6.5.2.0

The per-(srvHost, provider) worker shards added in #1779 still funnel
all APNS sends through one HTTP2Client's reqQ, where a single process
thread calls sendRequest serially - one in-flight HTTP/2 stream at a
time, capping APNS throughput at 1/RTT.

sendRequestDirect bypasses the queue and invokes sendReq directly from
the calling worker, so concurrent workers open parallel HTTP/2 streams
on the shared APNS connection and the multiplexing happens on the wire.

.github/workflows/build.yml

@@ -58,11 +58,11 @@ jobs:
 # =============================
 
   build:
-    name: "ubuntu-${{ matrix.os }}, GHC: ${{ matrix.ghc }}"
+    name: "ubuntu-${{ matrix.os }}-${{ matrix.arch }}, GHC: ${{ matrix.ghc }}"
     needs: maybe-release
     env:
       apps: "smp-server xftp-server ntf-server xftp"
-    runs-on: ubuntu-${{ matrix.os }}
+    runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }}
     services:
       postgres:
         image: postgres:15
@@ -81,16 +81,34 @@ jobs:
       matrix:
         include:
           - os: 22.04
+            os_underscore: 22_04
+            arch: x86-64
+            runner: "ubuntu-22.04"
             ghc: "8.10.7"
-            platform_name: 22_04-8.10.7
             should_run: ${{ !(github.ref == 'refs/heads/stable' || startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')) }}
           - os: 22.04
+            os_underscore: 22_04
+            arch: x86-64
+            runner: "ubuntu-22.04"
             ghc: "9.6.3"
-            platform_name: 22_04-x86-64
             should_run: true
           - os: 24.04
+            os_underscore: 24_04
+            arch: x86-64
+            runner: "ubuntu-24.04"
+            ghc: "9.6.3"
+            should_run: true
+          - os: 22.04
+            os_underscore: 22_04
+            arch: aarch64
+            runner: "ubuntu-22.04-arm"
+            ghc: "9.6.3"
+            should_run: true
+          - os: 24.04
+            os_underscore: 24_04
+            arch: aarch64
+            runner: "ubuntu-24.04-arm"
             ghc: "9.6.3"
-            platform_name: 24_04-x86-64
             should_run: true
     steps:
       - name: Clone project
@@ -127,11 +145,7 @@ jobs:
           context: .
           load: true
           file: Dockerfile.build
-          tags: build/${{ matrix.platform_name }}:latest
-          cache-from: |
-            type=gha
-            type=gha,scope=master
-          cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
+          tags: build/${{ matrix.os }}:latest
           build-args: |
             TAG=${{ matrix.os }}
             GHC=${{ matrix.ghc }}
@@ -143,32 +157,37 @@ jobs:
           path: |
             ~/.cabal/store
             dist-newstyle
-          key: ${{ matrix.os }}-${{ hashFiles('cabal.project', 'simplexmq.cabal') }}
+          key: ubuntu-${{ matrix.os }}-${{ matrix.arch }}-ghc${{ matrix.ghc }}-${{ hashFiles('cabal.project', 'simplexmq.cabal') }}
 
       - name: Start container
         if: matrix.should_run == true
         shell: bash
         run: |
           docker run -t -d \
+            --device /dev/fuse \
+            --cap-add SYS_ADMIN \
+            --security-opt apparmor:unconfined \
             --name builder \
             -v ~/.cabal:/root/.cabal \
             -v /home/runner/work/_temp:/home/runner/work/_temp \
             -v ${{ github.workspace }}:/project \
-            build/${{ matrix.platform_name }}:latest
+            build/${{ matrix.os }}:latest
 
-      - name: Build smp-server (postgresql) and tests
+      - name: Build smp-server, xftp-server (postgresql) and tests
         if: matrix.should_run == true
         shell: docker exec -t builder sh -eu {0}
         run: |
+          chmod -fR 777 ~/.cabal ./dist-newstyle || :; git config --global --add safe.directory '*'
+          cabal clean
           cabal update
           cabal build --jobs=$(nproc) --enable-tests -fserver_postgres
           mkdir -p /out
-          for i in smp-server simplexmq-test; do
+          for i in smp-server xftp-server simplexmq-test; do
             bin=$(find /project/dist-newstyle -name "$i" -type f -executable)
             chmod +x "$bin"
             mv "$bin" /out/
           done
-          strip /out/smp-server
+          strip /out/smp-server /out/xftp-server
 
       - name: Copy simplexmq-test from container
         if: matrix.should_run == true
@@ -176,19 +195,29 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           docker cp builder:/out/simplexmq-test .
 
-      - name: Copy smp-server (postgresql) from container and prepare it
+      - name: Copy smp-server, xftp-server (postgresql) from container and prepare it
         if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && matrix.should_run == true
         id: prepare-postgres
         shell: bash
         run: |
-          name="smp-server-postgres-ubuntu-${{ matrix.platform_name }}"
-          docker cp builder:/out/smp-server $name
+          printf 'bins<<EOF\n' > bins.output
+          printf 'hashes<<EOF\n' > hashes.output
 
-          path="${{ github.workspace }}/$name"
-          echo "bin=$path" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          for i in smp-server xftp-server; do
+            name="${i}-postgres-ubuntu-${{ matrix.os_underscore }}-${{ matrix.arch }}"
+            docker cp builder:/out/$i $name
 
-          hash="SHA2-256($name)= $(openssl sha256 $path | cut -d' ' -f 2)"
-          printf 'hash=%s' "$hash" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+            path="${{ github.workspace }}/$name"
+            hash="SHA2-256($name)= $(openssl sha256 $path | cut -d' ' -f 2)"
+
+            printf '%s\n' "$path" >> bins.output
+            printf '%s\n\n' "$hash" >> hashes.output
+          done
+          printf 'EOF\n' >> bins.output
+          printf 'EOF\n' >> hashes.output
+
+          cat bins.output >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          cat hashes.output >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
 
       - name: Build everything else (standard)
         if: matrix.should_run == true
@@ -213,9 +242,9 @@ jobs:
           printf 'bins<<EOF\n' > bins.output
           printf 'hashes<<EOF\n' > hashes.output
           for i in ${{ env.apps }}; do
-            mv ./out/$i ./$i-ubuntu-${{ matrix.platform_name }}
+            name="$i-ubuntu-${{ matrix.os_underscore }}-${{ matrix.arch }}"
 
-            name="$i-ubuntu-${{ matrix.platform_name }}"
+            mv ./out/$i ./$name
 
             path="${{ github.workspace }}/$name"
             hash="SHA2-256($name)= $(openssl sha256 $path | cut -d' ' -f 2)"
@@ -238,15 +267,15 @@ jobs:
           fail_on_unmatched_files: true
           body: |
             ${{ steps.prepare-regular.outputs.hashes }}
-            ${{ steps.prepare-postgres.outputs.hash }}
+            ${{ steps.prepare-postgres.outputs.hashes }}
           files: |
             ${{ steps.prepare-regular.outputs.bins }}
-            ${{ steps.prepare-postgres.outputs.bin }}
+            ${{ steps.prepare-postgres.outputs.bins }}
         env:
           GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
 
       - name: Test
-        if: matrix.should_run == true
+        if: matrix.should_run == true && matrix.arch == 'x86-64'
         timeout-minutes: 120
         shell: bash
         env:

.github/workflows/docker-image.yml

@@ -39,9 +39,17 @@ jobs:
             type=semver,pattern=v{{major}}.{{minor}}
             type=semver,pattern=v{{major}}
 
+      - name: Set up QEMU
+        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3
+
+      - name: Set up Docker Buildx
+        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
+
       - name: Build and push Docker image
         uses: simplex-chat/docker-build-push-action@v6
         with:
+          context: .
+          platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64
           push: true
           build-args: |
             APP=${{ matrix.app }}

.github/workflows/reproduce-schedule.yml

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Execute reproduce script
         run: |
-          ${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/scripts/reproduce-builds.sh "$TAG"
+          ${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/scripts/simplexmq-reproduce-builds.sh "$TAG" || :
 
       - name: Check if build has been reproduced
         env:
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ jobs:
           user: ${{ secrets.STATUS_SIMPLEX_WEBHOOK_USER }}
           pass: ${{ secrets.STATUS_SIMPLEX_WEBHOOK_PASS }}
         run: |
-          if [ -f "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/$TAG/_sha256sums" ]; then
+          if [ -f "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/${TAG}-simplexmq/_sha256sums" ]; then
             exit 0
           else
             curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf \

.gitignore

@@ -11,3 +11,4 @@ cabal.project.local~
 .hpc/
 *.tix
 .coverage
+

2026-02-04-xftp-web-persistent-connections.md

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# XFTPClientAgent Pattern
+
+## TOC
+1. Executive Summary
+2. Changes: client.ts
+3. Changes: agent.ts
+4. Changes: test/browser.test.ts
+5. Verification
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+Add `XFTPClientAgent` — a per-server connection pool matching the Haskell pattern. The agent caches `XFTPClient` instances by server URL. All orchestration functions (`uploadFile`, `downloadFile`, `deleteFile`) take `agent` as first parameter and use `getXFTPServerClient(agent, server)` instead of calling `connectXFTP` directly. Connections stay open on success; the caller creates and closes the agent.
+
+`connectXFTP` and `closeXFTP` stay exported (used by `XFTPWebTests.hs` Haskell tests). The `browserClients` hack, per-function `connections: Map`, and `getOrConnect` are deleted.
+
+## Changes: client.ts
+
+**Add** after types section: `XFTPClientAgent` interface, `newXFTPAgent`, `getXFTPServerClient`, `closeXFTPServerClient`, `closeXFTPAgent`.
+
+**Delete**: `browserClients` Map and all `isNode` browser-cache checks in `connectXFTP` and `closeXFTP`.
+
+**Revert `closeXFTP`** to unconditional `c.transport.close()` (browser transport.close() is already a no-op).
+
+`connectXFTP` stays exported (backward compat) but becomes a raw low-level function — no caching.
+
+## Changes: agent.ts
+
+**Imports**: replace `connectXFTP`/`closeXFTP` with `getXFTPServerClient`/`closeXFTPAgent` etc.
+
+**Re-export** from agent.ts: `newXFTPAgent`, `closeXFTPAgent`, `XFTPClientAgent`.
+
+**`uploadFile`**: add `agent: XFTPClientAgent` as first param. Replace `connectXFTP` → `getXFTPServerClient`. Remove `finally { closeXFTP }`. Pass `agent` to `uploadRedirectDescription`.
+
+**`uploadRedirectDescription`**: change from `(client, server, innerFd)` to `(agent, server, innerFd)`. Get client via `getXFTPServerClient`.
+
+**`downloadFile`**: add `agent` param. Delete local `connections: Map`. Replace `getOrConnect` → `getXFTPServerClient`. Remove finally cleanup. Pass `agent` to `downloadWithRedirect`.
+
+**`downloadWithRedirect`**: add `agent` param. Same replacements. Remove try/catch cleanup. Recursive call passes `agent`.
+
+**`deleteFile`**: add `agent` param. Same pattern.
+
+**Delete**: `getOrConnect` function entirely.
+
+## Changes: test/browser.test.ts
+
+Create agent before operations, pass to upload/download, close in finally.
+
+## Verification
+
+1. `npx vitest --run` — browser round-trip test passes
+2. No remaining `browserClients`, `getOrConnect`, or per-function `connections: Map` locals
+3. `connectXFTP` and `closeXFTP` still exported (XFTPWebTests.hs compat)
+4. All orchestration functions take `agent` as first param

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,3 +1,97 @@
+# 6.5.1
+
+Version 6.5.1.0
+
+XFTP client:
+- backwards compatible file header decoding.
+
+# 6.5.0
+
+Version 6.5.0.17
+
+SMP agent:
+- improve subscriptions
+  - reduce memory usage and retries during initial subscription (#1758)
+  - fix race resulting in pending subscriptions never subscribed (#1756)
+  - batch processing of subscription results and errors (#1652)
+  - reduce memory usage of active subscriptions.
+- drop message after N reception attempts (#1762)
+- fix possible deadlocks of queue overloading when processing messages (#1713)
+- improved APIs for short link management and creation.
+- support multiple link owners in link data (#1701)
+
+SMP server:
+- store messages in PostgreSQL (#1622).
+- reduce memory usage with PostgreSQL database - do not use queue cache (#1637)
+- fix in-memory server not restoring queue/service associations after 2+ restarts (#1618)
+
+XFTP server:
+- support PostgreSQL database.
+- add server page.
+- support uploads from web clients.
+
+Servers:
+- better socket leak prevention during TLS handshake, NetworkError type to bette diagnose connection errors (#1619)
+- use "=" as default INI key-value separator (#1767)
+
+# 6.4.4
+
+Servers:
+- fix server pages when source code is not specified.
+- include commit SHA in printed version and in web page (#1608).
+
+SMP server:
+- support short SimpleX addresses in server information page (#1600).
+- wrap all queries in transactions (#1603).
+
+SMP agent:
+- chat relay address type for short links (#1602).
+- extend xrcp certificate validity 1 hour in the past, to allow out of sync clocks (#1601).
+
+# 6.4.3
+
+SMP agent:
+- fix some connection errors by updating contact request server hosts to match server in short link (#1597).
+
+SMP server:
+- support short link URI as queue identifier in control port commands (#1596).
+
+# 6.4.2
+
+SMP server:
+- fix memory leak when connection interrupts straight after client connects.
+- do not include repeated queue blocking into stats/quota.
+
+XFTP server:
+- prometheus metrics
+
+# 6.4.1
+
+SMP protocol:
+- create notification credentials via NEW command that creates the queue (#1586)
+
+SMP server:
+- control port session improvements (#1591)
+- additional stat counter for ntf credentials created together with the queue (#1589)
+
+# 6.4.0
+
+SMP protocol (server/client):
+- support associated queue data and short connection links (see [RFC](./rfcs/2025-03-16-smp-queues.md)).
+- service certificates to optimize subscriptions.
+
+SMP agent:
+- support retries for interactive connection handshakes.
+- use web port 443 by default for preset servers.
+- use static RNG function to avoid creating dynamic C stubs when generating sntrup keys (it was detected as Dynamic Code Loading in GrapheneOS).
+- different timeouts for interactive and background operations.
+
+Ntf server:
+- PostgreSQL storage.
+- Prometheus metrics.
+- use service certificates.
+- fix repeat token registration.
+
 # 6.3.2
 
 Servers:
@@ -18,7 +112,7 @@ Servers:
 - update script (simplex-servers-update) downloads scripts from the specified or the latest stable tag.
 
 SMP server:
-- support for PostrgreSQL database for queue records for higher traffic servers.
+- support for PostgreSQL database for queue records for higher traffic servers.
 - fix old clients sending messages to new servers (#1443)
 - remove empty journals when opening message queues and expiring idle queues (#1456, #1458).
 - additional start options (#1465):
@@ -74,7 +168,7 @@ Servers: more reliable restoring of state.
 
 SMP server: reduced memory usage and faster start.
 
-Notifications: compensate for iOS notifications being droppted by Apple while device is offline (#1378):
+Notifications: compensate for iOS notifications being dropped by Apple while device is offline (#1378):
 - Ntf server: send multiple SMP notifications in one iOS notification.
 - Agent: get multiple messages for one iOS notification.
 

README.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # SimpleXMQ
 
-[![GitHub build](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/workflows/build/badge.svg)](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/actions?query=workflow%3Abuild)
+[![GitHub build](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/actions/workflows/build.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/actions/workflows/build.yml)
 [![GitHub release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/simplex-chat/simplexmq)](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/releases)
 
 📢 SimpleXMQ v1 is released - with many security, privacy and efficiency improvements, new functionality - see [release notes](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/releases/tag/v1.0.0).
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ To initialize the server use `smp-server init -n <fqdn>` (or `smp-server init --
 
 SMP server uses in-memory persistence with an optional append-only log of created queues that allows to re-start the server without losing the connections. This log is compacted on every server restart, permanently removing suspended and removed queues.
 
-To enable store log, initialize server using `smp-server -l` command, or modify `smp-server.ini` created during initialization (uncomment `enable: on` option in the store log section). Use `smp-server --help` for other usage tips.
+To enable store log, initialize server using `smp-server -l` command, or modify `smp-server.ini` created during initialization (uncomment `enable = on` option in the store log section). Use `smp-server --help` for other usage tips.
 
 Starting from version 2.3.0, when store log is enabled, the server would also enable saving undelivered messages on exit and restoring them on start. This can be disabled via a separate setting `restore_messages` in `smp-server.ini` file. Saving messages would only work if the server is stopped with SIGINT signal (keyboard interrupt), if it is stopped with SIGTERM signal the messages would not be saved.
 
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ On Linux, you can deploy smp and xftp server using Docker. This will download im
 2. Run your Docker container.
 
    - `smp-server`
-   
+
      You must change **your_ip_or_domain**. `-e "pass=password"` is optional variable to password-protect your `smp` server:
      ```sh
      docker run -d \
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ On Linux, you can deploy smp and xftp server using Docker. This will download im
      ```
 
    - `xftp-server`
-   
+
      You must change **your_ip_or_domain** and **maximum_storage**.
      ```sh
      docker run -d \
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ On Linux, you can build smp server using Docker.
 3. Run your Docker container.
 
    - `smp-server`
-   
+
      You must change **your_ip_or_domain**. `-e "pass=password"` is optional variable to password-protect your `smp` server:
      ```sh
      docker run -d \
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ On Linux, you can build smp server using Docker.
      ```
 
    - `xftp-server`
-   
+
      You must change **your_ip_or_domain** and **maximum_storage**.
      ```sh
      docker run -d \
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ On Linux, you can build smp server using Docker.
 
    `xftp-server`
    ```sh
-   cabal list-bin exe:xftp-server 
+   cabal list-bin exe:xftp-server
    ```
 
 - Initialize SMP server with `smp-server init [-l] -n <fqdn>` or `smp-server init [-l] --ip <ip>` - depending on how you initialize it, either FQDN or IP will be used for server's address.

apps/common/Web/Embedded.hs

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
+
+module Web.Embedded where
+
+import Data.FileEmbed (embedDir, embedFile)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Web (EmbeddedContent (..))
+
+embeddedContent :: EmbeddedContent
+embeddedContent =
+  EmbeddedContent
+    { indexHtml = $(embedFile "apps/common/Web/static/index.html"),
+      linkHtml = $(embedFile "apps/common/Web/static/link.html"),
+      mediaContent = $(embedDir "apps/common/Web/static/media/"),
+      wellKnown = $(embedDir "apps/common/Web/static/.well-known/")
+    }

apps/common/Web/static/index.html

@@ -105,6 +105,13 @@
                     class="text-[16px] leading-[26px] tracking-[0.01em] nav-link-text text-black dark:text-white before:bg-black dark:before:bg-white">Server
                     information</span></a>
               </li>
+              <!-- <x-xftpConfig>
+              <li class="nav-link relative"><a href="/file"
+                  class="flex items-center justify-between gap-2 lg:py-5 whitespace-nowrap"><span
+                    class="text-[16px] leading-[26px] tracking-[0.01em] nav-link-text text-black dark:text-white before:bg-black dark:before:bg-white">File
+                    transfer</span></a>
+              </li>
+              </x-xftpConfig> -->
             </ul><a target="_blank" href="https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#help-us-with-donations"
               class="whitespace-nowrap flex items-center gap-1 self-center text-white dark:text-black text-[16px] font-medium tracking-[0.02em] rounded-[34px] bg-primary-light dark:bg-primary-dark py-3 lg:py-2 px-20 lg:px-5 mb-16 lg:mb-0">Donate</a>
           </div>
@@ -223,11 +230,14 @@
             <table id="public-info">
               <tr class="text-grey-black dark:text-white text-base">
                 <td>Server version:</td>
-                <td>${version}</td>
+                <td>${version}<x-commit> / <a href="${commitSourceCode}/commit/${commit}" target="_blank">${shortCommit}</a></x-commit></td>
               </tr>
               <tr class="text-grey-black dark:text-white text-base">
                 <td>Source code:</td>
-                <td><a href="${sourceCode}" target="_blank">${sourceCode}</a></td>
+                <td>
+                  <x-sourceCode><a href="${sourceCode}" target="_blank">${sourceCode}</a></x-sourceCode>
+                  <x-noSourceCode>add to ${iniFileName} (required by <a href="https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/LICENSE" target="_blank">AGPLv3</a>)</x-noSourceCode>
+                </td>
               </tr>
               <x-website>
                 <tr class="text-grey-black dark:text-white text-base">
@@ -314,6 +324,7 @@
             <h2 class="text-[30px] mb-[20px] leading-[28px] text-[#606C71] dark:text-white font-bold max-w-[475px]">
               Configuration</h2>
             <table id="config">
+              <x-smpConfig>
               <tr class="text-grey-black dark:text-white text-base">
                 <td>Persistence:</td>
                 <td>${persistence}</td>
@@ -334,6 +345,25 @@
                 <td>Basic auth enabled:</td>
                 <td>${basicAuthEnabled}</td>
               </tr>
+              </x-smpConfig>
+              <x-xftpConfig>
+              <tr class="text-grey-black dark:text-white text-base">
+                <td>File expiration:</td>
+                <td>${fileExpiration}</td>
+              </tr>
+              <tr class="text-grey-black dark:text-white text-base">
+                <td>Stats enabled:</td>
+                <td>${statsEnabled}</td>
+              </tr>
+              <tr class="text-grey-black dark:text-white text-base">
+                <td>New uploads allowed:</td>
+                <td>${newUploadsAllowed}</td>
+              </tr>
+              <tr class="text-grey-black dark:text-white text-base">
+                <td>Basic auth enabled:</td>
+                <td>${basicAuthEnabled}</td>
+              </tr>
+              </x-xftpConfig>
             </table>
           </div>
         </div>

apps/common/Web/static/link.html

@@ -512,6 +512,8 @@
         element.innerHTML = 'This is a one-time link of the SimpleX network user'
       } else if (url.includes('/c')) {
         element.innerHTML = 'This is a public channel address on SimpleX network'
+      } else if (url.includes('/r')) {
+        element.innerHTML = 'This is a chat relay address on SimpleX network'
       }
     }
   </script>

apps/smp-server/Main.hs

@@ -2,8 +2,9 @@ module Main where
 
 import Control.Logger.Simple
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI (getEnvPath)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main
-import qualified Static
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main (smpServerCLI_)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Web (serveStaticFiles, attachStaticFiles)
+import SMPWeb (smpGenerateSite)
 
 defaultCfgPath :: FilePath
 defaultCfgPath = "/etc/opt/simplex"
@@ -16,7 +17,6 @@ logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
 
 main :: IO ()
 main = do
-  setLogLevel LogDebug
   cfgPath <- getEnvPath "SMP_SERVER_CFG_PATH" defaultCfgPath
   logPath <- getEnvPath "SMP_SERVER_LOG_PATH" defaultLogPath
-  withGlobalLogging logCfg $ smpServerCLI_ Static.generateSite Static.serveStaticFiles Static.attachStaticFiles cfgPath logPath
+  withGlobalLogging logCfg $ smpServerCLI_ smpGenerateSite serveStaticFiles attachStaticFiles cfgPath logPath

apps/smp-server/SMPWeb.hs

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
+
+module SMPWeb
+  ( smpGenerateSite,
+    serverInformation,
+  ) where
+
+import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
+import Data.String (fromString)
+import Web.Embedded (embeddedContent)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String (strEncode)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Information
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main (simplexmqSource)
+import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Server.Web as Web
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Web (render, serverInfoSubsts, timedTTLText)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
+
+smpGenerateSite :: ServerInformation -> Maybe TransportHost -> FilePath -> IO ()
+smpGenerateSite si onionHost path =
+  Web.generateSite embeddedContent (serverInformation si onionHost) smpLinkPages path
+
+smpLinkPages :: [String]
+smpLinkPages = ["contact", "invitation", "a", "c", "g", "r", "i"]
+
+serverInformation :: ServerInformation -> Maybe TransportHost -> ByteString
+serverInformation ServerInformation {config, information} onionHost = render (Web.indexHtml embeddedContent) substs
+  where
+    substs = [("smpConfig", Just "y"), ("xftpConfig", Nothing)] <> substConfig <> serverInfoSubsts simplexmqSource information <> [("onionHost", strEncode <$> onionHost), ("iniFileName", Just "smp-server.ini")]
+    substConfig =
+      [ ( "persistence",
+          Just $ case persistence config of
+            SPMMemoryOnly -> "In-memory only"
+            SPMQueues -> "Queues"
+            SPMMessages -> "Queues and messages"
+        ),
+        ("messageExpiration", Just $ maybe "Never" (fromString . timedTTLText) $ messageExpiration config),
+        ("statsEnabled", Just . yesNo $ statsEnabled config),
+        ("newQueuesAllowed", Just . yesNo $ newQueuesAllowed config),
+        ("basicAuthEnabled", Just . yesNo $ basicAuthEnabled config)
+      ]
+    yesNo True = "Yes"
+    yesNo False = "No"

apps/smp-server/static/a/index.html

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-../link.html

apps/smp-server/static/c/index.html

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-../link.html

apps/smp-server/static/contact/index.html

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-../link.html

apps/smp-server/static/i/index.html

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-../link.html

apps/smp-server/static/invitation/index.html

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-../link.html

apps/smp-server/web/Static.hs

@@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
-{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
-{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
-{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
-
-module Static where
-
-import Control.Logger.Simple
-import Control.Monad
-import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
-import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
-import Data.Char (toUpper)
-import Data.IORef (readIORef)
-import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
-import Data.String (fromString)
-import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
-import Network.Socket (getPeerName)
-import Network.Wai (Application, Request (..))
-import Network.Wai.Application.Static (StaticSettings (..))
-import qualified Network.Wai.Application.Static as S
-import qualified Network.Wai.Handler.Warp as W
-import qualified Network.Wai.Handler.Warp.Internal as WI
-import qualified Network.Wai.Handler.WarpTLS as WT
-import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String (strEncode)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Server (AttachHTTP)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Information
-import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main (EmbeddedWebParams (..), WebHttpsParams (..))
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (simplexMQVersion)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
-import Simplex.Messaging.Util (tshow)
-import Static.Embedded as E
-import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing)
-import System.FilePath
-import UnliftIO.Concurrent (forkFinally)
-import UnliftIO.Exception (bracket, finally)
-import qualified WaiAppStatic.Types as WAT
-
-serveStaticFiles :: EmbeddedWebParams -> IO ()
-serveStaticFiles EmbeddedWebParams {webStaticPath, webHttpPort, webHttpsParams} = do
-  forM_ webHttpPort $ \port -> flip forkFinally (\e -> logError $ "HTTP server crashed: " <> tshow e) $ do
-    logInfo $ "Serving static site on port " <> tshow port
-    W.runSettings (mkSettings port) app
-  forM_ webHttpsParams $ \WebHttpsParams {port, cert, key} -> flip forkFinally (\e -> logError $ "HTTPS server crashed: " <> tshow e) $ do
-    logInfo $ "Serving static site on port " <> tshow port <> " (TLS)"
-    WT.runTLS (WT.tlsSettings cert key) (mkSettings port) app
-  where
-    app = staticFiles webStaticPath
-    mkSettings port = W.setPort port warpSettings
-
--- | Prepare context and prepare HTTP handler for TLS connections that already passed TLS.handshake and ALPN check.
-attachStaticFiles :: FilePath -> (AttachHTTP -> IO ()) -> IO ()
-attachStaticFiles path action =
-  -- Initialize global internal state for http server.
-  WI.withII warpSettings $ \ii -> do
-    action $ \socket cxt -> do
-      -- Initialize internal per-connection resources.
-      addr <- getPeerName socket
-      withConnection addr cxt $ \(conn, transport) ->
-        withTimeout ii conn $ \th ->
-          -- Run Warp connection handler to process HTTP requests for static files.
-          WI.serveConnection conn ii th addr transport warpSettings app
-  where
-    app = staticFiles path
-    -- from warp-tls
-    withConnection socket cxt = bracket (WT.attachConn socket cxt) (terminate . fst)
-    -- from warp
-    withTimeout ii conn =
-      bracket
-        (WI.registerKillThread (WI.timeoutManager ii) (WI.connClose conn))
-        WI.cancel
-    -- shared clean up
-    terminate conn = WI.connClose conn `finally` (readIORef (WI.connWriteBuffer conn) >>= WI.bufFree)
-
-warpSettings :: W.Settings
-warpSettings = W.setGracefulShutdownTimeout (Just 1) W.defaultSettings
-
-staticFiles :: FilePath -> Application
-staticFiles root = S.staticApp settings . changeWellKnownPath
-  where
-    settings = defSettings {ssListing = Nothing, ssGetMimeType = getMimeType}
-    defSettings = S.defaultFileServerSettings root
-    getMimeType f
-      | WAT.fromPiece (WAT.fileName f) == "apple-app-site-association" = pure "application/json"
-      | otherwise = (ssGetMimeType defSettings) f
-    changeWellKnownPath req = case pathInfo req of
-      ".well-known" : rest ->
-        req
-          { pathInfo = "well-known" : rest,
-            rawPathInfo = "/well-known/" <> B.drop pfxLen (rawPathInfo req)
-          }
-      _ -> req
-    pfxLen = B.length "/.well-known/"
-
-generateSite :: ServerInformation -> Maybe TransportHost -> FilePath -> IO ()
-generateSite si onionHost sitePath = do
-  createDirectoryIfMissing True sitePath
-  B.writeFile (sitePath </> "index.html") $ serverInformation si onionHost
-  copyDir "media" E.mediaContent
-  -- `.well-known` path is re-written in changeWellKnownPath,
-  -- staticApp does not allow hidden folders.
-  copyDir "well-known" E.wellKnown
-  createLinkPage "contact"
-  createLinkPage "invitation"
-  createLinkPage "a"
-  createLinkPage "c"
-  createLinkPage "g"
-  createLinkPage "i"
-  logInfo $ "Generated static site contents at " <> tshow sitePath
-  where
-    copyDir dir content = do
-      createDirectoryIfMissing True $ sitePath </> dir
-      forM_ content $ \(path, s) -> B.writeFile (sitePath </> dir </> path) s
-    createLinkPage path = do
-      createDirectoryIfMissing True $ sitePath </> path
-      B.writeFile (sitePath </> path </> "index.html") E.linkHtml
-
-serverInformation :: ServerInformation -> Maybe TransportHost -> ByteString
-serverInformation ServerInformation {config, information} onionHost = render E.indexHtml substs
-  where
-    substs = substConfig <> maybe [] substInfo information <> [("onionHost", strEncode <$> onionHost)]
-    substConfig =
-      [ ( "persistence",
-          Just $ case persistence config of
-            SPMMemoryOnly -> "In-memory only"
-            SPMQueues -> "Queues"
-            SPMMessages -> "Queues and messages"
-        ),
-        ("messageExpiration", Just $ maybe "Never" (fromString . timedTTLText) $ messageExpiration config),
-        ("statsEnabled", Just . yesNo $ statsEnabled config),
-        ("newQueuesAllowed", Just . yesNo $ newQueuesAllowed config),
-        ("basicAuthEnabled", Just . yesNo $ basicAuthEnabled config)
-      ]
-    yesNo True = "Yes"
-    yesNo False = "No"
-    substInfo spi =
-      concat
-        [ basic,
-          maybe [("usageConditions", Nothing), ("usageAmendments", Nothing)] conds (usageConditions spi),
-          maybe [("operator", Nothing)] operatorE (operator spi),
-          maybe [("admin", Nothing)] admin (adminContacts spi),
-          maybe [("complaints", Nothing)] complaints (complaintsContacts spi),
-          maybe [("hosting", Nothing)] hostingE (hosting spi),
-          server
-        ]
-      where
-        basic =
-          [ ("sourceCode", Just . encodeUtf8 $ sourceCode spi),
-            ("version", Just $ B.pack simplexMQVersion),
-            ("website", encodeUtf8 <$> website spi)
-          ]
-        conds ServerConditions {conditions, amendments} =
-          [ ("usageConditions", Just $ encodeUtf8 conditions),
-            ("usageAmendments", encodeUtf8 <$> amendments)
-          ]
-        operatorE Entity {name, country} =
-          [ ("operator", Just ""),
-            ("operatorEntity", Just $ encodeUtf8 name),
-            ("operatorCountry", encodeUtf8 <$> country)
-          ]
-        admin ServerContactAddress {simplex, email, pgp} =
-          [ ("admin", Just ""),
-            ("adminSimplex", strEncode <$> simplex),
-            ("adminEmail", encodeUtf8 <$> email),
-            ("adminPGP", encodeUtf8 . pkURI <$> pgp),
-            ("adminPGPFingerprint", encodeUtf8 . pkFingerprint <$> pgp)
-          ]
-        complaints ServerContactAddress {simplex, email, pgp} =
-          [ ("complaints", Just ""),
-            ("complaintsSimplex", strEncode <$> simplex),
-            ("complaintsEmail", encodeUtf8 <$> email),
-            ("complaintsPGP", encodeUtf8 . pkURI <$> pgp),
-            ("complaintsPGPFingerprint", encodeUtf8 . pkFingerprint <$> pgp)
-          ]
-        hostingE Entity {name, country} =
-          [ ("hosting", Just ""),
-            ("hostingEntity", Just $ encodeUtf8 name),
-            ("hostingCountry", encodeUtf8 <$> country)
-          ]
-        server =
-          [ ("serverCountry", encodeUtf8 <$> serverCountry spi),
-            ("hostingType",  (\s -> maybe s (\(c, rest) -> toUpper c `B.cons` rest) $ B.uncons s) . strEncode <$> hostingType spi)
-          ]
-
--- Copy-pasted from simplex-chat Simplex.Chat.Types.Preferences
-{-# INLINE timedTTLText #-}
-timedTTLText :: (Integral i, Show i) => i -> String
-timedTTLText 0 = "0 sec"
-timedTTLText ttl = do
-  let (m', s) = ttl `quotRem` 60
-      (h', m) = m' `quotRem` 60
-      (d', h) = h' `quotRem` 24
-      (mm, d) = d' `quotRem` 30
-  unwords $
-    [mms mm | mm /= 0]
-      <> [ds d | d /= 0]
-      <> [hs h | h /= 0]
-      <> [ms m | m /= 0]
-      <> [ss s | s /= 0]
-  where
-    ss s = show s <> " sec"
-    ms m = show m <> " min"
-    hs 1 = "1 hour"
-    hs h = show h <> " hours"
-    ds 1 = "1 day"
-    ds 7 = "1 week"
-    ds 14 = "2 weeks"
-    ds d = show d <> " days"
-    mms 1 = "1 month"
-    mms mm = show mm <> " months"
-
--- | Rewrite source with provided substitutions
-render :: ByteString -> [(ByteString, Maybe ByteString)] -> ByteString
-render src = \case
-  [] -> src
-  (label, content') : rest -> render (section_ label content' src) rest
-
--- | Rewrite section content inside @<x-label>...</x-label>@ markers.
--- Markers are always removed when found. Closing marker is mandatory.
--- If content is absent, whole section is removed.
--- Section content is delegated to `item_`. If no sections found, the whole source is delegated.
-section_ :: ByteString -> Maybe ByteString -> ByteString -> ByteString
-section_ label content' src =
-  case B.breakSubstring startMarker src of
-    (_, "") -> item_ label (fromMaybe "" content') src -- no section, just replace items
-    (before, afterStart') ->
-      -- found section start, search for end too
-      case B.breakSubstring endMarker $ B.drop (B.length startMarker) afterStart' of
-        (_, "") -> error $ "missing section end: " <> show endMarker
-        (inside, next') ->
-          let next = B.drop (B.length endMarker) next'
-           in case content' of
-                Nothing -> before <> next -- collapse section
-                Just content -> before <> item_ label content inside <> section_ label content' next
-  where
-    startMarker = "<x-" <> label <> ">"
-    endMarker = "</x-" <> label <> ">"
-
--- | Replace all occurences of @${label}@ with provided content.
-item_ :: ByteString -> ByteString -> ByteString -> ByteString
-item_ label content' src =
-  case B.breakSubstring marker src of
-    (done, "") -> done
-    (before, after') -> before <> content' <> item_ label content' (B.drop (B.length marker) after')
-  where
-    marker = "${" <> label <> "}"

apps/smp-server/web/Static/Embedded.hs

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
-
-module Static.Embedded where
-
-import Data.FileEmbed (embedDir, embedFile)
-import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
-
-indexHtml :: ByteString
-indexHtml = $(embedFile "apps/smp-server/static/index.html")
-
-linkHtml :: ByteString
-linkHtml = $(embedFile "apps/smp-server/static/link.html")
-
-mediaContent :: [(FilePath, ByteString)]
-mediaContent = $(embedDir "apps/smp-server/static/media/")
-
-wellKnown :: [(FilePath, ByteString)]
-wellKnown = $(embedDir "apps/smp-server/static/.well-known/")

apps/xftp-server/Main.hs

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 module Main where
 
 import Control.Logger.Simple
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Main (xftpServerCLI_)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI (getEnvPath)
-import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Main
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Web (serveStaticFiles)
+import XFTPWeb (xftpGenerateSite)
 
 defaultCfgPath :: FilePath
 defaultCfgPath = "/etc/opt/simplex-xftp"
@@ -18,4 +20,4 @@ main = do
   setLogLevel LogDebug -- change to LogError in production
   cfgPath <- getEnvPath "XFTP_SERVER_CFG_PATH" defaultCfgPath
   logPath <- getEnvPath "XFTP_SERVER_LOG_PATH" defaultLogPath
-  withGlobalLogging logCfg $ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath
+  withGlobalLogging logCfg $ xftpServerCLI_ xftpGenerateSite serveStaticFiles cfgPath logPath

apps/xftp-server/XFTPWeb.hs

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
+
+module XFTPWeb
+  ( xftpGenerateSite,
+    xftpServerInformation,
+  ) where
+
+import Control.Monad (forM_)
+import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
+import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
+import Data.FileEmbed (embedDir, embedFile)
+import Data.Maybe (isJust)
+import Data.String (fromString)
+import Web.Embedded (embeddedContent)
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String (strEncode)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration (ExpirationConfig (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Information (ServerPublicInfo)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main (simplexmqSource)
+import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Server.Web as Web
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Web (render, serverInfoSubsts, timedTTLText)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
+import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing)
+import System.FilePath ((</>))
+
+xftpWebContent :: [(FilePath, ByteString)]
+xftpWebContent = $(embedDir "apps/xftp-server/static/xftp-web-bundle/")
+
+xftpMediaContent :: [(FilePath, ByteString)]
+xftpMediaContent = $(embedDir "apps/xftp-server/static/media/")
+
+xftpFilePageHtml :: ByteString
+xftpFilePageHtml = $(embedFile "apps/xftp-server/static/file.html")
+
+xftpGenerateSite :: XFTPServerConfig s -> Maybe ServerPublicInfo -> Maybe TransportHost -> FilePath -> IO ()
+xftpGenerateSite cfg info onionHost path = do
+  let substs = xftpSubsts cfg info onionHost
+  Web.generateSite embeddedContent (render (Web.indexHtml embeddedContent) substs) [] path
+  let xftpDir = path </> "xftp-web-bundle"
+      mediaDir = path </> "media"
+      fileDir = path </> "file"
+  filePage xftpDir xftpWebContent
+  filePage mediaDir xftpMediaContent
+  createDirectoryIfMissing True fileDir
+  B.writeFile (fileDir </> "index.html") $ render xftpFilePageHtml substs
+  where
+    filePage dir content_ = do
+      createDirectoryIfMissing True dir
+      forM_ content_ $ \(fp, content) -> B.writeFile (dir </> fp) content
+
+xftpServerInformation :: XFTPServerConfig s -> Maybe ServerPublicInfo -> Maybe TransportHost -> ByteString
+xftpServerInformation cfg info onionHost = render (Web.indexHtml embeddedContent) (xftpSubsts cfg info onionHost)
+
+xftpSubsts :: XFTPServerConfig s -> Maybe ServerPublicInfo -> Maybe TransportHost -> [(ByteString, Maybe ByteString)]
+xftpSubsts XFTPServerConfig {fileExpiration, logStatsInterval, allowNewFiles, newFileBasicAuth} information onionHost =
+  [("smpConfig", Nothing), ("xftpConfig", Just "y")] <> substConfig <> serverInfoSubsts simplexmqSource information <> [("onionHost", strEncode <$> onionHost), ("iniFileName", Just "file-server.ini")]
+  where
+    substConfig =
+      [ ("fileExpiration", Just $ maybe "Never" (fromString . timedTTLText . ttl) fileExpiration),
+        ("statsEnabled", Just . yesNo $ isJust logStatsInterval),
+        ("newUploadsAllowed", Just . yesNo $ allowNewFiles),
+        ("basicAuthEnabled", Just . yesNo $ isJust newFileBasicAuth)
+      ]
+    yesNo True = "Yes"
+    yesNo False = "No"

apps/xftp-server/static/media/xftp-protocol-dark.svg

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+<svg width="440" height="520" viewBox="-20 0 440 520" fill="none" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
+  <!-- Sender browser -->
+  <rect x="120" y="16" width="160" height="56" rx="10" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1.5"/>
+  <text x="200" y="40" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="13" font-weight="600" fill="#70F0F9">Sender's browser</text>
+  <text x="200" y="56" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="11" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.7)">encrypts file</text>
+
+  <!-- Arrow down from sender to chunks -->
+  <line x1="200" y1="72" x2="200" y2="120" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowC)"/>
+
+  <!-- Chunks row -->
+  <rect x="112" y="120" width="176" height="40" rx="8" fill="none" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1" stroke-dasharray="4 3"/>
+  <text x="200" y="145" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="12" fill="#70F0F9">encrypted chunks</text>
+
+  <!-- Arrows from chunks to routers -->
+  <line x1="152" y1="160" x2="80" y2="220" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowC)"/>
+  <line x1="200" y1="160" x2="200" y2="220" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowC)"/>
+  <line x1="248" y1="160" x2="320" y2="220" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowC)"/>
+
+  <!-- Router 1 (SimpleX) -->
+  <rect x="20" y="220" width="120" height="56" rx="6" fill="none" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1.5"/>
+  <g transform="translate(28, 227)">
+    <rect width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.5)"/>
+    <rect y="6" width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.5)"/>
+    <rect y="12" width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.5)"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="2" r="1" fill="#70F0F9"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="8" r="1" fill="#70F0F9"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="14" r="1" fill="#70F0F9"/>
+  </g>
+  <text x="80" y="244" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="11" font-weight="600" fill="#70F0F9">SimpleX</text>
+  <text x="80" y="258" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="9" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.7)">XFTP router</text>
+
+  <!-- Router 2 (Flux) -->
+  <rect x="155" y="220" width="90" height="56" rx="6" fill="none" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1.5"/>
+  <g transform="translate(163, 227)">
+    <rect width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.5)"/>
+    <rect y="6" width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.5)"/>
+    <rect y="12" width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.5)"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="2" r="1" fill="#70F0F9"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="8" r="1" fill="#70F0F9"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="14" r="1" fill="#70F0F9"/>
+  </g>
+  <text x="200" y="244" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="11" font-weight="600" fill="#70F0F9">Flux</text>
+  <text x="200" y="258" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="9" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.7)">XFTP router</text>
+
+  <!-- Router 3 (SimpleX) -->
+  <rect x="260" y="220" width="120" height="56" rx="6" fill="none" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1.5"/>
+  <g transform="translate(268, 227)">
+    <rect width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.5)"/>
+    <rect y="6" width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.5)"/>
+    <rect y="12" width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.5)"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="2" r="1" fill="#70F0F9"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="8" r="1" fill="#70F0F9"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="14" r="1" fill="#70F0F9"/>
+  </g>
+  <text x="320" y="244" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="11" font-weight="600" fill="#70F0F9">SimpleX</text>
+  <text x="320" y="258" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="9" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.7)">XFTP router</text>
+
+  <!-- Arrows from routers down -->
+  <line x1="80" y1="276" x2="152" y2="336" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowC)"/>
+  <line x1="200" y1="276" x2="200" y2="336" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowC)"/>
+  <line x1="320" y1="276" x2="248" y2="336" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowC)"/>
+
+  <!-- Re-encrypt label -->
+  <text x="330" y="310" text-anchor="start" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="10" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.7)">re-encrypted</text>
+  <text x="330" y="322" text-anchor="start" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="10" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.7)">per recipient</text>
+
+  <!-- Chunks row (download) -->
+  <rect x="112" y="336" width="176" height="40" rx="8" fill="none" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1" stroke-dasharray="4 3"/>
+  <text x="200" y="361" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="12" fill="#70F0F9">encrypted chunks</text>
+
+  <!-- Arrow down to recipient -->
+  <line x1="200" y1="376" x2="200" y2="424" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowC)"/>
+
+  <!-- Recipient browser -->
+  <rect x="120" y="424" width="160" height="56" rx="10" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1.5"/>
+  <text x="200" y="448" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="13" font-weight="600" fill="#70F0F9">Recipient's browser</text>
+  <text x="200" y="464" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="11" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.7)">decrypts file</text>
+
+  <!-- Key path (dashed, side) -->
+  <path d="M120 44 L8 44 L8 452 L120 452" stroke="#70F0F9" stroke-width="1.5" stroke-dasharray="6 4" fill="none" marker-end="url(#arrowC)"/>
+  <text x="-6" y="240" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="10" fill="#70F0F9" transform="rotate(-90 -6 240)">key in URL fragment - never sent to page server or data router</text>
+
+
+  <!-- Closed padlock: encryption (between sender and chunks) -->
+  <g transform="translate(192, 88)">
+    <path d="M4,7 V4 C4,1.2 12,1.2 12,4 V7" stroke="#60a5fa" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none" stroke-linecap="round"/>
+    <rect x="2" y="7" width="12" height="9" rx="2" fill="#60a5fa"/>
+    <circle cx="8" cy="12" r="1.2" fill="#0B2A59"/>
+  </g>
+
+  <!-- Open padlock: decryption (between chunks and recipient) -->
+  <g transform="translate(192, 392)">
+    <path d="M4,7 V4 C4,1.2 12,1.2 12,4 V2" stroke="#60a5fa" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none" stroke-linecap="round"/>
+    <rect x="2" y="7" width="12" height="9" rx="2" fill="#60a5fa"/>
+    <circle cx="8" cy="12" r="1.2" fill="#0B2A59"/>
+  </g>
+
+  <!-- Key icon on dashed line -->
+  <g transform="translate(8, 410)">
+    <circle cx="0" cy="0" r="6" stroke="#FBBF24" stroke-width="2" fill="#FBBF24"/>
+    <circle cx="0" cy="0" r="2" fill="#0B2A59"/>
+    <line x1="6" y1="0" x2="16" y2="0" stroke="#FBBF24" stroke-width="2"/>
+    <line x1="14" y1="0" x2="14" y2="4" stroke="#FBBF24" stroke-width="2"/>
+    <line x1="11" y1="0" x2="11" y2="3.5" stroke="#FBBF24" stroke-width="2"/>
+  </g>
+
+  <!-- Annotation: no shared IDs -->
+  <text x="200" y="510" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="10" fill="rgba(112,240,249,0.7)">Each file fragment uses unique anonymous credentials - no shared identifiers</text>
+
+  <defs>
+    <marker id="arrowC" viewBox="0 0 10 10" refX="9" refY="5" markerWidth="6" markerHeight="6" orient="auto-start-reverse">
+      <path d="M 0 0 L 10 5 L 0 10 z" fill="#70F0F9"/>
+    </marker>
+  </defs>
+</svg>

apps/xftp-server/static/media/xftp-protocol.svg

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+<svg width="440" height="520" viewBox="-20 0 440 520" fill="none" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
+  <!-- Sender browser -->
+  <rect x="120" y="16" width="160" height="56" rx="10" fill="url(#gBox)" stroke="#606C71" stroke-width="1.5"/>
+  <text x="200" y="40" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="13" font-weight="600" fill="#fff">Sender's browser</text>
+  <text x="200" y="56" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="11" fill="rgba(255,255,255,0.8)">encrypts file</text>
+
+  <!-- Arrow down from sender to chunks -->
+  <line x1="200" y1="72" x2="200" y2="120" stroke="#606C71" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowG)"/>
+
+  <!-- Chunks row -->
+  <rect x="112" y="120" width="176" height="40" rx="8" fill="#f0f7ff" stroke="#0053D0" stroke-width="1" stroke-dasharray="4 3"/>
+  <text x="200" y="145" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="12" fill="#0053D0">encrypted chunks</text>
+
+  <!-- Arrows from chunks to routers -->
+  <line x1="152" y1="160" x2="80" y2="220" stroke="#606C71" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowG)"/>
+  <line x1="200" y1="160" x2="200" y2="220" stroke="#606C71" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowG)"/>
+  <line x1="248" y1="160" x2="320" y2="220" stroke="#606C71" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowG)"/>
+
+  <!-- Router 1 (SimpleX) -->
+  <rect x="20" y="220" width="120" height="56" rx="6" fill="#f0f4f8" stroke="#606C71" stroke-width="1.5"/>
+  <g transform="translate(28, 227)">
+    <rect width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="#606C71"/>
+    <rect y="6" width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="#606C71"/>
+    <rect y="12" width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="#606C71"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="2" r="1" fill="#53C1FF"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="8" r="1" fill="#53C1FF"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="14" r="1" fill="#53C1FF"/>
+  </g>
+  <text x="80" y="244" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="11" font-weight="600" fill="#3F484B">SimpleX</text>
+  <text x="80" y="258" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="9" fill="#606C71">XFTP router</text>
+
+  <!-- Router 2 (Flux) -->
+  <rect x="155" y="220" width="90" height="56" rx="6" fill="#f0f4f8" stroke="#606C71" stroke-width="1.5"/>
+  <g transform="translate(163, 227)">
+    <rect width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="#606C71"/>
+    <rect y="6" width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="#606C71"/>
+    <rect y="12" width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="#606C71"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="2" r="1" fill="#53C1FF"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="8" r="1" fill="#53C1FF"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="14" r="1" fill="#53C1FF"/>
+  </g>
+  <text x="200" y="244" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="11" font-weight="600" fill="#3F484B">Flux</text>
+  <text x="200" y="258" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="9" fill="#606C71">XFTP router</text>
+
+  <!-- Router 3 (SimpleX) -->
+  <rect x="260" y="220" width="120" height="56" rx="6" fill="#f0f4f8" stroke="#606C71" stroke-width="1.5"/>
+  <g transform="translate(268, 227)">
+    <rect width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="#606C71"/>
+    <rect y="6" width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="#606C71"/>
+    <rect y="12" width="14" height="4" rx="1" fill="#606C71"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="2" r="1" fill="#53C1FF"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="8" r="1" fill="#53C1FF"/>
+    <circle cx="11" cy="14" r="1" fill="#53C1FF"/>
+  </g>
+  <text x="320" y="244" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="11" font-weight="600" fill="#3F484B">SimpleX</text>
+  <text x="320" y="258" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="9" fill="#606C71">XFTP router</text>
+
+  <!-- Arrows from routers down -->
+  <line x1="80" y1="276" x2="152" y2="336" stroke="#606C71" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowG)"/>
+  <line x1="200" y1="276" x2="200" y2="336" stroke="#606C71" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowG)"/>
+  <line x1="320" y1="276" x2="248" y2="336" stroke="#606C71" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowG)"/>
+
+  <!-- Re-encrypt label -->
+  <text x="330" y="310" text-anchor="start" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="10" fill="#606C71">re-encrypted</text>
+  <text x="330" y="322" text-anchor="start" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="10" fill="#606C71">per recipient</text>
+
+  <!-- Chunks row (download) -->
+  <rect x="112" y="336" width="176" height="40" rx="8" fill="#f0f7ff" stroke="#0053D0" stroke-width="1" stroke-dasharray="4 3"/>
+  <text x="200" y="361" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="12" fill="#0053D0">encrypted chunks</text>
+
+  <!-- Arrow down to recipient -->
+  <line x1="200" y1="376" x2="200" y2="424" stroke="#606C71" stroke-width="1.5" marker-end="url(#arrowG)"/>
+
+  <!-- Recipient browser -->
+  <rect x="120" y="424" width="160" height="56" rx="10" fill="url(#gBox)" stroke="#606C71" stroke-width="1.5"/>
+  <text x="200" y="448" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="13" font-weight="600" fill="#fff">Recipient's browser</text>
+  <text x="200" y="464" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="11" fill="rgba(255,255,255,0.8)">decrypts file</text>
+
+  <!-- Key path (dashed, side) -->
+  <path d="M120 44 L8 44 L8 452 L120 452" stroke="#0053D0" stroke-width="1.5" stroke-dasharray="6 4" fill="none" marker-end="url(#arrowB)"/>
+  <text x="-6" y="240" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="10" fill="#0053D0" transform="rotate(-90 -6 240)">key in URL fragment - never sent to page server or data router</text>
+
+
+  <!-- Closed padlock: encryption (between sender and chunks) -->
+  <g transform="translate(192, 88)">
+    <path d="M4,7 V4 C4,1.2 12,1.2 12,4 V7" stroke="#0053D0" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none" stroke-linecap="round"/>
+    <rect x="2" y="7" width="12" height="9" rx="2" fill="#0053D0"/>
+    <circle cx="8" cy="12" r="1.2" fill="#fff"/>
+  </g>
+
+  <!-- Open padlock: decryption (between chunks and recipient) -->
+  <g transform="translate(192, 392)">
+    <path d="M4,7 V4 C4,1.2 12,1.2 12,4 V2" stroke="#0053D0" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none" stroke-linecap="round"/>
+    <rect x="2" y="7" width="12" height="9" rx="2" fill="#0053D0"/>
+    <circle cx="8" cy="12" r="1.2" fill="#fff"/>
+  </g>
+
+  <!-- Key icon on dashed line -->
+  <g transform="translate(8, 410)">
+    <circle cx="0" cy="0" r="6" stroke="#D97706" stroke-width="2" fill="#D97706"/>
+    <circle cx="0" cy="0" r="2" fill="#fff"/>
+    <line x1="6" y1="0" x2="16" y2="0" stroke="#D97706" stroke-width="2"/>
+    <line x1="14" y1="0" x2="14" y2="4" stroke="#D97706" stroke-width="2"/>
+    <line x1="11" y1="0" x2="11" y2="3.5" stroke="#D97706" stroke-width="2"/>
+  </g>
+
+  <!-- Annotation: no shared IDs -->
+  <text x="200" y="510" text-anchor="middle" font-family="system-ui, sans-serif" font-size="10" fill="#606C71">Each file fragment uses unique anonymous credentials - no shared identifiers</text>
+
+  <defs>
+    <linearGradient id="gBox" x1="120" y1="16" x2="280" y2="72" gradientUnits="userSpaceOnUse">
+      <stop stop-color="#0053D0"/>
+      <stop offset="1" stop-color="#53C1FF"/>
+    </linearGradient>
+    <linearGradient id="gSrv1" x1="20" y1="220" x2="140" y2="276" gradientUnits="userSpaceOnUse">
+      <stop stop-color="#0053D0"/>
+      <stop offset="1" stop-color="#53C1FF"/>
+    </linearGradient>
+    <linearGradient id="gSrv2" x1="155" y1="220" x2="245" y2="276" gradientUnits="userSpaceOnUse">
+      <stop stop-color="#0053D0"/>
+      <stop offset="1" stop-color="#53C1FF"/>
+    </linearGradient>
+    <marker id="arrowG" viewBox="0 0 10 10" refX="9" refY="5" markerWidth="6" markerHeight="6" orient="auto-start-reverse">
+      <path d="M 0 0 L 10 5 L 0 10 z" fill="#606C71"/>
+    </marker>
+    <marker id="arrowB" viewBox="0 0 10 10" refX="9" refY="5" markerWidth="6" markerHeight="6" orient="auto-start-reverse">
+      <path d="M 0 0 L 10 5 L 0 10 z" fill="#0053D0"/>
+    </marker>
+  </defs>
+</svg>

apps/xftp-server/static/xftp-web-bundle/index.css

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+#app, [data-xftp-app] {
+  font-family: system-ui, -apple-system, sans-serif;
+  color: #333;
+  width: 100%;
+  max-width: 480px;
+  padding: 16px;
+  box-sizing: border-box;
+  --xftp-ring-fg: #3b82f6;
+}
+
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .card {
+  background: #fff;
+  border-radius: 12px;
+  padding: 32px 24px;
+  box-shadow: 0 1px 3px rgba(0,0,0,.1);
+  text-align: center;
+}
+
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) h1 {
+  font-size: 1.25rem;
+  font-weight: 600;
+  margin-bottom: 24px;
+}
+
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .stage { margin-top: 16px; }
+
+/* Drop zone */
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .drop-zone {
+  border: 2px dashed #ccc;
+  border-radius: 8px;
+  padding: 32px 16px;
+  transition: border-color .15s, background .15s;
+}
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .drop-zone.drag-over {
+  border-color: #3b82f6;
+  background: #eff6ff;
+}
+
+/* Buttons */
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .btn {
+  display: inline-block;
+  padding: 10px 24px;
+  border: none;
+  border-radius: 6px;
+  background: #3b82f6;
+  color: #fff;
+  font-size: .9rem;
+  font-weight: 500;
+  cursor: pointer;
+  transition: background .15s;
+}
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .btn:hover { background: #2563eb; }
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .btn-secondary { background: #6b7280; }
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .btn-secondary:hover { background: #4b5563; }
+
+/* Hints */
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .hint { color: #999; font-size: .85rem; margin-top: 8px; }
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .expiry { margin-top: 12px; }
+
+/* Progress */
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .progress-ring { display: block; margin: 0 auto 12px; }
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) #upload-status,
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) #dl-status { font-size: .9rem; color: #666; margin-bottom: 12px; }
+
+/* Share link row */
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .link-row {
+  display: flex;
+  gap: 8px;
+  margin-top: 12px;
+}
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .link-row input {
+  flex: 1;
+  padding: 8px 10px;
+  border: 1px solid #ccc;
+  border-radius: 6px;
+  font-size: .85rem;
+  background: #f9fafb;
+}
+
+/* Upload link */
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .upload-link {
+  margin-top: 12px;
+  color: #3b82f6;
+  font-size: .9rem;
+  text-decoration: none;
+  cursor: pointer;
+}
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .upload-link:not([hidden]) {
+  display: inline-block;
+}
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .upload-link:hover { text-decoration: underline; }
+
+/* Messages */
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .success { color: #16a34a; font-weight: 600; }
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .error { color: #dc2626; font-weight: 500; margin-bottom: 12px; }
+
+/* Security note */
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .security-note {
+  margin-top: 20px;
+  padding: 12px;
+  background: #f0fdf4;
+  border-radius: 6px;
+  font-size: .8rem;
+  color: #555;
+  text-align: left;
+}
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .security-note p + p { margin-top: 6px; }
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .security-note a { color: #3b82f6; text-decoration: none; }
+:is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .security-note a:hover { text-decoration: underline; }
+
+/* ── Dark mode ─────────────────────────────────── */
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) {
+  color: #e5e7eb;
+  --xftp-ring-bg: #374151;
+  --xftp-ring-fg: #60a5fa;
+  --xftp-ring-text: #e5e7eb;
+  --xftp-ring-done: #4ade80;
+}
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .card {
+  background: #1f2937;
+  box-shadow: 0 1px 3px rgba(0,0,0,.4);
+}
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .drop-zone { border-color: #4b5563; }
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .drop-zone.drag-over {
+  border-color: #60a5fa;
+  background: rgba(59,130,246,.15);
+}
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .btn-secondary { background: #4b5563; }
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .btn-secondary:hover { background: #374151; }
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .hint { color: #9ca3af; }
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) #upload-status,
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) #dl-status { color: #9ca3af; }
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .link-row input {
+  background: #374151;
+  border-color: #4b5563;
+  color: #e5e7eb;
+}
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .success { color: #4ade80; }
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .error { color: #f87171; }
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .security-note {
+  background: rgba(34,197,94,.1);
+  color: #d1d5db;
+}
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .upload-link { color: #60a5fa; }
+.dark :is(#app, [data-xftp-app]) .security-note a { color: #60a5fa; }

contributing/CODE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+# Coding and building
+
+This file provides guidance on coding style and approaches and on building the code.
+
+## Code Security
+
+When designing code and planning implementations:
+- Apply adversarial thinking, and consider what may happen if one of the communicating parties is malicious.
+- Formulate an explicit threat model for each change - who can do which undesirable things and under which circumstances.
+
+## Code Quality Standards
+
+Haskell client and server code serves as system specification, not just implementation — we use type-driven design to reflect the business domain in types. Quality, conciseness, and clarity of Haskell code are critical.
+
+## Code Style, Formatting and Approaches
+
+The project uses **fourmolu** for Haskell code formatting. Configuration is in `fourmolu.yaml`.
+
+**Key formatting rules:**
+- 2-space indentation
+- Trailing function arrows, commas, and import/export style
+- Record brace without space: `{field = value}`
+- Single newline between declarations
+- Never use unicode symbols
+- Inline `let` style with right-aligned `in`
+
+**Format code before committing:**
+
+```bash
+# Format a single file
+fourmolu -i src/Simplex/Messaging/Protocol.hs
+```
+
+Some files that use CPP language extension cannot be formatted as a whole, so individual code fragments need to be formatted.
+
+**Follow existing code patterns:**
+- Match the style of surrounding code
+- Use qualified imports with short aliases (e.g., `import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B`)
+- Use record syntax for types with multiple fields
+- Prefer explicit pattern matching over partial functions
+
+**Comments policy:**
+- Avoid redundant comments that restate what the code already says
+- Only comment on non-obvious design decisions or tricky implementation details
+- Function names and type signatures should be self-documenting
+- Do not add comments like "wire format encoding" (Encoding class is always wire format) or "check if X" when the function name already says that
+- Assume a competent Haskell reader
+
+**Diff and refactoring:**
+- Avoid unnecessary changes and code movements
+- Never do refactoring unless it substantially reduces cost of solving the current problem, including the cost of refactoring
+- Aim to minimize the code changes - do what is minimally required to solve users' problems
+
+**Document and code structure:**
+- **Never move existing code or sections around** - add new content at appropriate locations without reorganizing existing structure.
+- When adding new sections to documents, continue the existing numbering scheme.
+- Minimize diff size - prefer small, targeted changes over reorganization.
+
+**Code analysis and review:**
+- Trace data flows end-to-end: from origin, through storage/parameters, to consumption. Flag values that are discarded and reconstructed from partial data (e.g. extracted from a URI missing original fields) — this is usually a bug.
+- Read implementations of called functions, not just signatures — if duplication involves a called function, check whether decomposing it resolves the duplication.
+- Do not save time on analysis. Read every function in the data flow even when the interface seems clear — wrong assumptions about internals are the main source of missed bugs.
+
+### Haskell Extensions
+- `StrictData` enabled by default
+- Use STM for safe concurrency
+- Assume concurrency in PostgreSQL queries
+- Comprehensive warning flags with strict pattern matching
+
+## Build Commands
+
+```bash
+# Standard build
+cabal build
+
+# Fast build
+cabal build --ghc-options -O0
+
+# Build specific executables
+cabal build exe:smp-server exe:xftp-server exe:ntf-server exe:xftp
+
+# Build with PostgreSQL server support
+cabal build -fserver_postgres
+
+# Client-only library build (no server code)
+cabal build -fclient_library
+
+# Find binary location
+cabal list-bin exe:smp-server
+```
+
+### Cabal Flags
+
+- `swift`: Enable Swift JSON format
+- `client_library`: Build without server code
+- `client_postgres`: Use PostgreSQL instead of SQLite for agent persistence
+- `server_postgres`: PostgreSQL support for server queue/notification store
+
+## External Dependencies
+
+Custom forks specified in `cabal.project`:
+- `aeson`, `hs-socks` (SimpleX forks)
+- `direct-sqlcipher`, `sqlcipher-simple` (encrypted SQLite)
+- `warp`, `warp-tls` (HTTP server)

contributing/PROJECT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+# SimpleXMQ repository
+
+This file provides guidance on the project structure to help working with code in this repository.
+
+## Project Overview
+
+SimpleXMQ is a Haskell message broker implementing unidirectional (simplex) queues for privacy-preserving messaging. 
+
+Key components:
+
+- **SimpleX Messaging Protocol**: SMP protocol definition and encodings ([code](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Protocol.hs), [transport code](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Transport.hs), [spec](../protocol/simplex-messaging.md)).
+- **SMP Server**: Message broker with TLS, in-memory queues, optional persistence ([main code](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs), [all code files](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/), [executable](../apps/smp-server/)). For proxying SMP commands the server uses [lightweight SMP client](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Client/Agent.hs).
+- **SMP Client**: Functional API with STM-based message delivery ([code](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Client.hs)).
+- **SMP Agent**: High-level duplex connections via multiple simplex queues with E2E encryption ([code](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent.hs)). Implements Agent-to-agent protocol ([code](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Protocol.hs), [spec](../protocol/agent-protocol.md)) via intermediary agent client ([code](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Client.hs)).
+- **XFTP**: SimpleX File Transfer Protocol, server and CLI client ([code](../src/Simplex/FileTransfer/), [spec](../protocol/xftp.md)).
+- **XRCP**: SimpleX Remote Control Protocol ([code](`../src/Simplex/RemoteControl/`), [spec](../protocol/xrcp.md)).
+- **Notifications**: Push notifications server requires PostgreSQL ([code](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Notifications), [executable](../apps/ntf-server/)). Client protocol is used for clients to communicate with the server ([code](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Notifications/Protocol.hs), [spec](../protocol/push-notifications.md)). For subscribing to SMP notifications the server uses [lightweight SMP client](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Client/Agent.hs).
+
+## Architecture
+
+For general overview see `../protocol/overview-tjr.md`.
+
+SMP Protocol Layers:
+
+```
+TLS Transport → SMP Protocol → Agent Protocol → Application protocol
+```
+
+XFTP Protocol Layers:
+
+```
+TLS Transport (HTTP2 encoding) → XFTP Protocol → Out-of-band file descriptions
+```
+
+## Key Patterns
+
+1. **Persistence**: All queue state managed via Software Transactional Memory or via PostgreSQL
+   - `Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.STM` - in-memory messages
+   - `Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.STM` - in-memory queue state
+   - `Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Postgres` - message storage
+   - `Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Postgres` - queue storage
+
+2. **Append-Only Store Log**: Optional persistence via journal for in-memory storage
+   - `Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog` - queue creation log
+   - Compacted on restart
+
+3. **Agent Storage**:
+   - SQLite (default) or PostgreSQL
+   - Migrations in `src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Store/{SQLite,Postgres}/Migrations/`
+
+4. **Protocol Versioning**: All layers support version negotiation
+   - `Simplex.Messaging.Version` - version range utilities
+
+5. **Double Ratchet E2E**: Per-connection encryption
+   - `Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet`
+   - SNTRUP761 post-quantum KEM (`src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto/SNTRUP761/`)
+
+## Source Layout
+
+```
+src/Simplex/
+├── Messaging/
+│   ├── Agent.hs          # Main agent (~210KB)
+│   ├── Server.hs         # SMP server (~130KB)
+│   ├── Client.hs         # Client API (~65KB)
+│   ├── Protocol.hs       # Protocol types (~77KB)
+│   ├── Crypto.hs         # E2E encryption (~52KB)
+│   ├── Transport.hs      # Transport encoding over TLS
+│   ├── Agent/Store/      # SQLite/Postgres persistence
+│   ├── Server/           # Server internals (QueueStore, MsgStore, Control)
+│   └── Notifications/    # Push notification system
+├── FileTransfer/         # XFTP implementation for file transfers
+└── RemoteControl/        # XRCP implementation for device discovery & control
+```
+
+## Protocol Documentation
+
+- `protocol/overview-tjr.md`: SMP protocols stack overview
+- `protocol/simplex-messaging.md`: SMP protocol spec (v19)
+- `protocol/agent-protocol.md`: Agent protocol spec (v7)
+- `protocol/xftp.md`: File transfer protocol
+- `protocol/xrcp.md`: Remote control protocol
+- `rfcs/`: Design RFCs for features
+
+## Testing
+
+```bash
+# Run all tests
+cabal test --test-show-details=streaming
+
+# Run specific test group (uses HSpec)
+cabal test --test-option=--match="/Core tests/Encryption tests/"
+
+# Run single test
+cabal test --test-option=--match="/SMP client agent/functional API/"
+```
+
+Tests require PostgreSQL running on `localhost:5432` when using `-fserver_postgres` or `-fclient_postgres`.
+
+Test files are in `tests/` with structure:
+- `Test.hs`: Main runner
+- `AgentTests/`: Agent protocol and connection tests
+- `CoreTests/`: Crypto, encoding, storage tests
+- `ServerTests.hs`: SMP server tests
+- `XFTPServerTests.hs`: File transfer tests

contributing/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Contributing to SimpleX repositories
+
+## Focus on user problems
+
+We do not make code changes to improve code - any change must address a specific user problem or request.
+
+## Discuss the plans as early as possible
+
+Please discuss the problem you want to solve and your detailed implementation plan with the project team prior to contributing, to avoid wasted time and additional changes. Acceptance of your contribution depends on your willingness and ability to iterate the proposed contribution to achieve the required quality level, coding style, test coverage, and alignment with user requirements as they are understood by the project team.
+
+## Follow project structure, coding style and approaches
+
+./PROJECT.md has information about the structure of this `simplexmq` repository.
+
+./CODE.md has details about general requirements common for `simplexmq` and `simplex-chat` repositories.
+
+This files can be used with LLM prompts, e.g. if you use Claude Code you can create CLAUDE.md file in project root importing content from these files:
+
+```markdown
+@README.md
+@contributing/PROJECT.md
+@contributing/CODE.md
+```

notes-flow.txt

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-common:
-  corrId - random BS, used as CbNonce
-  entityId - p2r tlsUniq
-
-# setup
-s->p: "proxy", uri, auth?
-  # unless connected
-  p->r: "p_handshake"
-  p<-r: "r_key", tls-signed dh pub
-s<-r: "r_key", tls-signed dh pub # reply entityId contains tlsUniq
-
-# working
-s ; generate random dh priv, make shared secret
-s->p: s2r("forward", random dh pub, SEND command blob)
-  p->r: p2r("forward", random dh pub, s2r("forward", ...)))
-    r->c@ "msg", ...
-  p<-r: p2r("r_res", s2r("ok" / "error", error))
-s<-p@ s2r("ok" / "error", error)
-
-# expired
-  p<-r@ p2r("error", "key expired")
-s<-p@ "error", "key expired"
-s ; reconnect

