: AgentConfig -> SndFileChunk -> SndFileChunkReplica -> m ()
uploadFileChunk AgentConfig {xftpMaxRecipientsPerRequest = maxRecipients} sndFileChunk@SndFileChunk {sndFileId, userId, chunkSpec = chunkSpec@XFTPChunkSpec {filePath}, digest = chunkDigest} replica = do
replica'@SndFileChunkReplica {sndChunkReplicaId} <- addRecipients sndFileChunk replica
fsFilePath <- toFSFilePath filePath
unlessM (doesFileExist fsFilePath) $ throwError $ INTERNAL "encrypted file doesn't exist on upload"
let chunkSpec' = chunkSpec {filePath = fsFilePath} :: XFTPChunkSpec
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
agentXFTPUploadChunk c userId chunkDigest replica' chunkSpec'
atomically $ waitUntilForeground c
sf@SndFile {sndFileEntityId, prefixPath, chunks} <- withStore c $ \db -> do
updateSndChunkReplicaStatus db sndChunkReplicaId SFRSUploaded
getSndFile db sndFileId
let uploaded = uploadedSize chunks
total = totalSize chunks
complete = all chunkUploaded chunks
notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFPROG uploaded total
when complete $ do
(sndDescr, rcvDescrs) <- sndFileToDescrs sf
notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFDONE sndDescr rcvDescrs
forM_ prefixPath $ removePath <=< toFSFilePath
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndFileComplete db sndFileId
where
addRecipients :: SndFileChunk -> SndFileChunkReplica -> m SndFileChunkReplica
addRecipients ch@SndFileChunk {numRecipients} cr@SndFileChunkReplica {rcvIdsKeys}
| length rcvIdsKeys > numRecipients = throwError $ INTERNAL "too many recipients"
| length rcvIdsKeys == numRecipients = pure cr
| otherwise = do
let numRecipients' = min (numRecipients - length rcvIdsKeys) maxRecipients
rcvIdsKeys' <- agentXFTPAddRecipients c userId chunkDigest cr numRecipients'
cr' <- withStore' c $ \db -> addSndChunkReplicaRecipients db cr $ L.toList rcvIdsKeys'
addRecipients ch cr'
sndFileToDescrs :: SndFile -> m (ValidFileDescription 'FSender, [ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient])
sndFileToDescrs SndFile {digest = Nothing} = throwError $ INTERNAL "snd file has no digest"
sndFileToDescrs SndFile {chunks = []} = throwError $ INTERNAL "snd file has no chunks"
sndFileToDescrs SndFile {digest = Just digest, key, nonce, chunks = chunks@(fstChunk : _)} = do
let chunkSize = FileSize $ sndChunkSize fstChunk
size = FileSize $ sum $ map (fromIntegral . sndChunkSize) chunks
-- snd description
sndDescrChunks <- mapM toSndDescrChunk chunks
let fdSnd = FileDescription {party = SFSender, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, chunks = sndDescrChunks}
validFdSnd <- either (throwError . INTERNAL) pure $ validateFileDescription fdSnd
-- rcv descriptions
let fdRcv = FileDescription {party = SFRecipient, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, chunks = []}
fdRcvs = createRcvFileDescriptions fdRcv chunks
validFdRcvs <- either (throwError . INTERNAL) pure $ mapM validateFileDescription fdRcvs
pure (validFdSnd, validFdRcvs)
toSndDescrChunk :: SndFileChunk -> m FileChunk
toSndDescrChunk SndFileChunk {replicas = []} = throwError $ INTERNAL "snd file chunk has no replicas"
toSndDescrChunk ch@SndFileChunk {chunkNo, digest = chDigest, replicas = (SndFileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey} : _)} = do
let chunkSize = FileSize $ sndChunkSize ch
replicas = [FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey}]
pure FileChunk {chunkNo, digest = chDigest, chunkSize, replicas}
createRcvFileDescriptions :: FileDescription 'FRecipient -> [SndFileChunk] -> [FileDescription 'FRecipient]
createRcvFileDescriptions fd sndChunks = map (\chunks -> (fd :: (FileDescription 'FRecipient)) {chunks}) rcvChunks
where
rcvReplicas :: [SentRecipientReplica]
rcvReplicas = concatMap toSentRecipientReplicas sndChunks
toSentRecipientReplicas :: SndFileChunk -> [SentRecipientReplica]
toSentRecipientReplicas ch@SndFileChunk {chunkNo, digest, replicas} =
let chunkSize = FileSize $ sndChunkSize ch
in concatMap
( \SndFileChunkReplica {server, rcvIdsKeys} ->
zipWith
(\rcvNo (replicaId, replicaKey) -> SentRecipientReplica {chunkNo, server, rcvNo, replicaId, replicaKey, digest, chunkSize})
[1 ..]
rcvIdsKeys
)
replicas
rcvChunks :: [[FileChunk]]
rcvChunks = map (sortChunks . M.elems) $ M.elems $ foldl' addRcvChunk M.empty rcvReplicas
sortChunks :: [FileChunk] -> [FileChunk]
sortChunks = map reverseReplicas . sortOn (\FileChunk {chunkNo} -> chunkNo)
reverseReplicas ch@FileChunk {replicas} = (ch :: FileChunk) {replicas = reverse replicas}
addRcvChunk :: Map Int (Map Int FileChunk) -> SentRecipientReplica -> Map Int (Map Int FileChunk)
addRcvChunk m SentRecipientReplica {chunkNo, server, rcvNo, replicaId, replicaKey, digest, chunkSize} =
M.alter (Just . addOrChangeRecipient) rcvNo m
where
addOrChangeRecipient :: Maybe (Map Int FileChunk) -> Map Int FileChunk
addOrChangeRecipient = \case
Just m' -> M.alter (Just . addOrChangeChunk) chunkNo m'
_ -> M.singleton chunkNo $ FileChunk {chunkNo, digest, chunkSize, replicas = [replica']}
addOrChangeChunk :: Maybe FileChunk -> FileChunk
addOrChangeChunk = \case
Just ch@FileChunk {replicas} -> ch {replicas = replica' : replicas}
_ -> FileChunk {chunkNo, digest, chunkSize, replicas = [replica']}
replica' = FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey}
uploadedSize :: [SndFileChunk] -> Int64
uploadedSize = foldl' (\sz ch -> sz + uploadedChunkSize ch) 0
uploadedChunkSize ch
| chunkUploaded ch = fromIntegral (sndChunkSize ch)
| otherwise = 0
totalSize :: [SndFileChunk] -> Int64
totalSize = foldl' (\sz ch -> sz + fromIntegral (sndChunkSize ch)) 0
chunkUploaded :: SndFileChunk -> Bool
chunkUploaded SndFileChunk {replicas} =
any (\SndFileChunkReplica {replicaStatus} -> replicaStatus == SFRSUploaded) replicas
deleteSndFileInternal :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SndFileId -> m ()
deleteSndFileInternal c sndFileEntityId = do
SndFile {sndFileId, prefixPath, status} <- withStore c $ \db -> getSndFileByEntityId db sndFileEntityId
if status == SFSComplete || status == SFSError
then do
forM_ prefixPath $ removePath <=< toFSFilePath
withStore' c (`deleteSndFile'` sndFileId)
else withStore' c (`updateSndFileDeleted` sndFileId)
deleteSndFileRemote :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> SndFileId -> ValidFileDescription 'FSender -> m ()
deleteSndFileRemote c userId sndFileEntityId (ValidFileDescription FileDescription {chunks}) = do
deleteSndFileInternal c sndFileEntityId `catchAgentError` (notify c sndFileEntityId . SFERR)
forM_ chunks $ \ch -> deleteFileChunk ch `catchAgentError` (notify c sndFileEntityId . SFERR)
where
deleteFileChunk :: FileChunk -> m ()
deleteFileChunk FileChunk {digest, replicas = replica@FileChunkReplica {server} : _} = do
withStore' c $ \db -> createDeletedSndChunkReplica db userId replica digest
void $ getXFTPDelWorker True c server
deleteFileChunk _ = pure ()
resumeXFTPDelWork :: AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> m ()
resumeXFTPDelWork = void .: getXFTPDelWorker False
getXFTPDelWorker :: AgentMonad' m => Bool -> AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> m Worker
getXFTPDelWorker hasWork c server = do
ws <- asks $ xftpDelWorkers . xftpAgent
getAgentWorker "xftp_del" hasWork c server ws $ runXFTPDelWorker c server
runXFTPDelWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> Worker -> m ()
runXFTPDelWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
cfg <- asks config
forever $ do
waitForWork doWork
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
runXFTPOperation cfg
where
runXFTPOperation :: AgentConfig -> m ()
runXFTPOperation AgentConfig {rcvFilesTTL, reconnectInterval = ri, xftpNotifyErrsOnRetry = notifyOnRetry, xftpConsecutiveRetries} = do
-- no point in deleting files older than rcv ttl, as they will be expired on server
withWork c doWork (\db -> getNextDeletedSndChunkReplica db srv rcvFilesTTL) processDeletedReplica
where
processDeletedReplica replica@DeletedSndChunkReplica {deletedSndChunkReplicaId, userId, server, chunkDigest, delay} = do
let ri' = maybe ri (\d -> ri {initialInterval = d, increaseAfter = 0}) delay
withRetryIntervalLimit xftpConsecutiveRetries ri' $ \delay' loop ->
deleteChunkReplica
`catchAgentError` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP del worker" (retryLoop loop e delay') (retryDone e) e
where
retryLoop loop e replicaDelay = do
flip catchAgentError (\_ -> pure ()) $ do
when notifyOnRetry $ notify c "" $ SFERR e
closeXFTPServerClient c userId server chunkDigest
withStore' c $ \db -> updateDeletedSndChunkReplicaDelay db deletedSndChunkReplicaId replicaDelay
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
loop
retryDone = delWorkerInternalError c deletedSndChunkReplicaId
deleteChunkReplica = do
agentXFTPDeleteChunk c userId replica
withStore' c $ \db -> deleteDeletedSndChunkReplica db deletedSndChunkReplicaId
delWorkerInternalError :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> Int64 -> AgentErrorType -> m ()
delWorkerInternalError c deletedSndChunkReplicaId e = do
withStore' c $ \db -> deleteDeletedSndChunkReplica db deletedSndChunkReplicaId
notify c "" $ SFERR e
assertAgentForeground :: AgentClient -> STM ()
assertAgentForeground c = do
throwWhenInactive c
waitUntilForeground c
-35
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@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks where
import Data.Word (Word32)
serverChunkSizes :: [Word32]
serverChunkSizes = [chunkSize0, chunkSize1, chunkSize2, chunkSize3]
{-# INLINE serverChunkSizes #-}
chunkSize0 :: Word32
chunkSize0 = kb 64
{-# INLINE chunkSize0 #-}
chunkSize1 :: Word32
chunkSize1 = kb 256
{-# INLINE chunkSize1 #-}
chunkSize2 :: Word32
chunkSize2 = mb 1
{-# INLINE chunkSize2 #-}
chunkSize3 :: Word32
chunkSize3 = mb 4
{-# INLINE chunkSize3 #-}
kb :: Integral a => a -> a
kb n = 1024 * n
{-# INLINE kb #-}
mb :: Integral a => a -> a
mb n = 1024 * kb n
{-# INLINE mb #-}
gb :: Integral a => a -> a
gb n = 1024 * mb n
{-# INLINE gb #-}
-237
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@@ -1,237 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE BlockArguments #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client where
import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Builder as BB
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
import Data.Time (UTCTime)
import Data.Word (Word32)
import qualified Network.HTTP.Types as N
import qualified Network.HTTP2.Client as H
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description (mb)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport
import Simplex.Messaging.Builder (Builder, builder)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client
( NetworkConfig (..),
ProtocolClientError (..),
TransportSession,
chooseTransportHost,
defaultNetworkConfig,
proxyUsername,
transportClientConfig,
)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent ()
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
( BasicAuth,
Protocol (..),
ProtocolServer (..),
RecipientId,
SenderId,
)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (supportedParameters)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportClientConfig, TransportHost)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Client
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, liftEitherError, whenM)
import UnliftIO
import UnliftIO.Directory
data XFTPClient = XFTPClient
{ http2Client :: HTTP2Client,
transportSession :: TransportSession FileResponse,
config :: XFTPClientConfig
}
data XFTPClientConfig = XFTPClientConfig
{ xftpNetworkConfig :: NetworkConfig,
uploadTimeoutPerMb :: Int64
}
data XFTPChunkBody = XFTPChunkBody
{ chunkSize :: Int,
chunkPart :: Int -> IO ByteString,
http2Body :: HTTP2Body
}
data XFTPChunkSpec = XFTPChunkSpec
{ filePath :: FilePath,
chunkOffset :: Int64,
chunkSize :: Word32
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
type XFTPClientError = ProtocolClientError XFTPErrorType
defaultXFTPClientConfig :: XFTPClientConfig
defaultXFTPClientConfig =
XFTPClientConfig
{ xftpNetworkConfig = defaultNetworkConfig,
uploadTimeoutPerMb = 10000000 -- 10 seconds
}
getXFTPClient :: TransportSession FileResponse -> XFTPClientConfig -> (XFTPClient -> IO ()) -> IO (Either XFTPClientError XFTPClient)
getXFTPClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {xftpNetworkConfig} disconnected = runExceptT $ do
let tcConfig = transportClientConfig xftpNetworkConfig
http2Config = xftpHTTP2Config tcConfig config
username = proxyUsername transportSession
ProtocolServer _ host port keyHash = srv
useHost <- liftEither $ chooseTransportHost xftpNetworkConfig host
clientVar <- newTVarIO Nothing
let usePort = if null port then "443" else port
clientDisconnected = readTVarIO clientVar >>= mapM_ disconnected
http2Client <- liftEitherError xftpClientError $ getVerifiedHTTP2Client (Just username) useHost usePort (Just keyHash) Nothing http2Config clientDisconnected
let c = XFTPClient {http2Client, transportSession, config}
atomically $ writeTVar clientVar $ Just c
pure c
closeXFTPClient :: XFTPClient -> IO ()
closeXFTPClient XFTPClient {http2Client} = closeHTTP2Client http2Client
xftpClientServer :: XFTPClient -> String
xftpClientServer = B.unpack . strEncode . snd3 . transportSession
where
snd3 (_, s, _) = s
xftpTransportHost :: XFTPClient -> TransportHost
xftpTransportHost XFTPClient {http2Client = HTTP2Client {client_ = HClient {host}}} = host
xftpSessionTs :: XFTPClient -> UTCTime
xftpSessionTs = sessionTs . http2Client
xftpHTTP2Config :: TransportClientConfig -> XFTPClientConfig -> HTTP2ClientConfig
xftpHTTP2Config transportConfig XFTPClientConfig {xftpNetworkConfig = NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout}} =
defaultHTTP2ClientConfig
{ bodyHeadSize = xftpBlockSize,
suportedTLSParams = supportedParameters,
connTimeout = tcpConnectTimeout,
transportConfig
}
xftpClientError :: HTTP2ClientError -> XFTPClientError
xftpClientError = \case
HCResponseTimeout -> PCEResponseTimeout
HCNetworkError -> PCENetworkError
HCIOError e -> PCEIOError e
sendXFTPCommand :: forall p. FilePartyI p => XFTPClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> XFTPFileId -> FileCommand p -> Maybe XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (FileResponse, HTTP2Body)
sendXFTPCommand c@XFTPClient {http2Client = HTTP2Client {sessionId}} pKey fId cmd chunkSpec_ = do
t <-
liftEither . first PCETransportError $
xftpEncodeTransmission sessionId (Just pKey) ("", fId, FileCmd (sFileParty @p) cmd)
sendXFTPTransmission c t chunkSpec_
sendXFTPTransmission :: XFTPClient -> Builder -> Maybe XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (FileResponse, HTTP2Body)
sendXFTPTransmission XFTPClient {config, http2Client = http2@HTTP2Client {sessionId}} t chunkSpec_ = do
let req = H.requestStreaming N.methodPost "/" [] streamBody
reqTimeout = (\XFTPChunkSpec {chunkSize} -> chunkTimeout config chunkSize) <$> chunkSpec_
HTTP2Response {respBody = body@HTTP2Body {bodyHead}} <- liftEitherError xftpClientError $ sendRequest http2 req reqTimeout
when (B.length bodyHead /= xftpBlockSize) $ throwError $ PCEResponseError BLOCK
-- TODO validate that the file ID is the same as in the request?
(_, _, (_, _fId, respOrErr)) <- liftEither . first PCEResponseError $ xftpDecodeTransmission sessionId bodyHead
case respOrErr of
Right r -> case protocolError r of
Just e -> throwError $ PCEProtocolError e
_ -> pure (r, body)
Left e -> throwError $ PCEResponseError e
where
streamBody :: (BB.Builder -> IO ()) -> IO () -> IO ()
streamBody send done = do
send $ builder t
forM_ chunkSpec_ $ \XFTPChunkSpec {filePath, chunkOffset, chunkSize} ->
withFile filePath ReadMode $ \h -> do
hSeek h AbsoluteSeek $ fromIntegral chunkOffset
hSendFile h send $ fromIntegral chunkSize
done
createXFTPChunk ::
XFTPClient ->
C.APrivateSignKey ->
FileInfo ->
NonEmpty C.APublicVerifyKey ->
Maybe BasicAuth ->
ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (SenderId, NonEmpty RecipientId)
createXFTPChunk c spKey file rcps auth_ =
sendXFTPCommand c spKey "" (FNEW file rcps auth_) Nothing >>= \case
(FRSndIds sId rIds, body) -> noFile body (sId, rIds)
(r, _) -> throwError . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
addXFTPRecipients :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> XFTPFileId -> NonEmpty C.APublicVerifyKey -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (NonEmpty RecipientId)
addXFTPRecipients c spKey fId rcps =
sendXFTPCommand c spKey fId (FADD rcps) Nothing >>= \case
(FRRcvIds rIds, body) -> noFile body rIds
(r, _) -> throwError . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
uploadXFTPChunk :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> XFTPFileId -> XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
uploadXFTPChunk c spKey fId chunkSpec =
sendXFTPCommand c spKey fId FPUT (Just chunkSpec) >>= okResponse
downloadXFTPChunk :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> XFTPClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> XFTPFileId -> XFTPRcvChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
downloadXFTPChunk g c@XFTPClient {config} rpKey fId chunkSpec@XFTPRcvChunkSpec {filePath, chunkSize} = do
(rDhKey, rpDhKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
sendXFTPCommand c rpKey fId (FGET rDhKey) Nothing >>= \case
(FRFile sDhKey cbNonce, HTTP2Body {bodyHead = _bg, bodySize = _bs, bodyPart}) -> case bodyPart of
-- TODO atm bodySize is set to 0, so chunkSize will be incorrect - validate once set
Just chunkPart -> do
let dhSecret = C.dh' sDhKey rpDhKey
cbState <- liftEither . first PCECryptoError $ LC.cbInit dhSecret cbNonce
let t = chunkTimeout config chunkSize
t `timeout` download cbState >>= maybe (throwError PCEResponseTimeout) pure
where
download cbState =
withExceptT PCEResponseError $
receiveEncFile chunkPart cbState chunkSpec `catchError` \e ->
whenM (doesFileExist filePath) (removeFile filePath) >> throwError e
_ -> throwError $ PCEResponseError NO_FILE
(r, _) -> throwError . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
chunkTimeout :: XFTPClientConfig -> Word32 -> Int
chunkTimeout config chunkSize = fromIntegral $ (fromIntegral chunkSize * uploadTimeoutPerMb config) `div` mb 1
deleteXFTPChunk :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> SenderId -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
deleteXFTPChunk c spKey sId = sendXFTPCommand c spKey sId FDEL Nothing >>= okResponse
ackXFTPChunk :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> RecipientId -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
ackXFTPChunk c rpKey rId = sendXFTPCommand c rpKey rId FACK Nothing >>= okResponse
pingXFTP :: XFTPClient -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
pingXFTP c@XFTPClient {http2Client = HTTP2Client {sessionId}} = do
t <-
liftEither . first PCETransportError $
xftpEncodeTransmission sessionId Nothing ("", "", FileCmd SFRecipient PING)
(r, _) <- sendXFTPTransmission c t Nothing
case r of
FRPong -> pure ()
_ -> throwError $ PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
okResponse :: (FileResponse, HTTP2Body) -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
okResponse = \case
(FROk, body) -> noFile body ()
(r, _) -> throwError . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
-- TODO this currently does not check anything because response size is not set and bodyPart is always Just
noFile :: HTTP2Body -> a -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO a
noFile HTTP2Body {bodyPart} a = case bodyPart of
Just _ -> pure a -- throwError $ PCEResponseError HAS_FILE
_ -> pure a
-- FACK :: FileCommand Recipient
-- PING :: FileCommand Recipient
-128
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@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NumericUnderscores #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Agent where
import Control.Logger.Simple (logInfo)
import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Text (Text)
import Data.Text.Encoding (decodeUtf8)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (NetworkConfig (..), ProtocolClientError (..), temporaryClientError)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent ()
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtocolServer (..), XFTPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (catchAll_)
import UnliftIO
type XFTPClientVar = TMVar (Either XFTPClientAgentError XFTPClient)
data XFTPClientAgent = XFTPClientAgent
{ xftpClients :: TMap XFTPServer XFTPClientVar,
config :: XFTPClientAgentConfig
}
data XFTPClientAgentConfig = XFTPClientAgentConfig
{ xftpConfig :: XFTPClientConfig,
reconnectInterval :: RetryInterval
}
defaultXFTPClientAgentConfig :: XFTPClientAgentConfig
defaultXFTPClientAgentConfig =
XFTPClientAgentConfig
{ xftpConfig = defaultXFTPClientConfig,
reconnectInterval =
RetryInterval
{ initialInterval = 5_000000,
increaseAfter = 10_000000,
maxInterval = 60_000000
}
}
data XFTPClientAgentError = XFTPClientAgentError XFTPServer XFTPClientError
deriving (Show, Exception)
newXFTPAgent :: XFTPClientAgentConfig -> STM XFTPClientAgent
newXFTPAgent config = do
xftpClients <- TM.empty
pure XFTPClientAgent {xftpClients, config}
type ME a = ExceptT XFTPClientAgentError IO a
getXFTPServerClient :: XFTPClientAgent -> XFTPServer -> ME XFTPClient
getXFTPServerClient XFTPClientAgent {xftpClients, config} srv = do
atomically getClientVar >>= either newXFTPClient waitForXFTPClient
where
connectClient :: ME XFTPClient
connectClient =
ExceptT $
first (XFTPClientAgentError srv)
<$> getXFTPClient (1, srv, Nothing) (xftpConfig config) clientDisconnected
clientDisconnected :: XFTPClient -> IO ()
clientDisconnected _ = do
atomically $ TM.delete srv xftpClients
logInfo $ "disconnected from " <> showServer srv
getClientVar :: STM (Either XFTPClientVar XFTPClientVar)
getClientVar = maybe (Left <$> newClientVar) (pure . Right) =<< TM.lookup srv xftpClients
where
newClientVar :: STM XFTPClientVar
newClientVar = do
var <- newEmptyTMVar
TM.insert srv var xftpClients
pure var
waitForXFTPClient :: XFTPClientVar -> ME XFTPClient
waitForXFTPClient clientVar = do
let XFTPClientConfig {xftpNetworkConfig = NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout}} = xftpConfig config
client_ <- tcpConnectTimeout `timeout` atomically (readTMVar clientVar)
liftEither $ case client_ of
Just (Right c) -> Right c
Just (Left e) -> Left e
Nothing -> Left $ XFTPClientAgentError srv PCEResponseTimeout
newXFTPClient :: XFTPClientVar -> ME XFTPClient
newXFTPClient clientVar = tryConnectClient tryConnectAsync
where
tryConnectClient :: ME () -> ME XFTPClient
tryConnectClient retryAction =
tryError connectClient >>= \r -> case r of
Right client -> do
logInfo $ "connected to " <> showServer srv
atomically $ putTMVar clientVar r
pure client
Left e@(XFTPClientAgentError _ e') -> do
if temporaryClientError e'
then retryAction
else atomically $ do
putTMVar clientVar r
TM.delete srv xftpClients
throwError e
tryConnectAsync :: ME ()
tryConnectAsync = void . async $ do
withRetryInterval (reconnectInterval config) $ \_ loop -> void $ tryConnectClient loop
showServer :: XFTPServer -> Text
showServer ProtocolServer {host, port} =
decodeUtf8 $ strEncode host <> B.pack (if null port then "" else ':' : port)
closeXFTPServerClient :: XFTPClientAgent -> XFTPServer -> IO ()
closeXFTPServerClient XFTPClientAgent {xftpClients, config} srv =
atomically (TM.lookupDelete srv xftpClients) >>= mapM_ closeClient
where
closeClient cVar = do
let NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout} = xftpNetworkConfig $ xftpConfig config
tcpConnectTimeout `timeout` atomically (readTMVar cVar) >>= \case
Just (Right client) -> closeXFTPClient client `catchAll_` pure ()
_ -> pure ()
-601
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@@ -1,601 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-ambiguous-fields #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Main
( SendOptions (..),
CLIError (..),
xftpClientCLI,
cliSendFile,
prepareChunkSizes,
prepareChunkSpecs,
maxFileSize,
fileSizeLen,
getChunkDigest,
SentRecipientReplica (..),
)
where
import Control.Logger.Simple
import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
import Data.Char (toLower)
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.List (foldl', sortOn)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..), nonEmpty)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Map (Map)
import qualified Data.Map as M
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Data.Word (Word32)
import GHC.Records (HasField (getField))
import Options.Applicative
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Agent
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Presets
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Crypto
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPRcvChunkSpec (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Types
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Util (uniqueCombine)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File (CryptoFile (..), FTCryptoError (..))
