transport: add send-queueing timeout

* agent: make version independent of PQ enqryption support

* remove comment

.github/workflows/build.yml

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ jobs:
         run: cabal build --enable-tests
 
       - name: Test
-        timeout-minutes: 40
+        timeout-minutes: 30
         shell: bash
         run: cabal test --test-show-details=direct
 

notes-flow.txt

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-common:
-  corrId - random BS, used as CbNonce
-  entityId - p2r tlsUniq
-
-# setup
-s->p: "proxy", uri, auth?
-  # unless connected
-  p->r: "p_handshake"
-  p<-r: "r_key", tls-signed dh pub
-s<-r: "r_key", tls-signed dh pub # reply entityId contains tlsUniq
-
-# working
-s ; generate random dh priv, make shared secret
-s->p: s2r("forward", random dh pub, SEND command blob)
-  p->r: p2r("forward", random dh pub, s2r("forward", ...)))
-    r->c@ "msg", ...
-  p<-r: p2r("r_res", s2r("ok" / "error", error))
-s<-p@ s2r("ok" / "error", error)
-
-# expired
-  p<-r@ p2r("error", "key expired")
-s<-p@ "error", "key expired"
-s ; reconnect

package.yaml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: simplexmq
-version: 5.6.2.2
+version: 5.7.0.2
 synopsis: SimpleXMQ message broker
 description: |
   This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,

rfcs/2023-09-12-second-relays.md

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 
 ## Problem
 
-SMP protocol relays are chosen and can be controlled by the message recipients. It means that the recipients can find out IP addresses of message senders by modifying SMP relay code (or by using proxies and timing correlation), unless the senders use VPN or some overlay network. Tor is an adequate solution in most cases to mitigate it, but it requires additional technical knowledge to install and configure (even installing Orbot on Android is seen as "complex" by many users), and reduces usability because of higher latency.
+SMP protocol relays are chosen and can be controlled by the message recipients. It means that the recipients can find out IP addresses of message senders by modifying SMP relay code (or by using proxies and timing correlation), unless the senders use VPN or some overlay network. Tor is an audequate solution in most cases to mitigate it, but it requires additional technical knowledge to install and configure (even installing Orbot on Android is seen as "complex" by many users), and reduces usability because of higher latency.
 
-The lack of in-built IP address protection is the main concern of many users, particularly given that most people do not realize that it is lacking by default - without transport protection SimpleX is not perceived as a "whole product".
+The lack of in-built IP address protection is the main concern of many users, particularly given that most people do not realise that it is lacking by default - without transport protection SimpleX is not perceived as a "whole product".
 
 Similarly, XFTP protocol relays are chosen by senders, and they can be used to detect file recipients' IP addresses.
 
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Overall, this is not a viable or even appropriate option for the current stage.
 
 3. SMP / XFTP proxy.
 
-Introduce SMP and XFTP protocol extensions to allow message senders and file recipients to delegate the tasks of sending messages and receiving files to the proxies, so that peer-chosen relays can only observe IP addresses of the proxies and not of the users.
+Introduce SMP and XFTP protocol extenstions to allow message senders and file recipients to delegate the tasks of sending messages and receiving files to the proxies, so that peer-chosen relays can only observe IP addresses of the proxies and not of the users.
 
 Pros:
 - no dependency on and lower latency than via Tor
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Below considers this design.
 
 2. SMP proxy should not be able to observe queue addresses and their count on the destination relays. This requirement is not needed for XFTP proxies, as each file chunk is downloaded only once, so there is no need to hide its address.
 
-3. There must be no identifiers and ciphertext in common in outgoing and incoming traffic inside TLS (the current designs have this quality).
+3. There must be no identifiers and cyphertext in common in outgoing and incoming traffic inside TLS (the current designs have this quality).
 
 4. Traffic between the client and destination relays must be e2e encrypted, with MITM-by-proxy mitigated, relying on the relay identity (certificate fingerprint), ideally without any additional fingerprint in relay address.
 
@@ -97,11 +97,11 @@ This would also reduce the difference in how the traffic looks to the observer -
 
 The flow of the messages will be:
 
-1. Client requests proxy to create session with the relay by sending `PRXY` command with the SMP relay address and optional proxy basic AUTH (below). It should be possible to batch multiple session requests into one block, to reduce traffic.
+1. Client requests proxy to create session with the relay by sending `server` command with the SMP relay address and optional proxy basic AUTH (below). It should be possible to batch multiple session requests into one block, to reduce traffic.
 