plans/2026-03-25-xftp-postgres-backend-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,472 @@
+# XFTP Server PostgreSQL Backend
+
+## Overview
+
+Add PostgreSQL backend support to xftp-server, following the SMP server pattern. Supports bidirectional migration between STM (in-memory with StoreLog) and PostgreSQL backends.
+
+## Goals
+
+- PostgreSQL-backed file metadata storage as an alternative to STM + StoreLog
+- Polymorphic server code via `FileStoreClass` typeclass with IO-based methods (following `QueueStoreClass` pattern)
+- Bidirectional migration: StoreLog <-> PostgreSQL via CLI commands
+- Shared `server_postgres` cabal flag (same flag enables both SMP and XFTP Postgres support)
+- INI-based backend selection at runtime
+
+## Architecture
+
+### FileStoreClass Typeclass
+
+IO-based typeclass following the `QueueStoreClass` pattern — each method is a self-contained IO action, with the implementation responsible for its own atomicity (STM backend wraps in `atomically`, Postgres backend uses database transactions):
+
+```haskell
+class FileStoreClass s where
+  type FileStoreConfig s
+
+  -- Lifecycle
+  newFileStore :: FileStoreConfig s -> IO s
+  closeFileStore :: s -> IO ()
+
+  -- File operations
+  addFile :: s -> SenderId -> FileInfo -> RoundedFileTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+  setFilePath :: s -> SenderId -> FilePath -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+  addRecipient :: s -> SenderId -> FileRecipient -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+  getFile :: s -> SFileParty p -> XFTPFileId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType (FileRec, C.APublicAuthKey))
+  deleteFile :: s -> SenderId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+  blockFile :: s -> SenderId -> BlockingInfo -> Bool -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+  deleteRecipient :: s -> RecipientId -> FileRec -> IO ()
+  ackFile :: s -> RecipientId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+
+  -- Expiration (with LIMIT for Postgres; called in a loop until empty)
+  expiredFiles :: s -> Int64 -> Int -> IO [(SenderId, Maybe FilePath, Word32)]
+
+  -- Storage and stats (for init-time computation)
+  getUsedStorage :: s -> IO Int64
+  getFileCount :: s -> IO Int
+```
+
+- STM backend: each method wraps its STM transaction in `atomically` internally.
+- Postgres backend: each method runs its query via `withDB` / database connection internally.
+
+No polymorphic monad or `runStore` dispatcher needed — unlike `MsgStoreClass`, XFTP file operations are individually atomic and don't require grouping multiple operations into backend-dependent transactions.
+
+### PostgresFileStore Data Type
+
+```haskell
+data PostgresFileStore = PostgresFileStore
+  { dbStore :: DBStore,
+    dbStoreLog :: Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
+  }
+```
+
+- `dbStore` — connection pool created via `createDBStore`, runs schema migrations on init.
+- `dbStoreLog` — optional parallel log file (enabled by `db_store_log` INI setting). When present, every mutation (`addFile`, `setFilePath`, `deleteFile`, `blockFile`, `addRecipient`, `ackFile`) also writes to this log via a `withLog` wrapper. `withLog` is called AFTER the DB operation succeeds (so the log reflects committed state only). Log write failures are non-fatal (logged as warnings, do not fail the DB operation). This provides an audit trail and enables recovery via export.
+
+`closeFileStore` for Postgres calls `closeDBStore` (closes connection pool) then `mapM_ closeStoreLog dbStoreLog` (flushes and closes the parallel log). For STM, it closes the storeLog. Called from a `finally` block during server shutdown, matching SMP's `stopServer` → `closeMsgStore` → `closeQueueStore` pattern.
+
+### STMFileStore Type
+
+After extracting from current `Store.hs`, `STMFileStore` retains the file and recipient maps but no longer owns `usedStorage` (moved to `XFTPEnv`):
+
+```haskell
+data STMFileStore = STMFileStore
+  { files :: TMap SenderId FileRec,
+    recipients :: TMap RecipientId (SenderId, RcvPublicAuthKey)
+  }
+```
+
+`closeFileStore` for STM is a no-op (TMaps are garbage-collected; the env-level `storeLog` is closed separately by the server).
+
+### Error Handling
+
+Postgres operations follow SMP's `withDB` / `handleDuplicate` pattern:
+
+```haskell
+withDB :: Text -> PostgresFileStore -> (DB.Connection -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)) -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO a
+withDB op st action =
+  ExceptT $ E.try (withTransaction (dbStore st) action) >>= either logErr pure
+  where
+    logErr :: E.SomeException -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)
+    logErr e = logError ("STORE: " <> err) $> Left INTERNAL
+      where
+        err = op <> ", withDB, " <> tshow e
+
+handleDuplicate :: SqlError -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)
+handleDuplicate e = case constraintViolation e of
+  Just (UniqueViolation _) -> pure $ Left DUPLICATE_
+  _ -> E.throwIO e
+```
+
+- All DB operations wrapped in `withDB` — catches exceptions, logs, returns `INTERNAL`.
+- Unique constraint violations caught by `handleDuplicate` and mapped to `DUPLICATE_`.
+- UPDATE operations verified with `assertUpdated` — returns `AUTH` if 0 rows affected (matching SMP pattern, prevents silent failures when WHERE clause doesn't match).
+- Critical sections (DB write + TVar update) wrapped in `uninterruptibleMask_` to prevent async exceptions from leaving inconsistent state between DB and TVars.
+
+### FileRec and TVar Fields
+
+`FileRec` retains its `TVar` fields (matching SMP's `PostgresQueue` pattern):
+
+```haskell
+data FileRec = FileRec
+  { senderId :: SenderId,
+    fileInfo :: FileInfo,
+    filePath :: TVar (Maybe FilePath),
+    recipientIds :: TVar (Set RecipientId),
+    createdAt :: RoundedFileTime,
+    fileStatus :: TVar ServerEntityStatus
+  }
+```
+
+- **STM backend**: TVars are the source of truth, as currently.
+- **Postgres backend**: `getFile` reads from DB and creates a `FileRec` with fresh TVars populated from the DB row (matching SMP's `mkQ` pattern — `newTVarIO` per load). Mutation methods (`setFilePath`, `blockFile`, etc.) update both the DB (persistence) and the TVars (in-session consistency). The `recipientIds` TVar is initialized to `S.empty` — no subquery needed because no server code reads `recipientIds` directly; all recipient operations go through the typeclass methods (`addRecipient`, `deleteRecipient`, `ackFile`), which query the `recipients` table for Postgres.
+
+### usedStorage Ownership
+
+`usedStorage :: TVar Int64` moves from the store to `XFTPEnv`. The store typeclass does **not** manage `usedStorage` — it only provides `getUsedStorage` for init-time computation.
+
+- **STM init**: StoreLog replay calls `setFilePath` (which only sets the filePath TVar — the STM `setFilePath` implementation is changed to **not** update `usedStorage`). Similarly, STM `deleteFile` (Store.hs line 117) and `blockFile` (line 125) are changed to **not** update `usedStorage` — the server handles all `usedStorage` adjustments externally. After replay, `getUsedStorage` computes the sum over all file sizes (matching current `countUsedStorage` behavior).
+- **Postgres init**: `getUsedStorage` executes `SELECT COALESCE(SUM(file_size), 0) FROM files`.
+- **Runtime**: Server manages `usedStorage` TVar directly for reserve/commit/rollback during uploads, and adjusts after `deleteFile`/`blockFile` calls.
+
+**Note on `getUsedStorage` semantics**: The current STM `countUsedStorage` sums all file sizes unconditionally (including files without `filePath` set, i.e., created but not yet uploaded). The Postgres `getUsedStorage` matches this: `SELECT SUM(file_size) FROM files` (no `WHERE file_path IS NOT NULL`). In practice, orphaned files (created but never uploaded) are rare and short-lived (expired within 48h), so the difference is negligible. A future improvement could filter by `file_path IS NOT NULL` in both backends to reflect actual disk usage more accurately.
+
+### Server.hs Refactoring
+
+`Server.hs` becomes polymorphic over `FileStoreClass s`. Since all typeclass methods are IO, call sites replace `atomically` with direct IO calls to the store.
+
+**Call sites requiring changes** (exhaustive list):
+
+1. **`receiveServerFile`** (line 563): `atomically $ writeTVar filePath (Just fPath)` → `setFilePath store senderId fPath`. The `reserve` logic (line 551-555) stays as direct TVar manipulation on `usedStorage` from `XFTPEnv`.
+
+2. **`verifyXFTPTransmission`** (line 453): `atomically $ verify =<< getFile st party fId` — the `getFile` call and subsequent `readTVar fileStatus` are in a single `atomically` block. Refactored to: `getFile st party fId` (IO), then `readTVarIO (fileStatus fr)` from the returned `FileRec` (safe for both backends — STM TVar is the source of truth, Postgres TVar is a fresh snapshot from DB).
+
+3. **`retryAdd`** (line 516): Signature `XFTPFileId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)` → `XFTPFileId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)`. The `atomically` call (line 520) replaced with `liftIO`.
+
+4. **`deleteOrBlockServerFile_`** (line 620): Parameter `FileStore -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())` → `FileStoreClass s => s -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())`. The `atomically` call (line 626) removed — the store method is already IO. After the store action, server adjusts `usedStorage` TVar in `XFTPEnv` based on `fileInfo.size`.
+
+5. **`ackFileReception`** (line 605): `atomically $ deleteRecipient st rId fr` → `deleteRecipient st rId fr`.
+
+6. **Control port `CPDelete`/`CPBlock`** (lines 371, 377): `atomically $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId` → `getFile fs SFRecipient fileId`.
+
+7. **`expireServerFiles`** (line 636): Replace per-file `expiredFilePath` iteration with batched `expiredFiles st old batchSize`, which returns `[(SenderId, Maybe FilePath, Word32)]` — the `Word32` file size is needed so the server can adjust the `usedStorage` TVar after each deletion. Called in a loop until the returned list is empty. The `itemDelay` between files applies to the deletion loop over each batch, not the query itself. STM backend ignores the batch size limit (returns all expired files from TMap scan); Postgres uses `LIMIT`.
+
+8. **`restoreServerStats`** (line 694): `FileStore {files, usedStorage} <- asks store` accesses store fields directly. Refactored to: `usedStorage` from `XFTPEnv` via `asks usedStorage`, file count via `getFileCount store`. STM: `M.size <$> readTVarIO files`. Postgres: `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM files`.
+
+### Store Config Selection
+
+GADT in `Env.hs`:
+
+```haskell
+data XFTPStoreConfig s where
+  XSCMemory :: Maybe FilePath -> XFTPStoreConfig STMFileStore
+#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
+  XSCDatabase :: PostgresFileStoreCfg -> XFTPStoreConfig PostgresFileStore
+#endif
+```
+
+`XFTPEnv` becomes polymorphic:
+
+```haskell
+data XFTPEnv s = XFTPEnv
+  { config :: XFTPServerConfig,
+    store :: s,
+    usedStorage :: TVar Int64,
+    storeLog :: Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode),
+    ...
+  }
+```
+
+The `M` monad (`ReaderT (XFTPEnv s) IO`) and all functions in `Server.hs` gain `FileStoreClass s =>` constraints.
+
+**StoreLog lifecycle per backend:**
+
+- **STM mode**: `storeLog = Just sl` (current behavior — append-only log for persistence and recovery).
+- **Postgres mode**: `storeLog = Nothing` (main storeLog disabled — Postgres is the source of truth). The optional parallel `dbStoreLog` inside `PostgresFileStore` provides audit/recovery if enabled via `db_store_log` INI setting.
+
+The existing `withFileLog` pattern in Server.hs continues to work unchanged — it maps over `Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode)`, which is `Nothing` in Postgres mode so the calls become no-ops.
+
+### Main.hs Store Type Dispatch
+
+The `Start` CLI command gains a `--confirm-migrations` flag (default `MCConsole` — manual prompt, matching SMP's `StartOptions`). For automated deployments, `--confirm-migrations up` auto-applies forward migrations. The import command uses `MCYesUp` (always auto-apply).
+
+Following SMP's existential dispatch pattern (`AStoreType` + `run`), `Main.hs` selects the store type from INI config and dispatches to the polymorphic server:
+
+```haskell
+runServer ini = do
+  let storeType = fromRight "memory" $ lookupValue "STORE_LOG" "store_files" ini
+  case storeType of
+    "memory" -> run $ XSCMemory (enableStoreLog $> storeLogFilePath)
+    "database" ->
+#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
+      run $ XSCDatabase PostgresFileStoreCfg {..}
+#else
+      exitError "server not compiled with Postgres support"
+#endif
+    _ -> exitError $ "Invalid store_files value: " <> storeType
+  where
+    run :: FileStoreClass s => XFTPStoreConfig s -> IO ()
+    run storeCfg = do
+      env <- newXFTPServerEnv storeCfg config
+      runReaderT (xftpServer config) env
+```
+
+**`newXFTPServerEnv` refactored signature:**
+
+```haskell
+newXFTPServerEnv :: FileStoreClass s => XFTPStoreConfig s -> XFTPServerConfig -> IO (XFTPEnv s)
+newXFTPServerEnv storeCfg config = do
+  (store, storeLog) <- case storeCfg of
+    XSCMemory storeLogPath -> do
+      st <- newFileStore ()
+      sl <- mapM (`readWriteFileStore` st) storeLogPath
+      pure (st, sl)
+    XSCDatabase dbCfg -> do
+      st <- newFileStore dbCfg
+      pure (st, Nothing)  -- main storeLog disabled for Postgres
+  usedStorage <- newTVarIO =<< getUsedStorage store
+  ...
+  pure XFTPEnv {config, store, usedStorage, storeLog, ...}
+```
+
+### Startup Config Validation
+
+Following SMP's `checkMsgStoreMode` pattern, `Main.hs` validates config before starting:
+
+- **`store_files=database` + StoreLog file exists** (without `db_store_log=on`): Error — "StoreLog file present but store_files is `database`. Use `xftp-server database import` to migrate, or set `db_store_log: on`."
+- **`store_files=database` + schema doesn't exist**: Error — "Create schema in PostgreSQL or use `xftp-server database import`."
+- **`store_files=memory` + Postgres schema exists**: Warning — "Postgres schema exists but store_files is `memory`. Data in Postgres will not be used."
+- **Binary compiled without `server_postgres` + `store_files=database`**: Error — "Server not compiled with Postgres support."
+
+## Module Structure
+
+```
+src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/
+  Store.hs                    -- FileStoreClass typeclass + shared types (FileRec, FileRecipient, etc.)
+  Store/
+    STM.hs                    -- STMFileStore (extracted from current Store.hs)
+    Postgres.hs               -- PostgresFileStore                [CPP-guarded]
+    Postgres/
+      Migrations.hs           -- Schema migrations                [CPP-guarded]
+      Config.hs               -- PostgresFileStoreCfg             [CPP-guarded]
+  StoreLog.hs                 -- Unchanged (interchange format for both backends + migration)
+  Env.hs                      -- XFTPStoreConfig GADT, polymorphic XFTPEnv
+  Main.hs                     -- Store selection, migration CLI commands
+  Server.hs                   -- Polymorphic over FileStoreClass
+```
+
+## PostgreSQL Schema
+
+Initial migration (`20260325_initial`):
+
+```sql
+CREATE TABLE files (
+  sender_id BYTEA NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
+  file_size INT4 NOT NULL,
+  file_digest BYTEA NOT NULL,
+  sender_key BYTEA NOT NULL,
+  file_path TEXT,
+  created_at INT8 NOT NULL,
+  status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active'
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE recipients (
+  recipient_id BYTEA NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
+  sender_id BYTEA NOT NULL REFERENCES files ON DELETE CASCADE,
+  recipient_key BYTEA NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX idx_recipients_sender_id ON recipients (sender_id);
+CREATE INDEX idx_files_created_at ON files (created_at);
+```
+
+- `file_size` is `INT4` matching `Word32` in `FileInfo.size`
+- `sender_key` and `recipient_key` stored as `BYTEA` using binary encoding via `C.encodePubKey` / `C.decodePubKey` (matching SMP's `ToField`/`FromField` instances for `APublicAuthKey` — includes algorithm type tag in the binary format)
+- `file_path` nullable (set after upload completes via `setFilePath`)
+- `ON DELETE CASCADE` for recipients when file is hard-deleted
+- `created_at` stores rounded epoch seconds (1-hour precision, `RoundedFileTime`)
+- `status` as TEXT via `StrEncoding` (`ServerEntityStatus`: `EntityActive`, `EntityBlocked info`, `EntityOff`)
+- Hard deletes (no `deleted_at` column)
+- No PL/pgSQL functions needed; `setFilePath` uses `WHERE file_path IS NULL` to prevent duplicate uploads (the `UPDATE` itself acquires a row-level lock)
+- `used_storage` computed on startup: `SELECT COALESCE(SUM(file_size), 0) FROM files` (matches STM `countUsedStorage` — all files, see usedStorage Ownership section)
+
+### Migrations Module
+
+Following SMP's `QueueStore/Postgres/Migrations.hs` pattern:
+
+```haskell
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Migrations
+  ( xftpServerMigrations,
+  )
+where
+
+import Data.List (sortOn)
+import Data.Text (Text)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared
+import Text.RawString.QQ (r)
+
+xftpSchemaMigrations :: [(String, Text, Maybe Text)]
+xftpSchemaMigrations =
+  [ ("20260325_initial", m20260325_initial, Nothing)
+  ]
+
+xftpServerMigrations :: [Migration]
+xftpServerMigrations = sortOn name $ map migration xftpSchemaMigrations
+  where
+    migration (name, up, down) = Migration {name, up, down = down}
+
+m20260325_initial :: Text
+m20260325_initial =
+  [r|
+CREATE TABLE files (
+  sender_id BYTEA NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
+  ...
+);
+  |]
+```
+
+The `Migration` type (from `Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared`) has fields `{name :: String, up :: Text, down :: Maybe Text}`. Initial migration has `Nothing` for `down`. Future migrations should include `Just down_migration` for rollback support. Called via `createDBStore dbOpts xftpServerMigrations (MigrationConfig confirmMigrations Nothing)`.
+
+### Postgres Operations
+
+Key query patterns:
+
+- **`addFile`**: `INSERT INTO files (...) VALUES (...)`, return `DUPLICATE_` on unique violation.
+- **`setFilePath`**: `UPDATE files SET file_path = ? WHERE sender_id = ? AND file_path IS NULL`, verified with `assertUpdated` (returns `AUTH` if 0 rows affected — file not found or already uploaded). The `WHERE file_path IS NULL` prevents duplicate uploads; the `UPDATE` acquires a row lock implicitly. Only persists the path; `usedStorage` managed by server.
+- **`addRecipient`**: `INSERT INTO recipients (...)`, plus check for duplicates. No need for `recipientIds` TVar update — Postgres derives it from the table.
+- **`getFile`** (sender): `SELECT ... FROM files WHERE sender_id = ?`, returns auth key from `sender_key` column.
+- **`getFile`** (recipient): `SELECT f.*, r.recipient_key FROM recipients r JOIN files f ON ... WHERE r.recipient_id = ?`.
+- **`deleteFile`**: `DELETE FROM files WHERE sender_id = ?` (recipients cascade).
+- **`blockFile`**: `UPDATE files SET status = ? WHERE sender_id = ?`. When `deleted = True`, the server adjusts `usedStorage` externally (matching current STM behavior where `blockFile` only updates status and storage, not `filePath`).
+- **`expiredFiles`**: `SELECT sender_id, file_path, file_size FROM files WHERE created_at + ? < ? LIMIT ?` — batched query replaces per-file iteration, includes `file_size` for `usedStorage` adjustment. Called in a loop until no rows returned.
+
+## INI Configuration
+
+New keys in `[STORE_LOG]` section:
+
+```ini
+[STORE_LOG]
+enable: on
+store_files: memory            # memory | database
+db_connection: postgresql://xftp@/xftp_server_store
+db_schema: xftp_server
+db_pool_size: 10
+db_store_log: off
+expire_files_hours: 48
+```
+
+`store_files` selects the backend (`store_files` rather than `store_queues` because XFTP stores files, not queues):
+- `memory` -> `XSCMemory` (current behavior)
+- `database` -> `XSCDatabase` (requires `server_postgres` build flag)
+
+### INI Template Generation (`xftp-server init`)
+
+The `iniFileContent` function in `Main.hs` must be updated to generate the new keys in the `[STORE_LOG]` section. Following SMP's `iniDbOpts` pattern with `optDisabled'` (prefixes `"# "` when value equals default), Postgres keys are generated commented out by default:
+
+```ini
+[STORE_LOG]
+enable: on
+
+# File storage mode: `memory` or `database` (PostgreSQL).
+store_files: memory
+
+# Database connection settings for PostgreSQL database (`store_files: database`).
+# db_connection: postgresql://xftp@/xftp_server_store
+# db_schema: xftp_server
+# db_pool_size: 10
+
+# Write database changes to store log file
+# db_store_log: off
+
+expire_files_hours: 48
+```
+
+Reuses `iniDBOptions` from `Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI` for runtime parsing (falls back to defaults when keys are commented out or missing). `enableDbStoreLog'` pattern (`settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "db_store_log"`) controls `dbStoreLogPath`.
+
+### PostgresFileStoreCfg
+
+```haskell
+data PostgresFileStoreCfg = PostgresFileStoreCfg
+  { dbOpts :: DBOpts,
+    dbStoreLogPath :: Maybe FilePath,
+    confirmMigrations :: MigrationConfirmation
+  }
+```
+
+No `deletedTTL` (hard deletes).
+
+### Default DB Options
+
+```haskell
+defaultXFTPDBOpts :: DBOpts
+defaultXFTPDBOpts =
+  DBOpts
+    { connstr = "postgresql://xftp@/xftp_server_store",
+      schema = "xftp_server",
+      poolSize = 10,
+      createSchema = False
+    }
+```
+
+## Migration CLI
+
+Bidirectional migration via StoreLog as interchange format:
+
+```
+xftp-server database import [--database DB_CONN] [--schema DB_SCHEMA] [--pool-size N]
+xftp-server database export [--database DB_CONN] [--schema DB_SCHEMA] [--pool-size N]
+```
+
+No `--table` flag needed (unlike SMP which has queues/messages/all) — XFTP has a single entity type (files + recipients, always migrated together).
+
+CLI options reuse `dbOptsP` parser from `Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI`.
+
+### Import (StoreLog -> PostgreSQL)
+
+1. Confirm: prompt user with database connection details and StoreLog path
+2. Read and replay StoreLog into temporary `STMFileStore`
+3. Connect to PostgreSQL, run schema migrations (`createSchema = True`, `confirmMigrations = MCYesUp`)
+4. Batch-insert file records into `files` table using PostgreSQL COPY protocol (matching SMP's `batchInsertQueues` pattern for performance). Progress reported every 10k files.
+5. Batch-insert recipient records into `recipients` table using COPY protocol
+6. Verify counts: `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM files` / `recipients` — warn if mismatch
+7. Rename StoreLog to `.bak` (prevents accidental re-import, preserves original for rollback)
+8. Report counts
+
+### Export (PostgreSQL -> StoreLog)
+
+1. Confirm: prompt user with database connection details and output path. Fail if output file already exists.
+2. Connect to PostgreSQL
+3. Open new StoreLog file for writing
+4. Fold over all file records, writing per file (in this order, matching existing `writeFileStore`): `AddFile` (with `ServerEntityStatus` — this preserves `EntityBlocked` state), `AddRecipients`, then `PutFile` (if `file_path` is set)
+5. Report counts
+
+Note: `AddFile` carries `ServerEntityStatus` which includes `EntityBlocked info`, so blocking state is preserved through export/import without needing separate `BlockFile` log entries.
+
+File data on disk is untouched by migration — only metadata moves between backends.
+
+## Cabal Integration
+
+Shared `server_postgres` flag. New Postgres modules added to existing conditional block:
+
+```cabal
+if flag(server_postgres)
+  cpp-options: -DdbServerPostgres
+  exposed-modules:
+    ...existing SMP modules...
+    Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres
+    Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Migrations
+    Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config
+```
+
+CPP guards (`#if defined(dbServerPostgres)`) in:
+- `Store.hs` — Postgres `FromField`/`ToField` instances for XFTP-specific types if needed
+- `Env.hs` — `XSCDatabase` constructor
+- `Main.hs` — database CLI commands, store selection for `database` mode, Postgres imports
+- `Server.hs` — Postgres-specific imports if needed
+
+## Testing
+
+- **Parameterized server tests**: Existing `xftpServerTests` refactored to accept a store type parameter (following SMP's `SpecWith (ASrvTransport, AStoreType)` pattern). The same server tests run against both STM and Postgres backends — STM tests run unconditionally, Postgres tests added under `#if defined(dbServerPostgres)` with `postgressBracket` for database lifecycle (drop → create → test → drop).
+- **Unit tests**: `PostgresFileStore` operations — add/get/delete/block/expire, duplicate detection, auth errors
+- **Migration round-trip**: STM store → export to StoreLog → import to Postgres → export back → verify StoreLog equality (including blocked file status)
+- **Tests location**: in `tests/` alongside existing XFTP tests, guarded by `server_postgres` CPP flag
+- **Test database**: PostgreSQL on `localhost:5432`, using a dedicated `xftp_server_test` schema (dropped and recreated per test run via `postgressBracket`, following SMP's test database lifecycle pattern)
+- **Test fixtures**: `testXFTPStoreDBOpts :: DBOpts` with `createSchema = True`, `confirmMigrations = MCYesUp`, in `tests/XFTPClient.hs`

plans/2026-03-25-xftp-postgres-implementation-plan.md

@@ -0,0 +1,648 @@
+# XFTP PostgreSQL Backend — Implementation Plan
+
+> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED: Use superpowers-extended-cc:subagent-driven-development (if subagents available) or superpowers-extended-cc:executing-plans to implement this plan. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
+
+**Goal:** Add PostgreSQL backend support to xftp-server as an alternative to STM + StoreLog, with bidirectional migration.
+
+**Architecture:** Introduce `FileStoreClass` typeclass (IO-based, following `QueueStoreClass` pattern). Extract current STM store into `Store/STM.hs`, make `Server.hs` polymorphic, then add `Store/Postgres.hs` behind `server_postgres` CPP flag. `usedStorage` moves from store to `XFTPEnv` so the server manages quota tracking externally.
+
+**Tech Stack:** Haskell, postgresql-simple, STM, fourmolu, cabal with CPP flags
+
+**Design spec:** `plans/2026-03-25-xftp-postgres-backend-design.md`
+
+---
+
+## File Structure
+
+**Existing files modified:**
+- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs` — rewritten: becomes typeclass + shared types
+- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs` — polymorphic `XFTPEnv s`, `XFTPStoreConfig` GADT
+- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs` — polymorphic over `FileStoreClass s`
+- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/StoreLog.hs` — update for IO store functions
+- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs` — INI config, dispatch, CLI commands
+- `simplexmq.cabal` — new modules
+- `tests/XFTPClient.hs` — Postgres test fixtures
+- `tests/Test.hs` — Postgres test group
+
+**New files created:**
+- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/STM.hs` — `STMFileStore` (extracted from current `Store.hs`)
+- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs` — `PostgresFileStore` [CPP-guarded]
+- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Config.hs` — `PostgresFileStoreCfg` [CPP-guarded]
+- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Migrations.hs` — schema SQL [CPP-guarded]
+- `tests/CoreTests/XFTPStoreTests.hs` — Postgres store unit tests [CPP-guarded]
+
+---
+
+## Task 1: Move `usedStorage` from `FileStore` to `XFTPEnv`
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs`
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs`
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Remove `usedStorage` from `FileStore` in `Store.hs`**
+
+  1. Remove `usedStorage :: TVar Int64` field from `FileStore` record (line 47).
+  2. Remove `usedStorage <- newTVarIO 0` from `newFileStore` (line 75) and drop the field from the record construction (line 76).
+  3. In `setFilePath` (line 92-97): remove `modifyTVar' (usedStorage st) (+ fromIntegral (size fileInfo))` — keep only `writeTVar filePath (Just fPath)`. Change pattern from `\FileRec {fileInfo, filePath}` to `\FileRec {filePath}` (fileInfo is now unused — `-Wunused-matches` error).
+  4. In `deleteFile` (line 112-119): remove `modifyTVar' usedStorage $ subtract (fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)`. Change outer pattern match from `FileStore {files, recipients, usedStorage}` to `FileStore {files, recipients}`. Change inner pattern from `Just FileRec {fileInfo, recipientIds}` to `Just FileRec {recipientIds}` (`fileInfo` is now unused — `-Wunused-matches` error).
+  5. In `blockFile` (line 122-127): remove `when deleted $ modifyTVar' usedStorage $ subtract (fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)`. Change pattern match from `st@FileStore {usedStorage}` to `st`. The `deleted` parameter and `fileInfo` in the inner pattern become unused — prefix with `_` or remove from pattern to avoid `-Wunused-matches`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Add `usedStorage` to `XFTPEnv` in `Env.hs`**
+
+  1. Add `usedStorage :: TVar Int64` field to `XFTPEnv` record (between `store` and `storeLog`, line 93).
+  2. In `newXFTPServerEnv` (line 112-126): replace lines 117-118:
+     ```
+     used <- countUsedStorage <$> readTVarIO (files store)
+     atomically $ writeTVar (usedStorage store) used
+     ```
+     with:
+     ```
+     usedStorage <- newTVarIO =<< countUsedStorage <$> readTVarIO (files store)
+     ```
+  3. Add `usedStorage` to the `pure XFTPEnv {..}` construction.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Update all `usedStorage` access sites in `Server.hs`**
+
+  1. Line 552: `us <- asks $ usedStorage . store` → `us <- asks usedStorage`.
+  2. Line 569: `us <- asks $ usedStorage . store` → `us <- asks usedStorage`.
+  3. Line 639: `usedStart <- readTVarIO $ usedStorage st` → `usedStart <- readTVarIO =<< asks usedStorage`.
+  4. Line 647: `usedEnd <- readTVarIO $ usedStorage st` → `usedEnd <- readTVarIO =<< asks usedStorage`.
+  5. Line 694: `FileStore {files, usedStorage} <- asks store` → split into `FileStore {files} <- asks store` and `usedStorage <- asks usedStorage`.
+  6. In `deleteOrBlockServerFile_` (line 620): after `void $ atomically $ storeAction st`, add usedStorage adjustment — `us <- asks usedStorage` then `atomically $ modifyTVar' us $ subtract (fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)` when file had a path (check `path` from `readTVarIO filePath` earlier in the function).
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Build and verify**
+
+  Run: `cabal build`
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Run existing tests**
+
+  Run: `cabal test --test-show-details=streaming --test-option=--match="/XFTP/"`
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Format and commit**
+
+  ```bash
+  fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs
+  git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs
+  git commit -m "refactor(xftp): move usedStorage from FileStore to XFTPEnv"
+  ```
+
+---
+
+## Task 2: Add `getUsedStorage`, `getFileCount`, `expiredFiles` functions
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs`
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs`
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Add three new functions to `Store.hs`**
+
+  1. Add to exports: `getUsedStorage`, `getFileCount`, `expiredFiles`.
+  2. Remove `expiredFilePath` from exports AND delete the function definition (dead code → `-Wunused-binds` error). Also remove `($>>=)` from import `Simplex.Messaging.Util (ifM, ($>>=))` → `Simplex.Messaging.Util (ifM)` — `$>>=` was only used by `expiredFilePath`.
+  3. Add import: `qualified Data.Map.Strict as M` (needed for `M.foldl'` in `getUsedStorage` and `M.toList` in `expiredFiles`).
+  4. Implement:
+     ```haskell
+     getUsedStorage :: FileStore -> IO Int64
+     getUsedStorage FileStore {files} =
+       M.foldl' (\acc FileRec {fileInfo = FileInfo {size}} -> acc + fromIntegral size) 0 <$> readTVarIO files
+
+     getFileCount :: FileStore -> IO Int
+     getFileCount FileStore {files} = M.size <$> readTVarIO files
+
+     expiredFiles :: FileStore -> Int64 -> Int -> IO [(SenderId, Maybe FilePath, Word32)]
+     expiredFiles FileStore {files} old _limit = do
+       fs <- readTVarIO files
+       fmap catMaybes . forM (M.toList fs) $ \(sId, FileRec {fileInfo = FileInfo {size}, filePath, createdAt = RoundedSystemTime createdAt}) ->
+         if createdAt + fileTimePrecision < old
+           then do
+             path <- readTVarIO filePath
+             pure $ Just (sId, path, size)
+           else pure Nothing
+     ```
+  5. Add imports: `Data.Maybe (catMaybes)`, `Data.Word (Word32)` (note: `qualified Data.Map.Strict as M` already added in item 3).
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Replace `countUsedStorage` in `Env.hs`**
+
+  1. Replace `countUsedStorage <$> readTVarIO (files store)` with `getUsedStorage store` in `newXFTPServerEnv`.
+  2. Remove `countUsedStorage` function definition and its export.
+  3. Remove `qualified Data.Map.Strict as M` import if no longer used.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Update `restoreServerStats` in `Server.hs` to use `getFileCount`**
+
+  In `restoreServerStats` (line 694-696): replace `FileStore {files} <- asks store` and `_filesCount <- M.size <$> readTVarIO files` with `st <- asks store` and `_filesCount <- liftIO $ getFileCount st` (eliminates the `FileStore` pattern match — `files` binding no longer needed).
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Replace `expireServerFiles` iteration in `Server.hs`**
+
+  1. Replace the body of `expireServerFiles` (lines 636-660). Remove `files' <- readTVarIO (files st)` and the `forM_ (M.keys files')` loop.
+  2. New body: call `expiredFiles st old 10000` in a loop. For each `(sId, filePath_, fileSize)` in returned list: apply `itemDelay`, remove disk file if present, call `atomically $ deleteFile st sId`, adjust `usedStorage` TVar by `fileSize`, increment `filesExpired` stat. Loop until `expiredFiles` returns `[]`.
+  3. Remove `Data.Map.Strict` import from Server.hs if no longer needed (was used for `M.size` and `M.keys` — now replaced by `getFileCount` and `expiredFiles`).
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Build and verify**
+
+  Run: `cabal build`
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Run existing tests**
+
+  Run: `cabal test --test-show-details=streaming --test-option=--match="/XFTP/"`
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Format and commit**
+
+  ```bash
+  fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs
+  git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs
+  git commit -m "refactor(xftp): add getUsedStorage, getFileCount, expiredFiles store functions"
+  ```
+
+---
+
+## Task 3: Change `Store.hs` functions from STM to IO
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs`
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs`
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/StoreLog.hs`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Change all Store.hs function signatures from STM to IO**
+
+  For each of: `addFile`, `setFilePath`, `addRecipient`, `getFile`, `deleteFile`, `blockFile`, `deleteRecipient`, `ackFile`:
+  1. Change return type from `STM (Either XFTPErrorType ...)` to `IO (Either XFTPErrorType ...)` (or `STM ()` to `IO ()` for `deleteRecipient`).
+  2. Wrap the function body in `atomically $ do ...`.
+  3. Keep `withFile` and `newFileRec` as internal STM helpers (called inside the `atomically` blocks).
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Update Server.hs call sites — remove `atomically` wrappers**
+
+  1. Line 563 (`receiveServerFile`): change `atomically $ writeTVar filePath (Just fPath)` → add `st <- asks store` then `void $ liftIO $ setFilePath st senderId fPath` (design call site #1 — `store` is not in scope in `receiveServerFile`'s `receive` helper, so bind via `asks`; `void` avoids `-Wunused-do-bind` warning on the `Either` result).
+  2. Line 453 (`verifyXFTPTransmission`): split `atomically $ verify =<< getFile st party fId` into: `liftIO (getFile st party fId)` (IO→M lift), then pattern match on result, use `readTVarIO (fileStatus fr)` instead of `readTVar`.
+  3. Lines 371, 377 (control port `CPDelete`/`CPBlock`): change `ExceptT $ atomically $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId` → `ExceptT $ liftIO $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId` (inside `unliftIO u $ do` block which runs in M monad — `liftIO` required to lift IO into M).
+  4. Line 508 (`addFile` in `createFile`): the `ExceptT $ addFile st sId file ts EntityActive` — `addFile` is now IO, `ExceptT` wraps IO directly. Remove any `atomically`.
+  5. Line 514 (`addRecipient`): same — `ExceptT . addRecipient st sId` works directly in IO.
+  6. Line 516 (`retryAdd`): change parameter type from `(XFTPFileId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a))` to `(XFTPFileId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a))`. Line 520: change `atomically (add fId)` to `liftIO (add fId)`.
+  7. Line 605 (`ackFileReception`): change `atomically $ deleteRecipient st rId fr` to `liftIO $ deleteRecipient st rId fr`.
+  8. Line 620 (`deleteOrBlockServerFile_`): change third parameter type from `(FileStore -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ()))` to `(FileStore -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ()))`. Line 626: change `void $ atomically $ storeAction st` to `void $ liftIO $ storeAction st`.
+  9. `expireServerFiles` `delete` helper: change `atomically $ deleteFile st sId` to `liftIO $ deleteFile st sId` (deleteFile is now IO; `liftIO` required because the helper runs in M monad, not IO).
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Update `StoreLog.hs` — remove `atomically` from replay**
+
+  In `readFileStore` (line 93), function `addToStore`:
+  1. Change `atomically (addToStore lr)` to `addToStore lr` — store functions are now IO.
+  2. The `addToStore` body calls `addFile`, `setFilePath`, `deleteFile`, `blockFile`, `ackFile` — all IO now, no `atomically` needed.
+  3. For `AddRecipients`: `runExceptT $ mapM_ (ExceptT . addRecipient st sId) rcps` — `addRecipient` returns `IO (Either ...)`, so `ExceptT . addRecipient st sId` works directly.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Build and verify**
+
+  Run: `cabal build`
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Run existing tests**
+
+  Run: `cabal test --test-show-details=streaming --test-option=--match="/XFTP/"`
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Format and commit**
+
+  ```bash
+  fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/StoreLog.hs
+  git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/StoreLog.hs
+  git commit -m "refactor(xftp): change file store operations from STM to IO"
+  ```
+
+---
+
+## Task 4: Extract `FileStoreClass` typeclass, move STM impl to `Store/STM.hs`
+
+**Files:**
+- Rewrite: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs`
+- Create: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/STM.hs`
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/StoreLog.hs`
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs`
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs`
+- Modify: `simplexmq.cabal`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Create `Store/STM.hs` — move all implementation code**
+
+  1. Create directory `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/`.
+  2. Create `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/STM.hs`.
+  3. Move from `Store.hs`: `FileStore` data type (rename to `STMFileStore`), all function implementations, internal helpers (`withFile`, `newFileRec`), all STM-specific imports.
+  4. Rename all `FileStore` references to `STMFileStore` in the new file.
+  5. Module declaration: `module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.STM` exporting only `STMFileStore (..)` — do NOT export standalone functions (`addFile`, `setFilePath`, etc.) to avoid name collisions with the typeclass methods from `Store.hs`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Rewrite `Store.hs` as the typeclass module**
+
+  1. Add `{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}` pragma to `Store.hs` (required for `type FileStoreConfig s` associated type).
+  2. Keep in `Store.hs`: `FileRec (..)`, `FileRecipient (..)`, `RoundedFileTime`, `fileTimePrecision` definitions and their `StrEncoding` instance.
+  3. Add `FileStoreClass` typeclass:
+     ```haskell
+     class FileStoreClass s where
+       type FileStoreConfig s
+
+       -- Lifecycle
+       newFileStore :: FileStoreConfig s -> IO s
+       closeFileStore :: s -> IO ()
+
+       -- File operations
+       addFile :: s -> SenderId -> FileInfo -> RoundedFileTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+       setFilePath :: s -> SenderId -> FilePath -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+       addRecipient :: s -> SenderId -> FileRecipient -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+       getFile :: s -> SFileParty p -> XFTPFileId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType (FileRec, C.APublicAuthKey))
+       deleteFile :: s -> SenderId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+       blockFile :: s -> SenderId -> BlockingInfo -> Bool -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+       deleteRecipient :: s -> RecipientId -> FileRec -> IO ()
+       ackFile :: s -> RecipientId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+
+       -- Expiration
+       expiredFiles :: s -> Int64 -> Int -> IO [(SenderId, Maybe FilePath, Word32)]
+
+       -- Stats
+       getUsedStorage :: s -> IO Int64
+       getFileCount :: s -> IO Int
+     ```
+  4. Do NOT re-export from `Store/STM.hs` — this would create a circular module dependency (Store.hs imports Store/STM.hs, Store/STM.hs imports Store.hs). Consumers must import `Store.STM` directly where they need `STMFileStore`.
+  5. Remove all STM-specific imports that are no longer needed.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Add `FileStoreClass` instance in `Store/STM.hs`**
+
+  1. Import `FileStoreClass` from `Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store`.
+  2. Inline all implementations directly in the instance body (do NOT delegate to standalone functions — the standalone names collide with typeclass method names, causing ambiguous occurrences for importers):
+     ```haskell
+     instance FileStoreClass STMFileStore where
+       type FileStoreConfig STMFileStore = ()
+       newFileStore () = do
+         files <- TM.emptyIO
+         recipients <- TM.emptyIO
+         pure STMFileStore {files, recipients}
+       closeFileStore _ = pure ()
+       addFile st sId fileInfo createdAt status = atomically $ ...
+       setFilePath st sId fPath = atomically $ ...
+       -- ... (each method's body is the existing function body, inlined)
+     ```
+  3. Remove the standalone top-level function definitions — they are now instance methods. Keep only `withFile` and `newFileRec` as internal helpers used by the instance methods.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Update importers**
+
+  1. `Env.hs`: add `import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.STM (STMFileStore (..))`. Change `FileStore` → `STMFileStore` in `XFTPEnv` type and `newXFTPServerEnv`. Change `store <- newFileStore` to `store <- newFileStore ()` (typeclass method now takes `FileStoreConfig STMFileStore` which is `()`). Keep `import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store` for `FileRec`, `FileRecipient`, `FileStoreClass`, etc.
+  2. `Server.hs`: add `import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.STM`. Change `FileStore` → `STMFileStore` in any explicit type annotations. Import `FileStoreClass` from `Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store`.
+  3. `StoreLog.hs`: add `import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.STM` to access concrete `STMFileStore` type and store functions used during log replay. Change `FileStore` → `STMFileStore` in `readWriteFileStore` and `writeFileStore` parameter types.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Update cabal file**
+
+  Add `Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.STM` to `exposed-modules` in the `!flag(client_library)` section, alongside existing XFTP server modules.
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Build and verify**
+
+  Run: `cabal build`
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Run existing tests**
+
+  Run: `cabal test --test-show-details=streaming --test-option=--match="/XFTP/"`
+
+- [ ] **Step 8: Format and commit**
+
+  ```bash
+  fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/STM.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/StoreLog.hs
+  git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/STM.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/StoreLog.hs simplexmq.cabal
+  git commit -m "refactor(xftp): extract FileStoreClass typeclass, move STM impl to Store.STM"
+  ```
+
+---
+
+## Task 5: Make `XFTPEnv` and `Server.hs` polymorphic over `FileStoreClass`
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs`
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs`
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs`
+- Modify: `tests/XFTPClient.hs` (if it calls `runXFTPServerBlocking` directly)
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Make `XFTPEnv` polymorphic in `Env.hs`**
+
+  1. Add `XFTPStoreConfig` GADT: `data XFTPStoreConfig s where XSCMemory :: Maybe FilePath -> XFTPStoreConfig STMFileStore`.
+  2. Change `data XFTPEnv` to `data XFTPEnv s` — field `store :: FileStore` becomes `store :: s`.
+  3. Change `newXFTPServerEnv :: XFTPServerConfig -> IO XFTPEnv` to `newXFTPServerEnv :: FileStoreClass s => XFTPStoreConfig s -> XFTPServerConfig -> IO (XFTPEnv s)`.
+  4. Pattern match on `XSCMemory storeLogPath` in `newXFTPServerEnv` body. Create store via `newFileStore ()`, storeLog via `mapM (`readWriteFileStore` st) storeLogPath`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Make `Server.hs` polymorphic**
+
+  1. Change `type M a = ReaderT XFTPEnv IO a` to `type M s a = ReaderT (XFTPEnv s) IO a`.
+  2. Add `FileStoreClass s =>` constraint to all functions using `M s a`. Use `forall s.` in signatures of functions that have `where`-block bindings with `M s` type annotations — `ScopedTypeVariables` requires explicit `forall` to bring `s` into scope for inner type signatures (matching SMP's `smpServer :: forall s. MsgStoreClass s => ...` pattern). Full list: `xftpServer`, `processRequest`, `verifyXFTPTransmission`, `processXFTPRequest` and all its `where`-bound functions (`createFile`, `addRecipients`, `receiveServerFile`, `sendServerFile`, `deleteServerFile`, `ackFileReception`, `retryAdd`, `addFileRetry`, `addRecipientRetry`), `deleteServerFile_`, `blockServerFile`, `deleteOrBlockServerFile_`, `expireServerFiles`, `randomId`, `getFileId`, `withFileLog`, `incFileStat`, `saveServerStats`, `restoreServerStats`, `randomDelay` (inside `#ifdef slow_servers` CPP block). Also update `encodeXftp` (line 236) and `runCPClient` (line 339) which use explicit `ReaderT XFTPEnv IO` instead of the `M` alias — change to `ReaderT (XFTPEnv s) IO`.
+  3. Change `runXFTPServerBlocking` and `runXFTPServer` to take `XFTPStoreConfig s` parameter.
+  4. Add `closeFileStore store` call to the server shutdown path (in the `finally` block or `stopServer` equivalent — after saving stats, before logging "Server stopped"). This ensures Postgres connection pool and `dbStoreLog` are properly closed. For STM this is a no-op.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Update `Main.hs` dispatch**
+
+  1. In `runServer`: construct `XSCMemory (enableStoreLog $> storeLogFilePath)`.
+  2. Add dispatch function that calls the updated `runXFTPServer` (which creates `started` internally):
+     ```haskell
+     run :: FileStoreClass s => XFTPStoreConfig s -> IO ()
+     run storeCfg = runXFTPServer storeCfg serverConfig
+     ```
+  3. Call `run` with the `XSCMemory` config.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Update test helper if needed**
+
+  If `tests/XFTPClient.hs` calls `runXFTPServerBlocking` directly, update the call to pass an `XSCMemory` config. Check the `withXFTPServer` / `serverBracket` helper.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Build and verify**
+
+  Run: `cabal build && cabal build test:simplexmq-test`
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Run existing tests**
+
+  Run: `cabal test --test-show-details=streaming --test-option=--match="/XFTP/"`
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Format and commit**
+
+  ```bash
+  fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs
+  git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs tests/XFTPClient.hs simplexmq.cabal
+  git commit -m "refactor(xftp): make XFTPEnv and server polymorphic over FileStoreClass"
+  ```
+
+---
+
+## Task 6: Add Postgres config, migrations, and store skeleton
+
+**Files:**
+- Create: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Config.hs`
+- Create: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Migrations.hs`
+- Create: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs`
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs`
+- Modify: `simplexmq.cabal`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Create `Store/Postgres/Config.hs`**
+
+  ```haskell
+  module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config
+    ( PostgresFileStoreCfg (..),
+      defaultXFTPDBOpts,
+    )
+  where
+
+  import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Options (DBOpts (..))
+  import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (MigrationConfirmation)
+
+  data PostgresFileStoreCfg = PostgresFileStoreCfg
+    { dbOpts :: DBOpts,
+      dbStoreLogPath :: Maybe FilePath,
+      confirmMigrations :: MigrationConfirmation
+    }
+
+  defaultXFTPDBOpts :: DBOpts
+  defaultXFTPDBOpts =
+    DBOpts
+      { connstr = "postgresql://xftp@/xftp_server_store",
+        schema = "xftp_server",
+        poolSize = 10,
+        createSchema = False
+      }
+  ```
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Create `Store/Postgres/Migrations.hs`**
+
+  Full migration module with `xftpServerMigrations :: [Migration]` and `m20260325_initial` containing CREATE TABLE SQL for `files` and `recipients` tables plus indexes. Follow SMP's `QueueStore/Postgres/Migrations.hs` pattern exactly: tuple list → `sortOn name . map migration`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Create `Store/Postgres.hs` with stub instance**
+
+  1. Define `PostgresFileStore` with `dbStore :: DBStore` and `dbStoreLog :: Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode)`.
+  2. `instance FileStoreClass PostgresFileStore` with `error "not implemented"` for all methods except `newFileStore` (calls `createDBStore` + opens `dbStoreLog`) and `closeFileStore` (closes both). `type FileStoreConfig PostgresFileStore = PostgresFileStoreCfg`.
+  3. Add `withDB`, `handleDuplicate`, `assertUpdated`, `withLog` helpers.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Add `XSCDatabase` GADT constructor in `Env.hs` (CPP-guarded)**
+
+  ```haskell
+  #if defined(dbServerPostgres)
+  import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres (PostgresFileStore)
+  import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config (PostgresFileStoreCfg)
+  #endif
+
+  data XFTPStoreConfig s where
+    XSCMemory :: Maybe FilePath -> XFTPStoreConfig STMFileStore
+  #if defined(dbServerPostgres)
+    XSCDatabase :: PostgresFileStoreCfg -> XFTPStoreConfig PostgresFileStore
+  #endif
+  ```
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Update cabal**
+
+  Add to existing `if flag(server_postgres)` block:
+  ```
+  Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres
+  Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config
+  Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Migrations
+  ```
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Build both ways**
+
+  Run: `cabal build && cabal build -fserver_postgres`
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Format and commit**
+
+  ```bash
+  fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Config.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs
+  git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Config.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Migrations.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs simplexmq.cabal
+  git commit -m "feat(xftp): add PostgreSQL store skeleton with schema migration"
+  ```
+
+---
+
+## Task 7: Implement `PostgresFileStore` operations
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Implement `addFile`**
+
+  `INSERT INTO files (sender_id, file_size, file_digest, sender_key, file_path, created_at, status) VALUES (?,?,?,?,NULL,?,?)`. Catch unique violation with `handleDuplicate` → `DUPLICATE_`. Call `withLog "addFile"` after.
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Implement `getFile`**
+
+  For `SFSender`: `SELECT ... FROM files WHERE sender_id = ?`. Construct `FileRec` with `newTVarIO` per TVar field. `recipientIds = S.empty`.
+  For `SFRecipient`: `SELECT f.*, r.recipient_key FROM recipients r JOIN files f ON r.sender_id = f.sender_id WHERE r.recipient_id = ?`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Implement `setFilePath`**
+
+  `UPDATE files SET file_path = ? WHERE sender_id = ? AND file_path IS NULL`. Use `assertUpdated`. Call `withLog "setFilePath"`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Implement `addRecipient`**
+
+  `INSERT INTO recipients (recipient_id, sender_id, recipient_key) VALUES (?,?,?)`. `handleDuplicate` → `DUPLICATE_`. Call `withLog "addRecipient"`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Implement `deleteFile`, `blockFile`**
+
+  `deleteFile`: `DELETE FROM files WHERE sender_id = ?` (CASCADE). `withLog "deleteFile"`.
+  `blockFile`: `UPDATE files SET status = ? WHERE sender_id = ?`. `assertUpdated`. `withLog "blockFile"`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Implement `deleteRecipient`, `ackFile`**
+
+  `deleteRecipient`: `DELETE FROM recipients WHERE recipient_id = ?`. `withLog "deleteRecipient"`.
+  `ackFile`: same + return `Left AUTH` if 0 rows.
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Implement `expiredFiles`, `getUsedStorage`, `getFileCount`**
+
+  `expiredFiles`: `SELECT sender_id, file_path, file_size FROM files WHERE created_at + ? < ? LIMIT ?`.
+  `getUsedStorage`: `SELECT COALESCE(SUM(file_size), 0) FROM files`.
+  `getFileCount`: `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM files`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 8: Add `ToField`/`FromField` instances**
+
+  For `RoundedFileTime` (Int64 wrapper), `ServerEntityStatus` (Text via StrEncoding), `C.APublicAuthKey` (Binary via `encodePubKey`/`decodePubKey`). Check SMP's `QueueStore/Postgres.hs` for existing instances to import.
+
+- [ ] **Step 9: Wrap mutation operations in `uninterruptibleMask_`**
+
+  Operations that combine a DB write with a TVar update (e.g., `getFile` constructs `FileRec` with `newTVarIO`) must be wrapped in `E.uninterruptibleMask_` to prevent async exceptions from leaving inconsistent state. Follow SMP's `addQueue_`, `deleteStoreQueue` pattern.
+
+- [ ] **Step 10: Build**
+
+  Run: `cabal build -fserver_postgres`
+
+- [ ] **Step 11: Format and commit**
+
+  ```bash
+  fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs
+  git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs
+  git commit -m "feat(xftp): implement PostgresFileStore operations"
+  ```
+
+---
+
+## Task 8: Add INI config, Main.hs dispatch, startup validation
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs`
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Update `iniFileContent` in `Main.hs`**
+
+  Add to `[STORE_LOG]` section: `store_files: memory`, commented-out `db_connection`, `db_schema`, `db_pool_size`, `db_store_log` keys. Follow SMP's `optDisabled'` pattern for commented defaults.
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Add `StartOptions` and `--confirm-migrations` flag**
+
+  ```haskell
+  data StartOptions = StartOptions
+    { confirmMigrations :: MigrationConfirmation
+    }
+  ```
+  Add to `Start` command parser with default `MCConsole`. Thread through to `runServer`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Add store_files INI parsing and CPP-guarded Postgres dispatch**
+
+  In `runServer`: read `store_files` from INI (`fromRight "memory" $ lookupValue "STORE_LOG" "store_files" ini`). Add `"database"` branch (CPP-guarded) that constructs `PostgresFileStoreCfg` using `iniDBOptions ini defaultXFTPDBOpts` and `enableDbStoreLog'` pattern. Non-postgres build: `exitError`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Add `XSCDatabase` branch in `newXFTPServerEnv` (`Env.hs`)**
+
+  CPP-guarded pattern match on `XSCDatabase dbCfg`: `newFileStore dbCfg`, `storeLog = Nothing`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Add startup config validation**
+
+  Add `checkFileStoreMode` (CPP-guarded) before `run`: validate conflicting storeLog file + database mode, missing schema, etc. per design doc.
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Build both ways**
+
+  Run: `cabal build && cabal build -fserver_postgres`
+
+- [ ] **Step 7: Format and commit**
+
+  ```bash
+  fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs
+  git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs
+  git commit -m "feat(xftp): add PostgreSQL INI config, store dispatch, startup validation"
+  ```
+
+---
+
+## Task 9: Add database import/export CLI commands
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Add `Database` CLI command (CPP-guarded)**
+
+  Add `Database StoreCmd DBOpts` constructor to `CliCommand`. Add `database` subcommand parser with `import`/`export` subcommands + `dbOptsP defaultXFTPDBOpts`.
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Implement `importFileStoreToDatabase`**
+
+  1. `confirmOrExit` with database details.
+  2. Create temporary `STMFileStore`, replay StoreLog via `readWriteFileStore`.
+  3. Create `PostgresFileStore` with `createSchema = True`, `confirmMigrations = MCYesUp`.
+  4. Batch-insert files using PostgreSQL COPY protocol. Progress every 10k.
+  5. Batch-insert recipients using COPY protocol.
+  6. Verify counts: `SELECT COUNT(*)` — warn on mismatch.
+  7. Rename StoreLog to `.bak`.
+  8. Report counts.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Implement `exportDatabaseToStoreLog`**
+
+  1. `confirmOrExit`. Fail if output file exists.
+  2. Create `PostgresFileStore` from config.
+  3. Open StoreLog for writing.
+  4. Fold over file records: write `AddFile` (with status), `AddRecipients`, `PutFile` per file.
+  5. Close StoreLog, report counts.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Build**
+
+  Run: `cabal build -fserver_postgres`
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Format and commit**
+
+  ```bash
+  fourmolu -i src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs
+  git add src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs
+  git commit -m "feat(xftp): add database import/export CLI commands"
+  ```
+
+---
+
+## Task 10: Add Postgres tests
+
+**Files:**
+- Modify: `tests/XFTPClient.hs`
+- Modify: `tests/Test.hs`
+- Create: `tests/CoreTests/XFTPStoreTests.hs`
+
+- [ ] **Step 1: Add test fixtures in `tests/XFTPClient.hs`**
+
+  ```haskell
+  testXFTPStoreDBOpts :: DBOpts
+  testXFTPStoreDBOpts =
+    DBOpts
+      { connstr = "postgresql://test_xftp_server_user@/test_xftp_server_db",
+        schema = "xftp_server_test",
+        poolSize = 10,
+        createSchema = True
+      }
+  ```
+  Add `testXFTPDBConnectInfo :: ConnectInfo` matching the connection string.
+
+- [ ] **Step 2: Add Postgres server test group in `tests/Test.hs`**
+
+  CPP-guarded block that runs existing `xftpServerTests` with Postgres store config, wrapped in `postgressBracket testXFTPDBConnectInfo`. Parameterize `withXFTPServer` to accept store config if needed.
+
+- [ ] **Step 3: Create `tests/CoreTests/XFTPStoreTests.hs` — unit tests**
+
+  Test `PostgresFileStore` operations directly:
+  - `addFile` + `getFile SFSender` round-trip.
+  - `addFile` duplicate → `DUPLICATE_`.
+  - `getFile` nonexistent → `AUTH`.
+  - `setFilePath` + verify `WHERE file_path IS NULL` guard.
+  - `addRecipient` + `getFile SFRecipient` round-trip.
+  - `deleteFile` cascades recipients.
+  - `blockFile` + verify status.
+  - `expiredFiles` batch semantics.
+  - `getUsedStorage`, `getFileCount` correctness.
+
+- [ ] **Step 4: Add migration round-trip test**
+
+  Create `STMFileStore` with test data (files + recipients + blocked status) → export to StoreLog → import to Postgres → export back → compare StoreLog files byte-for-byte.
+
+- [ ] **Step 5: Build and run tests**
+
+  ```bash
+  cabal build -fserver_postgres test:simplexmq-test
+  cabal test --test-show-details=streaming --test-option=--match="/XFTP/" -fserver_postgres
+  ```
+
+- [ ] **Step 6: Format and commit**
+
+  ```bash
+  fourmolu -i tests/CoreTests/XFTPStoreTests.hs tests/XFTPClient.hs
+  git add tests/CoreTests/XFTPStoreTests.hs tests/XFTPClient.hs tests/Test.hs
+  git commit -m "test(xftp): add PostgreSQL backend tests"
+  ```

protocol/overview-tjr.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-Revision 2, 2024-06-22
+Revision 4, 2026-03-09
 
 Evgeny Poberezkin
 
@@ -8,16 +8,17 @@ Evgeny Poberezkin
 
 - [Introduction](#introduction)
   - [What is SimpleX](#what-is-simplex)
+  - [Network model](#network-model)
+  - [Applications](#applications)
   - [SimpleX objectives](#simplex-objectives)
   - [In Comparison](#in-comparison)
 - [Technical Details](#technical-details)
-  - [Trust in Servers](#trust-in-servers)
-  - [Client -> Server Communication](#client---server-communication)
+  - [Trust in Routers](#trust-in-routers)
+  - [Client -> Router Communication](#client---router-communication)
   - [2-hop Onion Message Routing](#2-hop-onion-message-routing)
   - [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](#simplex-messaging-protocol)
   - [SimpleX Agents](#simplex-agents)
-  - [Encryption Primitives Used](#encryption-primitives-used)
-- [Threat model](#threat-model)
+- [Security](#security)
 - [Acknowledgements](#acknowledgements)
 
 
@@ -27,27 +28,27 @@ Evgeny Poberezkin
 
 SimpleX as a whole is a platform upon which applications can be built. [SimpleX Chat](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat) is one such application that also serves as an example and reference application.
 
- - [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](./simplex-messaging.md) (SMP) is a protocol to send messages in one direction to a recipient, relying on a server in-between. The messages are delivered via uni-directional queues created by recipients.
- 
- - SMP protocol allows to send message via a SMP server playing proxy role using 2-hop onion routing (referred to as "private routing" in messaging clients) to protect transport information of the sender (IP address and session) from the server chosen (and possibly controlled) by the recipient.
+ - [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](./simplex-messaging.md) (SMP) is a protocol to send messages in one direction to a recipient, relying on a router in-between. The messages are delivered via uni-directional queues created by recipients.
+
+ - SMP protocol allows to send message via a SMP router playing proxy role using 2-hop onion routing (referred to as "private routing" in messaging clients) to protect transport information of the sender (IP address and session) from the router chosen (and possibly controlled) by the recipient.
 
  - SMP runs over a transport protocol (shown below as TLS) that provides integrity, server authentication, confidentiality, and transport channel binding.
 
- - A SimpleX Server is one of those servers.
+ - A SimpleX router is one of those routers.
 
- - The SimpleX Network is the term used for the collective of SimpleX Servers that facilitate SMP.
+ - The SimpleX Network is the term used for the collective of SimpleX routers that facilitate SMP.
 
- - SimpleX Client libraries speak SMP to SimpleX Servers and provide a low-level API not generally intended to be used by applications.
+ - SimpleX Client libraries speak SMP to SimpleX routers and provide a low-level API not generally intended to be used by applications.
 
  - SimpleX Agents interface with SimpleX Clients to provide a more high-level API intended to be used by applications. Typically they are embedded as libraries, but can also be abstracted into local services.
 
  - SimpleX Agents communicate with other agents inside e2e encrypted envelopes provided by SMP protocol - the syntax and semantics of the messages exchanged by the agent are defined by [SMP agent protocol](./agent-protocol.md)
 
 
-*Diagram showing the SimpleX Chat app, with logical layers of the chat application interfacing with a SimpleX Agent library, which in turn interfaces with a SimpleX Client library. The Client library in turn speaks the Messaging Protocol to a SimpleX Server.*
+*Diagram showing the SimpleX Chat app, with logical layers of the chat application interfacing with a SimpleX Agent library, which in turn interfaces with a SimpleX Client library. The Client library in turn speaks the Messaging Protocol to a SimpleX router.*
 
 ```
-  User's Computer                 Internet                    Third-Party Server
+  User's Computer                 Internet                    Third-Party Router
 ------------------     |   ----------------------     |   -------------------------
                        |                              |
    SimpleX Chat        |                              |
@@ -57,11 +58,43 @@ SimpleX as a whole is a platform upon which applications can be built. [SimpleX
 +----------------+     |                              |
 |  SimpleX Agent |     |                              |
 +----------------+    -------------- TLS ----------------    +----------------+
-| SimpleX Client | ------ SimpleX Messaging Protocol ------> | SimpleX Server |
+| SimpleX Client | ------ SimpleX Messaging Protocol ------> | SimpleX router |
 +----------------+    -----------------------------------    +----------------+
                        |                              |
 ```
 
+#### Network model
+
+SimpleX is a general-purpose packet routing network built on top of the Internet. Network endpoints — end-user devices, automated services, AI-enabled applications, IoT devices — exchange data packets through SimpleX network nodes (SMP routers), which accept, buffer, and deliver packets. Each router operates independently and can be operated by any party on standard computing hardware.
+
+SimpleX routers use resource-based addressing: each address identifies a resource on a router, similar to how the World Wide Web addresses resources via URLs. Internet routers, by comparison, use endpoint-based addressing, where IP addresses identify destination devices. Because of this design, SimpleX network participants do not need globally unique addresses to communicate.
+
+SimpleX network has two resource-based addressing schemes:
+
+- *Messaging queues* ([SMP](./simplex-messaging.md)). A queue is a unidirectional, ordered sequence of fixed-size data packets (16,384 bytes each). Each queue has a resource address on a specific router, gated by cryptographic credentials that separately authorize sending and receiving.
+
+- *Data packets* ([XFTP](./xftp.md)). A data packet is an individually addressed block in one of the standard sizes. Each packet has a unique resource address on a specific router, gated by cryptographic credentials. Data packet addressing is more efficient for delivery of larger payloads than queues.
+
+Packet delivery follows a two-router path. The sending endpoint submits a packet to a first router, which forwards it to a second router, where the receiving endpoint retrieves it. The sending endpoint's IP address is known only to the first router; the receiving endpoint's IP address is known only to the second router. See [2-hop Onion Message Routing](#2-hop-onion-message-routing) for details.
+
+Routers buffer packets between submission and retrieval — from seconds to days, enabling asynchronous delivery when endpoints are online at different times. Packets are removed after delivery or after a configured expiration period.
+
+
+#### Applications
+
+Applications currently using SimpleX network:
+
+- **SimpleX Chat** — a peer-to-peer messenger using SimpleX network as a transport layer, in the same way that communication applications use WebRTC, Tor, i2p, or Nym. All communication logic — contacts, conversations, groups, message formats, end-to-end encryption — runs on endpoint devices.
+
+- **IoT devices** — using the SimpleX queue protocol directly for sensor data collection and device control.
+
+- **AI-based services** — automated services built on the SimpleX Chat application core.
+
+- **Secure monitoring and control systems** — applications for equipment monitoring and control, including robotics, using the network for command delivery and telemetry collection.
+
+[SimpleGo](https://simplego.dev), developed by an independent organization, is a microcontroller-based device running a SimpleX Chat-compatible messenger directly on a microcontroller without a general-purpose operating system. Running over 20 days on a single battery charge, it demonstrates the energy efficiency of resource-based addressing: the device receives packets without continuous polling. A microcontroller-based router implementation that functions simultaneously as a WiFi router is also in development.
+
+
 #### SimpleX objectives
 
 1. Provide messaging infrastructure for distributed applications. This infrastructure needs to have the following qualities:
@@ -70,7 +103,7 @@ SimpleX as a whole is a platform upon which applications can be built. [SimpleX
 
    - Privacy: protect against traffic correlation attacks to determine the contacts that the users communicate with.
 
-   - Reliability: the messages should be delivered even if some participating network servers or receiving clients fail, with “at least once” delivery guarantee.
+   - Reliability: the messages should be delivered even if some participating network routers or receiving clients fail, with "at least once" delivery guarantee.
 
    - Integrity: the messages sent in one direction are ordered in a way that sender and recipient agree on; the recipient can detect when a message was removed or changed.
 
@@ -78,63 +111,63 @@ SimpleX as a whole is a platform upon which applications can be built. [SimpleX
 
    - Low latency: the delay introduced by the network should not be higher than 100ms-1s in addition to the underlying TCP network latency.
 
-2. Provide better communication security and privacy than the alternative instant messaging solutions. In particular SimpleX provides better privacy of metadata (who talks to whom and when) and better security against active network attackers and malicious servers.
+2. Provide better communication security and privacy than the alternative instant messaging solutions. In particular SimpleX provides better privacy of metadata (who talks to whom and when) and better security against active network attackers and malicious routers.
 
 3. Balance user experience with privacy requirements, prioritizing experience of mobile device users.
 
 
 #### In Comparison
 
-SimpleX network has a design similar to P2P networks, but unlike most P2P networks it consists of clients and servers without depending on any centralized component.
+SimpleX network has a design similar to P2P networks, but unlike most P2P networks it consists of clients and routers without depending on any centralized component.
 In comparison to more traditional messaging applications (e.g. WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram) the key differences of SimpleX network are:
 
 - participants do not need to have globally unique addresses to communicate, instead they use redundant unidirectional (simplex) messaging queues, with a separate set of queues for each contact.
 
 - connection requests are passed out-of-band, non-optionally protecting key exchange against man-in-the-middle attack.
 
-- simple message queues provided by network servers are used by the clients to create more complex communication scenarios, such as duplex one-to-one communication, transmitting files, group communication without central servers, and content/communication channels.
+- simple message queues provided by network routers are used by the clients to create more complex communication scenarios, such as duplex one-to-one communication, transmitting files, group communication without central routers, and content/communication channels.
 
-- servers do not store any user information (no user profiles or contacts, or messages once they are delivered), and primarily use in-memory persistence.
+- routers do not store any user information (no user profiles or contacts, or messages once they are delivered), and primarily use in-memory persistence.
 
-- users can change servers with minimal disruption - even after an in-use server disappears, simply by changing the configuration on which servers the new queues are created.
+- users can change routers with minimal disruption - even after an in-use router disappears, simply by changing the configuration on which routers the new queues are created.
 
 
 ## Technical Details
 
-#### Trust in Servers
+#### Trust in Routers
 
-Clients communicate directly with servers (but not with other clients) using SimpleX Messaging Protocol (SMP) running over some transport protocol that provides integrity, server authentication, confidentiality, and transport channel binding. By default, we assume this transport protocol is TLS.
+Clients communicate directly with routers (but not with other clients) using SimpleX Messaging Protocol (SMP) running over some transport protocol that provides integrity, server authentication, confidentiality, and transport channel binding. By default, we assume this transport protocol is TLS.
 
-Users use multiple servers, and choose where to receive their messages. Accordingly, they send messages to their communication partners' chosen servers either directly, if this is a known/trusted server, or via another SMP server providing proxy functionality to protect IP address and session of the sender.
+Users use multiple routers, and choose where to receive their messages. Accordingly, they send messages to their communication partners' chosen routers either directly, if this is a known/trusted router, or via another SMP router providing proxy functionality to protect IP address and session of the sender.
 
-Although end-to-end encryption is always present, users place a degree of trust in servers they connect to. This trust decision is very similar to a user's choice of email provider; however the trust placed in a SimpleX server is significantly less. Notably, there is no re-used identifier or credential between queues on the same (or different) servers. While a user *may* re-use a transport connection to fetch messages from multiple queues, or connect to a server from the same IP address, both are choices a user may opt into to break the promise of un-correlatable queues.
+Although end-to-end encryption is always present, users place a degree of trust in routers they connect to. This trust decision is very similar to a user's choice of email provider; however the trust placed in a SimpleX router is significantly less. Notably, there is no re-used identifier or credential between queues on the same (or different) routers. While a user *may* re-use a transport connection to fetch messages from multiple queues, or connect to a router from the same IP address, both are choices a user may opt into to break the promise of un-correlatable queues.
 
-Users may trust a server because:
+Users may trust a router because:
 
-- They deploy and control the servers themselves from the available open-source code. This has the trade-offs of strong trust in the server but limited metadata obfuscation to a passive network observer. Techniques such as noise traffic, traffic mixing (incurring latency), and using an onion routing transport protocol can mitigate that.
+- They deploy and control the routers themselves from the available open-source code. This has the trade-offs of strong trust in the router but limited metadata obfuscation to a passive network observer. Techniques such as noise traffic, traffic mixing (incurring latency), and using an onion routing transport protocol can mitigate that.
 
-- They use servers from a trusted commercial provider. The more clients the provider has, the less metadata about the communication times is leaked to the network observers.
+- They use routers from a trusted commercial provider. The more clients the provider has, the less metadata about the communication times is leaked to the network observers.
 
-By default, servers do not retain access logs, and permanently delete messages and queues when requested. Messages persist only in memory until they cross a threshold of time, typically on the order of days.[0] There is still a risk that a server maliciously records all queues and messages (even though encrypted) sent via the same transport connection to gain a partial knowledge of the user’s communications graph and other meta-data.
+By default, routers do not retain access logs, and permanently delete messages and queues when requested. Messages persist in memory or in a database until they cross a threshold of time, typically on the order of days.[0] There is still a risk that a router maliciously records all queues and messages (even though encrypted) sent via the same transport connection to gain a partial knowledge of the user's communications graph and other meta-data.
 
-SimpleX supports measures (managed transparently to the user at the agent level) to mitigate the trust placed in servers.  These include rotating the queues in use between users, noise traffic, supporting overlay networks such as Tor, and isolating traffic to different queues to different transport connections (and Tor circuits, if Tor is used).
+SimpleX supports measures (managed transparently to the user at the agent level) to mitigate the trust placed in routers.  These include rotating the queues in use between users, noise traffic, supporting overlay networks such as Tor, and isolating traffic to different queues to different transport connections (and Tor circuits, if Tor is used).
 
-[0] While configurable by servers, a minimum value is enforced by the default software. SimpleX Agents can provide redundant routing over queues to mitigate against message loss.
+[0] While configurable by routers, a minimum value is enforced by the default software. SimpleX Agents can provide redundant routing over queues to mitigate against message loss.
 
 
-#### Client -> Server Communication
+#### Client -> Router Communication
 
 Utilizing TLS grants the SimpleX Messaging Protocol (SMP) server authentication and metadata protection to a passive network observer. But SMP does not rely on the transport protocol for message confidentiality or client authentication. The SMP protocol itself provides end-to-end confidentiality, authentication, and integrity of messages between communicating parties.
 
-Servers have long-lived, self-signed, offline certificates whose hash is pre-shared with clients over secure channels - either provided with the client library or provided in the secure introduction between clients, as part of the server address.  The offline certificate signs an online certificate used in the transport protocol handshake. [0]
+Routers have long-lived, self-signed, offline certificates whose hash is pre-shared with clients over secure channels - either provided with the client library or provided in the secure introduction between clients, as part of the router address.  The offline certificate signs an online certificate used in the transport protocol handshake. [0]
 
-If the transport protocol's confidentiality is broken, incoming and outgoing messages to the server cannot be correlated by message contents. Additionally, because of encryption at the SMP layer, impersonating the server is not sufficient to pass (and therefore correlate) a message from a sender to recipient - the only attack possible is to drop the messages. Only by additionally *compromising* the server can one pass and correlate messages.
+If the transport protocol's confidentiality is broken, incoming and outgoing messages to the router cannot be correlated by message contents. Additionally, because of encryption at the SMP layer, impersonating the router is not sufficient to pass (and therefore correlate) a message from a sender to recipient - the only attack possible is to drop the messages. Only by additionally *compromising* the router can one pass and correlate messages.
 
-It's important to note that the SMP protocol does not do server authentication. Instead we rely upon the fact that an attacker who tricks the transport protocol into authenticating the server incorrectly cannot do anything with the SMP messages except drop them.
+It's important to note that the SMP protocol does not do server authentication. Instead we rely upon the fact that an attacker who tricks the transport protocol into authenticating the router incorrectly cannot do anything with the SMP messages except drop them.
 
-After the connection is established, the client sends blocks of a fixed size 16KB, and the server replies with the blocks of the same size to reduce metadata observable to a network adversary. The protocol has been designed to make traffic correlation attacks difficult, adapting ideas from Tor, remailers, and more general onion and mix networks. It does not try to replace Tor though - SimpleX servers can be deployed as onion services and SimpleX clients can communicate with servers over Tor to further improve participants privacy.
+After the connection is established, the client sends blocks of a fixed size 16KB, and the router replies with the blocks of the same size to reduce metadata observable to a network adversary. The protocol has been designed to make traffic correlation attacks difficult, adapting ideas from Tor, remailers, and more general onion and mix networks. It does not try to replace Tor though - SimpleX routers can be deployed as onion services and SimpleX clients can communicate with routers over Tor to further improve participants privacy.
 
-By using fixed-size blocks, oversized for the expected content, the vast majority of traffic is uniform in nature. When enough traffic is transiting a server simultaneously, the server acts as a low-latency mix node. We can't rely on this behavior to make a security claim, but we have engineered to take advantage of it when we can. As mentioned, this holds true even if the transport connection is compromised.
+By using fixed-size blocks, oversized for the expected content, the vast majority of traffic is uniform in nature. When enough traffic is transiting a router simultaneously, the router acts as a low-latency mix node. We can't rely on this behavior to make a security claim, but we have engineered to take advantage of it when we can. As mentioned, this holds true even if the transport connection is compromised.
 
 The protocol does not protect against attacks targeted at particular users with known identities - e.g., if the attacker wants to prove that two known users are communicating, they can achieve it by observing their local traffic. At the same time, it substantially complicates large-scale traffic correlation, making determining the real user identities much less effective.
 
@@ -143,39 +176,39 @@ The protocol does not protect against attacks targeted at particular users with
 
 #### 2-hop Onion Message Routing
 
-As SimpleX Messaging Protocol servers providing messaging queues are chosen by the recipients, in case senders connect to these servers directly the server owners (who potentially can be the recipients themselves) can learn senders' IP addresses (if Tor is not used) and which other queues on the same server are accessed by the user in the same transport connection (even if Tor is used).
+As SimpleX Messaging Protocol routers providing messaging queues are chosen by the recipients, in case senders connect to these routers directly the router owners (who potentially can be the recipients themselves) can learn senders' IP addresses (if Tor is not used) and which other queues on the same router are accessed by the user in the same transport connection (even if Tor is used).
 
 While the clients support isolating the messages sent to different queues into different transport connections (and Tor circuits), this is not practical, as it consumes additional traffic and system resources.
 
-To mitigate this problem SimpleX Messaging Protocol servers support 2-hop onion message routing when the SMP server chosen by the sender forwards the messages to the servers chosen by the recipients, thus protecting both the senders IP addresses and sessions, even if connection isolation and Tor are not used.
+To mitigate this problem SimpleX Messaging Protocol routers support 2-hop onion message routing when the SMP router chosen by the sender forwards the messages to the routers chosen by the recipients, thus protecting both the senders IP addresses and sessions, even if connection isolation and Tor are not used.
 
 The design of 2-hop onion message routing prevents these potential attacks:
 
-- MITM by proxy (SMP server that forwards the messages).
+- MITM by proxy (SMP router that forwards the messages).
 
-- Identification by the proxy which and how many queues the sender sends messages to (as messages are additionally e2e encrypted between the sender and the destination SMP server).
+- Identification by the proxy which and how many queues the sender sends messages to (as messages are additionally e2e encrypted between the sender and the destination SMP router).
 
 - Correlation of messages sent to different queues via the same user session (as random correlation IDs and keys are used for each message).
 
 See more details about 2-hop onion message routing design in [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](./simplex-messaging.md#proxying-sender-commands)
 
-Also see [Threat model](#threat-model)
+Also see [Security](./security.md)
 
 
 #### SimpleX Messaging Protocol
 
-SMP is initialized with an in-person or out-of-band introduction message, where Alice provides Bob with details of a server (including IP address or host name, port, and hash of the long-lived offline certificate), a queue ID, and Alice's public keys to agree e2e encryption. These introductions are similar to the PANDA key-exchange, in that if observed, the adversary can race to establish the communication channel instead of the intended participant. [0]
+SMP is initialized with an in-person or out-of-band introduction message, where Alice provides Bob with details of a router (including IP address or host name, port, and hash of the long-lived offline certificate), a queue ID, and Alice's public keys to agree e2e encryption. These introductions are similar to the PANDA key-exchange, in that if observed, the adversary can race to establish the communication channel instead of the intended participant. [0]
 
 Because queues are uni-directional, Bob provides an identically-formatted introduction message to Alice over Alice's now-established receiving queue.
 
-When setting up a queue, the server will create separate sender and recipient queue IDs (provided to Alice during set-up and Bob during initial connection). Additionally, during set-up Alice will perform a DH exchange with the server to agree upon a shared secret. This secret will be used to re-encrypt Bob's incoming message before Alice receives it, creating the anti-correlation property earlier-described should the transport encryption be compromised.
+When setting up a queue, the router will create separate sender and recipient queue IDs (provided to Alice during set-up and Bob during initial connection). Additionally, during set-up Alice will perform a DH exchange with the router to agree upon a shared secret. This secret will be used to re-encrypt Bob's incoming message before Alice receives it, creating the anti-correlation property earlier-described should the transport encryption be compromised.
 
-[0] Users can additionally create public 'contact queues' that are only used to receive connection requests.  
+[0] Users can additionally create public 'contact queues' that are only used to receive connection requests.
 
 
 #### SimpleX Agents
 
-SimpleX agents provide higher-level operations compared to SimpleX Clients, who are primarily concerned with creating queues and communicating with servers using SMP.  Agent operations include:
+SimpleX agents provide higher-level operations compared to SimpleX Clients, who are primarily concerned with creating queues and communicating with routers using SMP.  Agent operations include:
 
 - Managing sets of bi-directional, redundant queues for communication partners
 
@@ -186,195 +219,21 @@ SimpleX agents provide higher-level operations compared to SimpleX Clients, who
 - Noise traffic
 
 
-#### Encryption Primitives Used
+## Security
 
-- Ed25519 or Curve25519 to authorize/verify commands to SMP servers (authorization algorithm is set via client/server configuration).
-- Curve25519 for DH exchange to agree:
-  - the shared secret between server and recipient (to encrypt message bodies - it avoids shared cipher-text in sender and recipient traffic)
-  - the shared secret between sender and recipient (to encrypt messages end-to-end in each queue - it avoids shared cipher-text in redundant queues).
-- [NaCl crypto_box](https://nacl.cr.yp.to/box.html) encryption scheme (curve25519xsalsa20poly1305) for message body encryption between server and recipient and for E2E per-queue encryption.
-- SHA256 to validate server offline certificates.
-- [double ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) protocol for end-to-end message encryption between the agents:
-  - Curve448 keys to agree shared secrets required for double ratchet initialization (using [X3DH](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/) key agreement with 2 ephemeral keys for each side),
-  - AES-GCM AEAD cipher,
-  - SHA512-based HKDF for key derivation.
+For encryption primitives, threat model, and detailed security analysis, see [Security](./security.md).
 
+SimpleX provides these security properties:
 
-## Threat Model
+- **End-to-end encryption** using Double Ratchet algorithm with forward secrecy and post-quantum cryptography.
 
-#### Global Assumptions
+- **No shared identifiers** across connections — contacts cannot prove they communicate with the same user.
 
- - A user protects their local database and key material.
- - The user's application is authentic, and no local malware is running.
- - The cryptographic primitives in use are not broken.
- - A user's choice of servers is not directly tied to their identity or otherwise represents distinguishing information about the user.
- - The user's client uses 2-hop onion message routing.
+- **Sender deniability** — neither routers nor recipients can cryptographically prove message origin.
 
-#### A passive adversary able to monitor the traffic of one user
+- **Transport metadata protection** — fixed-size blocks, 2-hop onion routing, and optional connection isolation frustrate traffic correlation.
 
-*can:*
-
- - identify that and when a user is using SimpleX.
-
- - determine which servers the user receives the messages from.
-
- - observe how much traffic is being sent, and make guesses as to its purpose.
-
-*cannot:*
-
- - see who sends messages to the user and who the user sends the messages to.
-
- - determine the servers used by users' contacts.
-
-#### A passive adversary able to monitor a set of senders and recipients
-
- *can:*
-
- - identify who and when is using SimpleX.
-
- - learn which SimpleX Messaging Protocol servers are used as receive queues for which users.
-
- - learn when messages are sent and received.
-
- - perform traffic correlation attacks against senders and recipients and correlate senders and recipients within the monitored set, frustrated by the number of users on the servers.
-
- - observe how much traffic is being sent, and make guesses as to its purpose
-
-*cannot, even in case of a compromised transport protocol:*
-
- - perform traffic correlation attacks with any increase in efficiency over a non-compromised transport protocol
-
-#### SimpleX Messaging Protocol server
-
-*can:*
-
-- learn when a queue recipient is online
-
-- know how many messages are sent via the queue (although some may be noise or not content messages).
-
-- learn which messages would trigger notifications even if a user does not use [push notifications](./push-notifications.md).
-
-- perform the correlation of the queue used to receive messages (matching multiple queues to a single user) via either a re-used transport connection, user's IP Address, or connection timing regularities.
-
-- learn a recipient's IP address, track them through other IP addresses they use to access the same queue, and infer information (e.g. employer) based on the IP addresses, as long as Tor is not used.
-
-- drop all future messages inserted into a queue, detectable only over other, redundant queues.
-
-- lie about the state of a queue to the recipient and/or to the sender  (e.g. suspended or deleted when it is not).
-
-- spam a user with invalid messages.
-
-*cannot:*
-
-- undetectably add, duplicate, or corrupt individual messages.
-
-- undetectably drop individual messages, so long as a subsequent message is delivered.
-
-- learn the contents or type of messages.
-
-- distinguish noise messages from regular messages except via timing regularities.
-
-- compromise the users' end-to-end encryption with an active attack.
-
-- learn a sender's IP address, track them through other IP addresses they use to access the same queue, and infer information (e.g. employer) based on the IP addresses, even if Tor is not used (provided messages are sent via proxy SMP server).
-
-- perform senders' queue correlation (matching multiple queues to a single sender) via either a re-used transport connection, user's IP Address, or connection timing regularities, unless it has additional information from the proxy SMP server (provided messages are sent via proxy SMP server).
-
-#### SimpleX Messaging Protocol server that proxies the messages to another SMP server
-
-*can:*
-
-- learn a sender's IP address, as long as Tor is not used.
-
-- learn when a sender with a given IP address is online.
-
-- know how many messages are sent from a given IP address and to a given destination SMP server.
-
-- drop all messages from a given IP address or to a given destination server.
-
-- unless destination SMP server detects repeated public DH keys of senders, replay messages to a destination server within a single session, causing either duplicate message delivery (which will be detected and ignored by the receiving clients), or, when receiving client is not connected to SMP server, exhausting capacity of destination queues used within the session.
-
-*cannot:*
-
-- perform queue correlation (matching multiple queues to a single user), unless it has additional information from the destination SMP server.
-
-- undetectably add, duplicate, or corrupt individual messages.
-
-- undetectably drop individual messages, so long as a subsequent message is delivered.
-
-- learn the contents or type of messages.
-
-- learn which messages would trigger notifications.
-
-- learn the destination queues of messages.
-
-- distinguish noise messages from regular messages except via timing regularities.
-
-- compromise the user's end-to-end encryption with another user via an active attack.
-
-- compromise the user's end-to-end encryption with the destination SMP servers via an active attack.
-
-#### An attacker who obtained Alice's (decrypted) chat database
-
-*can:*
-
-- see the history of all messages exchanged by Alice with her communication partners.
-
-- see shared profiles of contacts and groups.
-
-- surreptitiously receive new messages sent to Alice via existing queues; until communication queues are rotated or the Double-Ratchet advances forward.
-
-- prevent Alice from receiving all new messages sent to her - either surreptitiously by emptying the queues regularly or overtly by deleting them.
-
-- send messages from the user to their contacts; recipients will detect it as soon as the user sends the next message, because the previous message hash won’t match (and potentially won’t be able to decrypt them in case they don’t keep the previous ratchet keys).
-
-*cannot:*
-
-- impersonate a sender and send messages to the user whose database was stolen. Doing so requires also compromising the server (to place the message in the queue, that is possible until the Double-Ratchet advances forward) or the user's device at a subsequent time (to place the message in the database).
-
-- undetectably communicate at the same time as Alice with her contacts. Doing so would result in the contact getting different messages with repeated IDs.
-
-- undetectably monitor message queues in realtime without alerting the user they are doing so, as a second subscription request unsubscribes the first and notifies the second.
-
-#### A user’s contact
-
-*can:*
-
-- spam the user with messages.
-
-- forever retain messages from the user.
-
-*cannot:*
-
-- cryptographically prove to a third-party that a message came from a user (assuming the user’s device is not seized).
-
-- prove that two contacts they have is the same user.
-
-- cannot collaborate with another of the user's contacts to confirm they are communicating with the same user.
-
-#### An attacker who observes Alice showing an introduction message to Bob
-
-*can:*
-
- - Impersonate Bob to Alice.
-
-*cannot:*
-
- - Impersonate Alice to Bob.
-
-#### An attacker with Internet access
-
-*can:*
-
-- Denial of Service SimpleX messaging servers.
-
-- spam a user's public “contact queue” with connection requests.
-
-*cannot:*
-
-- send messages to a user who they are not connected with.
-
-- enumerate queues on a SimpleX server.
+- **Out-of-band key exchange** — connection requests passed outside the network protect against MITM attacks.
 