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File as CF
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String (StrEncoding (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parseAll)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtoServerWithAuth (..), SenderId, SndPrivateSignKey, XFTPServer, XFTPServerWithAuth)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI (getCliCommand')
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (groupAllOn, ifM, tshow, whenM)
import System.Exit (exitFailure)
import System.FilePath (splitFileName, (</>))
import System.IO.Temp (getCanonicalTemporaryDirectory)
import System.Random (StdGen, newStdGen, randomR)
import UnliftIO
import UnliftIO.Directory
xftpClientVersion :: String
xftpClientVersion = "1.0.1"
maxFileSize :: Int64
maxFileSize = gb 1
maxFileSizeStr :: String
maxFileSizeStr = B.unpack . strEncode $ FileSize maxFileSize
fileSizeLen :: Int64
fileSizeLen = 8
newtype CLIError = CLIError String
deriving (Eq, Show, Exception)
cliCryptoError :: FTCryptoError -> CLIError
cliCryptoError = \case
FTCECryptoError e -> CLIError $ "Error decrypting file: " <> show e
FTCEInvalidHeader e -> CLIError $ "Invalid file header: " <> e
FTCEInvalidAuthTag -> CLIError "Error decrypting file: incorrect auth tag"
FTCEInvalidFileSize -> CLIError "Error decrypting file: incorrect file size"
FTCEFileIOError e -> CLIError $ "File IO error: " <> show e
data CliCommand
= SendFile SendOptions
| ReceiveFile ReceiveOptions
| DeleteFile DeleteOptions
| RandomFile RandomFileOptions
| FileDescrInfo InfoOptions
data SendOptions = SendOptions
{ filePath :: FilePath,
outputDir :: Maybe FilePath,
numRecipients :: Int,
xftpServers :: [XFTPServerWithAuth],
retryCount :: Int,
tempPath :: Maybe FilePath,
verbose :: Bool
}
deriving (Show)
data ReceiveOptions = ReceiveOptions
{ fileDescription :: FilePath,
filePath :: Maybe FilePath,
retryCount :: Int,
tempPath :: Maybe FilePath,
verbose :: Bool,
yes :: Bool
}
deriving (Show)
data DeleteOptions = DeleteOptions
{ fileDescription :: FilePath,
retryCount :: Int,
verbose :: Bool,
yes :: Bool
}
deriving (Show)
newtype InfoOptions = InfoOptions
{ fileDescription :: FilePath
}
deriving (Show)
data RandomFileOptions = RandomFileOptions
{ filePath :: FilePath,
fileSize :: FileSize Int64
}
deriving (Show)
defaultRetryCount :: Int
defaultRetryCount = 3
cliCommandP :: Parser CliCommand
cliCommandP =
hsubparser
( command "send" (info (SendFile <$> sendP) (progDesc "Send file"))
<> command "recv" (info (ReceiveFile <$> receiveP) (progDesc "Receive file"))
<> command "del" (info (DeleteFile <$> deleteP) (progDesc "Delete file from server(s)"))
<> command "info" (info (FileDescrInfo <$> infoP) (progDesc "Show file description"))
)
<|> hsubparser (command "rand" (info (RandomFile <$> randomP) (progDesc "Generate a random file of a given size")) <> internal)
where
sendP :: Parser SendOptions
sendP =
SendOptions
<$> argument str (metavar "FILE" <> help "File to send")
<*> optional (argument str $ metavar "DIR" <> help "Directory to save file descriptions (default: current directory)")
<*> option auto (short 'n' <> metavar "COUNT" <> help "Number of recipients" <> value 1 <> showDefault)
<*> xftpServers
<*> retryCountP
<*> temp
<*> verboseP
receiveP :: Parser ReceiveOptions
receiveP =
ReceiveOptions
<$> fileDescrArg
<*> optional (argument str $ metavar "DIR" <> help "Directory to save file (default: system Downloads directory)")
<*> retryCountP
<*> temp
<*> verboseP
<*> yesP
deleteP :: Parser DeleteOptions
deleteP =
DeleteOptions
<$> fileDescrArg
<*> retryCountP
<*> verboseP
<*> yesP
infoP :: Parser InfoOptions
infoP = InfoOptions <$> fileDescrArg
randomP :: Parser RandomFileOptions
randomP =
RandomFileOptions
<$> argument str (metavar "FILE" <> help "Path to save file")
<*> argument str (metavar "SIZE" <> help "File size (bytes/kb/mb/gb)")
fileDescrArg = argument str (metavar "FILE" <> help "File description file")
retryCountP = option auto (long "retry" <> short 'r' <> metavar "RETRY" <> help "Number of network retries" <> value defaultRetryCount <> showDefault)
temp = optional (strOption $ long "tmp" <> metavar "TMP" <> help "Directory for temporary encrypted file (default: system temp directory)")
verboseP = switch (long "verbose" <> short 'v' <> help "Verbose output")
yesP = switch (long "yes" <> short 'y' <> help "Yes to questions")
xftpServers =
option
parseXFTPServers
( long "servers"
<> short 's'
<> metavar "SERVER"
<> help "Semicolon-separated list of XFTP server(s) to use (each server can have more than one hostname)"
<> value []
)
parseXFTPServers = eitherReader $ parseAll xftpServersP . B.pack
xftpServersP = strP `A.sepBy1` A.char ';'
data SentFileChunk = SentFileChunk
{ chunkNo :: Int,
sndId :: SenderId,
sndPrivateKey :: SndPrivateSignKey,
chunkSize :: FileSize Word32,
digest :: FileDigest,
replicas :: [SentFileChunkReplica]
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data SentFileChunkReplica = SentFileChunkReplica
{ server :: XFTPServer,
recipients :: [(ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateSignKey)]
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data SentRecipientReplica = SentRecipientReplica
{ chunkNo :: Int,
server :: XFTPServer,
rcvNo :: Int,
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
replicaKey :: C.APrivateSignKey,
digest :: FileDigest,
chunkSize :: FileSize Word32
}
logCfg :: LogConfig
logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
xftpClientCLI :: IO ()
xftpClientCLI =
getCliCommand' cliCommandP clientVersion >>= \case
SendFile opts -> runLogE opts $ cliSendFile opts
ReceiveFile opts -> runLogE opts $ cliReceiveFile opts
DeleteFile opts -> runLogE opts $ cliDeleteFile opts
FileDescrInfo opts -> runE $ cliFileDescrInfo opts
RandomFile opts -> cliRandomFile opts
where
clientVersion = "SimpleX XFTP client v" <> xftpClientVersion
runLogE :: HasField "verbose" a Bool => a -> ExceptT CLIError IO () -> IO ()
runLogE opts a
| getField @"verbose" opts = setLogLevel LogDebug >> withGlobalLogging logCfg (runE a)
| otherwise = runE a
runE :: ExceptT CLIError IO () -> IO ()
runE a =
runExceptT a >>= \case
Left (CLIError e) -> putStrLn e >> exitFailure
_ -> pure ()
cliSendFile :: SendOptions -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
cliSendFile opts = cliSendFileOpts opts True $ printProgress "Uploaded"
cliSendFileOpts :: SendOptions -> Bool -> (Int64 -> Int64 -> IO ()) -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
cliSendFileOpts SendOptions {filePath, outputDir, numRecipients, xftpServers, retryCount, tempPath, verbose} printInfo notifyProgress = do
let (_, fileName) = splitFileName filePath
liftIO $ when printInfo $ printNoNewLine "Encrypting file..."
g <- liftIO C.newRandom
(encPath, fdRcv, fdSnd, chunkSpecs, encSize) <- encryptFileForUpload g fileName
liftIO $ when printInfo $ printNoNewLine "Uploading file..."
uploadedChunks <- newTVarIO []
sentChunks <- uploadFile g chunkSpecs uploadedChunks encSize
whenM (doesFileExist encPath) $ removeFile encPath
-- TODO if only small chunks, use different default size
liftIO $ do
let fdRcvs = createRcvFileDescriptions fdRcv sentChunks
fdSnd' = createSndFileDescription fdSnd sentChunks
(fdRcvPaths, fdSndPath) <- writeFileDescriptions fileName fdRcvs fdSnd'
when printInfo $ do
printNoNewLine "File uploaded!"
putStrLn $ "\nSender file description: " <> fdSndPath
putStrLn "Pass file descriptions to the recipient(s):"
forM_ fdRcvPaths putStrLn
where
encryptFileForUpload :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> String -> ExceptT CLIError IO (FilePath, FileDescription 'FRecipient, FileDescription 'FSender, [XFTPChunkSpec], Int64)
encryptFileForUpload g fileName = do
fileSize <- fromInteger <$> getFileSize filePath
when (fileSize > maxFileSize) $ throwError $ CLIError $ "Files bigger than " <> maxFileSizeStr <> " are not supported"
encPath <- getEncPath tempPath "xftp"
key <- atomically $ C.randomSbKey g
nonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
let fileHdr = smpEncode FileHeader {fileName, fileExtra = Nothing}
fileSize' = fromIntegral (B.length fileHdr) + fileSize
chunkSizes = prepareChunkSizes $ fileSize' + fileSizeLen + authTagSize
defChunkSize = head chunkSizes
chunkSizes' = map fromIntegral chunkSizes
encSize = sum chunkSizes'
srcFile = CF.plain filePath
withExceptT (CLIError . show) $ encryptFile srcFile fileHdr key nonce fileSize' encSize encPath
digest <- liftIO $ LC.sha512Hash <$> LB.readFile encPath
let chunkSpecs = prepareChunkSpecs encPath chunkSizes
fdRcv = FileDescription {party = SFRecipient, size = FileSize encSize, digest = FileDigest digest, key, nonce, chunkSize = FileSize defChunkSize, chunks = []}
fdSnd = FileDescription {party = SFSender, size = FileSize encSize, digest = FileDigest digest, key, nonce, chunkSize = FileSize defChunkSize, chunks = []}
logInfo $ "encrypted file to " <> tshow encPath
pure (encPath, fdRcv, fdSnd, chunkSpecs, encSize)
uploadFile :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> [XFTPChunkSpec] -> TVar [Int64] -> Int64 -> ExceptT CLIError IO [SentFileChunk]
uploadFile g chunks uploadedChunks encSize = do
a <- atomically $ newXFTPAgent defaultXFTPClientAgentConfig
gen <- newTVarIO =<< liftIO newStdGen
let xftpSrvs = fromMaybe defaultXFTPServers (nonEmpty xftpServers)
srvs <- liftIO $ replicateM (length chunks) $ getXFTPServer gen xftpSrvs
let thd3 (_, _, x) = x
chunks' = groupAllOn thd3 $ zip3 [1 ..] chunks srvs
-- TODO shuffle/unshuffle chunks
-- the reason we don't do pooled downloads here within one server is that http2 library doesn't handle cleint concurrency, even though
-- upload doesn't allow other requests within the same client until complete (but download does allow).
logInfo $ "uploading " <> tshow (length chunks) <> " chunks..."
map snd . sortOn fst . concat <$> pooledForConcurrentlyN 16 chunks' (mapM $ uploadFileChunk a)
where
uploadFileChunk :: XFTPClientAgent -> (Int, XFTPChunkSpec, XFTPServerWithAuth) -> ExceptT CLIError IO (Int, SentFileChunk)
uploadFileChunk a (chunkNo, chunkSpec@XFTPChunkSpec {chunkSize}, ProtoServerWithAuth xftpServer auth) = do
logInfo $ "uploading chunk " <> tshow chunkNo <> " to " <> showServer xftpServer <> "..."
(sndKey, spKey) <- atomically $ C.generateSignatureKeyPair C.SEd25519 g
rKeys <- atomically $ L.fromList <$> replicateM numRecipients (C.generateSignatureKeyPair C.SEd25519 g)
digest <- liftIO $ getChunkDigest chunkSpec
let ch = FileInfo {sndKey, size = fromIntegral chunkSize, digest}
c <- withRetry retryCount $ getXFTPServerClient a xftpServer
(sndId, rIds) <- withRetry retryCount $ createXFTPChunk c spKey ch (L.map fst rKeys) auth
withReconnect a xftpServer retryCount $ \c' -> uploadXFTPChunk c' spKey sndId chunkSpec
logInfo $ "uploaded chunk " <> tshow chunkNo
uploaded <- atomically . stateTVar uploadedChunks $ \cs ->
let cs' = fromIntegral chunkSize : cs in (sum cs', cs')
liftIO $ do
notifyProgress uploaded encSize
when verbose $ putStrLn ""
let recipients = L.toList $ L.map ChunkReplicaId rIds `L.zip` L.map snd rKeys
replicas = [SentFileChunkReplica {server = xftpServer, recipients}]
pure (chunkNo, SentFileChunk {chunkNo, sndId, sndPrivateKey = spKey, chunkSize = FileSize $ fromIntegral chunkSize, digest = FileDigest digest, replicas})
getXFTPServer :: TVar StdGen -> NonEmpty XFTPServerWithAuth -> IO XFTPServerWithAuth
getXFTPServer gen = \case
srv :| [] -> pure srv
servers -> do
atomically $ (servers L.!!) <$> stateTVar gen (randomR (0, L.length servers - 1))
-- M chunks, R replicas, N recipients
-- rcvReplicas: M[SentFileChunk] -> M * R * N [SentRecipientReplica]
-- rcvChunks: M * R * N [SentRecipientReplica] -> N[ M[FileChunk] ]
createRcvFileDescriptions :: FileDescription 'FRecipient -> [SentFileChunk] -> [FileDescription 'FRecipient]
createRcvFileDescriptions fd sentChunks = map (\chunks -> (fd :: (FileDescription 'FRecipient)) {chunks}) rcvChunks
where
rcvReplicas :: [SentRecipientReplica]
rcvReplicas =
concatMap
( \SentFileChunk {chunkNo, digest, chunkSize, replicas} ->
concatMap
( \SentFileChunkReplica {server, recipients} ->
zipWith (\rcvNo (replicaId, replicaKey) -> SentRecipientReplica {chunkNo, server, rcvNo, replicaId, replicaKey, digest, chunkSize}) [1 ..] recipients
)
replicas
)
sentChunks
rcvChunks :: [[FileChunk]]
rcvChunks = map (sortChunks . M.elems) $ M.elems $ foldl' addRcvChunk M.empty rcvReplicas
sortChunks :: [FileChunk] -> [FileChunk]
sortChunks = map reverseReplicas . sortOn (\FileChunk {chunkNo} -> chunkNo)
reverseReplicas ch@FileChunk {replicas} = (ch :: FileChunk) {replicas = reverse replicas}
addRcvChunk :: Map Int (Map Int FileChunk) -> SentRecipientReplica -> Map Int (Map Int FileChunk)
addRcvChunk m SentRecipientReplica {chunkNo, server, rcvNo, replicaId, replicaKey, digest, chunkSize} =
M.alter (Just . addOrChangeRecipient) rcvNo m
where
addOrChangeRecipient :: Maybe (Map Int FileChunk) -> Map Int FileChunk
addOrChangeRecipient = \case
Just m' -> M.alter (Just . addOrChangeChunk) chunkNo m'
_ -> M.singleton chunkNo $ FileChunk {chunkNo, digest, chunkSize, replicas = [replica]}
addOrChangeChunk :: Maybe FileChunk -> FileChunk
addOrChangeChunk = \case
Just ch@FileChunk {replicas} -> ch {replicas = replica : replicas}
_ -> FileChunk {chunkNo, digest, chunkSize, replicas = [replica]}
replica = FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey}
createSndFileDescription :: FileDescription 'FSender -> [SentFileChunk] -> FileDescription 'FSender
createSndFileDescription fd sentChunks = fd {chunks = sndChunks}
where
sndChunks :: [FileChunk]
sndChunks =
map
( \SentFileChunk {chunkNo, sndId, sndPrivateKey, chunkSize, digest, replicas} ->
FileChunk {chunkNo, digest, chunkSize, replicas = sndReplicas replicas (ChunkReplicaId sndId) sndPrivateKey}
)
sentChunks
-- SentFileChunk having sndId and sndPrivateKey represents the current implementation's limitation
-- that sender uploads each chunk only to one server, so we can use the first replica's server for FileChunkReplica
sndReplicas :: [SentFileChunkReplica] -> ChunkReplicaId -> C.APrivateSignKey -> [FileChunkReplica]
sndReplicas [] _ _ = []
sndReplicas (SentFileChunkReplica {server} : _) replicaId replicaKey = [FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey}]
writeFileDescriptions :: String -> [FileDescription 'FRecipient] -> FileDescription 'FSender -> IO ([FilePath], FilePath)
writeFileDescriptions fileName fdRcvs fdSnd = do
outDir <- uniqueCombine (fromMaybe "." outputDir) (fileName <> ".xftp")
createDirectoryIfMissing True outDir
fdRcvPaths <- forM (zip [1 ..] fdRcvs) $ \(i :: Int, fd) -> do
let fdPath = outDir </> ("rcv" <> show i <> ".xftp")
B.writeFile fdPath $ strEncode fd
pure fdPath
let fdSndPath = outDir </> "snd.xftp.private"
B.writeFile fdSndPath $ strEncode fdSnd
pure (fdRcvPaths, fdSndPath)
getChunkDigest :: XFTPChunkSpec -> IO ByteString
getChunkDigest XFTPChunkSpec {filePath = chunkPath, chunkOffset, chunkSize} =
withFile chunkPath ReadMode $ \h -> do
hSeek h AbsoluteSeek $ fromIntegral chunkOffset
LC.sha256Hash <$> LB.hGet h (fromIntegral chunkSize)
cliReceiveFile :: ReceiveOptions -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath, verbose, yes} =
getFileDescription' fileDescription >>= receive
where
receive :: ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
receive (ValidFileDescription FileDescription {size, digest, key, nonce, chunks}) = do
encPath <- getEncPath tempPath "xftp"
createDirectory encPath
a <- atomically $ newXFTPAgent defaultXFTPClientAgentConfig
liftIO $ printNoNewLine "Downloading file..."
downloadedChunks <- newTVarIO []
let srv FileChunk {replicas} = case replicas of
[] -> error "empty FileChunk.replicas"
FileChunkReplica {server} : _ -> server
srvChunks = groupAllOn srv chunks
g <- liftIO C.newRandom
chunkPaths <- map snd . sortOn fst . concat <$> pooledForConcurrentlyN 16 srvChunks (mapM $ downloadFileChunk g a encPath size downloadedChunks)
encDigest <- liftIO $ LC.sha512Hash <$> readChunks chunkPaths
when (encDigest /= unFileDigest digest) $ throwError $ CLIError "File digest mismatch"
encSize <- liftIO $ foldM (\s path -> (s +) . fromIntegral <$> getFileSize path) 0 chunkPaths
when (FileSize encSize /= size) $ throwError $ CLIError "File size mismatch"
liftIO $ printNoNewLine "Decrypting file..."
CryptoFile path _ <- withExceptT cliCryptoError $ decryptChunks encSize chunkPaths key nonce $ fmap CF.plain . getFilePath
forM_ chunks $ acknowledgeFileChunk a
whenM (doesPathExist encPath) $ removeDirectoryRecursive encPath
liftIO $ do
printNoNewLine $ "File downloaded: " <> path
removeFD yes fileDescription
downloadFileChunk :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> XFTPClientAgent -> FilePath -> FileSize Int64 -> TVar [Int64] -> FileChunk -> ExceptT CLIError IO (Int, FilePath)
downloadFileChunk g a encPath (FileSize encSize) downloadedChunks FileChunk {chunkNo, chunkSize, digest, replicas = replica : _} = do
let FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey} = replica
logInfo $ "downloading chunk " <> tshow chunkNo <> " from " <> showServer server <> "..."
chunkPath <- uniqueCombine encPath $ show chunkNo
let chunkSpec = XFTPRcvChunkSpec chunkPath (unFileSize chunkSize) (unFileDigest digest)
withReconnect a server retryCount $ \c -> downloadXFTPChunk g c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId) chunkSpec
logInfo $ "downloaded chunk " <> tshow chunkNo <> " to " <> T.pack chunkPath
downloaded <- atomically . stateTVar downloadedChunks $ \cs ->
let cs' = fromIntegral (unFileSize chunkSize) : cs in (sum cs', cs')
liftIO $ do
printProgress "Downloaded" downloaded encSize
when verbose $ putStrLn ""
pure (chunkNo, chunkPath)
downloadFileChunk _ _ _ _ _ _ = throwError $ CLIError "chunk has no replicas"
getFilePath :: String -> ExceptT String IO FilePath
getFilePath name =
case filePath of
Just path ->
ifM (doesDirectoryExist path) (uniqueCombine path name) $
ifM (doesFileExist path) (throwError "File already exists") (pure path)
_ -> (`uniqueCombine` name) . (</> "Downloads") =<< getHomeDirectory
acknowledgeFileChunk :: XFTPClientAgent -> FileChunk -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
acknowledgeFileChunk a FileChunk {replicas = replica : _} = do
let FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey} = replica
c <- withRetry retryCount $ getXFTPServerClient a server
withRetry retryCount $ ackXFTPChunk c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId)
acknowledgeFileChunk _ _ = throwError $ CLIError "chunk has no replicas"
printProgress :: String -> Int64 -> Int64 -> IO ()
printProgress s part total = printNoNewLine $ s <> " " <> show ((part * 100) `div` total) <> "%"
printNoNewLine :: String -> IO ()
printNoNewLine s = do
putStr $ s <> replicate (max 0 $ 25 - length s) ' ' <> "\r"
hFlush stdout
cliDeleteFile :: DeleteOptions -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
cliDeleteFile DeleteOptions {fileDescription, retryCount, yes} = do
getFileDescription' fileDescription >>= deleteFile
where
deleteFile :: ValidFileDescription 'FSender -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
deleteFile (ValidFileDescription FileDescription {chunks}) = do
a <- atomically $ newXFTPAgent defaultXFTPClientAgentConfig
forM_ chunks $ deleteFileChunk a
liftIO $ do
printNoNewLine "File deleted!"
removeFD yes fileDescription
deleteFileChunk :: XFTPClientAgent -> FileChunk -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
deleteFileChunk a FileChunk {chunkNo, replicas = replica : _} = do
let FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey} = replica
withReconnect a server retryCount $ \c -> deleteXFTPChunk c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId)
logInfo $ "deleted chunk " <> tshow chunkNo <> " from " <> showServer server
deleteFileChunk _ _ = throwError $ CLIError "chunk has no replicas"
cliFileDescrInfo :: InfoOptions -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
cliFileDescrInfo InfoOptions {fileDescription} = do
getFileDescription fileDescription >>= \case
AVFD (ValidFileDescription FileDescription {party, size, chunkSize, chunks}) -> do
let replicas = groupReplicasByServer chunkSize chunks
liftIO $ do
printParty
putStrLn $ "File download size: " <> strEnc size
putStrLn "File server(s):"
forM_ replicas $ \srvReplicas@(FileServerReplica {server} :| _) -> do
let chSizes = fmap (\FileServerReplica {chunkSize = chSize_} -> unFileSize $ fromMaybe chunkSize chSize_) srvReplicas
putStrLn $ strEnc server <> ": " <> strEnc (FileSize $ sum chSizes)
where
printParty :: IO ()
printParty = case party of
SFRecipient -> putStrLn "Recipient file description"
SFSender -> putStrLn "Sender file description"
strEnc :: StrEncoding a => a -> String
strEnc = B.unpack . strEncode
getFileDescription :: FilePath -> ExceptT CLIError IO AValidFileDescription
getFileDescription path =
ExceptT $ first (CLIError . ("Failed to parse file description: " <>)) . strDecode <$> B.readFile path
getFileDescription' :: FilePartyI p => FilePath -> ExceptT CLIError IO (ValidFileDescription p)
getFileDescription' path =
getFileDescription path >>= \case
AVFD fd -> either (throwError . CLIError) pure $ checkParty fd
prepareChunkSizes :: Int64 -> [Word32]
prepareChunkSizes size' = prepareSizes size'
where
(smallSize, bigSize)
| size' > size34 chunkSize3 = (chunkSize2, chunkSize3)
| otherwise = (chunkSize1, chunkSize2)
-- | size' > size34 chunkSize2 = (chunkSize1, chunkSize2)
-- | otherwise = (chunkSize0, chunkSize1)
size34 sz = (fromIntegral sz * 3) `div` 4
prepareSizes 0 = []
prepareSizes size
| size >= fromIntegral bigSize = replicate (fromIntegral n1) bigSize <> prepareSizes remSz
| size > size34 bigSize = [bigSize]
| otherwise = replicate (fromIntegral n2') smallSize
where
(n1, remSz) = size `divMod` fromIntegral bigSize
n2' = let (n2, remSz2) = (size `divMod` fromIntegral smallSize) in if remSz2 == 0 then n2 else n2 + 1
prepareChunkSpecs :: FilePath -> [Word32] -> [XFTPChunkSpec]
prepareChunkSpecs filePath chunkSizes = reverse . snd $ foldl' addSpec (0, []) chunkSizes
where
addSpec :: (Int64, [XFTPChunkSpec]) -> Word32 -> (Int64, [XFTPChunkSpec])
addSpec (chunkOffset, specs) sz =
let spec = XFTPChunkSpec {filePath, chunkOffset, chunkSize = fromIntegral sz}
in (chunkOffset + fromIntegral sz, spec : specs)
getEncPath :: MonadIO m => Maybe FilePath -> String -> m FilePath
getEncPath path name = (`uniqueCombine` (name <> ".encrypted")) =<< maybe (liftIO getCanonicalTemporaryDirectory) pure path
withReconnect :: Show e => XFTPClientAgent -> XFTPServer -> Int -> (XFTPClient -> ExceptT e IO a) -> ExceptT CLIError IO a
withReconnect a srv n run = withRetry n $ do
c <- withRetry n $ getXFTPServerClient a srv
withExceptT (CLIError . show) (run c) `catchError` \e -> do
liftIO $ closeXFTPServerClient a srv
throwError e
withRetry :: Show e => Int -> ExceptT e IO a -> ExceptT CLIError IO a
withRetry retryCount = withRetry' retryCount . withExceptT (CLIError . show)
where
withRetry' :: Int -> ExceptT CLIError IO a -> ExceptT CLIError IO a
withRetry' 0 _ = throwError $ CLIError "internal: no retry attempts"
withRetry' 1 a = a
withRetry' n a =
a `catchError` \e -> do
logWarn ("retrying: " <> tshow e)
withRetry' (n - 1) a
removeFD :: Bool -> FilePath -> IO ()
removeFD yes fd
| yes = do
removeFile fd
putStrLn $ "\nFile description " <> fd <> " is deleted."
| otherwise = do
y <- liftIO . getConfirmation $ "\nFile description " <> fd <> " can't be used again. Delete it"
when y $ removeFile fd
getConfirmation :: String -> IO Bool
getConfirmation prompt = do
putStr $ prompt <> " (Y/n): "
hFlush stdout
s <- getLine
case map toLower s of
"y" -> pure True
"" -> pure True
"n" -> pure False
_ -> getConfirmation prompt
cliRandomFile :: RandomFileOptions -> IO ()
cliRandomFile RandomFileOptions {filePath, fileSize = FileSize size} = do
withFile filePath WriteMode (`saveRandomFile` size)
putStrLn $ "File created: " <> filePath
where
saveRandomFile h sz = do
g <- C.newRandom
bytes <- atomically $ C.randomBytes (fromIntegral $ min mb' sz) g
B.hPut h bytes
when (sz > mb') $ saveRandomFile h (sz - mb')
mb' = mb 1
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedLists #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Presets where
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (XFTPServerWithAuth)
defaultXFTPServers :: NonEmpty XFTPServerWithAuth
defaultXFTPServers =
[ "xftp://da1aH3nOT-9G8lV7bWamhxpDYdJ1xmW7j3JpGaDR5Ug=@xftp1.simplex.im,blisztokwh6alt5oem45f2eksm2xdowxszmhjesntcyolmhutoon7sid.onion",
"xftp://5vog2Imy1ExJB_7zDZrkV1KDWi96jYFyy9CL6fndBVw=@xftp2.simplex.im,jk6jybnel5hin2am5omd7g3hyvb4tfkyl7ea4vx5ldi7gpvz5ogqtcqd.onion",
"xftp://PYa32DdYNFWi0uZZOprWQoQpIk5qyjRJ3EF7bVpbsn8=@xftp3.simplex.im,pqhchr4bpkzef5wra4hnmzvppn5j5mjrpzkh5ixx6mhylnxxd6lmwnad.onion",
"xftp://k_GgQl40UZVV0Y4BX9ZTyMVqX5ZewcLW0waQIl7AYDE=@xftp4.simplex.im,q2lrjgiyo2efyweksavwxh3dlsrxetaxjztde2x5nateugrtrwzvmdid.onion",
"xftp://-bIo6o8wuVc4wpZkZD3tH-rCeYaeER_0lz1ffQcSJDs=@xftp5.simplex.im,2kikdbdhlrluburwt6q6rnoxvezcm2ifx2hj463jlunkeftlzm7hf3qd.onion",
"xftp://6nSvtY9pJn6PXWTAIMNl95E1Kk1vD7FM2TeOA64CFLg=@xftp6.simplex.im,tg3fmu6houq7vfqlsipm2qqzhtpgxesnuydqozx3khojxydhs53sbbyd.onion"
]
-113
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@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Crypto where
import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Types (FileHeader (..), authTagSize)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File (CryptoFile (..), FTCryptoError (..))