-2. Proxy connects to SMP relay, negotiating a shared secret via a handshake headers - it will be used to encrypt all sender blocks inside TLS (proxy-relay encryption). DH key returned by SMP relay in handshake will also be used to encrypt client commands, combining it with random per-command keys (sender-relay encryption, to hide metadata sent to the destination relay from proxy).
+2. Proxy connects to SMP relay, negotiating a shared secret in the handshake that will be used to encrypt all sender blocks inside TLS (proxy-relay encryption). SMP relay also returns in handshake its temporary DH key to agree e2e encryption with the client (sender-relay encryption, to hide metadata sent to the destination relay from proxy).
 
-3. Proxy replies to sender with `PKEY` message using "entityId" transmission field to indicate session ID for using in further requests, relay DH key for _s2r_ encryption with the client - this key is signed with the TLS online private key associated with the certificate (its fingerprint is included in the relay address), and the TLS session ID between proxy and relay (this session ID must be used in transmissions, to mitigate replay attacks as before).
+3. Proxy replies with `server_id` command including relay session ID to identify it in further requests, relay DH key for e2e encryption with the client - this key is signed with the TLS online private key associated with the certificate (its fingerprint is included in the relay address), and the TLS session ID between proxy and relay (this session ID must be used in transmissions, to mitigate replay attacks as before).
 
 A possible attack here is that proxy can use this TLS session to replay commands received from the client. Possibly, it could be mitigated with a bloom filter per proxy/SMP relay connection that would reject the repeated DH keys (that need to be used for replay), and also with DH key expiration (this mitigation should allow some acceptable rate of false positives from the bloom filter).
 
@@ -113,11 +113,11 @@ It is important that the same public key from destination relay is returned to a
 
 *Unrelated cosideration for SMP protocol privacy improvement*: instead of signing commands to the destination relay, the sender could have a ratchet per queue agreed with the destination relay that would simply use authenticated encryption with per-message symmetric key to encrypt the message on the way to relay, and this encryption would be used as a proof of sender.
 
-4. Now the client sends `PFWD` to proxy, which it then forwards to SMP relay as `RFWD`, applying _p2r_ encryption layer.
+4. Now the client sends `forward` to proxy, which it then forwards to SMP relay, applying additional encryption layer.
 
-5. SMP relay sends `RRES` to proxy applying _p2r_ encryption layer, which it then forwards to the client as `PRES`, removing the _p2r_ encryption layer.
+5. SMP relay sends `response` to proxy applying additional encryption layer, which it then forwards to the client removing the additional encryption layer.
 
-Effectively it works as a simplified two-hop onion routing with the first relay (proxy) chosen by the sending client and the second relay chosen by the recipient, not only protecting senders' IP addresses from the recipients' relays, but also preventing recipients' relays from correlating senders' traffic to different queues, as TLS session is owned by the proxy now and it mixes the traffic from multiple senders. To correlate traffic to users, proxy and relay would have to combine their information. SMP relays are still able to correlate traffic to receiving users via transport session.
+Effectively it works as a simplified two-hop onion routing with the first relay (proxy) chosen by the sending client and the second relay chosen by the recipient, not only protecting senders' IP addresses from the recipients' relays, but also preventing recipients relays from correlating senders' traffic to different queues, as TLS session is owned by the proxy now and it mixes the traffic from multiple senders. To correlate traffic to users, proxy and relay would have to combine their information. SMP relays are still able to correlate traffic to receiving users via transport session.
 
 Sequence diagram for sending the message via SMP proxy:
 