 
 ## Acknowledgements

protocol/security.md

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+Revision 1, 2026-03-09
+
+# SimpleX Network: Security
+
+This document describes the cryptographic primitives and threat model for the SimpleX network. For a general introduction, see [SimpleX: messaging and application platform](./overview-tjr.md).
+
+## Table of contents
+
+- [Encryption primitives](#encryption-primitives)
+- [Threat model](#threat-model)
+  - [Global Assumptions](#global-assumptions)
+  - [A passive adversary able to monitor the traffic of one user](#a-passive-adversary-able-to-monitor-the-traffic-of-one-user)
+  - [A passive adversary able to monitor a set of senders and recipients](#a-passive-adversary-able-to-monitor-a-set-of-senders-and-recipients)
+  - [SimpleX Messaging Protocol router](#simplex-messaging-protocol-router)
+  - [SimpleX Messaging Protocol router that proxies the messages to another SMP router](#simplex-messaging-protocol-router-that-proxies-the-messages-to-another-smp-router)
+  - [An attacker who obtained Alice's (decrypted) chat database](#an-attacker-who-obtained-alices-decrypted-chat-database)
+  - [A user's contact](#a-users-contact)
+  - [An attacker who observes Alice showing an introduction message to Bob](#an-attacker-who-observes-alice-showing-an-introduction-message-to-bob)
+  - [An attacker with Internet access](#an-attacker-with-internet-access)
+
+
+## Encryption primitives
+
+- **Router command authorization**: X25519 DH-based authenticated encryption (SMP v7+), providing sender deniability. Ed25519 signatures used for recipient commands and notifier commands.
+
+- **Per-queue key agreement**: Curve25519 DH exchange to agree:
+  - the shared secret between router and recipient (to encrypt message bodies — avoids shared ciphertext in sender and recipient traffic),
+  - the shared secret between sender and recipient (to encrypt messages end-to-end in each queue — avoids shared ciphertext in redundant queues).
+
+- **SMP-layer encryption**: [NaCl crypto_box](https://nacl.cr.yp.to/box.html) (curve25519xsalsa20poly1305) for message body encryption between router and recipient, and for e2e per-queue encryption.
+
+- **Certificate validation**: SHA256 to validate router offline certificates.
+
+- **End-to-end encryption**: [Double ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) protocol:
+  - Curve448 keys for shared secret agreement via [X3DH](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/) with 2 ephemeral keys per side,
+  - optional [SNTRUP761](https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/) post-quantum KEM running in parallel with the DH ratchet (see [PQDR](./pqdr.md)), providing post-quantum forward secrecy,
+  - AES-GCM AEAD cipher,
+  - SHA512-based HKDF for key derivation.
+
+
+## Threat Model
+
+### Global Assumptions
+
+- A user protects their local database and key material.
+- The user's application is authentic, and no local malware is running.
+- The cryptographic primitives in use are not broken.
+- A user's choice of routers is not directly tied to their identity or otherwise represents distinguishing information about the user.
+- The user's client uses 2-hop onion message routing.
+
+### A passive adversary able to monitor the traffic of one user
+
+*can:*
+
+- identify that and when a user is using SimpleX.
+
+- determine which routers the user receives messages from.
+
+- observe how much traffic is being sent, and make guesses as to its purpose.
+
+*cannot:*
+
+- see who sends messages to the user and who the user sends messages to.
+
+- determine the routers used by users' contacts.
+
+### A passive adversary able to monitor a set of senders and recipients
+
+*can:*
+
+- identify who and when is using SimpleX.
+
+- learn which SimpleX Messaging Protocol routers are used as receive queues for which users.
+
+- learn when messages are sent and received.
+
+- perform traffic correlation attacks against senders and recipients and correlate senders and recipients within the monitored set, frustrated by the number of users on the routers.
+
+- observe how much traffic is being sent, and make guesses as to its purpose.
+
+*cannot, even in case of a compromised transport protocol:*
+
+- perform traffic correlation attacks with any increase in efficiency over a non-compromised transport protocol.
+
+### SimpleX Messaging Protocol router
+
+*can:*
+
+- learn when a queue recipient is online.
+
+- know how many messages are sent via the queue (although some may be noise or not content messages).
+
+- learn which messages would trigger notifications even if a user does not use [push notifications](./push-notifications.md).
+
+- perform the correlation of the queue used to receive messages (matching multiple queues to a single user) via either a re-used transport connection, user's IP Address, or connection timing regularities.
+
+- learn a recipient's IP address, track them through other IP addresses they use to access the same queue, and infer information (e.g. employer) based on the IP addresses, as long as Tor is not used.
+
+- drop all future messages inserted into a queue, detectable only over other, redundant queues.
+
+- lie about the state of a queue to the recipient and/or to the sender  (e.g. suspended or deleted when it is not).
+
+- spam a user with invalid messages.
+
+*cannot:*
+
+- undetectably add, duplicate, or corrupt individual messages.
+
+- undetectably drop individual messages, so long as a subsequent message is delivered.
+
+- learn the contents or type of messages.
+
+- distinguish noise messages from regular messages except via timing regularities.
+
+- compromise the users' end-to-end encryption with an active attack.
+
+- learn a sender's IP address, track them through other IP addresses they use to access the same queue, and infer information (e.g. employer) based on the IP addresses, even if Tor is not used (provided messages are sent via proxy SMP router).
+
+- perform senders' queue correlation (matching multiple queues to a single sender) via either a re-used transport connection, user's IP Address, or connection timing regularities, unless it has additional information from the proxy SMP router (provided messages are sent via proxy SMP router).
+
+### SimpleX Messaging Protocol router that proxies the messages to another SMP router
+
+*can:*
+
+- learn a sender's IP address, as long as Tor is not used.
+
+- learn when a sender with a given IP address is online.
+
+- know how many messages are sent from a given IP address and to a given destination SMP router.
+
+- drop all messages from a given IP address or to a given destination router.
+
+- unless destination SMP router detects repeated public DH keys of senders, replay messages to a destination router within a single session, causing either duplicate message delivery (which will be detected and ignored by the receiving clients), or, when receiving client is not connected to SMP router, exhausting capacity of destination queues used within the session.
+
+*cannot:*
+
+- perform queue correlation (matching multiple queues to a single user), unless it has additional information from the destination SMP router.
+
+- undetectably add, duplicate, or corrupt individual messages.
+
+- undetectably drop individual messages, so long as a subsequent message is delivered.
+
+- learn the contents or type of messages.
+
+- learn which messages would trigger notifications.
+
+- learn the destination queues of messages.
+
+- distinguish noise messages from regular messages except via timing regularities.
+
+- compromise the user's end-to-end encryption with another user via an active attack.
+
+- compromise the user's end-to-end encryption with the destination SMP routers via an active attack.
+
+### An attacker who obtained Alice's (decrypted) chat database
+
+*can:*
+
+- see the history of all messages exchanged by Alice with her communication partners.
+
+- see shared profiles of contacts and groups.
+
+- surreptitiously receive new messages sent to Alice via existing queues; until communication queues are rotated or the Double-Ratchet advances forward.
+
+- prevent Alice from receiving all new messages sent to her - either surreptitiously by emptying the queues regularly or overtly by deleting them.
+
+- send messages from the user to their contacts; recipients will detect it as soon as the user sends the next message, because the previous message hash won't match (and potentially won't be able to decrypt them in case they don't keep the previous ratchet keys).
+
+*cannot:*
+
+- impersonate a sender and send messages to the user whose database was stolen. Doing so requires also compromising the router (to place the message in the queue, that is possible until the Double-Ratchet advances forward) or the user's device at a subsequent time (to place the message in the database).
+
+- undetectably communicate at the same time as Alice with her contacts. Doing so would result in the contact getting different messages with repeated IDs.
+
+- undetectably monitor message queues in realtime without alerting the user they are doing so, as a second subscription request unsubscribes the first and notifies the first.
+
+### A user's contact
+
+*can:*
+
+- spam the user with messages.
+
+- forever retain messages from the user.
+
+*cannot:*
+
+- cryptographically prove to a third-party that a message came from a user (assuming the user's device is not seized).
+
+- prove that two contacts they have is the same user.
+
+- cannot collaborate with another of the user's contacts to confirm they are communicating with the same user.
+
+### An attacker who observes Alice showing an introduction message to Bob
+
+*can:*
+
+- Impersonate Bob to Alice.
+
+*cannot:*
+
+- Impersonate Alice to Bob.
+
+### An attacker with Internet access
+
+*can:*
+
+- Denial of Service SimpleX messaging routers.
+
+- spam a user's public "contact queue" with connection requests.
+
+*cannot:*
+
+- send messages to a user who they are not connected with.
+
+- enumerate queues on a SimpleX router.

rfcs/2025-03-16-smp-queues.md

@@ -5,22 +5,19 @@
 This change is related to these problems:
 - differentiating queue retention time,
 - supporting MITM-resistant short connection links,
-- improving notifications.
 
 This RFC is based on the previous discussions about short links, blob storage and notifications ([1](./2024-06-21-short-links.md), [2](./2024-09-09-smp-blobs.md), [3](./2024-11-25-queue-blobs-2.md), [4](./2024-09-25-ios-notifications-2.md)).
 
-SMP protocol supports two types of queues - queues to communicate over and queues to send invitations. While SMP protocol was originally "unaware" of these queue types, it could differentiate it by message flow, and with the recent addition of SKEY command to allow securing the queue by the sender this difference became persistent.
+SMP protocol supports two types of queues - queues to send messages (messaging queues) and queues to send invitations to connect (contact queues). While SMP protocol was originally "unaware" of these queue types, it could differentiate it by message flow, and with the recent addition of SKEY command to allow securing the queue by the sender this difference became persistent.
 
 Simply designating queue types would allow to use this information to decide for how long to retain queues, and potentially extending it:
 - unsecured 1-time invitation queues with sndSecure (support of securing by sender) - e.g., 3 months.
 - contact address queues without sndSecure - e.g., 3 years without activity.
-- Possibly, "queues" that prohibit messages and used only as blob storage - they would be used to store group profiles and superpeer addresses for the group.
-
-This proposal also combines NEW and NKEY command to streamline notifications in preparation to reworking of the notifications protocol.
+- Possibly, "queues" that prohibit messages and used only as blob storage - they would be used to store group profiles and super-peer addresses for the group.
 
 ## Design objectives
 
-We want to achieve these objectives:
+We want to achieve these objectives for short links and associated queue data:
 1. no possibility to provide incorrect SenderId inside link data (e.g. from another queue).
 2. link data cannot be accessed by the server unless it has the link.
 3. prevent MITM attack by the server, including the server that obtained the link.
@@ -28,17 +25,17 @@ We want to achieve these objectives:
 5. for one-time links, prevent accessing link data by link observers who did not compromise the server.
 6. allow changing the user-defined part of link data.
 7. avoid changing the link when user-defined part of link data changes, while preventing MITM attack by the server on user-defined part, even if it has the link.
-8. retain the quality that it is impossible to check the existense of secured queue from having any of its temporary visible IDs (sender ID and link ID in 1-time invitations) - it requires that these IDs remain server-generated (contrary to the previous RFCs).
+8. retain the quality that it is impossible to check the existence of secured queue from having any of its temporary visible IDs (sender ID and link ID in 1-time invitations) - it requires that these IDs remain server-generated (contrary to the previous RFCs).
 
-To achieve these objectives the queue data must have immutable part and mutable part.
+To achieve these objectives the queue data will include fixed (immutable) and user-defined (mutable) parts.
 
-Immutable part would include:
-- full conection request (the current long link with all keys, including PQ keys). This includes SenderId that must match server response.
+Fixed part would include:
+- full connection request (the current long link with all keys, including PQ keys). This includes SenderId that must match server response.
 - public signature key to verify mutable part of link data.
 
-Signed mutable part would inlcude:
-- any links to chat relays that should be contacted instead of this queue (not in this RFC), but would allow delegating group connections and contact request connections to prevent spam, hiding online presense, etc.
-- and user-defined data - user profile or group profile.
+Signed mutable part would include:
+- any links to chat relays that should be contacted instead of this queue (not in this RFC), to allow delegating group connections and contact request connections to prevent spam, hiding online presence, etc.
+- and user-defined data - user profile or group profile, chat preferences, welcome message, etc.
 
 The link itself should include both the key and auth tag from the encryption of immutable part. Accessing one-time link data should require providing sender key and signing the command (`LKEY`).
 
@@ -49,8 +46,6 @@ Current NEW and NKEY commands:
 ```haskell
 NEW :: RcvPublicAuthKey -> RcvPublicDhKey -> Maybe BasicAuth -> SubscriptionMode -> SenderCanSecure -> Command Recipient
 
-NKEY :: NtfPublicAuthKey -> RcvNtfPublicDhKey -> Command Recipient
-
 -- | Queue IDs and keys, returned in IDS response
 data QueueIdsKeys = QIK
   { rcvId :: RecipientId,
@@ -70,43 +65,48 @@ data NewQueueReq = NewQueueReq
     rcvDhKey :: RcvPublicDhKey,
     auth_ :: Maybe BasicAuth,
     subMode :: SubscriptionMode,
-    queueData :: Maybe QueueReqData,
-    ntfCreds :: Maybe NewNtfCreds
+    queueReqData :: Maybe QueueReqData,
   }
 
--- Replaces NKEY command
--- This avoids additional command required from the client to enable notifications.
--- Further changes would move NotifierId generation to the client, and including a signed and encrypted command to be forwarded by SMP server to notification server.
-data NtfRequest = NtfRequest NtfPublicAuthKey RcvNtfPublicDhKey
-
 -- QRMessaging implies that sender can secure the queue.
 -- LinkId is not used with QRMessaging, to prevent the possibility of checking when connection is established by re-using the same link ID when creating another queue – the creating would have to fail if it is used.
 -- LinkId is required with QRContact, to have shorter link - it will be derived from the link_uri. And in this case we do not need to prevent checks that this queue exists.
-data QueueReqData = QRMessaging (Maybe QueueLinkData) | QRContact (Maybe (LinkId, QueueLinkData))
+data QueueReqData
+  = QRMessaging (Maybe (SenderId, QueueLinkData))
+  | QRContact (Maybe (LinkId, (SenderId, QueueLinkData)))
 
 -- SenderId should be computed client-side as the first 24 bytes of sha3-384(correlation_id),
 -- The server must verify it and reject if it is not.
-type QueueLinkData = (SenderId, EncImmutableDataBytes, EncUserDataBytes)
+-- It allows to include sender ID inside encrypted associated link data as part of full connection URI without requesting it from the server, but prevents checking if a given sender ID exists (queue creation would fail for a duplicate sender ID), as sha3-384 derivation is not reversible.
+type QueueLinkData = (EncFixedLinkData, EncUserDataBytes)
 
-type EncImmutableDataBytes = ByteString
+type EncFixedLinkData = ByteString
 
 type EncUserDataBytes = ByteString
 
--- We need to use binary encoding for AConnectionRequestUri to reduce its size
--- connReq including the full link allows connection redundancy.
--- The clients would reject changed immutable data (based on auth tag in the link) and
--- AConnectionRequestUri where SenderId of the queue does not match.
-data ImmutableLinkData = ImmutableLinkData
-  { signature :: SignatureEd25519, -- signature of the remaining part of immutable data
-    connReq :: AConnectionRequestUri,
-    sigKey :: PublicKeyEd25519
+-- We need to use binary encoding for ConnectionRequestUri to reduce its size
+-- The clients would reject changed immutable data and
+-- ConnectionRequestUri where server or SenderId of the queue do not match.
+data FixedLinkData c = FixedLinkData
+  { agentVRange :: VersionRangeSMPA,
+    rootKey :: C.PublicKeyEd25519,
+    connReq :: ConnectionRequestUri c
   }
 
--- This part of link data can also include any relays, but possibly we need a separate blob for it
-data UserLinkData = UserLinkData
-  { signature :: SignatureEd25519, -- signs the remaining part of the data
-    userData :: ByteString -- the max size needs to be estimated, but it is likely to be ~ 14kb
-  }
+data ConnLinkData c where
+  InvitationLinkData :: VersionRangeSMPA -> UserLinkData -> ConnLinkData 'CMInvitation
+  ContactLinkData ::
+    { agentVRange :: VersionRangeSMPA,
+      -- direct connection via connReq in fixed data is allowed.
+      direct :: Bool,
+      -- additional owner keys to sign changes of mutable data.
+      owners :: [OwnerAuth],
+      -- alternative addresses of chat relays that receive requests for this contact address.
+      relays :: [ConnShortLink 'CMContact],
+      userData :: UserLinkData
+    } -> ConnLinkData 'CMContact
+
+newtype UserLinkData = UserLinkData ByteString
 
 -- | Updated queue IDs and keys, returned in IDS response
 data QueueIdsKeys = QIK
@@ -114,17 +114,14 @@ data QueueIdsKeys = QIK
     sndId :: SenderId, -- server-generated
     rcvPublicDhKey :: RcvPublicDhKey,
     sndSecure :: SenderCanSecure, -- possibly, can be removed? or implied?
-    linkId :: Maybe LinkId, -- server-generated
-    serverNtfCreds :: Maybe ServerNtfCreds -- currently returned in NID response
+    linkId :: Maybe LinkId -- server-generated
   }
-
-data ServerNtfCreds = ServerNtfCreds NotifierId RcvNtfPublicDhKey -- NotifierId is server-generated.
 ```
 
-In addition to that we add the command allowing to update and also to retrieve and, optionally, secure the queue and get link data in one request, to have only one request:
+In addition to that we add the command allowing to update and also to retrieve and secure the queue and get link data in one request, to have only one request:
 
 ```haskell
--- This command allows to set all data or to update mutlable part of contact address queue.
+-- This command allows to set all data or to update mutable part of contact address queue.
 -- This command should fail on queues that support sndSecure and also on new queues created with QRMessaging.
 -- This should fail if LinkId or immutable part of data is changed with the update, but will succeed if only mutable part is updated, so it can be retried.
 -- Entity ID is RecipientId.
@@ -147,58 +144,43 @@ LKEY :: SndPublicAuthKey -> Command Sender
 -- Entity ID is LinkId
 LGET :: Command Sender
 
--- Response to LGET, LSKEY and LSGET
+-- Response to LGET and LSET
 -- Entity ID is the same as in the command
 LNK :: SenderId -> QueueLinkData -> BrokerMsg
 ```
 
-To both include sender_id into the full link before the server response, and to prevent "oracle attack" when a failure to create the queue with the supplied `sender_id` can be used as a proof of queue existense, it is proposed that `sender_id` is computed client-side as the first 24 bytes of 48 in `sha3-384(correlation_id)` and validated server-side, where `corelation_id` is the transmission correlation ID.
+To both include sender_id into the full link before the server response, and to prevent "oracle attack" when a failure to create the queue with the supplied `sender_id` can be used as a proof of queue existence, it is proposed that `sender_id` is computed client-side as the first 24 bytes of 48 in `sha3-384(correlation_id)` and validated server-side, where `corelation_id` is the transmission correlation ID.
 
-To allow retries and to avoid regenerating all queue data, NEW command must be idempotent, and `correlation_id` must be preserved in command for queue creation, so that the same `correlation_id` and all other data is used in retries. `correlation_id` should be removed after queue creation success.
+To allow retries, every time the command is sent a new random `correlation_id` and new `sender_id` (and for contact queue, also `link_id`, which would be random as it is derived from hash of fixed link data that includes a random signature key) should be used on each attempt, because other IDs would be generated randomly on the server, and in case the previous command succeeded on the server but failed to be communicated to the client, the retry will fail if the same ID is used.
 
-To allow retries, every time the command is sent a new random `correlation_id` and new `sender_id` / `link_id` should be used on each attempt, because other IDs would be generated randomly on the server, and in case the previous command succeeded on the server but failed to be communicated to the client, the retry will fail if the same ID is used.
-
-Alternative solutions considered and rejected:
+Alternative solutions that would allow retries that were considered and rejected:
 - additional request to save queue data, after `sender_id` is returned by the server. The scenarios that require short links are interactive - creating user addresses and 1-time invitations - so making two requests instead of one would make the UX worse.
 - include empty sender_id in the immutable data and have it replaced by the accepting party with `sender_id` received in `LINK` response - both a weird design, and might create possibility for some attacks via server, especially for contact addresses.
 - making NEW commands idempotent. Doing it would require generating all IDs client-side, not only `sender_id`. It increases complexity, and it is not really necessary as the only scenarios when retries are needed are async NEW commands, that do not require short links. For future short links of chat relays the retries are much less likely, as chat relays will have good network connections.
 
 ## Algorithm to prepare and to interpret queue link data.
 
-For contact addresses this approach follows the design proposed in [Short links](./2024-06-21-short-links.md) RFC - when link id is derived from the same random binary as key. For 1-time invitations link ID is independent and server-generated, to prevent existense checks.
+For contact addresses this approach follows the design proposed in [Short links](./2024-06-21-short-links.md) RFC - when link id is derived from the same random binary as key. For 1-time invitations link ID is independent and server-generated, to prevent existence checks (oracle attack).
 
-**Prepare queue link data**
+This scheme results in 32 byte binary size for contact addresses and 56 bytes for 1-time invitation links.
 
-- the queue owner generates a random 256 bit `link_key` that will be used in the link URI.
-- for 1-time links: crypto_box key and 2 nonces to encrypt link data are derived from link_uri using HKDF: `cb_key <> nonce1 <> nonce2 = HKDF(link_key, 80 bytes)` (nonce1 is used for immutable and nonce2 for user-defined parts).
-- for contact address links: key and 2 nonces and linkId will be derived: `link_id <> cb_key <> nonce1 <> nonce2 = HKDF(link_key, 104 bytes)`
-- both parts of link data are encrypted with crypto_box, and included into `NEW` or `LNEW` commands.
+For fixed link data.
 
-**Retrieving queue link data**
-
-- the sender uses `LinkId` from URI (or derived from URI) as entity ID to retrieve link data.
-- for one time links the sender must authorize the request to retrieve the data, the key is provided with the first request, preventing undetected access by link observers.
-- having received the link data, the client can now decrypt it using secret_box.
-
-## Improved algorithm to prepare and to interpret queue link data.
-
-This scheme reduces the size of the binary in the link from 48 bytes (72 in case of 1-time links) to 32 bytes (56 bytes for 1-time links).
-
-For immutable data.
-
-1. `link_key = SHA3-256(immutable_data)` - used as part of link, and to encrypt content.
-2. HKDF:
+1. Generate random `nonce` (also used as a correlation ID for server command) and signature key (public `rootKey` included in fixed data).
+2. Compute sender ID from `nonce` as the first 24 bytes of sha3-384 of `nonce`.
+3. Generate other keys for queue address, including queue e2e encryption keys and double ratchet connection e2e encryption keys.
+4. Construct the full connection address to be included in fixed data.
+5. `link_key = SHA3-256(fixed_data)` - used as part of the link, and to derive the key to encrypt content.
+6. HKDF:
   1) contact address: `(link_id, key) = HKDF(link_key, 56 bytes)`.
-  2) 1-time invitation: `key = HKDF(link_key, 32 bytes)`, `link-id` - server-generated. 
-3. 
-3. Random `nonce1` (for immutable data), to be stored with the link data.
-4. Encrypt: `(ct1, tag1) = secret_box(immutable_data, key, nonce1)`.
-5. Store: `(nonce1, ct1, tag1)` stored as immutable link data.
+  2) 1-time invitation: `key = HKDF(link_key, 32 bytes)`, `link-id` - server-generated.
+7. Encrypt: `(ct1, tag1) = secret_box(fixed_data, key, nonce1)`, where `nonce1` is a random nonce
+5. Store: `(nonce1, ct1, tag1)` stored as fixed link data.
 
 For mutable user data:
 
 1. Random `nonce2` and the same key are used.
-2. Sign `user_data` with key included in `immutable_data`.
+2. Sign `user_data` with key included in `fixed_data`.
 3. Encrypt: `(ct2, tag2) = secret_box(signed_used_data, key, nonce2)`.
 4. Store: `(nonce2, ct2, tag2)`
 
@@ -208,13 +190,15 @@ Link recipient:
 2. HKDF:
   1) contact address: `(link_id, key) = HKDF(link_key, 56 bytes)`.
   2) 1-time invitation: `key = HKDF(link_key, 32 bytes)`.
-3. Retrieves via `link_id`: `(nonce1, ct1, tag1)` and `(nonce2, ct2, tag2)`.
-4. Decrypt: `immutable_data = decrypt (nonce1, ct1, tag1)`.
-5. Verify: `SHA3-256(immutable_data) == link_key`, abort if not.
-6. Decrypt: `signed_used_data = decrypt(nonce2, ct2, tag2)`
-7. Verify signature with key in immutable data.
+3. Retrieves via `link_id`: `(nonce1, ct1, tag1)` and `(nonce2, ct2, tag2)`:
+  1) contact address: `LGET` command, that allows retrieving link data multiple times.
+  2) 1-time invitation: `LKEY` command, that non-optionally secures the queue, and only allows repeated link data retrievals if the same sender's key is provided and signs the transmission. This prevents link data retrieval by link observers.
+4. Decrypt: `(signature1, fixed_data) = decrypt (nonce1, ct1, tag1)`.
+5. Verify: `SHA3-256(fixed_data) == link_key`, abort if not.
+6. Decrypt: `(signature2, used_data) = decrypt(nonce2, ct2, tag2)`.
+7. Verify signatures using key in the fixed data, abort if they don't match.
 
-While using content hash as encryption key is unconventional, it is not completely unheard of - e.g., it is used in convergent encryption (although in our case using random nonce makes it not convergent, but other use cases suggest that this approach preserves encryption security). It is particularly acceptable for our use case, as `immutable_data` contains mostly random keys.
+While using content hash as encryption key is unconventional, it is not completely unusual - e.g., it is used in convergent encryption (although in our case using random nonce makes it not convergent, but other use cases suggest that this approach preserves encryption security). It is particularly acceptable for our use case, as `fixed_data` contains mostly random keys.
 
 ## Threat model
 
@@ -222,10 +206,10 @@ While using content hash as encryption key is unconventional, it is not complete
 
 can:
 - delete link data.
-- hide link selectively from some requests.
+- hide link data selectively for some or for all requests.
 
 cannot:
-- undetectably replace link data, even if they have the link (objective 3).
+- undetectably replace link data, even if it has the link (objective 3).
 - access unencrypted link data, whether it was or was not accessed by the accepting party, provided it has no link (objective 2).
 - observe IP addresses of the users accessing link data, if private routing is used.
 
@@ -236,10 +220,10 @@ can:
 
 cannot:
 - undetectably access observed 1-time link data, accessing the link would make the link inaccessible to the sender (objective 5).
-- undetectbly check the existense of messaging queue or 1-time link (objective 8).
+- undetectably check the existence of messaging queue or 1-time link (objective 8).
 - replace or delete the link data.
 
-**Queue owner who did not comprmise the server**:
+**Queue owner who did not compromise the server**:
 
 cannot:
 - redirect connecting user to another queue, on the same or on another server (objective 1).
@@ -247,40 +231,42 @@ cannot:
 
 ## Correlation of design objectives with design elements
 
-1. The presense of `SenderId` in `LINK` response from the server.
+1. The presence of `SenderId` in `LNK` response from the server.
 2. Encryption of link data with crypto_box.
-3. Auth tag in the link prevents server modification of immutable part of link data. Signature verification key in immutable part, and signing of mutable part prevents server modification of mutable part of link data.
-4. No server command to change immutable part of link data once it's set.
+3. Deriving encryption key from the hash of fixed data prevents it being modified by the server - any change would be detected and rejected by the client, as the hash of fixed data won't match the link. Signature verification with the key from fixed data, and signing of mutable data prevents server modification of mutable data.
+4. No server command to change fixed data once it's set. Also, changing fixed data would require changing the link.
 5. 1-time link data can only be accessed with `LKEY` command, that while allows retries to mitigate network failures, will require the same key for retries.
 6. `LSET` command.
-7. The link only includes auth tag for immutable part, mutable part includes signature.
-8. Temporarily public IDs (SenderId and LinkId for 1-time invitations) are generated server-side, and cannot be provided by the clients when creating the queues to check if these IDs are free.
+7. The link is derived from fixed data only, so it does not change when mutable link data changes. Mutable part is signed preventing server MITM attacks.
+8. SenderId is derived from request correlation ID, so it cannot be arbitrary defined to check existence of some known queue. LinkId for 1-time invitation is generated server-side, so it cannot be provided by the client when creating the queues to check if these IDs are used.
 
 ## Syntax for short links
 
-The proposed syntax:
+The syntax:
 
 ```abnf
-shortConnectionLink = %s"https://" smpServerHost "/" linkUri [ "?" param *( "&" param ) ]
+shortConnectionLink = uriAuthority "/" linkUri [ "?" param *( "&" param ) ]
+uriAuthority = %s"https://" smpServerHost / "simplex:" ; using simplex: scheme requires including host in the parameter hostParam
 smpServerHost = <hostname> ; RFC1123, RFC5891
-linkUri = %s"i#" serverInfo oneTimeLinkBytes / %s"c#" serverInfo contactLinkBytes
-oneTimeLinkBytes = <base64url(linkId | linkKey)> ; 56 bytes / 75 base64 encoded characters
-contactLinkBytes = <base64url(linkKey)> ; 32 bytes / 43 base64 encoded characters
-; linkId - 96 bits/24 bytes
+linkUri = %s"i#" oneTimeLink / contactType "#" contactLink
+contactType = %s"a" / %s"g" / %s"c" ; contact / group / channel address, respectively
+oneTimeLink = <base64url(linkId)> "/" <base64url(linkKey)> ; 56 bytes / 75 base64 encoded characters
+contactLink = <base64url(linkKey)> ; 32 bytes / 43 base64 encoded characters
+; linkId - 192 bits/24 bytes
 ; linkKey - 256 bits/32 bytes
 
-serverInfo = [fingerprint "@" [hostnames "/"]] ; not needed for preset servers, required otherwise - the clients must refuse to connect if they don't have fingerprint in the code.
-
-fingerprint = <base64url(server offline certificate fingerprint)>
-hostnames = "h=" <hostname> *( "," <hostname> ) ; additional hostnames, e.g. onion
+param = hostsParam / portParam / certHashParam
+hostsParam = %s"h=" host *("," host) ; additional hostnames, e.g. onion
+portParam = %s"p=" 1*DIGIT ; server port
+certHashParam = %s"c=" <base64url(server offline certificate fingerprint)>
 ```
 
-To have shorter links fingerpring and additional server hostnames do not need to be specified for preconfigured servers, even if they are disabled - they can be used from the client code. Any user defined servers will require including additional hosts and server fingerprint.
+To have shorter links fingerprint and additional server hostnames do not need to be specified for pre-configured servers, even if they are disabled - they can be used from the client code. Any user defined servers will require including additional hosts and server fingerprint.
 
-Example one-time link for preset server (103 characters):
+Example one-time link for preset server (104 characters):
 
 ```
-https://smp12.simplex.im/i#abcdefghij0123456789abcdefghij0123456789abcdefghij0123456789abcdefghij01234
+https://smp12.simplex.im/i#abcdefghij0123456789abcdefghij01/23456789abcdefghij0123456789abcdefghij01234
 ```
 
 Example contact link for preset server (71 characters):
@@ -289,16 +275,16 @@ Example contact link for preset server (71 characters):
 https://smp12.simplex.im/c#abcdefghij0123456789abcdefghij0123456789abc
 ```
 
-Example contact link for user-defined server (with fingerprint, but without onion hostname - 115 characters):
+Example contact link for user-defined server (with fingerprint, but without onion hostname - 117 characters):
 
 ```
-https://smp1.example.com/c#0YuTwO05YJWS8rkjn9eLJDjQhFKvIYd8d4xG8X1blIU@abcdefghij0123456789abcdefghij0123456789abc
+https://smp1.example.com/c#abcdefghij0123456789abcdefghij0123456789abc?c=0YuTwO05YJWS8rkjn9eLJDjQhFKvIYd8d4xG8X1blIU
 ```
 
-Example contact link for user-defined server (with fingerprint ant onion hostname - 178 characters):
+Example contact link for user-defined server (with fingerprint ant onion hostname - 182 characters):
 