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File as CF
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy (LazyByteString)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (liftEitherWith)
import UnliftIO
import UnliftIO.Directory (removeFile)
encryptFile :: CryptoFile -> ByteString -> C.SbKey -> C.CbNonce -> Int64 -> Int64 -> FilePath -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO ()
encryptFile srcFile fileHdr key nonce fileSize' encSize encFile = do
sb <- liftEitherWith FTCECryptoError $ LC.sbInit key nonce
CF.withFile srcFile ReadMode $ \r -> withFile encFile WriteMode $ \w -> do
let lenStr = smpEncode fileSize'
(hdr, !sb') = LC.sbEncryptChunk sb $ lenStr <> fileHdr
padLen = encSize - authTagSize - fileSize' - 8
liftIO $ B.hPut w hdr
sb2 <- encryptChunks r w (sb', fileSize' - fromIntegral (B.length fileHdr))
CF.hGetTag r
sb3 <- encryptPad w (sb2, padLen)
let tag = BA.convert $ LC.sbAuth sb3
liftIO $ B.hPut w tag
where
encryptChunks r = encryptChunks_ $ liftIO . CF.hGet r . fromIntegral
encryptPad = encryptChunks_ $ \sz -> pure $ B.replicate (fromIntegral sz) '#'
encryptChunks_ :: (Int64 -> IO ByteString) -> Handle -> (LC.SbState, Int64) -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO LC.SbState
encryptChunks_ get w (!sb, !len)
| len == 0 = pure sb
| otherwise = do
let chSize = min len 65536
ch <- liftIO $ get chSize
when (B.length ch /= fromIntegral chSize) $ throwError $ FTCEFileIOError "encrypting file: unexpected EOF"
let (ch', sb') = LC.sbEncryptChunk sb ch
liftIO $ B.hPut w ch'
encryptChunks_ get w (sb', len - chSize)
decryptChunks :: Int64 -> [FilePath] -> C.SbKey -> C.CbNonce -> (String -> ExceptT String IO CryptoFile) -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO CryptoFile
decryptChunks _ [] _ _ _ = throwError $ FTCEInvalidHeader "empty"
decryptChunks encSize (chPath : chPaths) key nonce getDestFile = case reverse chPaths of
[] -> do
(!authOk, !f) <- liftEither . first FTCECryptoError . LC.sbDecryptTailTag key nonce (encSize - authTagSize) =<< liftIO (LB.readFile chPath)
unless authOk $ throwError FTCEInvalidAuthTag
(FileHeader {fileName}, !f') <- parseFileHeader f
destFile <- withExceptT FTCEFileIOError $ getDestFile fileName
CF.writeFile destFile f'
pure destFile
lastPath : chPaths' -> do
(state, expectedLen, ch) <- decryptFirstChunk
(FileHeader {fileName}, ch') <- parseFileHeader ch
destFile@(CryptoFile path _) <- withExceptT FTCEFileIOError $ getDestFile fileName
authOk <- CF.withFile destFile WriteMode $ \h -> liftIO $ do
CF.hPut h ch'
state' <- foldM (decryptChunk h) state $ reverse chPaths'
decryptLastChunk h state' expectedLen
unless authOk $ do
removeFile path
throwError FTCEInvalidAuthTag
pure destFile
where
decryptFirstChunk = do
sb <- liftEitherWith FTCECryptoError $ LC.sbInit key nonce
ch <- liftIO $ LB.readFile chPath
let (ch1, !sb') = LC.sbDecryptChunkLazy sb ch
(!expectedLen, ch2) <- liftEitherWith FTCECryptoError $ LC.splitLen ch1
let len1 = LB.length ch2
pure ((sb', len1), expectedLen, ch2)
decryptChunk h (!sb, !len) chPth = do
ch <- LB.readFile chPth
let len' = len + LB.length ch
(ch', sb') = LC.sbDecryptChunkLazy sb ch
CF.hPut h ch'
pure (sb', len')
decryptLastChunk h (!sb, !len) expectedLen = do
ch <- LB.readFile lastPath
let (ch1, tag') = LB.splitAt (LB.length ch - authTagSize) ch
tag'' = LB.toStrict tag'
(ch2, sb') = LC.sbDecryptChunkLazy sb ch1
len' = len + LB.length ch2
ch3 = LB.take (LB.length ch2 - len' + expectedLen) ch2
tag :: ByteString = BA.convert (LC.sbAuth sb')
CF.hPut h ch3
CF.hPutTag h
pure $ B.length tag'' == 16 && BA.constEq tag'' tag
where
parseFileHeader :: LazyByteString -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO (FileHeader, LazyByteString)
parseFileHeader s = do
let (hdrStr, s') = LB.splitAt 1024 s
case A.parse smpP $ LB.toStrict hdrStr of
A.Fail _ _ e -> throwError $ FTCEInvalidHeader e
A.Partial _ -> throwError $ FTCEInvalidHeader "incomplete"
A.Done rest hdr -> pure (hdr, LB.fromStrict rest <> s')
readChunks :: [FilePath] -> IO LB.ByteString
readChunks = foldM (\s path -> (s <>) <$> LB.readFile path) ""
-339
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@@ -1,339 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-ambiguous-fields #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
( FileDescription (..),
AFileDescription (..),
ValidFileDescription, -- constructor is not exported, use pattern
pattern ValidFileDescription,
AValidFileDescription (..),
FileDigest (..),
FileChunk (..),
FileChunkReplica (..),
FileServerReplica (..),
FileSize (..),
ChunkReplicaId (..),
YAMLFileDescription (..), -- for tests
YAMLServerReplicas (..), -- for tests
validateFileDescription,
groupReplicasByServer,
fdSeparator,
kb,
mb,
gb,
)
where
import Control.Applicative (optional)
import Control.Monad ((<=<))
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON, ToJSON)
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 (Parser)
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.List (foldl', sortOn)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Map (Map)
import qualified Data.Map as M
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
import Data.String
import Data.Word (Word32)
import qualified Data.Yaml as Y
import Database.SQLite.Simple.FromField (FromField (..))
import Database.SQLite.Simple.ToField (ToField (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON, parseAll)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (XFTPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, (<$?>))
data FileDescription (p :: FileParty) = FileDescription
{ party :: SFileParty p,
size :: FileSize Int64,
digest :: FileDigest,
key :: C.SbKey,
nonce :: C.CbNonce,
chunkSize :: FileSize Word32,
chunks :: [FileChunk]
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data AFileDescription = forall p. FilePartyI p => AFD (FileDescription p)
newtype ValidFileDescription p = ValidFD (FileDescription p)
deriving (Eq, Show)
pattern ValidFileDescription :: FileDescription p -> ValidFileDescription p
pattern ValidFileDescription fd = ValidFD fd
{-# COMPLETE ValidFileDescription #-}
data AValidFileDescription = forall p. FilePartyI p => AVFD (ValidFileDescription p)
fdSeparator :: IsString s => s
fdSeparator = "################################\n"
newtype FileDigest = FileDigest {unFileDigest :: ByteString}
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance StrEncoding FileDigest where
strEncode (FileDigest fd) = strEncode fd
strDecode s = FileDigest <$> strDecode s
strP = FileDigest <$> strP
instance FromJSON FileDigest where
parseJSON = strParseJSON "FileDigest"
instance ToJSON FileDigest where
toJSON = strToJSON
toEncoding = strToJEncoding
instance FromField FileDigest where fromField f = FileDigest <$> fromField f
instance ToField FileDigest where toField (FileDigest s) = toField s
data FileChunk = FileChunk
{ chunkNo :: Int,
chunkSize :: FileSize Word32,
digest :: FileDigest,
replicas :: [FileChunkReplica]
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data FileChunkReplica = FileChunkReplica
{ server :: XFTPServer,
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
replicaKey :: C.APrivateSignKey
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
newtype ChunkReplicaId = ChunkReplicaId {unChunkReplicaId :: ByteString}
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance StrEncoding ChunkReplicaId where
strEncode (ChunkReplicaId fid) = strEncode fid
strP = ChunkReplicaId <$> strP
instance FromJSON ChunkReplicaId where
parseJSON = strParseJSON "ChunkReplicaId"
instance ToJSON ChunkReplicaId where
toJSON = strToJSON
toEncoding = strToJEncoding
instance FromField ChunkReplicaId where fromField f = ChunkReplicaId <$> fromField f
instance ToField ChunkReplicaId where toField (ChunkReplicaId s) = toField s
data YAMLFileDescription = YAMLFileDescription
{ party :: FileParty,
size :: String,
digest :: FileDigest,
key :: C.SbKey,
nonce :: C.CbNonce,
chunkSize :: String,
replicas :: [YAMLServerReplicas]
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data YAMLServerReplicas = YAMLServerReplicas
{ server :: XFTPServer,
chunks :: [String]
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data FileServerReplica = FileServerReplica
{ chunkNo :: Int,
server :: XFTPServer,
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
replicaKey :: C.APrivateSignKey,
digest :: Maybe FileDigest,
chunkSize :: Maybe (FileSize Word32)
}
deriving (Show)
newtype FileSize a = FileSize {unFileSize :: a}
deriving (Eq, Show)
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''YAMLServerReplicas)
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''YAMLFileDescription)
instance FilePartyI p => StrEncoding (ValidFileDescription p) where
strEncode (ValidFD fd) = strEncode fd
strDecode s = strDecode s >>= (\(AVFD fd) -> checkParty fd)
strP = strDecode <$?> A.takeByteString
instance StrEncoding AValidFileDescription where
strEncode (AVFD fd) = strEncode fd
strDecode = (\(AFD fd) -> AVFD <$> validateFileDescription fd) <=< strDecode
strP = strDecode <$?> A.takeByteString
instance FilePartyI p => StrEncoding (FileDescription p) where
strEncode = Y.encode . encodeFileDescription
strDecode s = strDecode s >>= (\(AFD fd) -> checkParty fd)
strP = strDecode <$?> A.takeByteString
instance StrEncoding AFileDescription where
strEncode (AFD fd) = strEncode fd
strDecode = decodeFileDescription <=< first show . Y.decodeEither'
strP = strDecode <$?> A.takeByteString
validateFileDescription :: FileDescription p -> Either String (ValidFileDescription p)
validateFileDescription fd@FileDescription {size, chunks}
| chunkNos /= [1 .. length chunks] = Left "chunk numbers are not sequential"
| chunksSize chunks /= unFileSize size = Left "chunks total size is different than file size"
| otherwise = Right $ ValidFD fd
where
chunkNos = map (\FileChunk {chunkNo} -> chunkNo) chunks
chunksSize = fromIntegral . foldl' (\s FileChunk {chunkSize} -> s + unFileSize chunkSize) 0
encodeFileDescription :: FileDescription p -> YAMLFileDescription
encodeFileDescription FileDescription {party, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, chunks} =
YAMLFileDescription
{ party = toFileParty party,
size = B.unpack $ strEncode size,
digest,
key,
nonce,
chunkSize = B.unpack $ strEncode chunkSize,
replicas = encodeFileReplicas chunkSize chunks
}
instance (Integral a, Show a) => StrEncoding (FileSize a) where
strEncode (FileSize b)
| b' /= 0 = bshow b
| ks' /= 0 = bshow ks <> "kb"
| ms' /= 0 = bshow ms <> "mb"
| otherwise = bshow gs <> "gb"
where
(ks, b') = b `divMod` 1024
(ms, ks') = ks `divMod` 1024
(gs, ms') = ms `divMod` 1024
strP =
FileSize
<$> A.choice
[ gb <$> A.decimal <* "gb",
mb <$> A.decimal <* "mb",
kb <$> A.decimal <* "kb",
A.decimal
]
instance (Integral a, Show a) => IsString (FileSize a) where
fromString = either error id . strDecode . B.pack
instance FromField a => FromField (FileSize a) where fromField f = FileSize <$> fromField f
instance ToField a => ToField (FileSize a) where toField (FileSize s) = toField s
groupReplicasByServer :: FileSize Word32 -> [FileChunk] -> [NonEmpty FileServerReplica]
groupReplicasByServer defChunkSize =
L.groupAllWith (\FileServerReplica {server} -> server) . unfoldChunksToReplicas defChunkSize
encodeFileReplicas :: FileSize Word32 -> [FileChunk] -> [YAMLServerReplicas]
encodeFileReplicas defChunkSize =
map encodeServerReplicas . groupReplicasByServer defChunkSize
where
encodeServerReplicas fs@(FileServerReplica {server} :| _) =
YAMLServerReplicas
{ server,
chunks = map (B.unpack . encodeServerReplica) $ L.toList fs
}
encodeServerReplica :: FileServerReplica -> ByteString
encodeServerReplica FileServerReplica {chunkNo, replicaId, replicaKey, digest, chunkSize} =
bshow chunkNo
<> ":"
<> strEncode replicaId
<> ":"
<> strEncode replicaKey
<> maybe "" ((":" <>) . strEncode) digest
<> maybe "" ((":" <>) . strEncode) chunkSize
serverReplicaP :: XFTPServer -> Parser FileServerReplica
serverReplicaP server = do
chunkNo <- A.decimal
replicaId <- A.char ':' *> strP
replicaKey <- A.char ':' *> strP
digest <- optional (A.char ':' *> strP)
chunkSize <- optional (A.char ':' *> strP)
pure FileServerReplica {chunkNo, server, replicaId, replicaKey, digest, chunkSize}
unfoldChunksToReplicas :: FileSize Word32 -> [FileChunk] -> [FileServerReplica]
unfoldChunksToReplicas defChunkSize = concatMap chunkReplicas
where
chunkReplicas c@FileChunk {replicas} = zipWith (replicaToServerReplica c) [1 ..] replicas
replicaToServerReplica :: FileChunk -> Int -> FileChunkReplica -> FileServerReplica
replicaToServerReplica FileChunk {chunkNo, digest, chunkSize} replicaNo FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey} =
let chunkSize' = if chunkSize /= defChunkSize && replicaNo == 1 then Just chunkSize else Nothing
digest' = if replicaNo == 1 then Just digest else Nothing
in FileServerReplica {chunkNo, server, replicaId, replicaKey, digest = digest', chunkSize = chunkSize'}
decodeFileDescription :: YAMLFileDescription -> Either String AFileDescription
decodeFileDescription YAMLFileDescription {party, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, replicas} = do
size' <- strDecode $ B.pack size
chunkSize' <- strDecode $ B.pack chunkSize
replicas' <- decodeFileParts replicas
chunks <- foldReplicasToChunks chunkSize' replicas'
pure $ case aFileParty party of
AFP party' -> AFD FileDescription {party = party', size = size', digest, key, nonce, chunkSize = chunkSize', chunks}
where
decodeFileParts = fmap concat . mapM decodeYAMLServerReplicas
decodeYAMLServerReplicas :: YAMLServerReplicas -> Either String [FileServerReplica]
decodeYAMLServerReplicas YAMLServerReplicas {server, chunks} =
mapM (parseAll (serverReplicaP server) . B.pack) chunks
-- this function should fail if:
-- 1. no replica has digest or two replicas have different digests
-- 2. two replicas have different chunk sizes
foldReplicasToChunks :: FileSize Word32 -> [FileServerReplica] -> Either String [FileChunk]
foldReplicasToChunks defChunkSize fs = do
sd <- foldSizesDigests fs
-- TODO validate (check that chunks match) or in separate function
sortOn (\FileChunk {chunkNo} -> chunkNo) . map reverseReplicas . M.elems <$> foldChunks sd fs
where
foldSizesDigests :: [FileServerReplica] -> Either String (Map Int (FileSize Word32), Map Int FileDigest)
foldSizesDigests = foldl' addSizeDigest $ Right (M.empty, M.empty)
addSizeDigest :: Either String (Map Int (FileSize Word32), Map Int FileDigest) -> FileServerReplica -> Either String (Map Int (FileSize Word32), Map Int FileDigest)
addSizeDigest (Left e) _ = Left e
addSizeDigest (Right (ms, md)) FileServerReplica {chunkNo, chunkSize, digest} =
(,) <$> combineChunk ms chunkNo chunkSize <*> combineChunk md chunkNo digest
combineChunk :: Eq a => Map Int a -> Int -> Maybe a -> Either String (Map Int a)
combineChunk m _ Nothing = Right m
combineChunk m chunkNo (Just value) = case M.lookup chunkNo m of
Nothing -> Right $ M.insert chunkNo value m
Just v -> if v == value then Right m else Left "different size or digest in chunk replicas"
foldChunks :: (Map Int (FileSize Word32), Map Int FileDigest) -> [FileServerReplica] -> Either String (Map Int FileChunk)
foldChunks sd = foldl' (addReplica sd) (Right M.empty)
addReplica :: (Map Int (FileSize Word32), Map Int FileDigest) -> Either String (Map Int FileChunk) -> FileServerReplica -> Either String (Map Int FileChunk)
addReplica _ (Left e) _ = Left e
addReplica (ms, md) (Right cs) FileServerReplica {chunkNo, server, replicaId, replicaKey} = do
case M.lookup chunkNo cs of
Just chunk@FileChunk {replicas} ->
let replica = FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey}
in Right $ M.insert chunkNo ((chunk :: FileChunk) {replicas = replica : replicas}) cs
_ -> do
case M.lookup chunkNo md of
Just digest' ->
let replica = FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey}
chunkSize' = fromMaybe defChunkSize $ M.lookup chunkNo ms
chunk = FileChunk {chunkNo, digest = digest', chunkSize = chunkSize', replicas = [replica]}
in Right $ M.insert chunkNo chunk cs
_ -> Left "no digest for chunk"
reverseReplicas c@FileChunk {replicas} = (c :: FileChunk) {replicas = reverse replicas}
-421
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@@ -1,421 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE MultiParamTypeClasses #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-unticked-promoted-constructors #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol where
import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Kind (Type)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
import Data.Type.Equality
import Data.Word (Word32)
import Simplex.Messaging.Builder (Builder)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Transport (ntfClientHandshake)
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
( BasicAuth,
CommandError (..),
Protocol (..),
ProtocolEncoding (..),
ProtocolErrorType (..),
ProtocolMsgTag (..),
ProtocolType (..),
RcvPublicDhKey,
RcvPublicVerifyKey,
RecipientId,
SenderId,
SentRawTransmission,
SignedTransmission,
SndPublicVerifyKey,
Transmission,
encodeTransmission,
messageTagP,
tDecodeParseValidate,
tEncode,
tEncodeBatch,
tParse,
)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (SessionId, TransportError (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, (<$?>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
currentXFTPVersion :: Version
currentXFTPVersion = 1
xftpBlockSize :: Int
xftpBlockSize = 16384
-- | File protocol clients
data FileParty = FRecipient | FSender
deriving (Eq, Show)
data SFileParty :: FileParty -> Type where
SFRecipient :: SFileParty FRecipient
SFSender :: SFileParty FSender
instance TestEquality SFileParty where
testEquality SFRecipient SFRecipient = Just Refl
testEquality SFSender SFSender = Just Refl
testEquality _ _ = Nothing
deriving instance Eq (SFileParty p)
deriving instance Show (SFileParty p)
data AFileParty = forall p. FilePartyI p => AFP (SFileParty p)
toFileParty :: SFileParty p -> FileParty
toFileParty = \case
SFRecipient -> FRecipient
SFSender -> FSender
aFileParty :: FileParty -> AFileParty
aFileParty = \case
FRecipient -> AFP SFRecipient
FSender -> AFP SFSender
class FilePartyI (p :: FileParty) where sFileParty :: SFileParty p
instance FilePartyI FRecipient where sFileParty = SFRecipient
instance FilePartyI FSender where sFileParty = SFSender
data FileCommandTag (p :: FileParty) where
FNEW_ :: FileCommandTag FSender
FADD_ :: FileCommandTag FSender
FPUT_ :: FileCommandTag FSender
FDEL_ :: FileCommandTag FSender
FGET_ :: FileCommandTag FRecipient
FACK_ :: FileCommandTag FRecipient
PING_ :: FileCommandTag FRecipient
deriving instance Show (FileCommandTag p)
data FileCmdTag = forall p. FilePartyI p => FCT (SFileParty p) (FileCommandTag p)
instance FilePartyI p => Encoding (FileCommandTag p) where
smpEncode = \case
FNEW_ -> "FNEW"
FADD_ -> "FADD"
FPUT_ -> "FPUT"
FDEL_ -> "FDEL"
FGET_ -> "FGET"
FACK_ -> "FACK"
PING_ -> "PING"
smpP = messageTagP
instance Encoding FileCmdTag where
smpEncode (FCT _ t) = smpEncode t
smpP = messageTagP
instance ProtocolMsgTag FileCmdTag where
decodeTag = \case
"FNEW" -> Just $ FCT SFSender FNEW_
"FADD" -> Just $ FCT SFSender FADD_
"FPUT" -> Just $ FCT SFSender FPUT_
"FDEL" -> Just $ FCT SFSender FDEL_
"FGET" -> Just $ FCT SFRecipient FGET_
"FACK" -> Just $ FCT SFRecipient FACK_
"PING" -> Just $ FCT SFRecipient PING_
_ -> Nothing
instance FilePartyI p => ProtocolMsgTag (FileCommandTag p) where
decodeTag s = decodeTag s >>= (\(FCT _ t) -> checkParty' t)
instance Protocol XFTPErrorType FileResponse where
type ProtoCommand FileResponse = FileCmd
type ProtoType FileResponse = 'PXFTP
protocolClientHandshake = ntfClientHandshake
protocolPing = FileCmd SFRecipient PING
protocolError = \case
FRErr e -> Just e
_ -> Nothing
data FileCommand (p :: FileParty) where
FNEW :: FileInfo -> NonEmpty RcvPublicVerifyKey -> Maybe BasicAuth -> FileCommand FSender
FADD :: NonEmpty RcvPublicVerifyKey -> FileCommand FSender
FPUT :: FileCommand FSender
FDEL :: FileCommand FSender
FGET :: RcvPublicDhKey -> FileCommand FRecipient
FACK :: FileCommand FRecipient
PING :: FileCommand FRecipient
deriving instance Show (FileCommand p)
data FileCmd = forall p. FilePartyI p => FileCmd (SFileParty p) (FileCommand p)
deriving instance Show FileCmd
data FileInfo = FileInfo
{ sndKey :: SndPublicVerifyKey,
size :: Word32,
digest :: ByteString
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
type XFTPFileId = ByteString
instance FilePartyI p => ProtocolEncoding XFTPErrorType (FileCommand p) where
type Tag (FileCommand p) = FileCommandTag p
encodeProtocol _v = \case
FNEW file rKeys auth_ -> e (FNEW_, ' ', file, rKeys, auth_)
FADD rKeys -> e (FADD_, ' ', rKeys)
FPUT -> e FPUT_
FDEL -> e FDEL_
FGET rKey -> e (FGET_, ' ', rKey)
FACK -> e FACK_
PING -> e PING_
where
e :: Encoding a => a -> ByteString
e = smpEncode
protocolP v tag = (\(FileCmd _ c) -> checkParty c) <$?> protocolP v (FCT (sFileParty @p) tag)
fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @XFTPErrorType @FileResponse
{-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
checkCredentials (sig, _, fileId, _) cmd = case cmd of
-- FNEW must not have signature and chunk ID
FNEW {}
| isNothing sig -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
| not (B.null fileId) -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
| otherwise -> Right cmd
PING
| isNothing sig && B.null fileId -> Right cmd
| otherwise -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
-- other client commands must have both signature and queue ID
_
| isNothing sig || B.null fileId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
| otherwise -> Right cmd
instance ProtocolEncoding XFTPErrorType FileCmd where
type Tag FileCmd = FileCmdTag
encodeProtocol _v (FileCmd _ c) = encodeProtocol _v c
protocolP _v = \case
FCT SFSender tag ->
FileCmd SFSender <$> case tag of
FNEW_ -> FNEW <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
FADD_ -> FADD <$> _smpP
FPUT_ -> pure FPUT
FDEL_ -> pure FDEL
FCT SFRecipient tag ->
FileCmd SFRecipient <$> case tag of
FGET_ -> FGET <$> _smpP
FACK_ -> pure FACK
PING_ -> pure PING
fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @XFTPErrorType @FileResponse
{-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
checkCredentials t (FileCmd p c) = FileCmd p <$> checkCredentials t c
instance Encoding FileInfo where
smpEncode FileInfo {sndKey, size, digest} = smpEncode (sndKey, size, digest)
smpP = FileInfo <$> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
instance StrEncoding FileInfo where
strEncode FileInfo {sndKey, size, digest} = strEncode (sndKey, size, digest)
strP = FileInfo <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> strP
data FileResponseTag
= FRSndIds_
| FRRcvIds_
| FRFile_
| FROk_
| FRErr_
| FRPong_
deriving (Show)
instance Encoding FileResponseTag where
smpEncode = \case
FRSndIds_ -> "SIDS"
FRRcvIds_ -> "RIDS"
FRFile_ -> "FILE"
FROk_ -> "OK"
FRErr_ -> "ERR"
FRPong_ -> "PONG"
smpP = messageTagP
instance ProtocolMsgTag FileResponseTag where
decodeTag = \case
"SIDS" -> Just FRSndIds_
"RIDS" -> Just FRRcvIds_
"FILE" -> Just FRFile_
"OK" -> Just FROk_
"ERR" -> Just FRErr_
"PONG" -> Just FRPong_
_ -> Nothing
data FileResponse
= FRSndIds SenderId (NonEmpty RecipientId)
| FRRcvIds (NonEmpty RecipientId)
| FRFile RcvPublicDhKey C.CbNonce
| FROk
| FRErr XFTPErrorType
| FRPong
deriving (Show)
instance ProtocolEncoding XFTPErrorType FileResponse where
type Tag FileResponse = FileResponseTag
encodeProtocol _v = \case
FRSndIds fId rIds -> e (FRSndIds_, ' ', fId, rIds)
FRRcvIds rIds -> e (FRRcvIds_, ' ', rIds)
FRFile rDhKey nonce -> e (FRFile_, ' ', rDhKey, nonce)
FROk -> e FROk_
FRErr err -> e (FRErr_, ' ', err)
FRPong -> e FRPong_
where
e :: Encoding a => a -> ByteString
e = smpEncode
protocolP _v = \case
FRSndIds_ -> FRSndIds <$> _smpP <*> smpP
FRRcvIds_ -> FRRcvIds <$> _smpP
FRFile_ -> FRFile <$> _smpP <*> smpP
FROk_ -> pure FROk
FRErr_ -> FRErr <$> _smpP
FRPong_ -> pure FRPong
fromProtocolError = \case
PECmdSyntax -> CMD SYNTAX
PECmdUnknown -> CMD UNKNOWN
PESession -> SESSION
PEBlock -> BLOCK
{-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
checkCredentials (_, _, entId, _) cmd = case cmd of
FRSndIds {} -> noEntity
-- ERR response does not always have entity ID
FRErr _ -> Right cmd
-- PONG response must not have queue ID
FRPong -> noEntity
-- other server responses must have entity ID
_
| B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
| otherwise -> Right cmd
where
noEntity
| B.null entId = Right cmd
| otherwise = Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
data XFTPErrorType
= -- | incorrect block format, encoding or signature size
BLOCK
| -- | incorrect SMP session ID (TLS Finished message / tls-unique binding RFC5929)
SESSION
| -- | SMP command is unknown or has invalid syntax
CMD {cmdErr :: CommandError}
| -- | command authorization error - bad signature or non-existing SMP queue
AUTH
| -- | incorrent file size
SIZE
| -- | storage quota exceeded
QUOTA
| -- | incorrent file digest
DIGEST
| -- | file encryption/decryption failed
CRYPTO
| -- | no expected file body in request/response or no file on the server
NO_FILE
| -- | unexpected file body
HAS_FILE
| -- | file IO error
FILE_IO
| -- | internal server error
INTERNAL
| -- | used internally, never returned by the server (to be removed)
DUPLICATE_ -- not part of SMP protocol, used internally
deriving (Eq, Read, Show)
instance StrEncoding XFTPErrorType where
strEncode = \case
CMD e -> "CMD " <> bshow e
e -> bshow e
strP = "CMD " *> (CMD <$> parseRead1) <|> parseRead1
instance Encoding XFTPErrorType where
smpEncode = \case
BLOCK -> "BLOCK"
SESSION -> "SESSION"
CMD err -> "CMD " <> smpEncode err
AUTH -> "AUTH"
SIZE -> "SIZE"
QUOTA -> "QUOTA"
DIGEST -> "DIGEST"
CRYPTO -> "CRYPTO"
NO_FILE -> "NO_FILE"
HAS_FILE -> "HAS_FILE"
FILE_IO -> "FILE_IO"