 ```
-https://smp1.example.com/c#0YuTwO05YJWS8rkjn9eLJDjQhFKvIYd8d4xG8X1blIU@beccx4yfxxbvyhqypaavemqurytl6hozr47wfc7uuecacjqdvwpw2xid.onion/abcdefghij0123456789abcdefghij0123456789abc
+https://smp1.example.com/c#abcdefghij0123456789abcdefghij0123456789abc?c=0YuTwO05YJWS8rkjn9eLJDjQhFKvIYd8d4xG8X1blIU&h=beccx4yfxxbvyhqypaavemqurytl6hozr47wfc7uuecacjqdvwpw2xid.onion
 ```
 
 For the links to work in the browser the servers must provide server pages.

rfcs/2025-05-05-client-certificates.md

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+# Service certificates for high volume servers and services connecting to SMP servers
+
+## Problem
+
+The absense of user and client identification benefits privacy, but it requires separately authorizing subscription for each messaging queue, that doesn't scale when a high volume server or service acts as a client for SMP server even for the current traffic and network size.
+
+These servers/services include:
+- operators' chat relays (aka super-peers),
+- notification servers,
+- high-traffic service chat bots,
+- high-traffic business support clients.
+
+The future chat relays would reduce the number of subscriptions required for the usual clients, by replacing connections with each group member to 1-3 connections with chat relays per group/community, it would shift the burden to the chat relays, that are also clients.
+
+Self-hosted chat relays may want to retain privacy, so they will not use client certificates, but this privacy is not needed (and counter-productive) for the chat relays provided by network operators.
+
+Even today, directory service subscribing to all queues may take 15-20 minutes, which is experienced as downtime by the end users.
+
+Notification servers also acting as clients to messaging servers also take 15-20 minutes to subscribe to all notifications, during which time notifications are not delivered.
+
+Not only these subscription take a lot of time, they also consume a large amount of memory both in the clients and in the servers, as association between clients and queues is currently session-scoped and not persisted anywhere (and it should not be, because end-users' clients do need privacy).
+
+## Solution
+
+High volume "clients" (operators' chat relays, directory service, SimpleX Chat team support client, SimpleX Status bot, etc.) that don't need privacy will identify themselves to the messaging servers at a point of connection by providing client sertificate, both in TLS handshake and in SMP handshake (the same certificate must be provided).
+
+All the new queues and subscriptions made in this session will be creating a permanent association of the messaging queue with the client, and on subsequent reconnections the client can "subscribe" to all their queues with a single client subscription command.
+
+This will save a lot of time subscribing and resubscribing on server and client restarts, servers' bandwidth, servers' traffic spikes, and memory of both clients and servers.
+
+## Protocol
+
+An ephemeral per-session signature key signed by long-term client certificate is used for client authorization – this session signature key will be passed in SMP handshake.
+
+To transition existing queues, the subscription command will have to be double-signed - by the queue key, and then by client key.
+
+When server receives such "hand-over" subscription it would create a permanent association between the client certificate and the queue, and on subsequent re-connections the client can subscribe to all the existing queues still associated with the client with one command.
+
+The server will respond to the client with the number of queues it was subscribed to - it would both inform the client that it has to re-connect in case of interruption, and can be used for client and server statistics.
+
+When client creates a new queue, it would also sign the request with both keys, per-queue and client's. Other queue operations (e.g., deletion, or changing associated queue data for short links) would still require two signatures, both the queue key and the client key.
+
+The open question is whether there is any value in allowing to remove the association between the client and the queue. Probably not, as threat model should assume that the server would retain this information, and the use-case for users controlling their servers is narrow.
+
+## Protocol connection handshake
+
+Currently, the types for handshakes are:
+
+```haskell
+data ServerHandshake = ServerHandshake
+  { smpVersionRange :: VersionRangeSMP,
+    sessionId :: SessionId,
+    -- pub key to agree shared secrets for command authorization and entity ID encryption.
+    -- todo C.PublicKeyX25519
+    authPubKey :: Maybe (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)
+  }
+
+data ClientHandshake = ClientHandshake
+  { -- | agreed SMP server protocol version
+    smpVersion :: VersionSMP,
+    -- | server identity - CA certificate fingerprint
+    keyHash :: C.KeyHash,
+    -- | pub key to agree shared secret for entity ID encryption, shared secret for command authorization is agreed using per-queue keys.
+    authPubKey :: Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519,
+    -- | Whether connecting client is a proxy server (send from SMP v12).
+    -- This property, if True, disables additional transport encrytion inside TLS.
+    -- (Proxy server connection already has additional encryption, so this layer is not needed there).
+    proxyServer :: Bool
+  }
+```
+
+`ServerHandshake` already contains `authPubKey` with the server certificate chain and the signed key for connection encryption and creating a shared secret for denable authorization (with client entity key) and session encryption layer.
+
+`ClientHandshake` contains only ephemeral `authPubKey` to compute a shared secret for session encryption layer, so we need an additional field for an optional client certificate:
+
+```haskell
+serviceCertKey :: Maybe (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)
+```
+
+Certificate here defines client identity. The actual key to be used to sign commands is session-scoped, and is signed by the certificate key. In case of notification server it MUST be the same certificate that is used for server TLS connections.
+
+For operators' clients we may optionally include operators' certificate in the chain, and that would allow servers to identify operators if either wants to. This would improve end-user security, as not only the server would validate that its certificate matches the address, but it would also validate that it is operated by SimpleX Chat or by Flux, preventing any server impersonation (e.g., via DNS manipulations) - the client could then report that the files are hosted on SimpleX Chat servers, but then can stop and show additional warning in case certificate does not match the domain - same as the browsers do with CA stores in the client.
+
+## Protocol transmissions
+
+Each transport block can contain one or several protocol transmissions.
+
+Each transmission has this structure:
+
+```abnf
+transmission = authenticator authorized
+; authenticator - Ed25519 signature for recipients or X25519 authenticator for senders, to provide repudiation.
+; authenticator authorizes the rest of the transmission.
+authorized = sessId corrId entityId command.
+; sessId is tls-unique channel binding, its presense in the transmission prevents replay attacks.
+```
+
+The proposed change would replace authenticator with exactly one or two authenticators, where the first one will remain resource-level authorization (queue key), and the optional second one will be client authorization with the client key.
+
+```abnf
+authenticator = queue_authenticator ("0" / "1" service_authenticator)
+; "0" and "1" characters (digit characters, not x00 or x01) are conventionally used for Maybe types in the protocol.
+```
+
+In case service_authenticator is present, queue_authenticator should authorize over `fingerprint authorized` (concatenation of service identity certificate fingerprint and the rest of the transmission).
+
+All queues created with client key will have to be double-authorized with both the queue key and the client key - both the client and the server would have to maintain this knowledge, whether the queue is associated with the client or not.
+
+Asymmetric retries have to be supported - the first request creating this association may succeed on the server and timeout on the client.
+
+## Subscription
+
+To subscribe to all associated queues the client has to send a single command authorized with the client key passed in handshake.
+
+The command and response:
+
+```haskell
+SUBS :: Command Recipient -- to enable all client subscriptions, empty entity ID in the transmission, signed by client key - it must be the same as was used in handover subscription signature.
+NSUBS :: Command Recipient -- notification subscription
+SOK :: Maybe ServiceId -- new subscription response
+SOKS :: Int64 -> BrokerMsg -- response from the server, includes the number of subscribed queues
+ENDS :: Int64 -> BrokerMsg -- when another session subscribes with the same certificate
+```
+
+Open questions:
+- What should used as an entity ID for `SUBS` transmission - certificate fingerprint or an empty string?
+- Should there be a command to get the list of all associated queues? It is likely to be useful for debugging?
+- What should happen when `SUB` is sent for a single already associated queue? What if it is signed with the correct session key, but that is different from existing association? The current approach is that once associated, this associaiton would require authorization for single subscriptions, with the same certificate as already associated.
+
+## Ephemeral client-session association
+
+This was considered to reduce costs for the usual clients to re-subscribe. Currently it's a big problem, because of groups, and with transition to chat relays it won't be.
+
+For some very busy end-user clients it may help.
+
+Given that server has access to an ephemeral association between recipient client session and queues anyway (even with clients connecting via Tor, unless per-connection transport isolation is used), introducing `sessionPubKey` to allow resubscription to the previously subscribed queues may reduce the traffic. This won't change threat model as the server would only keep this association in memory, and not persist it. Clients on another hand may safely persist this association for fast resubscription on client restarts.
+
+This is not planned for the forseable future, as migrating to chat relays would solve most of the problem.
+
+Assuming an average active user has 20 contacts and 20 groups, and they would need ~3 subscriptions for each (for redundancy), so about 120 subscription to reconnect. The single 16kb transport block allows to send ~136 subscriptions. Which means that ephemeral sessions would create no value for clients at all, unless they are super active.
+
+Further, improving transport efficiency for super-active non-identified clients may help network abuse, so ephemeral sessions may have negative value.

rfcs/2025-07-15-multi-device.md

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+# Using the same profile from multiple devices
+
+## Problem
+
+Double Ratchet algorithm makes it hard to send/receive messages sent to the user from different devices, as each message changes the state of Double Ratchet keys, and these state changes must be strictly sequential and they cannot be reversed (although skipping is possible).
+
+Traditional approach for multi-device converts each direct conversation into a group, where each device participates as a member. Likewise, for group conversations each device also participates as a member. While these members *look* as if they are the same user to others, a very simple client app modification may show device ID for each message, and the communication peers, both in direct chats and in groups would know how many devices a user has and which device the user sent the message from. In addition to that, with this approach communication peers can send different messages to different devices (it can be prevented by provider who would request that only message key is encrypted with DR, while the encrypted message is the same) or withheld from some devices (it cannot be prevented by provider, as it cannot add key to the communication in case it is missing, and cannot withhold the message completely too). These opens various vectors for targeted attacks, e.g.:
+- tracking movements of the user: once each devices is identified as "desk" and "phone" it would allow to know where the user is at a given time.
+- manipulating information by sending messages to one device (to have proof it was sent) and withholding from others, or sending different messages if the protocol allows it.
+
+In addition to that, the specific implementation of this approach in Signal compromises break-in recovery property (aka post-compromise security) of Double-Ratchet algorithm, making its design ineffective - the only reason to have the second ratchet in DR algorithm is to provide break-in recovery, without it a much simpler design with a single ratchet is sufficient. See [this paper](https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/626.pdf) for details.
+
+While this limitation can be addressed with notifications when a new device is added and per-device keys, we still find the remaining attack vectors on user security and privacy to be unacceptable, and opening unsuspecting users to various criminal actions - and it is wrong to say that would only affect security conscious users, and most people would not be affected by these risks. Allowing potential criminals in groups to know which device you are currently using is a real risk for all users.
+
+Another approach was offered by Threema that is ["mediator" server](https://threema.com/en/blog/md-architectural-overview) where the state of encryption ratchets is stored server-side. While it protects the user from their communication peers, it increases required level of trust to the servers, and in case of SimpleX network it would expose the knowledge of who communicates to whom. So while the idea of server-side storage of encryption state is promising, it has to be per-connection, to retain "no-accounts" property of SimpleX messaging network.
+
+Also see [FAQ](https://simplex.chat/faq/#why-cant-i-use-the-same-profile-on-different-devices) and [this issue](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/issues/444#issuecomment-3066968358).
+
+## Proposed solution
+
+One of the ideas presented in FAQ - to store the state of Double Ratchet algorithm in the encrypted container on the server seems promising. The RFC develops this idea.
+
+### Considerations for the design
+
+1. The largest ratchet state size with the current implementation is less than 8kb (which is achieved when both sides shared PQ keys and ciphertexts), so while it cannot fit in the same transport blocks together with sent and received messages, it would fit in one transport block.
+
+2. Protocol commands and events may be changed (even if at the cost of slightly reducing message size) can fit the hash of the ratchet state (32 bytes sha256 would be sufficient), so that the client can determine whether it has the most recent ratchet state or if it needs to retrieve the latest copy. Message size reduction won't affect the users because we use compression, and there is a substantial reserve.
+
+3. Client commands that modify ratchet state would include the hash of the previous ratchet state so that the server can reject or ignore the command in case the previous ratchet state is different or in case command is repeated in case of lost response).
+
+4. The client does not need to retrieve message state for each encryption and decryption operation - it can "speculatively" use the ratchet state it has, and receive correct ratchet state in the "error" response after attempting encryption based on incorrect ratchet state.
+
+## Proposed protocol design
+
+Ratchet state will be stored on the same server that stores message queue, as part of message queue record. 8kb is a sufficient size for this blob (the actual max size is 7800 bytes). The server would also store the hashes of the current and, possibly, the previous ratchet states (TBC).
+
+While ratchet is used for duplex connection, the connection still has primary queue, and with redundancy the same ratchet state can be stored on all secondary queues.
+
+Ratchet state will be encrypted using secret_box - a symmetric encryption scheme, so PQ-resistant. If ratchet state is stored on more than one server, it has to be encrypted with a different key for each server.
+
+Questions: how to rotate the key used to store ratchet? Should key used to encrypt ratchet rotate at the same time when queue is rotated? The latter is a logical option, as it prevents additional complexity and solves the problem anyway. A possible option is to have "ratchet version" that will be used to advance the key used to encrypt ratchet via HKDF.
+
+Security considerations: the scheme may reduce break-in recovery to the points queues are rotated, unless there is some randomness mixed-in into the key derivation (the key used to encrypt ratchet state). But including randomness would defeat the purpose, as other devices wouldn't be able to access the ratchets. Another approach would be to have each device use its own key for encryption, and encrypt to all keys of all devices (or to encrypt key, to avoid size increase). Having multiple encryptions would show how many devices use the queue, but servers already can observe it, so it is a better tradeoff. Another idea would be to rotate the key used to authorize queue commands - we already support multiple recipient keys, and it can be used for multi-device scenario. That would partially mitigate break-in attacks as the attacker who obtained the key from ratchet state would be able to decrypt it, but won't be able to decrypt it (the attacker collusion with the server is not mitigated). Yet another idea would be for each party (device) to share its private (or encapsulation) key and to have a symmetric key (used to encrypt the ratchet state) encrypted (encapsulated) separately for each device. This would reduce the size of the stored data to `ratchet size` + `encrypted key size` * N, so even in case of PQ encryption (e.g. sntrup) the size required to store the ratchet would be under transport block size, while limiting it to say 4-8 devices, which is sufficient.
+
+To participate in multi-device scheme the devices would join the usual group that will be used to share public (encapsulation) device keys and to communicate updates to conversations that were received by the currently "active" device. "Active" means the device that received or sent and processed the message, and while only one device can receive messages from a given queue, device "active" state may be determined per queue, allowing concurrent usage.
+
+The scheme must be resilient to state updates being lost, and in case of direct messages it would result in some messages not being shown (or shown as skipped), while conversation preference and profile updates can be re-requested from peers, while the current profile of the user would become the latest. Likewise, for groups state updates ca be requested from super-peers or for decentralized groups - from owners. Maintaining chat state consistency is an important consideration, but is not a focus of this RFC - the focus is managing message delivery and DR encryption for multiple devices. Other multi-device schemes have the same issues with state consistency. Partially, the profile state consistency can be improved by using a single shared queue (or set of queues) to store user's profile and chat preferences to synchronize profile updates asynchronously between the devices.
+
+## The protocol to send the message
+
+`rsi` - ratchet state on device `i`.
+
+`enc(rs)` - current authoritative ratchet state on the server.
+
+`pt` and `ct` - plaintext and ciphertext messages.
+
+Encryption is a state transition function ratchetEnc: `(ct, rs') = ratchetEnc(pt, rs)`.
+
+1. Device encrypts the message using the stored ratchet state: `(ct, rsi') = ratchetEnc(pt, rsi)`
+
+2. Device sends modified encrypted ratchet state and the hash of the previous encrypted state to the server that stores the queue: `RSET (hash(enc(rsi)), enc(rsi'))`.
+
+3. If the hash of the previous state matches state stored on the server (`hash(enc(rsi)) == hash(enc(rs))`), the server updates the state and responds with `ratchet_ok` (that may include the current state or it's hash, for validation). If the hash is different, the server responds with `bad_ratchet(enc(rs))` message that includes the correct ratchet state. These updates must be atomic. In this case device has to update the local ratchet state (provided it can decrypt it), and repeat encryption attempt. If device cannot decrypt the provided ratchet state, it means that the connection is disrupted (possibly, device is removed from device group, but missed the notifications).
+
+4. After successful state update in primary receiving queue, the device would update it in secondary receiving queues.
+
+5. Device sends encrypted message as usual, via proxy that must be different both from the server that stores the ratchet and from the destination server.
+
+6. Device broadcasts sent message and new ratchet state to other devices in the device group.
+
+This protocol is simple, and it minimizes requests when sending the message to one additional request to update ratchet state in most cases, only requiring two requests when device state was not updated via device group prior to message sending attempt.
+
+## The protocol to receive the message
+
+Decryption is also a state transition function: `(pt, rs') = ratchetDec(ct, rs)`
+
+1. Server sends the message to the device (can be in response to SUB or ACK commands, or with active subscription). Pushed message would include the hash of the currently stored ratchet state: `hash(enc(rs))`.
+
+2. If device has the ratchet state with the same hash (`hash(enc(rs)) == hash(enc(rsi))`), it decrypts the message: `(pt, rsi') = ratchetDec(ct, rsi)`.
+
+3. If device has ratchet state with a different hash, it requests ratchet from the server with additional protocol command `RGET` with response `RCHT (enc(rs))` and updates the local state.
+
+4. Device decrypts the message `(pt, rsi') = ratchetDec(ct, rsi)` and processes it as usual.
+
+5. Device sends acknowledgement to the server as usual, but now it includes the new ratchet state and the hash of the previous state: `ACK msgId (hash(enc(rsi)), enc(rsi'))`
+
+6. The server compares ratchet state with stored state hash, and in case it matches it processes `ACK` and responds with `OK` as usual (or `NO_MSG` in case msgId is incorrect, also as usual - it would happen in repeated ACK requests). If ratchet state hash does not match, the server would respond with `bad_ratchet(enc(rs))` - which means that the message was already processed by another device and ratchet was advanced. This is a complex scenario, as the client has to either revert the change from message processing or somehow combine the change with the updates communicated via device group (as a side note, device group can simply re-broadcast messages, not state updates, but it will result in state divergence between devices when different messages are lost).
+
+Unlike sending messages, this flow does not require any additional requests in most cases, only requiring requesting message state reconciliation when the same message was received and processed by more than one client, but it does not require re-acknowledgement.
+
+## Challenges
+
+This is an idea of the design rather than the actual design, as it requires more thinking about:
+- how to handle concurrent ratchet state updates,
+- "active" status transitions per queue,
+- avoiding concurrent subscriptions to queues from multiple devices,
+- state updates and synchronization between devices,
+- handling skipped messages,
+- costs to update ratchets in bulk send scenario - this scheme would substantially increase costs of preparing large broadcasts, and it makes this scheme not acceptable for chat relays. Which means that "profile" on desktop used as chat relay won't be synched to other devices.
+- etc.
+
+## Advantages
+
+The communication peers won't know how many devices the user has, and which device was used to send the message. Also, the communication peers won't be able to send different messages to different user's devices, or to withhold messages from some devices.

rfcs/2026-01-30-send-file-page/2026-01-31-xftp-web-server-changes.md

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+# XFTP Server: SNI, CORS, and Web Support
+
+Implementation details for Phase 3 of `rfcs/2026-01-30-send-file-page.md` (sections 6.1-6.4).
+
+## 1. Overview
+
+The XFTP server is extended to support web browser clients by:
+
+1. **SNI-based TLS certificate switching** — Present a CA-issued web certificate (e.g., Let's Encrypt) to browsers, while continuing to present the self-signed XFTP identity certificate to native clients.
+2. **CORS headers** — Add CORS response headers on SNI connections so browsers allow cross-origin XFTP requests.
+3. **Configuration** — `[WEB]` INI section for HTTPS cert/key paths; opt-in (commented out by default).
+
+Web handshake (challenge-response identity proof, §6.3 of parent RFC) is not yet implemented and will be added separately.
+
+## 2. SNI Certificate Switching
+
+### 2.1 Reusing the SMP Pattern
+
+The SMP server already implements SNI-based certificate switching via `TLSServerCredential` and `runTransportServerState_` (see `rfcs/2024-09-15-shared-port.md`). The XFTP server applies the same pattern with one key difference: both native and web XFTP clients use HTTP/2 transport, whereas SMP switches between raw SMP protocol and HTTP entirely.
+
+### 2.2 Approach
+
+When `httpServerCreds` is configured, the XFTP server bypasses `runHTTP2Server` and uses `runTransportServerState_` directly to obtain the per-connection `sniUsed` flag. It then sets up HTTP/2 manually on each TLS connection using `withHTTP2` (same internals as `runHTTP2ServerWith_`). The `sniUsed` flag is captured in the closure and shared by all HTTP/2 requests on that connection.
+
+When `httpServerCreds` is absent, the existing `runHTTP2Server` path is unchanged.
+
+```
+Native client (no SNI)  ──TLS──> XFTP identity cert ──HTTP/2──> processRequest (no CORS)
+Browser client (SNI)    ──TLS──> Web CA cert        ──HTTP/2──> processRequest (+ CORS)
+```
+
+### 2.3 Certificate Chain
+
+The web certificate file (e.g., `web.crt`) must contain the full chain: leaf certificate followed by the signing CA certificate. `loadServerCredential` uses `T.credentialLoadX509Chain` which reads all PEM blocks from the file.
+
+The client validates the chain by comparing `idCert` fingerprint (the CA cert, second in the 2-cert chain) against the known `keyHash`. This is the same validation as for XFTP identity certificates — the CA that signed the web cert must match the XFTP server's identity.
+
+## 3. CORS Support
+
+### 3.1 Design
+
+CORS headers are only added when both conditions are true:
+- `addCORSHeaders` is `True` in `TransportServerConfig` (set in XFTP `Main.hs`)
+- `sniUsed` is `True` for the current TLS connection
+
+This ensures native clients never see CORS headers.
+
+### 3.2 Response Headers
+
+All POST responses on SNI connections include:
+```
+Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
+Access-Control-Expose-Headers: *
+```
+
+### 3.3 OPTIONS Preflight
+
+OPTIONS requests are intercepted at the HTTP/2 dispatch level, before `processRequest`. This is necessary because `processRequest` rejects bodies that don't match `xftpBlockSize`.
+
+Preflight response:
+```
+HTTP/2 200
+Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
+Access-Control-Allow-Methods: POST, OPTIONS
+Access-Control-Allow-Headers: *
+Access-Control-Max-Age: 86400
+```
+
+### 3.4 Security
+
+`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` is safe because:
+- All XFTP commands require Ed25519 authentication (per-chunk keys from file description).
+- No cookies or browser credentials are involved.
+- File content is end-to-end encrypted.
+
+## 4. Configuration
+
+### 4.1 INI Template
+
+```ini
+[WEB]
+# cert: /etc/opt/simplex-xftp/web.crt
+# key: /etc/opt/simplex-xftp/web.key
+```
+
+Commented out by default — web support is opt-in.
+
+### 4.2 Behavior
+
+- `[WEB]` section not configured: silently ignored, server operates normally for native clients only.
+- `[WEB]` section configured with valid cert/key paths: SNI + CORS enabled.
+- `[WEB]` section configured with missing cert files: warning + continue (non-fatal, unlike SMP where it is fatal).
+
+## 5. Files Modified
+
+### 5.1 `src/Simplex/Messaging/Transport/Server.hs`
+
+Added `addCORSHeaders :: Bool` field to `TransportServerConfig`. Updated `mkTransportServerConfig` to accept the new parameter. All existing SMP call sites pass `False`.
+
+### 5.2 `src/Simplex/Messaging/Transport/HTTP2/Server.hs`
+
+- Extracted `expireInactiveClient` from `runHTTP2ServerWith_`'s `where` clause to a module-level function.
+- Parameterized `runHTTP2ServerWith_`: setup type changed from `((TLS p -> IO ()) -> a)` to `(((Bool, TLS p) -> IO ()) -> a)`, callback from `HTTP2ServerFunc` to `Bool -> HTTP2ServerFunc`. The `Bool` is the per-connection `sniUsed` flag, threaded through `H.run` to the callback.
+- Extended `runHTTP2Server` with `Maybe T.Credential` parameter for SNI web certificate. Its setup uses `runTransportServerState_` with `TLSServerCredential`, which naturally provides `(sniUsed, tls)` pairs matching the new `runHTTP2ServerWith_` setup type.
+- Adapted `runHTTP2ServerWith` (client-side HTTP/2, no SNI): wraps its setup to inject `(False, tls)` and its callback with `const`.
+- Updated `getHTTP2Server` (test helper) to pass `Nothing` for httpCreds.
+
+### 5.3 `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs`
+
+- Added `httpCredentials :: Maybe ServerCredentials` to `XFTPServerConfig`.
+- Added `httpServerCreds :: Maybe T.Credential` to `XFTPEnv`.
+- `newXFTPServerEnv` loads HTTP credentials when configured.
+
+### 5.4 `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs`
+
+- Added `[WEB]` section to INI template.
+- Added `httpCredentials` parsing from INI `[WEB]` section (`cert` and `key` fields).
+- Set `addCORSHeaders = isJust httpCredentials_` in transport config (conditional on web cert presence).
+
+### 5.5 `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs`
+
+Core server changes:
+
+- `runServer` calls `runHTTP2Server` with `httpCreds_` and a `\sniUsed -> handleRequest (sniUsed && addCORSHeaders transportConfig)` callback. TLS params are `defaultSupportedParamsHTTPS` when web creds present, `defaultSupportedParams` otherwise. SNI routing, HTTP/2 setup, and client expiration are handled inside `runHTTP2Server`.
+
+- `XFTPTransportRequest` carries `addCORS :: Bool` field, threaded through to `sendXFTPResponse`.
+
+- `sendXFTPResponse` conditionally includes CORS headers based on `addCORS`.
+
+- OPTIONS requests on SNI connections return CORS preflight headers before reaching `processRequest`.
+
+- Helper functions: `corsHeaders` (response headers), `corsPreflightHeaders` (preflight headers).
+
+### 5.6 `tests/XFTPClient.hs`
+
+- Added `httpCredentials = Nothing` to `testXFTPServerConfig`.
+- Added `testXFTPServerConfigSNI` with web cert config and `addCORSHeaders = True`.
+- Added `withXFTPServerSNI` helper.
+
+### 5.7 `tests/XFTPServerTests.hs`
+
+Added SNI and CORS tests as a subsection within `xftpServerTests` (6 tests):
+
+1. **SNI cert selection** — Connect with SNI + `h2` ALPN, verify RSA web certificate is presented.
+2. **Non-SNI cert selection** — Connect without SNI + `xftp/1` ALPN, verify Ed448 XFTP certificate is presented.
+3. **CORS headers** — SNI POST request includes `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` and `Access-Control-Expose-Headers: *`.
+4. **OPTIONS preflight** — SNI OPTIONS request returns all CORS preflight headers.
+5. **No CORS without SNI** — Non-SNI POST request has no CORS headers.
+6. **File chunk delivery** — Full XFTP file chunk upload/download through SNI-enabled server verifying no regression.
+
+## 6. Remaining Work
+
+- **Web handshake** (§6.3 of parent RFC): Challenge-response identity proof for SNI connections. The server detects web clients via the `sniUsed` flag and expects a 32-byte challenge in the first POST body (non-empty, unlike standard handshake). Response includes full cert chain + signature over `(challenge ++ sessionId)`.
+- **Static page serving** (§6.5 of parent RFC): Optional serving of the web page HTML/JS bundle on GET requests.

rfcs/2026-01-30-send-file-page/2026-02-02-xftp-web-handshake.md

@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+# Web Handshake — Challenge-Response Identity Proof
+
+RFC §6.3: Server proves XFTP identity to web clients independently of TLS CA infrastructure.
+
+## 1. Protocol
+
+**Standard handshake** (unchanged):
+```
+Client → empty POST                                        → Server
+Server → padded {vRange, sessionId, authPubKey, Nothing}    → Client
+Client → padded {version, keyHash, Nothing}                 → Server
+Server → empty                                              → Client
+```
+
+**Web handshake** (SNI connection, non-empty hello):
+```
+Client → padded {32 random bytes}                                → Server
+Server → padded {vRange, sessionId, authPubKey, Just sigBytes}   → Client
+  sigBytes = signatureBytes(sign(identityLeafKey, challenge <> sessionId))
+Client validates:
+  1. chainIdCaCerts(authPubKey.certChain) → CCValid {leafCert, idCert}
+  2. SHA-256(idCert) == keyHash   (server identity)
+  3. verify(leafCert.pubKey, sigBytes, challenge <> sessionId)  (challenge-response)
+  4. verify(leafCert.pubKey, signedPubKey.signature, signedPubKey.objectDer)  (DH key auth)
+Client → padded {version, keyHash, Just challenge}               → Server
+Server verifies: echoed challenge == stored challenge from step 1
+Server → empty                                                   → Client
+```
+
+**Detection**: `sniUsed` per-connection flag. Non-empty hello allowed only when `sniUsed`. Empty hello with SNI → standard handshake.
+
+**Why both steps 3 and 4**: Native clients verify `signedPubKey` using the TLS peer certificate (`serverKey` from `getServerVerifyKey`), which is the XFTP identity cert in non-SNI connections — TLS provides this binding. Web clients cannot access TLS peer certificate data (browser API limitation; TLS presents the web CA cert but provides no API to extract it). So web clients must verify at the application layer using `authPubKey.certChain`, which always contains the XFTP identity chain regardless of which cert TLS used. Step 3 proves the server holds its identity key *right now* (freshness via random challenge). Step 4 proves the DH session key was signed by the identity key holder (prevents MITM key substitution). Together they give web clients some assurance native clients get from TLS, except channel binding for commands.
+
+## 2. Type Changes — `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Transport.hs`
+
+### `XFTPServerHandshake` (line 114)
+
+Add field: `webIdentityProof :: Maybe ByteString` — raw Ed448 signature bytes (114 bytes), or `Nothing` for standard handshake. No record needed — the cert chain is already in `authPubKey.certChain`.
+
+### `Encoding XFTPServerHandshake` (line 136)
+
+- `smpEncode`: append `smpEncode webIdentityProof`
+- `smpP`: `Tail compat`, if non-empty `eitherToMaybe $ smpDecode compat`
+
+Backward compat: old clients ignore via `Tail _compat`; new client + old server → empty compat → `Nothing`.
+
+### `XFTPClientHandshake` (line 121)
+
+Add field: `webChallenge :: Maybe ByteString`
+
+### `Encoding XFTPClientHandshake` (line 128)
+
+Same `Tail compat` pattern as server handshake.
+
+### Export list
+
+Both types use `(..)` export — new fields auto-exported.
+
+## 3. Server Changes — `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs`
+
+### `XFTPTransportRequest` (line 88)
+
+Add field: `sniUsed :: SNICredentialUsed` (`Bool` from `Transport.Server`). Add import.
+
+### `Handshake` (line 117)
+
+`HandshakeSent C.PrivateKeyX25519` → `HandshakeSent C.PrivateKeyX25519 (Maybe ByteString)` — stores 32-byte web challenge or `Nothing`.
+
+### `runServer` handler (line 145–161)
+
+- Pass `sniUsed` into request construction (line 154)
+- SNI-first routing: when `sniUsed`, always route to `xftpServerHandshakeV1` (web ALPN `h2` would otherwise fall to `_` catch-all)
+
+### `xftpServerHandshakeV1` (line 162)
+
+- Destructure `sniUsed` from request
+- Match `HandshakeSent pk challenge_` → `processClientHandshake pk challenge_`
+
+### `processHello` (line 171)
+
+- Branch `(sniUsed, B.null bodyHead)`:
+  - `(_, True)` → standard: `challenge_ = Nothing`
+  - `(True, False)` → web: unpad, verify 32 bytes, `challenge_ = Just`
+  - `(False, False)` → `throwE HANDSHAKE`
+- Store: `HandshakeSent pk challenge_`
+- Compute: `webIdentityProof = C.signatureBytes . C.sign serverSignKey . (<> sessionId) <$> challenge_`
+- Construct `XFTPServerHandshake` with `webIdentityProof`
+
+### `processClientHandshake` (line 183)
+
+- Accept `challenge_` parameter
+- Decode `webChallenge` from `XFTPClientHandshake`
+- Add: `unless (challenge_ == webChallenge) $ throwE HANDSHAKE`
+  (standard: both `Nothing` → passes)
+
+## 4. Native Client — `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Client.hs`
+
+### `xftpClientHandshakeV1` (line 142)
+
+Add `webChallenge = Nothing` in `sendClientHandshake` call.
+
+No other changes — parser handles new fields via `Tail`, native client ignores `webIdentityProof`.
+
+## 5. TypeScript Changes (DONE except Ed448)
+
+Sections 5.1 and 5.2 are implemented. Section 5.3 needs Ed448 support.
+
+## 10. Ed448 Support via `@noble/curves`
+
+**Problem**: Production servers use Ed448 certificates (default). `identity.ts` only supports Ed25519 via libsodium. libsodium has no Ed448 support and never will.
+
+**Solution**: Add `@noble/curves` dependency for Ed448 verification only. All other crypto stays with libsodium.
+
+### 10.1 `xftp-web/package.json` — Add dependency
+
+```json
+"dependencies": {
+  "libsodium-wrappers-sumo": "^0.7.13",
+  "@noble/curves": "^1.9.7"
+}
+```
+
+Use v1.x (supports both CJS and ESM). v2.x is ESM-only with `.js` extension requirement.
+
+### 10.2 `xftp-web/src/crypto/keys.ts` — Ed448 DER constants and decode
+
+Add Ed448 SPKI DER prefix (12 bytes, same prefix length as Ed25519):
+```
+30 43 30 05 06 03 2b 65 71 03 3a 00
+```
+
+| Property | Ed25519 | Ed448 |
+|----------|---------|-------|
+| OID | `2b 65 70` | `2b 65 71` |
+| SPKI prefix | `30 2a ...` | `30 43 ...` |
+| Raw key size | 32 bytes | 57 bytes |
+| SPKI total | 44 bytes | 69 bytes |
+| Signature size | 64 bytes | 114 bytes |
+
+New functions:
+- `decodePubKeyEd448(der: Uint8Array): Uint8Array` — 69 bytes → 57 bytes raw
+- `encodePubKeyEd448(raw: Uint8Array): Uint8Array` — 57 bytes → 69 bytes DER
+- `verifyEd448(publicKey: Uint8Array, sig: Uint8Array, msg: Uint8Array): boolean` — uses `ed448.verify(sig, msg, publicKey)` from `@noble/curves/ed448`
+
+Note: `@noble/curves` parameter order is `(signature, message, publicKey)`, not `(publicKey, signature, message)`.
+
+### 10.3 `xftp-web/src/crypto/identity.ts` — Algorithm-agnostic verification
+
+Replace `extractCertEd25519Key` + hardcoded Ed25519 `verify` with algorithm detection:
+
+1. `extractCertPublicKeyInfo(certDer)` → SPKI DER (already exists, works for any algorithm)
+2. Detect algorithm from SPKI: byte at offset 8 is `0x70` (Ed25519) or `0x71` (Ed448)
+3. Extract raw key with appropriate decoder
+4. Verify signatures with appropriate function
+
+```typescript
+type CertKeyAlgorithm = 'ed25519' | 'ed448'
+
+function detectKeyAlgorithm(spki: Uint8Array): CertKeyAlgorithm {
+  if (spki.length === 44 && spki[8] === 0x70) return 'ed25519'
+  if (spki.length === 69 && spki[8] === 0x71) return 'ed448'
+  throw new Error("unsupported certificate key algorithm")
+}
+```
+
+`verifyIdentityProof` changes:
+- Extract SPKI from leaf cert
+- Detect algorithm → choose `decodePubKeyEd25519`/`decodePubKeyEd448` and `verify`/`verifyEd448`
+- Both challenge signature and DH key signature use the same leaf key + algorithm
+
+Remove `extractCertEd25519Key` (replaced by generic path). Keep `extractCertPublicKeyInfo` (already generic).
+
+### 10.4 `xftp-web/src/protocol/handshake.ts` — Comment update
+
+`SignedKey.signature` comment: "raw Ed25519 signature bytes (64 bytes)" → "raw signature bytes (Ed25519: 64, Ed448: 114)"
+
+### 10.5 Tests — `tests/XFTPWebTests.hs`
+
+**Integration test**: Switch from `withXFTPServerEd25519SNI` (Ed25519 fixtures) to `withXFTPServerSNI` (default Ed448 fixtures). Update fingerprint source from `tests/fixtures/ed25519/ca.crt` to `tests/fixtures/ca.crt`.
+
+Optionally add a second integration test with Ed25519 to cover both paths, or rely on existing unit tests for Ed25519 coverage.
+
+### 10.6 Implementation order
+
+1. `npm install @noble/curves` in `xftp-web/`
+2. `keys.ts` — Ed448 constants, decode, encode, verifyEd448
+3. `identity.ts` — algorithm detection, generic verification
+4. `handshake.ts` — comment fix
+5. `XFTPWebTests.hs` — switch integration test to Ed448
+6. Build TS + run all tests
+
+## 6. Haskell Integration Test — `tests/XFTPServerTests.hs`
+
+Add `testWebHandshake` to "XFTP SNI and CORS" describe block.
+
+1. `withXFTPServerSNI` — server with web credentials
+2. Connect with SNI + `h2` ALPN
+3. Send padded 32-byte challenge
+4. Decode `XFTPServerHandshake`, assert `webIdentityProof` is `Just`
+5. `chainIdCaCerts` on `authPubKey.certChain` → `CCValid {leafCert, idCert}`
+6. Verify `SHA-256(idCert) == keyHash`
+7. Extract `leafCert` public key, verify challenge signature
+8. Verify `signedPubKey` signature using `leafCert` key (DH key auth)
+9. Send `XFTPClientHandshake` with `webChallenge = Just challenge`
+10. Assert empty response
+
+Imports: `XFTPServerHandshake (..)`, `XFTPClientHandshake (..)`, `ChainCertificates (..)`, `chainIdCaCerts`.
+
+## 7. TS Tests — `tests/XFTPWebTests.hs`
+
+### Unit tests
+
+- **`decodeServerHandshake` with proof**: Haskell-encode with `Just sigBytes`, TS-decode, verify bytes match.
+- **`encodeClientHandshake` with challenge**: TS-encode, compare with Haskell-encoded.
+- **`chainIdCaCerts`**: 2/3/4-cert chains return correct positions.
+- **`caFingerprint` (fixed)**: matches `sha256(idCert)` for 2 and 3-cert chains.
+
+### Integration test
+
+Node.js inline script against `withXFTPServerSNI`:
+1. Connect with SNI via `http2.connect`
+2. Send padded challenge, decode `XFTPServerHandshake` with TS
+3. `verifyIdentityProof` — full chain validation + challenge sig + DH key sig
+4. Send client handshake with echoed challenge
+5. Assert empty response
+
+## 8. Implementation Order
+
+1. `Transport.hs` — `Maybe` fields + encoding instances
+2. `Server.hs` — `sniUsed`, challenge in `Handshake`, `processHello`, `processClientHandshake`, SNI routing
+3. `Client.hs` — `webChallenge = Nothing`
+4. Build: `cabal build --ghc-options -O0`
+5. Run existing SNI/CORS tests
+6. `XFTPServerTests.hs` — `testWebHandshake`
+7. `handshake.ts` — types, decoding, `chainIdCaCerts`, fix `caFingerprint`
+8. `crypto/identity.ts` — Node.js verification functions
+9. `XFTPWebTests.hs` — unit + integration tests
+10. Build TS + run all tests
+
+## 9. Verification
+
+```bash
+cd xftp-web && npm install && npm run build && cd ..
+cabal test --ghc-options=-O0 --test-option='--match=/XFTP/XFTP server/XFTP SNI and CORS/' --test-show-details=streaming
+cabal test --ghc-options=-O0 --test-option='--match=/XFTP Web Client/' --test-show-details=streaming
+```

rfcs/2026-01-30-send-file-page/2026-02-03-xftp-web-browser-tests.md

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+# Plan: Browser ↔ Haskell File Transfer Tests
+
+## Table of Contents
+1. Goal
+2. Current State
+3. Implementation
+4. Success Criteria
+5. Files
+6. Order
+
+## 1. Goal
+Run browser upload/download tests in headless Chromium via Vitest, proving fetch-based transport works in real browser environment.
+
+## 2. Current State
+- `client.ts`: Transport abstraction done — http2 for Node, fetch for browser ✓
+- `agent.ts`: Uses `node:crypto` (randomBytes) and `node:zlib` (deflateRawSync/inflateRawSync) — **won't run in browser**
+- `XFTPWebTests.hs`: Cross-language tests exist (Haskell calls TS via Node.js) ✓
+
+## 3. Implementation
+
+### 3.1 Make agent.ts isomorphic
+
+| Current (Node.js only) | Isomorphic replacement |
+|------------------------|------------------------|
+| `import crypto from "node:crypto"` | Remove import |
+| `import zlib from "node:zlib"` | `import pako from "pako"` |
+| `crypto.randomBytes(32)` | `crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))` |
+| `zlib.deflateRawSync(buf)` | `pako.deflateRaw(buf)` |
+| `zlib.inflateRawSync(buf)` | `pako.inflateRaw(buf)` |
+
+Note: `crypto.getRandomValues` available in both browser and Node.js (globalThis.crypto).
+
+### 3.2 Vitest browser mode setup
+
+`package.json` additions:
+```json
+"devDependencies": {
+  "vitest": "^3.0.0",
+  "@vitest/browser": "^3.0.0",
+  "playwright": "^1.50.0",
+  "@types/pako": "^2.0.3"
+},
+"dependencies": {
+  "pako": "^2.1.0"
+}
+```
+
+`vitest.config.ts`:
+```typescript
+import {defineConfig} from 'vitest/config'
+import {readFileSync} from 'fs'
+import {createHash} from 'crypto'
+
+// Compute fingerprint from ca.crt (same as Haskell's loadFileFingerprint)
+const caCert = readFileSync('../tests/fixtures/ca.crt')
+const fingerprint = createHash('sha256').update(caCert).digest('base64url')
+const serverAddr = `xftp://${fingerprint}@localhost:7000`
+
+export default defineConfig({
+  define: {
+    'import.meta.env.XFTP_SERVER': JSON.stringify(serverAddr)
+  },
+  test: {
+    browser: {
+      enabled: true,
+      provider: 'playwright',
+      instances: [{browser: 'chromium'}],
+      headless: true,
+      providerOptions: {
+        launch: {ignoreHTTPSErrors: true}
+      }
+    },
+    globalSetup: './test/globalSetup.ts'
+  }
+})
+```
+
+### 3.3 Server startup
+
+`test/globalSetup.ts`:
+```typescript
+import {spawn, ChildProcess} from 'child_process'
+import {resolve, join} from 'path'
+import {mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, copyFileSync} from 'fs'
+import {tmpdir} from 'os'
+
+let server: ChildProcess | null = null
+
+export async function setup() {
+  const fixtures = resolve(__dirname, '../../tests/fixtures')
+
+  // Create temp directories
+  const cfgDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'xftp-cfg-'))
+  const logDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'xftp-log-'))
+  const filesDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'xftp-files-'))
+
+  // Copy certificates to cfgDir (xftp-server expects ca.crt, server.key, server.crt there)
+  copyFileSync(join(fixtures, 'ca.crt'), join(cfgDir, 'ca.crt'))
+  copyFileSync(join(fixtures, 'server.key'), join(cfgDir, 'server.key'))
+  copyFileSync(join(fixtures, 'server.crt'), join(cfgDir, 'server.crt'))
+
+  // Write INI config file
+  const iniContent = `[STORE_LOG]
+enable: off
+
+[TRANSPORT]
+host: localhost
+port: 7000
+
+[FILES]
+path: ${filesDir}
+
+[WEB]
+cert: ${join(fixtures, 'web.crt')}
+key: ${join(fixtures, 'web.key')}
+`
+  writeFileSync(join(cfgDir, 'file-server.ini'), iniContent)
+
+  // Spawn xftp-server with env vars
+  server = spawn('cabal', ['exec', 'xftp-server', '--', 'start'], {
+    env: {
+      ...process.env,
+      XFTP_SERVER_CFG_PATH: cfgDir,
+      XFTP_SERVER_LOG_PATH: logDir
+    },
+    stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe']
+  })
+
+  // Wait for "Listening on port 7000..."
+  await waitForServerReady(server)
+}
+
+export async function teardown() {
+  server?.kill('SIGTERM')
+  await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 500))
+}
+
+function waitForServerReady(proc: ChildProcess): Promise<void> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const timeout = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('Server start timeout')), 15000)
+    proc.stdout?.on('data', (data: Buffer) => {
+      if (data.toString().includes('Listening on port')) {
+        clearTimeout(timeout)
+        resolve()
+      }
+    })
+    proc.stderr?.on('data', (data: Buffer) => {
+      console.error('[xftp-server]', data.toString())
+    })
+    proc.on('error', reject)
+    proc.on('exit', (code) => {
+      clearTimeout(timeout)
+      if (code !== 0) reject(new Error(`Server exited with code ${code}`))
+    })
+  })
+}
+```
+
+Server env vars (from `apps/xftp-server/Main.hs` + `getEnvPath`):
+- `XFTP_SERVER_CFG_PATH` — directory containing `file-server.ini` and certs (`ca.crt`, `server.key`, `server.crt`)
+- `XFTP_SERVER_LOG_PATH` — directory for logs
+
+### 3.4 Browser test
+
+`test/browser.test.ts`:
+```typescript
+import {test, expect} from 'vitest'
+import {encryptFileForUpload, uploadFile, downloadFile} from '../src/agent.js'
+import {parseXFTPServer} from '../src/protocol/address.js'
+
+const server = parseXFTPServer(import.meta.env.XFTP_SERVER)
+
+test('browser upload + download round-trip', async () => {
+  const data = new Uint8Array(50000)
+  crypto.getRandomValues(data)
+  const encrypted = encryptFileForUpload(data, 'test.bin')
+  const {rcvDescription} = await uploadFile(server, encrypted)
+  const {content} = await downloadFile(rcvDescription)
+  expect(content).toEqual(data)
+})
+```
+
+## 4. Success Criteria
+
+1. `npm run build` — agent.ts compiles without node: imports
+2. `cabal test --test-option='--match=/XFTP Web Client/'` — existing Node.js tests still pass
+3. `npm run test:browser` — browser round-trip test passes in headless Chromium
+
+## 5. Files to Create/Modify
+
+**Modify:**
+- `xftp-web/package.json` — add vitest, @vitest/browser, playwright, pako, @types/pako
+- `xftp-web/src/agent.ts` — replace node:crypto, node:zlib with isomorphic alternatives
+
+**Create:**
+- `xftp-web/vitest.config.ts` — browser mode config
+- `xftp-web/test/globalSetup.ts` — xftp-server lifecycle
+- `xftp-web/test/browser.test.ts` — browser round-trip test
+
+## 6. Order of Implementation
+
+1. **Add pako dependency** — `npm install pako @types/pako`
+2. **Make agent.ts isomorphic** — replace node:crypto, node:zlib
+3. **Verify Node.js tests pass** — `cabal test --test-option='--match=/XFTP Web Client/'`
+4. **Set up Vitest** — add devDeps, create vitest.config.ts
+5. **Create globalSetup.ts** — write INI config, spawn xftp-server
+6. **Write browser test** — upload + download round-trip
+7. **Verify browser test passes** — `npm run test:browser`

rfcs/2026-01-30-send-file-page/2026-02-04-xftp-web-browser-transport.md

@@ -0,0 +1,920 @@
+# Browser Transport & Web Worker Architecture
+
+## TOC
+
+1. Executive Summary
+2. Transport: fetch() API
+3. Architecture: Environment Abstraction
+4. Web Worker Implementation
+5. OPFS Implementation
+6. Implementation Plan
+7. Testing Strategy
+
+## 1. Executive Summary
+
+Adapt `client.ts` from `node:http2` to `fetch()` API for isomorphic Node.js/browser support. Add environment abstraction layer so the same upload/download pipeline works with or without Web Workers and with or without OPFS. In browsers, crypto runs in a Web Worker to keep UI responsive; in Node.js tests, crypto runs directly.
+
+**Key architectural constraint:** Existing crypto functions (`encryptFile`, `decryptChunks`, etc.) remain unchanged. The abstraction layer wraps them, choosing execution context (direct vs Worker) and storage (memory vs OPFS) based on environment.
+
+**Scope:**
+- Replace `node:http2` with `fetch()` in `client.ts`
+- Add `CryptoBackend` abstraction with three implementations
+- Create Web Worker that calls existing crypto functions
+- Add OPFS storage for large files in browser
+
+**Out of scope:** Web page UI (Phase 5 in main RFC).
+
+## 2. Transport: fetch() API
+
+### 2.1 Current State
+
+`client.ts` uses `node:http2`:
+```typescript
+import http2 from "node:http2"
+const session = http2.connect(url)
+const stream = session.request({':method': 'POST', ':path': '/'})
+stream.write(commandBlock)
+stream.end(chunkData)
+```
+
+### 2.2 Target State
+
+Isomorphic `fetch()` (Node.js 18+ and browsers):
+```typescript
+const response = await fetch(url, {
+  method: 'POST',
+  body: concatStreams(commandBlock, chunkData),
+  duplex: 'half',  // Required for streaming request body
+})
+const reader = response.body!.getReader()
+```
+
+### 2.3 Key Differences
+
+| Aspect | node:http2 | fetch() |
+|--------|-----------|---------|
+| Session management | Explicit `session.connect()` / `session.close()` | Per-request (HTTP/2 connection reuse is automatic) |
+| Streaming upload | `stream.write()` chunks | `ReadableStream` body + `duplex: 'half'` |
+| Streaming download | `stream.on('data')` | `response.body.getReader()` |
+| Connection pooling | Manual | Automatic per origin |
+
+### 2.4 API Changes
+
+```typescript
+// Before (node:http2)
+export interface XFTPClient {
+  session: http2.ClientHttp2Session
+  thParams: THParams
+  server: XFTPServer
+}
+
+// After (fetch)
+export interface XFTPClient {
+  baseUrl: string           // "https://host:port"
+  thParams: THParams
+  server: XFTPServer
+}
+```
+
+`connectXFTP()` performs handshake via fetch, returns `XFTPClient` with `baseUrl`.
+Subsequent commands use `fetch(client.baseUrl, ...)`.
+
+### 2.5 Handshake via fetch()
+
+**TLS session binding:** Multiple fetch() requests to the same origin reuse the HTTP/2 connection, which means they share the same TLS session. The server's `sessionId` (derived from TLS channel binding) remains consistent across the handshake round-trips and subsequent commands.
+
+```typescript
+async function connectXFTP(server: XFTPServer): Promise<XFTPClient> {
+  const baseUrl = `https://${server.host}:${server.port}`
+
+  // Round-trip 1: challenge → server handshake + identity proof
+  const challenge = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))
+  const req1 = pad(encodeWebClientHello(challenge), xftpBlockSize)
+  const resp1 = await fetch(baseUrl, {method: 'POST', body: req1})
+
+  const reader = resp1.body!.getReader()
+  const serverBlock = await readExactly(reader, xftpBlockSize)
+  const serverHs = decodeServerHandshake(unPad(serverBlock))
+  const proofBody = await readRemaining(reader)
+  verifyIdentityProof(server.keyHash, challenge, serverHs.sessionId, proofBody)
+
+  // Round-trip 2: client handshake → server ack
+  const clientHs = encodeClientHandshake({xftpVersion: 3, keyHash: server.keyHash})
+  const req2 = pad(clientHs, xftpBlockSize)
+  await fetch(baseUrl, {method: 'POST', body: req2})
+
+  return {baseUrl, thParams: {sessionId: serverHs.sessionId, ...}, server}
+}
+```
+
+### 2.6 Command Execution
+
+```typescript
+async function sendXFTPCommand(
+  client: XFTPClient,
+  key: Uint8Array,
+  entityId: Uint8Array,
+  cmd: Uint8Array,
+  chunkData?: Uint8Array
+): Promise<{response: Uint8Array, body?: ReadableStream}> {
+  const block = xftpEncodeAuthTransmission(client.thParams, key, entityId, cmd)
+
+  const reqBody = chunkData
+    ? concatBytes(block, chunkData)
+    : block
+
+  const resp = await fetch(client.baseUrl, {
+    method: 'POST',
+    body: reqBody,
+    duplex: 'half',
+  })
+
+  const reader = resp.body!.getReader()
+  const responseBlock = await readExactly(reader, xftpBlockSize)
+  const parsed = xftpDecodeTransmission(responseBlock)
+
+  // For FGET: remaining body is encrypted chunk
+  const hasMore = await peekReader(reader)
+  return {
+    response: parsed,
+    body: hasMore ? wrapAsStream(reader) : undefined
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## 3. Architecture: Environment Abstraction
+
+### 3.1 Core Principle
+
+**Existing crypto functions remain unchanged.** The functions `encryptFile()`, `decryptChunks()`, `sha512()`, etc. in `crypto/file.ts` and `crypto/digest.ts` are pure computation — they take input bytes and produce output bytes. They have no knowledge of Workers, OPFS, or execution context.
+
+The abstraction layer sits between `agent.ts` (upload/download orchestration) and these crypto functions:
+
+```
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│  agent.ts (upload/download orchestration)                            │
+│  - Unchanged logic: encrypt → chunk → upload → build description     │
+│  - Calls CryptoBackend interface, not crypto functions directly      │
+├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
+│  CryptoBackend interface (env.ts)                                    │
+│  - Abstract interface for encrypt/decrypt/readChunk/writeChunk       │
+│  - Factory function selects implementation based on environment      │
+├──────────────┬──────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────┤
+│ DirectMemory │ WorkerMemory         │ WorkerOPFS                    │
+│ Backend      │ Backend              │ Backend                       │
+│ (Node.js)    │ (Browser, ≤50MB)     │ (Browser, >50MB)              │
+├──────────────┼──────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────┤
+│ Calls crypto │ Posts to Worker,     │ Posts to Worker,              │
+│ functions    │ Worker calls crypto  │ Worker calls crypto,          │
+│ directly     │ functions, returns   │ streams through OPFS          │
+│              │ via postMessage      │                               │
+├──────────────┴──────────────────────┴───────────────────────────────┤
+│  crypto/file.ts, crypto/digest.ts (unchanged)                        │
+│  - encryptFile(), decryptChunks(), sha512(), etc.                    │
+│  - Pure functions, no environment dependencies                       │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+### 3.2 CryptoBackend Interface
+
+```typescript
+// env.ts
+export interface CryptoBackend {
+  // Encrypt file, store result (in memory or OPFS depending on backend)
+  encrypt(
+    data: Uint8Array,
+    fileName: string,
+    onProgress?: (done: number, total: number) => void
+  ): Promise<EncryptResult>
+
+  // Decrypt from stored encrypted data
+  decrypt(
+    key: Uint8Array,
+    nonce: Uint8Array,
+    size: number,
+    onProgress?: (done: number, total: number) => void
+  ): Promise<DecryptResult>
+
+  // Read chunk from stored encrypted data (for upload)
+  readChunk(offset: number, size: number): Promise<Uint8Array>
+
+  // Write chunk to storage (for download, before decrypt)
+  writeChunk(data: Uint8Array, offset: number): Promise<void>
+
+  // Clean up temporary storage
+  cleanup(): Promise<void>
+}
+
+export interface EncryptResult {
+  digest: Uint8Array      // SHA-512 of encrypted data
+  key: Uint8Array         // Generated encryption key
+  nonce: Uint8Array       // Generated nonce
+  chunkSizes: number[]    // Chunk sizes for upload
+  totalSize: number       // Total encrypted size
+}
+
+export interface DecryptResult {
+  header: FileHeader      // Extracted file header (fileName, etc.)
+  content: Uint8Array     // Decrypted file content
+}
+```
+
+### 3.3 Backend Implementations
+
+**DirectMemoryBackend** (Node.js):
+```typescript
+class DirectMemoryBackend implements CryptoBackend {
+  private encryptedData: Uint8Array | null = null
+
+  async encrypt(data: Uint8Array, fileName: string, onProgress?): Promise<EncryptResult> {
+    const key = randomBytes(32)
+    const nonce = randomBytes(24)
+    // Call existing crypto function directly
+    this.encryptedData = encryptFile(data, fileName, key, nonce, onProgress)
+    const digest = sha512(this.encryptedData)
+    const chunkSizes = prepareChunkSizes(this.encryptedData.length)
+    return { digest, key, nonce, chunkSizes, totalSize: this.encryptedData.length }
+  }
+
+  async decrypt(key, nonce, size, onProgress): Promise<DecryptResult> {
+    // Call existing crypto function directly
+    return decryptChunks([this.encryptedData!], key, nonce, size, onProgress)
+  }
+
+  async readChunk(offset: number, size: number): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+    return this.encryptedData!.slice(offset, offset + size)
+  }
+
+  async writeChunk(data: Uint8Array, offset: number): Promise<void> {
+    if (!this.encryptedData) this.encryptedData = new Uint8Array(offset + data.length)
+    this.encryptedData.set(data, offset)
+  }
+
+  async cleanup(): Promise<void> {
+    this.encryptedData = null
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**WorkerMemoryBackend** and **WorkerOPFSBackend** are similar but post messages to a Web Worker instead of calling crypto directly. The Worker then calls the same `encryptFile()`, `decryptChunks()` functions. See §4 for Worker implementation details.
+
+### 3.4 Factory Function
+
+```typescript
+// env.ts
+export function createCryptoBackend(fileSize: number): CryptoBackend {
+  const hasWorker = typeof Worker !== 'undefined'
+  const hasOPFS = typeof navigator?.storage?.getDirectory !== 'undefined'
+  const isLargeFile = fileSize > 50 * 1024 * 1024
+
+  if (hasWorker && hasOPFS && isLargeFile) {
+    return new WorkerOPFSBackend()   // Browser + large file
+  } else if (hasWorker) {
+    return new WorkerMemoryBackend() // Browser + small file
+  } else {
+    return new DirectMemoryBackend() // Node.js
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### 3.5 Usage in agent.ts
+
+```typescript
+// agent.ts - upload orchestration (simplified)
+export async function uploadFile(
+  server: XFTPServer,
+  fileData: Uint8Array,
+  fileName: string,
+  onProgress?: ProgressCallback
+): Promise<string> {
+  // Create backend based on environment
+  const backend = createCryptoBackend(fileData.length)
+
+  try {
+    // Encrypt (runs in Worker in browser, directly in Node)
+    const enc = await backend.encrypt(fileData, fileName, onProgress)
+
+    // Upload chunks (same code regardless of backend)
+    const client = await connectXFTP(server)
+    const sentChunks = []
+    let offset = 0
+    for (const size of enc.chunkSizes) {
+      const chunk = await backend.readChunk(offset, size)
+      const sent = await uploadChunk(client, chunk, enc.digest)
+      sentChunks.push(sent)
+      offset += size
+    }
+
+    // Build description and URI
+    const fd = buildFileDescription(enc, sentChunks)
+    return encodeFileDescriptionURI(fd)
+  } finally {
+    await backend.cleanup()
+  }
+}
+```
+
+The key point: `uploadFile()` logic is identical regardless of whether crypto runs in a Worker or directly. The `CryptoBackend` abstraction hides that detail.
+
+### 3.6 Why This Matters for Testing
+
+- **Layer 1 tests** (per-function): Call `encryptFile()`, `decryptChunks()` directly via Node — unchanged
+- **Layer 2 tests** (full flow): Call `uploadFile()`, `downloadFile()` in Node — uses `DirectMemoryBackend`, same code path as browser except for Worker
+- **Layer 3 tests** (browser): Call `uploadFile()`, `downloadFile()` in Playwright — uses `WorkerMemoryBackend` or `WorkerOPFSBackend`
+
+All three layers exercise the same crypto functions. The only difference is execution context.
+
+## 4. Web Worker Implementation
+
+### 4.1 Why Web Worker
+
+File encryption (XSalsa20-Poly1305) is sequential and CPU-bound:
+- 100 MB file ≈ 1-2 seconds of continuous computation
+- Running on main thread blocks UI (no progress updates, frozen page)
+- Chunking into async microtasks adds complexity and still causes jank
+
+Web Worker runs crypto in parallel thread. Main thread stays responsive.
+
+### 4.2 Architecture
+
+```
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│  Main Thread                                                 │
+│  ┌─────────────┐  ┌─────────────┐  ┌─────────────────────┐  │
+│  │ UI (upload/ │  │ Progress    │  │ Network (fetch)     │  │
+│  │ download)   │  │ display     │  │                     │  │
+│  └──────┬──────┘  └──────▲──────┘  └──────────▲──────────┘  │
+│         │                │                    │              │
+│         │ postMessage    │ progress          │ encrypted    │
+│         ▼                │ events            │ chunks       │
+├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
+│  Web Worker                                                  │
+│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐│
+│  │ Crypto Pipeline                                          ││
+│  │ - encryptFile() with progress callbacks                  ││
+│  │ - decryptChunks() with progress callbacks                ││
+│  │ - OPFS read/write for temp storage                       ││
+│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘│
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+### 4.3 Message Protocol
+
+**Main → Worker:**
+
+```typescript
+type WorkerRequest =
+  // Encrypt file, store result in OPFS (large) or memory (small)
+  | {type: 'encrypt', file: File, fileName: string, useOPFS: boolean}
+  // Read encrypted chunk from OPFS for upload
+  | {type: 'readChunk', offset: number, size: number}
+  // Write downloaded chunk to OPFS for later decryption
+  | {type: 'writeChunk', data: ArrayBuffer, offset: number}
+  // Decrypt from OPFS or provided chunks
+  | {type: 'decrypt', key: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, size: number, chunks?: ArrayBuffer[]}
+  // Delete OPFS temp files
+  | {type: 'cleanup'}
+  | {type: 'cancel'}
+```
+
+**Worker → Main:**
+
+```typescript
+type WorkerResponse =
+  | {type: 'progress', phase: 'encrypt' | 'decrypt', done: number, total: number}
+  // For OPFS: encData is empty, data lives in OPFS temp file
+  | {type: 'encrypted', encData: ArrayBuffer | null, digest: Uint8Array, key: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, chunkSizes: number[]}
+  | {type: 'chunk', data: ArrayBuffer}  // Response to readChunk
+  | {type: 'chunkWritten'}              // Response to writeChunk
+  | {type: 'decrypted', header: FileHeader, content: ArrayBuffer}
+  | {type: 'cleaned'}                   // Response to cleanup
+  | {type: 'error', message: string}
+```
+
+### 4.4 Worker Implementation
+
+```typescript
+// crypto.worker.ts
+import {encryptFile, encryptFileStreaming, decryptChunks, decryptFromOPFS} from './crypto/file.js'
+import {sha512} from './crypto/digest.js'
+import {prepareChunkSizes} from './protocol/chunks.js'
+
+let opfsHandle: FileSystemSyncAccessHandle | null = null
+
+self.onmessage = async (e: MessageEvent<WorkerRequest>) => {
+  const req = e.data
+
+  if (req.type === 'encrypt') {
+    const key = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))
+    const nonce = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(24))
+
+    if (req.useOPFS) {
+      // Large file: stream through OPFS to avoid memory pressure
+      const root = await navigator.storage.getDirectory()
+      const fileHandle = await root.getFileHandle('encrypted-temp', {create: true})
+      opfsHandle = await fileHandle.createSyncAccessHandle()
+
+      // Stream encrypt: read 64KB from File, encrypt, write to OPFS
+      const digest = await encryptFileStreaming(
+        req.file,
+        req.fileName,
+        key,
+        nonce,
+        opfsHandle,
+        (done, total) => self.postMessage({type: 'progress', phase: 'encrypt', done, total})
+      )
+
+      const encSize = opfsHandle.getSize()
+      const chunkSizes = prepareChunkSizes(encSize)
+
+      self.postMessage({
+        type: 'encrypted',
+        encData: null,  // Data in OPFS, not memory
+        digest, key, nonce, chunkSizes
+      })
+    } else {
+      // Small file: in-memory is fine
+      const source = new Uint8Array(await req.file.arrayBuffer())
+      const encData = encryptFile(source, req.fileName, key, nonce, (done, total) => {
+        self.postMessage({type: 'progress', phase: 'encrypt', done, total})
+      })
+
+      const digest = sha512(encData)
+      const chunkSizes = prepareChunkSizes(encData.length)
+
+      self.postMessage({
+        type: 'encrypted',
+        encData: encData.buffer,
+        digest, key, nonce, chunkSizes
+      }, [encData.buffer])
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (req.type === 'readChunk') {
+    // Read chunk from OPFS for upload
+    const chunk = new Uint8Array(req.size)
+    opfsHandle!.read(chunk, {at: req.offset})
+    self.postMessage({type: 'chunk', data: chunk.buffer}, [chunk.buffer])
+  }
+
+  if (req.type === 'writeChunk') {
+    // Write downloaded chunk to OPFS
+    if (!opfsHandle) {
+      const root = await navigator.storage.getDirectory()
+      const fileHandle = await root.getFileHandle('download-temp', {create: true})
+      opfsHandle = await fileHandle.createSyncAccessHandle()
+    }
+    opfsHandle.write(new Uint8Array(req.data), {at: req.offset})
+    self.postMessage({type: 'chunkWritten'})
+  }
+
+  if (req.type === 'decrypt') {
+    let result
+    if (req.chunks) {
+      // Small file: chunks provided in memory
+      const chunks = req.chunks.map(b => new Uint8Array(b))
+      result = decryptChunks(chunks, req.key, req.nonce, req.size, (done, total) => {
+        self.postMessage({type: 'progress', phase: 'decrypt', done, total})
+      })
+    } else {
+      // Large file: read from OPFS
+      result = decryptFromOPFS(opfsHandle!, req.key, req.nonce, req.size, (done, total) => {
+        self.postMessage({type: 'progress', phase: 'decrypt', done, total})
+      })
+    }
+
+    self.postMessage({
+      type: 'decrypted',
+      header: result.header,
+      content: result.content.buffer
+    }, [result.content.buffer])
+  }
+
+  if (req.type === 'cleanup') {
+    if (opfsHandle) {
+      opfsHandle.close()
+      opfsHandle = null
+    }
+    const root = await navigator.storage.getDirectory()
+    try { await root.removeEntry('encrypted-temp') } catch {}
+    try { await root.removeEntry('download-temp') } catch {}
+    self.postMessage({type: 'cleaned'})
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### 4.5 Main Thread Wrapper
+
+```typescript
+// crypto-worker.ts (main thread)
+export class CryptoWorker {
+  private worker: Worker
+  private pending: Map<string, {resolve: Function, reject: Function}> = new Map()
+  private onProgress?: (done: number, total: number) => void
+
+  constructor() {
+    this.worker = new Worker(new URL('./crypto.worker.js', import.meta.url), {type: 'module'})
+    this.worker.onmessage = (e) => this.handleMessage(e.data)
+  }
+
+  async encrypt(file: File, onProgress?: (done: number, total: number) => void): Promise<EncryptedFileInfo> {
+    const useOPFS = file.size > 50 * 1024 * 1024  // 50 MB threshold
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      this.pending.set('encrypt', {resolve, reject})
+      this.onProgress = onProgress
+      this.worker.postMessage({type: 'encrypt', file, fileName: file.name, useOPFS})
+    })
+  }
+
+  async decrypt(
+    chunks: Uint8Array[],
+    key: Uint8Array,
+    nonce: Uint8Array,
+    size: number,
+    onProgress?: (done: number, total: number) => void
+  ): Promise<DownloadResult> {
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      this.pending.set('decrypt', {resolve, reject})
+      this.onProgress = onProgress
+      this.worker.postMessage({
+        type: 'decrypt',
+        chunks: chunks.map(c => c.buffer),
+        key, nonce, size
+      }, chunks.map(c => c.buffer))
+    })
+  }
+
+  private handleMessage(msg: WorkerResponse) {
+    if (msg.type === 'progress') {
+      this.onProgress?.(msg.done, msg.total)
+    } else if (msg.type === 'encrypted') {
+      this.pending.get('encrypt')?.resolve({
+        encData: msg.encData ? new Uint8Array(msg.encData) : null,  // null when using OPFS
+        digest: msg.digest,
+        key: msg.key,
+        nonce: msg.nonce,
+        chunkSizes: msg.chunkSizes
+      })
+    } else if (msg.type === 'decrypted') {
+      this.pending.get('decrypt')?.resolve({
+        header: msg.header,
+        content: new Uint8Array(msg.content)
+      })
+    } else if (msg.type === 'error') {
+      // Reject all pending
+      for (const p of this.pending.values()) p.reject(new Error(msg.message))
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## 5. OPFS Implementation
+
+### 5.1 Purpose
+
+For files approaching 100 MB, holding encrypted data in memory while uploading creates memory pressure. OPFS provides temporary file storage:
+- Write encrypted data to OPFS as it's generated
+- Read chunks from OPFS for upload
+- Delete after upload completes
+
+### 5.2 When to Use
+
+- Files > 50 MB: Use OPFS
+- Files ≤ 50 MB: In-memory (simpler, no OPFS overhead)
+
+Threshold is configurable.
+
+### 5.3 OPFS API
+
+```typescript
+// In Web Worker (synchronous API for performance)
+const root = await navigator.storage.getDirectory()
+const fileHandle = await root.getFileHandle('encrypted-temp', {create: true})
+const accessHandle = await fileHandle.createSyncAccessHandle()
+
+// Write encrypted chunks as they're generated
+accessHandle.write(encryptedChunk, {at: offset})
+
+// Read chunk for upload
+const chunk = new Uint8Array(chunkSize)
+accessHandle.read(chunk, {at: chunkOffset})
+
+// Cleanup
+accessHandle.close()
+await root.removeEntry('encrypted-temp')
+```
+
+### 5.4 Upload Flow with OPFS
+
+```
+1. Main: user drops file
+2. Main → Worker: {type: 'encrypt', file}
+3. Worker:
+   - Create OPFS temp file
+   - Encrypt 64KB at a time, write to OPFS
+   - Post progress every 64KB
+   - Compute digest
+   - Return {digest, key, nonce, chunkSizes} (data stays in OPFS)
+4. Main: for each chunk:
+   - Main → Worker: {type: 'readChunk', offset, size}
+   - Worker: read from OPFS, return chunk
+   - Main: upload chunk via fetch()
+5. Main → Worker: {type: 'cleanup'}
+6. Worker: delete OPFS temp file
+```
+
+### 5.5 Download Flow with OPFS
+
+```
+1. Main: parse URL, get FileDescription
+2. Main: for each chunk:
+   - Download via fetch()
+   - Main → Worker: {type: 'writeChunk', data, offset}
+   - Worker: write to OPFS temp file
+3. Main → Worker: {type: 'decrypt', key, nonce, size}
+4. Worker:
+   - Read from OPFS
+   - Decrypt, verify auth tag
+   - Return {header, content}
+5. Main: trigger browser download
+6. Main → Worker: {type: 'cleanup'}
+```
+
+## 6. Implementation Plan
+
+### 6.1 Phase A: fetch() Transport
+
+**Goal:** Replace `node:http2` with `fetch()` in `client.ts`. All existing Node.js tests pass.
+
+1. Rewrite `connectXFTP()` to use fetch() for handshake
+2. Rewrite `sendXFTPCommand()` to use fetch()
+3. Update `createXFTPChunk`, `uploadXFTPChunk`, `downloadXFTPChunk`, etc.
+4. Remove `node:http2` import
+5. Run existing Haskell integration tests — must pass
+
+**Files:** `client.ts`
+
+### 6.2 Phase B: Environment Abstraction + Web Worker
+
+**Goal:** Add `CryptoBackend` abstraction (§3) so the same code works in Node (direct) and browser (Worker).
+
+1. Create `env.ts` with `CryptoBackend` interface and `createCryptoBackend()` factory (as specified in §3)
+2. Implement `DirectMemoryBackend` for Node.js
+3. Create `crypto.worker.ts` that imports and calls existing crypto functions
+4. Implement `WorkerMemoryBackend` for browser
+5. Update `agent.ts` to use `createCryptoBackend()` instead of direct crypto calls
+6. Existing tests pass (now using `DirectMemoryBackend`)
+
+**Files:** `env.ts`, `crypto.worker.ts`, `agent.ts`
+
+### 6.3 Phase C: OPFS Backend
+
+**Goal:** Large files (>50 MB) use OPFS for temp storage in browser.
+
+1. Implement `WorkerOPFSBackend` — uses OPFS sync API in worker
+2. Add OPFS helpers in worker: read/write to temp file
+3. Factory function now returns `WorkerOPFSBackend` for large files
+4. Same `agent.ts` code works — only backend implementation differs
+
+**Files:** `env.ts`, `crypto.worker.ts`
+
+### 6.4 Phase D: Browser Testing
+
+**Goal:** Verify everything works in real browsers.
+
+1. Create minimal test HTML page
+2. Test upload flow in Chrome, Firefox, Safari
+3. Test download flow
+4. Test progress reporting
+5. Test cancellation
+6. Test error handling (network failure, invalid file)
+
+## 7. Testing Strategy
+
+### 7.1 Test Layers
+
+The `CryptoBackend` abstraction (§3) enables testing at multiple levels without code duplication:
+
+```
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Layer 3: Browser Integration (Playwright)                        │
+│ - Web Worker message passing                                     │
+│ - OPFS read/write                                                │
+│ - Progress UI updates                                            │
+│ - Real browser fetch() with CORS                                 │
+├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
+│ Layer 2: Full Flow (Haskell-driven, Node.js)                     │
+│ - fetch() transport against real xftp-server                     │
+│ - Upload: encrypt → chunk → upload → build description           │
+│ - Download: parse → download → verify → decrypt                  │
+│ - Cross-language: TS upload ↔ Haskell download (and vice versa)  │
+├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
+│ Layer 1: Per-Function (Haskell-driven, Node.js)                  │
+│ - 172 existing tests                                             │
+│ - Byte-identical output vs Haskell functions                     │
+└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+### 7.2 Layer 1: Per-Function Tests (Existing)
+
+Existing Haskell-driven tests in `XFTPWebTests.hs`. Each test calls a TypeScript function via Node and compares output with Haskell.
+
+```bash
+cabal test --ghc-options -O0 --test-option='--match=/XFTP Web Client/'
+```
+
+All 172 tests must pass. No changes needed for browser transport work.
+
+### 7.3 Layer 2: Full Flow Tests (Node.js + fetch)
+
+Haskell-driven integration tests using Node.js native fetch(). These test the complete upload/download flow without Worker/OPFS.
+
+```haskell
+-- XFTPWebTests.hs (extends existing test file)
+it "fetch transport: upload and download round-trip" $ do
+  withXFTPServer testXFTPServerConfigSNI $ \server -> do
+    -- TypeScript uploads via fetch(), returns URI
+    uri <- jsOut $ callTS "src/agent" "uploadFileTest" serverAddrHex <> testFileHex
+    -- TypeScript downloads via fetch()
+    content <- jsOut $ callTS "src/agent" "downloadFileTest" uriHex
+    content `shouldBe` testFileContent
+
+it "fetch transport: TS upload, Haskell download" $ do
+  withXFTPServer testXFTPServerConfigSNI $ \server -> do
+    uri <- jsOut $ callTS "src/agent" "uploadFileTest" serverAddrHex <> testFileHex
+    -- Haskell agent downloads using existing xftp CLI pattern
+    outPath <- withAgent 1 agentCfg initAgentServers testDB $ \a -> do
+      rfId <- xftpReceiveFile' a 1 uri Nothing
+      waitRfDone a
+    content <- B.readFile outPath
+    content `shouldBe` testFileContent
+```
+
+**What this tests:**
+- fetch() handshake (challenge-response, TLS session binding)
+- fetch() command execution (FNEW, FPUT, FGET, FACK)
+- Streaming request/response bodies
+- Full encrypt → upload → download → decrypt flow
+
+**What this doesn't test:**
+- Web Worker message passing
+- OPFS storage
+- Browser-specific fetch() behavior (CORS preflight, etc.)
+
+### 7.4 Layer 3: Browser Integration Tests (Playwright)
+
+Playwright tests run in real browsers, testing browser-specific functionality.
+
+**Test infrastructure:**
+
+```
+xftp-web/
+├── test/
+│   ├── browser.test.ts      # Playwright test file
+│   └── test-server.ts       # Spawns xftp-server for tests
+└── test-page/
+    ├── index.html           # Minimal test UI
+    └── test-harness.ts      # Exposes test functions to window
+```
+
+**Running browser tests:**
+
+```bash
+cd xftp-web
+npm run test:browser  # Spawns xftp-server, runs Playwright
+```
+
+**Test cases:**
+
+```typescript
+// test/browser.test.ts
+import { test, expect } from '@playwright/test'
+import { spawn } from 'child_process'
+
+let serverProcess: ChildProcess
+
+test.beforeAll(async () => {
+  // Spawn xftp-server with SNI cert for browser TLS
+  serverProcess = spawn('xftp-server', ['start', '-c', 'test-config.ini'])
+  await waitForServer()
+})
+
+test.afterAll(async () => {
+  serverProcess.kill()
+})
+
+test('small file upload/download (in-memory)', async ({ page }) => {
+  await page.goto('/test-page/')
+
+  const result = await page.evaluate(async () => {
+    const data = new Uint8Array(1024 * 1024)  // 1 MB
+    crypto.getRandomValues(data)
+    const file = new File([data], 'small.bin')
+
+    const uri = await window.xftp.uploadFile(file)
+    const downloaded = await window.xftp.downloadFile(uri)
+
+    return {
+      uploadedSize: data.length,
+      downloadedSize: downloaded.length,
+      match: arraysEqual(data, downloaded),
+      usedOPFS: window.xftp.lastUploadUsedOPFS
+    }
+  })
+
+  expect(result.match).toBe(true)
+  expect(result.usedOPFS).toBe(false)  // Small file, no OPFS
+})
+
+test('large file upload/download (OPFS)', async ({ page }) => {
+  await page.goto('/test-page/')
+
+  const result = await page.evaluate(async () => {
+    const data = new Uint8Array(60 * 1024 * 1024)  // 60 MB
+    crypto.getRandomValues(data)
+    const file = new File([data], 'large.bin')
+
+    const uri = await window.xftp.uploadFile(file)
+    const downloaded = await window.xftp.downloadFile(uri)
+
+    return {
+      match: arraysEqual(data, downloaded),
+      usedOPFS: window.xftp.lastUploadUsedOPFS
+    }
+  })
+
+  expect(result.match).toBe(true)
+  expect(result.usedOPFS).toBe(true)  // Large file, used OPFS
+})
+
+test('progress events fire during upload', async ({ page }) => {
+  await page.goto('/test-page/')
+
+  const progressEvents = await page.evaluate(async () => {
+    const events: number[] = []
+    const data = new Uint8Array(10 * 1024 * 1024)  // 10 MB
+    const file = new File([data], 'progress.bin')
+
+    await window.xftp.uploadFile(file, (done, total) => {
+      events.push(done / total)
+    })
+
+    return events
+  })
+
+  expect(progressEvents.length).toBeGreaterThan(1)
+  expect(progressEvents[progressEvents.length - 1]).toBe(1)  // 100% at end
+})
+
+test('Web Worker keeps UI responsive', async ({ page }) => {
+  await page.goto('/test-page/')
+
+  // Start upload and measure main thread responsiveness
+  const result = await page.evaluate(async () => {
+    const data = new Uint8Array(50 * 1024 * 1024)  // 50 MB
+    const file = new File([data], 'responsive.bin')
+
+    let frameCount = 0
+    let uploadDone = false
+
+    // Count animation frames during upload
+    function countFrames() {
+      frameCount++
+      if (!uploadDone) requestAnimationFrame(countFrames)
+    }
+    requestAnimationFrame(countFrames)
+
+    const start = performance.now()
+    await window.xftp.uploadFile(file)
+    uploadDone = true
+    const elapsed = performance.now() - start
+
+    // If main thread was blocked, frameCount would be very low
+    const expectedFrames = (elapsed / 1000) * 30  // ~30 fps minimum
+    return { frameCount, expectedFrames, elapsed }
+  })
+
+  // Should maintain reasonable frame rate (Worker offloaded crypto)
+  expect(result.frameCount).toBeGreaterThan(result.expectedFrames * 0.5)
+})
+```
+
+### 7.5 Cross-Browser Matrix
+
+| Browser | fetch streaming | Web Worker | OPFS sync | Status |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-----------|--------|
+| Chrome 105+ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | Primary target |
+| Firefox 111+ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | Supported |
+| Safari 16.4+ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | Supported |
+| Edge 105+ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | Supported (Chromium) |
+
+Playwright tests run against Chrome by default. CI can run against all browsers.
+
+### 7.6 Test Execution Summary
+
+| Phase | Test Layer | Command | What's Verified |
+|-------|-----------|---------|-----------------|
+| A | Layer 1 + 2 | `cabal test --test-option='--match=/XFTP Web Client/'` | fetch() transport, full flow |
+| B | Layer 3 | `npm run test:browser` | Worker message passing, progress |
+| C | Layer 3 | `npm run test:browser` | OPFS storage for large files |
+| D | Layer 3 | `npm run test:browser -- --project=firefox,webkit` | Cross-browser |

rfcs/2026-01-30-send-file-page/2026-02-04-xftp-web-page.md

@@ -0,0 +1,772 @@
+# Send File Web Page — Implementation Plan
+
+## TOC
+1. Executive Summary
+2. Architecture
+3. CryptoBackend & Web Worker
+4. Server Configuration
+5. Page Structure & UI
+6. Upload Flow
+7. Download Flow
+8. Build & Dev Setup
+9. agent.ts Changes
+10. Testing
+11. Files
+12. Implementation Order
+
+## 1. Executive Summary
+
+Build a static web page for browser-based XFTP file transfer (Phase 5 of master RFC). The page supports upload (drag-drop → encrypt → upload → shareable link) and download (open link → download → decrypt → save). Crypto runs in a Web Worker; large files use OPFS temp storage.
+
+Two build variants:
+- **Local**: single test server at `localhost:7000` (development/testing)
+- **Production**: 12 preset XFTP servers (6 SimpleX + 6 Flux)
+
+Uses Vite for bundling (already a dependency via vitest). No CSS framework — plain CSS per RFC spec.
+
+## 2. Architecture
+
+```
+xftp-web/
+├── src/                        # Library (existing, targeted changes)
+│   ├── agent.ts                # Modified: uploadFile readChunk, downloadFileRaw
+│   ├── client.ts               # Modified: downloadXFTPChunkRaw
+│   ├── crypto/                 # Unchanged
+│   ├── download.ts             # Unchanged
+│   └── protocol/
+│       └── description.ts      # Fix: SHA-256 → SHA-512 comment on digest field
+├── web/                        # Web page (new)
+│   ├── index.html              # Entry point (CSP meta tag)
+│   ├── main.ts                 # Router + sodium.ready init
+│   ├── upload.ts               # Upload UI + orchestration
+│   ├── download.ts             # Download UI + orchestration
+│   ├── progress.ts             # Circular progress canvas component
+│   ├── servers.ts              # Server list (build-time configured, imports servers.json)
+│   ├── servers.json            # Preset server addresses (shared with vite.config.ts)
+│   ├── crypto-backend.ts       # CryptoBackend interface + WorkerBackend
+│   ├── crypto.worker.ts        # Web Worker: encrypt/decrypt/OPFS
+│   └── style.css               # Minimal styling
+├── vite.config.ts              # Page build config (new)
+├── tsconfig.web.json           # IDE/CI type-check for web/ (new)
+├── tsconfig.worker.json        # IDE/CI type-check for worker (new)
+├── playwright.config.ts        # Page E2E test config (new)
+├── vitest.config.ts            # Test config (existing)
+├── .gitignore                  # Existing (add dist-web/)
+└── test/                       # Tests (existing + new page test)
+```
+
+Data flow:
+
+```
+                  ┌───────────────────────────────────────────┐
+                  │ Main Thread                                 │
+                  │                                             │
+                  │  Upload:  upload.ts ──► agent.ts ──► fetch()│
+                  │  Download: download.ts ──► agent.ts ──► fetch()
+                  │         │                                   │
+                  │    postMessage                        HTTP/2 │
+                  │         ▼                                   ▼
+                  │ ┌─────────────────┐             ┌──────────┐│
+                  │ │ Web Worker       │             │ XFTP     ││
+                  │ │ crypto.worker.ts │             │ Server   ││
+                  │ │ ┌─────────────┐ │             └──────────┘│
+                  │ │ │ OPFS temp   │ │                         │
+                  │ │ └─────────────┘ │                         │
+                  │ └─────────────────┘                         │
+                  └───────────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+Both upload and download use `agent.ts` for orchestration (connection pooling, parallel chunk transfers, redirect handling). Upload uses a `readChunk` callback for Worker data access. Download uses an `onRawChunk` callback to route raw encrypted chunks to the Worker for decryption (see §7.2). ACK is the caller's responsibility — `downloadFileRaw` returns the resolved `FileDescription` without ACKing, so the caller can verify integrity before acknowledging.
+
+## 3. CryptoBackend & Web Worker
+
+### 3.1 Interface
+
+```typescript
+// crypto-backend.ts
+export interface CryptoBackend {
+  // Upload: encrypt file, store encrypted data in OPFS
+  encrypt(data: Uint8Array, fileName: string,
+          onProgress?: (done: number, total: number) => void
+  ): Promise<EncryptResult>
+
+  // Upload: read encrypted chunk from OPFS (called by agent.ts via readChunk callback)