INTERNAL -> "INTERNAL"
DUPLICATE_ -> "DUPLICATE_"
smpP =
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"BLOCK" -> pure BLOCK
"SESSION" -> pure SESSION
"CMD" -> CMD <$> _smpP
"AUTH" -> pure AUTH
"SIZE" -> pure SIZE
"QUOTA" -> pure QUOTA
"DIGEST" -> pure DIGEST
"CRYPTO" -> pure CRYPTO
"NO_FILE" -> pure NO_FILE
"HAS_FILE" -> pure HAS_FILE
"FILE_IO" -> pure FILE_IO
"INTERNAL" -> pure INTERNAL
"DUPLICATE_" -> pure DUPLICATE_
_ -> fail "bad error type"
checkParty :: forall t p p'. (FilePartyI p, FilePartyI p') => t p' -> Either String (t p)
checkParty c = case testEquality (sFileParty @p) (sFileParty @p') of
Just Refl -> Right c
Nothing -> Left "incorrect XFTP party"
checkParty' :: forall t p p'. (FilePartyI p, FilePartyI p') => t p' -> Maybe (t p)
checkParty' c = case testEquality (sFileParty @p) (sFileParty @p') of
Just Refl -> Just c
_ -> Nothing
xftpEncodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding e c => SessionId -> Maybe C.APrivateSignKey -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError Builder
xftpEncodeTransmission sessionId pKey (corrId, fId, msg) = do
let t = encodeTransmission currentXFTPVersion sessionId (corrId, fId, msg)
xftpEncodeBatch1 $ signTransmission t
where
signTransmission :: ByteString -> SentRawTransmission
signTransmission t = ((`C.sign` t) <$> pKey, t)
-- this function uses batch syntax but puts only one transmission in the batch
xftpEncodeBatch1 :: (Maybe C.ASignature, ByteString) -> Either TransportError Builder
xftpEncodeBatch1 (sig, t) =
let t' = tEncodeBatch 1 . encodeLarge $ tEncode (sig, t)
in first (const TELargeMsg) $ C.pad' t' xftpBlockSize
xftpDecodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding e c => SessionId -> ByteString -> Either XFTPErrorType (SignedTransmission e c)
xftpDecodeTransmission sessionId t = do
t' <- first (const BLOCK) $ C.unPad t
case tParse True t' of
t'' :| [] -> Right $ tDecodeParseValidate sessionId currentXFTPVersion t''
_ -> Left BLOCK
$(J.deriveJSON (enumJSON $ dropPrefix "F") ''FileParty)
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''XFTPErrorType)
-459
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@@ -1,459 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NumericUnderscores #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedLists #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server where
import Control.Logger.Simple
import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.Reader
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as B64
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.List (intercalate)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime (..), diffTimeToPicoseconds, getCurrentTime)
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..), getSystemTime)
import Data.Time.Format.ISO8601 (iso8601Show)
import Data.Word (Word32)
import GHC.IO.Handle (hSetNewlineMode)
import GHC.Stats (getRTSStats)
import qualified Network.HTTP.Types as N
import qualified Network.HTTP2.Server as H
import Network.Socket
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Control
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport
import Simplex.Messaging.Builder (builder)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CorrId, RcvPublicDhKey, RcvPublicVerifyKey, RecipientId)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server (dummyVerifyCmd, verifyCmdSignature)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Buffer (trimCR)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Server
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (runTCPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
import System.Exit (exitFailure)
import System.FilePath ((</>))
import System.IO (hPrint, hPutStrLn, universalNewlineMode)
import UnliftIO
import UnliftIO.Concurrent (threadDelay)
import UnliftIO.Directory (doesFileExist, removeFile, renameFile)
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
type M a = ReaderT XFTPEnv IO a
runXFTPServer :: XFTPServerConfig -> IO ()
runXFTPServer cfg = do
started <- newEmptyTMVarIO
runXFTPServerBlocking started cfg
runXFTPServerBlocking :: TMVar Bool -> XFTPServerConfig -> IO ()
runXFTPServerBlocking started cfg = newXFTPServerEnv cfg >>= runReaderT (xftpServer cfg started)
xftpServer :: XFTPServerConfig -> TMVar Bool -> M ()
xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpiration} started = do
restoreServerStats
raceAny_ (runServer : expireFilesThread_ cfg <> serverStatsThread_ cfg <> controlPortThread_ cfg) `finally` stopServer
where
runServer :: M ()
runServer = do
serverParams <- asks tlsServerParams
env <- ask
liftIO $
runHTTP2Server started xftpPort defaultHTTP2BufferSize serverParams transportConfig inactiveClientExpiration $ \sessionId r sendResponse -> do
reqBody <- getHTTP2Body r xftpBlockSize
processRequest HTTP2Request {sessionId, request = r, reqBody, sendResponse} `runReaderT` env
stopServer :: M ()
stopServer = do
withFileLog closeStoreLog
saveServerStats
expireFilesThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig -> [M ()]
expireFilesThread_ XFTPServerConfig {fileExpiration = Just fileExp} = [expireFiles fileExp]
expireFilesThread_ _ = []
expireFiles :: ExpirationConfig -> M ()
expireFiles expCfg = do
st <- asks store
let interval = checkInterval expCfg * 1000000
forever $ do
liftIO $ threadDelay' interval
old <- liftIO $ expireBeforeEpoch expCfg
sIds <- M.keysSet <$> readTVarIO (files st)
forM_ sIds $ \sId -> do
threadDelay 100000
atomically (expiredFilePath st sId old)
>>= mapM_ (maybeRemove $ delete st sId)
where
maybeRemove del = maybe del (remove del)
remove del filePath =
ifM
(doesFileExist filePath)
((removeFile filePath >> del) `catch` \(e :: SomeException) -> logError $ "failed to remove expired file " <> tshow filePath <> ": " <> tshow e)
del
delete st sId = do
withFileLog (`logDeleteFile` sId)
void $ atomically $ deleteFile st sId
FileServerStats {filesExpired} <- asks serverStats
atomically $ modifyTVar' filesExpired (+ 1)
serverStatsThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig -> [M ()]
serverStatsThread_ XFTPServerConfig {logStatsInterval = Just interval, logStatsStartTime, serverStatsLogFile} =
[logServerStats logStatsStartTime interval serverStatsLogFile]
serverStatsThread_ _ = []
logServerStats :: Int64 -> Int64 -> FilePath -> M ()
logServerStats startAt logInterval statsFilePath = do
initialDelay <- (startAt -) . fromIntegral . (`div` 1000000_000000) . diffTimeToPicoseconds . utctDayTime <$> liftIO getCurrentTime
liftIO $ putStrLn $ "server stats log enabled: " <> statsFilePath
liftIO $ threadDelay' $ 1_000_000 * (initialDelay + if initialDelay < 0 then 86_400 else 0)
FileServerStats {fromTime, filesCreated, fileRecipients, filesUploaded, filesExpired, filesDeleted, filesDownloaded, fileDownloads, fileDownloadAcks, filesCount, filesSize} <- asks serverStats
let interval = 1_000_000 * logInterval
forever $ do
withFile statsFilePath AppendMode $ \h -> liftIO $ do
hSetBuffering h LineBuffering
ts <- getCurrentTime
fromTime' <- atomically $ swapTVar fromTime ts
filesCreated' <- atomically $ swapTVar filesCreated 0
fileRecipients' <- atomically $ swapTVar fileRecipients 0
filesUploaded' <- atomically $ swapTVar filesUploaded 0
filesExpired' <- atomically $ swapTVar filesExpired 0
filesDeleted' <- atomically $ swapTVar filesDeleted 0
files <- atomically $ periodStatCounts filesDownloaded ts
fileDownloads' <- atomically $ swapTVar fileDownloads 0
fileDownloadAcks' <- atomically $ swapTVar fileDownloadAcks 0
filesCount' <- readTVarIO filesCount
filesSize' <- readTVarIO filesSize
hPutStrLn h $
intercalate
","
[ iso8601Show $ utctDay fromTime',
show filesCreated',
show fileRecipients',
show filesUploaded',
show filesDeleted',
dayCount files,
weekCount files,
monthCount files,
show fileDownloads',
show fileDownloadAcks',
show filesCount',
show filesSize',
show filesExpired'
]
liftIO $ threadDelay' interval
controlPortThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig -> [M ()]
controlPortThread_ XFTPServerConfig {controlPort = Just port} = [runCPServer port]
controlPortThread_ _ = []
runCPServer :: ServiceName -> M ()
runCPServer port = do
cpStarted <- newEmptyTMVarIO
u <- askUnliftIO
liftIO $ do
labelMyThread "control port server"
runTCPServer cpStarted port $ runCPClient u
where
runCPClient :: UnliftIO (ReaderT XFTPEnv IO) -> Socket -> IO ()
runCPClient u sock = do
labelMyThread "control port client"
h <- socketToHandle sock ReadWriteMode
hSetBuffering h LineBuffering
hSetNewlineMode h universalNewlineMode
hPutStrLn h "XFTP server control port\n'help' for supported commands"
cpLoop h
where
cpLoop h = do
s <- B.hGetLine h
case strDecode $ trimCR s of
Right CPQuit -> hClose h
Right cmd -> processCP h cmd >> cpLoop h
Left err -> hPutStrLn h ("error: " <> err) >> cpLoop h
processCP h = \case
CPStatsRTS -> E.tryAny getRTSStats >>= either (hPrint h) (hPrint h)
CPDelete fileId -> unliftIO u $ do
fs <- asks store
r <- runExceptT $ do
let asSender = ExceptT . atomically $ getFile fs SFSender fileId
let asRecipient = ExceptT . atomically $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId
(fr, _) <- asSender `catchError` const asRecipient
ExceptT $ deleteServerFile_ fr
liftIO . hPutStrLn h $ either (\e -> "error: " <> show e) (\() -> "ok") r
CPHelp -> hPutStrLn h "commands: stats-rts, delete, help, quit"
CPQuit -> pure ()
CPSkip -> pure ()
data ServerFile = ServerFile
{ filePath :: FilePath,
fileSize :: Word32,
sbState :: LC.SbState
}
processRequest :: HTTP2Request -> M ()
processRequest HTTP2Request {sessionId, reqBody = body@HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sendResponse}
| B.length bodyHead /= xftpBlockSize = sendXFTPResponse ("", "", FRErr BLOCK) Nothing
| otherwise = do
case xftpDecodeTransmission sessionId bodyHead of
Right (sig_, signed, (corrId, fId, cmdOrErr)) -> do
case cmdOrErr of
Right cmd -> do
verifyXFTPTransmission sig_ signed fId cmd >>= \case
VRVerified req -> uncurry send =<< processXFTPRequest body req
VRFailed -> send (FRErr AUTH) Nothing
Left e -> send (FRErr e) Nothing
where
send resp = sendXFTPResponse (corrId, fId, resp)
Left e -> sendXFTPResponse ("", "", FRErr e) Nothing
where
sendXFTPResponse :: (CorrId, XFTPFileId, FileResponse) -> Maybe ServerFile -> M ()
sendXFTPResponse (corrId, fId, resp) serverFile_ = do
let t_ = xftpEncodeTransmission sessionId Nothing (corrId, fId, resp)
liftIO $ sendResponse $ H.responseStreaming N.ok200 [] $ streamBody t_
where
streamBody t_ send done = do
case t_ of
Left _ -> do
send "padding error" -- TODO respond with BLOCK error?
done
Right t -> do
send $ builder t
-- timeout sending file in the same way as receiving
forM_ serverFile_ $ \ServerFile {filePath, fileSize, sbState} -> do
withFile filePath ReadMode $ \h -> sendEncFile h send sbState (fromIntegral fileSize)
done
data VerificationResult = VRVerified XFTPRequest | VRFailed
verifyXFTPTransmission :: Maybe C.ASignature -> ByteString -> XFTPFileId -> FileCmd -> M VerificationResult
verifyXFTPTransmission sig_ signed fId cmd =
case cmd of
FileCmd SFSender (FNEW file rcps auth) -> pure $ XFTPReqNew file rcps auth `verifyWith` sndKey file
FileCmd SFRecipient PING -> pure $ VRVerified XFTPReqPing
FileCmd party _ -> verifyCmd party
where
verifyCmd :: SFileParty p -> M VerificationResult
verifyCmd party = do
st <- asks store
atomically $ verify <$> getFile st party fId
where
verify = \case
Right (fr, k) -> XFTPReqCmd fId fr cmd `verifyWith` k
_ -> maybe False (dummyVerifyCmd signed) sig_ `seq` VRFailed
req `verifyWith` k = if verifyCmdSignature sig_ signed k then VRVerified req else VRFailed
processXFTPRequest :: HTTP2Body -> XFTPRequest -> M (FileResponse, Maybe ServerFile)
processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
XFTPReqNew file rks auth -> noFile =<< ifM allowNew (createFile file rks) (pure $ FRErr AUTH)
where
allowNew = do
XFTPServerConfig {allowNewFiles, newFileBasicAuth} <- asks config
pure $ allowNewFiles && maybe True ((== auth) . Just) newFileBasicAuth
XFTPReqCmd fId fr (FileCmd _ cmd) -> case cmd of
FADD rks -> noFile =<< addRecipients fId rks
FPUT -> noFile =<< receiveServerFile fr
FDEL -> noFile =<< deleteServerFile fr
FGET rDhKey -> sendServerFile fr rDhKey
FACK -> noFile =<< ackFileReception fId fr
-- it should never get to the commands below, they are passed in other constructors of XFTPRequest
FNEW {} -> noFile $ FRErr INTERNAL
PING -> noFile FRPong
XFTPReqPing -> noFile FRPong
where
noFile resp = pure (resp, Nothing)
createFile :: FileInfo -> NonEmpty RcvPublicVerifyKey -> M FileResponse
createFile file rks = do
st <- asks store
r <- runExceptT $ do
sizes <- asks $ allowedChunkSizes . config
unless (size file `elem` sizes) $ throwError SIZE
ts <- liftIO getSystemTime
-- TODO validate body empty
sId <- ExceptT $ addFileRetry st file 3 ts
rcps <- mapM (ExceptT . addRecipientRetry st 3 sId) rks
withFileLog $ \sl -> do
logAddFile sl sId file ts
logAddRecipients sl sId rcps
stats <- asks serverStats
atomically $ modifyTVar' (filesCreated stats) (+ 1)
atomically $ modifyTVar' (fileRecipients stats) (+ length rks)
let rIds = L.map (\(FileRecipient rId _) -> rId) rcps
pure $ FRSndIds sId rIds
pure $ either FRErr id r
addFileRetry :: FileStore -> FileInfo -> Int -> SystemTime -> M (Either XFTPErrorType XFTPFileId)
addFileRetry st file n ts =
retryAdd n $ \sId -> runExceptT $ do
ExceptT $ addFile st sId file ts
pure sId
addRecipientRetry :: FileStore -> Int -> XFTPFileId -> RcvPublicVerifyKey -> M (Either XFTPErrorType FileRecipient)
addRecipientRetry st n sId rpk =
retryAdd n $ \rId -> runExceptT $ do
let rcp = FileRecipient rId rpk
ExceptT $ addRecipient st sId rcp
pure rcp
retryAdd :: Int -> (XFTPFileId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)) -> M (Either XFTPErrorType a)
retryAdd 0 _ = pure $ Left INTERNAL
retryAdd n add = do
fId <- getFileId
atomically (add fId) >>= \case
Left DUPLICATE_ -> retryAdd (n - 1) add
r -> pure r
addRecipients :: XFTPFileId -> NonEmpty RcvPublicVerifyKey -> M FileResponse
addRecipients sId rks = do
st <- asks store
r <- runExceptT $ do
rcps <- mapM (ExceptT . addRecipientRetry st 3 sId) rks
withFileLog $ \sl -> logAddRecipients sl sId rcps
stats <- asks serverStats
atomically $ modifyTVar' (fileRecipients stats) (+ length rks)
let rIds = L.map (\(FileRecipient rId _) -> rId) rcps
pure $ FRRcvIds rIds
pure $ either FRErr id r
receiveServerFile :: FileRec -> M FileResponse
receiveServerFile fr@FileRec {senderId, fileInfo} = case bodyPart of
-- TODO do not allow repeated file upload
Nothing -> pure $ FRErr SIZE
Just getBody -> do
-- TODO validate body size before downloading, once it's populated
path <- asks $ filesPath . config
let fPath = path </> B.unpack (B64.encode senderId)
FileInfo {size, digest} = fileInfo
withFileLog $ \sl -> logPutFile sl senderId fPath
st <- asks store
quota_ <- asks $ fileSizeQuota . config
-- TODO timeout file upload, remove partially uploaded files
stats <- asks serverStats
liftIO $
runExceptT (receiveFile getBody (XFTPRcvChunkSpec fPath size digest)) >>= \case
Right () -> do
used <- readTVarIO $ usedStorage st
if maybe False (used + fromIntegral size >) quota_
then remove fPath $> FRErr QUOTA
else do
atomically (setFilePath' st fr fPath)
atomically $ modifyTVar' (filesUploaded stats) (+ 1)
atomically $ modifyTVar' (filesCount stats) (+ 1)
atomically $ modifyTVar' (filesSize stats) (+ fromIntegral size)
pure FROk
Left e -> remove fPath $> FRErr e
where
remove fPath = whenM (doesFileExist fPath) (removeFile fPath) `catch` logFileError
sendServerFile :: FileRec -> RcvPublicDhKey -> M (FileResponse, Maybe ServerFile)
sendServerFile FileRec {senderId, filePath, fileInfo = FileInfo {size}} rDhKey = do
readTVarIO filePath >>= \case
Just path -> do
g <- asks random
(sDhKey, spDhKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
let dhSecret = C.dh' rDhKey spDhKey
cbNonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
case LC.cbInit dhSecret cbNonce of
Right sbState -> do
stats <- asks serverStats
atomically $ modifyTVar' (fileDownloads stats) (+ 1)
atomically $ updatePeriodStats (filesDownloaded stats) senderId
pure (FRFile sDhKey cbNonce, Just ServerFile {filePath = path, fileSize = size, sbState})
_ -> pure (FRErr INTERNAL, Nothing)
_ -> pure (FRErr NO_FILE, Nothing)
deleteServerFile :: FileRec -> M FileResponse
deleteServerFile fr = either FRErr (\() -> FROk) <$> deleteServerFile_ fr
logFileError :: SomeException -> IO ()
logFileError e = logError $ "Error deleting file: " <> tshow e
ackFileReception :: RecipientId -> FileRec -> M FileResponse
ackFileReception rId fr = do
withFileLog (`logAckFile` rId)
st <- asks store
atomically $ deleteRecipient st rId fr
stats <- asks serverStats
atomically $ modifyTVar' (fileDownloadAcks stats) (+ 1)
pure FROk
deleteServerFile_ :: FileRec -> M (Either XFTPErrorType ())
deleteServerFile_ FileRec {senderId, fileInfo, filePath} = do
withFileLog (`logDeleteFile` senderId)
runExceptT $ do
path <- readTVarIO filePath
stats <- asks serverStats
ExceptT $ first (\(_ :: SomeException) -> FILE_IO) <$> try (forM_ path $ \p -> whenM (doesFileExist p) (removeFile p >> deletedStats stats))
st <- asks store
void $ atomically $ deleteFile st senderId
atomically $ modifyTVar' (filesDeleted stats) (+ 1)
where
deletedStats stats = do
atomically $ modifyTVar' (filesCount stats) (subtract 1)
atomically $ modifyTVar' (filesSize stats) (subtract $ fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)
randomId :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader XFTPEnv m) => Int -> m ByteString
randomId n = atomically . C.randomBytes n =<< asks random
getFileId :: M XFTPFileId
getFileId = do
size <- asks (fileIdSize . config)
atomically . C.randomBytes size =<< asks random
withFileLog :: (MonadIO m, MonadReader XFTPEnv m) => (StoreLog 'WriteMode -> IO a) -> m ()
withFileLog action = liftIO . mapM_ action =<< asks storeLog
incFileStat :: (FileServerStats -> TVar Int) -> M ()
incFileStat statSel = do
stats <- asks serverStats
atomically $ modifyTVar (statSel stats) (+ 1)
saveServerStats :: M ()
saveServerStats =
asks (serverStatsBackupFile . config)
>>= mapM_ (\f -> asks serverStats >>= atomically . getFileServerStatsData >>= liftIO . saveStats f)
where
saveStats f stats = do
logInfo $ "saving server stats to file " <> T.pack f
B.writeFile f $ strEncode stats
logInfo "server stats saved"
restoreServerStats :: M ()
restoreServerStats = asks (serverStatsBackupFile . config) >>= mapM_ restoreStats
where
restoreStats f = whenM (doesFileExist f) $ do
logInfo $ "restoring server stats from file " <> T.pack f
liftIO (strDecode <$> B.readFile f) >>= \case
Right d@FileServerStatsData {_filesCount = statsFilesCount, _filesSize = statsFilesSize} -> do
s <- asks serverStats
FileStore {files, usedStorage} <- asks store
_filesCount <- M.size <$> readTVarIO files
_filesSize <- readTVarIO usedStorage
atomically $ setFileServerStats s d {_filesCount, _filesSize}
renameFile f $ f <> ".bak"
logInfo "server stats restored"
when (statsFilesCount /= _filesCount) $ logWarn $ "Files count differs: stats: " <> tshow statsFilesCount <> ", store: " <> tshow _filesCount
when (statsFilesSize /= _filesSize) $ logWarn $ "Files size differs: stats: " <> tshow statsFilesSize <> ", store: " <> tshow _filesSize
logInfo $ "Restored " <> tshow (_filesSize `div` 1048576) <> " MBs in " <> tshow _filesCount <> " files"
Left e -> do
logInfo $ "error restoring server stats: " <> T.pack e
liftIO exitFailure
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Control where
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
data ControlProtocol
= CPStatsRTS
| CPDelete ByteString
| CPHelp
| CPQuit
| CPSkip
instance StrEncoding ControlProtocol where
strEncode = \case
CPStatsRTS -> "stats-rts"
CPDelete bs -> "delete " <> strEncode bs
CPHelp -> "help"
CPQuit -> "quit"
CPSkip -> ""
strP =
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"stats-rts" -> pure CPStatsRTS
"delete" -> CPDelete <$> (A.space *> strP)
"help" -> pure CPHelp
"quit" -> pure CPQuit
"" -> pure CPSkip
_ -> fail "bad ControlProtocol command"
-108
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@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE StrictData #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env where
import Control.Logger.Simple (logInfo)
import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
import Crypto.Random
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import Data.Time.Clock (getCurrentTime)
import Data.Word (Word32)
import Data.X509.Validation (Fingerprint (..))
import Network.Socket
import qualified Network.TLS as T
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileCmd, FileInfo, XFTPFileId)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BasicAuth, RcvPublicVerifyKey)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (TransportServerConfig, loadFingerprint, loadTLSServerParams)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (tshow)
import System.IO (IOMode (..))
import UnliftIO.STM
data XFTPServerConfig = XFTPServerConfig
{ xftpPort :: ServiceName,
controlPort :: Maybe ServiceName,
fileIdSize :: Int,
storeLogFile :: Maybe FilePath,
filesPath :: FilePath,
-- | server storage quota
fileSizeQuota :: Maybe Int64,
-- | allowed file chunk sizes
allowedChunkSizes :: [Word32],
-- | set to False to prohibit creating new files
allowNewFiles :: Bool,
-- | simple password that the clients need to pass in handshake to be able to create new files
newFileBasicAuth :: Maybe BasicAuth,
-- | time after which the files can be removed and check interval, seconds
fileExpiration :: Maybe ExpirationConfig,
-- | time after which inactive clients can be disconnected and check interval, seconds
inactiveClientExpiration :: Maybe ExpirationConfig,
-- CA certificate private key is not needed for initialization
caCertificateFile :: FilePath,
privateKeyFile :: FilePath,
certificateFile :: FilePath,
-- stats config - see SMP server config
logStatsInterval :: Maybe Int64,
logStatsStartTime :: Int64,
serverStatsLogFile :: FilePath,
serverStatsBackupFile :: Maybe FilePath,
transportConfig :: TransportServerConfig
}
defaultInactiveClientExpiration :: ExpirationConfig
defaultInactiveClientExpiration =
ExpirationConfig
{ ttl = 43200, -- seconds, 12 hours
checkInterval = 3600 -- seconds, 1 hours
}
data XFTPEnv = XFTPEnv
{ config :: XFTPServerConfig,
store :: FileStore,
storeLog :: Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode),
random :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
serverIdentity :: C.KeyHash,
tlsServerParams :: T.ServerParams,
serverStats :: FileServerStats
}
defFileExpirationHours :: Int64
defFileExpirationHours = 48
defaultFileExpiration :: ExpirationConfig
defaultFileExpiration =
ExpirationConfig
{ ttl = defFileExpirationHours * 3600, -- seconds
checkInterval = 2 * 3600 -- seconds, 2 hours
}
newXFTPServerEnv :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => XFTPServerConfig -> m XFTPEnv
newXFTPServerEnv config@XFTPServerConfig {storeLogFile, fileSizeQuota, caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile} = do
random <- liftIO C.newRandom
store <- atomically newFileStore
storeLog <- liftIO $ mapM (`readWriteFileStore` store) storeLogFile
used <- readTVarIO (usedStorage store)
forM_ fileSizeQuota $ \quota -> do
logInfo $ "Total / available storage: " <> tshow quota <> " / " <> tshow (quota - used)
when (quota < used) $ logInfo "WARNING: storage quota is less than used storage, no files can be uploaded!"
tlsServerParams <- liftIO $ loadTLSServerParams caCertificateFile certificateFile privateKeyFile
Fingerprint fp <- liftIO $ loadFingerprint caCertificateFile
serverStats <- atomically . newFileServerStats =<< liftIO getCurrentTime
pure XFTPEnv {config, store, storeLog, random, tlsServerParams, serverIdentity = C.KeyHash fp, serverStats}
data XFTPRequest
= XFTPReqNew FileInfo (NonEmpty RcvPublicVerifyKey) (Maybe BasicAuth)
| XFTPReqCmd XFTPFileId FileRec FileCmd
| XFTPReqPing
-246
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@@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedLists #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Main where
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Either (fromRight)
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.Ini (lookupValue, readIniFile)
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Network.Socket (HostName)
import Options.Applicative
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description (FileSize (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server (runXFTPServer)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), defFileExpirationHours, defaultFileExpiration, defaultInactiveClientExpiration)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtoServerWithAuth (..), pattern XFTPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (TransportServerConfig (..), defaultTransportServerConfig)
import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing, doesFileExist)
import System.FilePath (combine)
import System.IO (BufferMode (..), hSetBuffering, stderr, stdout)
import Text.Read (readMaybe)
xftpServerVersion :: String
xftpServerVersion = "1.2.0.4"
xftpServerCLI :: FilePath -> FilePath -> IO ()
xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
getCliCommand' (cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile) serverVersion >>= \case
Init opts ->
doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
True -> exitError $ "Error: server is already initialized (" <> iniFile <> " exists).\nRun `" <> executableName <> " start`."
_ -> initializeServer opts
Start ->
doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
True -> readIniFile iniFile >>= either exitError runServer
_ -> exitError $ "Error: server is not initialized (" <> iniFile <> " does not exist).\nRun `" <> executableName <> " init`."