+  readChunk(offset: number, size: number): Promise<Uint8Array>
+
+  // Download: transit-decrypt raw chunk and store in OPFS
+  decryptAndStoreChunk(
+    dhSecret: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array,
+    body: Uint8Array, digest: Uint8Array, chunkNo: number
+  ): Promise<void>
+
+  // Download: verify digest + file-level decrypt all stored chunks
+  // Only needs size/digest/key/nonce — not the full FileDescription (avoids sending private keys to Worker)
+  verifyAndDecrypt(params: {size: number, digest: Uint8Array, key: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array}
+  ): Promise<{header: FileHeader, content: Uint8Array}>
+
+  cleanup(): Promise<void>
+}
+
+// Structurally identical to EncryptedFileMetadata from agent.ts (§9.1).
+// Kept separate to avoid crypto-backend.ts importing from agent.ts
+// (which would pull in node:http2 via client.ts, breaking Worker bundling).
+// TypeScript structural typing makes them assignment-compatible.
+export interface EncryptResult {
+  digest: Uint8Array
+  key: Uint8Array
+  nonce: Uint8Array
+  chunkSizes: number[]
+}
+```
+
+### 3.2 Factory
+
+```typescript
+export function createCryptoBackend(): CryptoBackend {
+  if (typeof Worker === 'undefined') {
+    throw new Error('Web Workers required — update your browser')
+  }
+  return new WorkerBackend()
+}
+```
+
+The Worker always uses OPFS for temp storage (single code path — no memory/disk branching). OPFS I/O overhead is negligible relative to crypto and network time. Each Worker session creates a unique directory in OPFS root named `session-<Date.now()>-<crypto.randomUUID()>`, containing `upload.bin` and `download.bin` as needed. `cleanup()` deletes the entire session directory. On Worker startup (before processing messages), sweep OPFS root and delete any `session-*` directories whose embedded timestamp (parsed from the name) is older than 1 hour — this handles stale files from crashed tabs. The OPFS API does not expose directory timestamps, so the name-encoded timestamp is the only reliable mechanism. This prevents cross-tab collisions and unbounded OPFS growth.
+
+### 3.3 Worker message protocol
+
+Every request carries a numeric `id`. Responses carry the same `id`. WorkerBackend maintains a `Map<number, {resolve, reject}>` to match responses to pending promises.
+
+Main → Worker (fields marked `†` are Transferable — arrive as `ArrayBuffer` in Worker, must be wrapped with `new Uint8Array(...)` before use):
+- `{id: number, type: 'encrypt', data†: ArrayBuffer, fileName: string}` — encrypt file, store in OPFS
+- `{id: number, type: 'readChunk', offset: number, size: number}` — read encrypted chunk from OPFS
+- `{id: number, type: 'decryptAndStoreChunk', dhSecret: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, body†: ArrayBuffer, chunkDigest: Uint8Array, chunkNo: number}` — transit-decrypt + store in OPFS. `chunkDigest` is the per-chunk SHA-256 digest (verified by `decryptReceivedChunk`). Distinct from the file-level SHA-512 digest in `verifyAndDecrypt`.
+- `{id: number, type: 'verifyAndDecrypt', size: number, digest: Uint8Array, key: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array}` — verify digest + file-level decrypt all chunks. Only the four fields needed for verification/decryption are sent — not the full `FileDescription`, which contains private replica keys that the Worker doesn't need.
+- `{id: number, type: 'cleanup'}` — delete OPFS temp files
+
+Worker → Main (fields marked `†` are Transferable):
+- `{id: number, type: 'progress', done: number, total: number}` — encryption/decryption progress (fire-and-forget, no promise)
+- `{id: number, type: 'encrypted', digest: Uint8Array, key: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, chunkSizes: number[]}` — all fields structured-cloned (not transferred)
+- `{id: number, type: 'chunk', data†: ArrayBuffer}` — readChunk response
+- `{id: number, type: 'stored'}` — decryptAndStore acknowledgment
+- `{id: number, type: 'decrypted', header: FileHeader, content†: ArrayBuffer}` — verifyAndDecrypt response
+- `{id: number, type: 'cleaned'}`
+- `{id: number, type: 'error', message: string}` — rejects the pending promise for this `id`
+
+All messages carrying large `ArrayBuffer` payloads use `postMessage(msg, [transferables])` to transfer ownership instead of structured-clone copying. Only `ArrayBuffer` can be transferred — `Uint8Array`, `number[]`, and other types are always structured-cloned. This applies to: `encrypt` request (`data`), `readChunk` response (`data`), `decryptAndStoreChunk` request (`body`), and `verifyAndDecrypt` response (`content`). The `WorkerBackend` implementation must ensure the transferred `ArrayBuffer` covers the full `Uint8Array` — if `byteOffset !== 0` or `byteLength !== buffer.byteLength`, slice first: `data.buffer.slice(data.byteOffset, data.byteOffset + data.byteLength)`. This is required for `decryptAndStore` request bodies: `sendXFTPCommand` returns `body = fullResp.subarray(XFTP_BLOCK_SIZE)`, which has `byteOffset = XFTP_BLOCK_SIZE`. Other payloads are full-buffer views (§6 step 3 creates `new Uint8Array(await file.arrayBuffer())`; Worker responses allocate fresh buffers) but `WorkerBackend` should guard unconditionally.
+
+### 3.4 Worker internals
+
+**Imports:** The Worker imports directly from `libsodium-wrappers-sumo` (for `await sodium.ready`), `src/crypto/file.js` (`encryptFile`, `encodeFileHeader`, `decryptChunks`), `src/crypto/digest.js` (`sha512`), `src/protocol/chunks.js` (`prepareChunkSizes`, `fileSizeLen`, `authTagSize`), `src/protocol/encoding.js` (`concatBytes`), and `src/download.js` (`decryptReceivedChunk`). `download.js` directly imports `src/protocol/client.js` (for `decryptTransportChunk`). These transitively pull in `src/crypto/secretbox.js`, `src/crypto/keys.js`, and `src/crypto/padding.js`. None of these import `src/agent.ts` or `src/client.ts` — those pull in `node:http2` via dynamic import which would break Worker bundling. Vite tree-shakes the transitive deps automatically. Note: `download.js` → `protocol/client.js` → `crypto/keys.js` transitively pulls in `@noble/curves` (~50-80KB). This is unavoidable since `decryptTransportChunk` needs `dh` from `keys.js`. If Worker bundle size becomes a concern, `decryptReceivedChunk` could be refactored out of `download.js` into a separate module that doesn't import `protocol/client.js`.
+
+**ArrayBuffer → Uint8Array conversion:** All Transferable fields arrive in the Worker as `ArrayBuffer`. The Worker's message handler must wrap them before passing to library functions: `new Uint8Array(msg.data)` for encrypt, `new Uint8Array(msg.body)` for decryptAndStore. Non-transferred fields (`dhSecret`, `nonce`, `digest`, `chunkSizes`) arrive as their original types (`Uint8Array` / `number[]`) via structured clone.
+
+The Worker's encrypt handler calls the same functions as `encryptFileForUpload` in agent.ts (key/nonce generation → `encryptFile` → `sha512` → `prepareChunkSizes`). This is not reimplementation — it's calling the same library functions from a different entry point.
+
+**Libsodium init:** Both the Worker and the main thread must `await sodium.ready` before calling any crypto functions that use libsodium. The Worker does this once on startup before processing messages. The main thread needs it before `connectXFTP` (which uses libsodium via `verifyIdentityProof`) and before `downloadXFTPChunkRaw` (which uses libsodium via `generateX25519KeyPair` + `dh`). In practice, `main.ts` calls `await sodium.ready` at page load, before any XFTP calls.
+
+Encrypt (mirrors `encryptFileForUpload` in agent.ts):
+1. Generate key (32B) + nonce (24B) via `crypto.getRandomValues`
+2. `fileHdr = encodeFileHeader({fileName, fileExtra: null})`
+3. `fileSize = BigInt(fileHdr.length + source.length)`
+4. `payloadSize = Number(fileSize) + fileSizeLen + authTagSize`
+5. `chunkSizes = prepareChunkSizes(payloadSize)`
+6. `encSize = BigInt(chunkSizes.reduce((a, b) => a + b, 0))`
+7. `encData = encryptFile(source, fileHdr, key, nonce, fileSize, encSize)`
+8. `digest = sha512(encData)` — note: the `digest` field comment in `FileDescription` in `description.ts` says "SHA-256" but the actual hash is SHA-512 everywhere (`sha512` in agent.ts and download.ts). Fix the comment during implementation.
+9. Open OPFS upload file via `createSyncAccessHandle`, write `encData`, flush, close handle. Null out `encData` reference.
+10. Reopen the same OPFS file with `createSyncAccessHandle` as a persistent read handle (stored on the Worker module scope). This handle is used by all subsequent `readChunk` calls and closed on `cleanup`.
+11. Post back `{digest, key, nonce, chunkSizes}` (no encData transfer — data stays in OPFS)
+
+readChunk:
+- Use the persistent read handle: `handle.read(buf, {at: offset})` → return slice as transferable ArrayBuffer. OPFS allows only one `FileSystemSyncAccessHandle` per file; the persistent handle avoids per-call open/close overhead.
+
+decryptAndStoreChunk (removes transport encryption only — stored data is still file-level encrypted):
+1. `decryptReceivedChunk(dhSecret, nonce, new Uint8Array(body), chunkDigest)` → transit-decrypted chunk data (still file-level encrypted — only the transport layer is removed). Argument order matches signature `(dhSecret, cbNonce, encData, expectedDigest)` from download.ts. `body` arrives as `ArrayBuffer` via Transferable and must be wrapped; `dhSecret`, `nonce`, `chunkDigest` arrive as `Uint8Array` via structured clone.
+2. On first call, open the OPFS download temp file via `createSyncAccessHandle` and store as a persistent write handle. Record `{chunkNo, size: decrypted.length}` in an in-memory `chunkMeta: Map<number, {offset: number, size: number}>` — offset is the running sum of sizes for chunks stored so far (chunks may arrive out of order with `concurrency > 1`, so offset is assigned as `currentFileOffset`, then `currentFileOffset += size`)
+3. Write decrypted chunk to the persistent handle at the recorded offset
+
+verifyAndDecrypt (mirrors size/digest checks in agent.ts `downloadFile`):
+1. Close the persistent download write handle (flush first), then reopen as a read handle. Read each chunk from OPFS into a `Uint8Array[]` array, ordered by `chunkNo`: for each entry in `chunkMeta` sorted by `chunkNo`, `handle.read(buf, {at: offset})` with the recorded offset and size
+2. Concatenate for verification: `combined = concatBytes(...chunks)`
+3. Verify total size: `combined.length === params.size`
+4. Verify SHA-512 digest: `sha512(combined)` matches `params.digest`
+5. Decrypt: `decryptChunks(BigInt(params.size), chunks, params.key, params.nonce)` — `params.size` is the encrypted file size (`fd.size` = `sum(chunkSizes)` = `decryptChunks`' first param `encSize`). Called directly instead of via `processDownloadedFile` (which expects a full `FileDescription`). Pass the original `chunks` array (not `combined`), as `decryptChunks` handles concatenation internally.
+6. Delete OPFS download temp file
+7. Return `{header, content}` via transferable ArrayBuffer
+
+### 3.5 Browser requirements
+
+The page requires a modern browser with Web Worker and OPFS support:
+- Chrome 102+, Firefox 114+, Safari 15.2+ (Workers + OPFS + ES module Workers — Firefox added module Worker support in 114)
+- If Worker or OPFS is unavailable, the page shows an error message rather than falling back silently.
+
+No `DirectBackend` is needed — the page is browser-only, and tests run in vitest browser mode (real Chromium). The existing library tests (`test/browser.test.ts`) test the crypto/upload/download pipeline directly without Workers.
+
+## 4. Server Configuration
+
+### 4.1 Server lists
+
+`web/servers.json` — single source of truth for preset server addresses (imported by both `servers.ts` and `vite.config.ts`):
+
+```json
+{
+  "simplex": [
+    "xftp://da1aH3nOT-9G8lV7bWamhxpDYdJ1xmW7j3JpGaDR5Ug=@xftp1.simplex.im",
+    "xftp://5vog2Imy1ExJB_7zDZrkV1KDWi96jYFyy9CL6fndBVw=@xftp2.simplex.im",
+    "xftp://PYa32DdYNFWi0uZZOprWQoQpIk5qyjRJ3EF7bVpbsn8=@xftp3.simplex.im",
+    "xftp://k_GgQl40UZVV0Y4BX9ZTyMVqX5ZewcLW0waQIl7AYDE=@xftp4.simplex.im",
+    "xftp://-bIo6o8wuVc4wpZkZD3tH-rCeYaeER_0lz1ffQcSJDs=@xftp5.simplex.im",
+    "xftp://6nSvtY9pJn6PXWTAIMNl95E1Kk1vD7FM2TeOA64CFLg=@xftp6.simplex.im"
+  ],
+  "flux": [
+    "xftp://92Sctlc09vHl_nAqF2min88zKyjdYJ9mgxRCJns5K2U=@xftp1.simplexonflux.com",
+    "xftp://YBXy4f5zU1CEhnbbCzVWTNVNsaETcAGmYqGNxHntiE8=@xftp2.simplexonflux.com",
+    "xftp://ARQO74ZSvv2OrulRF3CdgwPz_AMy27r0phtLSq5b664=@xftp3.simplexonflux.com",
+    "xftp://ub2jmAa9U0uQCy90O-fSUNaYCj6sdhl49Jh3VpNXP58=@xftp4.simplexonflux.com",
+    "xftp://Rh19D5e4Eez37DEE9hAlXDB3gZa1BdFYJTPgJWPO9OI=@xftp5.simplexonflux.com",
+    "xftp://0AznwoyfX8Od9T_acp1QeeKtxUi676IBIiQjXVwbdyU=@xftp6.simplexonflux.com"
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+`web/servers.ts`:
+
+```typescript
+import {parseXFTPServer, type XFTPServer} from '../src/protocol/address.js'
+import presets from './servers.json'
+
+declare const __XFTP_SERVERS__: string[]
+
+const serverAddresses: string[] = typeof __XFTP_SERVERS__ !== 'undefined'
+  ? __XFTP_SERVERS__
+  : [...presets.simplex, ...presets.flux]
+
+export function getServers(): XFTPServer[] {
+  return serverAddresses.map(parseXFTPServer)
+}
+
+export function pickRandomServer(servers: XFTPServer[]): XFTPServer {
+  return servers[Math.floor(Math.random() * servers.length)]
+}
+```
+
+### 4.2 Build-time injection
+
+`vite.config.ts` defines `__XFTP_SERVERS__`:
+- `mode === 'local'`: `["xftp://<test-fingerprint>@localhost:7000"]`
+- `mode === 'production'`: not defined → falls through to hardcoded list
+
+### 4.3 Assumption
+
+Production XFTP servers must have `[WEB]` section configured with a CA-signed certificate for browser TLS. Without this, browsers will reject the self-signed XFTP identity cert. The local test server uses `tests/fixtures/` certs which Chromium accepts via `ignoreHTTPSErrors`.
+
+## 5. Page Structure & UI
+
+### 5.1 Routing
+
+`main.ts` checks `window.location.hash` once on page load:
+- Hash present → download mode
+- Hash absent → upload mode
+
+No `hashchange` listener — the shareable link opens in a new tab. Simple page-load routing.
+
+### 5.2 Upload UI states
+
+1. **Landing**: Drag-drop zone centered, file picker button, size limit note
+2. **Uploading**: Circular progress (canvas), percentage, cancel button
+3. **Complete**: Shareable link (input + copy button), "Install SimpleX" CTA
+4. **Error**: Error message + retry button. On server-unreachable, auto-retry with exponential backoff (1s, 2s, 4s, up to 3 attempts) before showing the error state.
+
+### 5.3 Download UI states
+
+1. **Ready**: Approximate file size displayed (encrypted size from `fd.size` or `fd.redirect.size` — see §7 step 2; file name is unavailable — it's inside the encrypted content), download button
+2. **Downloading**: Circular progress, percentage
+3. **Complete**: Browser save dialog triggered automatically
+4. **Error**: Error message (expired, corrupted, unreachable)
+
+### 5.4 Security summary (RFC §7.4)
+
+Both upload-complete and download-ready states display a brief non-technical security summary:
+- Files are encrypted in the browser before upload — the server never sees file contents.
+- The link contains the decryption key in the hash fragment, which the browser never sends to any server.
+- For maximum security, use the SimpleX app.
+
+### 5.5 File expiry
+
+Display on upload-complete state: "Files are typically available for 48 hours." This is an approximation — actual expiry depends on each XFTP server's `[STORE_LOG]` retention configuration. The 48-hour figure matches the current preset server defaults.
+
+### 5.6 Styling
+
+Plain CSS, no framework. White background, centered content, responsive. Circular progress via `<canvas>` (arc drawing, percentage text in center).
+
+File size limit: 100MB. Displayed on upload page.
+
+### 5.7 CSP
+
+`index.html` includes a `<meta>` Content-Security-Policy tag with a build-time placeholder:
+
+```html
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"
+  content="default-src 'self'; worker-src 'self' blob:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src __CSP_CONNECT_SRC__;">
+```
+
+Vite's `transformIndexHtml` hook (in `vite.config.ts`) replaces `__CSP_CONNECT_SRC__` at build time with origins derived from the server list:
+- Local mode: `https://localhost:7000`
+- Production: `https://xftp1.simplex.im:443 https://xftp2.simplex.im:443 ...` (all 12 servers)
+
+## 6. Upload Flow
+
+`web/upload.ts`:
+
+1. User drops/picks file → `File` object
+2. Validate `file.size <= 100 * 1024 * 1024` — show error if exceeded
+3. Read file: `new Uint8Array(await file.arrayBuffer())` — note: after `backend.encrypt()` transfers the buffer to the Worker, `fileData` is detached (zero-length). Peak memory is ~2× file size (main thread holds original until transfer, Worker holds encrypted copy before OPFS write). Acceptable for the 100MB limit; do not raise the limit without considering memory implications.
+4. Create `CryptoBackend` via factory
+5. Create `XFTPClientAgent`
+6. `backend.encrypt(fileData, file.name, onProgress)` → `EncryptResult`
+   - Encryption progress shown on canvas (Worker posts progress messages)
+7. Pick one random server from configured list (V1: all chunks to same server)
+8. Call `uploadFile(agent, server, metadata, {onProgress, readChunk: (off, sz) => backend.readChunk(off, sz)})`:
+   - `metadata` = `{digest, key, nonce, chunkSizes}` from EncryptResult
+   - Network progress shown on canvas
+   - Returns `{rcvDescription, sndDescription, uri}`
+9. Construct full URL: `window.location.origin + window.location.pathname + '#' + uri`
+10. Display link, copy button
+11. Cleanup: `backend.cleanup()`, `closeXFTPAgent(agent)`
+
+**Cancel:** User can abort via cancel button. Sets an `AbortController` signal that:
+- Sends `{type: 'cleanup'}` to Worker
+- Closes the XFTPClientAgent (drops HTTP/2 connections)
+- Resets UI to landing state
+
+## 7. Download Flow
+
+`web/download.ts`:
+
+1. Parse `window.location.hash.slice(1)` → `decodeDescriptionURI(fragment)` → `FileDescription`
+2. Display file size (`fd.size` bytes, formatted human-readable). Note: `fd.size` is the encrypted size (slightly larger than plaintext due to padding + auth tag). The plaintext size is not available until decryption — display it as an approximate file size. If `fd.redirect !== null`, size comes from `fd.redirect.size` (which is the inner encrypted size).
+3. User clicks "Download"
+4. Create `CryptoBackend` and `XFTPClientAgent`
+5. Call `downloadFileRaw(agent, fd, onRawChunk, {onProgress, concurrency: 3})`:
+   - `onRawChunk` forwards each raw chunk to the Worker: `backend.decryptAndStoreChunk(raw.dhSecret, raw.nonce, raw.body, raw.digest, raw.chunkNo)`
+   - `downloadFileRaw` handles redirect resolution internally (see §7.1), parallel downloads, and connection pooling
+   - Returns the resolved `FileDescription` (inner fd for redirect case, original fd otherwise)
+6. `backend.verifyAndDecrypt({size: resolvedFd.size, digest: resolvedFd.digest, key: resolvedFd.key, nonce: resolvedFd.nonce})` → `{header, content}`
+   - Verifies size + SHA-512 digest + file-level decryption inside Worker. Only the four needed fields are sent — private replica keys stay on the main thread.
+7. ACK: `ackFileChunks(agent, resolvedFd)` — best-effort, after verification succeeds
+8. Sanitize `header.fileName` before use: strip path separators (`/`, `\`), replace null/control characters (U+0000-U+001F, U+007F), strip Unicode bidi override characters (U+202A-U+202E, U+2066-U+2069 — prevents `doc.pdf.exe` appearing as `doc.exe.pdf`), limit length to 255 chars. The filename is user-controlled (set by the uploader) and arrives via decrypted content. Then trigger browser save: `new Blob([content])` → `<a download="${sanitizedName}">` click
+9. Cleanup: `backend.cleanup()`, `closeXFTPAgent(agent)`
+
+### 7.1 Redirect handling
+
+Handled inside `downloadFileRaw` in agent.ts — the web page doesn't see it. When `fd.redirect !== null`:
+
+1. Download redirect chunks via `downloadXFTPChunkRaw` (parallel, same as regular chunks)
+2. Transit-decrypt + verify + file-level decrypt on main thread (redirect data is always small — a few KB of YAML, so main thread decryption is fine)
+3. Parse YAML → inner `FileDescription`, validate against `fd.redirect.{size, digest}`
+4. ACK redirect chunks (best-effort)
+5. Continue downloading inner description's chunks, calling `onRawChunk` for each
+
+### 7.2 Architecture note: download refactoring
+
+Both upload and download use `agent.ts` for orchestration. The key difference is where the crypto/network split happens:
+
+- **Upload**: agent.ts reads encrypted chunks from the Worker via `readChunk` callback, sends them over the network.
+- **Download**: agent.ts receives raw encrypted responses from the network via `downloadXFTPChunkRaw` (DH key exchange + network only, no decryption), passes them to the web page via `onRawChunk` callback, which routes them to the Worker for transit decryption.
+
+This split keeps all expensive crypto off the main thread. Transit decryption uses a custom JS Salsa20 implementation (`xorKeystream` in secretbox.ts) that would block the UI for ~50-200ms on a 4MB chunk. File-level decryption (`decryptChunks`) is similarly expensive. Both happen in the Worker.
+
+The cheap operations stay on the main thread: DH key exchange (`generateX25519KeyPair` + `dh` — ~1ms via libsodium WASM), XFTP command encoding/decoding, connection management.
+
+## 8. Build & Dev Setup
+
+### 8.1 vite.config.ts (new, separate from vitest.config.ts)
+
+```typescript
+import {defineConfig, type Plugin} from 'vite'
+import {readFileSync} from 'fs'
+import {createHash} from 'crypto'
+import presets from './web/servers.json'
+
+function parseHost(addr: string): string {
+  const m = addr.match(/@(.+)$/)
+  if (!m) throw new Error('bad server address: ' + addr)
+  const host = m[1].split(',')[0]
+  return host.includes(':') ? host : host + ':443'
+}
+
+function cspPlugin(servers: string[]): Plugin {
+  const origins = servers.map(s => 'https://' + parseHost(s)).join(' ')
+  return {
+    name: 'csp-connect-src',
+    transformIndexHtml: {
+      order: 'pre',
+      handler(html, ctx) {
+        if (ctx.server) {
+          // Dev mode: remove CSP meta tag entirely — Vite HMR needs inline scripts
+          return html.replace(/<meta\s[^>]*?Content-Security-Policy[\s\S]*?>/i, '')
+        }
+        return html.replace('__CSP_CONNECT_SRC__', origins)
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+export default defineConfig(({mode}) => {
+  const define: Record<string, string> = {}
+  let servers: string[]
+
+  if (mode === 'local') {
+    const pem = readFileSync('../tests/fixtures/ca.crt', 'utf-8')
+    const der = Buffer.from(pem.replace(/-----[^-]+-----/g, '').replace(/\s/g, ''), 'base64')
+    const fp = createHash('sha256').update(der).digest('base64')
+      .replace(/\+/g, '-').replace(/\//g, '_')
+    servers = [`xftp://${fp}@localhost:7000`]
+    define['__XFTP_SERVERS__'] = JSON.stringify(servers)
+  } else {
+    servers = [...presets.simplex, ...presets.flux]
+  }
+
+  return {
+    root: 'web',
+    build: {outDir: '../dist-web'},
+    define,
+    worker: {format: 'es'},
+    plugins: [cspPlugin(servers)],
+  }
+})
+```
+
+### 8.2 package.json scripts
+
+```json
+"dev": "vite --mode local",
+"build:local": "vite build --mode local",
+"build:prod": "vite build --mode production",
+"preview": "vite preview",
+"check:web": "tsc -p tsconfig.web.json --noEmit && tsc -p tsconfig.worker.json --noEmit"
+```
+
+Note: `check:web` type-checks `src/` twice (once per config) — acceptable for this small library.
+
+Add `vite` as an explicit devDependency (`^6.0.0` — matching the version vitest 3.x depends on transitively). Relying on transitive resolution is fragile across package managers.
+
+### 8.3 TypeScript configuration
+
+The existing `tsconfig.json` has `rootDir: "src"` and `include: ["src/**/*.ts"]` — this is for library compilation only (output to `dist/`). Vite handles `web/` TypeScript compilation independently via esbuild, so the main tsconfig is unchanged. `web/*.ts` files import from `../src/*.js` using relative paths.
+
+Add two tsconfigs for `web/` type-checking — split by environment to avoid type pollution between DOM and WebWorker globals:
+
+`tsconfig.web.json` — main-thread files (DOM globals: `document`, `window`, etc.):
+
+```json
+{
+  "extends": "./tsconfig.json",
+  "compilerOptions": {
+    "rootDir": ".",
+    "noEmit": true,
+    "types": [],
+    "moduleResolution": "bundler",
+    "lib": ["ES2022", "DOM"]
+  },
+  "include": ["web/**/*.ts", "src/**/*.ts"],
+  "exclude": ["web/crypto.worker.ts"]
+}
+```
+
+`tsconfig.worker.json` — Worker file (`self`, `FileSystemSyncAccessHandle`, etc.):
+
+```json
+{
+  "extends": "./tsconfig.json",
+  "compilerOptions": {
+    "rootDir": ".",
+    "noEmit": true,
+    "types": [],
+    "moduleResolution": "bundler",
+    "lib": ["ES2022", "WebWorker"]
+  },
+  "include": ["web/crypto.worker.ts", "src/**/*.ts"]
+}
+```
+
+Both configs set `"types": []` to prevent auto-inclusion of `@types/node` and `"moduleResolution": "bundler"` for Vite-compatible resolution (JSON imports, `.js` extension mapping). The base config's `"moduleResolution": "node"` would cause false type errors on `import ... from './servers.json'`. Both override `@types/node`, which would pollute DOM/WebWorker environments with Node.js globals (`process`, `Buffer`, etc.). This means `src/client.ts`'s dynamic `import("node:http2")` will produce a type error in these configs. This is acceptable — `src/client.ts` provides `createNodeTransport` which is never used in browser code (Vite tree-shakes it out), and full `src/` type-checking is handled by the base `tsconfig.json`. If the error is distracting, add `src/client.ts` to both configs' `exclude` arrays.
+
+Both extend the library tsconfig (inheriting `strict`, `module`, etc.) and include `src/**/*.ts` so imports from `../src/*.js` resolve. `"noEmit": true` means they're only used for type-checking — Vite handles actual compilation. The inherited `"exclude": ["node_modules", "dist", "test"]` intentionally excludes `test/` — test files are type-checked by their own vitest/playwright configs, not by `check:web`.
+
+### 8.4 Dev workflow
+
+`npm run dev` → Vite dev server at `localhost:5173`, configured for local test server. Start `xftp-server` on port 7000 separately (or via the existing globalSetup).
+
+Note: The CSP meta tag's `default-src 'self'` blocks Vite's injected HMR inline scripts in dev mode. The `cspPlugin` handles this by removing the entire CSP `<meta>` tag in serve mode (dev server), so HMR works without restrictions. Production builds always have the correct CSP.
+
+## 9. Library Changes (agent.ts + client.ts)
+
+Changes to support the web page: upload `readChunk` callback, download `onRawChunk` callback with parallel chunk downloads.
+
+### 9.1 Type changes
+
+Split the existing `EncryptedFileInfo` (which currently has `encData`, `digest`, `key`, `nonce`, `chunkSizes` as direct fields) into a metadata-only base and an extension:
+
+```typescript
+// Metadata-only variant (no encData — data lives in Worker/OPFS)
+export interface EncryptedFileMetadata {
+  digest: Uint8Array
+  key: Uint8Array
+  nonce: Uint8Array
+  chunkSizes: number[]
+}
+
+// Full variant (existing, extends metadata with data)
+export interface EncryptedFileInfo extends EncryptedFileMetadata {
+  encData: Uint8Array
+}
+```
+
+### 9.2 uploadFile signature change
+
+Replace positional optional params with an options bag. Add optional `readChunk`. When provided, `encrypted.encData` is not accessed.
+
+```typescript
+export interface UploadOptions {
+  onProgress?: (uploaded: number, total: number) => void
+  redirectThreshold?: number
+  readChunk?: (offset: number, size: number) => Promise<Uint8Array>
+}
+
+export async function uploadFile(
+  agent: XFTPClientAgent,
+  server: XFTPServer,
+  encrypted: EncryptedFileMetadata,
+  options?: UploadOptions
+): Promise<UploadResult>
+```
+
+Inside `uploadFile`:
+- Chunk read: if `options?.readChunk` is provided, use it. Otherwise, verify `'encData' in encrypted` at runtime (throws `"uploadFile: readChunk required when encData is absent"` if missing), then use `(off, sz) => Promise.resolve((encrypted as EncryptedFileInfo).encData.subarray(off, off + sz))`. This guards against calling `uploadFile` with `EncryptedFileMetadata` but no `readChunk`. For each chunk, call `readChunk(offset, size)` once and use the returned `Uint8Array` for both `getChunkDigest(chunkData)` and `uploadXFTPChunk(..., chunkData)` — do not call `readChunk` twice per chunk.
+- Progress total: `const total = encrypted.chunkSizes.reduce((a, b) => a + b, 0)` — replaces `encrypted.encData.length` (line 129) since `EncryptedFileMetadata` has no `encData`. The values are identical: `encData.length === sum(chunkSizes)`.
+- `buildDescription` parameter type: change from `EncryptedFileInfo` to `EncryptedFileMetadata` — it only accesses `chunkSizes`, `digest`, `key`, `nonce` (not `encData`).
+
+`uploadRedirectDescription` (internal) is unchanged — redirect descriptions are always small and created in-memory by `encryptFileForUpload`.
+
+### 9.3 Backward compatibility
+
+The signature change from positional params `(agent, server, encrypted, onProgress?, redirectThreshold?)` to `(agent, server, encrypted, options?)` is a breaking change for callers that pass `onProgress` or `redirectThreshold`. In practice, the only callers are the browser test (which passes no options — no change needed) and the web page (new code). `EncryptedFileInfo` extends `EncryptedFileMetadata`, so existing callers that pass `EncryptedFileInfo` work without change.
+
+### 9.4 client.ts: downloadXFTPChunkRaw
+
+Split `downloadXFTPChunk` at the network/crypto boundary. The new function does DH key exchange and network I/O but skips transit decryption:
+
+```typescript
+export interface RawChunkResponse {
+  dhSecret: Uint8Array
+  nonce: Uint8Array
+  body: Uint8Array
+}
+
+export async function downloadXFTPChunkRaw(
+  c: XFTPClient, rpKey: Uint8Array, fId: Uint8Array
+): Promise<RawChunkResponse> {
+  const {publicKey, privateKey} = generateX25519KeyPair()
+  const cmd = encodeFGET(encodePubKeyX25519(publicKey))
+  const {response, body} = await sendXFTPCommand(c, rpKey, fId, cmd)
+  if (response.type !== "FRFile") throw new Error("unexpected response: " + response.type)
+  const dhSecret = dh(response.rcvDhKey, privateKey)
+  return {dhSecret, nonce: response.nonce, body}
+}
+```
+
+`RawChunkResponse` contains only what client.ts produces (DH secret, nonce, encrypted body). The chunk metadata (`chunkNo`, `digest`) is added by agent.ts when constructing `RawDownloadedChunk` (see §9.5).
+
+The existing `downloadXFTPChunk` is refactored to call `downloadXFTPChunkRaw` + `decryptReceivedChunk`:
+
+```typescript
+export async function downloadXFTPChunk(
+  c: XFTPClient, rpKey: Uint8Array, fId: Uint8Array, digest?: Uint8Array
+): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+  const {dhSecret, nonce, body} = await downloadXFTPChunkRaw(c, rpKey, fId)
+  return decryptReceivedChunk(dhSecret, nonce, body, digest ?? null)
+}
+```
+
+### 9.5 agent.ts: downloadFileRaw, ackFileChunks, RawDownloadedChunk
+
+New type combining client.ts's `RawChunkResponse` with chunk metadata from agent.ts:
+
+```typescript
+export interface RawDownloadedChunk {
+  chunkNo: number
+  dhSecret: Uint8Array
+  nonce: Uint8Array
+  body: Uint8Array
+  digest: Uint8Array
+}
+```
+
+New function providing download orchestration with a raw chunk callback. Handles connection pooling, parallel downloads, redirect resolution, and progress. Does **not** ACK — the caller ACKs after verification.
+
+```typescript
+export interface DownloadRawOptions {
+  onProgress?: (downloaded: number, total: number) => void
+  concurrency?: number  // max parallel chunk downloads, default 1
+}
+
+export async function downloadFileRaw(
+  agent: XFTPClientAgent,
+  fd: FileDescription,
+  onRawChunk: (chunk: RawDownloadedChunk) => Promise<void>,
+  options?: DownloadRawOptions
+): Promise<FileDescription>
+```
+
+Returns the resolved `FileDescription` — for redirect files this is the inner fd, for non-redirect files this is the original fd. The caller uses this for verification and ACK.
+
+Internal structure:
+
+1. Validate `fd` via `validateFileDescription` (may double-validate if caller already validated via `decodeDescriptionURI` — harmless)
+2. If `fd.redirect !== null`: resolve redirect on main thread (redirect data is small):
+   a. Download redirect chunks via `downloadXFTPChunk` (not raw — main thread decryption is fine for a few KB)
+   b. Verify size + digest, `processDownloadedFile` → YAML bytes
+   c. Parse inner `FileDescription`, validate against `fd.redirect.{size, digest}`
+   d. ACK redirect chunks (best-effort — redirect chunks are small and separate from the file chunks)
+   e. Replace `fd` with inner description
+3. Pre-connect: call `getXFTPServerClient(agent, server)` for each unique server before launching concurrent workers. This ensures the client connection exists in the agent's map, avoiding a race condition where multiple concurrent workers all see the client as missing and each call `connectXFTP` independently (leaking all but the last connection). Known limitation: if a connection drops mid-download and multiple workers attempt reconnection simultaneously, the same TOCTOU race reappears. This is a pre-existing issue in `getXFTPServerClient`; a proper fix (per-key connection promise) is out of scope for this plan but should be tracked for follow-up.
+4. Download file chunks in parallel (concurrency-limited via sliding window):
+   - Create a queue of chunk indices `[0, 1, ..., N-1]`. Launch `min(concurrency, N)` async workers, each pulling the next index from the queue until empty. Each worker loops: pull index → derive key → `getXFTPServerClient` → `downloadXFTPChunkRaw` → `await onRawChunk(...)` → update progress → next index. `await Promise.all(workers)` to wait for completion.
+   - For each chunk: derive key (`decodePrivKeyEd25519` → `ed25519KeyPairFromSeed`), get client (`getXFTPServerClient`), call `downloadXFTPChunkRaw`, `await onRawChunk(...)` with result + `chunkNo` + `chunk.digest`
+   - Each concurrency slot awaits its `onRawChunk` before starting the next download on that slot. With `concurrency > 1`, multiple `onRawChunk` calls may be in-flight concurrently (one per slot). The Worker handles this correctly — messages are queued and processed sequentially.
+   - Update progress after each chunk: `downloaded += chunk.chunkSize; onProgress?.(downloaded, resolvedFd.size)` — both values use encrypted sizes for consistency
+5. Return the resolved `fd`
+
+New helper for ACKing after verification:
+
+```typescript
+export async function ackFileChunks(
+  agent: XFTPClientAgent, fd: FileDescription
+): Promise<void> {
+  for (const chunk of fd.chunks) {
+    const replica = chunk.replicas[0]
+    if (!replica) continue
+    try {
+      const client = await getXFTPServerClient(agent, parseXFTPServer(replica.server))
+      const seed = decodePrivKeyEd25519(replica.replicaKey)
+      const kp = ed25519KeyPairFromSeed(seed)
+      await ackXFTPChunk(client, kp.privateKey, replica.replicaId)
+    } catch (_) {}
+  }
+}
+```
+
+The existing `downloadFile` is refactored to use `downloadFileRaw` internally:
+
+```typescript
+export async function downloadFile(
+  agent: XFTPClientAgent,
+  fd: FileDescription,
+  onProgress?: (downloaded: number, total: number) => void
+): Promise<DownloadResult> {
+  const chunks: Uint8Array[] = []
+  const resolvedFd = await downloadFileRaw(agent, fd, async (raw) => {
+    chunks[raw.chunkNo - 1] = decryptReceivedChunk(
+      raw.dhSecret, raw.nonce, raw.body, raw.digest
+    )
+  }, {onProgress})
+  // verify + file-level decrypt using resolvedFd (inner fd for redirect case)
+  const combined = chunks.length === 1 ? chunks[0] : concatBytes(...chunks)
+  if (combined.length !== resolvedFd.size) throw new Error("downloadFile: file size mismatch")
+  const digest = sha512(combined)
+  if (!digestEqual(digest, resolvedFd.digest)) throw new Error("downloadFile: file digest mismatch")
+  // processDownloadedFile re-concatenates chunks internally — this mirrors the
+  // existing downloadFile pattern (verify on concatenated data, then pass chunks
+  // array to decryptChunks which concatenates again). Acceptable overhead for
+  // correctness: verification must happen on transit-decrypted data before
+  // file-level decryption transforms it.
+  const result = processDownloadedFile(resolvedFd, chunks)
+  await ackFileChunks(agent, resolvedFd)
+  return result
+}
+```
+
+Existing callers retain serial behavior (`concurrency` defaults to 1). The web page opts into parallelism by passing `concurrency: 3`. The browser test (`test/browser.test.ts`) continues to work unchanged. The chunks array is initialized empty (`[]`) and populated by sparse index assignment (`chunks[raw.chunkNo - 1] = ...`), so it correctly handles both redirect and non-redirect cases regardless of the outer fd's chunk count. `digestEqual` is an existing module-private helper in agent.ts (line 327) that performs constant-time byte comparison.
+
+### 9.6 Backward compatibility (download)
+
+`downloadFile` signature is unchanged — existing callers are unaffected. The refactoring adds `downloadFileRaw`, `ackFileChunks`, and `RawDownloadedChunk` as new exports from agent.ts, and `downloadXFTPChunkRaw` + `RawChunkResponse` as new exports from client.ts.
+
+## 10. Testing
+
+### 10.1 Existing tests (unchanged)
+
+- `npm run test:browser` — vitest browser round-trip (library-level)
+- `cabal test --test-option='--match=/XFTP Web Client/'` — Haskell per-function tests
+
+### 10.2 New: page E2E test
+
+Add `test/page.spec.ts` using `@playwright/test` (not vitest browser mode — vitest tests run IN the browser and can't control page navigation; Playwright tests run in Node.js and control the browser). Add `@playwright/test` as a devDependency.
+
+Add `playwright.config.ts` at the project root (`xftp-web/`):
+- `webServer: { command: 'vite build --mode local && vite preview', url: 'http://localhost:4173', reuseExistingServer: !process.env.CI }` — the `url` property tells Playwright to wait until the preview server is ready before running tests
+- `use.ignoreHTTPSErrors: true` (test server uses self-signed cert)
+- `use.launchOptions: { args: ['--ignore-certificate-errors'] }` — required because Playwright's `ignoreHTTPSErrors` only affects page navigation, not `fetch()` calls from in-page JavaScript. Without this flag, the page's `createBrowserTransport` fetch to `https://localhost:7000` would fail TLS validation.
+- `globalSetup`: `'./test/globalSetup.ts'` (starts xftp-server, shared with vitest)
+
+```typescript
+import {test, expect} from '@playwright/test'
+
+test('page upload + download round-trip', async ({page}) => {
+  await page.goto(PAGE_URL)
+  // Set file input via page.setInputFiles()
+  // Wait for upload link to appear: page.waitForSelector('[data-testid="share-link"]')
+  // Extract hash from link text
+  // Navigate to PAGE_URL + '#' + hash
+  // Wait for download complete state
+  // Verify file was offered for save (check download event)
+})
+```
+
+Add script: `"test:page": "playwright test test/page.spec.ts"`
+
+This tests the real bundle including Worker loading, OPFS, and CSP. The existing `test/browser.test.ts` continues to test the library-level pipeline (vitest browser mode, no Workers).
+
+### 10.3 Manual testing
+
+`npm run dev` → open `localhost:5173` in browser → drag file → get link → open link in new tab → download. Requires xftp-server running on port 7000 (local mode).
+
+## 11. Files
+
+**Create:**
+- `xftp-web/web/index.html` — page entry point (includes CSP meta tag)
+- `xftp-web/web/main.ts` — router + libsodium init
+- `xftp-web/web/upload.ts` — upload UI + orchestration
+- `xftp-web/web/download.ts` — download UI + orchestration
+- `xftp-web/web/progress.ts` — circular progress canvas component
+- `xftp-web/web/servers.json` — preset server addresses (shared by servers.ts and vite.config.ts)
+- `xftp-web/web/servers.ts` — server configuration (imports servers.json)
+- `xftp-web/web/crypto-backend.ts` — CryptoBackend interface + WorkerBackend + factory
+- `xftp-web/web/crypto.worker.ts` — Web Worker implementation
+- `xftp-web/web/style.css` — styles
+- `xftp-web/vite.config.ts` — page build config (CSP generation, server list)
+- `xftp-web/tsconfig.web.json` — IDE/CI type-checking for `web/` main-thread files (DOM)
+- `xftp-web/tsconfig.worker.json` — IDE/CI type-checking for `web/crypto.worker.ts` (WebWorker)
+- `xftp-web/playwright.config.ts` — Playwright E2E test config (webServer, globalSetup)
+- `xftp-web/test/page.spec.ts` — page E2E test (Playwright)
+
+**Modify:**
+- `xftp-web/src/agent.ts` — add `EncryptedFileMetadata` type, `uploadFile` options bag with `readChunk`, `downloadFileRaw` with `onRawChunk` callback + parallel downloads, `ackFileChunks`, `RawDownloadedChunk` type, refactor `downloadFile` on top of `downloadFileRaw`, add `import {decryptReceivedChunk} from "./download.js"` (needed by refactored `downloadFile`)
+- `xftp-web/src/client.ts` — add `downloadXFTPChunkRaw`, `RawChunkResponse` type, refactor `downloadXFTPChunk` to use raw variant
+- `xftp-web/package.json` — add dev/build/check:web/test:page scripts, add `vite` + `@playwright/test` devDeps
+- `xftp-web/src/protocol/description.ts` — fix stale "SHA-256" comment on `FileDescription.digest` to "SHA-512"
+- `xftp-web/.gitignore` — add `dist-web/`
+
+## 12. Implementation Order
+
+1. **Library refactoring** — `client.ts`: add `downloadXFTPChunkRaw`; `agent.ts`: add `downloadFileRaw` + parallel downloads, `uploadFile` options bag with `readChunk`; refactor existing `downloadFile` on top of `downloadFileRaw`. Run existing tests to verify no regressions.
+2. **Vite config + HTML shell** — `vite.config.ts`, `index.html`, `main.ts`, verify dev server works
+3. **Server config** — `servers.ts` with both local and production server lists
+4. **CryptoBackend + Worker** — interface, WorkerBackend, Worker implementation, OPFS logic
+5. **Upload flow** — `upload.ts` with drag-drop, encrypt via Worker, upload via agent, show link
+6. **Download flow** — `download.ts` with URL parsing, download via agent `downloadFileRaw`, Worker decrypt, browser save
+7. **Progress component** — `progress.ts` canvas drawing
+8. **Styling** — `style.css`
+9. **Testing** — page E2E test, manual browser verification
+10. **Build scripts** — `build:local`, `build:prod` in package.json

rfcs/2026-01-30-send-file-page/2026-02-04-xftp-web-persistent-connections.md

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# XFTPClientAgent Pattern
+
+## TOC
+1. Executive Summary
+2. Changes: client.ts
+3. Changes: agent.ts
+4. Changes: test/browser.test.ts
+5. Verification
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+Add `XFTPClientAgent` — a per-server connection pool matching the Haskell pattern. The agent caches `XFTPClient` instances by server URL. All orchestration functions (`uploadFile`, `downloadFile`, `deleteFile`) take `agent` as first parameter and use `getXFTPServerClient(agent, server)` instead of calling `connectXFTP` directly. Connections stay open on success; the caller creates and closes the agent.
+
+`connectXFTP` and `closeXFTP` stay exported (used by `XFTPWebTests.hs` Haskell tests). The `browserClients` hack, per-function `connections: Map`, and `getOrConnect` are deleted.
+
+## Changes: client.ts
+
+**Add** after types section: `XFTPClientAgent` interface, `newXFTPAgent`, `getXFTPServerClient`, `closeXFTPServerClient`, `closeXFTPAgent`.
+
+**Delete**: `browserClients` Map and all `isNode` browser-cache checks in `connectXFTP` and `closeXFTP`.
+
+**Revert `closeXFTP`** to unconditional `c.transport.close()` (browser transport.close() is already a no-op).
+
+`connectXFTP` stays exported (backward compat) but becomes a raw low-level function — no caching.
+
+## Changes: agent.ts
+
+**Imports**: replace `connectXFTP`/`closeXFTP` with `getXFTPServerClient`/`closeXFTPAgent` etc.
+
+**Re-export** from agent.ts: `newXFTPAgent`, `closeXFTPAgent`, `XFTPClientAgent`.
+
+**`uploadFile`**: add `agent: XFTPClientAgent` as first param. Replace `connectXFTP` → `getXFTPServerClient`. Remove `finally { closeXFTP }`. Pass `agent` to `uploadRedirectDescription`.
+
+**`uploadRedirectDescription`**: change from `(client, server, innerFd)` to `(agent, server, innerFd)`. Get client via `getXFTPServerClient`.
+
+**`downloadFile`**: add `agent` param. Delete local `connections: Map`. Replace `getOrConnect` → `getXFTPServerClient`. Remove finally cleanup. Pass `agent` to `downloadWithRedirect`.
+
+**`downloadWithRedirect`**: add `agent` param. Same replacements. Remove try/catch cleanup. Recursive call passes `agent`.
+
+**`deleteFile`**: add `agent` param. Same pattern.
+
+**Delete**: `getOrConnect` function entirely.
+
+## Changes: test/browser.test.ts
+
+Create agent before operations, pass to upload/download, close in finally.
+
+## Verification
+
+1. `npx vitest --run` — browser round-trip test passes
+2. No remaining `browserClients`, `getOrConnect`, or per-function `connections: Map` locals
+3. `connectXFTP` and `closeXFTP` still exported (XFTPWebTests.hs compat)
+4. All orchestration functions take `agent` as first param

rfcs/2026-01-30-send-file-page/2026-02-05-xftp-web-e2e-tests.md

@@ -0,0 +1,859 @@
+# XFTP Web Page E2E Tests Plan
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+1. [Executive Summary](#1-executive-summary)
+2. [Test Infrastructure](#2-test-infrastructure)
+3. [Test Infrastructure - Page Objects](#3-test-infrastructure---page-objects)
+4. [Upload Flow Tests](#4-upload-flow-tests)
+5. [Download Flow Tests](#5-download-flow-tests)
+6. [Edge Cases](#6-edge-cases)
+7. [Implementation Order](#7-implementation-order)
+8. [Test Utilities](#8-test-utilities)
+
+---
+
+## 1. Executive Summary
+
+This document specifies comprehensive Playwright E2E tests for the XFTP web page. The existing test (`page.spec.ts`) performs a basic upload/download round-trip. This plan extends coverage to:
+
+- **Upload flow**: File selection (picker + drag-drop), validation, progress, cancellation, link sharing, error handling
+- **Download flow**: Invalid link handling, download button, progress, file save, error states
+- **Edge cases**: Boundary file sizes, special characters, network failures, multi-chunk files with redirect, UI information display
+
+**Key constraints**:
+- Tests run against a local XFTP server (started via `globalSetup.ts`)
+- Server port is dynamic (read from `/tmp/xftp-test-server.port`)
+- Browser uses `--ignore-certificate-errors` for self-signed certs
+- OPFS and Web Workers are required (Chromium supports both)
+
+**Test file location**: `/code/simplexmq/xftp-web/test/page.spec.ts`
+
+**Architecture**: Tests use the Page Object Model pattern to encapsulate UI interactions, making tests read as domain-specific scenarios rather than raw Playwright API calls.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Test Infrastructure
+
+### 2.1 Current Setup
+
+```
+xftp-web/
+├── playwright.config.ts      # Playwright config (webServer, globalSetup)
+├── test/
+│   ├── globalSetup.ts        # Starts xftp-server, writes port to PORT_FILE
+│   ├── page.spec.ts          # E2E tests (to be extended)
+│   └── pages/                # Page Objects (new)
+│       ├── UploadPage.ts
+│       └── DownloadPage.ts
+```
+
+### 2.2 Prerequisites
+
+- `globalSetup.ts` starts the XFTP server and writes port to `PORT_FILE`
+- Tests must read the port dynamically: `readFileSync(PORT_FILE, 'utf-8').trim()`
+- Vite builds and serves the page at `http://localhost:4173`
+
+---
+
+## 3. Test Infrastructure - Page Objects
+
+Page Objects encapsulate page-specific selectors and actions, providing a clean API for tests. This follows the standard Page Object Model pattern used in simplex-chat and most professional test suites.
+
+### 3.1 UploadPage
+
+```typescript
+// test/pages/UploadPage.ts
+import {Page, Locator, expect} from '@playwright/test'
+
+export class UploadPage {
+  readonly page: Page
+  readonly dropZone: Locator
+  readonly fileInput: Locator
+  readonly progressStage: Locator
+  readonly progressCanvas: Locator
+  readonly statusText: Locator
+  readonly cancelButton: Locator
+  readonly completeStage: Locator
+  readonly shareLink: Locator
+  readonly copyButton: Locator
+  readonly errorStage: Locator
+  readonly errorMessage: Locator
+  readonly retryButton: Locator
+  readonly expiryNote: Locator
+  readonly securityNote: Locator
+
+  constructor(page: Page) {
+    this.page = page
+    this.dropZone = page.locator('#drop-zone')
+    this.fileInput = page.locator('#file-input')
+    this.progressStage = page.locator('#upload-progress')
+    this.progressCanvas = page.locator('#progress-container canvas')
+    this.statusText = page.locator('#upload-status')
+    this.cancelButton = page.locator('#cancel-btn')
+    this.completeStage = page.locator('#upload-complete')
+    this.shareLink = page.locator('[data-testid="share-link"]')
+    this.copyButton = page.locator('#copy-btn')
+    this.errorStage = page.locator('#upload-error')
+    this.errorMessage = page.locator('#error-msg')
+    this.retryButton = page.locator('#retry-btn')
+    this.expiryNote = page.locator('.expiry')
+    this.securityNote = page.locator('.security-note')
+  }
+
+  async goto() {
+    await this.page.goto('http://localhost:4173')
+  }
+
+  async selectFile(name: string, content: Buffer, mimeType = 'application/octet-stream') {
+    await this.fileInput.setInputFiles({name, mimeType, buffer: content})
+  }
+
+  async selectTextFile(name: string, content: string) {
+    await this.selectFile(name, Buffer.from(content, 'utf-8'), 'text/plain')
+  }
+
+  async selectLargeFile(name: string, sizeBytes: number) {
+    // Create large file in browser to avoid memory issues in test process
+    await this.page.evaluate(({name, size}) => {
+      const input = document.getElementById('file-input') as HTMLInputElement
+      const buffer = new ArrayBuffer(size)
+      new Uint8Array(buffer).fill(0x55)
+      const file = new File([buffer], name, {type: 'application/octet-stream'})
+      const dt = new DataTransfer()
+      dt.items.add(file)
+      input.files = dt.files
+      input.dispatchEvent(new Event('change', {bubbles: true}))
+    }, {name, size: sizeBytes})
+  }
+
+  async dragDropFile(name: string, content: Buffer) {
+    // Drag-drop uses same file input handler internally
+    await this.selectFile(name, content)
+  }
+
+  async waitForEncrypting(timeout = 10_000) {
+    await expect(this.statusText).toContainText('Encrypting', {timeout})
+  }
+
+  async waitForUploading(timeout = 30_000) {
+    await expect(this.statusText).toContainText('Uploading', {timeout})
+  }
+
+  async waitForShareLink(timeout = 60_000): Promise<string> {
+    await expect(this.shareLink).toBeVisible({timeout})
+    return await this.shareLink.inputValue()
+  }
+
+  async clickCopy() {
+    await this.copyButton.click()
+    await expect(this.copyButton).toContainText('Copied!')
+  }
+
+  async clickCancel() {
+    await this.cancelButton.click()
+  }
+
+  async clickRetry() {
+    await this.retryButton.click()
+  }
+
+  async expectError(messagePattern: string | RegExp) {
+    await expect(this.errorStage).toBeVisible()
+    await expect(this.errorMessage).toContainText(messagePattern)
+  }
+
+  async expectDropZoneVisible() {
+    await expect(this.dropZone).toBeVisible()
+  }
+
+  async expectProgressVisible() {
+    await expect(this.progressStage).toBeVisible()
+    await expect(this.progressCanvas).toBeVisible()
+  }
+
+  async expectCompleteWithExpiry() {
+    await expect(this.completeStage).toBeVisible()
+    await expect(this.expiryNote).toContainText('48 hours')
+  }
+
+  async expectSecurityNote() {
+    await expect(this.securityNote).toBeVisible()
+    await expect(this.securityNote).toContainText('encrypted')
+  }
+
+  getHashFromLink(url: string): string {
+    return new URL(url).hash
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### 3.2 DownloadPage
+
+```typescript
+// test/pages/DownloadPage.ts
+import {Page, Locator, expect, Download} from '@playwright/test'
+
+export class DownloadPage {
+  readonly page: Page
+  readonly readyStage: Locator
+  readonly downloadButton: Locator
+  readonly progressStage: Locator
+  readonly progressCanvas: Locator
+  readonly statusText: Locator
+  readonly errorStage: Locator
+  readonly errorMessage: Locator
+  readonly retryButton: Locator
+  readonly securityNote: Locator
+
+  constructor(page: Page) {
+    this.page = page
+    this.readyStage = page.locator('#dl-ready')
+    this.downloadButton = page.locator('#dl-btn')
+    this.progressStage = page.locator('#dl-progress')
+    this.progressCanvas = page.locator('#dl-progress-container canvas')
+    this.statusText = page.locator('#dl-status')
+    this.errorStage = page.locator('#dl-error')
+    this.errorMessage = page.locator('#dl-error-msg')
+    this.retryButton = page.locator('#dl-retry-btn')
+    this.securityNote = page.locator('.security-note')
+  }
+
+  async goto(hash: string) {
+    await this.page.goto(`http://localhost:4173${hash}`)
+  }
+
+  async gotoWithLink(fullUrl: string) {
+    const hash = new URL(fullUrl).hash
+    await this.goto(hash)
+  }
+
+  async expectFileReady() {
+    await expect(this.readyStage).toBeVisible()
+    await expect(this.downloadButton).toBeVisible()
+  }
+
+  async expectFileSizeDisplayed() {
+    await expect(this.readyStage).toContainText(/\d+(?:\.\d+)?\s*(?:KB|MB|B)/)
+  }
+
+  async clickDownload(): Promise<Download> {
+    const downloadPromise = this.page.waitForEvent('download')
+    await this.downloadButton.click()
+    return downloadPromise
+  }
+
+  async waitForDownloading(timeout = 30_000) {
+    await expect(this.statusText).toContainText('Downloading', {timeout})
+  }
+
+  async waitForDecrypting(timeout = 30_000) {
+    await expect(this.statusText).toContainText('Decrypting', {timeout})
+  }
+
+  async expectProgressVisible() {
+    await expect(this.progressStage).toBeVisible()
+    await expect(this.progressCanvas).toBeVisible()
+  }
+
+  async expectInitialError(messagePattern: string | RegExp) {
+    // For malformed links - error shown in card without #dl-error stage
+    await expect(this.page.locator('.card .error')).toBeVisible()
+    await expect(this.page.locator('.card .error')).toContainText(messagePattern)
+  }
+
+  async expectRuntimeError(messagePattern: string | RegExp) {
+    // For runtime download errors - uses #dl-error stage
+    await expect(this.errorStage).toBeVisible()
+    await expect(this.errorMessage).toContainText(messagePattern)
+  }
+
+  async expectSecurityNote() {
+    await expect(this.securityNote).toBeVisible()
+    await expect(this.securityNote).toContainText('encrypted')
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### 3.3 Test Fixtures
+
+```typescript
+// test/fixtures.ts
+import {test as base} from '@playwright/test'
+import {UploadPage} from './pages/UploadPage'
+import {DownloadPage} from './pages/DownloadPage'
+import {readFileSync} from 'fs'
+
+// Extend Playwright test with page objects
+export const test = base.extend<{
+  uploadPage: UploadPage
+  downloadPage: DownloadPage
+}>({
+  uploadPage: async ({page}, use) => {
+    const uploadPage = new UploadPage(page)
+    await uploadPage.goto()
+    await use(uploadPage)
+  },
+  downloadPage: async ({page}, use) => {
+    await use(new DownloadPage(page))
+  },
+})
+
+export {expect} from '@playwright/test'
+
+// Test data helpers
+export function createTestContent(size: number, fill = 0x41): Buffer {
+  return Buffer.alloc(size, fill)
+}
+
+export function createTextContent(text: string): Buffer {
+  return Buffer.from(text, 'utf-8')
+}
+
+export function uniqueFileName(base: string, ext = 'txt'): string {
+  return `${base}-${Date.now()}.${ext}`
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## 4. Upload Flow Tests
+
+### 4.1 File Selection - File Picker Button
+
+**Test ID**: `upload-file-picker`
+
+```typescript
+test('upload via file picker button', async ({uploadPage}) => {
+  await uploadPage.expectDropZoneVisible()
+
+  await uploadPage.selectTextFile('picker-test.txt', 'test content ' + Date.now())
+  await uploadPage.waitForEncrypting()
+  await uploadPage.waitForUploading()
+
+  const link = await uploadPage.waitForShareLink()
+  expect(link).toMatch(/^http:\/\/localhost:\d+\/#/)
+})
+```
+
+### 4.2 File Selection - Drag and Drop
+
+**Test ID**: `upload-drag-drop`
+
+```typescript
+test('upload via drag and drop', async ({uploadPage}) => {
+  await uploadPage.dragDropFile('dragdrop-test.txt', createTextContent('drag drop test'))
+  await uploadPage.expectProgressVisible()
+
+  const link = await uploadPage.waitForShareLink()
+  expect(link).toContain('#')
+})
+```
+
+### 4.3 File Size Validation - Too Large
+
+**Test ID**: `upload-file-too-large`
+
+```typescript
+test('upload rejects file over 100MB', async ({uploadPage}) => {
+  await uploadPage.selectLargeFile('large.bin', 100 * 1024 * 1024 + 1)
+  await uploadPage.expectError('too large')
+  await uploadPage.expectError('100 MB')
+})
+```
+
+### 4.4 File Size Validation - Empty File
+
+**Test ID**: `upload-file-empty`
+
+```typescript
+test('upload rejects empty file', async ({uploadPage}) => {
+  await uploadPage.selectFile('empty.txt', Buffer.alloc(0))
+  await uploadPage.expectError('empty')
+})
+```
+
+### 4.5 Progress Display
+
+**Test ID**: `upload-progress-display`
+
+```typescript
+test('upload shows progress during encryption and upload', async ({uploadPage}) => {
+  await uploadPage.selectFile('progress-test.bin', createTestContent(500 * 1024))
+
+  await uploadPage.expectProgressVisible()
+  await uploadPage.waitForEncrypting()
+  await uploadPage.waitForUploading()
+  await uploadPage.waitForShareLink()
+})
+```
+
+### 4.6 Cancel Button
+
+**Test ID**: `upload-cancel`
+
+```typescript
+test('cancel button aborts upload and returns to landing', async ({uploadPage}) => {
+  await uploadPage.selectFile('cancel-test.bin', createTestContent(1024 * 1024))
+  await uploadPage.expectProgressVisible()
+
+  await uploadPage.clickCancel()
+
+  await uploadPage.expectDropZoneVisible()
+  await expect(uploadPage.shareLink).toBeHidden()
+})
+```
+
+### 4.7 Share Link Display and Copy
+
+**Test ID**: `upload-share-link-copy`
+
+```typescript
+test('share link copy button works', async ({uploadPage, context}) => {
+  await context.grantPermissions(['clipboard-read', 'clipboard-write'])
+
+  await uploadPage.selectTextFile('copy-test.txt', 'copy test content')
+  const link = await uploadPage.waitForShareLink()
+
+  await uploadPage.clickCopy()
+
+  // Verify clipboard (may fail in headless)
+  try {
+    const clipboardText = await uploadPage.page.evaluate(() => navigator.clipboard.readText())
+    expect(clipboardText).toBe(link)
+  } catch {
+    // Clipboard API may not be available
+  }
+})
+```
+
+### 4.8 Error Handling and Retry
+
+**Test ID**: `upload-error-retry`
+
+```typescript
+test('error state shows retry button', async ({uploadPage}) => {
+  await uploadPage.selectFile('error-test.txt', Buffer.alloc(0))
+  await uploadPage.expectError('empty')
+  await expect(uploadPage.retryButton).toBeVisible()
+})
+```
+
+---
+
+## 5. Download Flow Tests
+
+### 5.1 Invalid Link Handling - Malformed Hash
+
+**Test ID**: `download-invalid-hash-malformed`
+
+```typescript
+test('download shows error for malformed hash', async ({downloadPage}) => {
+  await downloadPage.goto('#not-valid-base64!!!')
+  await downloadPage.expectInitialError(/[Ii]nvalid|corrupted/)
+  await expect(downloadPage.downloadButton).not.toBeVisible()
+})
+```
+
+### 5.2 Invalid Link Handling - Valid Base64 but Invalid Structure
+
+**Test ID**: `download-invalid-hash-structure`
+
+```typescript
+test('download shows error for invalid structure', async ({downloadPage}) => {
+  await downloadPage.goto('#AAAA')
+  await downloadPage.expectInitialError(/[Ii]nvalid|corrupted/)
+})
+```
+
+### 5.3 Download Button Click
+
+**Test ID**: `download-button-click`
+
+```typescript
+test('download button initiates download', async ({uploadPage, downloadPage}) => {
+  // Upload first
+  await uploadPage.selectTextFile('dl-btn-test.txt', 'download test content')
+  const link = await uploadPage.waitForShareLink()
+
+  // Navigate to download
+  await downloadPage.gotoWithLink(link)
+  await downloadPage.expectFileReady()
+
+  // Click download
+  const download = await downloadPage.clickDownload()
+  expect(download.suggestedFilename()).toBe('dl-btn-test.txt')
+})
+```
+
+### 5.4 Progress Display
+
+**Test ID**: `download-progress-display`
+
+```typescript
+test('download shows progress', async ({uploadPage, downloadPage}) => {
+  await uploadPage.selectFile('dl-progress.bin', createTestContent(500 * 1024))
+  const link = await uploadPage.waitForShareLink()
+
+  await downloadPage.gotoWithLink(link)
+  const downloadPromise = downloadPage.clickDownload()
+
+  await downloadPage.expectProgressVisible()
+  await downloadPage.waitForDownloading()
+
+  await downloadPromise
+})
+```
+
+### 5.5 File Save Verification
+
+**Test ID**: `download-file-save`
+
+```typescript
+test('downloaded file content matches upload', async ({uploadPage, downloadPage}) => {
+  const content = 'verification content ' + Date.now()
+  const fileName = 'verify.txt'
+
+  await uploadPage.selectTextFile(fileName, content)
+  const link = await uploadPage.waitForShareLink()
+
+  await downloadPage.gotoWithLink(link)
+  const download = await downloadPage.clickDownload()
+
+  expect(download.suggestedFilename()).toBe(fileName)
+
+  const path = await download.path()
+  if (path) {
+    const downloadedContent = (await import('fs')).readFileSync(path, 'utf-8')
+    expect(downloadedContent).toBe(content)
+  }
+})
+```
+
+---
+
+## 6. Edge Cases
+
+### 6.1 Very Small Files
+
+**Test ID**: `edge-small-file`
+
+```typescript
+test('upload and download 1-byte file', async ({uploadPage, downloadPage}) => {
+  await uploadPage.selectFile('tiny.bin', Buffer.from([0x42]))
+  const link = await uploadPage.waitForShareLink()
+
+  await downloadPage.gotoWithLink(link)
+  const download = await downloadPage.clickDownload()
+
+  expect(download.suggestedFilename()).toBe('tiny.bin')
+
+  const path = await download.path()
+  if (path) {
+    const content = (await import('fs')).readFileSync(path)
+    expect(content.length).toBe(1)
+    expect(content[0]).toBe(0x42)
+  }
+})
+```
+
+### 6.2 Files Near 100MB Limit
+
+**Test ID**: `edge-near-limit`
+
+```typescript
+test.slow()
+test('upload file at exactly 100MB', async ({uploadPage}) => {
+  await uploadPage.selectLargeFile('exactly-100mb.bin', 100 * 1024 * 1024)
+
+  // Should succeed (not show error)
+  await expect(uploadPage.errorStage).toBeHidden({timeout: 5000})
+  await uploadPage.expectProgressVisible()
+
+  // Wait for completion (may take a while)
+  await uploadPage.waitForShareLink(300_000)
+})
+```
+
+### 6.3 Special Characters in Filename
+
+**Test ID**: `edge-special-chars-filename`
+
+```typescript
+test('upload and download file with unicode filename', async ({uploadPage, downloadPage}) => {
+  const fileName = 'test-\u4e2d\u6587-\u0420\u0443\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439.txt'
+
+  await uploadPage.selectTextFile(fileName, 'unicode filename test')
+  const link = await uploadPage.waitForShareLink()
+
+  await downloadPage.gotoWithLink(link)
+  const download = await downloadPage.clickDownload()
+
+  expect(download.suggestedFilename()).toBe(fileName)
+})
+
+test('upload and download file with spaces', async ({uploadPage, downloadPage}) => {
+  const fileName = 'my document (final) v2.txt'
+
+  await uploadPage.selectTextFile(fileName, 'spaces test')
+  const link = await uploadPage.waitForShareLink()
+
+  await downloadPage.gotoWithLink(link)
+  const download = await downloadPage.clickDownload()
+
+  expect(download.suggestedFilename()).toBe(fileName)
+})
+
+test('filename with path separators is sanitized', async ({uploadPage, downloadPage}) => {
+  await uploadPage.selectTextFile('../../../etc/passwd', 'path traversal test')
+  const link = await uploadPage.waitForShareLink()
+
+  await downloadPage.gotoWithLink(link)
+  const download = await downloadPage.clickDownload()
+
+  expect(download.suggestedFilename()).not.toContain('/')
+  expect(download.suggestedFilename()).not.toContain('\\')
+})
+```
+
+### 6.4 Network Errors (Mocked)
+
+**Test ID**: `edge-network-error`
+
+```typescript
+test('upload handles network error gracefully', async ({uploadPage}) => {
+  // Intercept and abort POST requests
+  await uploadPage.page.route('**/localhost:*', route => {
+    if (route.request().method() === 'POST') {
+      route.abort('failed')
+    } else {
+      route.continue()
+    }
+  })
+
+  await uploadPage.selectTextFile('network-error.txt', 'network error test')
+  await uploadPage.expectError(/.+/) // Any error message
+})
+```
+
+### 6.5 Binary File Content Integrity
+
+**Test ID**: `edge-binary-content`
+
+```typescript
+test('binary file with all byte values', async ({uploadPage, downloadPage}) => {
+  // Create buffer with all 256 byte values
+  const buffer = Buffer.alloc(256)
+  for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) buffer[i] = i
+
+  await uploadPage.selectFile('all-bytes.bin', buffer)
+  const link = await uploadPage.waitForShareLink()
+
+  await downloadPage.gotoWithLink(link)
+  const download = await downloadPage.clickDownload()
+
+  const path = await download.path()
+  if (path) {
+    const content = (await import('fs')).readFileSync(path)
+    expect(content.length).toBe(256)
+    for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+      expect(content[i]).toBe(i)
+    }
+  }
+})
+```
+
+### 6.6 Multiple Concurrent Downloads
+
+**Test ID**: `edge-concurrent-downloads`
+
+```typescript
+test('concurrent downloads from same link', async ({browser}) => {
+  const context = await browser.newContext({ignoreHTTPSErrors: true})
+  const page1 = await context.newPage()
+  const upload = new UploadPage(page1)
+
+  await upload.goto()
+  await upload.selectTextFile('concurrent.txt', 'concurrent download test')
+  const link = await upload.waitForShareLink()
+  const hash = upload.getHashFromLink(link)
+
+  // Open two tabs and download concurrently
+  const page2 = await context.newPage()
+  const page3 = await context.newPage()
+  const dl2 = new DownloadPage(page2)
+  const dl3 = new DownloadPage(page3)
+
+  await dl2.goto(hash)
+  await dl3.goto(hash)
+
+  const [download2, download3] = await Promise.all([
+    dl2.clickDownload(),
+    dl3.clickDownload()
+  ])
+
+  expect(download2.suggestedFilename()).toBe('concurrent.txt')
+  expect(download3.suggestedFilename()).toBe('concurrent.txt')
+
+  await context.close()
+})
+```
+
+### 6.7 Redirect File Handling (Multi-chunk)
+
+**Test ID**: `edge-redirect-file`
+
+```typescript
+test.slow()
+test('upload and download multi-chunk file with redirect', async ({uploadPage, downloadPage}) => {
+  // Use ~5MB file to get multiple chunks
+  await uploadPage.selectLargeFile('multi-chunk.bin', 5 * 1024 * 1024)
+  const link = await uploadPage.waitForShareLink(120_000)
+
+  await downloadPage.gotoWithLink(link)
+  const download = await downloadPage.clickDownload()
+
+  expect(download.suggestedFilename()).toBe('multi-chunk.bin')
+
+  const path = await download.path()
+  if (path) {
+    const stat = (await import('fs')).statSync(path)
+    expect(stat.size).toBe(5 * 1024 * 1024)
+  }
+})
+```
+
+### 6.8 UI Information Display
+
+**Test ID**: `edge-ui-info`
+
+```typescript
+test('upload complete shows expiry and security note', async ({uploadPage}) => {
+  await uploadPage.selectTextFile('ui-test.txt', 'ui test')
+  await uploadPage.waitForShareLink()
+
+  await uploadPage.expectCompleteWithExpiry()
+  await uploadPage.expectSecurityNote()
+})
+
+test('download page shows file size and security note', async ({uploadPage, downloadPage}) => {
+  await uploadPage.selectFile('size-test.bin', createTestContent(1024))
+  const link = await uploadPage.waitForShareLink()
+
+  await downloadPage.gotoWithLink(link)
+  await downloadPage.expectFileSizeDisplayed()
+  await downloadPage.expectSecurityNote()
+})
+```
+
+---
+
+## 7. Implementation Order
+
+### Phase 1: Core Infrastructure (Priority: High)
+1. Create `test/pages/UploadPage.ts` with Page Object
+2. Create `test/pages/DownloadPage.ts` with Page Object
+3. Create `test/fixtures.ts` with extended test function
+4. Refactor existing test to use Page Objects
+
+### Phase 2: Core Happy Path (Priority: High)
+5. `upload-file-picker` - Basic upload via file picker
+6. `download-button-click` - Basic download
+7. `download-file-save` - Content verification
+
+### Phase 3: Validation (Priority: High)
+8. `upload-file-too-large` - Size validation
+9. `upload-file-empty` - Empty file validation
+10. `download-invalid-hash-malformed` - Invalid link handling
+11. `download-invalid-hash-structure` - Invalid structure handling
+
+### Phase 4: Progress and Cancel (Priority: Medium)
+12. `upload-progress-display` - Progress visibility
+13. `upload-cancel` - Cancel functionality
+14. `download-progress-display` - Download progress
+
+### Phase 5: Link Sharing (Priority: Medium)
+15. `upload-share-link-copy` - Copy button functionality
+16. `upload-drag-drop` - Drag-drop upload
+
+### Phase 6: Edge Cases (Priority: Low)
+17. `edge-small-file` - 1-byte file
+18. `edge-special-chars-filename` - Unicode/special characters
+19. `edge-binary-content` - Binary content integrity
+20. `edge-near-limit` - 100MB file (slow test)
+21. `edge-network-error` - Network error handling
+
+### Phase 7: Error Recovery and Advanced (Priority: Low)
+22. `upload-error-retry` - Retry after error
+23. `edge-concurrent-downloads` - Concurrent access
+24. `edge-redirect-file` - Multi-chunk file with redirect (slow)
+25. `edge-ui-info` - Expiry message, security notes
+
+---
+
+## 8. Test Utilities
+
+### 8.1 Shared Test Setup
+
+```typescript
+// test/page.spec.ts
+import {test, expect, createTestContent, createTextContent, uniqueFileName} from './fixtures'
+
+test.describe('Upload Flow', () => {
+  test('upload via file picker', async ({uploadPage}) => {
+    // Tests use uploadPage fixture which navigates automatically
+  })
+})
+
+test.describe('Download Flow', () => {
+  test('download works', async ({uploadPage, downloadPage}) => {
+    // Both pages available via fixtures
+  })
+})
+
+test.describe('Edge Cases', () => {
+  // Edge case tests
+})
+```
+
+### 8.2 File Structure
+
+```
+xftp-web/test/
+├── fixtures.ts           # Playwright fixtures with page objects
+├── pages/
+│   ├── UploadPage.ts     # Upload page object
+│   └── DownloadPage.ts   # Download page object
+├── page.spec.ts          # All E2E tests
+└── globalSetup.ts        # Server startup (existing)
+```
+
+---
+
+## Appendix: Test Matrix
+
+| Test ID | Category | Priority | Estimated Time | Dependencies |
+|---------|----------|----------|----------------|--------------|
+| upload-file-picker | Upload | High | 30s | - |
+| upload-drag-drop | Upload | Medium | 30s | - |
+| upload-file-too-large | Upload | High | 5s | - |
+| upload-file-empty | Upload | High | 5s | - |
+| upload-progress-display | Upload | Medium | 45s | - |
+| upload-cancel | Upload | Medium | 30s | - |
+| upload-share-link-copy | Upload | Medium | 30s | - |
+| upload-error-retry | Upload | Low | 30s | - |
+| download-invalid-hash-malformed | Download | High | 5s | - |
+| download-invalid-hash-structure | Download | High | 5s | - |
+| download-button-click | Download | High | 45s | upload |
+| download-progress-display | Download | Medium | 60s | upload |
+| download-file-save | Download | High | 45s | upload |
+| edge-small-file | Edge | Low | 30s | - |
+| edge-near-limit | Edge | Low | 300s | - |
+| edge-special-chars-filename | Edge | Low | 30s | - |
+| edge-network-error | Edge | Low | 45s | - |
+| edge-binary-content | Edge | Low | 30s | - |
+| edge-concurrent-downloads | Edge | Low | 60s | upload |
+| edge-redirect-file | Edge | Low | 120s | - |
+| edge-ui-info | Edge | Low | 60s | upload |
+
+**Total estimated time**: ~18 minutes (excluding 100MB and 5MB tests)

rfcs/2026-01-30-send-file-page/2026-02-08-xftp-web-hello-header.md

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+# XFTP Web Hello Header — Session Re-handshake for Browser Connection Reuse
+
+## 1. Problem Statement
+
+Browser HTTP/2 connection pooling reuses TLS connections across page navigations (same origin = same connection pool). The XFTP server maintains per-TLS-connection session state in `TMap SessionId Handshake` keyed by `tlsUniq tls`. When a browser navigates from the upload page to the download page (or reloads), the new page sends a fresh ClientHello on the reused HTTP/2 connection. The server is already in `HandshakeAccepted` state for that connection, so it routes the request to `processRequest`, which expects a 16384-byte command block but receives a 34-byte ClientHello → `ERR BLOCK`.
+
+**Root cause**: The server cannot distinguish a ClientHello from a command on an already-handshaked connection because both arrive on the same HTTP/2 connection (same `tlsUniq`), and there is no content-level discriminator (ClientHello is unpadded, but the server never gets to parse it — the size check in `processRequest` rejects it first).
+
+**Browser limitation**: `fetch()` provides zero control over HTTP/2 connection pooling. There is no browser API to force a new connection or detect connection reuse before a request is sent.
+
+## 2. Solution Summary
+
+Add an HTTP header `xftp-web-hello` to web ClientHello requests. When the server sees this header on an already-handshaked connection (`HandshakeAccepted` state), it re-runs `processHello` **reusing the existing session keys** (same X25519 key pair from the original handshake). The client then completes the normal handshake flow (sends ClientHandshake, receives ack) and proceeds with commands.
+
+Key properties:
+- Server reuses existing `serverPrivKey` — no new key material generated on re-handshake, so `thAuth` remains consistent with any in-flight commands on concurrent HTTP/2 streams.
+- Header is only checked when `sniUsed` is true (web/browser connections). Native XFTP clients are unaffected.
+- CORS preflight already allows all headers (`Access-Control-Allow-Headers: *`).
+- Web clients always send this header on ClientHello — it's harmless on first connection (`Nothing` state) and enables re-handshake on reused connections (`HandshakeAccepted` state).
+
+## 3. Detailed Technical Design
+
+### 3.1 Server change: parameterize `processHello` (`src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs`)
+
+The entire server change is parameterizing the existing `processHello` with `Maybe C.PrivateKeyX25519`. Zero new functions.
+
+#### Current code (lines 165-191):
+
+```haskell
+xftpServerHandshakeV1 chain serverSignKey sessions
+  XFTPTransportRequest {thParams = thParams0@THandleParams {sessionId}, reqBody = HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sendResponse, sniUsed, addCORS} = do
+    s <- atomically $ TM.lookup sessionId sessions
+    r <- runExceptT $ case s of
+      Nothing -> processHello
+      Just (HandshakeSent pk) -> processClientHandshake pk
+      Just (HandshakeAccepted thParams) -> pure $ Just thParams
+    either sendError pure r
+    where
+      processHello = do
+        challenge_ <-
+          if
+            | B.null bodyHead -> pure Nothing
+            | sniUsed -> do
+                XFTPClientHello {webChallenge} <- liftHS $ smpDecode bodyHead
+                pure webChallenge
+            | otherwise -> throwE HANDSHAKE
+        (k, pk) <- atomically . C.generateKeyPair =<< asks random
+        atomically $ TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeSent pk) sessions
+        -- ...build and send ServerHandshake...
+        pure Nothing
+```
+
+#### After (diff is ~10 lines):
+
+```haskell
+xftpServerHandshakeV1 chain serverSignKey sessions
+  XFTPTransportRequest {thParams = thParams0@THandleParams {sessionId}, request, reqBody = HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sendResponse, sniUsed, addCORS} = do
+--                                                                      ^^^^^^^ bind request
+    s <- atomically $ TM.lookup sessionId sessions
+    r <- runExceptT $ case s of
+      Nothing -> processHello Nothing
+      Just (HandshakeSent pk) -> processClientHandshake pk
+      Just (HandshakeAccepted thParams)
+        | webHello -> processHello (serverPrivKey <$> thAuth thParams)
+        | otherwise -> pure $ Just thParams
+    either sendError pure r
+    where
+      webHello = sniUsed && any (\(t, _) -> tokenKey t == "xftp-web-hello") (fst $ H.requestHeaders request)
+      processHello pk_ = do
+        challenge_ <-
+          if
+            | B.null bodyHead -> pure Nothing
+            | sniUsed -> do
+                XFTPClientHello {webChallenge} <- liftHS $ smpDecode bodyHead
+                pure webChallenge
+            | otherwise -> throwE HANDSHAKE
+        (k, pk) <- maybe
+          (atomically . C.generateKeyPair =<< asks random)
+          (\pk -> pure (C.publicKey pk, pk))
+          pk_
+        atomically $ TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeSent pk) sessions
+        -- ...rest unchanged...
+        pure Nothing
+```
+
+#### What changes:
+
+1. **Bind `request`** in the `XFTPTransportRequest` pattern (+1 field)
+2. **Add `webHello`** binding in `where` clause (1 line) — checks header only when `sniUsed`
+3. **Add `pk_` parameter** to `processHello` (change signature)
+4. **Replace key generation** with `maybe` that generates fresh keys when `pk_ = Nothing`, or derives public from existing private when `pk_ = Just pk` (3 lines replace 1 line)
+5. **Add guard** in `HandshakeAccepted` branch (2 lines replace 1 line)
+6. **Call site** `Nothing -> processHello Nothing` (+1 word)
+7. **One import** added: `Network.HPACK.Token (tokenKey)`
+
+#### Imports to add:
+
+```haskell
+import Network.HPACK.Token (tokenKey)
+```
+
+`OverloadedStrings` (already enabled in Server.hs) provides the `IsString` instance for `CI ByteString`, so `tokenKey t == "xftp-web-hello"` works without importing `Data.CaseInsensitive`. Verified on Hackage: `requestHeaders :: Request -> HeaderTable`, `tokenKey :: Token -> CI ByteString`.
+
+### 3.2 Re-handshake flow
+
+When `webHello` is true in `HandshakeAccepted` state:
+
+1. `processHello (serverPrivKey <$> thAuth thParams)` is called with `Just pk` (existing private key)
+2. `(k, pk) <- pure (C.publicKey pk, pk)` — reuses same key pair, no generation
+3. `TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeSent pk) sessions` — transitions state back to `HandshakeSent` with same `pk`
+4. Server sends `ServerHandshake` response (same format as initial handshake)
+5. Client sends `ClientHandshake` on next stream → enters `Just (HandshakeSent pk) -> processClientHandshake pk` → normal flow
+6. `processClientHandshake` stores `HandshakeAccepted thParams` with same `serverPrivKey = pk`
+
+### 3.3 Web client change (`xftp-web/src/client.ts`)
+
+Add optional `headers?` parameter to `Transport.post()`, thread it through `fetch()` and `session.request()`, and pass `{"xftp-web-hello": "1"}` in the ClientHello call in `connectXFTP`.
+
+### 3.4 What does NOT change
+
+- **CORS**: Already has `Access-Control-Allow-Headers: *` (Server.hs:106).
+- **Native Haskell client**: Uses `[]` headers. No header = existing behavior.
+- **Protocol wire format**: ClientHello, ServerHandshake, ClientHandshake, commands — all unchanged.
+- **`processRequest`**, **`processClientHandshake`**, **`sendError`**, **`encodeXftp`** — unchanged.
+
+### 3.5 Haskell test (`tests/XFTPServerTests.hs`)
+
+Add `testWebReHandshake` next to the existing `testWebHandshake` (line 504). It reuses the same SNI + HTTP/2 setup pattern, performs a full handshake, then sends a second ClientHello with the `xftp-web-hello` header on the same connection and verifies the server responds with a valid ServerHandshake (same `sessionId`), then completes the second handshake.
+
+```haskell
+-- Register in xftpServerTests (after line 86):
+it "should re-handshake on same connection with xftp-web-hello header" testWebReHandshake
+
+-- Test (after testWebHandshake):
+testWebReHandshake :: Expectation
+testWebReHandshake =
+  withXFTPServerSNI $ \_ -> do
+    Fingerprint fp <- loadFileFingerprint "tests/fixtures/ca.crt"
+    let keyHash = C.KeyHash fp
+        cfg = defaultTransportClientConfig {clientALPN = Just ["h2"], useSNI = True}
+    runTLSTransportClient defaultSupportedParamsHTTPS Nothing cfg Nothing "localhost" xftpTestPort (Just keyHash) $ \(tls :: TLS 'TClient) -> do
+      let h2cfg = HC.defaultHTTP2ClientConfig {HC.bodyHeadSize = 65536}
+      h2 <- either (error . show) pure =<< HC.attachHTTP2Client h2cfg (THDomainName "localhost") xftpTestPort mempty 65536 tls
+      g <- C.newRandom
+      -- First handshake (same as testWebHandshake)
+      challenge1 <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 32 g
+      let helloReq1 = H2.requestBuilder "POST" "/" [] $ byteString (smpEncode (XFTPClientHello {webChallenge = Just challenge1}))
+      resp1 <- either (error . show) pure =<< HC.sendRequest h2 helloReq1 (Just 5000000)
+      shs1 <- either error pure $ smpDecode =<< C.unPad (bodyHead (HC.respBody resp1))
+      let XFTPServerHandshake {sessionId = sid1} = shs1
+      clientHsPadded <- either (error . show) pure $ C.pad (smpEncode (XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = VersionXFTP 1, keyHash})) xftpBlockSize
+      resp1b <- either (error . show) pure =<< HC.sendRequest h2 (H2.requestBuilder "POST" "/" [] $ byteString clientHsPadded) (Just 5000000)
+      B.length (bodyHead (HC.respBody resp1b)) `shouldBe` 0
+      -- Second handshake on same connection with xftp-web-hello header
+      challenge2 <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 32 g
+      let helloReq2 = H2.requestBuilder "POST" "/" [("xftp-web-hello", "1")] $ byteString (smpEncode (XFTPClientHello {webChallenge = Just challenge2}))
+      resp2 <- either (error . show) pure =<< HC.sendRequest h2 helloReq2 (Just 5000000)
+      shs2 <- either error pure $ smpDecode =<< C.unPad (bodyHead (HC.respBody resp2))
+      let XFTPServerHandshake {sessionId = sid2} = shs2
+      sid2 `shouldBe` sid1  -- same TLS connection → same sessionId
+      -- Complete second handshake
+      resp2b <- either (error . show) pure =<< HC.sendRequest h2 (H2.requestBuilder "POST" "/" [] $ byteString clientHsPadded) (Just 5000000)
+      B.length (bodyHead (HC.respBody resp2b)) `shouldBe` 0
+```
+
+The only difference from `testWebHandshake`: the second `helloReq2` passes `[("xftp-web-hello", "1")]` instead of `[]`. The test verifies:
+1. Server responds with `ServerHandshake` (not `ERR BLOCK`)
+2. Same `sessionId` (same TLS connection)
+3. Second `ClientHandshake` completes with empty ACK
+
+## 4. Implementation Plan
+
+### Step 1: Server — parameterize `processHello`
+
+Apply the diff from Section 3.1 to `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs`.
+
+### Step 2: Test — add `testWebReHandshake`
+
+Add the test from Section 3.5 to `tests/XFTPServerTests.hs`.
+
+### Step 3: Client — add `xftp-web-hello` header
+
+Add optional `headers?` to `Transport.post()`, pass `{"xftp-web-hello": "1"}` on ClientHello in `connectXFTP`.
+
+### Step 4: Test
+
+Run Haskell tests (`cabal test`) and E2E Playwright tests (`npx playwright test` in `xftp-web/`).
+
+## 5. Race Condition Analysis
+
+### Single-tab navigation (the common case)
+
+1. Upload page completes, all fetch() requests finish
+2. Browser navigates to download page (or reloads)
+3. All upload-page fetches are aborted on page unload
+4. Download page sends ClientHello with `xftp-web-hello` header
+5. Server is in `HandshakeAccepted` → `processHello (Just pk)` → `HandshakeSent pk` (same key)
+6. No concurrent streams → no race
+
+**Safe.**
+
+### Multi-tab (edge case)
+
+Tab A (upload) and Tab B (download) share the same HTTP/2 connection.
+
+1. Tab A has active command streams (e.g., FPUT upload in progress)
+2. Tab B sends ClientHello with header
+3. Server reads `HandshakeAccepted` atomically for both streams
+4. Tab A's stream already has its `thParams` snapshot → proceeds with `processRequest` using old `thParams`
+5. Tab B's stream triggers `processHello (Just pk)` → stores `HandshakeSent pk` (same pk!)
+6. Tab A's in-progress FPUT continues with snapshot `thParams` → completes normally (same `serverPrivKey`)
+7. Tab A's NEXT command reads `HandshakeSent` from TMap → enters `processClientHandshake` → fails (command body ≠ ClientHandshake format) → HANDSHAKE error
+
+**Tab A's in-flight commands succeed. Tab A's subsequent commands fail with HANDSHAKE error.** This is the inherent multi-tab problem — unavoidable with per-connection session state and HTTP/2 connection sharing. The failure is clean (HANDSHAKE error, not silent corruption).
+
+## 6. Security Considerations
+
+- **No new key material**: Re-handshake reuses existing `serverPrivKey`. No opportunity for key confusion or downgrade.
+- **Identity re-verification**: Server re-signs the web challenge with its long-term signing key. Client verifies identity again.
+- **Header cannot escalate privileges**: The header only triggers re-handshake (which the server was already capable of doing on first connection). It does not bypass any authentication.
+- **Timing**: Re-handshake takes the same code path as initial handshake, so timing side-channels are unchanged.

rfcs/2026-01-30-send-file-page/2026-02-11-xftp-web-error-handling.md

@@ -0,0 +1,948 @@
+# XFTP Web Error Handling and Connection Resilience
+
+## 1. Problem Statement
+
+The XFTP web client is fundamentally fragile: any transient error (browser opening a new HTTP/2 connection, network hiccup, server restart) causes an unrecoverable failure with a cryptic error message. There is no retry logic, no fetch timeout, no error categorization, and the upload uses a single server instead of distributing chunks across preset servers. This makes the app frustrating — it works most of the time but fails unpredictably, which is worse than being completely broken.
+
+### Confirmed root cause (from diagnostic logs)
+
+When the browser opens a new HTTP/2 connection mid-operation, the new connection has a different TLS SessionId with no handshake state in the server's `TMap SessionId Handshake`. The server's `Nothing` branch in `xftpServerHandshakeV1` (Server.hs:169) unconditionally calls `processHello`, which tries to decode the command body as `XFTPClientHello`, fails, and sends a raw padded "HANDSHAKE" error string. The client cannot parse this as a proper transmission (first byte 'H' = 72 is read as batch count), producing `"expected batch count 1, got 72"`.
+
+Server log confirming the SessionId change:
+```
+DEBUG dispatch: Accepted+command sessId="ZSo1GGETgIvjbB7CWHbvGPpbMjx_b2IlC1eTI6aKfqc="
+...20 successful commands...
+DEBUG dispatch: Nothing sessId="mJC7Sck9xxW5UsXoPGoUWduuHghSVgf6CnD6ZC6SBhU=" webHello=False
+```
+
+### Why re-handshake is required (cannot be made optional)
+
+1. **SessionId is baked into signed command data.** `encodeAuthTransmission` signs `concat(encode(sessionId), tInner)` with Ed25519. Server's `tDecodeServer` (Protocol.hs:2242) verifies `sessId == sessionId`. New connection = different sessionId = signature mismatch.
+2. **Server generates per-session DH keys.** `processHello` creates fresh X25519 keypair stored in `HandshakeSent`. For SMP browser clients (future), `verifyCmdAuth` (Protocol.hs:1322) requires the matching `serverPrivKey` from `thAuth`.
+3. **This applies to both XFTP and future SMP browser clients** — the session management approach is the same.
+
+### Why multiple preset servers cannot work
+
+Upload (`agent.ts:105-157`) takes a single `server: XFTPServer` parameter and uploads ALL chunks to it. `web/upload.ts:133` calls `pickRandomServer(servers)` which selects ONE random server from all presets. The multi-server preset configuration is pointless — only one server is ever used per upload. The design intent (RFC section 11.6: "upload in parallel to 8 randomly selected servers") is not implemented. This must be fixed in Phase 2 (section 3.7).
+
+## 2. Solution Summary
+
+### Phase 1: Error handling and connection resilience
+
+1. **Server: strict dispatch for allowed protocol combinations** — reject all invalid combinations
+2. **Client: automatic retry with re-handshake** on SESSION/HANDSHAKE errors
+3. **Client: fetch timeout** with configurable duration
+4. **UI: error categorization and retry** — auto-retry temporary, human-readable permanent
+5. **Client: connection state with Promise-based lock and per-server queues** — `ServerConnection` with `client: Promise<XFTPClient>` + `queue: Promise<void>`
+6. **Client: fix cache key** — include keyHash
+
+### Phase 2: Multi-server upload (after Phase 1)
+
+7. **Multi-server upload with server selection and failover** — distribute chunks across servers, retry FNEW on different server if one fails
+
+## 3. Detailed Technical Design
+
+### 3.1 Server: strict dispatch for allowed protocol combinations
+
+**Principle:** Everything not explicitly done by existing Haskell/TS clients is prohibited. It is better to fail on impossible combinations than to be permissive — permissiveness complicates debugging and creates attack vectors via unexpected behaviors.
+
+**Allowed behaviors by client type:**
+
+| Client | SNI | webHello header | Hello body | When |
+|--------|-----|----------------|------------|------|
+| Haskell | No | No | Empty | New connection only |
+| Web | Yes | Yes | Non-empty (XFTPClientHello) | New OR existing connection |
+
+**Minimal surgical change.** The existing dispatch (Server.hs:169-189) already correctly handles `HandshakeSent` and `HandshakeAccepted` — their guards cover all valid and invalid combinations. The ONLY missing case is `Nothing` + web client sending a command on a stale session.
+
+`processHello` (Server.hs:194-217) already internally routes: `B.null bodyHead` → Haskell hello, `sniUsed` → web hello decode, else → HANDSHAKE. For stale web sessions, it currently tries to decode a command body as `XFTPClientHello`, fails, and throws HANDSHAKE. The fix: detect this case BEFORE calling processHello and throw SESSION instead, so the client knows to re-handshake (not that its hello was malformed).
+
+**Change: add one guard to `Nothing` branch, remove debug logging.**
+
+```haskell
+-- Before (1 line):
+Nothing -> processHello Nothing
+
+-- After (3 lines):
+Nothing
+  | sniUsed && not webHello -> throwE SESSION  -- web command on stale session
+  | otherwise -> processHello Nothing          -- normal hello (web or Haskell)
+```
+
+`throwE SESSION` is caught by `either sendError pure r` (line 190). `sendError` pads `smpEncode SESSION` = `"SESSION"` (Transport.hs:298) to `xftpBlockSize`. The client's padded error detection (section 3.2) catches this as a retriable error and triggers re-handshake. SESSION is a valid `XFTPErrorType` constructor (Transport.hs:225) — no new helpers needed.
+
+**All other branches remain unchanged.** `HandshakeSent` guards (`webHello` → processHello, `otherwise` → processClientHandshake with body size check inside) are correct. `HandshakeAccepted` guards (`webHello`, `webHandshake`, `otherwise` → command) are correct.
+
+### 3.2 Client: automatic retry with re-handshake
+
+**Location:** `sendXFTPCommand` in `client.ts`
+
+**Design:** Retry loop inside `sendXFTPCommand`. Maximum 3 attempts. On retriable error, close old client, re-handshake, retry.
+
+**Error classification:**
+
+| Error | Type | Retriable? | Human-readable message |
+|-------|------|-----------|----------------------|
+| Padded "HANDSHAKE" | Temporary | Yes (auto) | "Connection interrupted, reconnecting..." |
+| Padded "SESSION" | Temporary | Yes (auto) | "Session expired, reconnecting..." |
+| `FRErr SESSION` | Temporary | Yes (auto) | "Session expired, reconnecting..." |
+| `FRErr HANDSHAKE` | Temporary | Yes (auto) | "Connection interrupted, reconnecting..." |
+| `fetch()` TypeError | Temporary | Yes (auto) | "Network error, retrying..." |
+| AbortError (timeout) | Temporary | Yes (auto) | "Server timeout, retrying..." |
+| `FRErr AUTH` | Permanent | No | "File is invalid, expired, or has been removed" |
+| `FRErr NO_FILE` | Permanent | No | "File not found — it may have expired" |
+| `FRErr SIZE` | Permanent | No | "File size exceeds server limit" |
+| `FRErr QUOTA` | Permanent | No | "Server storage quota exceeded" |
+| `FRErr BLOCKED` | Permanent | No | "File has been blocked by server" |
+| `FRErr DIGEST` | Permanent | No | "File integrity check failed" |
+| `FRErr INTERNAL` | Permanent | No | "Server internal error" |
+| `CMD *` | Permanent | No | "Protocol error" |
+
+**Retry behavior:**
+- Auto-retry up to 3 times for temporary errors, transparent to user
+- After 3 failures: show human-readable error with diagnosis, offer manual retry button
+- Permanent errors: show human-readable error immediately, NO manual retry button (user can reload page)
+
+**Implementation:**
+
+```typescript
+async function sendXFTPCommand(
+  agent: XFTPClientAgent,
+  server: XFTPServer,
+  privateKey: Uint8Array,
+  entityId: Uint8Array,
+  cmdBytes: Uint8Array,
+  chunkData?: Uint8Array,
+  maxRetries: number = 3
+): Promise<{response: FileResponse, body: Uint8Array}> {
+  let clientP = getXFTPServerClient(agent, server)
+  let client = await clientP
+  for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= maxRetries; attempt++) {
+    try {
+      return await sendXFTPCommandOnce(client, privateKey, entityId, cmdBytes, chunkData)
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (!isRetriable(e)) {
+        // Permanent error (AUTH, NO_FILE, etc.) — connection is fine, don't touch it
+        throw categorizeError(e)
+      }
+      if (attempt === maxRetries) {
+        // Retriable error exhausted — connection is bad, remove stale promise
+        removeStaleConnection(agent, server, clientP)
+        throw categorizeError(e)
+      }
+      clientP = reconnectClient(agent, server)
+      client = await clientP
+    }
+  }
+  throw new Error("unreachable")
+}
+```
+
+**`sendXFTPCommandOnce`** — renamed from current `sendXFTPCommand`. Two changes:
+
+1. **Padded error detection** (before `decodeTransmission`):
+
+```typescript
+// After getting respBlock, before decodeTransmission:
+const raw = blockUnpad(respBlock)
+if (raw.length < 20) {
+  const text = new TextDecoder().decode(raw)
+  if (/^[A-Z_]+$/.test(text)) {
+    throw new XFTPRetriableError(text)  // "HANDSHAKE" or "SESSION"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+2. **FRErr classification** (replaces current unconditional throw):
+
+```typescript
+// After decodeResponse, instead of throw new Error("Server error: " + err.type):
+if (response.type === "FRErr") {
+  const err = response.err
+  if (err.type === "SESSION" || err.type === "HANDSHAKE") {
+    throw new XFTPRetriableError(err.type)
+  }
+  throw new XFTPPermanentError(err.type, humanReadableMessage(err))
+}
+```
+
+### 3.3 Client: fetch timeout
+
+**Location:** `createBrowserTransport` and `createNodeTransport` in `client.ts`
+
+**Design:** `AbortController` with configurable timeout on every `fetch()`.
+
+```typescript
+interface TransportConfig {
+  timeoutMs: number  // default 30000, lower for tests
+}
+
+function createBrowserTransport(baseUrl: string, config: TransportConfig): Transport {
+  return {
+    async post(body: Uint8Array, headers?: Record<string, string>): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+      const controller = new AbortController()
+      const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), config.timeoutMs)
+      try {
+        const resp = await fetch(effectiveUrl, {
+          method: "POST", headers, body,
+          signal: controller.signal
+        })
+        if (!resp.ok) throw new Error(`Server request failed: ${resp.status}`)
+        return new Uint8Array(await resp.arrayBuffer())
+      } finally {
+        clearTimeout(timer)
+      }
+    },
+    close() {}
+  }
+}
+```
+
+For Node.js transport, use `setTimeout` on the HTTP/2 request stream.
+
+Default: 30s for production, 5s for tests. Threaded through `connectXFTP` → `createTransport`.
+
+### 3.4 UI: error categorization and retry
+
+**Behavior (Option D):**
+
+- **Temporary errors:** Auto-retry loop (3 attempts). After 3 failures, show human-readable diagnosis with manual retry button. Diagnosis examples: "Server timeout — the server may be temporarily unavailable", "Connection interrupted — your network may be unstable".
+- **Permanent errors:** Show human-readable error immediately, NO retry button. User can reload page if they want to retry. Examples: "File is invalid, expired, or has been removed" (AUTH), "File not found" (NO_FILE).
+
+**Current UI retry buttons:**
+- `upload.ts:73-75` — retry calls `startUpload(pendingFile)` from scratch
+- `download.ts:60` — retry calls `startDownload()` from scratch
+
+**Improvement:** Track uploaded/downloaded chunk indices. On manual retry, skip completed chunks:
+
+```typescript
+// Upload: track which chunks completed
+const completedChunks: Set<number> = new Set()
+for (let i = 0; i < specs.length; i++) {
+  if (completedChunks.has(i)) continue
+  // ... create + upload chunk
+  completedChunks.add(i)
+}
+
+// Download: already naturally resumable — each chunk is independent
+```
+
+### 3.5 Client: connection state with Promise-based lock and per-server queues
+
+**Design:** Each server gets a `ServerConnection` record containing a `Promise<XFTPClient>` (the connection lock) and a `Promise<void>` (the sequential command queue). The `XFTPClientAgent` maps server keys to these records.
+
+The promise IS the lock — every consumer awaits the same promise. When reconnect is needed, the promise is replaced atomically.
+
+```typescript
+interface ServerConnection {
+  client: Promise<XFTPClient>   // resolves to connected client; replaced on reconnect
+  queue: Promise<void>          // tail of sequential command chain
+}
+
+interface XFTPClientAgent {
+  connections: Map<string, ServerConnection>
+}
+
+function newXFTPAgent(): XFTPClientAgent {
+  return {connections: new Map()}
+}
+```
+
+**Connection lifecycle — `getXFTPServerClient` and `reconnectClient`:**
+
+```typescript
+function getXFTPServerClient(agent: XFTPClientAgent, server: XFTPServer): Promise<XFTPClient> {
+  const key = formatXFTPServer(server)
+  let conn = agent.connections.get(key)
+  if (!conn) {
+    const p = connectXFTP(server)
+    conn = {client: p, queue: Promise.resolve()}
+    agent.connections.set(key, conn)
+    // On connection failure, remove from map so next call retries
+    p.catch(() => {
+      const cur = agent.connections.get(key)
+      if (cur && cur.client === p) agent.connections.delete(key)
+    })
+  }
+  return conn.client
+}
+
+function reconnectClient(agent: XFTPClientAgent, server: XFTPServer): Promise<XFTPClient> {
+  const key = formatXFTPServer(server)
+  const old = agent.connections.get(key)
+  // Close old client (fire-and-forget)
+  old?.client.then(c => c.transport.close(), () => {})
+  // Replace with new connection promise — all concurrent callers will await this
+  // Queue survives reconnect — pending operations stay ordered
+  const p = connectXFTP(server)
+  const conn: ServerConnection = {client: p, queue: old?.queue ?? Promise.resolve()}
+  agent.connections.set(key, conn)
+  p.catch(() => {
+    const cur = agent.connections.get(key)
+    if (cur && cur.client === p) agent.connections.delete(key)
+  })
+  return p
+}
+
+function closeXFTPServerClient(agent: XFTPClientAgent, server: XFTPServer): void {
+  const key = formatXFTPServer(server)
+  const conn = agent.connections.get(key)
+  if (conn) {
+    agent.connections.delete(key)
+    conn.client.then(c => c.transport.close(), () => {})
+  }
+}
+
+function closeXFTPAgent(agent: XFTPClientAgent): void {
+  for (const conn of agent.connections.values()) {
+    conn.client.then(c => c.transport.close(), () => {})
+  }
+  agent.connections.clear()
+}
+```
+
+**Precise semantics:**
+
+1. `getXFTPServerClient(agent, server)` — returns existing `conn.client` promise if present, otherwise creates a new `ServerConnection` with fresh connection and empty queue
+2. When error detected, first caller calls `reconnectClient` which replaces `conn.client` with a new connection promise. The queue is preserved across reconnect.
+3. All concurrent callers awaiting the OLD promise receive the error
+4. They then call `getXFTPServerClient` which returns the NEW promise
+5. If reconnection fails, auto-cleanup (`p.catch(() => delete)`) removes the entry so the next caller starts fresh
+
+**Stale error cleanup rule:** When a caller exhausts retries for a retriable error, it removes the failed entry from the map (only if no concurrent caller has already replaced it via `reconnectClient`). This prevents the next caller from receiving a stale rejected promise. Permanent errors (AUTH, NO_FILE, etc.) do NOT remove the connection — the transport is fine, only the command failed.
+
+```typescript
+function removeStaleConnection(
+  agent: XFTPClientAgent, server: XFTPServer, failedP: Promise<XFTPClient>
+): void {
+  const key = formatXFTPServer(server)
+  const conn = agent.connections.get(key)
+  // Only remove if current promise is the one that failed — not if already replaced by reconnect
+  if (conn && conn.client === failedP) {
+    agent.connections.delete(key)
+    failedP.then(c => c.transport.close(), () => {})
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**Per-server sequential queue:** `queue` is a `Promise<void>` — the tail of the sequential operation chain. Each new operation `.then()`s onto it. It's `void` because callers hold their own typed promises; the queue only tracks completion order:
+
+```typescript
+async function enqueueCommand<T>(
+  agent: XFTPClientAgent,
+  server: XFTPServer,
+  fn: () => Promise<T>   // no client param — fn uses command wrappers (agent+server)
+): Promise<T> {
+  const key = formatXFTPServer(server)
+  // Ensure connection exists (with auto-cleanup on failure)
+  await getXFTPServerClient(agent, server)
+  const conn = agent.connections.get(key)!  // guaranteed to exist after getXFTPServerClient
+  // Chain onto the queue — fn runs after previous operation completes
+  let resolve_: (v: T) => void, reject_: (e: any) => void
+  const result = new Promise<T>((res, rej) => { resolve_ = res; reject_ = rej })
+  conn.queue = conn.queue.then(
+    () => fn().then(resolve_!, reject_!),
+    () => fn().then(resolve_!, reject_!)
+  ).then(() => {}, () => {})  // swallow errors in the chain
+  return result
+}
+```
+
+Commands to the same server execute one at a time via the queue. Commands to different servers execute concurrently because each has its own queue. `enqueueCommand` provides sequencing; `sendXFTPCommand` (called inside `fn` via command wrappers) provides retry. They compose as: `enqueueCommand` sequences calls to wrappers that internally use `sendXFTPCommand`.
+
+**Download change:** Group chunks by server, process each server's chunks sequentially, servers in parallel. Uses `for` loop for per-server sequencing (same pattern as Stage 2 upload). `enqueueCommand` is available for cases where different callers target the same server.
+
+```typescript
+const byServer = new Map<string, FileChunk[]>()
+for (const chunk of resolvedFd.chunks) {
+  const srv = chunk.replicas[0]?.server ?? ""
+  if (!byServer.has(srv)) byServer.set(srv, [])
+  byServer.get(srv)!.push(chunk)
+}
+await Promise.all([...byServer.entries()].map(async ([srv, chunks]) => {
+  const server = parseXFTPServer(srv)
+  for (const chunk of chunks) {
+    const seed = decodePrivKeyEd25519(chunk.replicas[0].replicaKey)
+    const kp = ed25519KeyPairFromSeed(seed)
+    const raw = await downloadXFTPChunkRaw(agent, server, kp.privateKey, chunk.replicas[0].replicaId)
+    await onRawChunk({chunkNo: chunk.chunkNo, dhSecret: raw.dhSecret, nonce: raw.nonce, body: raw.body, digest: chunk.digest})
+    downloaded += chunk.chunkSize
+    onProgress?.(downloaded, resolvedFd.size)
+  }
+}))
+```
+
+### 3.6 Fix cache key
+
+**Bug:** `getXFTPServerClient` (client.ts:110) uses `"https://" + server.host + ":" + server.port` as cache key, ignoring `keyHash`. Two servers with same host:port but different keyHash share a cached connection, bypassing identity verification.
+
+**Fix:** Use `formatXFTPServer(server)` as cache key (includes keyHash). Already available in `protocol/address.ts:52-54`.
+
+```typescript
+// Before:
+const key = "https://" + server.host + ":" + server.port
+
+// After:
+const key = formatXFTPServer(server)
+```
+
+Note: With the redesign in 3.5, the cache key fix is inherent — the `connections` Map uses `formatXFTPServer(server)` everywhere.
+
+### 3.7 Phase 2: Multi-server upload with server selection and failover
+
+**Problem:** Current upload (`agent.ts:105-157`) takes a single `server: XFTPServer` and uploads ALL chunks to it. The 12 preset servers (6 SimpleX + 6 Flux) are pointless — only one is ever used.
+
+**Design goal:** Distribute chunks across servers. Retry FNEW on a different server if one fails. Once working servers are found, prefer them (heuristic: server unlikely to fail mid-process, more likely to be broken initially due to maintenance/downtime).
+
+**Reference implementation:** Haskell `Agent.hs:457-486` (`createChunk` / `createWithNextSrv`) + `Client.hs:2335-2385` (`getNextServer_` / `withNextSrv`).
+
+#### Haskell algorithm summary
+
+Two-stage architecture:
+
+1. **Allocate stage (serial per file in Haskell):** For each chunk, call FNEW on a randomly-selected server. If FNEW fails, pick a different server and retry. Track tried hosts to avoid retrying the same server. After all chunks are assigned to servers, spawn one upload worker per server.
+
+2. **Upload stage (parallel per server):** Each server worker uploads its assigned chunks sequentially (FPUT). On FPUT failure, retry on the same server with backoff (because the chunk replica already exists on that server). No server failover for FPUT.
+
+Server selection constraints (hierarchical, `getNextServer_` Client.hs:2335-2350):
+1. Prefer servers from unused operators (operator diversity)
+2. Prefer servers with unused hosts (host diversity)
+3. Random pick from the most-constrained candidate set
+4. If all exhausted, reset tried set and start over
+
+#### Web client adaptation
+
+The web client doesn't have operators or a database. Simplified algorithm with two stages:
+
+**Stage 1 — Allocate:** Create chunk records on servers (FNEW). Unlike Haskell which is serial here, web FNEW runs concurrently within a concurrency limit. FNEW is a small command — concurrent FNEW on the same connection is not a problem, and concurrent FNEW across servers improves upload startup time.
+
+**Stage 2 — Upload:** Upload chunk data (FPUT). Parallel across servers, sequential per server (reuses per-server queues from 3.5). FPUT retries on the same server with backoff — no server rotation because the chunk replica already exists on that server. Stage 2 reads chunk data by offset (via `readChunk`), so `SentChunk` must be extended with `chunkOffset: number` (from ChunkSpec).
+
+```typescript
+interface UploadState {
+  untriedServers: XFTPServer[]    // servers not yet attempted — initially all servers
+  workingServers: XFTPServer[]    // servers that succeeded FNEW
+}
+
+const MAX_FNEW_ATTEMPTS = 5  // per chunk: try up to 5 different servers
+
+async function uploadFile(
+  agent: XFTPClientAgent,
+  allServers: XFTPServer[],
+  encrypted: EncryptedFileMetadata,
+  options?: UploadOptions
+): Promise<UploadResult> {
+  const state: UploadState = {untriedServers: [...allServers], workingServers: []}
+  const specs = prepareChunkSpecs(encrypted.chunkSizes)
+  const concurrency = options?.concurrency ?? 4
+
+  // Stage 1: Allocate — concurrent FNEW within concurrency limit
+  const sentChunks: SentChunk[] = new Array(specs.length)
+  const queue = specs.map((spec, i) => ({spec, chunkNo: i + 1, index: i}))
+  let idx = 0
+  async function allocateWorker() {
+    while (idx < queue.length) {
+      const item = queue[idx++]
+      const {server, chunk} = await createChunkWithFailover(
+        agent, allServers, state, concurrency, item.spec, item.chunkNo
+      )
+      sentChunks[item.index] = chunk
+    }
+  }
+  const allocateWorkers = Array.from(
+    {length: Math.min(concurrency, queue.length)},
+    () => allocateWorker()
+  )
+  await Promise.all(allocateWorkers)
+
+  // Stage 2: Upload — parallel across servers, sequential per server
+  // readChunk reads from the encrypted file by offset (same as Phase 1 uploadFile)
+  let uploaded = 0
+  const total = encrypted.chunkSizes.reduce((a, b) => a + b, 0)
+  const byServer = groupBy(sentChunks, c => formatXFTPServer(c.server))
+  await Promise.all([...byServer.entries()].map(async ([srvKey, chunks]) => {
+    for (const chunk of chunks) {
+      const chunkData = await readChunk(chunk.chunkOffset, chunk.chunkSize)
+      await uploadXFTPChunk(agent, chunk.server, chunk.senderKey, chunk.senderId, chunkData)
+      uploaded += chunk.chunkSize
+      options?.onProgress?.(uploaded, total)
+    }
+  }))
+
+  return buildDescriptions(encrypted, sentChunks)
+}
+```
+
+**`createChunkWithFailover`** — server selection with per-chunk retry limit:
+
+```typescript
+async function createChunkWithFailover(
+  agent: XFTPClientAgent,
+  allServers: XFTPServer[],
+  state: UploadState,
+  concurrency: number,
+  spec: ChunkSpec,
+  chunkNo: number
+): Promise<{server: XFTPServer, chunk: SentChunk}> {
+  const maxAttempts = Math.min(allServers.length, MAX_FNEW_ATTEMPTS)
+
+  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < maxAttempts; attempt++) {
+    const server = pickServer(allServers, state, concurrency)
+    try {
+      const chunk = await createAndPrepareChunk(agent, server, spec, chunkNo)
+      // Success — add to working set (if not already there)
+      if (!state.workingServers.some(s => formatXFTPServer(s) === formatXFTPServer(server))) {
+        state.workingServers.push(server)
+      }
+      return {server, chunk}
+    } catch (e) {
+      // Remove from working if it was there
+      state.workingServers = state.workingServers.filter(
+        s => formatXFTPServer(s) !== formatXFTPServer(server)
+      )
+      if (attempt === maxAttempts - 1) throw e
+    }
+  }
+  throw new Error("unreachable")
+}
+```
+
+**`pickServer`** — two-list selection:
+
+```typescript
+function pickServer(
+  allServers: XFTPServer[],
+  state: UploadState,
+  concurrency: number
+): XFTPServer {
+  // Once enough working servers found, only use those
+  if (state.workingServers.length >= concurrency) {
+    return randomPick(state.workingServers)
+  }
+  // Still exploring — pick from untried
+  if (state.untriedServers.length > 0) {
+    const idx = Math.floor(Math.random() * state.untriedServers.length)
+    return state.untriedServers.splice(idx, 1)[0]  // remove from untried
+  }
+  // All tried — reset untried to non-working servers and retry
+  state.untriedServers = allServers.filter(
+    s => !state.workingServers.some(w => formatXFTPServer(w) === formatXFTPServer(s))
+  )
+  if (state.untriedServers.length > 0) {
+    const idx = Math.floor(Math.random() * state.untriedServers.length)
+    return state.untriedServers.splice(idx, 1)[0]
+  }
+  // Every server is working — pick any working
+  return randomPick(state.workingServers)
+}
+```
+
+**Algorithm:** Two lists — `untriedServers` (initially all) and `workingServers` (initially empty). When `workingServers.length < concurrency`, pick from `untriedServers` (removing on pick). On FNEW success, add to `workingServers`. On FNEW failure, server is already removed from `untriedServers`; remove from `workingServers` if present. When `untriedServers` is empty, reset it to all non-working servers. Once `workingServers.length >= concurrency`, pick randomly only from `workingServers`.
+
+**Termination condition:** Each chunk tries at most `min(serverCount, 5)` different servers. If all attempts fail, the chunk fails and the upload fails with the last error. Rationale: if 5 out of 12 servers are down, something systemic is wrong and continuing is unlikely to help. Timeouts count as failures — the timed-out server is removed from working and a different server is picked next.
+
+**Key differences from Haskell:**
+- No operator concept — just host diversity via random selection
+- No database — state tracked in-memory during upload
+- FNEW runs concurrently (Haskell is serial) — improves startup time
+- FNEW is cheap and retried with server rotation; FPUT retries on same server
+
+**Download changes (also Phase 2):** Default concurrency should be 4 (matching Haskell). Download already groups by server in 3.5. If `replicas[0]` download fails, try `replicas[1]`, `replicas[2]`, etc. (fallback across replicas).
+
+## 4. Implementation Plan
+
+### Phase 1: Error handling and connection resilience
+
+Steps are ordered by dependency and should be implemented one by one.
+
+#### Step 1: Fix cache key (3.6)
+- Change cache key to `formatXFTPServer(server)` in `getXFTPServerClient` and `closeXFTPServerClient`
+- Add import for `formatXFTPServer`
+- Run existing tests to verify no regression
+
+#### Step 2: Typed error detection for padded server errors (3.2 client-side)
+- Add `XFTPRetriableError` class
+- In `sendXFTPCommand`, detect padded error strings before `decodeTransmission`
+- Classify `FRErr` responses as retriable or permanent with human-readable messages
+- Run existing tests
+
+#### Step 3: Fetch timeout (3.3)
+- Add `TransportConfig` with `timeoutMs`
+- Thread config through `createTransport` → `connectXFTP` → command wrappers
+- Add `AbortController` to browser `fetch()` and `setTimeout` to Node.js HTTP/2
+- Add vitest test: timeout triggers after configured duration
+- Run existing tests
+
+#### Step 4: Connection state with Promise-based lock and per-server queues (3.5)
+- Introduce `ServerConnection` record: `{client: Promise<XFTPClient>, queue: Promise<void>}`
+- Replace `XFTPClientAgent.clients: Map<string, XFTPClient>` with `connections: Map<string, ServerConnection>`
+- Implement `reconnectClient` — replaces `conn.client` with new promise, preserves queue
+- Implement `enqueueCommand` — chains operation onto server's queue
+- Implement `removeStaleConnection` — removes entry only if current promise is the failed one
+- Auto-cleanup: `p.catch(() => delete)` removes failed connections so next caller starts fresh
+- Adapt `closeXFTPServerClient` and `closeXFTPAgent`
+- Add vitest tests:
+  - Concurrent calls to same server produce single connection
+  - Failed promise is cleaned up, next caller gets fresh connection
+
+#### Step 5: Automatic retry in sendXFTPCommand (3.2)
+- Add retry loop with reconnect
+- Change `sendXFTPCommand` signature: takes `agent + server` instead of `client`; export it (needed by tests and by agent.ts callers)
+- Rename current `sendXFTPCommand` → `sendXFTPCommandOnce` (private); add padded error detection + FRErr classification (throw `XFTPRetriableError` for SESSION/HANDSHAKE, `XFTPPermanentError` for AUTH/NO_FILE/etc.)
+- All command wrappers (`createXFTPChunk`, `uploadXFTPChunk`, etc.) pass agent + server
+- Update agent.ts call sites: remove `getXFTPServerClient` calls before command wrappers (in `uploadFile`, `uploadRedirectDescription`, `downloadFileRaw`, `resolveRedirect`, `deleteFile`)
+- Max 3 retries for retriable errors, immediate throw for permanent
+- On retriable error: call `reconnectClient` and retry. On retriable error exhausted: call `removeStaleConnection` to clean up. On permanent error: throw immediately without touching connection
+- Add vitest tests:
+  - Server started with delay → first attempt fails, retry succeeds
+  - 3 retries exhausted → error propagates with human-readable message
+  - Non-retriable error (AUTH) → no retry, immediate failure
+
+#### Step 6: Server-side stale session handling (3.1)
+- Add one guard to `Nothing` branch: `sniUsed && not webHello -> throwE SESSION`
+- Remove debug `hPutStrLn stderr` lines (all 6 occurrences in dispatch)
+- All other branches unchanged
+- Run Haskell tests + Playwright tests
+
+#### Step 7: Download with per-server grouping
+- Modify `downloadFileRaw` to group chunks by server, sequential within each server (`for` loop), parallel across servers (`Promise.all`)
+- Add vitest test: concurrent downloads from different servers run in parallel
+
+#### Step 8: UI error improvements (3.4)
+- Temporary errors: auto-retry loop (3 attempts), then show human-readable diagnosis + manual retry button
+- Permanent errors: show human-readable error, NO retry button
+- Manual retry resumes from last successful chunk (not full restart)
+
+#### Step 9: Remove debug logging
+- Remove all `console.log('[DEBUG ...]')` and `hPutStrLn stderr "DEBUG ..."` lines
+- Keep `console.error('[XFTP] ...')` error logging
+
+### Phase 2: Multi-server upload
+
+Implement after Phase 1 is complete and tested.
+
+#### Step 10: Multi-server upload with failover (3.7)
+- Extend `SentChunk` with `chunkOffset: number` (from ChunkSpec) and `server: XFTPServer` (assigned during allocate) — Stage 2 reads data by offset and groups chunks by server
+- Change `uploadFile` signature: takes `allServers: XFTPServer[]` instead of single `server`
+- Implement `UploadState` with `untriedServers` and `workingServers`
+- Implement `createChunkWithFailover` and `pickServer`: two-list selection (untried → working once enough found), max `min(serverCount, 5)` attempts per chunk
+- Allocate stage: concurrent FNEW within concurrency limit (default 4)
+- Upload stage: parallel across servers, sequential per server (reuse queue from Step 7)
+- Update `web/upload.ts`: pass `getServers()` instead of `pickRandomServer(getServers())`
+- Update description building: each chunk references its actual server
+- Add vitest tests:
+  - File split across N servers (verify different servers in description)
+  - One server down → chunks redistributed to others
+  - All servers down → error after exhausting 5 attempts per chunk
+
+#### Step 11: Download concurrency and replica fallback
+- Change default download concurrency from 1 to 4
+- If `replicas[0]` download fails, try `replicas[1]`, `replicas[2]`, etc.
+- Uses per-server queues from Step 7
+
+## 5. Testing Plan
+
+### Principle
+
+Prefer low-level vitest tests over Playwright E2E. Each new function gets one focused test. Pure functions tested without mocks; connection management tested with mock `connectXFTP`; server behavior tested with real server. Total: 13 tests across 4 files.
+
+Tests A-C run in browser context (`@vitest/browser` with Chromium headless), configured in `vitest.config.ts`. Test D (integration) requires a separate Node.js vitest config since it uses `node:http2`. Existing `globalSetup.ts` provides a real XFTP server for integration tests.
+
+### Test file A: `test/errors.test.ts` — pure, no server
+
+Tests error classification and padded error detection (Steps 2, 5).
+
+**T1. `isRetriable` classifies errors correctly**
+```typescript
+// Retriable:
+expect(isRetriable(new XFTPRetriableError("SESSION"))).toBe(true)
+expect(isRetriable(new XFTPRetriableError("HANDSHAKE"))).toBe(true)
+expect(isRetriable(new TypeError("fetch failed"))).toBe(true)          // network error
+expect(isRetriable(Object.assign(new Error(), {name: "AbortError"}))).toBe(true)  // timeout
+// Not retriable:
+expect(isRetriable(new XFTPPermanentError("AUTH", "..."))).toBe(false)
+expect(isRetriable(new XFTPPermanentError("NO_FILE", "..."))).toBe(false)
+expect(isRetriable(new XFTPPermanentError("INTERNAL", "..."))).toBe(false)
+```
+
+**T2. `categorizeError` produces human-readable messages**
+```typescript
+// categorizeError receives thrown errors (from sendXFTPCommandOnce or transport)
+const e = categorizeError(new XFTPPermanentError("AUTH", "File is invalid, expired, or has been removed"))
+expect(e.message).toContain("expired")
+// Verify every permanent error type maps to a non-empty human-readable message
+for (const errType of ["AUTH", "NO_FILE", "SIZE", "QUOTA", "BLOCKED", "DIGEST", "INTERNAL"]) {
+  expect(humanReadableMessage({type: errType}).length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
+}
+// Retriable errors also get human-readable messages after exhaustion
+const re = categorizeError(new XFTPRetriableError("SESSION"))
+expect(re.message).toContain("expired")  // "Session expired, reconnecting..."
+```
+
+**T3. Padded error detection extracts error string from padded block**
+```typescript
+import {blockPad, blockUnpad} from '../src/protocol/transmission.js'
+// Simulate server sending padded "SESSION"
+const padded = blockPad(new TextEncoder().encode("SESSION"))
+const raw = blockUnpad(padded)
+expect(raw.length).toBeLessThan(20)
+expect(new TextDecoder().decode(raw)).toBe("SESSION")
+// Normal transmission block (batch count + large-encoded data) is NOT a short string
+const sessionId = new Uint8Array(32)  // dummy
+const normalBlock = encodeTransmission(sessionId, new Uint8Array(0), new Uint8Array(0), encodePING())
+const normalRaw = blockUnpad(normalBlock)
+expect(normalRaw.length).toBeGreaterThan(20)  // not mistaken for padded error
+```
+
+### Test file B: `test/connection.test.ts` — mock connectXFTP, no server
+
+Tests connection management functions (Steps 4, 5). Uses `vi.mock` to replace `connectXFTP` with a controllable promise factory.
+
+**T4. `getXFTPServerClient` coalesces concurrent calls**
+```typescript
+// Mock connectXFTP to return a deferred promise
+const {promise, resolve} = promiseWithResolvers<XFTPClient>()
+vi.mocked(connectXFTP).mockReturnValueOnce(promise)
+const agent = newXFTPAgent()
+const p1 = getXFTPServerClient(agent, server)
+const p2 = getXFTPServerClient(agent, server)
+expect(p1).toBe(p2)  // same promise, single connection
+resolve(mockClient)
+expect(await p1).toBe(mockClient)
+```
+
+**T5. `getXFTPServerClient` auto-cleans failed connections**
+```typescript
+vi.mocked(connectXFTP).mockReturnValueOnce(Promise.reject(new Error("down")))
+const agent = newXFTPAgent()
+const p1 = getXFTPServerClient(agent, server)
+await expect(p1).rejects.toThrow("down")
+// After microtask, entry is removed
+await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 0))
+expect(agent.connections.has(formatXFTPServer(server))).toBe(false)
+// Next call creates fresh connection
+vi.mocked(connectXFTP).mockReturnValueOnce(Promise.resolve(mockClient))
+const p2 = getXFTPServerClient(agent, server)
+expect(p2).not.toBe(p1)
+```
+
+**T6. `removeStaleConnection` respects promise identity**
+```typescript
+const agent = newXFTPAgent()
+const p1 = Promise.resolve(mockClient)
+agent.connections.set(key, {client: p1, queue: Promise.resolve()})
+// Replace with reconnect
+const p2 = Promise.resolve(mockClient2)
+agent.connections.set(key, {client: p2, queue: Promise.resolve()})
+// removeStaleConnection with old promise does NOT remove new entry
+removeStaleConnection(agent, server, p1)
+expect(agent.connections.has(key)).toBe(true)
+expect(agent.connections.get(key)!.client).toBe(p2)
+// removeStaleConnection with current promise removes it
+removeStaleConnection(agent, server, p2)
+expect(agent.connections.has(key)).toBe(false)
+```
+
+**T7. `reconnectClient` replaces promise but preserves queue**
+```typescript
+const agent = newXFTPAgent()
+const origQueue = Promise.resolve()
+agent.connections.set(key, {client: Promise.resolve(mockClient), queue: origQueue})
+vi.mocked(connectXFTP).mockReturnValueOnce(Promise.resolve(mockClient2))
+reconnectClient(agent, server)
+const conn = agent.connections.get(key)!
+expect(await conn.client).toBe(mockClient2)  // new client
+expect(conn.queue).toBe(origQueue)            // queue preserved
+```
+
+**T8. Retry loop: retriable error triggers reconnect, permanent error does not**
+
+Mock approach: `vi.mock('../src/client.js')` to mock `connectXFTP` (exported). `reconnectClient` is not exported — its behavior is controlled indirectly via `connectXFTP` mock (it calls `connectXFTP` internally). Verify retry count via `connectXFTP` call count. Note: vitest module mocking may need adjustment depending on ESM transform behavior — if intra-module calls bypass the mock, extract `connectXFTP` to a separate module or use dependency injection for testing.
+
+```typescript
+// Script: first connectXFTP returns client whose post throws retriable,
+// second connectXFTP (from reconnect) returns client whose post succeeds
+vi.mocked(connectXFTP)
+  .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+    ...mockClient,
+    transport: { post: async () => { throw new XFTPRetriableError("SESSION") }, close: () => {} }
+  })
+  .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+    ...mockClient,
+    transport: { post: async () => okResponseBlock, close: () => {} }
+  })
+
+const agent = newXFTPAgent()
+const result = await sendXFTPCommand(agent, server, dummyKey, dummyId, encodePING())
+expect(result.response.type).toBe("FROk")
+expect(vi.mocked(connectXFTP)).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)  // initial + 1 reconnect
+
+// Reset — all 3 retries exhausted: connectXFTP called 3 times (initial + 2 reconnects)
+vi.mocked(connectXFTP).mockClear()
+vi.mocked(connectXFTP).mockResolvedValue({
+  ...mockClient,
+  transport: { post: async () => { throw new XFTPRetriableError("SESSION") }, close: () => {} }
+})
+const agent2 = newXFTPAgent()
+await expect(sendXFTPCommand(agent2, server, dummyKey, dummyId, encodePING()))
+  .rejects.toThrow(/reconnecting|expired/)
+expect(vi.mocked(connectXFTP)).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3)  // initial + 2 reconnects
+
+// Reset — permanent error: connectXFTP called once (initial only, no reconnect)
+vi.mocked(connectXFTP).mockClear()
+vi.mocked(connectXFTP).mockResolvedValue({
+  ...mockClient,
+  transport: { post: async () => authErrorBlock, close: () => {} }
+})
+const agent3 = newXFTPAgent()
+await expect(sendXFTPCommand(agent3, server, dummyKey, dummyId, encodePING()))
+  .rejects.toThrow(/expired/)
+expect(vi.mocked(connectXFTP)).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)  // initial only, no reconnect
+```
+
+### Test file C: `test/server-selection.test.ts` — pure, no server
+
+Tests `pickServer` state machine (Step 10). Determinism: seed `Math.random` or test invariants not specific picks.
+
+**T9. `pickServer` picks from untried when working < concurrency**
+```typescript
+const servers = [s1, s2, s3, s4, s5]
+const state: UploadState = {untriedServers: [...servers], workingServers: []}
+const picked = pickServer(servers, state, 4)
+// picked is from untried, and was removed from untried
+expect(state.untriedServers.length).toBe(4)
+expect(state.untriedServers).not.toContainEqual(picked)
+```
+
+**T10. `pickServer` picks only from working when working >= concurrency**
+```typescript
+const state: UploadState = {
+  untriedServers: [s5],  // still has untried
+  workingServers: [s1, s2, s3, s4]
+}
+const picked = pickServer(servers, state, 4)
+// Must pick from working, NOT from untried
+expect([s1, s2, s3, s4]).toContainEqual(picked)
+expect(state.untriedServers.length).toBe(1)  // untried unchanged
+```
+
+**T11. `pickServer` resets untried when exhausted**
+```typescript
+const state: UploadState = {
+  untriedServers: [],        // all tried
+  workingServers: [s1, s2]   // only 2 working, concurrency=4
+}
+const picked = pickServer(servers, state, 4)
+// Should have reset untried to non-working servers and picked from them
+expect([s3, s4, s5]).toContainEqual(picked)
+expect(state.untriedServers.length).toBe(2)  // 3 non-working minus 1 picked
+```
+
+### Test file D: `test/integration.test.ts` — real server, Node.js mode
+
+Requires separate vitest config with `browser: {enabled: false}` since these tests use `node:http2` directly. Alternatively, add `test/vitest.node.config.ts` that includes only `test/integration.test.ts` and runs in Node.js.
+
+**T12. Stale session returns padded SESSION error (requires Step 6)**
+```typescript
+import http2 from 'node:http2'
+// Connect and handshake normally via the client
+const client = await connectXFTP(server)
+// Create a raw HTTP/2 session (new TLS SessionId, no handshake state on server)
+const session = http2.connect(client.baseUrl, {rejectUnauthorized: false})
+// Build a dummy command block using the old client's sessionId.
+// Content doesn't matter — server detects stale session before parsing command.
+const dummyKey = new Uint8Array(64)  // Ed25519 private key (dummy)
+const dummyId = new Uint8Array(24)   // entity ID (dummy)
+const cmdBlock = encodeAuthTransmission(client.sessionId, new Uint8Array(0), dummyId, encodePING(), dummyKey)
+const resp = await new Promise<Uint8Array>((resolve, reject) => {
+  const req = session.request({":method": "POST", ":path": "/"})
+  const chunks: Buffer[] = []
+  req.on("data", (c: Buffer) => chunks.push(c))
+  req.on("end", () => resolve(new Uint8Array(Buffer.concat(chunks))))
+  req.on("error", reject)
+  req.end(Buffer.from(cmdBlock))
+})
+// Server should return padded "SESSION" (not crash, not "HANDSHAKE")
+const raw = blockUnpad(resp.subarray(0, XFTP_BLOCK_SIZE))
+expect(new TextDecoder().decode(raw)).toBe("SESSION")
+session.close()
+closeXFTP(client)
+```
+
+**T13. Fetch timeout fires within configured duration**
+```typescript
+// connectXFTP with 1ms timeout — handshake requires multiple round trips,
+// so even on localhost it will exceed 1ms and trigger abort
+await expect(
+  connectXFTP(server, {timeoutMs: 1})
+).rejects.toThrow(/abort|timeout/i)
+```
+
+### What existing tests already cover (no new tests needed)
+
+| Behavior | Covered by |
+|----------|-----------|
+| Cache key fix (Step 1) | Existing round-trip test — uses `formatXFTPServer` after refactor |
+| Basic upload/download | 24 Playwright tests + 1 vitest browser test |
+| File size limits, unicode filenames | Playwright edge case tests |
+| Server startup/teardown | `globalSetup.ts` / `globalTeardown.ts` |
+| Handshake + identity verification | `connectXFTP` in existing round-trip test |
+
+### Test ordering
+
+Tests must be added alongside their implementation step:
+- **Step 2**: Add T1, T2, T3 (test/errors.test.ts)
+- **Step 3**: Add T13 (test/integration.test.ts) — requires Node.js vitest config
+- **Step 4**: Add T4, T5, T6, T7 (test/connection.test.ts)
+- **Step 5**: Add T8 (test/connection.test.ts)
+- **Step 6**: Add T12 (test/integration.test.ts) — requires server change + Node.js vitest config
+- **Step 10**: Add T9, T10, T11 (test/server-selection.test.ts)
+
+## 6. Context for Implementation Sessions
+
+### Files to re-read on session start
+
+**TypeScript (xftp-web/src/):**
+- `client.ts` — `XFTPClient`, `XFTPClientAgent`, `getXFTPServerClient`, `closeXFTPServerClient`, `connectXFTP`, `sendXFTPCommand`, `createBrowserTransport`, `createNodeTransport`, all command wrappers
+- `agent.ts` — `uploadFile`, `downloadFileRaw`, `downloadFile`, `resolveRedirect`, `encryptFileForUpload`
+- `protocol/transmission.ts` — `encodeAuthTransmission`, `decodeTransmission`, `blockPad`, `blockUnpad`
+- `protocol/commands.ts` — `XFTPErrorType`, `FileResponse`, `decodeResponse`, `decodeXFTPError`
+- `protocol/handshake.ts` — `decodeServerHandshake` (padded error detection heuristic)
+- `protocol/address.ts` — `XFTPServer`, `parseXFTPServer`, `formatXFTPServer`
+- `web/upload.ts` — UI error handling, retry button
+- `web/download.ts` — UI error handling, retry button
+- `web/servers.ts` — `getServers`, `pickRandomServer`
+
+**TypeScript (xftp-web/test/):**
+- `browser.test.ts` — vitest Node.js test template (uses real Haskell server)
+- `globalSetup.ts` — server startup, config generation, port file
+- `page.spec.ts` — Playwright page tests
+
+**Haskell (reference for multi-server):**
+- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Agent.hs` — `createChunk` (lines 457-486, allocate stage), `runXFTPSndPrepareWorker` (lines 391-430, serial allocate in Haskell), `runXFTPSndWorker` (lines 494-548, per-server upload worker)
+- `src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Client.hs` — `getNextServer_` (lines 2335-2350), `withNextSrv` (lines 2366-2385), `pickServer` (lines 2309-2314)
+
+**Haskell (server):**
+- `src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs` — `xftpServerHandshakeV1` (lines 165-244), `processRequest` (lines 403-435)
+- `src/Simplex/Messaging/Protocol.hs` — `tDecodeServer` (lines 2239-2265) — sessionId verification at line 2242
+
+### Key design constraints
+
+1. `tDecodeServer` (Protocol.hs:2242) verifies `sessId == sessionId` — commands signed with old sessionId WILL fail on new connection
+2. Server generates per-session DH key in `processHello` (Server.hs:207) — cannot be shared across sessions
+3. `fetch()` provides zero control over HTTP/2 connection reuse — browser decides
+4. `xftp-web-hello` header is only checked in dispatch (Server.hs:192), NOT inside `processHello`
+5. Handshake-phase errors are raw padded strings; command-phase errors are proper ERR transmissions
+6. Ed25519 signature verification (`TASignature` path, Protocol.hs:1314) does NOT use `thAuth` — but SMP will
+7. Reconnect must re-handshake to get new sessionId AND new server DH key
+8. The new `throwE SESSION` guard (Step 6) sends a raw padded "SESSION" string — no sessionId framing. Client detects this via padded error heuristic (section 3.2), not via sessionId mismatch
+9. FNEW is cheap (creates chunk record on server) — retry with different server on failure
+10. FPUT retries on same server (chunk replica already exists there) — close connection + backoff
+
+## 7. Plan Maintenance
+
+This plan must be updated as implementation proceeds:
+- Mark completed steps with date
+- Record any deviations from the plan with rationale
+- Add new issues discovered during implementation
+- Update file references if code moves

rfcs/2026-01-30-send-file-page/2026-02-12-xftp-cli-web-link-compat.md

@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
+# CLI-Web Link Compatibility
+
+## Problem
+
+CLI and web clients are isolated: CLI outputs `.xftp` description files, web outputs
+`https://host/#<encoded>` links. A file uploaded via one cannot be downloaded via the other.
+
+## Solution Summary
+
+Make CLI produce and consume web-compatible links so that:
+- CLI `send` always outputs a web link (in addition to `.xftp` files)
+- CLI `recv` accepts a web link URL as input (alternative to `.xftp` file path)
+- Browser can download files uploaded by CLI and vice versa
+
+The web page host is derived from the XFTP server address - the server that hosts the file
+also hosts the download page. Making XFTP servers actually serve the web page is a separate
+concern (not covered here), but the link format anticipates it.
+
+The YAML file description format is already identical between CLI and web.
+The only gap is the URI encoding layer: DEFLATE-raw compression + base64url + URL structure.
+
+## Current State
+
+### Web link format
+
+```
+https://<xftp-server-host>/#<base64url(deflateRaw(YAML))>
+```
+
+Encoding chain (agent.ts:64-68):
+1. `encodeFileDescription(fd)` -> YAML string
+2. `TextEncoder.encode(yaml)` -> bytes
+3. `pako.deflateRaw(bytes)` -> compressed
+4. `base64urlEncode(compressed)` -> URI fragment (no `#`)
+
+For multi-chunk files exceeding ~400 chars in URI, a redirect description is uploaded:
+the real file description is encrypted, uploaded as a separate XFTP file, and a smaller
+"redirect" description (pointing to it) is put in the URI.
+
+### CLI file format
+
+```
+xftp send FILE -> writes rcv1.xftp (raw YAML), snd.xftp.private
+xftp recv FILE.xftp -> reads raw YAML from file
+```
+
+No URI support. No compression. No redirect descriptions.
+
+### Existing Haskell `FileDescriptionURI`
+
+`Description.hs:243-266` defines a `simplex:/file#/?desc=<URL-encoded raw YAML>` format.
+This is the SimpleX Chat app format - NOT the web page format. It uses URL-encoded raw YAML
+(no DEFLATE compression), and has a different URL structure.
+
+## Detailed Tech Design
+
+### 1. File Header (Filename) Compatibility
+
+The filename is carried **inside the encrypted file data**, not in the file description YAML.
+Both CLI and web use the same `FileHeader` structure and binary encoding - full interop.
+
+#### FileHeader type
+
+Haskell (`Types.hs:36-46`):
+```haskell
+data FileHeader = FileHeader { fileName :: Text, fileExtra :: Maybe Text }
+instance Encoding FileHeader where
+  smpEncode FileHeader {fileName, fileExtra} = smpEncode (fileName, fileExtra)
+```
+
+TypeScript (`crypto/file.ts:11-24`):
+```typescript
+interface FileHeader { fileName: string; fileExtra: string | null }
+function encodeFileHeader(hdr: FileHeader): Uint8Array {
+  return concatBytes(encodeString(hdr.fileName), encodeMaybe(encodeString, hdr.fileExtra))
+}
+```
+
+Both produce identical binary: `[1-byte UTF-8 length][fileName bytes]['0']` (for null fileExtra).
+Max filename: 255 UTF-8 bytes (1-byte length prefix).
+
+#### Encrypted file structure
+
+Both CLI and web produce the same encrypted stream:
+```
+XSalsa20-Poly1305 encrypted:
+  [8-byte Int64 fileSize] [FileHeader] [file content] ['#' padding]
+  + [16-byte auth tag]
+
+Where fileSize = len(FileHeader) + len(file content)
+```
+
+The 8-byte length prefix and padding are handled identically:
+- Haskell: `Crypto.hs:43-56` (`encryptFile`) / `Crypto.hs:81-87` (`decryptFirstChunk`)
+- TypeScript: `crypto/file.ts:51-70` (`encryptFile`) / `crypto/file.ts:81-94` (`decryptChunks`)
+
+On decryption, `unPadLazy`/`splitLen` strips the 8-byte length prefix, then `parseFileHeader`
+extracts the filename from the remaining decrypted bytes (up to 1024 bytes examined, both sides).
+
+#### CLI upload: sets real filename (ok)
+
+`Client/Main.hs:246-247,273`:
+```haskell
+let (_, fileNameStr) = splitFileName filePath
+    fileName = T.pack fileNameStr
+...
+    fileHdr = smpEncode FileHeader {fileName, fileExtra = Nothing}
+```
+
+Extracts the actual filename from the path and embeds it in the encrypted header.
+
+#### CLI download: uses filename from header (ok)
+
+`Crypto.hs:62-66` (single chunk) / `Crypto.hs:72-74` (multi-chunk):
+```haskell
+(FileHeader {fileName}, rest) <- parseFileHeader decryptedContent
+destFile <- withExceptT FTCEFileIOError $ getDestFile fileName
+```
+
+`Client/Main.hs:435-441` (`getFilePath`):
+- If output dir specified: saves to `<dir>/<fileName>`
+- If no dir: saves to `~/Downloads/<fileName>`
+
+The filename from the decrypted header determines the output file name.
+
+#### Web upload: sets real filename (ok)
+
+`upload.ts:121` -> `agent.ts:86`:
+```typescript
+const fileHdr = encodeFileHeader({fileName, fileExtra: null})
+```
+
+Where `fileName` comes from `file.name` (browser File API).
+
+#### Web download: uses filename from header (ok)
+
+`download.ts:97,102`:
+```typescript
+const fileName = sanitizeFileName(header.fileName)
+a.download = encodeURIComponent(fileName)
+```
+
+The web client additionally sanitizes the filename (strips path separators, control chars,
+bidi overrides, limits to 255 chars).
+
+#### Web redirect description: empty filename (correct)
+
+`agent.ts:193`: `encryptFileForUpload(yamlBytes, "")` - redirect descriptions use empty filename
+because they are internal artifacts, not user files. This is handled correctly on both sides:
+the redirect content is decrypted and parsed as YAML, not saved as a file.
+
+#### Cross-client interop: fully compatible (ok)
+
+| Scenario | Filename flow | Status |
+|----------|--------------|--------|
+| CLI upload -> CLI download | `splitFileName` -> header -> `getDestFile` | Works |
+| Web upload -> Web download | `File.name` -> header -> `sanitizeFileName` | Works |
+| CLI upload -> Web download | `splitFileName` -> header -> `sanitizeFileName` | **Compatible** |
+| Web upload -> CLI download | `File.name` -> header -> `getDestFile` | **Compatible** |
+
+The binary encoding is identical (smpEncode). No changes needed for filename interop.
+The CLI should consider adding filename sanitization similar to the web client for safety.
+
+### 2. Web Link Host Derivation
+
+The web page URL domain comes from the XFTP server address, not from a CLI flag:
+
+- **Non-redirected description**: use the server host of the first chunk's first replica.
+  E.g., `xftp://abc=@xftp1.simplex.im` -> `https://xftp1.simplex.im/#<encoded>`
+
+- **Redirected description**: use the server host of the redirect chunk (the outer description's
+  chunk that stores the encrypted inner description).
+
+The server address format is `xftp://<keyhash>@<host>[,<host2>,...][:<port>]`.
+The web link uses `https://<host>` (port 443 implied).
+
+This means the CLI does not need a `--web-url` flag - the server address fully determines
+the link. The XFTP server serving the web page is a separate deployment concern.
+
+### 3. Web URI Encoding/Decoding in Haskell
+
+Add two functions (new module or in `Description.hs`):
+
+```haskell
+-- Encode file description as web URI fragment (no leading #)
+encodeWebURI :: FileDescription 'FRecipient -> ByteString
+-- 1. Y.encode . encodeFileDescription -> YAML bytes
+-- 2. deflateRaw (raw DEFLATE, no zlib/gzip header) via zlib package
+-- 3. base64url encode (with padding, matching Data.ByteString.Base64.URL)
+
+-- Decode web URI fragment (no leading #) to file description
+decodeWebURI :: ByteString -> Either String (ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient)
+-- 1. base64url decode
+-- 2. inflateRaw (raw DEFLATE decompress)
+-- 3. Y.decodeEither' -> YAMLFileDescription -> FileDescription
+-- 4. validateFileDescription
+
+-- Build full web link from file description
+-- Extracts server host from first chunk replica (or redirect chunk)
+fileWebLink :: FileDescription 'FRecipient -> (String, ByteString)
+-- Returns (webHost, uriFragment)
+-- Caller assembles: "https://" <> webHost <> "/#" <> uriFragment
+```
+
+**Dependency**: Add `zlib` to `simplexmq.cabal` (for raw DEFLATE).
+The codebase already has `zstd` for message compression - `zlib` is standard and small.
+
+The `zlib` Haskell package provides `Codec.Compression.Zlib.Raw` for raw DEFLATE
+(no header/trailer), matching `pako.deflateRaw()` / `pako.inflateRaw()`.
+
+### 4. Redirect Description Support
+
+The CLI currently does NOT create redirect descriptions. For single-server single-recipient
+uploads, most file descriptions fit in a reasonable URI even for multi-chunk files. But for
+large files (many chunks x long server hostnames), the URI can exceed practical limits.
+
+**Approach**: Match the web client threshold.
+- After encoding the URI, if `length > 400` and chunks > 1, upload a redirect description.
+- The redirect upload uses the same XFTP upload flow: encrypt YAML -> upload as file -> create
+  outer description pointing to it.
+- This matches `agent.ts:152-155` exactly.
+- The redirect chunk's server becomes the web link host.
+
+For CLI download from a redirect URI, the existing `cliReceiveFile` needs extension:
+- After decoding the file description, check `redirect` field.
+- If present: download and decrypt the redirect chunks first to get the inner description,
+  then download the actual file using the inner description.
+- The web client already does this (`resolveRedirect` in agent.ts:320-346).
+
+### 5. CLI Command Changes
+
+#### `xftp send` - always output web link
+
+```
+xftp send FILE [DIR] [-n COUNT] [-s SERVERS]
+```
+
+- Upload file as usual
+- Generate web link: `https://<server-host>/#<encodeWebURI(rcvDescription)>`
+- If URI exceeds threshold, upload redirect description first
+- Print web link to stdout (in addition to `.xftp` file paths)
+- Only generates link for the first recipient (web links are single-recipient)
+
+**Output change**:
+```
+Sender file description: ./file.xftp/snd.xftp.private
+Pass file descriptions to the recipient(s):
+./file.xftp/rcv1.xftp
+
+Web link:
+https://xftp1.simplex.im/#eJy0VduO2zYQ...
+```
+
+#### `xftp recv` - accept URL as input
+
+```
+xftp recv <FILE.xftp | URL> [DIR]
+```
+
+- If input starts with `http://` or `https://`, extract hash fragment after `#`
+- Decode: base64url -> inflateRaw -> YAML -> FileDescription
+- Resolve redirect if present
+- Download and decrypt as usual
+
+The URL must be quoted on the command line (`"https://...#..."`) because `#` is a shell
+comment character when unquoted.
+
+Implementation: modify `receiveP` parser to accept URL, add `decodeWebURI` path in
+`cliReceiveFile` alongside existing `getFileDescription'`.
+
+### 6. YAML Format Compatibility
+
+Already identical. The web `description.ts` explicitly matches Haskell `Data.Yaml` output:
+- Same field names (alphabetical key order)
+- Same base64url encoding for binary fields (with `=` padding)
+- Same server replica colon-delimited format: `chunkNo:replicaId:replicaKey[:digest][:chunkSize]`
+- Same size encoding (`kb`/`mb`/`gb` suffixes)
+- Same redirect structure
+
+**Verification**: The Playwright test suite already tests upload->download round-trips.
+Adding a cross-client test (CLI upload -> web download, or web upload -> CLI download) would
+validate interop end-to-end.
+
+### 7. Server Compatibility
+
+No server changes needed. Both clients use the same XFTP protocol (FGET, FPUT, FNEW, FACK, FDEL).
+The web client adds `xftp-web-hello: 1` header for the hello handshake, but the actual file
+operations are identical wire-format.
+
+The only consideration: CLI uses native HTTP/2 (via `http2` Haskell package), web uses
+browser `fetch()` API over HTTP/2. Both produce identical XFTP protocol frames.
+
+**Note**: Making XFTP servers actually serve the web download page at `https://<host>/` is a
+separate deployment/infrastructure task. This plan only establishes the link format convention
+so that links are ready to work once servers serve the page.
+
+## Implementation Plan
+
+### Phase 1: Web URI codec in Haskell
+
+1. Add `zlib` dependency to `simplexmq.cabal`
+2. Add `encodeWebURI` / `decodeWebURI` / `fileWebLink` to `Simplex.FileTransfer.Description`
+   (or a new `Simplex.FileTransfer.Description.WebURI` module)
+3. `fileWebLink` extracts host from first chunk's first replica server address
+4. Add unit tests: encode a known FileDescription, verify output matches web client encoding
+5. Add round-trip test: encode -> decode -> compare
+
+### Phase 2: CLI `recv` accepts URL
+
+1. Modify `ReceiveOptions` to accept `Either FilePath WebURL` for `fileDescription`
+2. In `cliReceiveFile`: if URL, extract fragment after `#`, call `decodeWebURI`
+3. Add redirect resolution: if `redirect /= Nothing`, download redirect chunks,
+   decrypt, parse inner description, then proceed with download
+4. Test: upload via web page -> copy link -> `xftp recv <link>`
+
+### Phase 3: CLI `send` outputs web link
+
+1. After upload, call `fileWebLink` to get (host, fragment)
+2. If fragment exceeds threshold, upload redirect description first, rebuild link
+3. Print `https://<host>/#<fragment>` to stdout
+4. Test: `xftp send FILE` -> open link in browser -> download
+
+### Phase 4: Cross-client integration test
+
+1. Add test: CLI send -> extract link from stdout -> Playwright browser download -> verify
+2. Add test: Playwright browser upload -> extract link -> CLI recv -> verify
+3. These can be shell-script or Haskell test-suite tests that spawn both clients

rfcs/2026-02-17-fix-subq-deadlock.md

@@ -0,0 +1,415 @@
+# Fix subQ deadlock: blocking writeTBQueue inside connLock
+
+## Problem
+
+Users report that message reception silently and permanently stops across all connections, with no error alerts. The app appears functional but no messages arrive. Recovery requires restart.
+
+Root cause: a deadlock between worker threads holding `connLock` and the `agentSubscriber` (sole `subQ` reader).
+
+### The deadlock mechanism
+
+`subQ` (`TBQueue ATransmission`, capacity 4096 on mobile / 1024 on desktop) is the single pipeline between the agent layer and the chat layer. The `agentSubscriber` thread (`Commands.hs:4373`) is its **sole reader**.
+
+Three code sites hold `connLock` and call blocking `writeTBQueue subQ` without a fullness check. When `subQ` is full, these block while holding the lock. If `agentSubscriber` simultaneously needs the same `connLock` (via `sendMessagesB_` → `withConnLocks`), it blocks too — creating a circular wait:
+
+- **Worker**: holds `connLock(X)`, waits for `subQ` space (needs `agentSubscriber` to read)
+- **agentSubscriber**: sole `subQ` reader, waits for `connLock(X)` (needs worker to release)
+- **Result**: permanent silent deadlock — no exception, no alert, all connections blocked
+
+### Confirmed deadlock scenarios
+
+**Scenario 1**: Delivery worker during queue rotation test
+
+```
+Delivery worker:                    agentSubscriber (sole subQ reader):
+  withConnLock(X) [2187]              readTBQueue subQ → processAgentMessageConn
+  ...DB operations...                 → sendPendingGroupMessages (on CON/SENT/QCONT)
+  notify → writeTBQueue subQ [2238]   → batchSendConnMessages → deliverMessagesB
+  [BLOCKED — subQ full]               → withAgent sendMessagesB [synchronous]
+                                      → sendMessagesB_ → withConnLocks({..X..}) [1708]
+                                      [BLOCKED — connLock(X) held]
+```
+
+**Scenario 2**: Async command worker during message ACK with notification
+
+```
+Async cmd worker:                   agentSubscriber (sole subQ reader):
+  tryWithLock "ICAck" [1930→1824]     readTBQueue subQ → processAgentMessageConn
+  → withConnLock(X)                   → sendPendingGroupMessages
+  → ack → ackQueueMessage [1899]      → sendMessagesB_ → withConnLocks({..X..})
+  → sendMsgNtf [2381]                [BLOCKED — connLock(X) held]
+  → writeTBQueue subQ [2386]
+  [BLOCKED — subQ full]
+```
+
+**Scenario 3**: Synchronous `ackMessage'` API (same mechanism as Scenario 2 but from external API caller)
+
+```
+ackMessage' caller:                 agentSubscriber (sole subQ reader):
+  withConnLock(X) [2254]              → sendMessagesB_ → withConnLocks({..X..})
+  → ack → ackQueueMessage [2267]      [BLOCKED — connLock(X) held]
+  → sendMsgNtf [2381]
+  → writeTBQueue subQ [2386]
+  [BLOCKED — subQ full]
+```
+
+### ConnId overlap verified
+
+No guard prevents a connection undergoing queue rotation (AM_QTEST_) or ACK processing from being included in `sendMessagesB_`'s batch. During these operations, the connection has `connStatus == ConnReady`, passing all filters in `memberSendAction`.
+
+### Cascade amplification
+
+Once any single deadlock triggers, `subQ` never drains. ALL other threads that attempt `writeTBQueue subQ` block progressively — their locks are held forever too. The entire threading system freezes within seconds.
+
+### Affected code sites (blocking `writeTBQueue subQ` inside `connLock`)
+
+| Site | File | Lock line | Write line | Events written |
+|------|------|-----------|------------|----------------|
+| `runSmpQueueMsgDelivery::notify` | Agent.hs | 2187 | 2238 | SWITCH SPCompleted, ERR INTERNAL |
+| `runSmpQueueMsgDelivery::internalErr/notifyDel` | Agent.hs | 2187 | 2238 (via notifyDel→notify) | ERR INTERNAL + delMsg |
+| `ackQueueMessage::sendMsgNtf` | Agent.hs | 2254 or 1930 | 2386 | MSGNTF |
+
+### Safe patterns that already exist in the codebase
+
+1. **`isFullTBQueue` + pending TVar** (used at `runCommandProcessing` lines 1782-1784/1937, and `runProcessSMP` lines 3027-3029/3216):
+   ```haskell
+   -- Before processing (e.g. line 1782):
+   pending <- newTVarIO []
+   -- During processing — safe notify (e.g. line 1937):
+   notify cmd =
+     let t = (corrId, connId, AEvt (sAEntity @e) cmd)
+      in atomically $ ifM (isFullTBQueue subQ) (modifyTVar' pendingCmds (t :)) (writeTBQueue subQ t)
+   -- After processing — flush (e.g. line 1784):
+   mapM_ (atomically . writeTBQueue subQ) . reverse =<< readTVarIO pending
+   ```
+
+2. **`nonBlockingWriteTBQueue`** (used at Client.hs:789, NtfSubSupervisor.hs:507):
+   ```haskell
+   nonBlockingWriteTBQueue q x = do
+     sent <- atomically $ tryWriteTBQueue q x
+     unless sent $ void $ forkIO $ atomically $ writeTBQueue q x
+   ```
+   Note: `nonBlockingWriteTBQueue` does NOT preserve ordering — the spawned background thread may complete out of order relative to subsequent direct writes from the same calling thread.
+
+### Exhaustive proof: no other deadlock scenarios exist
+
+All 15 `withConnLock` sites in Agent.hs were analyzed. Only 3 write to `subQ`:
+
+| withConnLock site | Writes subQ? | Safe? |
+|-------------------|-------------|-------|
+| switchConnectionAsync' (899) | No | ✓ |
+| setConnShortLinkAsync' (995) | No | ✓ |
+| setConnShortLink' (1031) | No | ✓ |
+| deleteConnShortLink' (1075) | No | ✓ |
+| allowConnection' (1407) | No | ✓ |
+| acceptContact' (1417) | No | ✓ |
+| sendMessagesB_ (1708, `withConnLocks`) | No | ✓ |
+| tryWithLock/runSmpCommand (1930) | Yes (1937) | ✓ — `isFullTBQueue` check |
+| tryMoveableWithLock/runSmpCommand (1931) | Yes (1937) | ✓ — `isFullTBQueue` check |
+| **runSmpQueueMsgDelivery AM_QTEST_ (2187)** | **Yes (2238)** | **✗ — DEADLOCK** |
+| **ackMessage' (2254)** | **Yes (2386)** | **✗ — DEADLOCK** |
+| switchConnection' (2298) | No | ✓ |
+| abortConnectionSwitch' (2328) | No | ✓ |
+| synchronizeRatchet' (2351) | No | ✓ |
+| suspendConnection' (2390) | No | ✓ |
+| **processSMP (3037)** | Yes (3216) | ✓ — `isFullTBQueue` check |
+
+Note: `processSMP` (line 3037) holds `connLock` and its local `notify` (line 3216) writes to `subQ`, but it uses the safe `isFullTBQueue` pattern. Its `ack` (line 3196) uses `enqueueCmd` (DB-only), NOT `ackQueueMessage`. The actual `ackQueueMessage` runs later from the async command worker via ICAck/ICAckDel.
+
+Other lock pairs checked — no circular dependencies:
+- `connLock × DB MVar`: DB never acquires connLock
+- `entityLock × connLock`: consistent ordering (entity first in chat, conn in agent)
+- `connLock(X) × connLock(Y)`: single agentSubscriber thread, one `withConnLocks` at a time
+
+---
+
+## Deadlock call graph: agentSubscriber → connLock
+
+All deadlock paths require `agentSubscriber` to synchronously acquire `connLock`. Exhaustive analysis shows that **every such path converges on a single agent function**: `sendMessagesB_` → `withConnLocks` (Agent.hs:1708). No other agent API function called synchronously from the agentSubscriber acquires connLock.
+
+Verified (FACT): `ackMessageAsync` → `enqueueCommand` only (no connLock). `toggleConnectionNtfs` → no lock. `deleteConnectionAsync` → `deleteLock` not `connLock`. `joinConnectionAsync` → `withInvLock` not `connLock`.
+
+Also verified (FACT): `Lock = TMVar Text` (Lock.hs:24) is **non-reentrant** — double acquisition on the same thread deadlocks.
+
+### All 22 trigger paths
+
+Every path goes through `deliverMessage`/`deliverMessages`/`deliverMessagesB` → `withAgent sendMessagesB` → `sendMessagesB_` → `withConnLocks`:
+
+| # | Trigger | Chat function | ConnIds locked | Risk |
+|---|---------|--------------|----------------|------|
+| 1 | Group CON (Invitee) | `introduceToAll` → broadcast XGrpMemNew | **ALL member connIds** | **HIGHEST** |
+| 2 | Group MSG XGrpLinkAcpt | `introduceToRemaining` → broadcast | **ALL member connIds** | **HIGHEST** |
+| 3 | Group CON (Invitee) | `sendIntroductions` → batch intros to new member | new member connId | Medium |
+| 4 | Group CON (Invitee) | `sendHistory` → batch to new member | new member connId | Medium |
+| 5 | Group CON | `sendPendingGroupMessages` | member connId | Medium |
+| 6 | Group SENT | `sendPendingGroupMessages` | member connId | Medium |
+| 7 | Group QCONT | `sendPendingGroupMessages` | member connId | Medium |
+| 8 | Group CON (PendingReview) | `introduceToModerators` → to moderators | moderator connIds | Medium |
+| 9 | Group CON (PreMember) | `sendXGrpMemCon` → to host | host connId | Low |
+| 10 | Group CON (PreMember) | `probeMatchingMemberContact` → probes + hashes | member + N matching connIds | Medium |
+| 11 | Direct CON | `probeMatchingMembers` → probes + hashes | contact + N matching connIds | Medium |
+| 12 | Direct JOINED | `sendAutoReply` | contact connId | Low |
+| 13 | Group JOINED | `sendGroupAutoReply` | member connId | Low |
+| 14 | Group INV | `sendXGrpMemInv` → to host | host connId | Low |
+| 15 | Group INV (legacy) | `sendGrpInvitation` → to contact | contact connId | Low |
+| 16 | Group MSG XGrpMemInv | `xGrpMemInv` → `sendGroupMemberMessage` | re-member connId | Low |
+| 17 | Group MSG XGrpMemDel | `forwardToMember` | deleted member connId | Low |
+| 18 | Group MSG XGrpLinkMem | `probeMatchingMemberContact` | member + N matching connIds | Medium |
+| 19 | Group MSG (dup relay) | `saveGroupRcvMsg` error → `sendDirectMemberMessage` | forwarder connId | Low |
+| 20 | SFDONE | `sendFileDescriptions` → to recipients | recipient connIds | Medium |
+| 21 | Group MSG XGrpLinkAcpt | `sendHistory` → to accepted member | accepted member connId | Medium |
+| 22 | Direct MSG (autoAccept) | `autoAcceptFile` → inline accept reply | contact connId | Low (test-only config) |
+
+### Key observations
+
+1. **Single bottleneck**: All 22 paths converge on `sendMessagesB_` → `withConnLocks` (Agent.hs:1708). The deadlock is between this lock acquisition and any worker thread holding `connLock` + blocking on `writeTBQueue subQ`.
+
+2. **Highest-risk paths** (#1, #2): Broadcasting to ALL group members in `introduceToAll` / `introduceToRemaining` acquires `withConnLocks` on ALL member connIds in a single batch. For large groups, this holds the agentSubscriber thread for a long time, during which subQ fills, which causes worker threads holding connLock on any of those connIds to deadlock.
+
+3. **Medium-risk paths** (#5-7): `sendPendingGroupMessages` fires on every CON/SENT/QCONT. These are frequent and lock the member's connId, which is the SAME connId that a delivery worker or ACK worker may hold while writing to subQ.
+
+---
+
+## Analysis: `withConnLocks` in `sendMessagesB_`
+
+### FACT: the lock protects ratchet encryption state
+
+`sendMessagesB_` (Agent.hs:1708-1713) acquires `withConnLocks` and executes:
+
+1. **`getConn_`** — reads connection metadata, send queues from DB
+2. **`setConnPQSupport`** — updates PQ encryption flag per connection
+3. **`enqueueMessagesB`** → `enqueueMessageB` → `storeSentMsg_` which calls:
+   - **`updateSndIds`** (AgentStore.hs:899) — increments `internalSndId` (sequential send counter)
+   - **`agentRatchetEncryptHeader`** (Agent.hs:3698) — reads current ratchet via `getRatchetForUpdate`, encrypts message header via `rcEncryptHeader`, writes advanced ratchet state via `updateRatchet`
+   - **`createSndMsg`** + **`createSndMsgDelivery`** — inserts message and delivery records
+
+All operations run within `unsafeWithStore` → `withTransaction` (single DB transaction per batch).
+
+### FACT: the lock CANNOT be removed
+
+Without `withConnLocks`, concurrent `sendMessagesB_` calls targeting the same connection would:
+- Read the same ratchet state, both encrypt, one overwrite the other → **ratchet desync** (unrecoverable)
+- Get duplicate `internalSndId` values → **message ID collision**
+- Race on `setConnPQSupport` → **PQ state inconsistency**
+
+The lock serializes ALL operations on the connection's encryption state. Removing it would introduce data corruption.
+
+Note: `sendMessage` (singular, line 530) uses the same `sendMessagesB_` function — there is no lock-free send path.
+
+### Eliminated strategies
+
+- **Strategy C (remove lock)**: The lock protects ratchet encryption. Removing it causes unrecoverable ratchet desync. Eliminated.
+- **Strategy A (async dispatch)**: All 22 chat-layer callers use `deliverMessagesB` return values (delivery IDs, PQ state) synchronously. `forkIO` loses results. Eliminated.
+- **Strategy W (isFullTBQueue + pending TVar)**: The existing pattern (lines 1937, 3216) buffers events in a local TVar and flushes after lock release. Between lock release and flush, another thread can acquire the same connLock and write events to subQ — reordering events within the same connection. This trades a visible deadlock for invisible ordering bugs. Eliminated.
+- **Strategy O (per-connection overflow queues)**: Bounded overflow queues with "drop when full" were analyzed. Drop consequences are unacceptable at 5 of 6 write sites — CONF, INFO, CON cause permanent connection failure after ACK; INV loses connection invitations; SENT/MERR leave messages stuck forever. Unbounded overflow defeats backpressure. Eliminated.
+
+---
+
+## Solution: move subQ writes outside connLock
+
+### Root cause
+
+The `writeTBQueue subQ` calls at the 3 deadlock sites are inside `connLock` by accident of code structure, not necessity. `connLock` protects ratchet encryption state and DB consistency. The `notify` calls write informational events to `subQ` — they do not modify any state that `connLock` protects.
+
+Moving the writes outside the lock scope eliminates the deadlock: blocking `writeTBQueue subQ` without holding `connLock` is safe — agentSubscriber is free to acquire the lock, process events, and drain `subQ`.
+
+### Why reordering doesn't matter at these sites
+
+The chat layer handlers for the 3 deadlock site events do NOT advance the ratchet:
+
+| Event | Chat handler | Calls sendMessagesB_? |
+|-------|-------------|----------------------|
+| SWITCH SPCompleted | Creates internal chat item, updates UI | **No** |
+| ERR INTERNAL | Logs error to view | **No** |
+| MSGNTF | `toView CEvtNtfMessage` → empty output | **No** |
+
+Events that DO trigger ratchet advances (CON, SENT, QCONT → `sendPendingGroupMessages` → `sendMessagesB_`) are all already written OUTSIDE `connLock` in the current code.
+
+Ratchet state lives in the DB, not in subQ events. agentSubscriber processes events sequentially regardless of arrival order. The SENT-before-SWITCH race already exists in the current code (new queue worker writes SENT outside connLock while old queue worker writes SWITCH inside connLock).
+
+### Fix: Site 1 — `runSmpQueueMsgDelivery` AM_QTEST_ (line 2187)
+
+Restructure `withConnLock` to return the event, write outside.
+
+**Current code** (Agent.hs:2187-2214):
+```haskell
+AM_QTEST_ -> withConnLock c connId "runSmpQueueMsgDelivery AM_QTEST_" $ do
+  withStore' c $ \db -> setSndQueueStatus db sq Active
+  SomeConn _ conn <- withStore c (`getConn` connId)
+  case conn of
+    DuplexConnection cData' rqs sqs -> do
+      let addr = qAddress sq
+      case findQ addr sqs of
+        Just SndQueue {dbReplaceQueueId = Just replacedId, primary} ->
+          case removeQP (\sq' -> dbQId sq' == replacedId && not (sameQueue addr sq')) sqs of
+            Nothing -> internalErr msgId "sent QTEST: queue not found in connection"
+            Just (sq', sq'' : sqs') -> do
+              checkSQSwchStatus sq' SSSendingQTEST
+              atomically $ TM.delete (qAddress sq') $ smpDeliveryWorkers c
+              withStore' c $ \db -> do
+                when primary $ setSndQueuePrimary db connId sq
+                deletePendingMsgs db connId sq'
+                deleteConnSndQueue db connId sq'
+              let sqs'' = sq'' :| sqs'
+                  conn' = DuplexConnection cData' rqs sqs''
+              cStats <- connectionStats c conn'
+              notify $ SWITCH QDSnd SPCompleted cStats       -- DEADLOCK
+            _ -> internalErr msgId "sent QTEST: ..."         -- DEADLOCK (via notifyDel → notify)
+        _ -> internalErr msgId "sent QTEST: ..."             -- DEADLOCK
+    _ -> internalErr msgId "QTEST sent not in duplex ..."    -- DEADLOCK
+```
+
+**New code:**
+```haskell
+AM_QTEST_ -> do
+  evt_ <- withConnLock c connId "runSmpQueueMsgDelivery AM_QTEST_" $ do
+    withStore' c $ \db -> setSndQueueStatus db sq Active
+    SomeConn _ conn <- withStore c (`getConn` connId)
+    case conn of
+      DuplexConnection cData' rqs sqs -> do
+        let addr = qAddress sq
+        case findQ addr sqs of
+          Just SndQueue {dbReplaceQueueId = Just replacedId, primary} ->
+            case removeQP (\sq' -> dbQId sq' == replacedId && not (sameQueue addr sq')) sqs of
+              Nothing -> pure $ Left "sent QTEST: queue not found in connection"
+              Just (sq', sq'' : sqs') -> do
+                checkSQSwchStatus sq' SSSendingQTEST
+                atomically $ TM.delete (qAddress sq') $ smpDeliveryWorkers c
+                withStore' c $ \db -> do
+                  when primary $ setSndQueuePrimary db connId sq
+                  deletePendingMsgs db connId sq'
+                  deleteConnSndQueue db connId sq'
+                let sqs'' = sq'' :| sqs'
+                    conn' = DuplexConnection cData' rqs sqs''
+                cStats <- connectionStats c conn'
+                pure $ Right $ SWITCH QDSnd SPCompleted cStats
+              _ -> pure $ Left "sent QTEST: there is only one queue in connection"
+          _ -> pure $ Left "sent QTEST: queue not in connection or not replacing another queue"
+      _ -> pure $ Left "QTEST sent not in duplex connection"
+  -- subQ write is now OUTSIDE connLock — blocking writeTBQueue is safe
+  case evt_ of
+    Right evt -> notify evt
+    Left err -> internalErr msgId err
+```
+
+All DB operations remain inside the lock. Only `notify`/`internalErr` (which write to subQ) move outside. `internalErr` calls `notifyDel` = `notify >> delMsg` — both `notify` (subQ write) and `delMsg` (`deleteSndMsgDelivery`, keyed on unique msgId) are safe outside the lock. The existing double-delete pattern (`delMsg` inside `internalErr` + `delMsgKeep` at line 2216) is preserved.
+
+### Fix: Sites 2 & 3 — `ackQueueMessage::sendMsgNtf` (line 2386)
+
+Change `ackQueueMessage` to return the MSGNTF event instead of writing it to subQ. Callers write to subQ after releasing connLock.
+
+**Current code** (Agent.hs:2371-2386):
+```haskell
+ackQueueMessage :: AgentClient -> RcvQueue -> SMP.MsgId -> AM ()
+ackQueueMessage c rq@RcvQueue {userId, connId, server} srvMsgId = do
+  atomically $ incSMPServerStat c userId server ackAttempts
+  tryAllErrors (sendAck c rq srvMsgId) >>= \case
+    Right _ -> sendMsgNtf ackMsgs
+    Left (SMP _ SMP.NO_MSG) -> sendMsgNtf ackNoMsgErrs
+    Left e -> ...
+  where
+    sendMsgNtf stat = do
+      atomically $ incSMPServerStat c userId server stat
+      whenM (liftIO $ hasGetLock c rq) $ do
+        atomically $ releaseGetLock c rq
+        brokerTs_ <- eitherToMaybe <$> tryAllErrors (withStore c $ \db -> getRcvMsgBrokerTs db connId srvMsgId)
+        atomically $ writeTBQueue (subQ c) ("", connId, AEvt SAEConn $ MSGNTF srvMsgId brokerTs_)
+```
+
+**New code** — return `Maybe ATransmission` instead of writing:
+```haskell
+ackQueueMessage :: AgentClient -> RcvQueue -> SMP.MsgId -> AM (Maybe ATransmission)
+ackQueueMessage c rq@RcvQueue {userId, connId, server} srvMsgId = do
+  atomically $ incSMPServerStat c userId server ackAttempts
+  tryAllErrors (sendAck c rq srvMsgId) >>= \case
+    Right _ -> sendMsgNtf ackMsgs
+    Left (SMP _ SMP.NO_MSG) -> sendMsgNtf ackNoMsgErrs
+    Left e -> ... >> pure Nothing
+  where
+    sendMsgNtf stat = do
+      atomically $ incSMPServerStat c userId server stat
+      ifM (liftIO $ hasGetLock c rq)
+        (do atomically $ releaseGetLock c rq
+            brokerTs_ <- eitherToMaybe <$> tryAllErrors (withStore c $ \db -> getRcvMsgBrokerTs db connId srvMsgId)
+            pure $ Just ("", connId, AEvt SAEConn $ MSGNTF srvMsgId brokerTs_))
+        (pure Nothing)
+```
+
+**Caller 1: `ackMessage'`** (Agent.hs:2253-2267) — return event from `withConnLock`, write after:
+```haskell
+ackMessage' c connId msgId rcptInfo_ = do
+  t_ <- withConnLock c connId "ackMessage" $ do
+    SomeConn _ conn <- withStore c (`getConn` connId)
+    case conn of
+      DuplexConnection {} -> do
+        t_ <- ack
+        sendRcpt conn
+        del
+        pure t_
+      RcvConnection {} -> do
+        t_ <- ack
+        del
+        pure t_
+      SndConnection {} -> throwE $ CONN SIMPLEX "ackMessage"
+      ContactConnection {} -> throwE $ CMD PROHIBITED "ackMessage: ContactConnection"
+      NewConnection _ -> throwE $ CMD PROHIBITED "ackMessage: NewConnection"
+  -- subQ write is OUTSIDE connLock
+  case t_ of
+    Just t -> atomically $ writeTBQueue (subQ c) t
+    Nothing -> pure ()
+```
+
+**Caller 2: `ICAck` / `ICAckDel`** (Agent.hs:1823-1824) — inline `tryWithLock` as `tryCommand` + `withConnLock`, write subQ between the two scopes:
+
+`tryWithLock name = tryCommand . withConnLock c connId name` — by inlining, the subQ write can be placed outside `withConnLock` but inside `tryCommand` (retaining retry/error handling).
+
+```haskell
+ICAck rId srvMsgId -> withServer $ \srv ->
+  tryCommand $ do
+    t_ <- withConnLock c connId "ICAck" $ ack srv rId srvMsgId
+    -- subQ write is OUTSIDE connLock — cannot deadlock with agentSubscriber
+    forM_ t_ $ atomically . writeTBQueue subQ
+
+ICAckDel rId srvMsgId msgId -> withServer $ \srv ->
+  tryCommand $ do
+    t_ <- withConnLock c connId "ICAckDel" $ do
+      t_ <- ack srv rId srvMsgId
+      withStore' c (\db -> deleteMsg db connId msgId)
+      pure t_
+    -- subQ write is OUTSIDE connLock — cannot deadlock with agentSubscriber
+    forM_ t_ $ atomically . writeTBQueue subQ
+```
+
+Where `ack` now returns `AM (Maybe ATransmission)`:
+```haskell
+ack srv rId srvMsgId = do
+  rq <- withStore c $ \db -> getRcvQueue db connId srv rId
+  ackQueueMessage c rq srvMsgId
+```
+
+All subQ writes for MSGNTF are now outside connLock. FIFO ordering is preserved — no `nonBlockingWriteTBQueue`, no forked threads. The same thread that held the lock writes to subQ sequentially after releasing it.
+
+### Race analysis
+
+Window between connLock release and subQ write at Site 1:
+
+| Thread | Can acquire connLock(X)? | Writes subQ? | Consequence |
+|--------|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|
+| agentSubscriber via sendMessagesB_ | Yes | **No** (encrypts only) | No race |
+| processSMP for connId X | Yes | Yes (pending flush) | MSG before SWITCH — cosmetic |
+| runCommandProcessing for connId X | Yes | Yes (pending flush) | Command response before SWITCH — cosmetic |
+| New queue delivery worker | No (SENT outside lock) | Yes | SENT before SWITCH — cosmetic, **already exists in current code** |
+
+All races are cosmetic UI ordering. None affect ratchet state, protocol correctness, or message delivery.
+
+### Summary of changes
+
+| File | Change | Lines affected |
+|------|--------|---------------|
+| Agent.hs | Restructure AM_QTEST_ to return event from `withConnLock`, write outside | ~2187-2214 |
+| Agent.hs | Change `ackQueueMessage` return type to `AM (Maybe ATransmission)`, return event instead of writing | ~2371-2386 |
+| Agent.hs | `ackMessage'`: return event from `withConnLock`, write outside | ~2253-2267 |
+| Agent.hs | `ICAck`/`ICAckDel`: inline `tryCommand` + `withConnLock`, write subQ between scopes | ~1823-1824 |
+| Agent.hs | `ack` helper: propagate new return type | ~1899-1901 |
+
+No new data structures. No new modules. No changes to other write sites (1937, 3216 — already safe). ~25 lines changed total.

rfcs/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+# SimpleX Network Protocol Specifications — Governance and Evolution (draft)
+
+## Why this document exists
+
+SimpleX Network protocol specifications must evolve as the network grows. This document defines how specifications change, who governs those changes, and how the history of changes is preserved.
+
+### Lessons from the web: why ratcheted governance matters
+
+The web's governance history demonstrates both the necessity of consortium governance and the dangers of getting the transition wrong.
+
+[Tim Berners-Lee invented the web in 1991](https://home.cern/science/computing/birth-web/short-history-web). [Netscape took over in 1994](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netscape_Navigator), driving rapid innovation as a single company — SSL, cookies, JavaScript, and the features that made the web commercially viable. In 1994, [W3C was founded](https://www.w3.org/about/history/) as a consortium hosted across multiple independent institutions (MIT in the US, INRIA/ERCIM in Europe, Keio University in Japan, later Beihang University in China) to govern web standards.
+
+The transition from company-led innovation to consortium governance was abrupt rather than gradual. Netscape's decline (accelerated by the [browser wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_wars) and [AOL acquisition](https://cybercultural.com/p/1999-the-fall-of-netscape-and-the-rise-of-mozilla/)) transferred control to a standards body that prioritized process over progress. The result was [a lost decade of web stagnation](https://eev.ee/blog/2020/02/01/old-css-new-css/): CSS 2.0 shipped in 1998; CSS 2.1 didn't reach Candidate Recommendation until 2004 and wasn't finalized until 2011. W3C pursued XHTML and rejected proposed enhancements to HTML, until frustrated engineers from Apple, Mozilla, and Opera formed [WHATWG in 2004](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WHATWG) to build HTML5 outside W3C's process. The abrupt governance transition, without a mechanism to balance community guarantees against the imperative to continue evolving the product at pace, dramatically slowed web evolution at the time it was needed most.
+
+Then in 2023, [W3C restructured from a multi-host consortium into a single 501(c)(3) nonprofit entity](https://www.w3.org/press-releases/2023/w3c-le-launched/) — W3C Inc, incorporated in the US. The previous structure distributed governance across four independent university hosts in different countries, making capture by any single entity structurally difficult. The new structure concentrates governance in a single legal entity with a board of directors. While presented as modernization, this effectively ended the decentralized consortium model that had protected web standards for nearly three decades.
+
+### The governance double ratchet
+
+SimpleX follows the same Netscape-to-consortium evolution path, but with two ratchets designed to prevent both failure modes — stagnation from premature governance transfer, and capture from governance centralization:
+
+- **Licensing ratchet**: all contributed IP is licensed under AGPLv3 (software) and Creative Commons (documentation), perpetually and irrevocably. What is licensed cannot be unlicensed. If a Party transfers Licensed IP, the licensing obligations transfer with it.
+
+- **Governance ratchet**: power can be given to the SimpleX Network Consortium, but never taken back. The Consortium Agreement requires majority decision of all Governing Parties for changes to the agreement itself, IP policy, and admission or removal of parties.
+
+The ratcheted transition is historically proven to be necessary. It allows the company to continue driving rapid product innovation (as Netscape did for the web) while incrementally and irreversibly transferring governance to the consortium, without the abrupt handover that stalled web evolution or the centralization that later undermined it.
+
+### Specification governance via the Consortium Agreement
+
+The SimpleX Network Consortium Agreement (being deployed in 2026) establishes two levels of intellectual property governance: **Licensed IP** (all contributed protocol specifications, software, and documentation, licensed perpetually and irrevocably) and **Core IP** (the subset essential to the network, requiring consortium governance to change). The distinction between these levels and how they map to the RFC process is described in [Standard vs Core specifications](#standard-vs-core-specifications) below.
+
+## Specification change process: protocol specifications and RFCs
+
+Protocol knowledge lives in two places:
+
+### `protocol/` — Consolidated specifications
+
+Each file is a complete, self-contained description of a protocol as it exists today. Like consolidated legislation in the UK legal system: the full current law in one document, not a patchwork of amendments.
+
+Consolidated specifications are maintained on every code change that affects protocol behavior. With LLMs, the cost of maintaining consolidated documents collapses — reworking prose to incorporate a new RFC is now inexpensive relative to the value of a single authoritative document per protocol.
+
+Implementers read `protocol/`. They should never need to reconstruct current behavior from a base spec plus a chain of RFCs.
+
+### `rfcs/` — Protocol evolution commits
+
+Each RFC describes a single change to a protocol specification. RFCs are the atomic unit of protocol evolution — analogous to commits in version control, or amending acts in legislation.
+
+An RFC is not part of the protocol specification. It becomes part of the specification only when embedded into the consolidated `protocol/` document. The RFC itself remains as a permanent historical record of what changed, when, and why.
+
+## RFC lifecycle
+
+```
+                  ┌——> done/ ——> standard/
+draft (root) ——>──┤
+                  └——> rejected/
+```
+
+### Draft — `rfcs/*.md`
+