Delete -> do
confirmOrExit "WARNING: deleting the server will make all queues inaccessible, because the server identity (certificate fingerprint) will change.\nTHIS CANNOT BE UNDONE!"
deleteDirIfExists cfgPath
deleteDirIfExists logPath
putStrLn "Deleted configuration and log files"
where
iniFile = combine cfgPath "file-server.ini"
serverVersion = "SimpleX XFTP server v" <> xftpServerVersion
defaultServerPort = "443"
executableName = "file-server"
storeLogFilePath = combine logPath "file-server-store.log"
initializeServer InitOptions {enableStoreLog, signAlgorithm, ip, fqdn, filesPath, fileSizeQuota} = do
clearDirIfExists cfgPath
clearDirIfExists logPath
createDirectoryIfMissing True cfgPath
createDirectoryIfMissing True logPath
let x509cfg = defaultX509Config {commonName = fromMaybe ip fqdn, signAlgorithm}
fp <- createServerX509 cfgPath x509cfg
let host = fromMaybe (if ip == "127.0.0.1" then "<hostnames>" else ip) fqdn
srv = ProtoServerWithAuth (XFTPServer [THDomainName host] "" (C.KeyHash fp)) Nothing
writeFile iniFile $ iniFileContent host
putStrLn $ "Server initialized, you can modify configuration in " <> iniFile <> ".\nRun `" <> executableName <> " start` to start server."
warnCAPrivateKeyFile cfgPath x509cfg
printServiceInfo serverVersion srv
where
iniFileContent host =
"[STORE_LOG]\n\
\# The server uses STM memory for persistence,\n\
\# that will be lost on restart (e.g., as with redis).\n\
\# This option enables saving memory to append only log,\n\
\# and restoring it when the server is started.\n\
\# Log is compacted on start (deleted objects are removed).\n"
<> ("enable: " <> onOff enableStoreLog <> "\n\n")
<> "# Expire files after the specified number of hours.\n"
<> ("expire_files_hours: " <> show defFileExpirationHours <> "\n\n")
<> "log_stats: off\n\
\\n\
\[AUTH]\n\
\# Set new_files option to off to completely prohibit uploading new files.\n\
\# This can be useful when you want to decommission the server, but still allow downloading the existing files.\n\
\new_files: on\n\
\\n\
\# Use create_password option to enable basic auth to upload new files.\n\
\# The password should be used as part of server address in client configuration:\n\
\# xftp://fingerprint:password@host1,host2\n\
\# The password will not be shared with file recipients, you must share it only\n\
\# with the users who you want to allow uploading files to your server.\n\
\# create_password: password to upload files (any printable ASCII characters without whitespace, '@', ':' and '/')\n\
\\n\
\[TRANSPORT]\n\
\# host is only used to print server address on start\n"
<> ("host: " <> host <> "\n")
<> ("port: " <> defaultServerPort <> "\n")
<> "log_tls_errors: off\n\
\# control_port: 5226\n\
\\n\
\[FILES]\n"
<> ("path: " <> filesPath <> "\n")
<> ("storage_quota: " <> B.unpack (strEncode fileSizeQuota) <> "\n")
<> "\n\
\[INACTIVE_CLIENTS]\n\
\# TTL and interval to check inactive clients\n\
\disconnect: off\n"
<> ("# ttl: " <> show (ttl defaultInactiveClientExpiration) <> "\n")
<> ("# check_interval: " <> show (checkInterval defaultInactiveClientExpiration) <> "\n")
runServer ini = do
hSetBuffering stdout LineBuffering
hSetBuffering stderr LineBuffering
fp <- checkSavedFingerprint cfgPath defaultX509Config
let host = fromRight "<hostnames>" $ T.unpack <$> lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "host" ini
port = T.unpack $ strictIni "TRANSPORT" "port" ini
srv = ProtoServerWithAuth (XFTPServer [THDomainName host] (if port == "443" then "" else port) (C.KeyHash fp)) Nothing
printServiceInfo serverVersion srv
printXFTPConfig serverConfig
runXFTPServer serverConfig
where
enableStoreLog = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "enable" ini
logStats = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "log_stats" ini
c = combine cfgPath . ($ defaultX509Config)
printXFTPConfig XFTPServerConfig {allowNewFiles, newFileBasicAuth, xftpPort, storeLogFile, fileExpiration, inactiveClientExpiration} = do
putStrLn $ case storeLogFile of
Just f -> "Store log: " <> f
_ -> "Store log disabled."
putStrLn $ case fileExpiration of
Just ExpirationConfig {ttl} -> "expiring files after " <> showTTL ttl
_ -> "not expiring files"
putStrLn $ case inactiveClientExpiration of
Just ExpirationConfig {ttl, checkInterval} -> "expiring clients inactive for " <> show ttl <> " seconds every " <> show checkInterval <> " seconds"
_ -> "not expiring inactive clients"
putStrLn $
"Uploading new files "
<> if allowNewFiles
then maybe "allowed." (const "requires password.") newFileBasicAuth
else "NOT allowed."
putStrLn $ "Listening on port " <> xftpPort <> "..."
serverConfig =
XFTPServerConfig
{ xftpPort = T.unpack $ strictIni "TRANSPORT" "port" ini,
controlPort = either (const Nothing) (Just . T.unpack) $ lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "control_port" ini,
fileIdSize = 16,
storeLogFile = enableStoreLog $> storeLogFilePath,
filesPath = T.unpack $ strictIni "FILES" "path" ini,
fileSizeQuota = either error unFileSize <$> strDecodeIni "FILES" "storage_quota" ini,
allowedChunkSizes = serverChunkSizes,
allowNewFiles = fromMaybe True $ iniOnOff "AUTH" "new_files" ini,
newFileBasicAuth = either error id <$> strDecodeIni "AUTH" "create_password" ini,
fileExpiration =
Just
defaultFileExpiration
{ ttl = 3600 * readIniDefault defFileExpirationHours "STORE_LOG" "expire_files_hours" ini
},
inactiveClientExpiration =
settingIsOn "INACTIVE_CLIENTS" "disconnect" ini
$> ExpirationConfig
{ ttl = readStrictIni "INACTIVE_CLIENTS" "ttl" ini,
checkInterval = readStrictIni "INACTIVE_CLIENTS" "check_interval" ini
},
caCertificateFile = c caCrtFile,
privateKeyFile = c serverKeyFile,
certificateFile = c serverCrtFile,
logStatsInterval = logStats $> 86400, -- seconds
logStatsStartTime = 0, -- seconds from 00:00 UTC
serverStatsLogFile = combine logPath "file-server-stats.daily.log",
serverStatsBackupFile = logStats $> combine logPath "file-server-stats.log",
transportConfig =
defaultTransportServerConfig
{ logTLSErrors = fromMaybe False $ iniOnOff "TRANSPORT" "log_tls_errors" ini
}
}
data CliCommand
= Init InitOptions
| Start
| Delete
data InitOptions = InitOptions
{ enableStoreLog :: Bool,
signAlgorithm :: SignAlgorithm,
ip :: HostName,
fqdn :: Maybe HostName,
filesPath :: FilePath,
fileSizeQuota :: FileSize Int64
}
deriving (Show)
cliCommandP :: FilePath -> FilePath -> FilePath -> Parser CliCommand
cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile =
hsubparser
( command "init" (info (Init <$> initP) (progDesc $ "Initialize server - creates " <> cfgPath <> " and " <> logPath <> " directories and configuration files"))
<> command "start" (info (pure Start) (progDesc $ "Start server (configuration: " <> iniFile <> ")"))
<> command "delete" (info (pure Delete) (progDesc "Delete configuration and log files"))
)
where
initP :: Parser InitOptions
initP =
InitOptions
<$> switch
( long "store-log"
<> short 'l'
<> help "Enable store log for persistence"
)
<*> option
(maybeReader readMaybe)
( long "sign-algorithm"
<> short 'a'
<> help "Signature algorithm used for TLS certificates: ED25519, ED448"
<> value ED448
<> showDefault
<> metavar "ALG"
)
<*> strOption
( long "ip"
<> help
"Server IP address, used as Common Name for TLS online certificate if FQDN is not supplied"
<> value "127.0.0.1"
<> showDefault
<> metavar "IP"
)
<*> (optional . strOption)
( long "fqdn"
<> short 'n'
<> help "Server FQDN used as Common Name for TLS online certificate"
<> showDefault
<> metavar "FQDN"
)
<*> strOption
( long "path"
<> short 'p'
<> help "Path to the directory to store files"
<> metavar "PATH"
)
<*> strOption
( long "quota"
<> short 'q'
<> help "File storage quota (e.g. 100gb)"
<> metavar "QUOTA"
)
-118
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@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats where
import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime)
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (SenderId)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats (PeriodStats, PeriodStatsData, getPeriodStatsData, newPeriodStats, setPeriodStats)
import UnliftIO.STM
data FileServerStats = FileServerStats
{ fromTime :: TVar UTCTime,
filesCreated :: TVar Int,
fileRecipients :: TVar Int,
filesUploaded :: TVar Int,
filesExpired :: TVar Int,
filesDeleted :: TVar Int,
filesDownloaded :: PeriodStats SenderId,
fileDownloads :: TVar Int,
fileDownloadAcks :: TVar Int,
filesCount :: TVar Int,
filesSize :: TVar Int64
}
data FileServerStatsData = FileServerStatsData
{ _fromTime :: UTCTime,
_filesCreated :: Int,
_fileRecipients :: Int,
_filesUploaded :: Int,
_filesExpired :: Int,
_filesDeleted :: Int,
_filesDownloaded :: PeriodStatsData SenderId,
_fileDownloads :: Int,
_fileDownloadAcks :: Int,
_filesCount :: Int,
_filesSize :: Int64
}
deriving (Show)
newFileServerStats :: UTCTime -> STM FileServerStats
newFileServerStats ts = do
fromTime <- newTVar ts
filesCreated <- newTVar 0
fileRecipients <- newTVar 0
filesUploaded <- newTVar 0
filesExpired <- newTVar 0
filesDeleted <- newTVar 0
filesDownloaded <- newPeriodStats
fileDownloads <- newTVar 0
fileDownloadAcks <- newTVar 0
filesCount <- newTVar 0
filesSize <- newTVar 0
pure FileServerStats {fromTime, filesCreated, fileRecipients, filesUploaded, filesExpired, filesDeleted, filesDownloaded, fileDownloads, fileDownloadAcks, filesCount, filesSize}
getFileServerStatsData :: FileServerStats -> STM FileServerStatsData
getFileServerStatsData s = do
_fromTime <- readTVar $ fromTime (s :: FileServerStats)
_filesCreated <- readTVar $ filesCreated s
_fileRecipients <- readTVar $ fileRecipients s
_filesUploaded <- readTVar $ filesUploaded s
_filesExpired <- readTVar $ filesExpired s
_filesDeleted <- readTVar $ filesDeleted s
_filesDownloaded <- getPeriodStatsData $ filesDownloaded s
_fileDownloads <- readTVar $ fileDownloads s
_fileDownloadAcks <- readTVar $ fileDownloadAcks s
_filesCount <- readTVar $ filesCount s
_filesSize <- readTVar $ filesSize s
pure FileServerStatsData {_fromTime, _filesCreated, _fileRecipients, _filesUploaded, _filesExpired, _filesDeleted, _filesDownloaded, _fileDownloads, _fileDownloadAcks, _filesCount, _filesSize}
setFileServerStats :: FileServerStats -> FileServerStatsData -> STM ()
setFileServerStats s d = do
writeTVar (fromTime (s :: FileServerStats)) $! _fromTime (d :: FileServerStatsData)
writeTVar (filesCreated s) $! _filesCreated d
writeTVar (fileRecipients s) $! _fileRecipients d
writeTVar (filesUploaded s) $! _filesUploaded d
writeTVar (filesExpired s) $! _filesExpired d
writeTVar (filesDeleted s) $! _filesDeleted d
setPeriodStats (filesDownloaded s) $! _filesDownloaded d
writeTVar (fileDownloads s) $! _fileDownloads d
writeTVar (fileDownloadAcks s) $! _fileDownloadAcks d
writeTVar (filesCount s) $! _filesCount d
writeTVar (filesSize s) $! _filesSize d
instance StrEncoding FileServerStatsData where
strEncode FileServerStatsData {_fromTime, _filesCreated, _fileRecipients, _filesUploaded, _filesExpired, _filesDeleted, _filesDownloaded, _fileDownloads, _fileDownloadAcks, _filesCount, _filesSize} =
B.unlines
[ "fromTime=" <> strEncode _fromTime,
"filesCreated=" <> strEncode _filesCreated,
"fileRecipients=" <> strEncode _fileRecipients,
"filesUploaded=" <> strEncode _filesUploaded,
"filesExpired=" <> strEncode _filesExpired,
"filesDeleted=" <> strEncode _filesDeleted,
"filesCount=" <> strEncode _filesCount,
"filesSize=" <> strEncode _filesSize,
"filesDownloaded:",
strEncode _filesDownloaded,
"fileDownloads=" <> strEncode _fileDownloads,
"fileDownloadAcks=" <> strEncode _fileDownloadAcks
]
strP = do
_fromTime <- "fromTime=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
_filesCreated <- "filesCreated=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
_fileRecipients <- "fileRecipients=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
_filesUploaded <- "filesUploaded=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
_filesExpired <- "filesExpired=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine <|> pure 0
_filesDeleted <- "filesDeleted=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
_filesCount <- "filesCount=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine <|> pure 0
_filesSize <- "filesSize=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine <|> pure 0
_filesDownloaded <- "filesDownloaded:" *> A.endOfLine *> strP <* A.endOfLine
_fileDownloads <- "fileDownloads=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
_fileDownloadAcks <- "fileDownloadAcks=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
pure FileServerStatsData {_fromTime, _filesCreated, _fileRecipients, _filesUploaded, _filesExpired, _filesDeleted, _filesDownloaded, _fileDownloads, _fileDownloadAcks, _filesCount, _filesSize}
-145
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@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
( FileStore (..),
FileRec (..),
FileRecipient (..),
newFileStore,
addFile,
setFilePath,
setFilePath',
addRecipient,
deleteFile,
deleteRecipient,
expiredFilePath,
getFile,
ackFile,
)
where
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.Set (Set)
import qualified Data.Set as S
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..), SFileParty (..), XFTPErrorType (..), XFTPFileId)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (RcvPublicVerifyKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (ifM, ($>>=))
data FileStore = FileStore
{ files :: TMap SenderId FileRec,
recipients :: TMap RecipientId (SenderId, RcvPublicVerifyKey),
usedStorage :: TVar Int64
}
data FileRec = FileRec
{ senderId :: SenderId,
fileInfo :: FileInfo,
filePath :: TVar (Maybe FilePath),
recipientIds :: TVar (Set RecipientId),
createdAt :: SystemTime
}
deriving (Eq)
data FileRecipient = FileRecipient RecipientId RcvPublicVerifyKey
instance StrEncoding FileRecipient where
strEncode (FileRecipient rId rKey) = strEncode rId <> ":" <> strEncode rKey
strP = FileRecipient <$> strP <* A.char ':' <*> strP
newFileStore :: STM FileStore
newFileStore = do
files <- TM.empty
recipients <- TM.empty
usedStorage <- newTVar 0
pure FileStore {files, recipients, usedStorage}
addFile :: FileStore -> SenderId -> FileInfo -> SystemTime -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
addFile FileStore {files} sId fileInfo createdAt =
ifM (TM.member sId files) (pure $ Left DUPLICATE_) $ do
f <- newFileRec sId fileInfo createdAt
TM.insert sId f files
pure $ Right ()
newFileRec :: SenderId -> FileInfo -> SystemTime -> STM FileRec
newFileRec senderId fileInfo createdAt = do
recipientIds <- newTVar S.empty
filePath <- newTVar Nothing
pure FileRec {senderId, fileInfo, filePath, recipientIds, createdAt}
setFilePath :: FileStore -> SenderId -> FilePath -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
setFilePath st sId fPath =
withFile st sId $ \fr -> setFilePath' st fr fPath $> Right ()
setFilePath' :: FileStore -> FileRec -> FilePath -> STM ()
setFilePath' st FileRec {fileInfo, filePath} fPath = do
writeTVar filePath (Just fPath)
modifyTVar' (usedStorage st) (+ fromIntegral (size fileInfo))
addRecipient :: FileStore -> SenderId -> FileRecipient -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
addRecipient st@FileStore {recipients} senderId (FileRecipient rId rKey) =
withFile st senderId $ \FileRec {recipientIds} -> do
rIds <- readTVar recipientIds
mem <- TM.member rId recipients
if rId `S.member` rIds || mem
then pure $ Left DUPLICATE_
else do
writeTVar recipientIds $! S.insert rId rIds
TM.insert rId (senderId, rKey) recipients
pure $ Right ()
-- this function must be called after the file is deleted from the file system
deleteFile :: FileStore -> SenderId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
deleteFile FileStore {files, recipients, usedStorage} senderId = do
TM.lookupDelete senderId files >>= \case
Just FileRec {fileInfo, recipientIds} -> do
readTVar recipientIds >>= mapM_ (`TM.delete` recipients)
modifyTVar' usedStorage $ subtract (fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)
pure $ Right ()
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
deleteRecipient :: FileStore -> RecipientId -> FileRec -> STM ()
deleteRecipient FileStore {recipients} rId FileRec {recipientIds} = do
TM.delete rId recipients
modifyTVar' recipientIds $ S.delete rId
getFile :: FileStore -> SFileParty p -> XFTPFileId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType (FileRec, C.APublicVerifyKey))
getFile st party fId = case party of
SFSender -> withFile st fId $ pure . Right . (\f -> (f, sndKey $ fileInfo f))
SFRecipient ->
TM.lookup fId (recipients st) >>= \case
Just (sId, rKey) -> withFile st sId $ pure . Right . (,rKey)
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
expiredFilePath :: FileStore -> XFTPFileId -> Int64 -> STM (Maybe (Maybe FilePath))
expiredFilePath FileStore {files} sId old =
TM.lookup sId files
$>>= \FileRec {filePath, createdAt} ->
if systemSeconds createdAt < old
then Just <$> readTVar filePath
else pure Nothing
ackFile :: FileStore -> RecipientId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
ackFile st@FileStore {recipients} recipientId = do
TM.lookupDelete recipientId recipients >>= \case
Just (sId, _) ->
withFile st sId $ \FileRec {recipientIds} -> do
modifyTVar' recipientIds $ S.delete recipientId
pure $ Right ()
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
withFile :: FileStore -> SenderId -> (FileRec -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)) -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)
withFile FileStore {files} sId a =
TM.lookup sId files >>= \case
Just f -> a f
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
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@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
( StoreLog,
FileStoreLogRecord (..),
closeStoreLog,
readWriteFileStore,
logAddFile,
logPutFile,
logAddRecipients,
logDeleteFile,
logAckFile,
)
where
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Monad.Except
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Composition ((.:), (.:.))
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Map.Strict (Map)
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (RcvPublicVerifyKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, whenM)
import System.Directory (doesFileExist, renameFile)
import System.IO
data FileStoreLogRecord
= AddFile SenderId FileInfo SystemTime
| PutFile SenderId FilePath
| AddRecipients SenderId (NonEmpty FileRecipient)
| DeleteFile SenderId
| AckFile RecipientId
instance StrEncoding FileStoreLogRecord where
strEncode = \case
AddFile sId file createdAt -> strEncode (Str "FNEW", sId, file, createdAt)
PutFile sId path -> strEncode (Str "FPUT", sId, path)
AddRecipients sId rcps -> strEncode (Str "FADD", sId, rcps)
DeleteFile sId -> strEncode (Str "FDEL", sId)
AckFile rId -> strEncode (Str "FACK", rId)
strP =
A.choice
[ "FNEW " *> (AddFile <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> strP),
"FPUT " *> (PutFile <$> strP_ <*> strP),
"FADD " *> (AddRecipients <$> strP_ <*> strP),
"FDEL " *> (DeleteFile <$> strP),
"FACK " *> (AckFile <$> strP)
]
logFileStoreRecord :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> FileStoreLogRecord -> IO ()
logFileStoreRecord = writeStoreLogRecord
logAddFile :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> SenderId -> FileInfo -> SystemTime -> IO ()
logAddFile s = logFileStoreRecord s .:. AddFile
logPutFile :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> SenderId -> FilePath -> IO ()
logPutFile s = logFileStoreRecord s .: PutFile
logAddRecipients :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> SenderId -> NonEmpty FileRecipient -> IO ()
logAddRecipients s = logFileStoreRecord s .: AddRecipients
logDeleteFile :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> SenderId -> IO ()
logDeleteFile s = logFileStoreRecord s . DeleteFile
logAckFile :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> RecipientId -> IO ()
logAckFile s = logFileStoreRecord s . AckFile
readWriteFileStore :: FilePath -> FileStore -> IO (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
readWriteFileStore f st = do
whenM (doesFileExist f) $ do
readFileStore f st
renameFile f $ f <> ".bak"
s <- openWriteStoreLog f
writeFileStore s st
pure s
readFileStore :: FilePath -> FileStore -> IO ()
readFileStore f st = mapM_ addFileLogRecord . B.lines =<< B.readFile f
where
addFileLogRecord s = case strDecode s of
Left e -> B.putStrLn $ "Log parsing error (" <> B.pack e <> "): " <> B.take 100 s
Right lr ->
atomically (addToStore lr) >>= \case
Left e -> B.putStrLn $ "Log processing error (" <> bshow e <> "): " <> B.take 100 s
_ -> pure ()
addToStore = \case
AddFile sId file createdAt -> addFile st sId file createdAt
PutFile qId path -> setFilePath st qId path
AddRecipients sId rcps -> runExceptT $ addRecipients sId rcps
DeleteFile sId -> deleteFile st sId
AckFile rId -> ackFile st rId
addRecipients sId rcps = mapM_ (ExceptT . addRecipient st sId) rcps
writeFileStore :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> FileStore -> IO ()
writeFileStore s FileStore {files, recipients} = do
allRcps <- readTVarIO recipients
readTVarIO files >>= mapM_ (logFile allRcps)
where
logFile :: Map RecipientId (SenderId, RcvPublicVerifyKey) -> FileRec -> IO ()
logFile allRcps FileRec {senderId, fileInfo, filePath, recipientIds, createdAt} = do
logAddFile s senderId fileInfo createdAt
(rcpErrs, rcps) <- M.mapEither getRcp . M.fromSet id <$> readTVarIO recipientIds
mapM_ (logAddRecipients s senderId) $ L.nonEmpty $ M.elems rcps
mapM_ (B.putStrLn . ("Error storing log: " <>)) rcpErrs
readTVarIO filePath >>= mapM_ (logPutFile s senderId)
where
getRcp rId = case M.lookup rId allRcps of
Just (sndId, rKey)
| sndId == senderId -> Right $ FileRecipient rId rKey
| otherwise -> Left $ "sender ID for recipient ID " <> bshow rId <> " does not match FileRec"
Nothing -> Left $ "recipient ID " <> bshow rId <> " not found"
-99
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@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE MultiWayIf #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport
( supportedFileServerVRange,
XFTPRcvChunkSpec (..),
ReceiveFileError (..),
receiveFile,
sendEncFile,
receiveEncFile,
receiveSbFile,
)
where
import qualified Control.Exception as E
import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.IO.Class
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
import Data.ByteString.Builder (Builder, byteString)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
import Data.Word (Word32)
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (XFTPErrorType (..))
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
import System.IO (Handle, IOMode (..), withFile)
data XFTPRcvChunkSpec = XFTPRcvChunkSpec
{ filePath :: FilePath,
chunkSize :: Word32,
chunkDigest :: ByteString
}
deriving (Show)
supportedFileServerVRange :: VersionRange
supportedFileServerVRange = mkVersionRange 1 1
sendEncFile :: Handle -> (Builder -> IO ()) -> LC.SbState -> Word32 -> IO ()
sendEncFile h send = go
where
go sbState 0 = do
let authTag = BA.convert (LC.sbAuth sbState)
send $ byteString authTag
go sbState sz =
getFileChunk h sz >>= \ch -> do
let (encCh, sbState') = LC.sbEncryptChunk sbState ch
send (byteString encCh) `E.catch` \(e :: E.SomeException) -> print e >> E.throwIO e
go sbState' $ sz - fromIntegral (B.length ch)
receiveFile :: (Int -> IO ByteString) -> XFTPRcvChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO ()
receiveFile getBody = receiveFile_ receive
where
receive h sz = hReceiveFile getBody h sz >>= \sz' -> pure $ if sz' == 0 then Right () else Left SIZE
receiveEncFile :: (Int -> IO ByteString) -> LC.SbState -> XFTPRcvChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO ()
receiveEncFile getBody = receiveFile_ . receive
where
receive sbState h sz = first err <$> receiveSbFile getBody h sbState sz
err RFESize = SIZE
err RFECrypto = CRYPTO
data ReceiveFileError = RFESize | RFECrypto
receiveSbFile :: (Int -> IO ByteString) -> Handle -> LC.SbState -> Word32 -> IO (Either ReceiveFileError ())
receiveSbFile getBody h = receive
where
receive sbState sz = do
ch <- getBody fileBlockSize
let chSize = fromIntegral $ B.length ch
if
| chSize > sz + authSz -> pure $ Left RFESize
| chSize > 0 -> do
let (ch', rest) = B.splitAt (fromIntegral sz) ch
(decCh, sbState') = LC.sbDecryptChunk sbState ch'
sz' = sz - fromIntegral (B.length ch')
B.hPut h decCh
if sz' > 0
then receive sbState' sz'
else do
let tag' = B.take C.authTagSize rest
tagSz = B.length tag'
tag = LC.sbAuth sbState'
tag'' <- if tagSz == C.authTagSize then pure tag' else (tag' <>) <$> getBody (C.authTagSize - tagSz)
pure $ if BA.constEq tag'' tag then Right () else Left RFECrypto
| otherwise -> pure $ Left RFESize
authSz = fromIntegral C.authTagSize
receiveFile_ :: (Handle -> Word32 -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())) -> XFTPRcvChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO ()
receiveFile_ receive XFTPRcvChunkSpec {filePath, chunkSize, chunkDigest} = do
ExceptT $ withFile filePath WriteMode (`receive` chunkSize)
digest' <- liftIO $ LC.sha256Hash <$> LB.readFile filePath
when (digest' /= chunkDigest) $ throwError DIGEST
-229
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@@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Types where
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.Word (Word32)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.FromField (FromField (..))
import Database.SQLite.Simple.ToField (ToField (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client (XFTPChunkSpec (..))
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol (RcvFileId, SndFileId)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File (CryptoFile (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (fromTextField_)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
import System.FilePath ((</>))
authTagSize :: Int64
authTagSize = fromIntegral C.authTagSize
-- fileExtra is added to allow header extension in future versions
data FileHeader = FileHeader
{ fileName :: String,
fileExtra :: Maybe String
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance Encoding FileHeader where
smpEncode FileHeader {fileName, fileExtra} = smpEncode (fileName, fileExtra)
smpP = do
(fileName, fileExtra) <- smpP
pure FileHeader {fileName, fileExtra}
type DBRcvFileId = Int64
data RcvFile = RcvFile
{ rcvFileId :: DBRcvFileId,
rcvFileEntityId :: RcvFileId,
userId :: Int64,
size :: FileSize Int64,
digest :: FileDigest,
key :: C.SbKey,
nonce :: C.CbNonce,
chunkSize :: FileSize Word32,
chunks :: [RcvFileChunk],
prefixPath :: FilePath,
tmpPath :: Maybe FilePath,
saveFile :: CryptoFile,
status :: RcvFileStatus,
deleted :: Bool
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data RcvFileStatus
= RFSReceiving
| RFSReceived
| RFSDecrypting
| RFSComplete
| RFSError
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance FromField RcvFileStatus where fromField = fromTextField_ textDecode
instance ToField RcvFileStatus where toField = toField . textEncode
instance TextEncoding RcvFileStatus where
textDecode = \case
"receiving" -> Just RFSReceiving
"received" -> Just RFSReceived
"decrypting" -> Just RFSDecrypting
"complete" -> Just RFSComplete
"error" -> Just RFSError
_ -> Nothing
textEncode = \case
RFSReceiving -> "receiving"
RFSReceived -> "received"
RFSDecrypting -> "decrypting"
RFSComplete -> "complete"
RFSError -> "error"
data RcvFileChunk = RcvFileChunk
{ rcvFileId :: DBRcvFileId,
rcvFileEntityId :: RcvFileId,
userId :: Int64,
rcvChunkId :: Int64,
chunkNo :: Int,
chunkSize :: FileSize Word32,
digest :: FileDigest,
replicas :: [RcvFileChunkReplica],
fileTmpPath :: FilePath,
chunkTmpPath :: Maybe FilePath
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data RcvFileChunkReplica = RcvFileChunkReplica
{ rcvChunkReplicaId :: Int64,
server :: XFTPServer,
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
replicaKey :: C.APrivateSignKey,
received :: Bool,
delay :: Maybe Int64,
retries :: Int
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
-- Sending files
type DBSndFileId = Int64
data SndFile = SndFile
{ sndFileId :: DBSndFileId,
sndFileEntityId :: SndFileId,
userId :: Int64,
numRecipients :: Int,
digest :: Maybe FileDigest,
key :: C.SbKey,
nonce :: C.CbNonce,
chunks :: [SndFileChunk],
srcFile :: CryptoFile,
prefixPath :: Maybe FilePath,
status :: SndFileStatus,
deleted :: Bool
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
sndFileEncPath :: FilePath -> FilePath
sndFileEncPath prefixPath = prefixPath </> "xftp.encrypted"
data SndFileStatus
= SFSNew -- db record created
| SFSEncrypting -- encryption started
| SFSEncrypted -- encryption complete
| SFSUploading -- all chunk replicas are created on servers
| SFSComplete -- all chunk replicas are uploaded
| SFSError -- permanent error
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance FromField SndFileStatus where fromField = fromTextField_ textDecode
instance ToField SndFileStatus where toField = toField . textEncode
instance TextEncoding SndFileStatus where
textDecode = \case
"new" -> Just SFSNew
"encrypting" -> Just SFSEncrypting
"encrypted" -> Just SFSEncrypted
"uploading" -> Just SFSUploading
"complete" -> Just SFSComplete
"error" -> Just SFSError
_ -> Nothing
textEncode = \case
SFSNew -> "new"
SFSEncrypting -> "encrypting"
SFSEncrypted -> "encrypted"
SFSUploading -> "uploading"
SFSComplete -> "complete"
SFSError -> "error"
data SndFileChunk = SndFileChunk
{ sndFileId :: DBSndFileId,
sndFileEntityId :: SndFileId,
userId :: Int64,
numRecipients :: Int,
sndChunkId :: Int64,
chunkNo :: Int,
chunkSpec :: XFTPChunkSpec,
filePrefixPath :: FilePath,
digest :: FileDigest,
replicas :: [SndFileChunkReplica]
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
sndChunkSize :: SndFileChunk -> Word32
sndChunkSize SndFileChunk {chunkSpec = XFTPChunkSpec {chunkSize}} = chunkSize
data NewSndChunkReplica = NewSndChunkReplica
{ server :: XFTPServer,
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
replicaKey :: C.APrivateSignKey,
rcvIdsKeys :: [(ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateSignKey)]
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data SndFileChunkReplica = SndFileChunkReplica
{ sndChunkReplicaId :: Int64,
server :: XFTPServer,
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
replicaKey :: C.APrivateSignKey,
rcvIdsKeys :: [(ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateSignKey)],
replicaStatus :: SndFileReplicaStatus,
delay :: Maybe Int64,
retries :: Int
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data SndFileReplicaStatus
= SFRSCreated
| SFRSUploaded
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance FromField SndFileReplicaStatus where fromField = fromTextField_ textDecode
instance ToField SndFileReplicaStatus where toField = toField . textEncode
instance TextEncoding SndFileReplicaStatus where
textDecode = \case
"created" -> Just SFRSCreated
"uploaded" -> Just SFRSUploaded
_ -> Nothing
textEncode = \case
SFRSCreated -> "created"
SFRSUploaded -> "uploaded"
data DeletedSndChunkReplica = DeletedSndChunkReplica
{ deletedSndChunkReplicaId :: Int64,
userId :: Int64,
server :: XFTPServer,
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
replicaKey :: C.APrivateSignKey,
chunkDigest :: FileDigest,
delay :: Maybe Int64,
retries :: Int
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
-24
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@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Util
( uniqueCombine,
removePath,
)
where
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (ifM, whenM)
import System.FilePath (splitExtensions, (</>))
import UnliftIO
import UnliftIO.Directory
uniqueCombine :: MonadIO m => FilePath -> String -> m FilePath
uniqueCombine filePath fileName = tryCombine (0 :: Int)
where
tryCombine n =
let (name, ext) = splitExtensions fileName
suffix = if n == 0 then "" else "_" <> show n
f = filePath </> (name <> suffix <> ext)
in ifM (doesPathExist f) (tryCombine $ n + 1) (pure f)
removePath :: MonadIO m => FilePath -> m ()
removePath p = do
ifM (doesDirectoryExist p) (removeDirectoryRecursive p) $
whenM (doesFileExist p) (removeFile p)
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+30 -221
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@@ -1,280 +1,89 @@
{-# LANGUAGE ConstraintKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NumericUnderscores #-}
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-unticked-promoted-constructors #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
( AgentMonad,
AgentMonad',
AgentConfig (..),
InitialAgentServers (..),
NetworkConfig (..),
( AgentConfig (..),
defaultAgentConfig,
defaultReconnectInterval,
tryAgentError,
catchAgentError,
agentFinally,
Env (..),
newSMPAgentEnv,
createAgentStore,
NtfSupervisor (..),
NtfSupervisorCommand (..),
XFTPAgent (..),
Worker (..),
RestartCount (..),
updateRestartCount,
)
where
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
import Control.Monad.Reader
import Crypto.Random
import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes)
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import Data.Map (Map)
import Data.Time.Clock (NominalDiffTime, nominalDay)
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..))