+A proposal for a protocol change. Not yet implemented. Active proposals live in the `rfcs/` root directory.
+
+Named by proposal date: `YYYY-MM-DD-topic.md`.
+
+A draft may be rejected if the proposal is considered but not accepted for implementation.
+
+### Done — `rfcs/done/`
+
+Implemented in code. The protocol change described by this RFC exists in the codebase, but the RFC has not yet been verified against the actual implementation (code may have diverged from the proposal during implementation).
+
+### Standard — `rfcs/standard/`
+
+Verified against the actual implementation and synchronized with code. The RFC accurately describes what was implemented. This is a permanent historical record — standard RFCs are never modified or removed.
+
+On promotion to standard, the RFC is:
+1. Renamed from proposal date to standardization date: `YYYY-MM-DD-topic.md` (new date, same topic slug)
+2. Updated with a document history header capturing the full lifecycle
+3. Embedded into the corresponding `protocol/` consolidated specification
+
+The `protocol/` document references embedded RFCs by name (e.g., "Private message routing added by RFC 2023-09-12-second-relays, standardized 2026-XX-XX"), similar to UK legislation citing the amending act for each clause.
+
+Protocol version numbers make it clear which RFCs are included in which protocol revision — no separate tracking is needed.
+
+### Rejected — `rfcs/rejected/`
+
+Draft proposals that were considered but not accepted for implementation. Only drafts move to rejected — once an RFC is implemented (done/), it proceeds to standard/ after verification. Preserved for historical record of design decisions.
+
+### Document history header
+
+Every RFC in `standard/` carries a history header:
+
+```
+---
+Proposed: YYYY-MM-DD
+Implemented: YYYY-MM-DD
+Standardized: YYYY-MM-DD
+Protocol: simplex-messaging v9 (or whichever protocol this amends)
+---
+```
+
+## Governance
+
+SimpleX Network follows the Netscape-to-W3C evolution path, with ratcheted rather than abrupt transitions:
+
+| Phase | Period | Governance | Development process |
+|-------|--------|-----------|-------------------|
+| Protocol invented | 2020 | Two people | Prototype developed |
+| SimpleX Chat Ltd | 2022 | One company | Product-first: code leads, specs follow |
+| SimpleX Network Consortium | 2026 | Agreement of SimpleX Chat Ltd and non-profit entities | Product-first for standard; standards-first for core |
+| Decentralized governance | Future | TBD (DAO research ongoing) | Standards-first |
+
+### Current: product-first development
+
+SimpleX protocols currently follow a product-first development process: requirements drive code, code drives specification. RFCs are written as design proposals before implementation, but implementation details are figured out in code. Consolidated protocol specifications in `protocol/` are then amended to match the implementation.
+
+This process is governed by SimpleX Chat Ltd as the IP Holding Party under the Consortium Agreement.
+
+Any Specification Author (as defined in the Consortium Agreement) may propose RFCs. Acceptance and standardization decisions are made by SimpleX Chat Ltd during the current product-first phase.
+
+### Standard vs Core specifications
+
+The distinction between standard and core maps directly to the two levels of IP governance in the Consortium Agreement, and reflects the difference between product-first and standards-first development:
+
+**Standard** — Licensed IP, not yet under consortium governance. Governed by the company.
+
+All contributed protocol specifications are Licensed IP under the Consortium Agreement. Standard specifications follow product-first development: the company can evolve them with product needs, and they must be maintained on every code change that affects protocol behavior.
+
+Standard specifications live in `rfcs/standard/` and `protocol/`.
+
+**Core** — Governed IP, governed by the consortium.
+
+A subset of standard specifications will be designated as Core IP under the Consortium Agreement. Core specifications will follow standards-first development: specification changes must be agreed via Governing Decision before code changes.
+
+This is a legally binding commitment. Once Licensed IP is included in Core IP, the company that owns the code cannot unilaterally change it — even though they own the code, the Consortium Agreement requires a Governing Decision for any change to Core IP. This protects the fundamental properties of the network (privacy, security, decentralization) from unilateral modification by any single party.
+
+The designation of specific specifications as Core IP is itself a Governing Decision that requires Consortium vote. The transition will happen incrementally as protocols stabilize — the governance ratchet ensures that each designation is irreversible.
+
+The exact mechanism for distinguishing core from standard within the RFC and protocol folder structure is TBD — it will be decided as the first protocols are designated as Core IP.
+
+### Future: standards-first development
+
+As more protocols are designated as Core IP, development naturally transitions to a standards-first process for a growing portion of the protocol suite. The governance ratchet ensures this transition is gradual and irreversible — each protocol that becomes core gains the protection of consortium governance permanently, while remaining standard protocols continue to evolve at product pace.
+
+## Current state
+
+| Location | Contents | Count |
+|----------|----------|-------|
+| `protocol/` | Consolidated specs (SMP v9, Agent v5, XFTP v2, XRCP v1, Push v2, PQDR v1) | 6 specs + overview |
+| `rfcs/` root | Active draft proposals | 19 |
+| `rfcs/done/` | Implemented, not yet verified | 25 |
+| `rfcs/standard/` | Verified against implementation | (to be populated) |
+| `rfcs/rejected/` | Draft proposals not accepted | 7 |

scripts/docker/entrypoint-smp-server

@@ -67,14 +67,14 @@ if [ ! -f "${confd}/smp-server.ini" ]; then
 
   # Fix path to certificates
   if [ -n "${WEB_MANUAL}" ]; then
-    sed -i -e 's|^[^#]*https: |#&|' \
-           -e 's|^[^#]*cert: |#&|' \
-           -e 's|^[^#]*key: |#&|' \
-           -e 's|^port:.*|port: 5223|' \
+    sed -i -e 's|^[^#]*https = |#&|' \
+           -e 's|^[^#]*cert = |#&|' \
+           -e 's|^[^#]*key = |#&|' \
+           -e 's|^port = .*|port = 5223|' \
            "${confd}/smp-server.ini"
   else
-    sed -i -e "s|cert: /etc/opt/simplex/web.crt|cert: $cert_path/$ADDR.crt|" \
-           -e "s|key: /etc/opt/simplex/web.key|key: $cert_path/$ADDR.key|" \
+    sed -i -e "s|cert = /etc/opt/simplex/web.crt|cert = $cert_path/$ADDR.crt|" \
+           -e "s|key = /etc/opt/simplex/web.key|key = $cert_path/$ADDR.key|" \
            "${confd}/smp-server.ini"
   fi
 fi

scripts/docker/entrypoint-xftp-server

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ if [ ! -f "${confd}/file-server.ini" ]; then
 
   # Optionally, set password
   if [ -n "${PASS}" ]; then
-    sed -i -e "/^# create_password:/a create_password: $PASS" \
+    sed -i -e "/^# create_password =/a create_password = $PASS" \
            "${confd}/file-server.ini"
   fi
 fi

scripts/simplexmq-reproduce-builds.sh

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ for os in 22.04 24.04; do
 	docker exec \
 		-t \
 		builder \
-		sh -c 'cabal update && cabal build --jobs=$(nproc) --enable-tests -fserver_postgres && mkdir -p /out && for i in smp-server simplexmq-test; do bin=$(find /project/dist-newstyle -name "$i" -type f -executable) && chmod +x "$bin" && mv "$bin" /out/; done && strip /out/smp-server'
+		sh -c 'git config --global --add safe.directory \*; cabal update && cabal build --jobs=$(nproc) --enable-tests -fserver_postgres && mkdir -p /out && for i in smp-server simplexmq-test; do bin=$(find /project/dist-newstyle -name "$i" -type f -executable) && chmod +x "$bin" && mv "$bin" /out/; done && strip /out/smp-server'
 
 	# Copy smp-server postgresql binary and prepare it
 	docker cp \

simplexmq.cabal

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 cabal-version: 1.12
 
 name:           simplexmq
-version:        6.4.0.4
+version:        6.5.2.0
 synopsis:       SimpleXMQ message broker
 description:    This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,
                 <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Client.html client> and
@@ -24,33 +24,38 @@ extra-source-files:
     CHANGELOG.md
     cbits/sha512.h
     cbits/sntrup761.h
-    apps/smp-server/static/index.html
-    apps/smp-server/static/link.html
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/apk_icon.png
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/apple_store.svg
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/contact.js
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/contact_page_mobile.png
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/f_droid.svg
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/favicon.ico
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/GilroyBold.woff2
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/GilroyLight.woff2
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/GilroyMedium.woff2
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/GilroyRegular.woff2
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/GilroyRegularItalic.woff2
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/google_play.svg
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/logo-dark.png
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/logo-light.png
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/logo-symbol-dark.svg
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/logo-symbol-light.svg
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/moon.svg
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/qrcode.js
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/script.js
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/style.css
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/sun.svg
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/swiper-bundle.min.css
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/swiper-bundle.min.js
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/tailwind.css
-    apps/smp-server/static/media/testflight.png
+    apps/common/Web/static/index.html
+    apps/common/Web/static/link.html
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/apk_icon.png
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/apple_store.svg
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/contact.js
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/contact_page_mobile.png
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/f_droid.svg
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/favicon.ico
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/GilroyBold.woff2
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/GilroyLight.woff2
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/GilroyMedium.woff2
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/GilroyRegular.woff2
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/GilroyRegularItalic.woff2
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/google_play.svg
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/logo-dark.png
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/logo-light.png
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/logo-symbol-dark.svg
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/logo-symbol-light.svg
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/moon.svg
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/qrcode.js
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/script.js
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/style.css
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/sun.svg
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/swiper-bundle.min.css
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/swiper-bundle.min.js
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/tailwind.css
+    apps/common/Web/static/media/testflight.png
+    apps/xftp-server/static/media/xftp-protocol.svg
+    apps/xftp-server/static/media/xftp-protocol-dark.svg
+    apps/xftp-server/static/xftp-web-bundle/crypto.worker.js
+    apps/xftp-server/static/xftp-web-bundle/index.css
+    apps/xftp-server/static/xftp-web-bundle/index.js
 
 flag swift
   description: Enable swift JSON format
@@ -103,12 +108,13 @@ library
       Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.AgentStore
       Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Common
       Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.DB
+      Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Entity
       Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Interface
       Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Migrations
       Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Migrations.App
       Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Options
       Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared
-      Simplex.Messaging.Agent.TRcvQueues
+      Simplex.Messaging.Agent.TSessionSubs
       Simplex.Messaging.Client
       Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent
       Simplex.Messaging.Compression
@@ -130,11 +136,13 @@ library
       Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Types
       Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
       Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
+      Simplex.Messaging.Protocol.Types
       Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
       Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Postgres.Config
       Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.QueueInfo
       Simplex.Messaging.ServiceScheme
       Simplex.Messaging.Session
+      Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime
       Simplex.Messaging.TMap
       Simplex.Messaging.Transport
       Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Buffer
@@ -146,6 +154,7 @@ library
       Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Server
       Simplex.Messaging.Transport.KeepAlive
       Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server
+      Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Shared
       Simplex.Messaging.Util
       Simplex.Messaging.Version
       Simplex.Messaging.Version.Internal
@@ -160,6 +169,11 @@ library
           Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20241210_initial
           Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20250203_msg_bodies
           Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20250322_short_links
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20250702_conn_invitations_remove_cascade_delete
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20251009_queue_to_subscribe
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20251010_client_notices
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20251230_strict_tables
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations.M20260410_receive_attempts
   else
       exposed-modules:
           Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite
@@ -206,6 +220,19 @@ library
           Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20241224_ratchet_e2e_snd_params
           Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20250203_msg_bodies
           Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20250322_short_links
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20250702_conn_invitations_remove_cascade_delete
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20251009_queue_to_subscribe
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20251010_client_notices
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20251230_strict_tables
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20260410_receive_attempts
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Util
+  if flag(client_postgres) || flag(server_postgres)
+      exposed-modules:
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Common
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.DB
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations
+          Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Util
   if !flag(client_library)
       exposed-modules:
           Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Main
@@ -213,6 +240,7 @@ library
           Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Control
           Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env
           Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Main
+          Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Prometheus
           Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats
           Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
           Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
@@ -222,7 +250,9 @@ library
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.Information
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main
+          Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main.GitCommit
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main.Init
+          Simplex.Messaging.Server.Web
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Journal
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Journal.SharedLock
@@ -238,14 +268,6 @@ library
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog.ReadWrite
           Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog.Types
           Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets
-      if flag(client_postgres) || flag(server_postgres)
-          exposed-modules:
-              Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres
-              Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Common
-              Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.DB
-              Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Migrations
-              Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Util
-
       if flag(server_postgres)
           exposed-modules:
               Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server
@@ -261,6 +283,10 @@ library
               Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Store.Postgres
               Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Store.Types
               Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.StoreLog
+              Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres
+              Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config
+              Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Migrations
+              Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.Postgres
               Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Postgres
               Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Postgres.Migrations
   other-modules:
@@ -308,6 +334,7 @@ library
     , network-transport ==0.5.6
     , network-udp ==0.0.*
     , random >=1.1 && <1.3
+    , scientific ==0.3.7.*
     , simple-logger ==0.1.*
     , socks ==0.6.*
     , stm ==2.5.*
@@ -330,7 +357,12 @@ library
       , optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
       , process ==1.6.*
       , temporary ==1.3.*
+      , wai >=3.2 && <3.3
+      , wai-app-static >=3.1 && <3.2
+      , warp ==3.3.30
+      , warp-tls ==3.4.7
       , websockets ==0.12.*
+      , zlib >=0.6 && <0.8
   if flag(client_postgres) || flag(server_postgres)
     build-depends:
         postgresql-libpq >=0.10.0.0
@@ -349,10 +381,12 @@ library
   if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
     build-depends:
         bytestring ==0.11.*
+      , template-haskell ==2.20.*
       , text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
   if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
     build-depends:
         bytestring ==0.10.*
+      , template-haskell ==2.16.*
       , text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
 
 executable ntf-server
@@ -383,30 +417,22 @@ executable smp-server
     cpp-options: -DdbServerPostgres
   main-is: Main.hs
   other-modules:
-      Static
-      Static.Embedded
+      SMPWeb
+      Web.Embedded
       Paths_simplexmq
   hs-source-dirs:
       apps/smp-server
-      apps/smp-server/web
+      apps/common
   default-extensions:
       StrictData
   ghc-options: -Weverything -Wno-missing-exported-signatures -Wno-missing-import-lists -Wno-missed-specialisations -Wno-all-missed-specialisations -Wno-unsafe -Wno-safe -Wno-missing-local-signatures -Wno-missing-kind-signatures -Wno-missing-deriving-strategies -Wno-monomorphism-restriction -Wno-prepositive-qualified-module -Wno-implicit-prelude -Wno-missing-safe-haskell-mode -Wno-missing-export-lists -Wno-partial-fields -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-record-updates -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Werror=incomplete-uni-patterns -Werror=missing-methods -Werror=tabs -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wunused-type-patterns -O2 -threaded -rtsopts
   build-depends:
       base
     , bytestring
-    , directory
-    , file-embed
-    , filepath
-    , network
+    , file-embed >=0.0.10 && <0.1
     , simple-logger
     , simplexmq
     , text
-    , unliftio
-    , wai
-    , wai-app-static
-    , warp ==3.3.30
-    , warp-tls ==3.4.7
   default-language: Haskell2010
 
 executable xftp
@@ -430,14 +456,21 @@ executable xftp-server
       buildable: False
   main-is: Main.hs
   other-modules:
+      XFTPWeb
+      Web.Embedded
       Paths_simplexmq
   hs-source-dirs:
       apps/xftp-server
+      apps/common
   default-extensions:
       StrictData
   ghc-options: -Weverything -Wno-missing-exported-signatures -Wno-missing-import-lists -Wno-missed-specialisations -Wno-all-missed-specialisations -Wno-unsafe -Wno-safe -Wno-missing-local-signatures -Wno-missing-kind-signatures -Wno-missing-deriving-strategies -Wno-monomorphism-restriction -Wno-prepositive-qualified-module -Wno-implicit-prelude -Wno-missing-safe-haskell-mode -Wno-missing-export-lists -Wno-partial-fields -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-record-updates -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Werror=incomplete-uni-patterns -Werror=missing-methods -Werror=tabs -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wunused-type-patterns -O2 -threaded -rtsopts
   build-depends:
       base
+    , bytestring
+    , directory
+    , file-embed >=0.0.10 && <0.1
+    , filepath
     , simple-logger
     , simplexmq
   default-language: Haskell2010
@@ -465,7 +498,7 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
       CoreTests.RetryIntervalTests
       CoreTests.SOCKSSettings
       CoreTests.StoreLogTests
-      CoreTests.TRcvQueuesTests
+      CoreTests.TSessionSubs
       CoreTests.UtilTests
       CoreTests.VersionRangeTests
       FileDescriptionTests
@@ -479,8 +512,11 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
       XFTPCLI
       XFTPClient
       XFTPServerTests
-      Static
-      Static.Embedded
+      WebTests
+      XFTPWebTests
+      SMPWeb
+      XFTPWeb
+      Web.Embedded
       Paths_simplexmq
   if flag(client_postgres)
       other-modules:
@@ -492,12 +528,15 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
   if flag(server_postgres)
       other-modules:
           AgentTests.NotificationTests
+          CoreTests.XFTPStoreTests
           NtfClient
           NtfServerTests
           PostgresSchemaDump
   hs-source-dirs:
       tests
-      apps/smp-server/web
+      apps/smp-server
+      apps/xftp-server
+      apps/common
   default-extensions:
       StrictData
   -- add -fhpc to ghc-options to run tests with coverage
@@ -508,17 +547,19 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
     , async
     , base64-bytestring
     , bytestring
+    , case-insensitive ==1.2.*
     , containers
     , crypton
     , crypton-x509
     , crypton-x509-store
     , crypton-x509-validation
     , directory
-    , file-embed
+    , file-embed >=0.0.10 && <0.1
     , filepath
     , generic-random ==1.5.*
     , hashable
     , hspec ==2.11.*
+    , hspec-core ==2.11.*
     , http-client
     , http-types
     , http2
@@ -526,6 +567,7 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
     , ini
     , iso8601-time
     , main-tester ==0.2.*
+    , memory
     , mtl
     , network
     , QuickCheck ==2.14.*
@@ -541,10 +583,6 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
     , unliftio
     , unliftio-core
     , unordered-containers
-    , wai
-    , wai-app-static
-    , warp
-    , warp-tls
     , yaml
   default-language: Haskell2010
   if flag(server_postgres)
@@ -553,9 +591,8 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
     cpp-options: -DdbPostgres
   else
     build-depends:
-        memory
-      , sqlcipher-simple
-  if !flag(client_postgres) || flag(server_postgres)
+        sqlcipher-simple
+  if !flag(client_postgres) || flag(client_postgres) || flag(server_postgres)
     build-depends:
         deepseq ==1.4.*
       , process

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Agent.hs

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ import Data.Map.Strict (Map)
 import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
 import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe, mapMaybe)
 import qualified Data.Set as S
-import Data.Text (Text)
+import Data.Text (Text, pack)
 import Data.Time.Clock (getCurrentTime)
 import Data.Time.Format (defaultTimeLocale, formatTime)
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks (toKB)
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String (strDecode, strEncode)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtocolServer, ProtocolType (..), XFTPServer)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
-import Simplex.Messaging.Util (catchAll_, liftError, tshow, unlessM, whenM)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Util (allFinally, catchAll_, catchAllErrors, liftError, tshow, unlessM, whenM)
 import System.FilePath (takeFileName, (</>))
 import UnliftIO
 import UnliftIO.Directory
@@ -198,10 +198,10 @@ runXFTPRcvWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
             liftIO $ waitForUserNetwork c
             atomically $ incXFTPServerStat c userId srv downloadAttempts
             downloadFileChunk fc replica approvedRelays
-              `catchAgentError` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP rcv worker" (retryLoop loop e delay') (retryDone e) e
+              `catchAllErrors` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP rcv worker" (retryLoop loop e delay') (retryDone e) e
           where
             retryLoop loop e replicaDelay = do
-              flip catchAgentError (\_ -> pure ()) $ do
+              flip catchAllErrors (\_ -> pure ()) $ do
                 when (serverHostError e) $ notify c (fromMaybe rcvFileEntityId redirectEntityId_) (RFWARN e)
                 liftIO $ closeXFTPServerClient c userId server digest
                 withStore' c $ \db -> updateRcvChunkReplicaDelay db rcvChunkReplicaId replicaDelay
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ runXFTPRcvWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
       agentXFTPDownloadChunk c userId digest replica chunkSpec
       liftIO $ waitUntilForeground c
       (entityId, complete, progress) <- withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
+        liftIO $ lockRcvFileForUpdate db rcvFileId
         liftIO $ updateRcvFileChunkReceived db (rcvChunkReplicaId replica) rcvChunkId relChunkPath
         RcvFile {size = FileSize currentSize, chunks, redirect} <- ExceptT $ getRcvFile db rcvFileId
         let rcvd = receivedSize chunks
@@ -280,7 +281,7 @@ runXFTPRcvLocalWorker c Worker {doWork} = do
     runXFTPOperation AgentConfig {rcvFilesTTL} =
       withWork c doWork (`getNextRcvFileToDecrypt` rcvFilesTTL) $
         \f@RcvFile {rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, tmpPath, redirect} ->
-          decryptFile f `catchAgentError` rcvWorkerInternalError c rcvFileId rcvFileEntityId (redirectEntityId <$> redirect) tmpPath
+          decryptFile f `catchAllErrors` rcvWorkerInternalError c rcvFileId rcvFileEntityId (redirectEntityId <$> redirect) tmpPath
     decryptFile :: RcvFile -> AM ()
     decryptFile RcvFile {rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, size, digest, key, nonce, tmpPath, saveFile, status, chunks, redirect} = do
       let CryptoFile savePath cfArgs = saveFile
@@ -307,7 +308,7 @@ runXFTPRcvLocalWorker c Worker {doWork} = do
           liftIO $ waitUntilForeground c
           withStore' c (`updateRcvFileComplete` rcvFileId)
           -- proceed with redirect
-          yaml <- liftError (FILE . FILE_IO . show) (CF.readFile $ CryptoFile fsSavePath cfArgs) `agentFinally` (lift $ toFSFilePath fsSavePath >>= removePath)
+          yaml <- liftError (FILE . FILE_IO . show) (CF.readFile $ CryptoFile fsSavePath cfArgs) `allFinally` (lift $ toFSFilePath fsSavePath >>= removePath)
           next@FileDescription {chunks = nextChunks} <- case strDecode (LB.toStrict yaml) of
             -- TODO switch to another error constructor
             Left _ -> throwE . FILE $ REDIRECT "decode error"
@@ -399,7 +400,7 @@ runXFTPSndPrepareWorker c Worker {doWork} = do
     runXFTPOperation cfg@AgentConfig {sndFilesTTL} =
       withWork c doWork (`getNextSndFileToPrepare` sndFilesTTL) $
         \f@SndFile {sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, prefixPath} ->
-          prepareFile cfg f `catchAgentError` sndWorkerInternalError c sndFileId sndFileEntityId prefixPath
+          prepareFile cfg f `catchAllErrors` sndWorkerInternalError c sndFileId sndFileEntityId prefixPath
     prepareFile :: AgentConfig -> SndFile -> AM ()
     prepareFile _ SndFile {prefixPath = Nothing} =
       throwE $ INTERNAL "no prefix path"
@@ -413,6 +414,7 @@ runXFTPSndPrepareWorker c Worker {doWork} = do
             withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndFileStatus db sndFileId SFSEncrypting
             (digest, chunkSpecsDigests) <- encryptFileForUpload sndFile fsEncPath
             withStore c $ \db -> do
+              lockSndFileForUpdate db sndFileId
               updateSndFileEncrypted db sndFileId digest chunkSpecsDigests
               getSndFile db sndFileId
           else pure sndFile
@@ -431,7 +433,7 @@ runXFTPSndPrepareWorker c Worker {doWork} = do
         encryptFileForUpload :: SndFile -> FilePath -> AM (FileDigest, [(XFTPChunkSpec, FileDigest)])
         encryptFileForUpload SndFile {key, nonce, srcFile, redirect} fsEncPath = do
           let CryptoFile {filePath} = srcFile
-              fileName = takeFileName filePath
+              fileName = pack $ takeFileName filePath
           fileSize <- liftIO $ fromInteger <$> CF.getFileContentsSize srcFile
           when (fileSize > maxFileSizeHard) $ throwE $ FILE FT.SIZE
           let fileHdr = smpEncode FileHeader {fileName, fileExtra = Nothing}
@@ -468,11 +470,11 @@ runXFTPSndPrepareWorker c Worker {doWork} = do
                 liftIO $ waitForUserNetwork c
                 let triedAllSrvs = n > userSrvCount
                 createWithNextSrv triedHosts
-                  `catchAgentError` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP prepare worker" (retryLoop loop triedAllSrvs e) (throwE e) e
+                  `catchAllErrors` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP prepare worker" (retryLoop loop triedAllSrvs e) (throwE e) e
               where
                 -- we don't do closeXFTPServerClient here to not risk closing connection for concurrent chunk upload
                 retryLoop loop triedAllSrvs e = do
-                  flip catchAgentError (\_ -> pure ()) $ do
+                  flip catchAllErrors (\_ -> pure ()) $ do
                     when (triedAllSrvs && serverHostError e) $ notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFWARN e
                   liftIO $ assertAgentForeground c
                   loop
@@ -508,10 +510,10 @@ runXFTPSndWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
             liftIO $ waitForUserNetwork c
             atomically $ incXFTPServerStat c userId srv uploadAttempts
             uploadFileChunk cfg fc replica
-              `catchAgentError` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP snd worker" (retryLoop loop e delay') (retryDone e) e
+              `catchAllErrors` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP snd worker" (retryLoop loop e delay') (retryDone e) e
           where
             retryLoop loop e replicaDelay = do
-              flip catchAgentError (\_ -> pure ()) $ do
+              flip catchAllErrors (\_ -> pure ()) $ do
                 when (serverHostError e) $ notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFWARN e
                 liftIO $ closeXFTPServerClient c userId server digest
                 withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndChunkReplicaDelay db sndChunkReplicaId replicaDelay
@@ -530,6 +532,7 @@ runXFTPSndWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
       agentXFTPUploadChunk c userId chunkDigest replica' chunkSpec'
       liftIO $ waitUntilForeground c
       sf@SndFile {sndFileEntityId, prefixPath, chunks} <- withStore c $ \db -> do
+        lockSndFileForUpdate db sndFileId
         updateSndChunkReplicaStatus db sndChunkReplicaId SFRSUploaded
         getSndFile db sndFileId
       let uploaded = uploadedSize chunks
@@ -681,10 +684,10 @@ runXFTPDelWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
             liftIO $ waitForUserNetwork c
             atomically $ incXFTPServerStat c userId srv deleteAttempts
             deleteChunkReplica
-              `catchAgentError` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP del worker" (retryLoop loop e delay') (retryDone e) e
+              `catchAllErrors` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP del worker" (retryLoop loop e delay') (retryDone e) e
           where
             retryLoop loop e replicaDelay = do
-              flip catchAgentError (\_ -> pure ()) $ do
+              flip catchAllErrors (\_ -> pure ()) $ do
                 when (serverHostError e) $ notify c "" $ SFWARN e
                 liftIO $ closeXFTPServerClient c userId server chunkDigest
                 withStore' c $ \db -> updateDeletedSndChunkReplicaDelay db deletedSndChunkReplicaId replicaDelay

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Chunks.hs

@@ -1,4 +1,14 @@
-module Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks where
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
+  ( serverChunkSizes,
+    chunkSize0,
+    chunkSize1,
+    chunkSize2,
+    chunkSize3,
+    kb,
+    toKB,
+    mb,
+    gb,
+  ) where
 
 import Data.Word (Word32)
 

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Client.hs

@@ -9,7 +9,28 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
 
-module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client where
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client
+  ( XFTPClient (..),
+    XFTPClientConfig (..),
+    XFTPChunkSpec (..),
+    XFTPClientError,
+    defaultXFTPClientConfig,
+    getXFTPClient,
+    closeXFTPClient,
+    xftpClientServer,
+    xftpTransportHost,
+    createXFTPChunk,
+    addXFTPRecipients,
+    uploadXFTPChunk,
+    downloadXFTPChunk,
+    deleteXFTPChunk,
+    ackXFTPChunk,
+    pingXFTP,
+    singleChunkSize,
+    prepareChunkSizes,
+    prepareChunkSpecs,
+    getChunkDigest,
+  ) where
 
 import Control.Logger.Simple
 import Control.Monad
@@ -31,18 +52,22 @@ import qualified Data.X509 as X
 import qualified Data.X509.Validation as XV
 import qualified Network.HTTP.Types as N
 import qualified Network.HTTP2.Client as H
+import Network.Socket (HostName)
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport
 import Simplex.Messaging.Client
   ( NetworkConfig (..),
+    NetworkRequestMode (..),
     ProtocolClientError (..),
     TransportSession,
     chooseTransportHost,
-    defaultNetworkConfig,
-    transportClientConfig,
     clientSocksCredentials,
+    defaultNetworkConfig,
+    netTimeoutInt,
+    transportClientConfig,
     unexpectedResponse,
+    useWebPort,
   )
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
@@ -50,14 +75,16 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding (smpDecode, smpEncode)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
   ( BasicAuth,
+    NetworkError (..),
     Protocol (..),
     ProtocolServer (..),
     RecipientId,
     SenderId,
+    toNetworkError,
     pattern NoEntity,
   )
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN, HandshakeError (..), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..), defaultSupportedParams)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportClientConfig, TransportHost, alpn)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN, CertChainPubKey (..), HandshakeError (..), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..), defaultSupportedParams)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportClientConfig (..), TransportHost)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Client
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File
@@ -99,15 +126,16 @@ defaultXFTPClientConfig =
   XFTPClientConfig
     { xftpNetworkConfig = defaultNetworkConfig,
       serverVRange = supportedFileServerVRange,
-      clientALPN = Just supportedXFTPhandshakes
+      clientALPN = Just alpnSupportedXFTPhandshakes
     }
 
-getXFTPClient :: TransportSession FileResponse -> XFTPClientConfig -> UTCTime -> (XFTPClient -> IO ()) -> IO (Either XFTPClientError XFTPClient)
-getXFTPClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN, xftpNetworkConfig, serverVRange} proxySessTs disconnected = runExceptT $ do
+getXFTPClient :: TransportSession FileResponse -> XFTPClientConfig -> [HostName] -> UTCTime -> (XFTPClient -> IO ()) -> IO (Either XFTPClientError XFTPClient)
+getXFTPClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN, xftpNetworkConfig, serverVRange} presetDomains proxySessTs disconnected = runExceptT $ do
   let socksCreds = clientSocksCredentials xftpNetworkConfig proxySessTs transportSession
       ProtocolServer _ host port keyHash = srv
+      useALPN = if useWebPort xftpNetworkConfig presetDomains srv then Just [httpALPN11] else clientALPN
   useHost <- liftEither $ chooseTransportHost xftpNetworkConfig host
-  let tcConfig = (transportClientConfig xftpNetworkConfig useHost False) {alpn = clientALPN}
+  let tcConfig = transportClientConfig xftpNetworkConfig NRMBackground useHost False useALPN
       http2Config = xftpHTTP2Config tcConfig config
   clientVar <- newTVarIO Nothing
   let usePort = if null port then "443" else port
@@ -116,10 +144,12 @@ getXFTPClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN,
   let HTTP2Client {sessionId, sessionALPN} = http2Client
       v = VersionXFTP 1
       thServerVRange = versionToRange v
-      thParams0 = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = v, thServerVRange, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, encryptBlock = Nothing, batch = True}
+      thParams0 = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = v, thServerVRange, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, encryptBlock = Nothing, batch = True, serviceAuth = False}
   logDebug $ "Client negotiated handshake protocol: " <> tshow sessionALPN
   thParams@THandleParams {thVersion} <- case sessionALPN of
-    Just "xftp/1" -> xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash http2Client thParams0
+    Just alpn
+      | alpn == xftpALPNv1 || alpn == httpALPN11 ->
+          xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash http2Client thParams0
     _ -> pure thParams0
   logDebug $ "Client negotiated protocol: " <> tshow thVersion
   let c = XFTPClient {http2Client, thParams, transportSession, config}
@@ -132,7 +162,8 @@ xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) c@HTTP2Client {session
   (vr, sk) <- processServerHandshake shs
   let v = maxVersion vr
   sendClientHandshake XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = v, keyHash}
-  pure thParams0 {thAuth = Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = sk, serverCertKey = ck, sessSecret = Nothing}, thVersion = v, thServerVRange = vr}
+  let thAuth = Just THAuthClient {peerServerPubKey = sk, peerServerCertKey = ck, clientService = Nothing, sessSecret = Nothing}
+  pure thParams0 {thAuth, thVersion = v, thServerVRange = vr}
   where
     getServerHandshake :: ExceptT XFTPClientError IO XFTPServerHandshake
     getServerHandshake = do
@@ -147,12 +178,12 @@ xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) c@HTTP2Client {session
         Nothing -> throwE $ PCETransportError TEVersion
         Just (Compatible vr) ->
           fmap (vr,) . liftTransportErr (TEHandshake BAD_AUTH) $ do
-            let (X.CertificateChain cert, exact) = serverAuth
+            let CertChainPubKey (X.CertificateChain cert) exact = serverAuth
             case cert of
               [_leaf, ca] | XV.Fingerprint kh == XV.getFingerprint ca X.HashSHA256 -> pure ()
               _ -> throwError "bad certificate"
             pubKey <- maybe (throwError "bad server key type") (`C.verifyX509` exact) serverKey
-            C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey
+            C.x509ToPublic' pubKey
     sendClientHandshake :: XFTPClientHandshake -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
     sendClientHandshake chs = do
       chs' <- liftTransportErr TELargeMsg $ C.pad (smpEncode chs) xftpBlockSize
@@ -177,14 +208,14 @@ xftpHTTP2Config transportConfig XFTPClientConfig {xftpNetworkConfig = NetworkCon
   defaultHTTP2ClientConfig
     { bodyHeadSize = xftpBlockSize,
       suportedTLSParams = defaultSupportedParams,
-      connTimeout = tcpConnectTimeout,
+      connTimeout = netTimeoutInt tcpConnectTimeout NRMBackground,
       transportConfig
     }
 
 xftpClientError :: HTTP2ClientError -> XFTPClientError
 xftpClientError = \case
   HCResponseTimeout -> PCEResponseTimeout
-  HCNetworkError -> PCENetworkError
+  HCNetworkError e -> PCENetworkError e
   HCIOError e -> PCEIOError e
 
 sendXFTPCommand :: forall p. FilePartyI p => XFTPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> XFTPFileId -> FileCommand p -> Maybe XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (FileResponse, HTTP2Body)
@@ -203,7 +234,7 @@ sendXFTPTransmission XFTPClient {config, thParams, http2Client} t chunkSpec_ = d
   HTTP2Response {respBody = body@HTTP2Body {bodyHead}} <- withExceptT xftpClientError . ExceptT $ sendRequest http2Client req (Just reqTimeout)
   when (B.length bodyHead /= xftpBlockSize) $ throwE $ PCEResponseError BLOCK
   -- TODO validate that the file ID is the same as in the request?
-  (_, _, (_, _fId, respOrErr)) <- liftEither . first PCEResponseError $ xftpDecodeTransmission thParams bodyHead
+  (_, _fId, respOrErr) <- liftEither $ first PCEResponseError $ xftpDecodeTClient thParams bodyHead
   case respOrErr of
     Right r -> case protocolError r of
       Just e -> throwE $ PCEProtocolError e
@@ -254,9 +285,9 @@ downloadXFTPChunk g c@XFTPClient {config} rpKey fId chunkSpec@XFTPRcvChunkSpec {
         ExceptT (sequence <$> (t `timeout` (download cbState `catches` errors))) >>= maybe (throwE PCEResponseTimeout) pure
         where
           errors =
-            [ Handler $ \(_e :: H.HTTP2Error) -> pure $ Left PCENetworkError,
-              Handler $ \(e :: IOException) -> pure $ Left (PCEIOError e),
-              Handler $ \(_e :: SomeException) -> pure $ Left PCENetworkError
+            [ Handler $ \(e :: H.HTTP2Error) -> pure $ Left $ PCENetworkError $ NEConnectError $ displayException e,
+              Handler $ \(e :: IOException) -> pure $ Left $ PCEIOError e,
+              Handler $ \(e :: SomeException) -> pure $ Left $ PCENetworkError $ toNetworkError e
             ]
           download cbState =
             runExceptT . withExceptT PCEResponseError $
@@ -267,11 +298,11 @@ downloadXFTPChunk g c@XFTPClient {config} rpKey fId chunkSpec@XFTPRcvChunkSpec {
 
 xftpReqTimeout :: XFTPClientConfig -> Maybe Word32 -> Int
 xftpReqTimeout cfg@XFTPClientConfig {xftpNetworkConfig = NetworkConfig {tcpTimeout}} chunkSize_ =
-  maybe tcpTimeout (chunkTimeout cfg) chunkSize_
+  maybe (netTimeoutInt tcpTimeout NRMBackground) (chunkTimeout cfg) chunkSize_
 
 chunkTimeout :: XFTPClientConfig -> Word32 -> Int
 chunkTimeout XFTPClientConfig {xftpNetworkConfig = NetworkConfig {tcpTimeout, tcpTimeoutPerKb}} sz =
-  tcpTimeout + fromIntegral (min ((fromIntegral sz `div` 1024) * tcpTimeoutPerKb) (fromIntegral (maxBound :: Int)))
+  netTimeoutInt tcpTimeout NRMBackground + fromIntegral (min ((fromIntegral sz `div` 1024) * tcpTimeoutPerKb) (fromIntegral (maxBound :: Int)))
 
 deleteXFTPChunk :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> SenderId -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
 deleteXFTPChunk c spKey sId = sendXFTPCommand c spKey sId FDEL Nothing >>= okResponse

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Client/Agent.hs

@@ -5,7 +5,17 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE NumericUnderscores #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
 
-module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Agent where
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Agent
+  ( XFTPClientVar,
+    XFTPClientAgent (..),
+    XFTPClientAgentConfig (..),
+    XFTPClientAgentError (..),
+    defaultXFTPClientAgentConfig,
+    newXFTPAgent,
+    getXFTPServerClient,
+    showServer,
+    closeXFTPServerClient,
+  ) where
 
 import Control.Logger.Simple (logInfo)
 import Control.Monad
@@ -19,7 +29,7 @@ import Data.Text.Encoding (decodeUtf8)
 import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime, getCurrentTime)
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client
 import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
-import Simplex.Messaging.Client (NetworkConfig (..), ProtocolClientError (..), temporaryClientError)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Client (NetworkConfig (..), NetworkRequestMode (..), ProtocolClientError (..), netTimeoutInt, temporaryClientError)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtocolServer (..), XFTPServer)
 import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
@@ -71,7 +81,7 @@ getXFTPServerClient XFTPClientAgent {xftpClients, startedAt, config} srv = do
     connectClient =
       ExceptT $
         first (XFTPClientAgentError srv)
-          <$> getXFTPClient (1, srv, Nothing) (xftpConfig config) startedAt clientDisconnected
+          <$> getXFTPClient (1, srv, Nothing) (xftpConfig config) [] startedAt clientDisconnected
 
     clientDisconnected :: XFTPClient -> IO ()
     clientDisconnected _ = do
@@ -90,7 +100,7 @@ getXFTPServerClient XFTPClientAgent {xftpClients, startedAt, config} srv = do
     waitForXFTPClient :: XFTPClientVar -> ME XFTPClient
     waitForXFTPClient clientVar = do
       let XFTPClientConfig {xftpNetworkConfig = NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout}} = xftpConfig config
-      client_ <- liftIO $ tcpConnectTimeout `timeout` atomically (readTMVar clientVar)
+      client_ <- liftIO $ netTimeoutInt tcpConnectTimeout NRMBackground `timeout` atomically (readTMVar clientVar)
       liftEither $ case client_ of
         Just (Right c) -> Right c
         Just (Left e) -> Left e
@@ -127,6 +137,6 @@ closeXFTPServerClient XFTPClientAgent {xftpClients, config} srv =
   where
     closeClient cVar = do
       let NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout} = xftpNetworkConfig $ xftpConfig config
-      tcpConnectTimeout `timeout` atomically (readTMVar cVar) >>= \case
+      netTimeoutInt tcpConnectTimeout NRMBackground `timeout` atomically (readTMVar cVar) >>= \case
         Just (Right client) -> closeXFTPClient client `catchAll_` pure ()
         _ -> pure ()

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Client/Main.hs

@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Main
     xftpClientCLI,
     cliSendFile,
     cliSendFileOpts,
+    encodeWebURI,
+    decodeWebURI,
+    fileWebLink,
     singleChunkSize,
     prepareChunkSizes,
     prepareChunkSpecs,
@@ -23,6 +26,7 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Main
   )
 where
 
+import qualified Codec.Compression.Zlib.Raw as Z
 import Control.Logger.Simple
 import Control.Monad
 import Control.Monad.Except
@@ -30,17 +34,19 @@ import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
 import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
 import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
 import Data.Bifunctor (first)
+import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as U
 import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
 import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
 import Data.Char (toLower)
 import Data.Either (partitionEithers)
 import Data.Int (Int64)
-import Data.List (foldl', sortOn)
+import Data.List (foldl', isPrefixOf, sortOn)
 import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..), nonEmpty)
 import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
 import Data.Map.Strict (Map)
 import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
 import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
+import Data.Text (Text)
 import qualified Data.Text as T
 import Data.Word (Word32)
 import GHC.Records (HasField (getField))
@@ -62,7 +68,7 @@ import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String (StrEncoding (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parseAll)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtoServerWithAuth (..), SenderId, SndPrivateAuthKey, XFTPServer, XFTPServerWithAuth)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtoServerWithAuth (..), ProtocolServer (..), SenderId, SndPrivateAuthKey, XFTPServer, XFTPServerWithAuth)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI (getCliCommand')
 import Simplex.Messaging.Util (groupAllOn, ifM, tshow, whenM)
 import System.Exit (exitFailure)
@@ -242,7 +248,8 @@ cliSendFile opts = cliSendFileOpts opts True $ printProgress "Uploaded"
 
 cliSendFileOpts :: SendOptions -> Bool -> (Int64 -> Int64 -> IO ()) -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
 cliSendFileOpts SendOptions {filePath, outputDir, numRecipients, xftpServers, retryCount, tempPath, verbose} printInfo notifyProgress = do
-  let (_, fileName) = splitFileName filePath
+  let (_, fileNameStr) = splitFileName filePath
+      fileName = T.pack fileNameStr
   liftIO $ when printInfo $ printNoNewLine "Encrypting file..."
   g <- liftIO C.newRandom
   (encPath, fdRcv, fdSnd, chunkSpecs, encSize) <- encryptFileForUpload g fileName
@@ -254,14 +261,18 @@ cliSendFileOpts SendOptions {filePath, outputDir, numRecipients, xftpServers, re
   liftIO $ do
     let fdRcvs = createRcvFileDescriptions fdRcv sentChunks
         fdSnd' = createSndFileDescription fdSnd sentChunks
-    (fdRcvPaths, fdSndPath) <- writeFileDescriptions fileName fdRcvs fdSnd'
+    (fdRcvPaths, fdSndPath) <- writeFileDescriptions fileNameStr fdRcvs fdSnd'
     when printInfo $ do
       printNoNewLine "File uploaded!"
       putStrLn $ "\nSender file description: " <> fdSndPath
       putStrLn "Pass file descriptions to the recipient(s):"
     forM_ fdRcvPaths putStrLn
+    when printInfo $ case fdRcvs of
+      rcvFd : _ -> forM_ (fileWebLink rcvFd) $ \(host, fragment) ->
+        putStrLn $ "\nWeb link:\nhttps://" <> B.unpack host <> "/#" <> B.unpack fragment
+      _ -> pure ()
   where
-    encryptFileForUpload :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> String -> ExceptT CLIError IO (FilePath, FileDescription 'FRecipient, FileDescription 'FSender, [XFTPChunkSpec], Int64)
+    encryptFileForUpload :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> Text -> ExceptT CLIError IO (FilePath, FileDescription 'FRecipient, FileDescription 'FSender, [XFTPChunkSpec], Int64)
     encryptFileForUpload g fileName = do
       fileSize <- fromInteger <$> getFileSize filePath
       when (fileSize > maxFileSize) $ throwE $ CLIError $ "Files bigger than " <> maxFileSizeStr <> " are not supported"
@@ -387,10 +398,16 @@ cliSendFileOpts SendOptions {filePath, outputDir, numRecipients, xftpServers, re
 
 cliReceiveFile :: ReceiveOptions -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
 cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath, verbose, yes} =
-  getFileDescription' fileDescription >>= receive
+  getInputFileDescription >>= receive 1
   where
-    receive :: ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
-    receive (ValidFileDescription FileDescription {size, digest, key, nonce, chunks}) = do
+    getInputFileDescription
+      | "http://" `isPrefixOf` fileDescription || "https://" `isPrefixOf` fileDescription = do
+          let fragment = B.pack $ drop 1 $ dropWhile (/= '#') fileDescription
+          when (B.null fragment) $ throwE $ CLIError "Invalid URL: no fragment"
+          either (throwE . CLIError . ("Invalid web link: " <>)) pure $ decodeWebURI fragment
+      | otherwise = getFileDescription' fileDescription
+    receive :: Int -> ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
+    receive depth (ValidFileDescription FileDescription {size, digest, key, nonce, chunks, redirect}) = do
       encPath <- getEncPath tempPath "xftp"
       createDirectory encPath
       a <- liftIO $ newXFTPAgent defaultXFTPClientAgentConfig
@@ -408,13 +425,26 @@ cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath,
       when (encDigest /= unFileDigest digest) $ throwE $ CLIError "File digest mismatch"
       encSize <- liftIO $ foldM (\s path -> (s +) . fromIntegral <$> getFileSize path) 0 chunkPaths
       when (FileSize encSize /= size) $ throwE $ CLIError "File size mismatch"
-      liftIO $ printNoNewLine "Decrypting file..."
-      CryptoFile path _ <- withExceptT cliCryptoError $ decryptChunks encSize chunkPaths key nonce $ fmap CF.plain . getFilePath
-      forM_ chunks $ acknowledgeFileChunk a
-      whenM (doesPathExist encPath) $ removeDirectoryRecursive encPath
-      liftIO $ do
-        printNoNewLine $ "File downloaded: " <> path
-        removeFD yes fileDescription
+      case redirect of
+        Just _
+          | depth > 0 -> do
+              CryptoFile tmpFile _ <- withExceptT cliCryptoError $ decryptChunks encSize chunkPaths key nonce $ \_ ->
+                fmap CF.plain $ uniqueCombine encPath "redirect.yaml"
+              forM_ chunks $ acknowledgeFileChunk a
+              yaml <- liftIO $ B.readFile tmpFile
+              whenM (doesPathExist encPath) $ removeDirectoryRecursive encPath
+              innerVfd <- either (throwE . CLIError . ("Redirect: invalid file description: " <>)) pure $ strDecode yaml
+              receive 0 innerVfd
+          | otherwise -> throwE $ CLIError "Redirect chain too long"
+        Nothing -> do
+          liftIO $ printNoNewLine "Decrypting file..."
+          CryptoFile path _ <- withExceptT cliCryptoError $ decryptChunks encSize chunkPaths key nonce $ fmap CF.plain . getFilePath
+          forM_ chunks $ acknowledgeFileChunk a
+          whenM (doesPathExist encPath) $ removeDirectoryRecursive encPath
+          liftIO $ do
+            printNoNewLine $ "File downloaded: " <> path
+            unless ("http://" `isPrefixOf` fileDescription || "https://" `isPrefixOf` fileDescription) $
+              removeFD yes fileDescription
     downloadFileChunk :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> XFTPClientAgent -> FilePath -> FileSize Int64 -> TVar [Int64] -> FileChunk -> ExceptT CLIError IO (Int, FilePath)
     downloadFileChunk g a encPath (FileSize encSize) downloadedChunks FileChunk {chunkNo, chunkSize, digest, replicas = replica : _} = do
       let FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey} = replica
@@ -430,13 +460,14 @@ cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath,
         when verbose $ putStrLn ""
       pure (chunkNo, chunkPath)
     downloadFileChunk _ _ _ _ _ _ = throwE $ CLIError "chunk has no replicas"
-    getFilePath :: String -> ExceptT String IO FilePath
-    getFilePath name =
-      case filePath of
-        Just path ->
-          ifM (doesDirectoryExist path) (uniqueCombine path name) $
-            ifM (doesFileExist path) (throwE "File already exists") (pure path)
-        _ -> (`uniqueCombine` name) . (</> "Downloads") =<< getHomeDirectory
+    getFilePath :: Text -> ExceptT String IO FilePath
+    getFilePath name = case filePath of
+      Just path ->
+        ifM (doesDirectoryExist path) (uniqueCombine path name') $
+          ifM (doesFileExist path) (throwE "File already exists") (pure path)
+      _ -> (`uniqueCombine` name') . (</> "Downloads") =<< getHomeDirectory
+      where
+        name' = T.unpack name
     acknowledgeFileChunk :: XFTPClientAgent -> FileChunk -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
     acknowledgeFileChunk a FileChunk {replicas = replica : _} = do
       let FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey} = replica
@@ -552,3 +583,24 @@ cliRandomFile RandomFileOptions {filePath, fileSize = FileSize size} = do
       B.hPut h bytes
       when (sz > mb') $ saveRandomFile h (sz - mb')
     mb' = mb 1
+
+-- | Encode file description as web-compatible URI fragment.
+-- Result is base64url(deflateRaw(YAML)), no leading '#'.
+encodeWebURI :: FileDescription 'FRecipient -> B.ByteString
+encodeWebURI fd = U.encode $ LB.toStrict $ Z.compress $ LB.fromStrict $ strEncode fd
+
+-- | Decode web URI fragment to validated file description.
+-- Input is base64url-encoded DEFLATE-compressed YAML, no leading '#'.
+decodeWebURI :: B.ByteString -> Either String (ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient)
+decodeWebURI fragment = do
+  compressed <- U.decode fragment
+  let yaml = LB.toStrict $ Z.decompress $ LB.fromStrict compressed
+  strDecode yaml >>= validateFileDescription
+
+-- | Extract web link host and URI fragment from a file description.
+-- Returns (hostname, uriFragment) for https://hostname/#uriFragment.
+fileWebLink :: FileDescription 'FRecipient -> Maybe (B.ByteString, B.ByteString)
+fileWebLink fd@FileDescription {chunks} = case chunks of
+  (FileChunk {replicas = FileChunkReplica {server = ProtocolServer {host}} : _} : _) ->
+    Just (strEncode (L.head host), encodeWebURI fd)
+  _ -> Nothing

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Client/Presets.hs

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedLists #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
 
-module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Presets where
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Presets
+  ( defaultXFTPServers,
+  ) where
 
 import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (XFTPServerWithAuth)

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Crypto.hs

@@ -4,7 +4,11 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
 
-module Simplex.FileTransfer.Crypto where
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Crypto
+  ( encryptFile,
+    decryptChunks,
+    readChunks,
+  ) where
 
 import Control.Monad
 import Control.Monad.Except
@@ -16,6 +20,7 @@ import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
 import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
 import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
 import Data.Int (Int64)
+import Data.Text (Text)
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Types (FileHeader (..), authTagSize)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File (CryptoFile (..), FTCryptoError (..))
@@ -54,7 +59,7 @@ encryptFile srcFile fileHdr key nonce fileSize' encSize encFile = do
           liftIO $ B.hPut w ch'
           encryptChunks_ get w (sb', len - chSize)
 
-decryptChunks :: Int64 -> [FilePath] -> C.SbKey -> C.CbNonce -> (String -> ExceptT String IO CryptoFile) -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO CryptoFile
+decryptChunks :: Int64 -> [FilePath] -> C.SbKey -> C.CbNonce -> (Text -> ExceptT String IO CryptoFile) -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO CryptoFile
 decryptChunks _ [] _ _ _ = throwE $ FTCEInvalidHeader "empty"
 decryptChunks encSize (chPath : chPaths) key nonce getDestFile = case reverse chPaths of
   [] -> do

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Protocol.hs

@@ -14,7 +14,25 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
 {-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-unticked-promoted-constructors #-}
 
-module Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol where
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol
+  ( FileParty (..),
+    SFileParty (..),
+    AFileParty (..),
+    FilePartyI (..),
+    FileCommand (..),
+    FileCmd (..),
+    FileInfo (..),
+    XFTPFileId,
+    FileResponse (..),
+    xftpBlockSize,
+    toFileParty,
+    aFileParty,
+    checkParty,
+    xftpEncodeAuthTransmission,
+    xftpEncodeTransmission,
+    xftpDecodeTServer,
+    xftpDecodeTClient,
+  ) where
 
 import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
 import Data.Bifunctor (first)
@@ -44,8 +62,9 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
     EntityId (..),
     RecipientId,
     SenderId,
+    RawTransmission,
     SentRawTransmission,
-    SignedTransmission,
+    SignedTransmissionOrError,
     SndPublicAuthKey,
     Transmission,
     TransmissionForAuth (..),
@@ -53,7 +72,8 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
     encodeTransmission,
     encodeTransmissionForAuth,
     messageTagP,
-    tDecodeParseValidate,
+    tDecodeServer,
+    tDecodeClient,
     tEncodeBatch1,
     tParse,
   )
@@ -144,10 +164,15 @@ instance Protocol XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType FileResponse where
   type ProtoCommand FileResponse = FileCmd
   type ProtoType FileResponse = 'PXFTP
   protocolClientHandshake = xftpClientHandshakeStub
+  {-# INLINE protocolClientHandshake #-}
+  useServiceAuth _ = False
+  {-# INLINE useServiceAuth #-}
   protocolPing = FileCmd SFRecipient PING
+  {-# INLINE protocolPing #-}
   protocolError = \case
     FRErr e -> Just e
     _ -> Nothing
+  {-# INLINE protocolError #-}
 
 data FileCommand (p :: FileParty) where
   FNEW :: FileInfo -> NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> Maybe BasicAuth -> FileCommand FSender
@@ -192,7 +217,7 @@ instance FilePartyI p => ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType (FileCommand
   fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @XFTPVersion @XFTPErrorType @FileResponse
   {-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
 
-  checkCredentials (auth, _, EntityId fileId, _) cmd = case cmd of
+  checkCredentials auth (EntityId fileId) cmd = case cmd of
     -- FNEW must not have signature and chunk ID
     FNEW {}
       | isNothing auth -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
@@ -226,7 +251,8 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType FileCmd where
   fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @XFTPVersion @XFTPErrorType @FileResponse
   {-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
 
-  checkCredentials t (FileCmd p c) = FileCmd p <$> checkCredentials t c
+  checkCredentials tAuth entId (FileCmd p c) = FileCmd p <$> checkCredentials tAuth entId c
+  {-# INLINE checkCredentials #-}
 
 instance Encoding FileInfo where
   smpEncode FileInfo {sndKey, size, digest} = smpEncode (sndKey, size, digest)
@@ -304,7 +330,7 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType FileResponse where
     PEBlock -> BLOCK
   {-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
 
-  checkCredentials (_, _, EntityId entId, _) cmd = case cmd of
+  checkCredentials _ (EntityId entId) cmd = case cmd of
     FRSndIds {} -> noEntity
     -- ERR response does not always have entity ID
     FRErr _ -> Right cmd
@@ -329,25 +355,35 @@ checkParty' c = case testEquality (sFileParty @p) (sFileParty @p') of
   Just Refl -> Just c
   _ -> Nothing
 
-xftpEncodeAuthTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
-xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams@THandleParams {thAuth} pKey (corrId, fId, msg) = do
-  let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, fId, msg)
-  xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission thAuth (Just pKey) (C.cbNonce $ bs corrId) tForAuth
+xftpEncodeAuthTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType c => THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
+xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams@THandleParams {thAuth} pKey t@(corrId, _, _) = do
+  let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams t
+  xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission thAuth False (Just pKey) (C.cbNonce $ bs corrId) tForAuth
 
-xftpEncodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion p -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
-xftpEncodeTransmission thParams (corrId, fId, msg) = do
-  let t = encodeTransmission thParams (corrId, fId, msg)
-  xftpEncodeBatch1 (Nothing, t)
+xftpEncodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion XFTPErrorType c => THandleParams XFTPVersion p -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
+xftpEncodeTransmission thParams t = xftpEncodeBatch1 (Nothing, encodeTransmission thParams t)
 
 -- this function uses batch syntax but puts only one transmission in the batch
 xftpEncodeBatch1 :: SentRawTransmission -> Either TransportError ByteString
-xftpEncodeBatch1 t = first (const TELargeMsg) $ C.pad (tEncodeBatch1 t) xftpBlockSize
+xftpEncodeBatch1 t = first (const TELargeMsg) $ C.pad (tEncodeBatch1 False t) xftpBlockSize
 
-xftpDecodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion p -> ByteString -> Either XFTPErrorType (SignedTransmission e c)
-xftpDecodeTransmission thParams t = do
+xftpDecodeTServer :: THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer -> ByteString -> Either XFTPErrorType (SignedTransmissionOrError XFTPErrorType FileCmd)
+xftpDecodeTServer = xftpDecodeTransmission tDecodeServer
+{-# INLINE xftpDecodeTServer #-}
+
+xftpDecodeTClient :: THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TClient -> ByteString -> Either XFTPErrorType (Transmission (Either XFTPErrorType FileResponse))
+xftpDecodeTClient = xftpDecodeTransmission tDecodeClient
+{-# INLINE xftpDecodeTClient #-}
+
+xftpDecodeTransmission ::
+  (THandleParams XFTPVersion p -> Either TransportError RawTransmission -> r) ->
+  THandleParams XFTPVersion p ->
+  ByteString ->
+  Either XFTPErrorType r
+xftpDecodeTransmission tDecode thParams t = do
   t' <- first (const BLOCK) $ C.unPad t
   case tParse thParams t' of
-    t'' :| [] -> Right $ tDecodeParseValidate thParams t''
+    t'' :| [] -> Right $ tDecode thParams t''
     _ -> Left BLOCK
 
 $(J.deriveJSON (enumJSON $ dropPrefix "F") ''FileParty)

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs

@@ -13,7 +13,10 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
 
-module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server where
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server
+  ( runXFTPServer,
+    runXFTPServerBlocking,
+  ) where
 
 import Control.Logger.Simple
 import Control.Monad
@@ -26,12 +29,11 @@ import Data.ByteString.Builder (Builder, byteString)
 import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
 import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
 import Data.Int (Int64)
-import Data.List (intercalate)
 import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
 import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
-import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
 import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe, isJust)
 import qualified Data.Text as T
+import qualified Data.Text.IO as T
 import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime (..), diffTimeToPicoseconds, getCurrentTime)
 import Data.Time.Format.ISO8601 (iso8601Show)
 import Data.Word (Word32)
@@ -40,11 +42,13 @@ import GHC.IO.Handle (hSetNewlineMode)
 import GHC.IORef (atomicSwapIORef)
 import GHC.Stats (getRTSStats)
 import qualified Network.HTTP.Types as N
+import Network.HPACK.Token (tokenKey)
 import qualified Network.HTTP2.Server as H
 import Network.Socket
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol
-import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Control
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Control (ControlProtocol (..))
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Prometheus
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
@@ -53,22 +57,25 @@ import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
-import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CorrId (..), BlockingInfo, EntityId (..), RcvPublicAuthKey, RcvPublicDhKey, RecipientId, TransmissionAuth, pattern NoEntity)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Server (dummyVerifyCmd, verifyCmdAuthorization)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BlockingInfo, EntityId (..), RcvPublicAuthKey, RcvPublicDhKey, RecipientId, SignedTransmission, pattern NoEntity)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server (controlPortAuth, dummyVerifyCmd, verifyCmdAuthorization)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Control (CPClientRole (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
-import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore (RoundedSystemTime, ServerEntityStatus (..), getRoundedSystemTime)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore (ServerEntityStatus (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats
+import Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime
 import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN, SessionId, THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TransportPeer (..), defaultSupportedParams)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (CertChainPubKey (..), SessionId, THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TransportPeer (..), defaultSupportedParams, defaultSupportedParamsHTTPS)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Buffer (trimCR)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File (fileBlockSize)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Server
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (runLocalTCPServer)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Server (runHTTP2Server)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (SNICredentialUsed, TransportServerConfig (..), runLocalTCPServer)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Web (serveStaticPageH2)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Util
 import Simplex.Messaging.Version
+import System.Environment (lookupEnv)
 import System.Exit (exitFailure)
 import System.FilePath ((</>))
 import System.IO (hPrint, hPutStrLn, universalNewlineMode)
@@ -77,78 +84,130 @@ import System.Random (getStdRandom, randomR)
 #endif
 import UnliftIO
 import UnliftIO.Concurrent (threadDelay)
-import UnliftIO.Directory (doesFileExist, removeFile, renameFile)
+import UnliftIO.Directory (canonicalizePath, doesFileExist, removeFile, renameFile)
 import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
 
-type M a = ReaderT XFTPEnv IO a
+type M s a = ReaderT (XFTPEnv s) IO a
 
 data XFTPTransportRequest = XFTPTransportRequest
   { thParams :: THandleParamsXFTP 'TServer,
     reqBody :: HTTP2Body,
     request :: H.Request,
-    sendResponse :: H.Response -> IO ()
+    sendResponse :: H.Response -> IO (),
+    sniUsed :: SNICredentialUsed,
+    addCORS :: Bool
   }
 
-runXFTPServer :: XFTPServerConfig -> IO ()
+corsHeaders :: Bool -> [N.Header]
+corsHeaders addCORS
+  | addCORS = [("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*"), ("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", "*")]
+  | otherwise = []
+
+corsPreflightHeaders :: [N.Header]
+corsPreflightHeaders =
+  [ ("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*"),
+    ("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "POST, OPTIONS"),
+    ("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "*"),
+    ("Access-Control-Max-Age", "86400")
+  ]
+
+runXFTPServer :: FileStoreClass s => XFTPServerConfig s -> IO ()
 runXFTPServer cfg = do
   started <- newEmptyTMVarIO
-  runXFTPServerBlocking started cfg $ Just supportedXFTPhandshakes
+  runXFTPServerBlocking started cfg
 
-runXFTPServerBlocking :: TMVar Bool -> XFTPServerConfig -> Maybe [ALPN] -> IO ()
-runXFTPServerBlocking started cfg alpn_ = newXFTPServerEnv cfg >>= runReaderT (xftpServer cfg started alpn_)
+runXFTPServerBlocking :: FileStoreClass s => TMVar Bool -> XFTPServerConfig s -> IO ()
+runXFTPServerBlocking started cfg = newXFTPServerEnv cfg >>= runReaderT (xftpServer cfg started)
 
 data Handshake
   = HandshakeSent C.PrivateKeyX25519
   | HandshakeAccepted (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer)
 
-xftpServer :: XFTPServerConfig -> TMVar Bool -> Maybe [ALPN] -> M ()
-xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpiration, fileExpiration, xftpServerVRange} started alpn_ = do
+xftpServer :: forall s. FileStoreClass s => XFTPServerConfig s -> TMVar Bool -> M s ()
+xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpiration, fileExpiration, xftpServerVRange} started = do
   mapM_ (expireServerFiles Nothing) fileExpiration
   restoreServerStats
-  raceAny_ (runServer : expireFilesThread_ cfg <> serverStatsThread_ cfg <> controlPortThread_ cfg) `finally` stopServer
+  raceAny_
+    ( runServer
+        : expireFilesThread_ cfg
+          <> serverStatsThread_ cfg
+          <> prometheusMetricsThread_ cfg
+          <> controlPortThread_ cfg
+    )
+    `finally` stopServer
   where
-    runServer :: M ()
+    runServer :: M s ()
     runServer = do
       srvCreds@(chain, pk) <- asks tlsServerCreds
-      signKey <- liftIO $ case C.x509ToPrivate (pk, []) >>= C.privKey of
+      httpCreds_ <- asks httpServerCreds
+      signKey <- liftIO $ case C.x509ToPrivate' pk of
         Right pk' -> pure pk'
-        Left e -> putStrLn ("servers has no valid key: " <> show e) >> exitFailure
+        Left e -> putStrLn ("Server has no valid key: " <> show e) >> exitFailure
       env <- ask
       sessions <- liftIO TM.emptyIO
       let cleanup sessionId = atomically $ TM.delete sessionId sessions
-      liftIO . runHTTP2Server started xftpPort defaultHTTP2BufferSize defaultSupportedParams srvCreds alpn_ transportConfig inactiveClientExpiration cleanup $ \sessionId sessionALPN r sendResponse -> do
-        reqBody <- getHTTP2Body r xftpBlockSize
-        let v = VersionXFTP 1
-            thServerVRange = versionToRange v
-            thParams0 = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = v, thServerVRange, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, encryptBlock = Nothing, batch = True}
-            req0 = XFTPTransportRequest {thParams = thParams0, request = r, reqBody, sendResponse}
-        flip runReaderT env $ case sessionALPN of
-          Nothing -> processRequest req0
-          Just "xftp/1" ->
-            xftpServerHandshakeV1 chain signKey sessions req0 >>= \case
-              Nothing -> pure () -- handshake response sent
-              Just thParams -> processRequest req0 {thParams} -- proceed with new version (XXX: may as well switch the request handler here)
-          _ -> liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseNoBody N.ok200 [] -- shouldn't happen: means server picked handshake protocol it doesn't know about
-    xftpServerHandshakeV1 :: X.CertificateChain -> C.APrivateSignKey -> TMap SessionId Handshake -> XFTPTransportRequest -> M (Maybe (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer))
-    xftpServerHandshakeV1 chain serverSignKey sessions XFTPTransportRequest {thParams = thParams0@THandleParams {sessionId}, reqBody = HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sendResponse} = do
+          srvParams = if isJust httpCreds_ then defaultSupportedParamsHTTPS else defaultSupportedParams
+      webCanonicalRoot_ <- liftIO $ mapM canonicalizePath (webStaticPath cfg)
+      liftIO . runHTTP2Server started xftpPort defaultHTTP2BufferSize srvParams srvCreds httpCreds_ transportConfig inactiveClientExpiration cleanup $ \sniUsed sessionId sessionALPN r sendResponse -> do
+        let addCORS' = sniUsed && addCORSHeaders transportConfig
+        case H.requestMethod r of
+          Just "OPTIONS" | addCORS' -> sendResponse $ H.responseNoBody N.ok200 corsPreflightHeaders
+          Just "GET" | sniUsed -> forM_ webCanonicalRoot_ $ \root -> serveStaticPageH2 root r sendResponse
+          _ -> do
+            reqBody <- getHTTP2Body r xftpBlockSize
+            let v = VersionXFTP 1
+                thServerVRange = versionToRange v
+                thParams0 = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = v, thServerVRange, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, encryptBlock = Nothing, batch = True, serviceAuth = False}
+                req0 = XFTPTransportRequest {thParams = thParams0, request = r, reqBody, sendResponse, sniUsed, addCORS = addCORS'}
+            flip runReaderT env $ case sessionALPN of
+              Nothing -> processRequest req0
+              Just alpn
+                | alpn == xftpALPNv1 || alpn == httpALPN11 || (sniUsed && alpn == "h2") ->
+                    xftpServerHandshakeV1 chain signKey sessions req0 >>= \case
+                      Nothing -> pure ()
+                      Just thParams -> processRequest req0 {thParams}
+                | otherwise -> liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseNoBody N.ok200 (corsHeaders addCORS')
+    xftpServerHandshakeV1 :: X.CertificateChain -> C.APrivateSignKey -> TMap SessionId Handshake -> XFTPTransportRequest -> M s (Maybe (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer))
+    xftpServerHandshakeV1 chain serverSignKey sessions XFTPTransportRequest {thParams = thParams0@THandleParams {sessionId}, request, reqBody = HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sendResponse, sniUsed, addCORS} = do
       s <- atomically $ TM.lookup sessionId sessions
       r <- runExceptT $ case s of
-        Nothing -> processHello
-        Just (HandshakeSent pk) -> processClientHandshake pk
-        Just (HandshakeAccepted thParams) -> pure $ Just thParams
+        Nothing
+          | sniUsed && not webHello -> throwE SESSION
+          | otherwise -> processHello Nothing
+        Just (HandshakeSent pk)
+          | webHello -> processHello (Just pk)
+          | otherwise -> processClientHandshake pk
+        Just (HandshakeAccepted thParams)
+          | webHello -> processHello (serverPrivKey <$> thAuth thParams)
+          | webHandshake, Just auth <- thAuth thParams -> processClientHandshake (serverPrivKey auth)
+          | otherwise -> pure $ Just thParams
       either sendError pure r
       where
-        processHello = do
-          unless (B.null bodyHead) $ throwE HANDSHAKE
-          (k, pk) <- atomically . C.generateKeyPair =<< asks random
-          atomically $ TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeSent pk) sessions
-          let authPubKey = (chain, C.signX509 serverSignKey $ C.publicToX509 k)
-          let hs = XFTPServerHandshake {xftpVersionRange = xftpServerVRange, sessionId, authPubKey}
+        webHello = sniUsed && any (\(t, _) -> tokenKey t == "xftp-web-hello") (fst $ H.requestHeaders request)
+        webHandshake = sniUsed && any (\(t, _) -> tokenKey t == "xftp-handshake") (fst $ H.requestHeaders request)
+        processHello pk_ = do
+          challenge_ <-
+            if
+              | B.null bodyHead -> pure Nothing
+              | sniUsed -> do
+                  body <- liftHS $ C.unPad bodyHead
+                  XFTPClientHello {webChallenge} <- liftHS $ first show (smpDecode body)
+                  pure webChallenge
+              | otherwise -> throwE HANDSHAKE
+          rng <- asks random
+          k <- atomically $ TM.lookup sessionId sessions >>= \case
+            Just (HandshakeSent pk') -> pure $ C.publicKey pk'
+            _ -> do
+              kp <- maybe (C.generateKeyPair rng) (\p -> pure (C.publicKey p, p)) pk_
+              fst kp <$ TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeSent $ snd kp) sessions
+          let authPubKey = CertChainPubKey chain (C.signX509 serverSignKey $ C.publicToX509 k)
+              webIdentityProof = C.sign serverSignKey . (<> sessionId) <$> challenge_
+          let hs = XFTPServerHandshake {xftpVersionRange = xftpServerVRange, sessionId, authPubKey, webIdentityProof}
           shs <- encodeXftp hs
 #ifdef slow_servers
           lift randomDelay
 #endif
-          liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseBuilder N.ok200 [] shs
+          liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseBuilder N.ok200 (corsHeaders addCORS) shs
           pure Nothing
         processClientHandshake pk = do
           unless (B.length bodyHead == xftpBlockSize) $ throwE HANDSHAKE
@@ -158,48 +217,49 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
           unless (keyHash == kh) $ throwE HANDSHAKE
           case compatibleVRange' xftpServerVRange v of
             Just (Compatible vr) -> do
-              let auth = THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, sessSecret' = Nothing}
+              let auth = THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, peerClientService = Nothing, sessSecret' = Nothing}
                   thParams = thParams0 {thAuth = Just auth, thVersion = v, thServerVRange = vr}
               atomically $ TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeAccepted thParams) sessions
 #ifdef slow_servers
               lift randomDelay
 #endif
-              liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseNoBody N.ok200 []
+              liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseNoBody N.ok200 (corsHeaders addCORS)
               pure Nothing
             Nothing -> throwE HANDSHAKE
-        sendError :: XFTPErrorType -> M (Maybe (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer))
+        sendError :: XFTPErrorType -> M s (Maybe (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer))
         sendError err = do
           runExceptT (encodeXftp err) >>= \case
-            Right bs -> liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseBuilder N.ok200 [] bs
+            Right bs -> liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseBuilder N.ok200 (corsHeaders addCORS) bs
             Left _ -> logError $ "Error encoding handshake error: " <> tshow err
           pure Nothing
-        encodeXftp :: Encoding a => a -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType (ReaderT XFTPEnv IO) Builder
+        encodeXftp :: Encoding a => a -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType (ReaderT (XFTPEnv s) IO) Builder
         encodeXftp a = byteString <$> liftHS (C.pad (smpEncode a) xftpBlockSize)
         liftHS = liftEitherWith (const HANDSHAKE)
 
-    stopServer :: M ()
+    stopServer :: M s ()
     stopServer = do
-      withFileLog closeStoreLog
+      st <- asks fileStore
+      liftIO $ closeFileStore st
       saveServerStats
       logNote "Server stopped"
 
-    expireFilesThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig -> [M ()]
+    expireFilesThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig s -> [M s ()]
     expireFilesThread_ XFTPServerConfig {fileExpiration = Just fileExp} = [expireFiles fileExp]
     expireFilesThread_ _ = []
 
-    expireFiles :: ExpirationConfig -> M ()
+    expireFiles :: ExpirationConfig -> M s ()
     expireFiles expCfg = do
       let interval = checkInterval expCfg * 1000000
       forever $ do
         liftIO $ threadDelay' interval
         expireServerFiles (Just 100000) expCfg
 
-    serverStatsThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig -> [M ()]
+    serverStatsThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig s -> [M s ()]
     serverStatsThread_ XFTPServerConfig {logStatsInterval = Just interval, logStatsStartTime, serverStatsLogFile} =
       [logServerStats logStatsStartTime interval serverStatsLogFile]
     serverStatsThread_ _ = []
 
-    logServerStats :: Int64 -> Int64 -> FilePath -> M ()
+    logServerStats :: Int64 -> Int64 -> FilePath -> M s ()
     logServerStats startAt logInterval statsFilePath = do
       initialDelay <- (startAt -) . fromIntegral . (`div` 1000000_000000) . diffTimeToPicoseconds . utctDayTime <$> liftIO getCurrentTime
       liftIO $ putStrLn $ "server stats log enabled: " <> statsFilePath
@@ -221,30 +281,54 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
           fileDownloadAcks' <- atomicSwapIORef fileDownloadAcks 0
           filesCount' <- readIORef filesCount
           filesSize' <- readIORef filesSize
-          hPutStrLn h $
-            intercalate
+          T.hPutStrLn h $
+            T.intercalate
               ","
-              [ iso8601Show $ utctDay fromTime',
-                show filesCreated',
-                show fileRecipients',
-                show filesUploaded',
-                show filesDeleted',
+              [ T.pack $ iso8601Show $ utctDay fromTime',
+                tshow filesCreated',
+                tshow fileRecipients',
+                tshow filesUploaded',
+                tshow filesDeleted',
                 dayCount files,
                 weekCount files,
                 monthCount files,
-                show fileDownloads',
-                show fileDownloadAcks',
-                show filesCount',
-                show filesSize',
-                show filesExpired'
+                tshow fileDownloads',
+                tshow fileDownloadAcks',
+                tshow filesCount',
+                tshow filesSize',
+                tshow filesExpired'
               ]
         liftIO $ threadDelay' interval
 
-    controlPortThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig -> [M ()]
+    prometheusMetricsThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig s -> [M s ()]
+    prometheusMetricsThread_ XFTPServerConfig {prometheusInterval = Just interval, prometheusMetricsFile} =
+      [savePrometheusMetrics interval prometheusMetricsFile]
+    prometheusMetricsThread_ _ = []
+
+    savePrometheusMetrics :: Int -> FilePath -> M s ()
+    savePrometheusMetrics saveInterval metricsFile = do
+      labelMyThread "savePrometheusMetrics"
+      liftIO $ putStrLn $ "Prometheus metrics saved every " <> show saveInterval <> " seconds to " <> metricsFile
+      ss <- asks serverStats
+      rtsOpts <- liftIO $ maybe ("set " <> rtsOptionsEnv) T.pack <$> lookupEnv (T.unpack rtsOptionsEnv)
+      let interval = 1000000 * saveInterval
+      liftIO $ forever $ do
+        threadDelay interval
+        ts <- getCurrentTime
+        sm <- getFileServerMetrics ss rtsOpts
+        T.writeFile metricsFile $ xftpPrometheusMetrics sm ts
+
+    getFileServerMetrics :: FileServerStats -> T.Text -> IO FileServerMetrics
+    getFileServerMetrics ss rtsOptions = do
+      d <- getFileServerStatsData ss
+      let fd = periodStatDataCounts $ _filesDownloaded d
+      pure FileServerMetrics {statsData = d, filesDownloadedPeriods = fd, rtsOptions}
+
+    controlPortThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig s -> [M s ()]
     controlPortThread_ XFTPServerConfig {controlPort = Just port} = [runCPServer port]
     controlPortThread_ _ = []
 
-    runCPServer :: ServiceName -> M ()
+    runCPServer :: ServiceName -> M s ()
     runCPServer port = do
       cpStarted <- newEmptyTMVarIO
       u <- askUnliftIO
@@ -252,7 +336,7 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
         labelMyThread "control port server"
         runLocalTCPServer cpStarted port $ runCPClient u
       where
-        runCPClient :: UnliftIO (ReaderT XFTPEnv IO) -> Socket -> IO ()
+        runCPClient :: UnliftIO (ReaderT (XFTPEnv s) IO) -> Socket -> IO ()
         runCPClient u sock = do
           labelMyThread "control port client"
           h <- socketToHandle sock ReadWriteMode
@@ -277,23 +361,20 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
                   CPSkip -> False
                   _ -> True
             processCP h role = \case
-              CPAuth auth -> atomically $ writeTVar role $! newRole cfg
+              CPAuth auth -> controlPortAuth h user admin role auth
                 where
-                  newRole XFTPServerConfig {controlPortUserAuth = user, controlPortAdminAuth = admin}
-                    | Just auth == admin = CPRAdmin
-                    | Just auth == user = CPRUser
-                    | otherwise = CPRNone
+                  XFTPServerConfig {controlPortUserAuth = user, controlPortAdminAuth = admin} = cfg