import Data.Word (Word16)
import Network.Socket
import Numeric.Natural
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client (XFTPClientConfig (..), defaultXFTPClientConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol (SMPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations as Migrations
import Simplex.Messaging.Client
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent ()
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (supportedE2EEncryptVRange)
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Types
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (NtfServer, XFTPServer, XFTPServerWithAuth, supportedSMPClientVRange)
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (TLS, Transport (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (defaultSMPPort)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (allFinally, catchAllErrors, tryAllErrors)
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
import System.Random (StdGen, newStdGen)
import UnliftIO (Async, SomeException)
import UnliftIO.STM
type AgentMonad' m = (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m)
type AgentMonad m = (AgentMonad' m, MonadError AgentErrorType m)
data InitialAgentServers = InitialAgentServers
{ smp :: Map UserId (NonEmpty SMPServerWithAuth),
ntf :: [NtfServer],
xftp :: Map UserId (NonEmpty XFTPServerWithAuth),
netCfg :: NetworkConfig
}
data AgentConfig = AgentConfig
{ tcpPort :: ServiceName,
initialSMPServers :: NonEmpty SMPServer,
cmdSignAlg :: C.SignAlg,
connIdBytes :: Int,
tbqSize :: Natural,
smpCfg :: ProtocolClientConfig,
ntfCfg :: ProtocolClientConfig,
xftpCfg :: XFTPClientConfig,
dbFile :: FilePath,
dbPoolSize :: Int,
yesToMigrations :: Bool,
smpCfg :: SMPClientConfig,
reconnectInterval :: RetryInterval,
messageRetryInterval :: RetryInterval2,
messageTimeout :: NominalDiffTime,
helloTimeout :: NominalDiffTime,
initialCleanupDelay :: Int64,
cleanupInterval :: Int64,
cleanupStepInterval :: Int,
maxWorkerRestartsPerMin :: Int,
maxSubscriptionTimeouts :: Int,
storedMsgDataTTL :: NominalDiffTime,
rcvFilesTTL :: NominalDiffTime,
sndFilesTTL :: NominalDiffTime,
xftpNotifyErrsOnRetry :: Bool,
xftpConsecutiveRetries :: Int,
xftpMaxRecipientsPerRequest :: Int,
deleteErrorCount :: Int,
ntfCron :: Word16,
ntfWorkerDelay :: Int,
ntfSMPWorkerDelay :: Int,
ntfSubCheckInterval :: NominalDiffTime,
ntfMaxMessages :: Int,
caCertificateFile :: FilePath,
privateKeyFile :: FilePath,
certificateFile :: FilePath,
e2eEncryptVRange :: VersionRange,
smpAgentVRange :: VersionRange,
smpClientVRange :: VersionRange,
initialClientId :: Int
certificateFile :: FilePath
}
defaultReconnectInterval :: RetryInterval
defaultReconnectInterval =
RetryInterval
{ initialInterval = 2_000000,
increaseAfter = 10_000000,
maxInterval = 180_000000
}
defaultMessageRetryInterval :: RetryInterval2
defaultMessageRetryInterval =
RetryInterval2
{ riFast =
RetryInterval
{ initialInterval = 1_000000,
increaseAfter = 10_000000,
maxInterval = 60_000000
},
riSlow =
-- TODO: these timeouts can be increased in v5.0 once most clients are updated
-- to resume sending on QCONT messages.
-- After that local message expiration period should be also increased.
RetryInterval
{ initialInterval = 60_000000,
increaseAfter = 60_000000,
maxInterval = 3600_000000 -- 1 hour
}
}
defaultAgentConfig :: AgentConfig
defaultAgentConfig =
AgentConfig
{ tcpPort = "5224",
initialSMPServers = undefined, -- TODO move it elsewhere?
cmdSignAlg = C.SignAlg C.SEd448,
connIdBytes = 12,
tbqSize = 64,
smpCfg = defaultClientConfig {defaultTransport = (show defaultSMPPort, transport @TLS)},
ntfCfg = defaultClientConfig {defaultTransport = ("443", transport @TLS)},
xftpCfg = defaultXFTPClientConfig,
reconnectInterval = defaultReconnectInterval,
messageRetryInterval = defaultMessageRetryInterval,
messageTimeout = 2 * nominalDay,
dbFile = "smp-agent.db",
dbPoolSize = 4,
yesToMigrations = False,
smpCfg = smpDefaultConfig,
reconnectInterval =
RetryInterval
{ initialInterval = second,
increaseAfter = 10 * second,
maxInterval = 10 * second
},
helloTimeout = 2 * nominalDay,
initialCleanupDelay = 30 * 1000000, -- 30 seconds
cleanupInterval = 30 * 60 * 1000000, -- 30 minutes
cleanupStepInterval = 200000, -- 200ms
maxWorkerRestartsPerMin = 5,
-- 3 consecutive subscription timeouts will result in alert to the user
-- this is a fallback, as the timeout set to 3x of expected timeout, to avoid potential locking.
maxSubscriptionTimeouts = 3,
storedMsgDataTTL = 21 * nominalDay,
rcvFilesTTL = 2 * nominalDay,
sndFilesTTL = nominalDay,
xftpNotifyErrsOnRetry = True,
xftpConsecutiveRetries = 3,
xftpMaxRecipientsPerRequest = 200,
deleteErrorCount = 10,
ntfCron = 20, -- minutes
ntfWorkerDelay = 100000, -- microseconds
ntfSMPWorkerDelay = 500000, -- microseconds
ntfSubCheckInterval = nominalDay,
ntfMaxMessages = 3,
-- CA certificate private key is not needed for initialization
-- ! we do not generate these
caCertificateFile = "/etc/opt/simplex-agent/ca.crt",
privateKeyFile = "/etc/opt/simplex-agent/agent.key",
certificateFile = "/etc/opt/simplex-agent/agent.crt",
e2eEncryptVRange = supportedE2EEncryptVRange,
smpAgentVRange = supportedSMPAgentVRange,
smpClientVRange = supportedSMPClientVRange,
initialClientId = 0
certificateFile = "/etc/opt/simplex-agent/agent.crt"
}
where
second = 1_000_000
data Env = Env
{ config :: AgentConfig,
store :: SQLiteStore,
random :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
idsDrg :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
clientCounter :: TVar Int,
randomServer :: TVar StdGen,
ntfSupervisor :: NtfSupervisor,
xftpAgent :: XFTPAgent,
multicastSubscribers :: TMVar Int
randomServer :: TVar StdGen
}
newSMPAgentEnv :: AgentConfig -> SQLiteStore -> IO Env
newSMPAgentEnv config@AgentConfig {initialClientId} store = do
random <- C.newRandom
clientCounter <- newTVarIO initialClientId
newSMPAgentEnv :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => AgentConfig -> m Env
newSMPAgentEnv config@AgentConfig {dbFile, dbPoolSize, yesToMigrations} = do
idsDrg <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
store <- liftIO $ createSQLiteStore dbFile dbPoolSize Migrations.app yesToMigrations
clientCounter <- newTVarIO 0
randomServer <- newTVarIO =<< liftIO newStdGen
ntfSupervisor <- atomically . newNtfSubSupervisor $ tbqSize config
xftpAgent <- atomically newXFTPAgent
multicastSubscribers <- newTMVarIO 0
pure Env {config, store, random, clientCounter, randomServer, ntfSupervisor, xftpAgent, multicastSubscribers}
createAgentStore :: FilePath -> ScrubbedBytes -> Bool -> MigrationConfirmation -> IO (Either MigrationError SQLiteStore)
createAgentStore dbFilePath dbKey keepKey = createSQLiteStore dbFilePath dbKey keepKey Migrations.app
data NtfSupervisor = NtfSupervisor
{ ntfTkn :: TVar (Maybe NtfToken),
ntfSubQ :: TBQueue (ConnId, NtfSupervisorCommand),
ntfWorkers :: TMap NtfServer Worker,
ntfSMPWorkers :: TMap SMPServer Worker
}
data NtfSupervisorCommand = NSCCreate | NSCDelete | NSCSmpDelete | NSCNtfWorker NtfServer | NSCNtfSMPWorker SMPServer
deriving (Show)
newNtfSubSupervisor :: Natural -> STM NtfSupervisor
newNtfSubSupervisor qSize = do
ntfTkn <- newTVar Nothing
ntfSubQ <- newTBQueue qSize
ntfWorkers <- TM.empty
ntfSMPWorkers <- TM.empty
pure NtfSupervisor {ntfTkn, ntfSubQ, ntfWorkers, ntfSMPWorkers}
data XFTPAgent = XFTPAgent
{ -- if set, XFTP file paths will be considered as relative to this directory
xftpWorkDir :: TVar (Maybe FilePath),
xftpRcvWorkers :: TMap (Maybe XFTPServer) Worker,
xftpSndWorkers :: TMap (Maybe XFTPServer) Worker,
xftpDelWorkers :: TMap XFTPServer Worker
}
newXFTPAgent :: STM XFTPAgent
newXFTPAgent = do
xftpWorkDir <- newTVar Nothing
xftpRcvWorkers <- TM.empty
xftpSndWorkers <- TM.empty
xftpDelWorkers <- TM.empty
pure XFTPAgent {xftpWorkDir, xftpRcvWorkers, xftpSndWorkers, xftpDelWorkers}
tryAgentError :: AgentMonad m => m a -> m (Either AgentErrorType a)
tryAgentError = tryAllErrors mkInternal
{-# INLINE tryAgentError #-}
catchAgentError :: AgentMonad m => m a -> (AgentErrorType -> m a) -> m a
catchAgentError = catchAllErrors mkInternal
{-# INLINE catchAgentError #-}
agentFinally :: AgentMonad m => m a -> m b -> m a
agentFinally = allFinally mkInternal
{-# INLINE agentFinally #-}
mkInternal :: SomeException -> AgentErrorType
mkInternal = INTERNAL . show
{-# INLINE mkInternal #-}
data Worker = Worker
{ workerId :: Int,
doWork :: TMVar (),
action :: TMVar (Maybe (Async ())),
restarts :: TVar RestartCount
}
data RestartCount = RestartCount
{ restartMinute :: Int64,
restartCount :: Int
}
updateRestartCount :: SystemTime -> RestartCount -> RestartCount
updateRestartCount t (RestartCount minute count) = do
let min' = systemSeconds t `div` 60
in RestartCount min' $ if minute == min' then count + 1 else 1
return Env {config, store, idsDrg, clientCounter, randomServer}
-49
View File
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Lock
( Lock,
createLock,
withLock,
withGetLock,
withGetLocks,
)
where
import Control.Monad (void)
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
import Data.Functor (($>))
import UnliftIO.Async (forConcurrently)
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
import UnliftIO.STM
type Lock = TMVar String
createLock :: STM Lock
createLock = newEmptyTMVar
{-# INLINE createLock #-}
withLock :: MonadUnliftIO m => Lock -> String -> m a -> m a
withLock lock name =
E.bracket_
(atomically $ putTMVar lock name)
(void . atomically $ takeTMVar lock)
withGetLock :: MonadUnliftIO m => (k -> STM Lock) -> k -> String -> m a -> m a
withGetLock getLock key name a =
E.bracket
(atomically $ getPutLock getLock key name)
(atomically . takeTMVar)
(const a)
withGetLocks :: MonadUnliftIO m => (k -> STM Lock) -> [k] -> String -> m a -> m a
withGetLocks getLock keys name = E.bracket holdLocks releaseLocks . const
where
holdLocks = forConcurrently keys $ \key -> atomically $ getPutLock getLock key name
-- only this withGetLocks would be holding the locks,
-- so it's safe to combine all lock releases into one transaction
releaseLocks = atomically . mapM_ takeTMVar
-- getLock and putTMVar can be in one transaction on the assumption that getLock doesn't write in case the lock already exists,
-- and in case it is created and added to some shared resource (we use TMap) it also helps avoid contention for the newly created lock.
getPutLock :: (k -> STM Lock) -> k -> String -> STM Lock
getPutLock getLock key name = getLock key >>= \l -> putTMVar l name $> l
@@ -1,345 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-ambiguous-fields #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.NtfSubSupervisor
( runNtfSupervisor,
nsUpdateToken,
nsRemoveNtfToken,
sendNtfSubCommand,
instantNotifications,
closeNtfSupervisor,
getNtfServer,
)
where
import Control.Logger.Simple (logError, logInfo)
import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.Reader
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Data.Text (Text)
import Data.Time (UTCTime, addUTCTime, getCurrentTime)
import Data.Time.Clock (diffUTCTime)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol (ACommand (..), APartyCmd (..), AgentErrorType (..), BrokerErrorType (..), ConnId, NotificationsMode (..), SAEntity (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent ()
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Protocol (NtfSubStatus (..), NtfTknStatus (..), SMPQueueNtf (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Types
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (NtfServer, SMPServer, sameSrvAddr)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (diffToMicroseconds, threadDelay', tshow, unlessM)
import System.Random (randomR)
import UnliftIO
import UnliftIO.Concurrent (forkIO, threadDelay)
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
runNtfSupervisor :: forall m. AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> m ()
runNtfSupervisor c = do
ns <- asks ntfSupervisor
forever $ do
cmd@(connId, _) <- atomically . readTBQueue $ ntfSubQ ns
handleErr connId . agentOperationBracket c AONtfNetwork waitUntilActive $
runExceptT (processNtfSub c cmd) >>= \case
Left e -> notifyErr connId e
Right _ -> return ()
where
handleErr :: ConnId -> m () -> m ()
handleErr connId = E.handle $ \(e :: E.SomeException) -> do
logError $ "runNtfSupervisor error " <> tshow e
notifyErr connId e
notifyErr connId e = notifyInternalError c connId $ "runNtfSupervisor error " <> show e
processNtfSub :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> (ConnId, NtfSupervisorCommand) -> m ()
processNtfSub c (connId, cmd) = do
logInfo $ "processNtfSub - connId = " <> tshow connId <> " - cmd = " <> tshow cmd
case cmd of
NSCCreate -> do
(a, RcvQueue {server = smpServer, clientNtfCreds}) <- withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
a <- liftIO $ getNtfSubscription db connId
q <- ExceptT $ getPrimaryRcvQueue db connId
pure (a, q)
logInfo $ "processNtfSub, NSCCreate - a = " <> tshow a
case a of
Nothing -> do
withNtfServer c $ \ntfServer -> do
case clientNtfCreds of
Just ClientNtfCreds {notifierId} -> do
let newSub = newNtfSubscription connId smpServer (Just notifierId) ntfServer NASKey
withStore c $ \db -> createNtfSubscription db newSub $ NtfSubNTFAction NSACreate
void $ getNtfNTFWorker True c ntfServer
Nothing -> do
let newSub = newNtfSubscription connId smpServer Nothing ntfServer NASNew
withStore c $ \db -> createNtfSubscription db newSub $ NtfSubSMPAction NSASmpKey
void $ getNtfSMPWorker True c smpServer
(Just (sub@NtfSubscription {ntfSubStatus, ntfServer = subNtfServer, smpServer = smpServer', ntfQueueId}, action_)) -> do
case (clientNtfCreds, ntfQueueId) of
(Just ClientNtfCreds {notifierId}, Just ntfQueueId')
| sameSrvAddr smpServer smpServer' && notifierId == ntfQueueId' -> create
| otherwise -> rotate
(Nothing, Nothing) -> create
_ -> rotate
where
create :: m ()
create = case action_ of
-- action was set to NULL after worker internal error
Nothing -> resetSubscription
Just (action, _)
-- subscription was marked for deletion / is being deleted
| isDeleteNtfSubAction action -> do
if ntfSubStatus == NASNew || ntfSubStatus == NASOff || ntfSubStatus == NASDeleted
then resetSubscription
else withNtfServer c $ \ntfServer -> do
withStore' c $ \db -> supervisorUpdateNtfSub db sub {ntfServer} (NtfSubNTFAction NSACreate)
void $ getNtfNTFWorker True c ntfServer
| otherwise -> case action of
NtfSubNTFAction _ -> void $ getNtfNTFWorker True c subNtfServer
NtfSubSMPAction _ -> void $ getNtfSMPWorker True c smpServer
rotate :: m ()
rotate = do
withStore' c $ \db -> supervisorUpdateNtfSub db sub (NtfSubNTFAction NSARotate)
void $ getNtfNTFWorker True c subNtfServer
resetSubscription :: m ()
resetSubscription =
withNtfServer c $ \ntfServer -> do
let sub' = sub {ntfQueueId = Nothing, ntfServer, ntfSubId = Nothing, ntfSubStatus = NASNew}
withStore' c $ \db -> supervisorUpdateNtfSub db sub' (NtfSubSMPAction NSASmpKey)
void $ getNtfSMPWorker True c smpServer
NSCDelete -> do
sub_ <- withStore' c $ \db -> do
supervisorUpdateNtfAction db connId (NtfSubNTFAction NSADelete)
getNtfSubscription db connId
logInfo $ "processNtfSub, NSCDelete - sub_ = " <> tshow sub_
case sub_ of
(Just (NtfSubscription {ntfServer}, _)) -> void $ getNtfNTFWorker True c ntfServer
_ -> pure () -- err "NSCDelete - no subscription"
NSCSmpDelete -> do
withStore' c (`getPrimaryRcvQueue` connId) >>= \case
Right rq@RcvQueue {server = smpServer} -> do
logInfo $ "processNtfSub, NSCSmpDelete - rq = " <> tshow rq
withStore' c $ \db -> supervisorUpdateNtfAction db connId (NtfSubSMPAction NSASmpDelete)
void $ getNtfSMPWorker True c smpServer
_ -> notifyInternalError c connId "NSCSmpDelete - no rcv queue"
NSCNtfWorker ntfServer -> void $ getNtfNTFWorker True c ntfServer
NSCNtfSMPWorker smpServer -> void $ getNtfSMPWorker True c smpServer
getNtfNTFWorker :: AgentMonad' m => Bool -> AgentClient -> NtfServer -> m Worker
getNtfNTFWorker hasWork c server = do
ws <- asks $ ntfWorkers . ntfSupervisor
getAgentWorker "ntf_ntf" hasWork c server ws $ runNtfWorker c server
getNtfSMPWorker :: AgentMonad' m => Bool -> AgentClient -> SMPServer -> m Worker
getNtfSMPWorker hasWork c server = do
ws <- asks $ ntfSMPWorkers . ntfSupervisor
getAgentWorker "ntf_smp" hasWork c server ws $ runNtfSMPWorker c server
withNtfServer :: AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> (NtfServer -> m ()) -> m ()
withNtfServer c action = getNtfServer c >>= mapM_ action
runNtfWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> NtfServer -> Worker -> m ()
runNtfWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
delay <- asks $ ntfWorkerDelay . config
forever $ do
waitForWork doWork
agentOperationBracket c AONtfNetwork throwWhenInactive runNtfOperation
threadDelay delay
where
runNtfOperation :: m ()
runNtfOperation =
withWork c doWork (`getNextNtfSubNTFAction` srv) $
\nextSub@(NtfSubscription {connId}, _, _) -> do
logInfo $ "runNtfWorker, nextSub " <> tshow nextSub
ri <- asks $ reconnectInterval . config
withRetryInterval ri $ \_ loop ->
processSub nextSub
`catchAgentError` retryOnError c "NtfWorker" loop (workerInternalError c connId . show)
processSub :: (NtfSubscription, NtfSubNTFAction, NtfActionTs) -> m ()
processSub (sub@NtfSubscription {connId, smpServer, ntfSubId}, action, actionTs) = do
ts <- liftIO getCurrentTime
unlessM (rescheduleAction doWork ts actionTs) $
case action of
NSACreate ->
getNtfToken >>= \case
Just tkn@NtfToken {ntfTokenId = Just tknId, ntfTknStatus = NTActive, ntfMode = NMInstant} -> do
RcvQueue {clientNtfCreds} <- withStore c (`getPrimaryRcvQueue` connId)
case clientNtfCreds of
Just ClientNtfCreds {ntfPrivateKey, notifierId} -> do
nSubId <- agentNtfCreateSubscription c tknId tkn (SMPQueueNtf smpServer notifierId) ntfPrivateKey
-- possible improvement: smaller retry until Active, less frequently (daily?) once Active
let actionTs' = addUTCTime 30 ts
withStore' c $ \db ->
updateNtfSubscription db sub {ntfSubId = Just nSubId, ntfSubStatus = NASCreated NSNew} (NtfSubNTFAction NSACheck) actionTs'
_ -> workerInternalError c connId "NSACreate - no notifier queue credentials"
_ -> workerInternalError c connId "NSACreate - no active token"
NSACheck ->
getNtfToken >>= \case
Just tkn ->
case ntfSubId of
Just nSubId ->
agentNtfCheckSubscription c nSubId tkn >>= \case
NSAuth -> do
getNtfServer c >>= \case
Just ntfServer -> do
withStore' c $ \db ->
updateNtfSubscription db sub {ntfServer, ntfQueueId = Nothing, ntfSubId = Nothing, ntfSubStatus = NASNew} (NtfSubSMPAction NSASmpKey) ts
ns <- asks ntfSupervisor
atomically $ writeTBQueue (ntfSubQ ns) (connId, NSCNtfSMPWorker smpServer)
_ -> workerInternalError c connId "NSACheck - failed to reset subscription, notification server not configured"
status -> updateSubNextCheck ts status
Nothing -> workerInternalError c connId "NSACheck - no subscription ID"
_ -> workerInternalError c connId "NSACheck - no active token"
NSADelete -> case ntfSubId of
Just nSubId ->
(getNtfToken >>= mapM_ (agentNtfDeleteSubscription c nSubId))
`agentFinally` continueDeletion
_ -> continueDeletion
where
continueDeletion = do
let sub' = sub {ntfSubId = Nothing, ntfSubStatus = NASOff}
withStore' c $ \db -> updateNtfSubscription db sub' (NtfSubSMPAction NSASmpDelete) ts
ns <- asks ntfSupervisor
atomically $ writeTBQueue (ntfSubQ ns) (connId, NSCNtfSMPWorker smpServer)
NSARotate -> case ntfSubId of
Just nSubId ->
(getNtfToken >>= mapM_ (agentNtfDeleteSubscription c nSubId))
`agentFinally` deleteCreate
_ -> deleteCreate
where
deleteCreate = do
withStore' c $ \db -> deleteNtfSubscription db connId
ns <- asks ntfSupervisor
atomically $ writeTBQueue (ntfSubQ ns) (connId, NSCCreate)
where
updateSubNextCheck ts toStatus = do
checkInterval <- asks $ ntfSubCheckInterval . config
let nextCheckTs = addUTCTime checkInterval ts
updateSub (NASCreated toStatus) (NtfSubNTFAction NSACheck) nextCheckTs
updateSub toStatus toAction actionTs' =
withStore' c $ \db ->
updateNtfSubscription db sub {ntfSubStatus = toStatus} toAction actionTs'
runNtfSMPWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SMPServer -> Worker -> m ()
runNtfSMPWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
delay <- asks $ ntfSMPWorkerDelay . config
forever $ do
waitForWork doWork
agentOperationBracket c AONtfNetwork throwWhenInactive runNtfSMPOperation
threadDelay delay
where
runNtfSMPOperation =
withWork c doWork (`getNextNtfSubSMPAction` srv) $
\nextSub@(NtfSubscription {connId}, _, _) -> do
logInfo $ "runNtfSMPWorker, nextSub " <> tshow nextSub
ri <- asks $ reconnectInterval . config
withRetryInterval ri $ \_ loop ->
processSub nextSub
`catchAgentError` retryOnError c "NtfSMPWorker" loop (workerInternalError c connId . show)
processSub :: (NtfSubscription, NtfSubSMPAction, NtfActionTs) -> m ()
processSub (sub@NtfSubscription {connId, ntfServer}, smpAction, actionTs) = do
ts <- liftIO getCurrentTime
unlessM (rescheduleAction doWork ts actionTs) $
case smpAction of
NSASmpKey ->
getNtfToken >>= \case
Just NtfToken {ntfTknStatus = NTActive, ntfMode = NMInstant} -> do
rq <- withStore c (`getPrimaryRcvQueue` connId)
C.SignAlg a <- asks (cmdSignAlg . config)
g <- asks random
(ntfPublicKey, ntfPrivateKey) <- atomically $ C.generateSignatureKeyPair a g
(rcvNtfPubDhKey, rcvNtfPrivDhKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
(notifierId, rcvNtfSrvPubDhKey) <- enableQueueNotifications c rq ntfPublicKey rcvNtfPubDhKey
let rcvNtfDhSecret = C.dh' rcvNtfSrvPubDhKey rcvNtfPrivDhKey
withStore' c $ \db -> do
setRcvQueueNtfCreds db connId $ Just ClientNtfCreds {ntfPublicKey, ntfPrivateKey, notifierId, rcvNtfDhSecret}
updateNtfSubscription db sub {ntfQueueId = Just notifierId, ntfSubStatus = NASKey} (NtfSubNTFAction NSACreate) ts
ns <- asks ntfSupervisor
atomically $ sendNtfSubCommand ns (connId, NSCNtfWorker ntfServer)
_ -> workerInternalError c connId "NSASmpKey - no active token"
NSASmpDelete -> do
rq_ <- withStore' c $ \db -> do
setRcvQueueNtfCreds db connId Nothing
getPrimaryRcvQueue db connId
mapM_ (disableQueueNotifications c) rq_
withStore' c $ \db -> deleteNtfSubscription db connId
rescheduleAction :: AgentMonad' m => TMVar () -> UTCTime -> UTCTime -> m Bool
rescheduleAction doWork ts actionTs
| actionTs <= ts = pure False
| otherwise = do
void . atomically $ tryTakeTMVar doWork
void . forkIO $ do
liftIO $ threadDelay' $ diffToMicroseconds $ diffUTCTime actionTs ts
atomically $ hasWorkToDo' doWork
pure True
retryOnError :: AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> Text -> m () -> (AgentErrorType -> m ()) -> AgentErrorType -> m ()
retryOnError c name loop done e = do
logError $ name <> " error: " <> tshow e
case e of
BROKER _ NETWORK -> retryLoop
BROKER _ TIMEOUT -> retryLoop
_ -> done e
where
retryLoop = do
atomically $ endAgentOperation c AONtfNetwork
atomically $ throwWhenInactive c
atomically $ beginAgentOperation c AONtfNetwork
loop
workerInternalError :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> String -> m ()
workerInternalError c connId internalErrStr = do
withStore' c $ \db -> setNullNtfSubscriptionAction db connId
notifyInternalError c connId internalErrStr
-- TODO change error
notifyInternalError :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> String -> m ()
notifyInternalError AgentClient {subQ} connId internalErrStr = atomically $ writeTBQueue subQ ("", connId, APC SAEConn $ ERR $ INTERNAL internalErrStr)
getNtfToken :: AgentMonad' m => m (Maybe NtfToken)
getNtfToken = do
tkn <- asks $ ntfTkn . ntfSupervisor
readTVarIO tkn
nsUpdateToken :: NtfSupervisor -> NtfToken -> STM ()
nsUpdateToken ns tkn = writeTVar (ntfTkn ns) $ Just tkn
nsRemoveNtfToken :: NtfSupervisor -> STM ()
nsRemoveNtfToken ns = writeTVar (ntfTkn ns) Nothing
sendNtfSubCommand :: NtfSupervisor -> (ConnId, NtfSupervisorCommand) -> STM ()
sendNtfSubCommand ns cmd = do
tkn <- readTVar (ntfTkn ns)
when (instantNotifications tkn) $ writeTBQueue (ntfSubQ ns) cmd
instantNotifications :: Maybe NtfToken -> Bool
instantNotifications = \case
Just NtfToken {ntfTknStatus = NTActive, ntfMode = NMInstant} -> True
_ -> False
closeNtfSupervisor :: MonadUnliftIO m => NtfSupervisor -> m ()
closeNtfSupervisor ns = do
stopWorkers $ ntfWorkers ns
stopWorkers $ ntfSMPWorkers ns
where
stopWorkers workers = atomically (swapTVar workers M.empty) >>= mapM_ (liftIO . cancelWorker)
getNtfServer :: AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> m (Maybe NtfServer)
getNtfServer c = do
ntfServers <- readTVarIO $ ntfServers c
case ntfServers of
[] -> pure Nothing
[srv] -> pure $ Just srv
servers -> do
gen <- asks randomServer
atomically . stateTVar gen $
first (Just . (servers !!)) . randomR (0, length servers - 1)
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+3 -12
View File
@@ -24,16 +24,7 @@ instance StrEncoding QueryStringParams where
strP = QSP QEscape . Q.parseSimpleQuery <$> A.takeTill (\c -> c == ' ' || c == '\n')
queryParam :: StrEncoding a => ByteString -> QueryStringParams -> Parser a
queryParam name q =
case queryParamStr name q of
Just p -> either fail pure $ parseAll strP p
queryParam name (QSP _ q) =
case find ((== name) . fst) q of
Just (_, p) -> either fail pure $ parseAll strP p
_ -> fail $ "no qs param " <> B.unpack name
queryParam_ :: StrEncoding a => ByteString -> QueryStringParams -> Parser (Maybe a)
queryParam_ name q =
case queryParamStr name q of
Just p -> either fail pure $ parseAll strP p
_ -> pure Nothing
queryParamStr :: ByteString -> QueryStringParams -> Maybe ByteString
queryParamStr name (QSP _ q) = snd <$> find ((== name) . fst) q
+16 -82
View File
@@ -1,94 +1,28 @@
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
( RetryInterval (..),
RetryInterval2 (..),
RetryIntervalMode (..),
RI2State (..),
withRetryInterval,
withRetryIntervalCount,
withRetryLock2,
updateRetryInterval2,
)
where
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval where
import Control.Concurrent (forkIO)
import Control.Monad (void)
import Control.Concurrent (threadDelay)
import Control.Monad.IO.Class (MonadIO, liftIO)
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (threadDelay', whenM)
import UnliftIO.STM
data RetryInterval = RetryInterval
{ initialInterval :: Int64,
increaseAfter :: Int64,
maxInterval :: Int64
{ initialInterval :: Int,
increaseAfter :: Int,
maxInterval :: Int
}
data RetryInterval2 = RetryInterval2
{ riSlow :: RetryInterval,
riFast :: RetryInterval
}
data RI2State = RI2State
{ slowInterval :: Int64,
fastInterval :: Int64
}
deriving (Show)
updateRetryInterval2 :: RI2State -> RetryInterval2 -> RetryInterval2
updateRetryInterval2 RI2State {slowInterval, fastInterval} RetryInterval2 {riSlow, riFast} =
RetryInterval2
{ riSlow = riSlow {initialInterval = slowInterval, increaseAfter = 0},
riFast = riFast {initialInterval = fastInterval, increaseAfter = 0}
}
data RetryIntervalMode = RISlow | RIFast
deriving (Eq, Show)
withRetryInterval :: forall m a. MonadIO m => RetryInterval -> (Int64 -> m a -> m a) -> m a
withRetryInterval ri = withRetryIntervalCount ri . const
withRetryIntervalCount :: forall m a. MonadIO m => RetryInterval -> (Int -> Int64 -> m a -> m a) -> m a
withRetryIntervalCount ri action = callAction 0 0 $ initialInterval ri
withRetryInterval :: forall m. MonadIO m => RetryInterval -> (m () -> m ()) -> m ()
withRetryInterval RetryInterval {initialInterval, increaseAfter, maxInterval} action =
callAction 0 initialInterval
where
callAction :: Int -> Int64 -> Int64 -> m a
callAction n elapsed delay = action n delay loop
callAction :: Int -> Int -> m ()
callAction elapsedTime delay = action loop
where
loop = do
liftIO $ threadDelay' delay
let elapsed' = elapsed + delay
callAction (n + 1) elapsed' $ nextDelay elapsed' delay ri
-- This function allows action to toggle between slow and fast retry intervals.