               CPStatsRTS -> E.tryAny getRTSStats >>= either (hPrint h) (hPrint h)
               CPDelete fileId -> withUserRole $ unliftIO u $ do
-                fs <- asks store
+                fs <- asks fileStore
                 r <- runExceptT $ do
-                  (fr, _) <- ExceptT $ atomically $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId
+                  (fr, _) <- ExceptT $ liftIO $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId
                   ExceptT $ deleteServerFile_ fr
                 liftIO . hPutStrLn h $ either (\e -> "error: " <> show e) (\() -> "ok") r
               CPBlock fileId info -> withUserRole $ unliftIO u $ do
-                fs <- asks store
+                fs <- asks fileStore
                 r <- runExceptT $ do
-                  (fr, _) <- ExceptT $ atomically $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId
+                  (fr, _) <- ExceptT $ liftIO $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId
                   ExceptT $ blockServerFile fr info
                 liftIO . hPutStrLn h $ either (\e -> "error: " <> show e) (\() -> "ok") r
               CPHelp -> hPutStrLn h "commands: stats-rts, delete, help, quit"
@@ -314,29 +395,27 @@ data ServerFile = ServerFile
     sbState :: LC.SbState
   }
 
-processRequest :: XFTPTransportRequest -> M ()
-processRequest XFTPTransportRequest {thParams, reqBody = body@HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sendResponse}
+processRequest :: FileStoreClass s => XFTPTransportRequest -> M s ()
+processRequest XFTPTransportRequest {thParams, reqBody = body@HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sendResponse, addCORS}
   | B.length bodyHead /= xftpBlockSize = sendXFTPResponse ("", NoEntity, FRErr BLOCK) Nothing
-  | otherwise = do
-      case xftpDecodeTransmission thParams bodyHead of
-        Right (sig_, signed, (corrId, fId, cmdOrErr)) ->
-          case cmdOrErr of
-            Right cmd -> do
-              let THandleParams {thAuth} = thParams
-              verifyXFTPTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (bs corrId)) <$> thAuth) sig_ signed fId cmd >>= \case
-                VRVerified req -> uncurry send =<< processXFTPRequest body req
-                VRFailed e -> send (FRErr e) Nothing
-            Left e -> send (FRErr e) Nothing
+  | otherwise =
+      case xftpDecodeTServer thParams bodyHead of
+        Right (Right t@(_, _, (corrId, fId, _))) -> do
+          let THandleParams {thAuth} = thParams
+          verifyXFTPTransmission thAuth t >>= \case
+            VRVerified req -> uncurry send =<< processXFTPRequest body req
+            VRFailed e -> send (FRErr e) Nothing
           where
             send resp = sendXFTPResponse (corrId, fId, resp)
+        Right (Left (corrId, fId, e)) -> sendXFTPResponse (corrId, fId, FRErr e) Nothing
         Left e -> sendXFTPResponse ("", NoEntity, FRErr e) Nothing
   where
-    sendXFTPResponse (corrId, fId, resp) serverFile_ = do
-      let t_ = xftpEncodeTransmission thParams (corrId, fId, resp)
+    sendXFTPResponse t' serverFile_ = do
+      let t_ = xftpEncodeTransmission thParams t'
 #ifdef slow_servers
       randomDelay
 #endif
-      liftIO $ sendResponse $ H.responseStreaming N.ok200 [] $ streamBody t_
+      liftIO $ sendResponse $ H.responseStreaming N.ok200 (corsHeaders addCORS) $ streamBody t_
       where
         streamBody t_ send done = do
           case t_ of
@@ -351,7 +430,7 @@ processRequest XFTPTransportRequest {thParams, reqBody = body@HTTP2Body {bodyHea
           done
 
 #ifdef slow_servers
-randomDelay :: M ()
+randomDelay :: M s ()
 randomDelay = do
   d <- asks $ responseDelay . config
   when (d > 0) $ do
@@ -361,31 +440,31 @@ randomDelay = do
 
 data VerificationResult = VRVerified XFTPRequest | VRFailed XFTPErrorType
 
-verifyXFTPTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer, C.CbNonce) -> Maybe TransmissionAuth -> ByteString -> XFTPFileId -> FileCmd -> M VerificationResult
-verifyXFTPTransmission auth_ tAuth authorized fId cmd =
+verifyXFTPTransmission :: forall s. FileStoreClass s => Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmission FileCmd -> M s VerificationResult
+verifyXFTPTransmission thAuth (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, fId, cmd)) =
   case cmd of
     FileCmd SFSender (FNEW file rcps auth') -> pure $ XFTPReqNew file rcps auth' `verifyWith` sndKey file
     FileCmd SFRecipient PING -> pure $ VRVerified XFTPReqPing
     FileCmd party _ -> verifyCmd party
   where
-    verifyCmd :: SFileParty p -> M VerificationResult
+    verifyCmd :: SFileParty p -> M s VerificationResult
     verifyCmd party = do
-      st <- asks store
-      atomically $ verify =<< getFile st party fId
+      st <- asks fileStore
+      liftIO $ verify =<< getFile st party fId
       where
         verify = \case
-          Right (fr, k) -> result <$> readTVar (fileStatus fr)
+          Right (fr, k) -> result <$> readTVarIO (fileStatus fr)
             where
               result = \case
                 EntityActive -> XFTPReqCmd fId fr cmd `verifyWith` k
                 EntityBlocked info -> VRFailed $ BLOCKED info
                 EntityOff -> noFileAuth
           Left _ -> pure noFileAuth
-        noFileAuth = maybe False (dummyVerifyCmd Nothing authorized) tAuth `seq` VRFailed AUTH
+        noFileAuth = dummyVerifyCmd thAuth tAuth authorized corrId `seq` VRFailed AUTH
     -- TODO verify with DH authorization
-    req `verifyWith` k = if verifyCmdAuthorization auth_ tAuth authorized k then VRVerified req else VRFailed AUTH
+    req `verifyWith` k = if verifyCmdAuthorization thAuth tAuth authorized corrId k then VRVerified req else VRFailed AUTH
 
-processXFTPRequest :: HTTP2Body -> XFTPRequest -> M (FileResponse, Maybe ServerFile)
+processXFTPRequest :: forall s. FileStoreClass s => HTTP2Body -> XFTPRequest -> M s (FileResponse, Maybe ServerFile)
 processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
   XFTPReqNew file rks auth -> noFile =<< ifM allowNew (createFile file rks) (pure $ FRErr AUTH)
     where
@@ -404,9 +483,9 @@ processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
   XFTPReqPing -> noFile FRPong
   where
     noFile resp = pure (resp, Nothing)
-    createFile :: FileInfo -> NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> M FileResponse
+    createFile :: FileInfo -> NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> M s FileResponse
     createFile file rks = do
-      st <- asks store
+      st <- asks fileStore
       r <- runExceptT $ do
         sizes <- asks $ allowedChunkSizes . config
         unless (size file `elem` sizes) $ throwE SIZE
@@ -423,27 +502,27 @@ processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
         let rIds = L.map (\(FileRecipient rId _) -> rId) rcps
         pure $ FRSndIds sId rIds
       pure $ either FRErr id r
-    addFileRetry :: FileStore -> FileInfo -> Int -> RoundedSystemTime -> M (Either XFTPErrorType XFTPFileId)
+    addFileRetry :: s -> FileInfo -> Int -> RoundedFileTime -> M s (Either XFTPErrorType XFTPFileId)
     addFileRetry st file n ts =
       retryAdd n $ \sId -> runExceptT $ do
         ExceptT $ addFile st sId file ts EntityActive
         pure sId
-    addRecipientRetry :: FileStore -> Int -> XFTPFileId -> RcvPublicAuthKey -> M (Either XFTPErrorType FileRecipient)
+    addRecipientRetry :: s -> Int -> XFTPFileId -> RcvPublicAuthKey -> M s (Either XFTPErrorType FileRecipient)
     addRecipientRetry st n sId rpk =
       retryAdd n $ \rId -> runExceptT $ do
         let rcp = FileRecipient rId rpk
         ExceptT $ addRecipient st sId rcp
         pure rcp
-    retryAdd :: Int -> (XFTPFileId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)) -> M (Either XFTPErrorType a)
+    retryAdd :: Int -> (XFTPFileId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)) -> M s (Either XFTPErrorType a)
     retryAdd 0 _ = pure $ Left INTERNAL
     retryAdd n add = do
       fId <- getFileId
-      atomically (add fId) >>= \case
+      liftIO (add fId) >>= \case
         Left DUPLICATE_ -> retryAdd (n - 1) add
         r -> pure r
-    addRecipients :: XFTPFileId -> NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> M FileResponse
+    addRecipients :: XFTPFileId -> NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> M s FileResponse
     addRecipients sId rks = do
-      st <- asks store
+      st <- asks fileStore
       r <- runExceptT $ do
         rcps <- mapM (ExceptT . addRecipientRetry st 3 sId) rks
         lift $ withFileLog $ \sl -> logAddRecipients sl sId rcps
@@ -452,7 +531,7 @@ processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
         let rIds = L.map (\(FileRecipient rId _) -> rId) rcps
         pure $ FRRcvIds rIds
       pure $ either FRErr id r
-    receiveServerFile :: FileRec -> M FileResponse
+    receiveServerFile :: FileRec -> M s FileResponse
     receiveServerFile FileRec {senderId, fileInfo = FileInfo {size, digest}, filePath} = case bodyPart of
       Nothing -> pure $ FRErr SIZE
       -- TODO validate body size from request before downloading, once it's populated
@@ -470,7 +549,7 @@ processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
                   | bs == 0 || bs > s -> pure $ FRErr SIZE
                   | otherwise -> drain (s - bs)
           reserve = do
-            us <- asks $ usedStorage . store
+            us <- asks usedStorage
             quota <- asks $ fromMaybe maxBound . fileSizeQuota . config
             atomically . stateTVar us $
               \used -> let used' = used + fromIntegral size in if used' <= quota then (True, used') else (False, used)
@@ -480,21 +559,28 @@ processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
             receiveChunk (XFTPRcvChunkSpec fPath size digest) >>= \case
               Right () -> do
                 stats <- asks serverStats
-                withFileLog $ \sl -> logPutFile sl senderId fPath
-                atomically $ writeTVar filePath (Just fPath)
-                incFileStat filesUploaded
-                incFileStat filesCount
-                liftIO $ atomicModifyIORef'_ (filesSize stats) (+ fromIntegral size)
-                pure FROk
+                st <- asks fileStore
+                liftIO (setFilePath st senderId fPath) >>= \case
+                  Right () -> do
+                    withFileLog $ \sl -> logPutFile sl senderId fPath
+                    incFileStat filesUploaded
+                    incFileStat filesCount
+                    liftIO $ atomicModifyIORef'_ (filesSize stats) (+ fromIntegral size)
+                    pure FROk
+                  Left _e -> do
+                    us <- asks usedStorage
+                    atomically $ modifyTVar' us $ subtract (fromIntegral size)
+                    liftIO $ whenM (doesFileExist fPath) (removeFile fPath) `catch` logFileError
+                    pure $ FRErr AUTH
               Left e -> do
-                us <- asks $ usedStorage . store
+                us <- asks usedStorage
                 atomically $ modifyTVar' us $ subtract (fromIntegral size)
                 liftIO $ whenM (doesFileExist fPath) (removeFile fPath) `catch` logFileError
                 pure $ FRErr e
           receiveChunk spec = do
             t <- asks $ fileTimeout . config
             liftIO $ fromMaybe (Left TIMEOUT) <$> timeout t (runExceptT $ receiveFile getBody spec)
-    sendServerFile :: FileRec -> RcvPublicDhKey -> M (FileResponse, Maybe ServerFile)
+    sendServerFile :: FileRec -> RcvPublicDhKey -> M s (FileResponse, Maybe ServerFile)
     sendServerFile FileRec {senderId, filePath, fileInfo = FileInfo {size}} rDhKey = do
       readTVarIO filePath >>= \case
         Just path -> ifM (doesFileExist path) sendFile (pure (FRErr AUTH, Nothing))
@@ -513,88 +599,94 @@ processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
                 _ -> pure (FRErr INTERNAL, Nothing)
         _ -> pure (FRErr NO_FILE, Nothing)
 
-    deleteServerFile :: FileRec -> M FileResponse
+    deleteServerFile :: FileRec -> M s FileResponse
     deleteServerFile fr = either FRErr (\() -> FROk) <$> deleteServerFile_ fr
 
     logFileError :: SomeException -> IO ()
     logFileError e = logError $ "Error deleting file: " <> tshow e
 
-    ackFileReception :: RecipientId -> FileRec -> M FileResponse
+    ackFileReception :: RecipientId -> FileRec -> M s FileResponse
     ackFileReception rId fr = do
       withFileLog (`logAckFile` rId)
-      st <- asks store
-      atomically $ deleteRecipient st rId fr
+      st <- asks fileStore
+      liftIO $ deleteRecipient st rId fr
       incFileStat fileDownloadAcks
       pure FROk
 
-deleteServerFile_ :: FileRec -> M (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+deleteServerFile_ :: FileStoreClass s => FileRec -> M s (Either XFTPErrorType ())
 deleteServerFile_ fr@FileRec {senderId} = do
   withFileLog (`logDeleteFile` senderId)
   deleteOrBlockServerFile_ fr filesDeleted (`deleteFile` senderId)
 
 -- this also deletes the file from storage, but doesn't include it in delete statistics
-blockServerFile :: FileRec -> BlockingInfo -> M (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+blockServerFile :: FileStoreClass s => FileRec -> BlockingInfo -> M s (Either XFTPErrorType ())
 blockServerFile fr@FileRec {senderId} info = do
   withFileLog $ \sl -> logBlockFile sl senderId info
   deleteOrBlockServerFile_ fr filesBlocked $ \st -> blockFile st senderId info True
 
-deleteOrBlockServerFile_ :: FileRec -> (FileServerStats -> IORef Int) -> (FileStore -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())) -> M (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+deleteOrBlockServerFile_ :: FileStoreClass s => FileRec -> (FileServerStats -> IORef Int) -> (s -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())) -> M s (Either XFTPErrorType ())
 deleteOrBlockServerFile_ FileRec {filePath, fileInfo} stat storeAction = runExceptT $ do
   path <- readTVarIO filePath
   stats <- asks serverStats
   ExceptT $ first (\(_ :: SomeException) -> FILE_IO) <$> try (forM_ path $ \p -> whenM (doesFileExist p) (removeFile p >> deletedStats stats))
-  st <- asks store
-  void $ atomically $ storeAction st
+  st <- asks fileStore
+  ExceptT $ liftIO $ storeAction st
+  forM_ path $ \_ -> do
+    us <- asks usedStorage
+    atomically $ modifyTVar' us $ subtract (fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)
   lift $ incFileStat stat
   where
     deletedStats stats = do
       liftIO $ atomicModifyIORef'_ (filesCount stats) (subtract 1)
       liftIO $ atomicModifyIORef'_ (filesSize stats) (subtract $ fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)
 
-getFileTime :: IO RoundedSystemTime
-getFileTime = getRoundedSystemTime fileTimePrecision
+getFileTime :: IO RoundedFileTime
+getFileTime = getRoundedSystemTime
 
-expireServerFiles :: Maybe Int -> ExpirationConfig -> M ()
+expireServerFiles :: FileStoreClass s => Maybe Int -> ExpirationConfig -> M s ()
 expireServerFiles itemDelay expCfg = do
-  st <- asks store
-  usedStart <- readTVarIO $ usedStorage st
+  st <- asks fileStore
+  us <- asks usedStorage
+  usedStart <- readTVarIO us
   old <- liftIO $ expireBeforeEpoch expCfg
-  files' <- readTVarIO (files st)
-  logNote $ "Expiration check: " <> tshow (M.size files') <> " files"
-  forM_ (M.keys files') $ \sId -> do
-    mapM_ threadDelay itemDelay
-    atomically (expiredFilePath st sId old)
-      >>= mapM_ (maybeRemove $ delete st sId)
-  usedEnd <- readTVarIO $ usedStorage st
+  filesCount <- liftIO $ getFileCount st
+  logNote $ "Expiration check: " <> tshow filesCount <> " files"
+  expireLoop st us old
+  usedEnd <- readTVarIO us
   logNote $ "Used " <> mbs usedStart <> " -> " <> mbs usedEnd <> ", " <> mbs (usedStart - usedEnd) <> " reclaimed."
   where
     mbs bs = tshow (bs `div` 1048576) <> "mb"
-    maybeRemove del = maybe del (remove del)
-    remove del filePath =
-      ifM
-        (doesFileExist filePath)
-        ((removeFile filePath >> del) `catch` \(e :: SomeException) -> logError $ "failed to remove expired file " <> tshow filePath <> ": " <> tshow e)
-        del
-    delete st sId = do
-      withFileLog (`logDeleteFile` sId)
-      void . atomically $ deleteFile st sId -- will not update usedStorage if sId isn't in store
-      incFileStat filesExpired
+    expireLoop st us old = do
+      expired <- liftIO $ expiredFiles st old 10000
+      forM_ expired $ \(sId, filePath_, fileSize) -> do
+        mapM_ threadDelay itemDelay
+        forM_ filePath_ $ \fp ->
+          whenM (doesFileExist fp) $
+            removeFile fp `catch` \(e :: SomeException) -> logError $ "failed to remove expired file " <> tshow fp <> ": " <> tshow e
+        forM_ filePath_ $ \_ ->
+          atomically $ modifyTVar' us $ subtract (fromIntegral fileSize)
+        incFileStat filesExpired
+      let sIds = map (\(sId, _, _) -> sId) expired
+      unless (null sIds) $ do
+        withFileLog $ \sl -> mapM_ (logDeleteFile sl) sIds
+        liftIO $ deleteFiles st sIds
+        expireLoop st us old
 
-randomId :: Int -> M ByteString
+randomId :: Int -> M s ByteString
 randomId n = atomically . C.randomBytes n =<< asks random
 
-getFileId :: M XFTPFileId
+getFileId :: M s XFTPFileId
 getFileId = fmap EntityId . randomId =<< asks (fileIdSize . config)
 
-withFileLog :: (StoreLog 'WriteMode -> IO a) -> M ()
+withFileLog :: (StoreLog 'WriteMode -> IO a) -> M s ()
 withFileLog action = liftIO . mapM_ action =<< asks storeLog
 
-incFileStat :: (FileServerStats -> IORef Int) -> M ()
+incFileStat :: (FileServerStats -> IORef Int) -> M s ()
 incFileStat statSel = do
   stats <- asks serverStats
   liftIO $ atomicModifyIORef'_ (statSel stats) (+ 1)
 
-saveServerStats :: M ()
+saveServerStats :: M s ()
 saveServerStats =
   asks (serverStatsBackupFile . config)
     >>= mapM_ (\f -> asks serverStats >>= liftIO . getFileServerStatsData >>= liftIO . saveStats f)
@@ -604,7 +696,7 @@ saveServerStats =
       B.writeFile f $ strEncode stats
       logNote "server stats saved"
 
-restoreServerStats :: M ()
+restoreServerStats :: FileStoreClass s => M s ()
 restoreServerStats = asks (serverStatsBackupFile . config) >>= mapM_ restoreStats
   where
     restoreStats f = whenM (doesFileExist f) $ do
@@ -612,9 +704,9 @@ restoreServerStats = asks (serverStatsBackupFile . config) >>= mapM_ restoreStat
       liftIO (strDecode <$> B.readFile f) >>= \case
         Right d@FileServerStatsData {_filesCount = statsFilesCount, _filesSize = statsFilesSize} -> do
           s <- asks serverStats
-          FileStore {files, usedStorage} <- asks store
-          _filesCount <- M.size <$> readTVarIO files
-          _filesSize <- readTVarIO usedStorage
+          st <- asks fileStore
+          _filesCount <- liftIO $ getFileCount st
+          _filesSize <- readTVarIO =<< asks usedStorage
           liftIO $ setFileServerStats s d {_filesCount, _filesSize}
           renameFile f $ f <> ".bak"
           logNote "server stats restored"

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Control.hs

@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
 
-module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Control where
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Control
+  ( ControlProtocol (..),
+  )
+where
 
 import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (XFTPFileId)

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Env.hs

@@ -1,20 +1,42 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE StrictData #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
 
-module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env where
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env
+  ( XFTPServerConfig (..),
+    XFTPStoreConfig (..),
+    XFTPEnv (..),
+    XFTPRequest (..),
+    XFTPStoreType,
+    FileStore (..),
+    AFStoreType (..),
+    fileStore,
+    fromFileStore,
+    defaultInactiveClientExpiration,
+    defFileExpirationHours,
+    defaultFileExpiration,
+    newXFTPServerEnv,
+    readFileStoreType,
+    runWithStoreConfig,
+    checkFileStoreMode,
+    importToDatabase,
+    exportFromDatabase,
+  ) where
 
 import Control.Logger.Simple
 import Control.Monad
 import Crypto.Random
 import Data.Int (Int64)
 import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
-import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
 import Data.Time.Clock (getCurrentTime)
 import Data.Word (Word32)
 import Data.X509.Validation (Fingerprint (..))
@@ -22,7 +44,21 @@ import Network.Socket
 import qualified Network.TLS as T
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileCmd, FileInfo (..), XFTPFileId)
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats
+import Data.Either (fromRight)
+import Data.Ini (Ini, lookupValue)
+import qualified Data.Text as T
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
+import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (MigrationConfirmation)
+import Data.Functor (($>))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI (settingIsOn)
+import System.Exit (exitFailure)
+#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
+import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres (PostgresFileStore, importFileStore, exportFileStore)
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config (PostgresFileStoreCfg (..), defaultXFTPDBOpts)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI (iniDBOptions)
+import System.Directory (doesFileExist)
+#endif
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (VersionRangeXFTP)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
@@ -33,10 +69,11 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Util (tshow)
 import System.IO (IOMode (..))
 import UnliftIO.STM
 
-data XFTPServerConfig = XFTPServerConfig
+data XFTPServerConfig s = XFTPServerConfig
   { xftpPort :: ServiceName,
     controlPort :: Maybe ServiceName,
     fileIdSize :: Int,
+    serverStoreCfg :: XFTPStoreConfig s,
     storeLogFile :: Maybe FilePath,
     filesPath :: FilePath,
     -- | server storage quota
@@ -57,6 +94,7 @@ data XFTPServerConfig = XFTPServerConfig
     -- | time after which inactive clients can be disconnected and check interval, seconds
     inactiveClientExpiration :: Maybe ExpirationConfig,
     xftpCredentials :: ServerCredentials,
+    httpCredentials :: Maybe ServerCredentials,
     -- | XFTP client-server protocol version range
     xftpServerVRange :: VersionRangeXFTP,
     -- stats config - see SMP server config
@@ -64,8 +102,11 @@ data XFTPServerConfig = XFTPServerConfig
     logStatsStartTime :: Int64,
     serverStatsLogFile :: FilePath,
     serverStatsBackupFile :: Maybe FilePath,
+    prometheusInterval :: Maybe Int,
+    prometheusMetricsFile :: FilePath,
     transportConfig :: TransportServerConfig,
-    responseDelay :: Int
+    responseDelay :: Int,
+    webStaticPath :: Maybe FilePath
   }
 
 defaultInactiveClientExpiration :: ExpirationConfig
@@ -75,16 +116,50 @@ defaultInactiveClientExpiration =
       checkInterval = 3600 -- seconds, 1 hours
     }
 
-data XFTPEnv = XFTPEnv
-  { config :: XFTPServerConfig,
-    store :: FileStore,
+data XFTPEnv s = XFTPEnv
+  { config :: XFTPServerConfig s,
+    store :: FileStore s,
+    usedStorage :: TVar Int64,
     storeLog :: Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode),
     random :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
     serverIdentity :: C.KeyHash,
     tlsServerCreds :: T.Credential,
+    httpServerCreds :: Maybe T.Credential,
     serverStats :: FileServerStats
   }
 
+fileStore :: XFTPEnv s -> s
+fileStore = fromFileStore . store
+{-# INLINE fileStore #-}
+
+data XFTPStoreConfig s where
+  XSCMemory :: Maybe FilePath -> XFTPStoreConfig STMFileStore
+#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
+  XSCDatabase :: PostgresFileStoreCfg -> XFTPStoreConfig PostgresFileStore
+#endif
+
+type family XFTPStoreType (fs :: FSType) where
+  XFTPStoreType 'FSMemory = STMFileStore
+#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
+  XFTPStoreType 'FSPostgres = PostgresFileStore
+#endif
+
+data FileStore s where
+  StoreMemory :: STMFileStore -> FileStore STMFileStore
+#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
+  StoreDatabase :: PostgresFileStore -> FileStore PostgresFileStore
+#endif
+
+data AFStoreType = forall fs. AFSType (SFSType fs)
+
+fromFileStore :: FileStore s -> s
+fromFileStore = \case
+  StoreMemory s -> s
+#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
+  StoreDatabase s -> s
+#endif
+{-# INLINE fromFileStore #-}
+
 defFileExpirationHours :: Int64
 defFileExpirationHours = 48
 
@@ -95,25 +170,99 @@ defaultFileExpiration =
       checkInterval = 2 * 3600 -- seconds, 2 hours
     }
 
-newXFTPServerEnv :: XFTPServerConfig -> IO XFTPEnv
-newXFTPServerEnv config@XFTPServerConfig {storeLogFile, fileSizeQuota, xftpCredentials} = do
+newXFTPServerEnv :: FileStoreClass s => XFTPServerConfig s -> IO (XFTPEnv s)
+newXFTPServerEnv config@XFTPServerConfig {serverStoreCfg, fileSizeQuota, xftpCredentials, httpCredentials} = do
   random <- C.newRandom
-  store <- newFileStore
-  storeLog <- mapM (`readWriteFileStore` store) storeLogFile
-  used <- countUsedStorage <$> readTVarIO (files store)
-  atomically $ writeTVar (usedStorage store) used
+  (store, storeLog) <- case serverStoreCfg of
+    XSCMemory storeLogPath -> do
+      st <- newFileStore ()
+      sl <- mapM (`readWriteFileStore` st) storeLogPath
+      atomically $ writeTVar (stmStoreLog st) sl
+      pure (StoreMemory st, sl)
+#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
+    XSCDatabase dbCfg -> do
+      st <- newFileStore dbCfg
+      pure (StoreDatabase st, Nothing)
+#endif
+  used <- getUsedStorage (fromFileStore store)
+  usedStorage <- newTVarIO used
   forM_ fileSizeQuota $ \quota -> do
     logNote $ "Total / available storage: " <> tshow quota <> " / " <> tshow (quota - used)
     when (quota < used) $ logWarn "WARNING: storage quota is less than used storage, no files can be uploaded!"
   tlsServerCreds <- loadServerCredential xftpCredentials
+  httpServerCreds <- mapM loadServerCredential httpCredentials
   Fingerprint fp <- loadFingerprint xftpCredentials
   serverStats <- newFileServerStats =<< getCurrentTime
-  pure XFTPEnv {config, store, storeLog, random, tlsServerCreds, serverIdentity = C.KeyHash fp, serverStats}
-
-countUsedStorage :: M.Map k FileRec -> Int64
-countUsedStorage = M.foldl' (\acc FileRec {fileInfo = FileInfo {size}} -> acc + fromIntegral size) 0
+  pure XFTPEnv {config, store, usedStorage, storeLog, random, tlsServerCreds, httpServerCreds, serverIdentity = C.KeyHash fp, serverStats}
 
 data XFTPRequest
   = XFTPReqNew FileInfo (NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey) (Maybe BasicAuth)
   | XFTPReqCmd XFTPFileId FileRec FileCmd
   | XFTPReqPing
+
+readFileStoreType :: Ini -> Either String AFStoreType
+readFileStoreType ini = case fromRight "memory" $ T.unpack <$> lookupValue "STORE_LOG" "store_files" ini of
+  "memory" -> Right $ AFSType SFSMemory
+  "database" -> Right $ AFSType SFSPostgres
+  other -> Left $ "Invalid store_files value: " <> other
+
+-- | Dispatch store config from AFStoreType singleton and run the callback.
+-- CPP guards for Postgres are handled here so Main.hs stays CPP-free.
+runWithStoreConfig ::
+  AFStoreType ->
+  Ini ->
+  FilePath ->
+  MigrationConfirmation ->
+  (forall s. FileStoreClass s => XFTPStoreConfig s -> IO ()) ->
+  IO ()
+runWithStoreConfig (AFSType SFSMemory) ini storeLogFilePath _confirmMigrations run =
+  run $ XSCMemory (enableStoreLog' $> storeLogFilePath)
+  where
+    enableStoreLog' = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "enable" ini
+runWithStoreConfig (AFSType SFSPostgres) ini storeLogFilePath confirmMigrations run =
+#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
+  run $ XSCDatabase dbCfg
+  where
+    enableDbStoreLog' = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "db_store_log" ini
+    dbStoreLogPath = enableDbStoreLog' $> storeLogFilePath
+    dbCfg = PostgresFileStoreCfg {dbOpts = iniDBOptions ini defaultXFTPDBOpts, dbStoreLogPath, confirmMigrations}
+#else
+  error "server binary is compiled without support for PostgreSQL database"
+#endif
+
+-- | Validate startup config when store_files=database.
+checkFileStoreMode :: Ini -> AFStoreType -> FilePath -> IO ()
+checkFileStoreMode ini (AFSType SFSPostgres) storeLogFilePath = do
+#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
+  storeLogExists <- doesFileExist storeLogFilePath
+  let dbStoreLogOn = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "db_store_log" ini
+  when (storeLogExists && isNothing dbStoreLogOn) $ do
+    putStrLn $ "Error: store log file " <> storeLogFilePath <> " exists but store_files is `database`."
+    putStrLn "Use `file-server database import` to migrate, or set `db_store_log: on`."
+    exitFailure
+#else
+  putStrLn "Error: server binary is compiled without support for PostgreSQL database."
+  putStrLn "Please re-compile with `cabal build -fserver_postgres`."
+  exitFailure
+#endif
+checkFileStoreMode _ (AFSType SFSMemory) _ = pure ()
+
+-- | Import StoreLog to PostgreSQL database.
+importToDatabase :: FilePath -> Ini -> MigrationConfirmation -> IO ()
+#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
+importToDatabase storeLogFilePath ini _confirmMigrations = do
+  let dbCfg = PostgresFileStoreCfg {dbOpts = iniDBOptions ini defaultXFTPDBOpts, dbStoreLogPath = Nothing, confirmMigrations = _confirmMigrations}
+  importFileStore storeLogFilePath dbCfg
+#else
+importToDatabase _ _ _ = error "Error: server binary is compiled without support for PostgreSQL database.\nPlease re-compile with `cabal build -fserver_postgres`."
+#endif
+
+-- | Export PostgreSQL database to StoreLog.
+exportFromDatabase :: FilePath -> Ini -> MigrationConfirmation -> IO ()
+#if defined(dbServerPostgres)
+exportFromDatabase storeLogFilePath ini _confirmMigrations = do
+  let dbCfg = PostgresFileStoreCfg {dbOpts = iniDBOptions ini defaultXFTPDBOpts, dbStoreLogPath = Nothing, confirmMigrations = _confirmMigrations}
+  exportFileStore storeLogFilePath dbCfg
+#else
+exportFromDatabase _ _ _ = error "Error: server binary is compiled without support for PostgreSQL database.\nPlease re-compile with `cabal build -fserver_postgres`."
+#endif

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs

@@ -5,14 +5,23 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedLists #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
 
-module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Main where
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Main
+  ( xftpServerCLI,
+    xftpServerCLI_,
+  ) where
 
+import Control.Monad (unless, when)
 import Data.Either (fromRight)
 import Data.Functor (($>))
 import Data.Ini (lookupValue, readIniFile)
 import Data.Int (Int64)
-import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
+import Data.List (find)
+import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
+import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe, isJust)
+import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
 import qualified Data.Text as T
 import qualified Data.Text.IO as T
 import Network.Socket (HostName)
@@ -20,24 +29,36 @@ import Options.Applicative
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description (FileSize (..))
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server (runXFTPServer)
-import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), defFileExpirationHours, defaultFileExpiration, defaultInactiveClientExpiration)
-import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (supportedFileServerVRange)
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), XFTPStoreConfig, AFStoreType (..), defFileExpirationHours, defaultFileExpiration, defaultInactiveClientExpiration, readFileStoreType, runWithStoreConfig, checkFileStoreMode, importToDatabase, exportFromDatabase)
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (alpnSupportedXFTPhandshakes, supportedFileServerVRange)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtoServerWithAuth (..), pattern XFTPServer)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (MigrationConfirmation (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (simplexMQVersion)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Information (ServerPublicInfo (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main (serverPublicInfo, printSourceCode)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Web (EmbeddedWebParams (..), WebHttpsParams (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (ServerCredentials (..), TransportServerConfig (..), defaultTransportServerConfig)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Util (safeDecodeUtf8, tshow)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2 (httpALPN)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (ServerCredentials (..), TransportServerConfig (..), mkTransportServerConfig)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Util (eitherToMaybe, safeDecodeUtf8, tshow)
 import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing, doesFileExist)
 import System.FilePath (combine)
 import System.IO (BufferMode (..), hSetBuffering, stderr, stdout)
 import Text.Read (readMaybe)
 
 xftpServerCLI :: FilePath -> FilePath -> IO ()
-xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
+xftpServerCLI = xftpServerCLI_ (\_ _ _ _ -> pure ()) (\_ -> pure ())
+
+xftpServerCLI_ ::
+  (forall s. XFTPServerConfig s -> Maybe ServerPublicInfo -> Maybe TransportHost -> FilePath -> IO ()) ->
+  (EmbeddedWebParams -> IO ()) ->
+  FilePath ->
+  FilePath ->
+  IO ()
+xftpServerCLI_ generateSite serveStaticFiles cfgPath logPath = do
   getCliCommand' (cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile) serverVersion >>= \case
     Init opts ->
       doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
@@ -47,9 +68,13 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
       doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
         True -> genOnline cfgPath certOpts
         _ -> exitError $ "Error: server is not initialized (" <> iniFile <> " does not exist).\nRun `" <> executableName <> " init`."
-    Start ->
+    Start opts ->
       doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
-        True -> readIniFile iniFile >>= either exitError runServer
+        True -> readIniFile iniFile >>= either exitError (runServer opts)
+        _ -> exitError $ "Error: server is not initialized (" <> iniFile <> " does not exist).\nRun `" <> executableName <> " init`."
+    Database cmd ->
+      doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
+        True -> readIniFile iniFile >>= either exitError (runDatabaseCmd cmd)
         _ -> exitError $ "Error: server is not initialized (" <> iniFile <> " does not exist).\nRun `" <> executableName <> " init`."
     Delete -> do
       confirmOrExit
@@ -60,11 +85,27 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
       putStrLn "Deleted configuration and log files"
   where
     iniFile = combine cfgPath "file-server.ini"
-    serverVersion = "SimpleX XFTP server v" <> simplexMQVersion
+    serverVersion = "SimpleX XFTP server v" <> simplexmqVersionCommit
     defaultServerPort = "443"
     executableName = "file-server"
     storeLogFilePath = combine logPath "file-server-store.log"
-    initializeServer InitOptions {enableStoreLog, signAlgorithm, ip, fqdn, filesPath, fileSizeQuota} = do
+    defaultStaticPath = combine logPath "www"
+    runDatabaseCmd cmd ini = case cmd of
+      SCImport -> do
+        storeLogExists <- doesFileExist storeLogFilePath
+        unless storeLogExists $ exitError $ "Error: store log file " <> storeLogFilePath <> " does not exist."
+        confirmOrExit
+          ("Import store log " <> storeLogFilePath <> " to PostgreSQL database?")
+          "Import cancelled."
+        importToDatabase storeLogFilePath ini MCYesUp
+      SCExport -> do
+        storeLogExists <- doesFileExist storeLogFilePath
+        when storeLogExists $ exitError $ "Error: store log file " <> storeLogFilePath <> " already exists."
+        confirmOrExit
+          ("Export PostgreSQL database to store log " <> storeLogFilePath <> "?")
+          "Export cancelled."
+        exportFromDatabase storeLogFilePath ini MCConsole
+    initializeServer InitOptions {enableStoreLog, signAlgorithm, ip, fqdn, filesPath, fileSizeQuota, webStaticPath = webStaticPath_} = do
       clearDirIfExists cfgPath
       clearDirIfExists logPath
       createDirectoryIfMissing True cfgPath
@@ -79,49 +120,89 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
       printServiceInfo serverVersion srv
       where
         iniFileContent host =
-          "[STORE_LOG]\n\
+          "[INFORMATION]\n\
+          \# AGPLv3 license requires that you make any source code modifications\n\
+          \# available to the end users of the server.\n\
+          \# LICENSE: https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/LICENSE\n\
+          \# Include correct source code URI in case the server source code is modified in any way.\n\
+          \# source_code = https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq\n\
+          \\n\
+          \# Declaring all below information is optional, any of these fields can be omitted.\n\
+          \# server_country = ISO-3166 2-letter code\n\
+          \# operator = entity (organization or person name)\n\
+          \# operator_country = ISO-3166 2-letter code\n\
+          \# website =\n\
+          \# admin_simplex = SimpleX address\n\
+          \# admin_email =\n\
+          \# complaints_simplex = SimpleX address\n\
+          \# complaints_email =\n\
+          \# hosting = entity (organization or person name)\n\
+          \# hosting_country = ISO-3166 2-letter code\n\
+          \# hosting_type = virtual\n\
+          \\n\
+          \[STORE_LOG]\n\
           \# The server uses STM memory for persistence,\n\
           \# that will be lost on restart (e.g., as with redis).\n\
           \# This option enables saving memory to append only log,\n\
           \# and restoring it when the server is started.\n\
           \# Log is compacted on start (deleted objects are removed).\n"
-            <> ("enable: " <> onOff enableStoreLog <> "\n\n")
+            <> ("enable = " <> onOff enableStoreLog <> "\n\n")
+            <> "# File storage mode: `memory` or `database` (PostgreSQL).\n\
+               \store_files = memory\n\n\
+               \# Database connection settings for PostgreSQL database (`store_files = database`).\n\
+               \# db_connection = postgresql://xftp@/xftp_server_store\n\
+               \# db_schema = xftp_server\n\
+               \# db_pool_size = 10\n\n\
+               \# Write database changes to store log file\n\
+               \# db_store_log = off\n\n"
             <> "# Expire files after the specified number of hours.\n"
-            <> ("expire_files_hours: " <> tshow defFileExpirationHours <> "\n\n")
-            <> "log_stats: off\n\
+            <> ("expire_files_hours = " <> tshow defFileExpirationHours <> "\n\n")
+            <> "log_stats = off\n\
+               \\n\
+               \# Log interval for real-time Prometheus metrics\n\
+               \# prometheus_interval = 60\n\
                \\n\
                \[AUTH]\n\
                \# Set new_files option to off to completely prohibit uploading new files.\n\
                \# This can be useful when you want to decommission the server, but still allow downloading the existing files.\n\
-               \new_files: on\n\
+               \new_files = on\n\
                \\n\
                \# Use create_password option to enable basic auth to upload new files.\n\
                \# The password should be used as part of server address in client configuration:\n\
                \# xftp://fingerprint:password@host1,host2\n\
                \# The password will not be shared with file recipients, you must share it only\n\
                \# with the users who you want to allow uploading files to your server.\n\
-               \# create_password: password to upload files (any printable ASCII characters without whitespace, '@', ':' and '/')\n\
+               \# create_password = password to upload files (any printable ASCII characters without whitespace, '@', ':' and '/')\n\
                \\n\
-               \# control_port_admin_password:\n\
-               \# control_port_user_password:\n\
+               \# control_port_admin_password =\n\
+               \# control_port_user_password =\n\
                \\n\
                \[TRANSPORT]\n\
                \# host is only used to print server address on start\n"
-            <> ("host: " <> T.pack host <> "\n")
-            <> ("port: " <> T.pack defaultServerPort <> "\n")
-            <> "log_tls_errors: off\n\
-               \# control_port: 5226\n\
+            <> ("host = " <> T.pack host <> "\n")
+            <> ("port = " <> T.pack defaultServerPort <> "\n")
+            <> "log_tls_errors = off\n\
+               \# control_port = 5226\n\
                \\n\
                \[FILES]\n"
-            <> ("path: " <> T.pack filesPath <> "\n")
-            <> ("storage_quota: " <> safeDecodeUtf8 (strEncode fileSizeQuota) <> "\n")
+            <> ("path = " <> T.pack filesPath <> "\n")
+            <> ("storage_quota = " <> safeDecodeUtf8 (strEncode fileSizeQuota) <> "\n")
             <> "\n\
                \[INACTIVE_CLIENTS]\n\
                \# TTL and interval to check inactive clients\n\
-               \disconnect: off\n"
-            <> ("# ttl: " <> tshow (ttl defaultInactiveClientExpiration) <> "\n")
-            <> ("# check_interval: " <> tshow (checkInterval defaultInactiveClientExpiration) <> "\n")
-    runServer ini = do
+               \disconnect = off\n"
+            <> ("# ttl = " <> tshow (ttl defaultInactiveClientExpiration) <> "\n")
+            <> ("# check_interval = " <> tshow (checkInterval defaultInactiveClientExpiration) <> "\n")
+            <> "\n\
+               \[WEB]\n\
+               \# Set path to generate static mini-site for server information\n"
+            <> ("static_path = " <> T.pack (fromMaybe defaultStaticPath webStaticPath_) <> "\n\n")
+            <> "# Run an embedded HTTP server on this port.\n\
+               \# http = 8000\n\n\
+               \# TLS credentials for HTTPS web server on the same port as XFTP.\n\
+               \# cert = " <> T.pack (cfgPath `combine` "web.crt") <> "\n\
+               \# key = " <> T.pack (cfgPath `combine` "web.key") <> "\n"
+    runServer StartOptions {confirmMigrations} ini = do
       hSetBuffering stdout LineBuffering
       hSetBuffering stderr LineBuffering
       fp <- checkSavedFingerprint cfgPath defaultX509Config
@@ -129,9 +210,28 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
           port = T.unpack $ strictIni "TRANSPORT" "port" ini
           srv = ProtoServerWithAuth (XFTPServer [THDomainName host] (if port == "443" then "" else port) (C.KeyHash fp)) Nothing
       printServiceInfo serverVersion srv
-      printXFTPConfig serverConfig
-      runXFTPServer serverConfig
+      let information = serverPublicInfo ini
+      printSourceCode (sourceCode <$> information)
+      case readFileStoreType ini of
+        Left err -> error err
+        Right fsType -> do
+          checkFileStoreMode ini fsType storeLogFilePath
+          runWithStoreConfig fsType ini storeLogFilePath confirmMigrations $ \storeCfg -> do
+            let cfg = serverConfig storeCfg
+            printXFTPConfig cfg
+            case webStaticPath' of
+              Just path -> do
+                let onionHost =
+                      either (const Nothing) (find isOnion) $
+                        strDecode @(L.NonEmpty TransportHost) . encodeUtf8 =<< lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "host" ini
+                    webHttpPort = eitherToMaybe (lookupValue "WEB" "http" ini) >>= readMaybe . T.unpack
+                generateSite cfg information onionHost path
+                when (isJust webHttpPort || isJust webHttpsParams') $
+                  serveStaticFiles EmbeddedWebParams {webStaticPath = path, webHttpPort, webHttpsParams = webHttpsParams'}
+              Nothing -> pure ()
+            runXFTPServer cfg
       where
+        isOnion = \case THOnionHost _ -> True; _ -> False
         enableStoreLog = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "enable" ini
         logStats = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "log_stats" ini
         c = combine cfgPath . ($ defaultX509Config)
@@ -152,11 +252,32 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
                 else "NOT allowed."
           putStrLn $ "Listening on port " <> xftpPort <> "..."
 
-        serverConfig =
+        httpCredentials_ =
+          eitherToMaybe $ do
+            cert <- T.unpack <$> lookupValue "WEB" "cert" ini
+            key <- T.unpack <$> lookupValue "WEB" "key" ini
+            pure
+              ServerCredentials
+                { caCertificateFile = Nothing,
+                  certificateFile = cert,
+                  privateKeyFile = key
+                }
+
+        webHttpsParams' = do
+          httpsPort <- eitherToMaybe (lookupValue "WEB" "https" ini) >>= readMaybe . T.unpack
+          cert <- eitherToMaybe $ T.unpack <$> lookupValue "WEB" "cert" ini
+          key <- eitherToMaybe $ T.unpack <$> lookupValue "WEB" "key" ini
+          pure WebHttpsParams {port = httpsPort, cert, key}
+
+        webStaticPath' = eitherToMaybe $ T.unpack <$> lookupValue "WEB" "static_path" ini
+
+        serverConfig :: XFTPStoreConfig s -> XFTPServerConfig s
+        serverConfig serverStoreCfg =
           XFTPServerConfig
             { xftpPort = T.unpack $ strictIni "TRANSPORT" "port" ini,
               controlPort = either (const Nothing) (Just . T.unpack) $ lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "control_port" ini,
               fileIdSize = 16,
+              serverStoreCfg,
               storeLogFile = enableStoreLog $> storeLogFilePath,
               filesPath = T.unpack $ strictIni "FILES" "path" ini,
               fileSizeQuota = either error unFileSize <$> strDecodeIni "FILES" "storage_quota" ini,
@@ -183,31 +304,46 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
                     privateKeyFile = c serverKeyFile,
                     certificateFile = c serverCrtFile
                   },
+              httpCredentials = httpCredentials_,
               xftpServerVRange = supportedFileServerVRange,
               logStatsInterval = logStats $> 86400, -- seconds
               logStatsStartTime = 0, -- seconds from 00:00 UTC
               serverStatsLogFile = combine logPath "file-server-stats.daily.log",
               serverStatsBackupFile = logStats $> combine logPath "file-server-stats.log",
+              prometheusInterval = eitherToMaybe (lookupValue "STORE_LOG" "prometheus_interval" ini) >>= readMaybe . T.unpack,
+              prometheusMetricsFile = combine logPath "xftp-server-metrics.txt",
               transportConfig =
-                defaultTransportServerConfig
-                  { logTLSErrors = fromMaybe False $ iniOnOff "TRANSPORT" "log_tls_errors" ini
-                  },
-              responseDelay = 0
+                let cfg =
+                      mkTransportServerConfig
+                        (fromMaybe False $ iniOnOff "TRANSPORT" "log_tls_errors" ini)
+                        (Just $ alpnSupportedXFTPhandshakes <> httpALPN)
+                        False
+                 in cfg {addCORSHeaders = isJust httpCredentials_},
+              responseDelay = 0,
+              webStaticPath = webStaticPath'
             }
 
 data CliCommand
   = Init InitOptions
   | OnlineCert CertOptions
-  | Start
+  | Start StartOptions
+  | Database StoreCmd
   | Delete
 
+data StoreCmd = SCImport | SCExport
+
+newtype StartOptions = StartOptions
+  { confirmMigrations :: MigrationConfirmation
+  }
+
 data InitOptions = InitOptions
   { enableStoreLog :: Bool,
     signAlgorithm :: SignAlgorithm,
     ip :: HostName,
     fqdn :: Maybe HostName,
     filesPath :: FilePath,
-    fileSizeQuota :: FileSize Int64
+    fileSizeQuota :: FileSize Int64,
+    webStaticPath :: Maybe FilePath
   }
   deriving (Show)
 
@@ -216,18 +352,22 @@ cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile =
   hsubparser
     ( command "init" (info (Init <$> initP) (progDesc $ "Initialize server - creates " <> cfgPath <> " and " <> logPath <> " directories and configuration files"))
         <> command "cert" (info (OnlineCert <$> certOptionsP) (progDesc $ "Generate new online TLS server credentials (configuration: " <> iniFile <> ")"))
-        <> command "start" (info (pure Start) (progDesc $ "Start server (configuration: " <> iniFile <> ")"))
+        <> command "start" (info (Start <$> startOptsP) (progDesc $ "Start server (configuration: " <> iniFile <> ")"))
+        <> command "database" (info (Database <$> storeCmdP) (progDesc "Import/export file store to/from PostgreSQL database"))
         <> command "delete" (info (pure Delete) (progDesc "Delete configuration and log files"))
     )
   where
     initP :: Parser InitOptions
     initP = do
       enableStoreLog <-
-        flag' False
+        flag'
+          False
           ( long "disable-store-log"
               <> help "Disable store log for persistence (enabled by default)"
           )
-          <|> flag True True
+          <|> flag
+            True
+            True
             ( long "store-log"
                 <> short 'l'
                 <> help "Enable store log for persistence (DEPRECATED, enabled by default)"
@@ -273,4 +413,27 @@ cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile =
               <> help "File storage quota (e.g. 100gb)"
               <> metavar "QUOTA"
           )
-      pure InitOptions {enableStoreLog, signAlgorithm, ip, fqdn, filesPath, fileSizeQuota}
+      webStaticPath <-
+        (optional . strOption)
+          ( long "web-path"
+              <> help "Directory to store generated static site with server information"
+              <> metavar "PATH"
+          )
+      pure InitOptions {enableStoreLog, signAlgorithm, ip, fqdn, filesPath, fileSizeQuota, webStaticPath}
+    startOptsP :: Parser StartOptions
+    startOptsP = do
+      confirmMigrations <-
+        option
+          parseConfirmMigrations
+          ( long "confirm-migrations"
+              <> metavar "CONFIRM_MIGRATIONS"
+              <> help "Confirm PostgreSQL database migration: up, down (default is manual confirmation)"
+              <> value MCConsole
+          )
+      pure StartOptions {confirmMigrations}
+    storeCmdP :: Parser StoreCmd
+    storeCmdP =
+      hsubparser
+        ( command "import" (info (pure SCImport) (progDesc "Import store log file into PostgreSQL database"))
+            <> command "export" (info (pure SCExport) (progDesc "Export PostgreSQL database to store log file"))
+        )

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Prometheus.hs

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
+{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-unrecognised-pragmas #-}
+
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Prometheus
+  ( FileServerMetrics (..),
+    rtsOptionsEnv,
+    xftpPrometheusMetrics,
+  ) where
+
+import Data.Int (Int64)
+import Data.Text (Text)
+import qualified Data.Text as T
+import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime (..), diffUTCTime)
+import Data.Time.Clock.System (systemEpochDay)
+import Data.Time.Format.ISO8601 (iso8601Show)
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats (PeriodStatCounts (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (simplexMQVersion)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Util (tshow)
+
+data FileServerMetrics = FileServerMetrics
+  { statsData :: FileServerStatsData,
+    filesDownloadedPeriods :: PeriodStatCounts,
+    rtsOptions :: Text
+  }
+
+rtsOptionsEnv :: Text
+rtsOptionsEnv = "XFTP_RTS_OPTIONS"
+
+{-# FOURMOLU_DISABLE\n#-}
+xftpPrometheusMetrics :: FileServerMetrics -> UTCTime -> Text
+xftpPrometheusMetrics sm ts =
+  time <> files <> info
+  where
+    FileServerMetrics {statsData, filesDownloadedPeriods, rtsOptions} = sm
+    FileServerStatsData
+      { _fromTime,
+        _filesCreated,
+        _fileRecipients,
+        _filesUploaded,
+        _filesExpired,
+        _filesDeleted,
+        _filesBlocked,
+        _fileDownloads,
+        _fileDownloadAcks,
+        _filesCount,
+        _filesSize
+      } = statsData
+    time =
+      "# Recorded at: " <> T.pack (iso8601Show ts) <> "\n\
+      \# Stats from: " <> T.pack (iso8601Show _fromTime) <> "\n\
+      \\n"
+    files =
+      "# Files\n\
+      \# -----\n\
+      \\n\
+      \# HELP simplex_xftp_files_created Created files\n\
+      \# TYPE simplex_xftp_files_created counter\n\
+      \simplex_xftp_files_created " <> mshow _filesCreated <> "\n\
+      \# filesCreated\n\
+      \\n\
+      \# HELP simplex_xftp_files_recipients Files recipients\n\
+      \# TYPE simplex_xftp_files_recipients counter\n\
+      \simplex_xftp_files_recipients " <> mshow _fileRecipients <> "\n\
+      \# fileRecipients\n\
+      \\n\
+      \# HELP simplex_xftp_files_uploaded Uploaded files\n\
+      \# TYPE simplex_xftp_files_uploaded counter\n\
+      \simplex_xftp_files_uploaded " <> mshow _filesUploaded <> "\n\
+      \# filesUploaded\n\
+      \\n\
+      \# HELP simplex_xftp_files_expired Expired files\n\
+      \# TYPE simplex_xftp_files_expired counter\n\
+      \simplex_xftp_files_expired " <> mshow _filesExpired <> "\n\
+      \# filesExpired\n\
+      \\n\
+      \# HELP simplex_xftp_files_deleted Deleted files\n\
+      \# TYPE simplex_xftp_files_deleted counter\n\
+      \simplex_xftp_files_deleted " <> mshow _filesDeleted <> "\n\
+      \# filesDeleted\n\
+      \\n\
+      \# HELP simplex_xftp_files_blocked Blocked files\n\
+      \# TYPE simplex_xftp_files_blocked counter\n\
+      \simplex_xftp_files_blocked " <> mshow _filesBlocked <> "\n\
+      \# filesBlocked\n\
+      \\n\
+      \# HELP simplex_xftp_file_downloads File downloads\n\
+      \# TYPE simplex_xftp_file_downloads counter\n\
+      \simplex_xftp_file_downloads " <> mshow _fileDownloads <> "\n\
+      \# fileDownloads\n\
+      \\n\
+      \# HELP simplex_xftp_file_download_acks File download ACKs\n\
+      \# TYPE simplex_xftp_file_download_acks counter\n\
+      \simplex_xftp_file_download_acks " <> mshow _fileDownloadAcks <> "\n\
+      \# fileDownloadAcks\n\
+      \\n\
+      \# HELP simplex_xftp_files_count_total Total files count \n\
+      \# TYPE simplex_xftp_files_count_total gauge\n\
+      \simplex_xftp_files_count_total " <> mshow _filesCount <> "\n\
+      \# filesCount\n\
+      \\n\
+      \# HELP simplex_xftp_files_size Size of files \n\
+      \# TYPE simplex_xftp_files_size gauge\n\
+      \simplex_xftp_files_size " <> mshow _filesSize <> "\n\
+      \# filesSize \n\
+      \\n\
+      \# HELP simplex_xftp_files_count_daily Daily files count\n\
+      \# TYPE simplex_xftp_files_count_daily gauge\n\
+      \simplex_xftp_files_count_daily " <> mstr (dayCount filesDownloadedPeriods) <> "\n\
+      \# filesDownloaded.dayCount\n\
+      \\n\
+      \# HELP simplex_xftp_files_count_weekly Weekly files count\n\
+      \# TYPE simplex_xftp_files_count_weekly gauge\n\
+      \simplex_xftp_files_count_weekly " <> mstr (weekCount filesDownloadedPeriods) <> "\n\
+      \# filesDownloaded.weekCount\n\
+      \\n\
+      \# HELP simplex_xftp_files_count_monthly Monthly files count\n\
+      \# TYPE simplex_xftp_files_count_monthly gauge\n\
+      \simplex_xftp_files_count_monthly " <> mstr (monthCount filesDownloadedPeriods) <> "\n\
+      \# filesDownloaded.monthCount\n\
+      \\n"
+    info =
+      "# Info\n\
+      \# ----\n\
+      \\n\
+      \# HELP simplex_xftp_info Server information. RTS options have to be passed via " <> rtsOptionsEnv <> " env var\n\
+      \# TYPE simplex_xftp_info gauge\n\
+      \simplex_xftp_info{version=\"" <> T.pack simplexMQVersion <> "\",rts_options=\"" <> rtsOptions <> "\"} 1\n\
+      \\n"
+    mstr a = a <> " " <> tsEpoch
+    mshow :: Show a => a -> Text
+    mshow = mstr . tshow
+    tsEpoch = tshow @Int64 $ floor @Double $ realToFrac (ts `diffUTCTime` epoch) * 1000
+    epoch = UTCTime systemEpochDay 0
+{-# FOURMOLU_ENABLE\n#-}

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Stats.hs

@@ -2,7 +2,13 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
 
-module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats where
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats
+  ( FileServerStats (..),
+    FileServerStatsData (..),
+    newFileServerStats,
+    getFileServerStatsData,
+    setFileServerStats,
+  ) where
 
 import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
 import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store.hs

@@ -1,158 +1,196 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
 
 module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
-  ( FileStore (..),
+  ( FSType (..),
+    SFSType (..),
+    FileStoreClass (..),
     FileRec (..),
     FileRecipient (..),
-    newFileStore,
-    addFile,
-    setFilePath,
-    addRecipient,
-    deleteFile,
-    blockFile,
-    deleteRecipient,
-    expiredFilePath,
-    getFile,
-    ackFile,
+    STMFileStore (..),
+    RoundedFileTime,
     fileTimePrecision,
   )
 where
 
+import Data.Kind (Type)
+
 import Control.Concurrent.STM
-import Control.Monad
+import Control.Monad (forM, void)
 import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
 import Data.Int (Int64)
+import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
+import Data.Maybe (catMaybes)
 import Data.Set (Set)
 import qualified Data.Set as S
+import Data.Word (Word32)
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..), SFileParty (..), XFTPFileId)
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..))
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BlockingInfo, RcvPublicAuthKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore (RoundedSystemTime (..), ServerEntityStatus (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore (ServerEntityStatus (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog (StoreLog, closeStoreLog)
+import System.IO (IOMode (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.SystemTime
 import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
-import Simplex.Messaging.Util (ifM, ($>>=))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Util (ifM)
 
-data FileStore = FileStore
-  { files :: TMap SenderId FileRec,
-    recipients :: TMap RecipientId (SenderId, RcvPublicAuthKey),
-    usedStorage :: TVar Int64
-  }
+data FSType = FSMemory | FSPostgres
+
+data SFSType :: FSType -> Type where
+  SFSMemory :: SFSType 'FSMemory
+  SFSPostgres :: SFSType 'FSPostgres
 
 data FileRec = FileRec
   { senderId :: SenderId,
     fileInfo :: FileInfo,
     filePath :: TVar (Maybe FilePath),
     recipientIds :: TVar (Set RecipientId),
-    createdAt :: RoundedSystemTime,
+    createdAt :: RoundedFileTime,
     fileStatus :: TVar ServerEntityStatus
   }
 
-fileTimePrecision :: Int64
-fileTimePrecision = 3600 -- truncate creation time to 1 hour
+type RoundedFileTime = RoundedSystemTime 3600
 
-data FileRecipient = FileRecipient RecipientId RcvPublicAuthKey
+fileTimePrecision :: Int64
+fileTimePrecision = 3600
+
+data FileRecipient = FileRecipient RecipientId C.APublicAuthKey
   deriving (Show)
 
 instance StrEncoding FileRecipient where
   strEncode (FileRecipient rId rKey) = strEncode rId <> ":" <> strEncode rKey
   strP = FileRecipient <$> strP <* A.char ':' <*> strP
 
-newFileStore :: IO FileStore
-newFileStore = do
-  files <- TM.emptyIO
-  recipients <- TM.emptyIO
-  usedStorage <- newTVarIO 0
-  pure FileStore {files, recipients, usedStorage}
+class FileStoreClass s where
+  type FileStoreConfig s
+  newFileStore :: FileStoreConfig s -> IO s
+  closeFileStore :: s -> IO ()
+  addFile :: s -> SenderId -> FileInfo -> RoundedFileTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+  setFilePath :: s -> SenderId -> FilePath -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+  addRecipient :: s -> SenderId -> FileRecipient -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+  deleteFile :: s -> SenderId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+  deleteFiles :: s -> [SenderId] -> IO ()
+  deleteFiles s = mapM_ (void . deleteFile s)
+  blockFile :: s -> SenderId -> BlockingInfo -> Bool -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+  deleteRecipient :: s -> RecipientId -> FileRec -> IO ()
+  getFile :: s -> SFileParty p -> XFTPFileId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType (FileRec, C.APublicAuthKey))
+  ackFile :: s -> RecipientId -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())
+  expiredFiles :: s -> Int64 -> Int -> IO [(SenderId, Maybe FilePath, Word32)]
+  getUsedStorage :: s -> IO Int64
+  getFileCount :: s -> IO Int
 
-addFile :: FileStore -> SenderId -> FileInfo -> RoundedSystemTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
-addFile FileStore {files} sId fileInfo createdAt status =
-  ifM (TM.member sId files) (pure $ Left DUPLICATE_) $ do
-    f <- newFileRec sId fileInfo createdAt status
-    TM.insert sId f files
-    pure $ Right ()
+-- STM in-memory store
 
-newFileRec :: SenderId -> FileInfo -> RoundedSystemTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> STM FileRec
+data STMFileStore = STMFileStore
+  { files :: TMap SenderId FileRec,
+    recipients :: TMap RecipientId (SenderId, RcvPublicAuthKey),
+    stmStoreLog :: TVar (Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode))
+  }
+
+instance FileStoreClass STMFileStore where
+  type FileStoreConfig STMFileStore = ()
+
+  newFileStore () = do
+    files <- TM.emptyIO
+    recipients <- TM.emptyIO
+    stmStoreLog <- newTVarIO Nothing
+    pure STMFileStore {files, recipients, stmStoreLog}
+
+  closeFileStore STMFileStore {stmStoreLog} = readTVarIO stmStoreLog >>= mapM_ closeStoreLog
+
+  addFile STMFileStore {files} sId fileInfo createdAt status = atomically $
+    ifM (TM.member sId files) (pure $ Left DUPLICATE_) $ do
+      f <- newFileRec sId fileInfo createdAt status
+      TM.insert sId f files
+      pure $ Right ()
+
+  setFilePath st sId fPath = atomically $
+    withFile st sId $ \FileRec {filePath, fileStatus} -> do
+      readTVar filePath >>= \case
+        Just _ -> pure $ Left AUTH
+        Nothing ->
+          readTVar fileStatus >>= \case
+            EntityActive -> do
+              writeTVar filePath (Just fPath)
+              pure $ Right ()
+            _ -> pure $ Left AUTH
+
+  addRecipient st@STMFileStore {recipients} senderId (FileRecipient rId rKey) = atomically $
+    withFile st senderId $ \FileRec {recipientIds} -> do
+      rIds <- readTVar recipientIds
+      mem <- TM.member rId recipients
+      if rId `S.member` rIds || mem
+        then pure $ Left DUPLICATE_
+        else do
+          writeTVar recipientIds $! S.insert rId rIds
+          TM.insert rId (senderId, rKey) recipients
+          pure $ Right ()
+
+  deleteFile STMFileStore {files, recipients} senderId = atomically $ do
+    TM.lookupDelete senderId files >>= \case
+      Just FileRec {recipientIds} -> do
+        readTVar recipientIds >>= mapM_ (`TM.delete` recipients)
+        pure $ Right ()
+      _ -> pure $ Left AUTH
+
+  blockFile st senderId info _deleted = atomically $
+    withFile st senderId $ \FileRec {fileStatus} -> do
+      writeTVar fileStatus $! EntityBlocked info
+      pure $ Right ()
+
+  deleteRecipient STMFileStore {recipients} rId FileRec {recipientIds} = atomically $ do
+    TM.delete rId recipients
+    modifyTVar' recipientIds $ S.delete rId
+
+  getFile st party fId = atomically $ case party of
+    SFSender -> withFile st fId $ pure . Right . (\f -> (f, sndKey $ fileInfo f))
+    SFRecipient ->
+      TM.lookup fId (recipients st) >>= \case
+        Just (sId, rKey) -> withFile st sId $ pure . Right . (,rKey)
+        _ -> pure $ Left AUTH
+
+  ackFile st@STMFileStore {recipients} recipientId = atomically $ do
+    TM.lookupDelete recipientId recipients >>= \case
+      Just (sId, _) ->
+        withFile st sId $ \FileRec {recipientIds} -> do
+          modifyTVar' recipientIds $ S.delete recipientId
+          pure $ Right ()
+      _ -> pure $ Left AUTH
+
+  expiredFiles STMFileStore {files} old _limit = do
+    fs <- readTVarIO files
+    fmap catMaybes . forM (M.toList fs) $ \(sId, FileRec {fileInfo = FileInfo {size}, filePath, createdAt = RoundedSystemTime createdAt}) ->
+      if createdAt + fileTimePrecision < old
+        then do
+          path <- readTVarIO filePath
+          pure $ Just (sId, path, size)
+        else pure Nothing
+
+  getUsedStorage STMFileStore {files} =
+    M.foldl' (\acc FileRec {fileInfo = FileInfo {size}} -> acc + fromIntegral size) 0 <$> readTVarIO files
+
+  getFileCount STMFileStore {files} = M.size <$> readTVarIO files
+
+-- Internal STM helpers
+
+newFileRec :: SenderId -> FileInfo -> RoundedFileTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> STM FileRec
 newFileRec senderId fileInfo createdAt status = do
   recipientIds <- newTVar S.empty
   filePath <- newTVar Nothing
   fileStatus <- newTVar status
   pure FileRec {senderId, fileInfo, filePath, recipientIds, createdAt, fileStatus}
 
-setFilePath :: FileStore -> SenderId -> FilePath -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
-setFilePath st sId fPath =
-  withFile st sId $ \FileRec {fileInfo, filePath} -> do
-    writeTVar filePath (Just fPath)
-    modifyTVar' (usedStorage st) (+ fromIntegral (size fileInfo))
-    pure $ Right ()
-
-addRecipient :: FileStore -> SenderId -> FileRecipient -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
-addRecipient st@FileStore {recipients} senderId (FileRecipient rId rKey) =
-  withFile st senderId $ \FileRec {recipientIds} -> do
-    rIds <- readTVar recipientIds
-    mem <- TM.member rId recipients
-    if rId `S.member` rIds || mem
-      then pure $ Left DUPLICATE_
-      else do
-        writeTVar recipientIds $! S.insert rId rIds
-        TM.insert rId (senderId, rKey) recipients
-        pure $ Right ()
-
--- this function must be called after the file is deleted from the file system
-deleteFile :: FileStore -> SenderId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
-deleteFile FileStore {files, recipients, usedStorage} senderId = do
-  TM.lookupDelete senderId files >>= \case
-    Just FileRec {fileInfo, recipientIds} -> do
-      readTVar recipientIds >>= mapM_ (`TM.delete` recipients)
-      modifyTVar' usedStorage $ subtract (fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)
-      pure $ Right ()
-    _ -> pure $ Left AUTH
-
--- this function must be called after the file is deleted from the file system
-blockFile :: FileStore -> SenderId -> BlockingInfo -> Bool -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
-blockFile st@FileStore {usedStorage} senderId info deleted =
-  withFile st senderId $ \FileRec {fileInfo, fileStatus} -> do
-    when deleted $ modifyTVar' usedStorage $ subtract (fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)
-    writeTVar fileStatus $! EntityBlocked info
-    pure $ Right ()
-
-deleteRecipient :: FileStore -> RecipientId -> FileRec -> STM ()
-deleteRecipient FileStore {recipients} rId FileRec {recipientIds} = do
-  TM.delete rId recipients
-  modifyTVar' recipientIds $ S.delete rId
-
-getFile :: FileStore -> SFileParty p -> XFTPFileId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType (FileRec, C.APublicAuthKey))
-getFile st party fId = case party of
-  SFSender -> withFile st fId $ pure . Right . (\f -> (f, sndKey $ fileInfo f))
-  SFRecipient ->
-    TM.lookup fId (recipients st) >>= \case
-      Just (sId, rKey) -> withFile st sId $ pure . Right . (,rKey)
-      _ -> pure $ Left AUTH
-
-expiredFilePath :: FileStore -> XFTPFileId -> Int64 -> STM (Maybe (Maybe FilePath))
-expiredFilePath FileStore {files} sId old =
-  TM.lookup sId files
-    $>>= \FileRec {filePath, createdAt = RoundedSystemTime createdAt} ->
-      if createdAt + fileTimePrecision < old
-        then Just <$> readTVar filePath
-        else pure Nothing
-
-ackFile :: FileStore -> RecipientId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
-ackFile st@FileStore {recipients} recipientId = do
-  TM.lookupDelete recipientId recipients >>= \case
-    Just (sId, _) ->
-      withFile st sId $ \FileRec {recipientIds} -> do
-        modifyTVar' recipientIds $ S.delete recipientId
-        pure $ Right ()
-    _ -> pure $ Left AUTH
-
-withFile :: FileStore -> SenderId -> (FileRec -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)) -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)
-withFile FileStore {files} sId a =
+withFile :: STMFileStore -> SenderId -> (FileRec -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)) -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType a)
+withFile STMFileStore {files} sId a =
   TM.lookup sId files >>= \case
     Just f -> a f
     _ -> pure $ Left AUTH

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres.hs

@@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
+
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres
+  ( PostgresFileStore (..),
+    importFileStore,
+    exportFileStore,
+  )
+where
+
+import qualified Control.Exception as E
+import Control.Logger.Simple
+import Control.Monad
+import Control.Monad.Except
+import Control.Monad.IO.Class
+import Control.Monad.Trans.Except (throwE)
+import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
+import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
+import Data.ByteString.Builder (Builder)
+import qualified Data.ByteString.Builder as BB
+import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as LB
+import Data.Functor (($>))
+import Data.Int (Int32, Int64)
+import Data.List (intersperse)
+import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
+import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
+import qualified Data.Set as S
+import Data.Text (Text)
+import Data.Word (Word32)
+import Database.PostgreSQL.Simple (Binary (..), In (..), Only (..), SqlError, (:.) (..))
+import qualified Database.PostgreSQL.Simple as DB
+import qualified Database.PostgreSQL.Simple.Copy as DB
+import Database.PostgreSQL.Simple.Errors (ConstraintViolation (..), constraintViolation)
+import Database.PostgreSQL.Simple.ToField (Action (..), ToField (..))
+import GHC.IO (catchAny)
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..), SFileParty (..))
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Migrations (xftpServerMigrations)
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres (closeDBStore, createDBStore)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Common (DBStore, withTransaction)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Options (DBOpts (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (MigrationConfig (..), MigrationConfirmation (..))
+import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
+import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (RcvPublicAuthKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (EntityId (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore (ServerEntityStatus (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.Postgres ()
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog (openWriteStoreLog)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Util (firstRow, tshow)
+import System.Directory (renameFile)
+import System.Exit (exitFailure)
+import System.IO (IOMode (..), hFlush, stdout)
+import UnliftIO.STM
+
+data PostgresFileStore = PostgresFileStore
+  { dbStore :: DBStore,
+    dbStoreLog :: Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
+  }
+
+instance FileStoreClass PostgresFileStore where
+  type FileStoreConfig PostgresFileStore = PostgresFileStoreCfg
+
+  newFileStore PostgresFileStoreCfg {dbOpts, dbStoreLogPath, confirmMigrations} = do
+    dbStore <- either err pure =<< createDBStore dbOpts xftpServerMigrations (MigrationConfig confirmMigrations Nothing)
+    dbStoreLog <- mapM (openWriteStoreLog True) dbStoreLogPath
+    pure PostgresFileStore {dbStore, dbStoreLog}
+    where
+      err e = do
+        logError $ "STORE: newFileStore, error opening PostgreSQL database, " <> tshow e
+        exitFailure
+
+  closeFileStore PostgresFileStore {dbStore, dbStoreLog} = do
+    closeDBStore dbStore
+    mapM_ closeStoreLog dbStoreLog
+
+  addFile st sId fileInfo@FileInfo {sndKey, size, digest} createdAt status =
+    E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ runExceptT $ do
+      void $ withDB "addFile" st $ \db ->
+        E.try
+          ( DB.execute
+              db
+              "INSERT INTO files (sender_id, file_size, file_digest, sender_key, created_at, status) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)"
+              (sId, (fromIntegral size :: Int32), Binary digest, Binary (C.encodePubKey sndKey), createdAt, status)
+          )
+          >>= either handleDuplicate (pure . Right)
+      withLog "addFile" st $ \s -> logAddFile s sId fileInfo createdAt status
+
+  setFilePath st sId fPath = E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ runExceptT $ do
+    assertUpdated $ withDB' "setFilePath" st $ \db ->
+      DB.execute db "UPDATE files SET file_path = ? WHERE sender_id = ? AND file_path IS NULL AND status = 'active'" (fPath, sId)
+    withLog "setFilePath" st $ \s -> logPutFile s sId fPath
+
+  addRecipient st senderId (FileRecipient rId rKey) = E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ runExceptT $ do
+    void $ withDB "addRecipient" st $ \db ->
+      E.try
+        ( DB.execute
+            db
+            "INSERT INTO recipients (recipient_id, sender_id, recipient_key) VALUES (?,?,?)"
+            (rId, senderId, Binary (C.encodePubKey rKey))
+        )
+        >>= either handleDuplicate (pure . Right)
+    withLog "addRecipient" st $ \s -> logAddRecipients s senderId (pure $ FileRecipient rId rKey)
+
+  deleteFile st sId = E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ runExceptT $ do
+    assertUpdated $ withDB' "deleteFile" st $ \db ->
+      DB.execute db "DELETE FROM files WHERE sender_id = ?" (Only sId)
+    withLog "deleteFile" st $ \s -> logDeleteFile s sId
+
+  deleteFiles st sIds = E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ do
+    withTransaction (dbStore st) $ \db ->
+      DB.execute db "DELETE FROM files WHERE sender_id IN ?" (Only (In sIds))
+    withLog "deleteFiles" st $ \s -> mapM_ (logDeleteFile s) sIds
+
+  blockFile st sId info _deleted = E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ runExceptT $ do
+    assertUpdated $ withDB' "blockFile" st $ \db ->
+      DB.execute db "UPDATE files SET status = ? WHERE sender_id = ?" (EntityBlocked info, sId)
+    withLog "blockFile" st $ \s -> logBlockFile s sId info
+
+  deleteRecipient st rId _fr =
+    void $ runExceptT $ withDB' "deleteRecipient" st $ \db ->
+      DB.execute db "DELETE FROM recipients WHERE recipient_id = ?" (Only rId)
+
+  getFile st party fId = runExceptT $ case party of
+    SFSender -> do
+      row <- loadFileRow "SELECT sender_id, file_size, file_digest, sender_key, file_path, created_at, status FROM files WHERE sender_id = ?"
+      fr <- ExceptT $ rowToFileRec row
+      pure (fr, sndKey (fileInfo fr))
+    SFRecipient -> do
+      row :. Only rcpKeyBs <-
+        loadFileRow
+          "SELECT f.sender_id, f.file_size, f.file_digest, f.sender_key, f.file_path, f.created_at, f.status, r.recipient_key FROM files f JOIN recipients r ON r.sender_id = f.sender_id WHERE r.recipient_id = ?"
+      fr <- ExceptT $ rowToFileRec row
+      rcpKey <- either (const $ throwE INTERNAL) pure $ C.decodePubKey rcpKeyBs
+      pure (fr, rcpKey)
+    where
+      loadFileRow :: DB.FromRow r => DB.Query -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO r
+      loadFileRow q =
+        withDB "getFile" st $ \db ->
+          firstRow id AUTH $ DB.query db q (Only fId)
+
+  ackFile st rId = E.uninterruptibleMask_ $ runExceptT $ do
+    assertUpdated $ withDB' "ackFile" st $ \db ->
+      DB.execute db "DELETE FROM recipients WHERE recipient_id = ?" (Only rId)
+    withLog "ackFile" st $ \s -> logAckFile s rId
+
+  expiredFiles st old limit =
+    fmap toResult $ withTransaction (dbStore st) $ \db ->
+      DB.query
+        db
+        "SELECT sender_id, file_path, file_size FROM files WHERE created_at + ? < ? ORDER BY created_at LIMIT ?"
+        (fileTimePrecision, old, limit)
+    where
+      toResult :: [(SenderId, Maybe FilePath, Int32)] -> [(SenderId, Maybe FilePath, Word32)]
+      toResult = map (\(sId, path, size) -> (sId, path, fromIntegral size))
+
+  getUsedStorage st =
+    withTransaction (dbStore st) $ \db -> do
+      [Only total] <- DB.query_ db "SELECT COALESCE(SUM(file_size::BIGINT), 0)::BIGINT FROM files"
+      pure total
+
+  getFileCount st =
+    withTransaction (dbStore st) $ \db -> do
+      [Only count] <- DB.query_ db "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM files"
+      pure (fromIntegral (count :: Int64))
+
+-- Internal helpers
+
+mkFileRec :: SenderId -> FileInfo -> Maybe FilePath -> RoundedFileTime -> ServerEntityStatus -> IO FileRec
+mkFileRec senderId fileInfo path createdAt status = do
+  filePath <- newTVarIO path
+  recipientIds <- newTVarIO S.empty
+  fileStatus <- newTVarIO status
+  pure FileRec {senderId, fileInfo, filePath, recipientIds, createdAt, fileStatus}
+
+type FileRecRow = (SenderId, Int32, ByteString, ByteString, Maybe FilePath, RoundedFileTime, ServerEntityStatus)
+
+rowToFileRec :: FileRecRow -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType FileRec)
+rowToFileRec (sId, size, digest, sndKeyBs, path, createdAt, status) =
+  case C.decodePubKey sndKeyBs of
+    Right sndKey -> do
+      let fileInfo = FileInfo {sndKey, size = fromIntegral size, digest}
+      Right <$> mkFileRec sId fileInfo path createdAt status
+    Left _ -> pure $ Left INTERNAL
+
+-- DB helpers
+
+withDB :: forall a. Text -> PostgresFileStore -> (DB.Connection -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)) -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO a
+withDB op st action =
+  ExceptT $ E.try (withTransaction (dbStore st) action) >>= either logErr pure
+  where
+    logErr :: E.SomeException -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)
+    logErr e = logError ("STORE: " <> err) $> Left INTERNAL
+      where
+        err = op <> ", withDB, " <> tshow e
+
+withDB' :: Text -> PostgresFileStore -> (DB.Connection -> IO a) -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO a
+withDB' op st action = withDB op st $ fmap Right . action
+
+assertUpdated :: ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO Int64 -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO ()
+assertUpdated = (>>= \n -> when (n == 0) (throwE AUTH))
+
+handleDuplicate :: SqlError -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType a)
+handleDuplicate e = case constraintViolation e of
+  Just (UniqueViolation _) -> pure $ Left DUPLICATE_
+  Just (ForeignKeyViolation _ _) -> pure $ Left AUTH
+  _ -> E.throwIO e
+
+withLog :: MonadIO m => Text -> PostgresFileStore -> (StoreLog 'WriteMode -> IO ()) -> m ()
+withLog op PostgresFileStore {dbStoreLog} action =
+  forM_ dbStoreLog $ \sl -> liftIO $ action sl `catchAny` \e ->
+    logWarn $ "STORE: " <> op <> ", withLog, " <> tshow e
+
+-- Import: StoreLog -> PostgreSQL
+
+importFileStore :: FilePath -> PostgresFileStoreCfg -> IO ()
+importFileStore storeLogFilePath dbCfg = do
+  putStrLn $ "Reading store log: " <> storeLogFilePath
+  stmStore <- newFileStore () :: IO STMFileStore
+  sl <- readWriteFileStore storeLogFilePath stmStore
+  closeStoreLog sl
+  allFiles <- readTVarIO (files stmStore)
+  allRcps <- readTVarIO (recipients stmStore)
+  let fileCount = M.size allFiles
+      rcpCount = M.size allRcps
+  putStrLn $ "Loaded " <> show fileCount <> " files, " <> show rcpCount <> " recipients."
+  let dbCfg' = dbCfg {dbOpts = (dbOpts dbCfg) {createSchema = True}, confirmMigrations = MCYesUp}
+  pgStore <- newFileStore dbCfg' :: IO PostgresFileStore
+  existingCount <- getFileCount pgStore
+  when (existingCount > 0) $ do
+    putStrLn $ "WARNING: database already contains " <> show existingCount <> " files. Import will fail on duplicate keys."
+    putStrLn "Drop the existing schema first or use a fresh database."
+    exitFailure
+  putStrLn "Importing files..."
+  fCnt <- withTransaction (dbStore pgStore) $ \db -> do
+    DB.copy_
+      db
+      "COPY files (sender_id, file_size, file_digest, sender_key, file_path, created_at, status) FROM STDIN WITH (FORMAT csv)"
+    iforM_ (M.toList allFiles) $ \i (sId, fr) -> do
+      DB.putCopyData db =<< fileRecToCSV sId fr
+      when (i > 0 && i `mod` 10000 == 0) $ putStr ("  " <> show i <> " files\r") >> hFlush stdout
+    DB.putCopyEnd db
+    [Only cnt] <- DB.query_ db "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM files"
+    pure (cnt :: Int64)
+  putStrLn $ "Imported " <> show fCnt <> " files."
+  putStrLn "Importing recipients..."
+  rCnt <- withTransaction (dbStore pgStore) $ \db -> do
+    DB.copy_
+      db
+      "COPY recipients (recipient_id, sender_id, recipient_key) FROM STDIN WITH (FORMAT csv)"
+    iforM_ (M.toList allRcps) $ \i (rId, (sId, rKey)) -> do
+      DB.putCopyData db $ recipientToCSV rId sId rKey
+      when (i > 0 && i `mod` 10000 == 0) $ putStr ("  " <> show i <> " recipients\r") >> hFlush stdout
+    DB.putCopyEnd db
+    [Only cnt] <- DB.query_ db "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM recipients"
+    pure (cnt :: Int64)
+  putStrLn $ "Imported " <> show rCnt <> " recipients."
+  when (fromIntegral fileCount /= fCnt) $
+    putStrLn $ "WARNING: expected " <> show fileCount <> " files, got " <> show fCnt
+  when (fromIntegral rcpCount /= rCnt) $
+    putStrLn $ "WARNING: expected " <> show rcpCount <> " recipients, got " <> show rCnt
+  closeFileStore pgStore
+  renameFile storeLogFilePath (storeLogFilePath <> ".bak")
+  putStrLn $ "Store log renamed to " <> storeLogFilePath <> ".bak"
+
+-- Export: PostgreSQL -> StoreLog
+
+exportFileStore :: FilePath -> PostgresFileStoreCfg -> IO ()
+exportFileStore storeLogFilePath dbCfg = do
+  pgStore <- newFileStore dbCfg :: IO PostgresFileStore
+  sl <- openWriteStoreLog False storeLogFilePath
+  -- Fold 1: stream files, write FNEW + FPUT per file
+  putStrLn "Exporting files..."
+  !fCnt <- withTransaction (dbStore pgStore) $ \db ->
+    DB.fold_
+      db
+      "SELECT sender_id, file_size, file_digest, sender_key, file_path, created_at, status FROM files ORDER BY created_at"
+      (0 :: Int)
+      ( \(!fc) (sId, size :: Int32, digest :: ByteString, sndKeyBs :: ByteString, path :: Maybe String, createdAt, status) ->
+          case C.decodePubKey sndKeyBs of
+            Right sndKey -> do
+              let fileInfo = FileInfo {sndKey, size = fromIntegral size, digest}
+              logAddFile sl sId fileInfo createdAt status
+              forM_ path $ logPutFile sl sId
+              pure (fc + 1)
+            Left _ -> do
+              putStrLn $ "WARNING: invalid sender key for " <> show sId
+              pure fc
+      )
+  -- Fold 2: stream recipients ordered by sender_id, flush FADD on sender change
+  putStrLn "Exporting recipients..."
+  !rCnt <- withTransaction (dbStore pgStore) $ \db ->
+    DB.fold_
+      db
+      "SELECT sender_id, recipient_id, recipient_key FROM recipients ORDER BY sender_id"
+      (Nothing :: Maybe SenderId, [] :: [FileRecipient], 0 :: Int)
+      ( \(!prevSId, !buf, !rc) (sId, rId, rKeyBs :: ByteString) ->
+          case C.decodePubKey rKeyBs of
+            Right rKey -> do
+              let rcp = FileRecipient rId rKey
+              case prevSId of
+                Just prev | prev /= sId -> do
+                  forM_ (L.nonEmpty buf) $ logAddRecipients sl prev
+                  pure (Just sId, [rcp], rc + length buf)
+                _ -> pure (Just sId, rcp : buf, rc)
+            Left _ -> putStrLn ("WARNING: invalid recipient key for " <> show rId) $> (prevSId, buf, rc)
+      )
+      >>= \(lastSId, buf, rc) -> do
+        forM_ lastSId $ \sId -> forM_ (L.nonEmpty buf) $ logAddRecipients sl sId
+        pure (rc + length buf)
+  closeStoreLog sl
+  closeFileStore pgStore
+  putStrLn $ "Exported " <> show fCnt <> " files, " <> show rCnt <> " recipients to " <> storeLogFilePath
+
+-- CSV helpers for COPY protocol
+
+iforM_ :: Monad m => [a] -> (Int -> a -> m ()) -> m ()
+iforM_ xs f = zipWithM_ f [0 ..] xs
+
+fileRecToCSV :: SenderId -> FileRec -> IO ByteString
+fileRecToCSV sId FileRec {fileInfo = FileInfo {sndKey, size, digest}, filePath, createdAt, fileStatus} = do
+  path <- readTVarIO filePath
+  status <- readTVarIO fileStatus
+  pure $ LB.toStrict $ BB.toLazyByteString $ mconcat (BB.char7 ',' `intersperse` fields path status) <> BB.char7 '\n'
+  where
+    fields path status =
+      [ renderField (toField (Binary (unEntityId sId))),
+        renderField (toField (fromIntegral size :: Int32)),
+        renderField (toField (Binary digest)),
+        renderField (toField (Binary (C.encodePubKey sndKey))),
+        nullable (toField <$> path),
+        renderField (toField createdAt),
+        quotedField (toField status)
+      ]
+
+recipientToCSV :: RecipientId -> SenderId -> RcvPublicAuthKey -> ByteString
+recipientToCSV rId sId rKey =
+  LB.toStrict $ BB.toLazyByteString $ mconcat (BB.char7 ',' `intersperse` fields) <> BB.char7 '\n'
+  where
+    fields =
+      [ renderField (toField (Binary (unEntityId rId))),
+        renderField (toField (Binary (unEntityId sId))),
+        renderField (toField (Binary (C.encodePubKey rKey)))
+      ]
+
+renderField :: Action -> Builder
+renderField = \case
+  Plain bld -> bld
+  Escape s -> BB.byteString s
+  EscapeByteA s -> BB.string7 "\\x" <> BB.byteStringHex s
+  EscapeIdentifier s -> BB.byteString s
+  Many as -> mconcat (map renderField as)
+
+nullable :: Maybe Action -> Builder
+nullable = maybe mempty renderField
+
+quotedField :: Action -> Builder
+quotedField a = BB.char7 '"' <> escapeQuotes (renderField a) <> BB.char7 '"'
+  where
+    escapeQuotes bld =
+      let bs = LB.toStrict $ BB.toLazyByteString bld
+       in BB.byteString $ B.concatMap (\c -> if c == '"' then "\"\"" else B.singleton c) bs

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Config.hs

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
+
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Config
+  ( PostgresFileStoreCfg (..),
+    defaultXFTPDBOpts,
+  )
+where
+
+import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Postgres.Options (DBOpts (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared (MigrationConfirmation)
+
+data PostgresFileStoreCfg = PostgresFileStoreCfg
+  { dbOpts :: DBOpts,
+    dbStoreLogPath :: Maybe FilePath,
+    confirmMigrations :: MigrationConfirmation
+  }
+
+defaultXFTPDBOpts :: DBOpts
+defaultXFTPDBOpts =
+  DBOpts
+    { connstr = "postgresql://xftp@/xftp_server_store",
+      schema = "xftp_server",
+      poolSize = 10,
+      createSchema = False
+    }

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Store/Postgres/Migrations.hs

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
+
+module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store.Postgres.Migrations
+  ( xftpServerMigrations,
+  )
+where
+
+import Data.List (sortOn)
+import Data.Text (Text)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.Shared
+import Text.RawString.QQ (r)
+
+xftpSchemaMigrations :: [(String, Text, Maybe Text)]
+xftpSchemaMigrations =
+  [ ("20260325_initial", m20260325_initial, Nothing)
+  ]
+
+-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
+xftpServerMigrations :: [Migration]
+xftpServerMigrations = sortOn name $ map migration xftpSchemaMigrations
+  where
+    migration (name, up, down) = Migration {name, up, down = down}
+
+m20260325_initial :: Text
+m20260325_initial =
+  [r|
+CREATE TABLE files (
+  sender_id BYTEA NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
+  file_size INTEGER NOT NULL,
+  file_digest BYTEA NOT NULL,
+  sender_key BYTEA NOT NULL,
+  file_path TEXT,
+  created_at BIGINT NOT NULL,
+  status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active'
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE recipients (
+  recipient_id BYTEA NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
+  sender_id BYTEA NOT NULL REFERENCES files ON DELETE CASCADE,
+  recipient_key BYTEA NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX idx_recipients_sender_id ON recipients (sender_id);
+CREATE INDEX idx_files_created_at ON files (created_at);
+|]