withRetryLock2 :: forall m. MonadIO m => RetryInterval2 -> TMVar () -> (RI2State -> (RetryIntervalMode -> m ()) -> m ()) -> m ()
withRetryLock2 RetryInterval2 {riSlow, riFast} lock action =
callAction (0, initialInterval riSlow) (0, initialInterval riFast)
where
callAction :: (Int64, Int64) -> (Int64, Int64) -> m ()
callAction slow fast = action (RI2State (snd slow) (snd fast)) loop
where
loop = \case
RISlow -> run slow riSlow (`callAction` fast)
RIFast -> run fast riFast (callAction slow)
run (elapsed, delay) ri call = do
wait delay
let elapsed' = elapsed + delay
delay' = nextDelay elapsed' delay ri
call (elapsed', delay')
wait delay = do
waiting <- newTVarIO True
_ <- liftIO . forkIO $ do
threadDelay' delay
atomically $ whenM (readTVar waiting) $ void $ tryPutTMVar lock ()
atomically $ do
takeTMVar lock
writeTVar waiting False
nextDelay :: Int64 -> Int64 -> RetryInterval -> Int64
nextDelay elapsed delay RetryInterval {increaseAfter, maxInterval} =
if elapsed < increaseAfter || delay == maxInterval
then delay
else min (delay * 3 `div` 2) maxInterval
let newDelay =
if elapsedTime < increaseAfter || delay == maxInterval
then delay
else min (delay * 3 `div` 2) maxInterval
liftIO $ threadDelay delay
callAction (elapsedTime + delay) newDelay
+15 -15
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Server
where
import Control.Logger.Simple (logInfo)
import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift (MonadUnliftIO)
import Control.Monad.Reader
import Crypto.Random (MonadRandom)
@@ -21,9 +21,8 @@ import Data.Text.Encoding (decodeUtf8)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite (SQLiteStore)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport (..), TProxy, Transport (..), simplexMQVersion)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (defaultTransportServerConfig, loadTLSServerParams, runTransportServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (loadTLSServerParams, runTransportServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow)
import UnliftIO.Async (race_)
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
@@ -32,25 +31,26 @@ import UnliftIO.STM
-- | Runs an SMP agent as a TCP service using passed configuration.
--
-- See a full agent executable here: https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/apps/smp-agent/Main.hs
runSMPAgent :: (MonadRandom m, MonadUnliftIO m) => ATransport -> AgentConfig -> InitialAgentServers -> SQLiteStore -> m ()
runSMPAgent t cfg initServers store =
runSMPAgentBlocking t cfg initServers store =<< newEmptyTMVarIO
runSMPAgent :: (MonadRandom m, MonadUnliftIO m) => ATransport -> AgentConfig -> m ()
runSMPAgent t cfg = do
started <- newEmptyTMVarIO
runSMPAgentBlocking t started cfg
-- | Runs an SMP agent as a TCP service using passed configuration with signalling.
--
-- This function uses passed TMVar to signal when the server is ready to accept TCP requests (True)
-- and when it is disconnected from the TCP socket once the server thread is killed (False).
runSMPAgentBlocking :: (MonadRandom m, MonadUnliftIO m) => ATransport -> AgentConfig -> InitialAgentServers -> SQLiteStore -> TMVar Bool -> m ()
runSMPAgentBlocking (ATransport t) cfg@AgentConfig {tcpPort, caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile} initServers store started = do
liftIO (newSMPAgentEnv cfg store) >>= runReaderT (smpAgent t)
runSMPAgentBlocking :: (MonadRandom m, MonadUnliftIO m) => ATransport -> TMVar Bool -> AgentConfig -> m ()
runSMPAgentBlocking (ATransport t) started cfg@AgentConfig {tcpPort, caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile} = do
runReaderT (smpAgent t) =<< newSMPAgentEnv cfg
where
smpAgent :: forall c m'. (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m', MonadReader Env m') => TProxy c -> m' ()
smpAgent _ = do
-- tlsServerParams is not in Env to avoid breaking functional API w/t key and certificate generation
tlsServerParams <- liftIO $ loadTLSServerParams caCertificateFile certificateFile privateKeyFile
runTransportServer started tcpPort tlsServerParams defaultTransportServerConfig $ \(h :: c) -> do
runTransportServer started tcpPort tlsServerParams $ \(h :: c) -> do
liftIO . putLn h $ "Welcome to SMP agent v" <> B.pack simplexMQVersion
c <- getAgentClient initServers
c <- getAgentClient
logConnection c True
race_ (connectClient h c) (runAgentClient c)
`E.finally` disconnectAgentClient c
@@ -60,10 +60,10 @@ connectClient h c = race_ (send h c) (receive h c)
receive :: forall c m. (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m) => c -> AgentClient -> m ()
receive h c@AgentClient {rcvQ, subQ} = forever $ do
(corrId, entId, cmdOrErr) <- tGet SClient h
(corrId, connId, cmdOrErr) <- tGet SClient h
case cmdOrErr of
Right cmd -> write rcvQ (corrId, entId, cmd)
Left e -> write subQ (corrId, entId, APC SAEConn $ ERR e)
Right cmd -> write rcvQ (corrId, connId, cmd)
Left e -> write subQ (corrId, connId, ERR e)
where
write :: TBQueue (ATransmission p) -> ATransmission p -> m ()
write q t = do
@@ -77,5 +77,5 @@ send h c@AgentClient {subQ} = forever $ do
logClient c "<--" t
logClient :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> ByteString -> ATransmission a -> m ()
logClient AgentClient {clientId} dir (corrId, connId, APC _ cmd) = do
logClient AgentClient {clientId} dir (corrId, connId, cmd) = do
logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ B.unwords [bshow clientId, dir, "A :", corrId, connId, B.takeWhile (/= ' ') $ serializeCommand cmd]
+66 -402
View File
@@ -1,78 +1,85 @@
{-# LANGUAGE ConstraintKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE MultiParamTypeClasses #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-unticked-promoted-constructors #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store where
import Control.Concurrent.STM (TVar)
import Control.Exception (Exception)
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.Kind (Type)
import Data.List (find)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Maybe (isJust)
import Data.Time (UTCTime)
import Data.Type.Equality
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval (RI2State)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (RatchetX448)
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (RatchetX448, SkippedMsgDiff, SkippedMsgKeys)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
( MsgBody,
MsgFlags,
MsgId,
NotifierId,
NtfPrivateSignKey,
NtfPublicVerifyKey,
RcvDhSecret,
RcvNtfDhSecret,
RcvPrivateSignKey,
SndPrivateSignKey,
)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
import Simplex.Messaging.Util ((<$?>))
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
-- * Store management
-- | Store class type. Defines store access methods for implementations.
class Monad m => MonadAgentStore s m where
-- Queue and Connection management
createRcvConn :: s -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> ConnData -> RcvQueue -> SConnectionMode c -> m ConnId
createSndConn :: s -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> m ConnId
getConn :: s -> ConnId -> m SomeConn
getRcvConn :: s -> SMPServer -> SMP.RecipientId -> m SomeConn
deleteConn :: s -> ConnId -> m ()
upgradeRcvConnToDuplex :: s -> ConnId -> SndQueue -> m ()
upgradeSndConnToDuplex :: s -> ConnId -> RcvQueue -> m ()
setRcvQueueStatus :: s -> RcvQueue -> QueueStatus -> m ()
setRcvQueueConfirmedE2E :: s -> RcvQueue -> C.DhSecretX25519 -> m ()
setSndQueueStatus :: s -> SndQueue -> QueueStatus -> m ()
-- Confirmations
createConfirmation :: s -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> NewConfirmation -> m ConfirmationId
acceptConfirmation :: s -> ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> m AcceptedConfirmation
getAcceptedConfirmation :: s -> ConnId -> m AcceptedConfirmation
removeConfirmations :: s -> ConnId -> m ()
-- Invitations - sent via Contact connections
createInvitation :: s -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> NewInvitation -> m InvitationId
getInvitation :: s -> InvitationId -> m Invitation
acceptInvitation :: s -> InvitationId -> ConnInfo -> m ()
deleteInvitation :: s -> ConnId -> InvitationId -> m ()
-- Msg management
updateRcvIds :: s -> ConnId -> m (InternalId, InternalRcvId, PrevExternalSndId, PrevRcvMsgHash)
createRcvMsg :: s -> ConnId -> RcvMsgData -> m ()
updateSndIds :: s -> ConnId -> m (InternalId, InternalSndId, PrevSndMsgHash)
createSndMsg :: s -> ConnId -> SndMsgData -> m ()
getPendingMsgData :: s -> ConnId -> InternalId -> m (Maybe RcvQueue, (AgentMessageType, MsgBody, InternalTs))
getPendingMsgs :: s -> ConnId -> m [InternalId]
checkRcvMsg :: s -> ConnId -> InternalId -> m ()
deleteMsg :: s -> ConnId -> InternalId -> m ()
-- Double ratchet persistence
createRatchetX3dhKeys :: s -> ConnId -> C.PrivateKeyX448 -> C.PrivateKeyX448 -> m ()
getRatchetX3dhKeys :: s -> ConnId -> m (C.PrivateKeyX448, C.PrivateKeyX448)
createRatchet :: s -> ConnId -> RatchetX448 -> m ()
getRatchet :: s -> ConnId -> m RatchetX448
getSkippedMsgKeys :: s -> ConnId -> m SkippedMsgKeys
updateRatchet :: s -> ConnId -> RatchetX448 -> SkippedMsgDiff -> m ()
-- * Queue types
data QueueStored = QSStored | QSNew
data SQueueStored (q :: QueueStored) where
SQSStored :: SQueueStored 'QSStored
SQSNew :: SQueueStored 'QSNew
data DBQueueId (q :: QueueStored) where
DBQueueId :: Int64 -> DBQueueId 'QSStored
DBNewQueue :: DBQueueId 'QSNew
deriving instance Eq (DBQueueId q)
deriving instance Show (DBQueueId q)
type RcvQueue = StoredRcvQueue 'QSStored
type NewRcvQueue = StoredRcvQueue 'QSNew
-- | A receive queue. SMP queue through which the agent receives messages from a sender.
data StoredRcvQueue (q :: QueueStored) = RcvQueue
{ userId :: UserId,
connId :: ConnId,
server :: SMPServer,
data RcvQueue = RcvQueue
{ server :: SMPServer,
-- | recipient queue ID
rcvId :: SMP.RecipientId,
-- | key used by the recipient to sign transmissions
@@ -84,60 +91,15 @@ data StoredRcvQueue (q :: QueueStored) = RcvQueue
-- | public sender's DH key and agreed shared DH secret for simple per-queue e2e
e2eDhSecret :: Maybe C.DhSecretX25519,
-- | sender queue ID
sndId :: SMP.SenderId,
sndId :: Maybe SMP.SenderId,
-- | queue status
status :: QueueStatus,
-- | database queue ID (within connection)
dbQueueId :: DBQueueId q,
-- | True for a primary or a next primary queue of the connection (next if dbReplaceQueueId is set)
primary :: Bool,
-- | database queue ID to replace, Nothing if this queue is not replacing another, `Just Nothing` is used for replacing old queues
dbReplaceQueueId :: Maybe Int64,
rcvSwchStatus :: Maybe RcvSwitchStatus,
-- | SMP client version
smpClientVersion :: Version,
-- | credentials used in context of notifications
clientNtfCreds :: Maybe ClientNtfCreds,
deleteErrors :: Int
status :: QueueStatus
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
rcvQueueInfo :: RcvQueue -> RcvQueueInfo
rcvQueueInfo rq@RcvQueue {server, rcvSwchStatus} =
RcvQueueInfo {rcvServer = server, rcvSwitchStatus = rcvSwchStatus, canAbortSwitch = canAbortRcvSwitch rq}
canAbortRcvSwitch :: RcvQueue -> Bool
canAbortRcvSwitch = maybe False canAbort . rcvSwchStatus
where
canAbort = \case
RSSwitchStarted -> True
RSSendingQADD -> True
-- if switch is in RSSendingQUSE, a race condition with sender deleting the original queue is possible
RSSendingQUSE -> False
-- if switch is in RSReceivedMessage status, aborting switch (deleting new queue)
-- will break the connection because the sender would have original queue deleted
RSReceivedMessage -> False
data ClientNtfCreds = ClientNtfCreds
{ -- | key pair to be used by the notification server to sign transmissions
ntfPublicKey :: NtfPublicVerifyKey,
ntfPrivateKey :: NtfPrivateSignKey,
-- | queue ID to be used by the notification server for NSUB command
notifierId :: NotifierId,
-- | shared DH secret used to encrypt/decrypt notification metadata (NMsgMeta) from server to recipient
rcvNtfDhSecret :: RcvNtfDhSecret
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
type SndQueue = StoredSndQueue 'QSStored
type NewSndQueue = StoredSndQueue 'QSNew
-- | A send queue. SMP queue through which the agent sends messages to a recipient.
data StoredSndQueue (q :: QueueStored) = SndQueue
{ userId :: UserId,
connId :: ConnId,
server :: SMPServer,
data SndQueue = SndQueue
{ server :: SMPServer,
-- | sender queue ID
sndId :: SMP.SenderId,
-- | key pair used by the sender to sign transmissions
@@ -148,94 +110,14 @@ data StoredSndQueue (q :: QueueStored) = SndQueue
-- | shared DH secret agreed for simple per-queue e2e encryption
e2eDhSecret :: C.DhSecretX25519,
-- | queue status
status :: QueueStatus,
-- | database queue ID (within connection)
dbQueueId :: DBQueueId q,
-- | True for a primary or a next primary queue of the connection (next if dbReplaceQueueId is set)
primary :: Bool,
-- | ID of the queue this one is replacing
dbReplaceQueueId :: Maybe Int64,
sndSwchStatus :: Maybe SndSwitchStatus,
-- | SMP client version
smpClientVersion :: Version
status :: QueueStatus
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
sndQueueInfo :: SndQueue -> SndQueueInfo
sndQueueInfo SndQueue {server, sndSwchStatus} =
SndQueueInfo {sndServer = server, sndSwitchStatus = sndSwchStatus}
instance SMPQueue RcvQueue where
qServer RcvQueue {server} = server
{-# INLINE qServer #-}
queueId RcvQueue {rcvId} = rcvId
{-# INLINE queueId #-}
instance SMPQueue SndQueue where
qServer SndQueue {server} = server
{-# INLINE qServer #-}
queueId SndQueue {sndId} = sndId
{-# INLINE queueId #-}
findQ :: SMPQueue q => (SMPServer, SMP.QueueId) -> NonEmpty q -> Maybe q
findQ = find . sameQueue
{-# INLINE findQ #-}
removeQ :: SMPQueue q => (SMPServer, SMP.QueueId) -> NonEmpty q -> Maybe (q, [q])
removeQ = removeQP . sameQueue
{-# INLINE removeQ #-}
removeQP :: (q -> Bool) -> NonEmpty q -> Maybe (q, [q])
removeQP p qs = case L.break p qs of
(_, []) -> Nothing
(qs1, q : qs2) -> Just (q, qs1 <> qs2)
sndAddress :: RcvQueue -> (SMPServer, SMP.SenderId)
sndAddress RcvQueue {server, sndId} = (server, sndId)
{-# INLINE sndAddress #-}
findRQ :: (SMPServer, SMP.SenderId) -> NonEmpty RcvQueue -> Maybe RcvQueue
findRQ sAddr = find $ sameQAddress sAddr . sndAddress
{-# INLINE findRQ #-}
switchingRQ :: NonEmpty RcvQueue -> Maybe RcvQueue
switchingRQ = find $ isJust . rcvSwchStatus
{-# INLINE switchingRQ #-}
updatedQs :: SMPQueueRec q => q -> NonEmpty q -> NonEmpty q
updatedQs q = L.map $ \q' -> if dbQId q == dbQId q' then q else q'
{-# INLINE updatedQs #-}
class SMPQueue q => SMPQueueRec q where
qUserId :: q -> UserId
qConnId :: q -> ConnId
dbQId :: q -> Int64
dbReplaceQId :: q -> Maybe Int64
instance SMPQueueRec RcvQueue where
qUserId RcvQueue {userId} = userId
{-# INLINE qUserId #-}
qConnId RcvQueue {connId} = connId
{-# INLINE qConnId #-}
dbQId RcvQueue {dbQueueId = DBQueueId qId} = qId
{-# INLINE dbQId #-}
dbReplaceQId RcvQueue {dbReplaceQueueId} = dbReplaceQueueId
{-# INLINE dbReplaceQId #-}
instance SMPQueueRec SndQueue where
qUserId SndQueue {userId} = userId
{-# INLINE qUserId #-}
qConnId SndQueue {connId} = connId
{-# INLINE qConnId #-}
dbQId SndQueue {dbQueueId = DBQueueId qId} = qId
{-# INLINE dbQId #-}
dbReplaceQId SndQueue {dbReplaceQueueId} = dbReplaceQueueId
{-# INLINE dbReplaceQId #-}
-- * Connection types
-- | Type of a connection.
data ConnType = CNew | CRcv | CSnd | CDuplex | CContact deriving (Eq, Show)
data ConnType = CRcv | CSnd | CDuplex | CContact deriving (Eq, Show)
-- | Connection of a specific type.
--
@@ -248,41 +130,22 @@ data ConnType = CNew | CRcv | CSnd | CDuplex | CContact deriving (Eq, Show)
-- - DuplexConnection is a connection that has both receive and send queues set up,
-- typically created by upgrading a receive or a send connection with a missing queue.
data Connection (d :: ConnType) where
NewConnection :: ConnData -> Connection CNew
RcvConnection :: ConnData -> RcvQueue -> Connection CRcv
SndConnection :: ConnData -> SndQueue -> Connection CSnd
DuplexConnection :: ConnData -> NonEmpty RcvQueue -> NonEmpty SndQueue -> Connection CDuplex
DuplexConnection :: ConnData -> RcvQueue -> SndQueue -> Connection CDuplex
ContactConnection :: ConnData -> RcvQueue -> Connection CContact
deriving instance Eq (Connection d)
deriving instance Show (Connection d)
toConnData :: Connection d -> ConnData
toConnData = \case
NewConnection cData -> cData
RcvConnection cData _ -> cData
SndConnection cData _ -> cData
DuplexConnection cData _ _ -> cData
ContactConnection cData _ -> cData
updateConnection :: ConnData -> Connection d -> Connection d
updateConnection cData = \case
NewConnection _ -> NewConnection cData
RcvConnection _ rq -> RcvConnection cData rq
SndConnection _ sq -> SndConnection cData sq
DuplexConnection _ rqs sqs -> DuplexConnection cData rqs sqs
ContactConnection _ rq -> ContactConnection cData rq
data SConnType :: ConnType -> Type where
SCNew :: SConnType CNew
SCRcv :: SConnType CRcv
SCSnd :: SConnType CSnd
SCDuplex :: SConnType CDuplex
SCContact :: SConnType CContact
connType :: SConnType c -> ConnType
connType SCNew = CNew
connType SCRcv = CRcv
connType SCSnd = CSnd
connType SCDuplex = CDuplex
@@ -310,161 +173,9 @@ instance Eq SomeConn where
deriving instance Show SomeConn
data ConnData = ConnData
{ connId :: ConnId,
userId :: UserId,
connAgentVersion :: Version,
enableNtfs :: Bool,
duplexHandshake :: Maybe Bool, -- added in agent protocol v2
lastExternalSndId :: PrevExternalSndId,
deleted :: Bool,
ratchetSyncState :: RatchetSyncState
}
newtype ConnData = ConnData {connId :: ConnId}
deriving (Eq, Show)
-- this function should be mirrored in the clients
ratchetSyncAllowed :: ConnData -> Bool
ratchetSyncAllowed cData@ConnData {ratchetSyncState} =
ratchetSyncSupported' cData && (ratchetSyncState `elem` ([RSAllowed, RSRequired] :: [RatchetSyncState]))
ratchetSyncSupported' :: ConnData -> Bool
ratchetSyncSupported' ConnData {connAgentVersion} = connAgentVersion >= 3
messageRcptsSupported :: ConnData -> Bool
messageRcptsSupported ConnData {connAgentVersion} = connAgentVersion >= 4
-- this function should be mirrored in the clients
ratchetSyncSendProhibited :: ConnData -> Bool
ratchetSyncSendProhibited ConnData {ratchetSyncState} =
ratchetSyncState `elem` ([RSRequired, RSStarted, RSAgreed] :: [RatchetSyncState])
data PendingCommand = PendingCommand
{ cmdId :: AsyncCmdId,
corrId :: ACorrId,
userId :: UserId,
connId :: ConnId,
command :: AgentCommand
}
data AgentCmdType = ACClient | ACInternal
instance StrEncoding AgentCmdType where
strEncode = \case
ACClient -> "CLIENT"
ACInternal -> "INTERNAL"
strP =
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"CLIENT" -> pure ACClient
"INTERNAL" -> pure ACInternal
_ -> fail "bad AgentCmdType"
data AgentCommand
= AClientCommand (APartyCmd 'Client)
| AInternalCommand InternalCommand
instance StrEncoding AgentCommand where
strEncode = \case
AClientCommand (APC _ cmd) -> strEncode (ACClient, Str $ serializeCommand cmd)
AInternalCommand cmd -> strEncode (ACInternal, cmd)
strP =
strP_ >>= \case
ACClient -> AClientCommand <$> ((\(ACmd _ e cmd) -> checkParty $ APC e cmd) <$?> dbCommandP)
ACInternal -> AInternalCommand <$> strP
data AgentCommandTag
= AClientCommandTag (APartyCmdTag 'Client)
| AInternalCommandTag InternalCommandTag
deriving (Show)
instance StrEncoding AgentCommandTag where
strEncode = \case
AClientCommandTag t -> strEncode (ACClient, t)
AInternalCommandTag t -> strEncode (ACInternal, t)
strP =
strP_ >>= \case
ACClient -> AClientCommandTag <$> strP
ACInternal -> AInternalCommandTag <$> strP
data InternalCommand
= ICAck SMP.RecipientId MsgId
| ICAckDel SMP.RecipientId MsgId InternalId
| ICAllowSecure SMP.RecipientId SMP.SndPublicVerifyKey
| ICDuplexSecure SMP.RecipientId SMP.SndPublicVerifyKey
| ICDeleteConn
| ICDeleteRcvQueue SMP.RecipientId
| ICQSecure SMP.RecipientId SMP.SndPublicVerifyKey
| ICQDelete SMP.RecipientId
data InternalCommandTag
= ICAck_
| ICAckDel_
| ICAllowSecure_
| ICDuplexSecure_
| ICDeleteConn_
| ICDeleteRcvQueue_
| ICQSecure_
| ICQDelete_
deriving (Show)
instance StrEncoding InternalCommand where
strEncode = \case
ICAck rId srvMsgId -> strEncode (ICAck_, rId, srvMsgId)
ICAckDel rId srvMsgId mId -> strEncode (ICAckDel_, rId, srvMsgId, mId)
ICAllowSecure rId sndKey -> strEncode (ICAllowSecure_, rId, sndKey)
ICDuplexSecure rId sndKey -> strEncode (ICDuplexSecure_, rId, sndKey)
ICDeleteConn -> strEncode ICDeleteConn_
ICDeleteRcvQueue rId -> strEncode (ICDeleteRcvQueue_, rId)
ICQSecure rId senderKey -> strEncode (ICQSecure_, rId, senderKey)
ICQDelete rId -> strEncode (ICQDelete_, rId)
strP =
strP >>= \case
ICAck_ -> ICAck <$> _strP <*> _strP
ICAckDel_ -> ICAckDel <$> _strP <*> _strP <*> _strP
ICAllowSecure_ -> ICAllowSecure <$> _strP <*> _strP
ICDuplexSecure_ -> ICDuplexSecure <$> _strP <*> _strP
ICDeleteConn_ -> pure ICDeleteConn
ICDeleteRcvQueue_ -> ICDeleteRcvQueue <$> _strP
ICQSecure_ -> ICQSecure <$> _strP <*> _strP
ICQDelete_ -> ICQDelete <$> _strP
instance StrEncoding InternalCommandTag where
strEncode = \case
ICAck_ -> "ACK"
ICAckDel_ -> "ACK_DEL"
ICAllowSecure_ -> "ALLOW_SECURE"
ICDuplexSecure_ -> "DUPLEX_SECURE"
ICDeleteConn_ -> "DELETE_CONN"
ICDeleteRcvQueue_ -> "DELETE_RCV_QUEUE"
ICQSecure_ -> "QSECURE"
ICQDelete_ -> "QDELETE"
strP =
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
"ACK" -> pure ICAck_
"ACK_DEL" -> pure ICAckDel_
"ALLOW_SECURE" -> pure ICAllowSecure_
"DUPLEX_SECURE" -> pure ICDuplexSecure_
"DELETE_CONN" -> pure ICDeleteConn_
"DELETE_RCV_QUEUE" -> pure ICDeleteRcvQueue_
"QSECURE" -> pure ICQSecure_
"QDELETE" -> pure ICQDelete_
_ -> fail "bad InternalCommandTag"
agentCommandTag :: AgentCommand -> AgentCommandTag
agentCommandTag = \case
AClientCommand cmd -> AClientCommandTag $ aPartyCmdTag cmd
AInternalCommand cmd -> AInternalCommandTag $ internalCmdTag cmd
internalCmdTag :: InternalCommand -> InternalCommandTag
internalCmdTag = \case
ICAck {} -> ICAck_
ICAckDel {} -> ICAckDel_
ICAllowSecure {} -> ICAllowSecure_
ICDuplexSecure {} -> ICDuplexSecure_
ICDeleteConn -> ICDeleteConn_
ICDeleteRcvQueue {} -> ICDeleteRcvQueue_
ICQSecure {} -> ICQSecure_
ICQDelete _ -> ICQDelete_
-- * Confirmation types
data NewConfirmation = NewConfirmation
@@ -509,27 +220,15 @@ type PrevRcvMsgHash = MsgHash
-- | Corresponds to `last_snd_msg_hash` in `connections` table
type PrevSndMsgHash = MsgHash
-- * Message data containers
-- * Message data containers - used on Msg creation to reduce number of parameters
data RcvMsgData = RcvMsgData
{ msgMeta :: MsgMeta,
msgType :: AgentMessageType,
msgFlags :: MsgFlags,
msgBody :: MsgBody,
internalRcvId :: InternalRcvId,
internalHash :: MsgHash,
externalPrevSndHash :: MsgHash,
encryptedMsgHash :: MsgHash
}
data RcvMsg = RcvMsg
{ internalId :: InternalId,
msgMeta :: MsgMeta,
msgType :: AgentMessageType,
msgBody :: MsgBody,
internalHash :: MsgHash,
msgReceipt :: Maybe MsgReceipt, -- if this message is a delivery receipt
userAck :: Bool
externalPrevSndHash :: MsgHash
}
data SndMsgData = SndMsgData
@@ -537,27 +236,14 @@ data SndMsgData = SndMsgData
internalSndId :: InternalSndId,
internalTs :: InternalTs,
msgType :: AgentMessageType,
msgFlags :: MsgFlags,
msgBody :: MsgBody,
internalHash :: MsgHash,
prevMsgHash :: MsgHash
}
data SndMsg = SndMsg
{ internalId :: InternalId,
internalSndId :: InternalSndId,
msgType :: AgentMessageType,
internalHash :: MsgHash,
msgReceipt :: Maybe MsgReceipt
}
data PendingMsgData = PendingMsgData
{ msgId :: InternalId,
msgType :: AgentMessageType,
msgFlags :: MsgFlags,
msgBody :: MsgBody,
msgRetryState :: Maybe RI2State,
internalTs :: InternalTs
data PendingMsg = PendingMsg
{ connId :: ConnId,
msgId :: InternalId
}
deriving (Show)
@@ -592,14 +278,8 @@ data MsgBase = MsgBase
newtype InternalId = InternalId {unId :: Int64} deriving (Eq, Show)
instance StrEncoding InternalId where
strEncode = strEncode . unId
strP = InternalId <$> strP
type InternalTs = UTCTime
type AsyncCmdId = Int64
-- * Store errors
-- | Agent store error.
@@ -608,16 +288,10 @@ data StoreError
SEInternal ByteString
| -- | Failed to generate unique random ID
SEUniqueID
| -- | User ID not found
SEUserNotFound
| -- | Connection not found (or both queues absent).
SEConnNotFound
| -- | Server not found.
SEServerNotFound
| -- | Connection already used.
SEConnDuplicate
| -- | Confirmed snd queue already exists.
SESndQueueExists
| -- | Wrong connection type, e.g. "send" connection when "receive" or "duplex" is expected, or vice versa.
-- 'upgradeRcvConnToDuplex' and 'upgradeSndConnToDuplex' do not allow duplex connections - they would also return this error.
SEBadConnType ConnType
@@ -627,8 +301,6 @@ data StoreError
SEInvitationNotFound
| -- | Message not found
SEMsgNotFound
| -- | Command not found
SECmdNotFound
| -- | Currently not used. The intention was to pass current expected queue status in methods,
-- as we always know what it should be at any stage of the protocol,
-- and in case it does not match use this error.
@@ -637,14 +309,6 @@ data StoreError
SERatchetNotFound
| -- | connection does not have associated x3dh keys
SEX3dhKeysNotFound
| -- | Used to wrap agent errors inside store operations to avoid race conditions
SEAgentError AgentErrorType
| -- | XFTP Server not found.
SEXFTPServerNotFound
| -- | XFTP File not found.
SEFileNotFound
| -- | XFTP Deleted snd chunk replica not found.
SEDeletedSndChunkReplicaNotFound
| -- | Error when reading work item that suspends worker - do not use!
SEWorkItemError ByteString
| -- | Used in `getMsg` that is not implemented/used. TODO remove.
SENotImplemented
deriving (Eq, Show, Exception)
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Common
( SQLiteStore (..),
withConnection,
withConnection',
withTransaction,
withTransaction',
withTransactionCtx,
dbBusyLoop,
storeKey,
)
where
import Control.Concurrent (threadDelay)
import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes)
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
import Data.Time.Clock (diffUTCTime, getCurrentTime)
import Database.SQLite.Simple (SQLError)
import qualified Database.SQLite.Simple as SQL
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.DB as DB
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (diffToMilliseconds)
import UnliftIO.Exception (bracket)
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
import UnliftIO.STM
storeKey :: ScrubbedBytes -> Bool -> Maybe ScrubbedBytes
storeKey key keepKey = if keepKey || BA.null key then Just key else Nothing
data SQLiteStore = SQLiteStore
{ dbFilePath :: FilePath,
dbKey :: TVar (Maybe ScrubbedBytes),
dbConnection :: TMVar DB.Connection,
dbClosed :: TVar Bool,
dbNew :: Bool
}
withConnection :: SQLiteStore -> (DB.Connection -> IO a) -> IO a
withConnection SQLiteStore {dbConnection} =
bracket
(atomically $ takeTMVar dbConnection)
(atomically . putTMVar dbConnection)
withConnection' :: SQLiteStore -> (SQL.Connection -> IO a) -> IO a
withConnection' st action = withConnection st $ action . DB.conn
withTransaction :: SQLiteStore -> (DB.Connection -> IO a) -> IO a
withTransaction = withTransactionCtx Nothing
withTransaction' :: SQLiteStore -> (SQL.Connection -> IO a) -> IO a
withTransaction' st action = withTransaction st $ action . DB.conn
withTransactionCtx :: Maybe String -> SQLiteStore -> (DB.Connection -> IO a) -> IO a
withTransactionCtx ctx_ st action = withConnection st $ dbBusyLoop . transactionWithCtx
where
transactionWithCtx db@DB.Connection {conn} = case ctx_ of
Nothing -> SQL.withImmediateTransaction conn $ action db
Just ctx -> do
t1 <- getCurrentTime
r <- SQL.withImmediateTransaction conn $ action db
t2 <- getCurrentTime
putStrLn $ "withTransactionCtx start :: " <> show t1 <> " :: " <> ctx
putStrLn $ "withTransactionCtx end :: " <> show t2 <> " :: " <> ctx <> " :: duration=" <> show (diffToMilliseconds $ diffUTCTime t2 t1)
pure r
dbBusyLoop :: forall a. IO a -> IO a
dbBusyLoop action = loop 500 3000000
where
loop :: Int -> Int -> IO a
loop t tLim =
action `E.catch` \(e :: SQLError) ->
if tLim > t && SQL.sqlError e == SQL.ErrorBusy
then do
threadDelay t
loop (t * 9 `div` 8) (tLim - t)
else E.throwIO e
@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE StrictData #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.DB
( Connection (..),
SlowQueryStats (..),
open,
close,
execute,
execute_,
executeNamed,
executeMany,
query,
query_,
queryNamed,
)
where
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Monad (when)
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.Time (diffUTCTime, getCurrentTime)
import Database.SQLite.Simple (FromRow, NamedParam, Query, ToRow)
import qualified Database.SQLite.Simple as SQL
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON)
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (diffToMilliseconds)
data Connection = Connection
{ conn :: SQL.Connection,
slow :: TMap Query SlowQueryStats
}
data SlowQueryStats = SlowQueryStats
{ count :: Int64,
timeMax :: Int64,
timeAvg :: Int64
}
deriving (Show)
timeIt :: TMap Query SlowQueryStats -> Query -> IO a -> IO a
timeIt slow sql a = do
t <- getCurrentTime
r <- a
t' <- getCurrentTime
let diff = diffToMilliseconds $ diffUTCTime t' t
atomically $ when (diff > 5) $ TM.alter (updateQueryStats diff) sql slow
pure r
where
updateQueryStats :: Int64 -> Maybe SlowQueryStats -> Maybe SlowQueryStats
updateQueryStats diff Nothing = Just $ SlowQueryStats 1 diff diff
updateQueryStats diff (Just SlowQueryStats {count, timeMax, timeAvg}) =
Just $
SlowQueryStats
{ count = count + 1,
timeMax = max timeMax diff,
timeAvg = (timeAvg * count + diff) `div` (count + 1)
}
open :: String -> IO Connection
open f = do
conn <- SQL.open f
slow <- atomically $ TM.empty
pure Connection {conn, slow}
close :: Connection -> IO ()
close = SQL.close . conn
execute :: ToRow q => Connection -> Query -> q -> IO ()
execute Connection {conn, slow} sql = timeIt slow sql . SQL.execute conn sql
{-# INLINE execute #-}
execute_ :: Connection -> Query -> IO ()
execute_ Connection {conn, slow} sql = timeIt slow sql $ SQL.execute_ conn sql
{-# INLINE execute_ #-}
executeNamed :: Connection -> Query -> [NamedParam] -> IO ()
executeNamed Connection {conn, slow} sql = timeIt slow sql . SQL.executeNamed conn sql
{-# INLINE executeNamed #-}
executeMany :: ToRow q => Connection -> Query -> [q] -> IO ()
executeMany Connection {conn, slow} sql = timeIt slow sql . SQL.executeMany conn sql
{-# INLINE executeMany #-}
query :: (ToRow q, FromRow r) => Connection -> Query -> q -> IO [r]
query Connection {conn, slow} sql = timeIt slow sql . SQL.query conn sql
{-# INLINE query #-}
query_ :: FromRow r => Connection -> Query -> IO [r]
query_ Connection {conn, slow} sql = timeIt slow sql $ SQL.query_ conn sql
{-# INLINE query_ #-}
queryNamed :: FromRow r => Connection -> Query -> [NamedParam] -> IO [r]
queryNamed Connection {conn, slow} sql = timeIt slow sql . SQL.queryNamed conn sql
{-# INLINE queryNamed #-}
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''SlowQueryStats)
@@ -1,193 +1,76 @@
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedLists #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE StrictData #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations
( Migration (..),
MigrationsToRun (..),
MTRError (..),
DownMigration (..),
app,
initialize,
get,
run,
getCurrent,
mtrErrorDescription,
-- for unit tests
migrationsToRun,
toDownMigration,
)
where
import Control.Monad (forM_, when)
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
import Data.List (intercalate, sortOn)
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import qualified Data.Map as M
import Data.Maybe (isNothing, mapMaybe)
import Control.Monad (forM_)
import Data.Function (on)
import Data.List (intercalate, sortBy)
import Data.Text (Text)
import Data.Text.Encoding (decodeLatin1)
import Data.Time.Clock (getCurrentTime)
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Connection, Only (..), Query (..))
import qualified Database.SQLite.Simple as DB
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
import qualified Database.SQLite3 as SQLite3
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol (extraSMPServerHosts)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Common
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220101_initial
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220301_snd_queue_keys
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220322_notifications
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220608_v2
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220625_v2_ntf_mode
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220811_onion_hosts
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220817_connection_ntfs
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220905_commands
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220915_connection_queues
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230110_users
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230117_fkey_indexes
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230120_delete_errors
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230217_server_key_hash
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230223_files
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230320_retry_state
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230401_snd_files
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230510_files_pending_replicas_indexes
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230516_encrypted_rcv_message_hashes
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230531_switch_status
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230615_ratchet_sync
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230701_delivery_receipts
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230720_delete_expired_messages
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230722_indexes
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230814_indexes
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230829_crypto_files
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20231222_command_created_at
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20231225_failed_work_items
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (dropPrefix, sumTypeJSON)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220320_server_ips
data Migration = Migration {name :: String, up :: Text, down :: Maybe Text}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data Migration = Migration {name :: String, up :: Text}
deriving (Show)
schemaMigrations :: [(String, Query, Maybe Query)]
schemaMigrations :: [(String, Query)]
schemaMigrations =
[ ("20220101_initial", m20220101_initial, Nothing),
("20220301_snd_queue_keys", m20220301_snd_queue_keys, Nothing),
("20220322_notifications", m20220322_notifications, Nothing),
("20220607_v2", m20220608_v2, Nothing),
("m20220625_v2_ntf_mode", m20220625_v2_ntf_mode, Nothing),
("m20220811_onion_hosts", m20220811_onion_hosts, Nothing),
("m20220817_connection_ntfs", m20220817_connection_ntfs, Nothing),
("m20220905_commands", m20220905_commands, Nothing),
("m20220915_connection_queues", m20220915_connection_queues, Nothing),
("m20230110_users", m20230110_users, Nothing),
("m20230117_fkey_indexes", m20230117_fkey_indexes, Nothing),
("m20230120_delete_errors", m20230120_delete_errors, Nothing),
("m20230217_server_key_hash", m20230217_server_key_hash, Nothing),
("m20230223_files", m20230223_files, Just down_m20230223_files),
("m20230320_retry_state", m20230320_retry_state, Just down_m20230320_retry_state),
("m20230401_snd_files", m20230401_snd_files, Just down_m20230401_snd_files),
("m20230510_files_pending_replicas_indexes", m20230510_files_pending_replicas_indexes, Just down_m20230510_files_pending_replicas_indexes),
("m20230516_encrypted_rcv_message_hashes", m20230516_encrypted_rcv_message_hashes, Just down_m20230516_encrypted_rcv_message_hashes),
("m20230531_switch_status", m20230531_switch_status, Just down_m20230531_switch_status),
("m20230615_ratchet_sync", m20230615_ratchet_sync, Just down_m20230615_ratchet_sync),
("m20230701_delivery_receipts", m20230701_delivery_receipts, Just down_m20230701_delivery_receipts),
("m20230720_delete_expired_messages", m20230720_delete_expired_messages, Just down_m20230720_delete_expired_messages),
("m20230722_indexes", m20230722_indexes, Just down_m20230722_indexes),
("m20230814_indexes", m20230814_indexes, Just down_m20230814_indexes),
("m20230829_crypto_files", m20230829_crypto_files, Just down_m20230829_crypto_files),
("m20231222_command_created_at", m20231222_command_created_at, Just down_m20231222_command_created_at),
("m20231225_failed_work_items", m20231225_failed_work_items, Just down_m20231225_failed_work_items)
[ ("20220101_initial", m20220101_initial),
("20220301_snd_queue_keys", m20220301_snd_queue_keys),
("20220320_server_ips", m20220320_server_ips)
]
-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
app :: [Migration]
app = sortOn name $ map migration schemaMigrations
app = sortBy (compare `on` name) $ map migration schemaMigrations
where
migration (name, up, down) = Migration {name, up = fromQuery up, down = fromQuery <$> down}
migration (name, query) = Migration {name = name, up = fromQuery query}
get :: SQLiteStore -> [Migration] -> IO (Either MTRError MigrationsToRun)
get st migrations = migrationsToRun migrations <$> withTransaction' st getCurrent
get :: Connection -> [Migration] -> IO (Either String [Migration])
get conn migrations =
migrationsToRun migrations . map fromOnly
<$> DB.query_ conn "SELECT name FROM migrations ORDER BY name ASC;"
getCurrent :: Connection -> IO [Migration]
getCurrent db = map toMigration <$> DB.query_ db "SELECT name, down FROM migrations ORDER BY name ASC;"
run :: Connection -> [Migration] -> IO ()
run conn ms = DB.withImmediateTransaction conn . forM_ ms $
\Migration {name, up} -> insert name >> execSQL up
where
toMigration (name, down) = Migration {name, up = "", down}
insert name = DB.execute conn "INSERT INTO migrations (name, ts) VALUES (?, ?);" . (name,) =<< getCurrentTime
execSQL = SQLite3.exec $ DB.connectionHandle conn
run :: SQLiteStore -> MigrationsToRun -> IO ()
run st = \case
MTRUp [] -> pure ()
MTRUp ms -> mapM_ runUp ms >> withConnection' st (`execSQL` "VACUUM;")
MTRDown ms -> mapM_ runDown $ reverse ms
MTRNone -> pure ()
where
runUp Migration {name, up, down} = withTransaction' st $ \db -> do
when (name == "m20220811_onion_hosts") $ updateServers db
insert db >> execSQL db up
where
insert db = DB.execute db "INSERT INTO migrations (name, down, ts) VALUES (?,?,?)" . (name,down,) =<< getCurrentTime
updateServers db = forM_ (M.assocs extraSMPServerHosts) $ \(h, h') ->
let hs = decodeLatin1 . strEncode $ ([h, h'] :: NonEmpty TransportHost)
in DB.execute db "UPDATE servers SET host = ? WHERE host = ?" (hs, decodeLatin1 $ strEncode h)
runDown DownMigration {downName, downQuery} = withTransaction' st $ \db -> do
execSQL db downQuery
DB.execute db "DELETE FROM migrations WHERE name = ?" (Only downName)
execSQL db = SQLite3.exec $ DB.connectionHandle db
initialize :: Connection -> IO ()
initialize conn =
DB.execute_
conn
[sql|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS migrations (
name TEXT NOT NULL,
ts TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (name)
);
|]
initialize :: SQLiteStore -> IO ()
initialize st = withTransaction' st $ \db -> do
cs :: [Text] <- map fromOnly <$> DB.query_ db "SELECT name FROM pragma_table_info('migrations')"
case cs of
[] -> createMigrations db
_ -> when ("down" `notElem` cs) $ DB.execute_ db "ALTER TABLE migrations ADD COLUMN down TEXT"
where
createMigrations db =
DB.execute_
db
[sql|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS migrations (
name TEXT NOT NULL,
ts TEXT NOT NULL,
down TEXT,
PRIMARY KEY (name)
);
|]
data DownMigration = DownMigration {downName :: String, downQuery :: Text}
deriving (Eq, Show)
toDownMigration :: Migration -> Maybe DownMigration
toDownMigration Migration {name, down} = DownMigration name <$> down
data MigrationsToRun = MTRUp [Migration] | MTRDown [DownMigration] | MTRNone
deriving (Eq, Show)
data MTRError
= MTRENoDown {dbMigrations :: [String]}
| MTREDifferent {appMigration :: String, dbMigration :: String}
deriving (Eq, Show)
mtrErrorDescription :: MTRError -> String
mtrErrorDescription = \case
MTRENoDown ms -> "database version is newer than the app, but no down migration for: " <> intercalate ", " ms
MTREDifferent a d -> "different migration in the app/database: " <> a <> " / " <> d
migrationsToRun :: [Migration] -> [Migration] -> Either MTRError MigrationsToRun
migrationsToRun [] [] = Right MTRNone
migrationsToRun appMs [] = Right $ MTRUp appMs
migrationsToRun [] dbMs
| length dms == length dbMs = Right $ MTRDown dms
| otherwise = Left $ MTRENoDown $ mapMaybe nameNoDown dbMs
where
dms = mapMaybe toDownMigration dbMs
nameNoDown m = if isNothing (down m) then Just $ name m else Nothing
migrationsToRun :: [Migration] -> [String] -> Either String [Migration]
migrationsToRun appMs [] = Right appMs
migrationsToRun [] dbMs = Left $ "database version is newer than the app: " <> intercalate ", " dbMs
migrationsToRun (a : as) (d : ds)
| name a == name d = migrationsToRun as ds
| otherwise = Left $ MTREDifferent (name a) (name d)
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON $ dropPrefix "MTRE") ''MTRError)
| name a == d = migrationsToRun as ds
| otherwise = Left $ "different migration in the app/database: " <> name a <> " / " <> d
@@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ CREATE TABLE snd_messages (
CREATE TABLE conn_confirmations (
confirmation_id BLOB NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
conn_id BLOB NOT NULL REFERENCES connections ON DELETE CASCADE,
e2e_snd_pub_key BLOB NOT NULL,
sender_key BLOB NOT NULL,
e2e_snd_pub_key BLOB NOT NULL, -- TODO per-queue key. Split?
sender_key BLOB NOT NULL, -- TODO per-queue key. Split?
ratchet_state BLOB NOT NULL,
sender_conn_info BLOB NOT NULL,
accepted INTEGER NOT NULL,
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220320_server_ips where
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
m20220320_server_ips :: Query
m20220320_server_ips =
[sql|
UPDATE servers SET host = '178.79.168.175' WHERE host = 'smp8.simplex.im';
UPDATE servers SET host = '178.79.169.107' WHERE host = 'smp9.simplex.im';
UPDATE servers SET host = '45.33.54.229' WHERE host = 'smp10.simplex.im';
|]
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220322_notifications where
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
m20220322_notifications :: Query
m20220322_notifications =
[sql|
CREATE TABLE ntf_servers (
ntf_host TEXT NOT NULL,
ntf_port TEXT NOT NULL,
ntf_key_hash BLOB NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
PRIMARY KEY (ntf_host, ntf_port)
) WITHOUT ROWID;
CREATE TABLE ntf_tokens (
provider TEXT NOT NULL, -- apns
device_token TEXT NOT NULL, -- ! this field is mislabeled and is actually saved as binary
ntf_host TEXT NOT NULL,
ntf_port TEXT NOT NULL,
tkn_id BLOB, -- token ID assigned by notifications server
tkn_pub_key BLOB NOT NULL, -- client's public key to verify token commands (used by server, for repeat registraions)
tkn_priv_key BLOB NOT NULL, -- client's private key to sign token commands
tkn_pub_dh_key BLOB NOT NULL, -- client's public DH key (for repeat registraions)
tkn_priv_dh_key BLOB NOT NULL, -- client's private DH key (for repeat registraions)
tkn_dh_secret BLOB, -- DH secret for e2e encryption of notifications
tkn_status TEXT NOT NULL,
tkn_action BLOB,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')), -- this is to check token status periodically to know when it was last checked
PRIMARY KEY (provider, device_token, ntf_host, ntf_port),
FOREIGN KEY (ntf_host, ntf_port) REFERENCES ntf_servers
ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE
) WITHOUT ROWID;
|]
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220608_v2 where
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
m20220608_v2 :: Query
m20220608_v2 =
[sql|
ALTER TABLE messages ADD COLUMN msg_flags TEXT NULL;
ALTER TABLE conn_confirmations ADD COLUMN smp_reply_queues BLOB NULL;
ALTER TABLE connections ADD COLUMN duplex_handshake INTEGER NULL DEFAULT 0;
ALTER TABLE rcv_messages ADD COLUMN user_ack INTEGER NULL DEFAULT 0;
ALTER TABLE rcv_queues ADD COLUMN ntf_public_key BLOB;
ALTER TABLE rcv_queues ADD COLUMN ntf_private_key BLOB;
ALTER TABLE rcv_queues ADD COLUMN ntf_id BLOB;
ALTER TABLE rcv_queues ADD COLUMN rcv_ntf_dh_secret BLOB;
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_rcv_queues_ntf ON rcv_queues (host, port, ntf_id);
CREATE TABLE ntf_subscriptions (
conn_id BLOB NOT NULL,
smp_host TEXT NULL,
smp_port TEXT NULL,
smp_ntf_id BLOB,
ntf_host TEXT NOT NULL,
ntf_port TEXT NOT NULL,
ntf_sub_id BLOB,
ntf_sub_status TEXT NOT NULL, -- see NtfAgentSubStatus
ntf_sub_action TEXT, -- if there is an action required on this subscription: NtfSubNTFAction
ntf_sub_smp_action TEXT, -- action with SMP server: NtfSubSMPAction; only one of this and ntf_sub_action can (should) be not null in same record
ntf_sub_action_ts TEXT, -- the earliest time for the action, e.g. checks can be scheduled every X hours
updated_by_supervisor INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, -- to be checked on updates by workers to not overwrite supervisor command (state still should be updated)
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
PRIMARY KEY (conn_id),
FOREIGN KEY (smp_host, smp_port) REFERENCES servers (host, port)
ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
FOREIGN KEY (ntf_host, ntf_port) REFERENCES ntf_servers
ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE
) WITHOUT ROWID;
|]
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220625_v2_ntf_mode where
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
m20220625_v2_ntf_mode :: Query
m20220625_v2_ntf_mode =
[sql|
ALTER TABLE ntf_tokens ADD COLUMN ntf_mode TEXT NULL;
DELETE FROM ntf_tokens;
|]
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220811_onion_hosts where
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
m20220811_onion_hosts :: Query
m20220811_onion_hosts =
[sql|
ALTER TABLE conn_confirmations ADD COLUMN smp_client_version INTEGER;
UPDATE ntf_servers
SET ntf_host = 'ntf2.simplex.im,ntg7jdjy2i3qbib3sykiho3enekwiaqg3icctliqhtqcg6jmoh6cxiad.onion'
WHERE ntf_host = 'ntf2.simplex.im';
|]
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220817_connection_ntfs where
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
m20220817_connection_ntfs :: Query
m20220817_connection_ntfs =
[sql|
ALTER TABLE connections ADD COLUMN enable_ntfs INTEGER;
|]

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