@@ -126,33 +126,33 @@ Sequence diagram for sending the message via SMP proxy:
 |  sending  |               |    SMP    |                     |    SMP    |              | receiving |
 |  client   |               |   proxy   |                     |   relay   |              |  client   |
 -------------               -------------                     -------------              -------------
-     |           `PRXY`           |                                 |                          |
+     |       `server`             |                                 |                          |
-     | -------------------------> |                                 |                          |
+     | -------------------------> |   create TLS session, get keys  |                          |
      |                            | ------------------------------> |                          |
-     |                            |          SMP handshake          |                          |
+     |        `server_id`         |       (if doesn't exist)        |                          |
-     |                            | <------------------------------ |                          |
-     |           `PKEY`           |                                 |                          |
      | <------------------------- |                                 |                          |
      |                            |                                 |                          |
-     |        `PFWD` (s2r)        |                                 |                          |
+     | TLS(F:s2r(SEND(e2e(msg)))) |                                 |                          |
-     | -------------------------> |                                 |                          |
+     | -------------------------> | TLS(F:p2r(s2r(SEND(e2e(msg))))) |                          |
-     |                            |           `RFWD` (p2r)          |                          |
      |                            | ------------------------------> |                          |
-     |                            |           `RRES` (p2r)          |                          |
+     |                            |                                 |                          |
-     |                            | <------------------------------ |                          |
+     |                            |     TLS(R:p2r(s2r(OK/ERR)))     |                          |
-     |        `PRES` (s2r)        |                                 |           `MSG`          |
+     |     TLS(R:s2r(OK/ERR))     | <------------------------------ |                          |
-     | <------------------------- |                                 | -----------------------> |
+     | <------------------------- |                                 | TLS(MSG(r2c(e2e(msg))))  |
-     |                            |                                 |           `ACK`          |
+     |                            |                                 | -----------------------> |
+     |                            |                                 |                          |
+     |                            |                                 |        TLS(ACK)          |
      |                            |                                 | <----------------------- |
      |                            |                                 |                          |
      |                            |                                 |                          |
+
 ```
 
-Below diagram shows the encrypttion layers for `PFWD`/`RFWD` commands and `RRES`/`PRES` responses:
+Below diagram shows the encrypttion layers for `forward` and `response` commands:
 
-- s2r (added) - encryption between client and SMP relay, with relay key returned in relay handshake, with MITM by proxy mitigated by verifying the certificate fingerprint included in the relay address.
+- s2r (added) - encryption between client and SMP relay, with relay key returned in server_id command, with MITM by proxy mitigated by verifying the certificate fingerprint included in the relay address.
 - e2e (exists now) - end-to-end encryption per SMP queue, with double ratchet e2e encryption inside it.
-- p2r (added) - additional encryption between proxy and SMP relay with the shared secret agreed in the handshake, to mitigate traffic correlation inside TLS.
+- p2r (added) - additional encryption between proxy and SMP relay with key agreed in the handshake, to mitigate traffic correlation inside TLS. This key could also be signed by the same certificate, if we don't want to rely on TLS security.
 - r2c (exists now) additional encryption between SMP relay and client to prevent traffic correlation inside TLS.
 
 ```
@@ -167,32 +167,27 @@ Below diagram shows the encrypttion layers for `PFWD`/`RFWD` commands and `RRES`
 -----------------             -----------------  -- TLS --  -----------------             -----------------
 ```
 
-Question: should proxy declare its role in handshake? When proxy connects to SMP relay it would indicate in the handshake that it will act as a proxy and the SMP relay would expect the same `forward` commands and reply with `response`s.
+When proxy connects to SMP relay it would indicate in the handshake that it will use proxy protocol and the SMP relay would expect the same `forward` commands and reply with `response`s.
 
-Common SMP transmission format (v4), for reference:
+Below syntax aims to fit in 16kb block using spare capacity in SMP protocol.
 
 ```abnf
-paddedTransmission = <padded(transmission), 16384>
+proxy_block = padded(proxy_transmission, 16384)
-transmission = signature signed
+proxy_transmission = corr_id relay_session_id proxy_command
-signature = 0 ; empty signatures here
+corr_id = length *8 OCTET
-signed = sessionIdentifier corrId entityId (smpCommand / brokerMsg)
+proxy_command = server / server_id / forward / response / error
+server = "S" address [relay_basic_auth] ; creates transport session between proxy and relay
+server_id = "I" relay_session_id tls_session_id signed_relay_key ;
+    ; session_id is the TLS session ID between proxy and relay, it has to be included inside encrypted block to prevent replay attacks
+forward = %s"F" random_dh_pub_key encrypted_block ; it's important that a new key is used for each command, to prevent any correlation by proxy or by destination relay
+response = %s"R" encrypted_block; response received from the destination SMP relay
+relay_session_id = length *8 OCTET
+error = %s"E" error
 ```
 
-- `corrId` is fully random each time and used as a nonce for encrypted blocks.
+The overhead is: 1+8 (corrId) + 1+8 (relay_session_id) + 1 (command) + 1+32 (random_dh_pub_key) + 2 (original length) + 16 (auth tag for e2e encryption) + 16 (auth tag for proxy to relay encryption) = 86 bytes. The reserve for sent messages in SMP is ~84 bytes, so it should about fit with some reduced bytes somewhere.
-- `entityId` carries tlsUniq from the current proxy-to-relay connection.
-- `smpCommand` gets extended with `s2p_command / p2r_command`.
-- `brokerMsg` gets extended with `r_key / r_response`.
 
-```abnf
+Another possible design is to allow mixing sent messages and normal SMP commands in the same transport connection, but it can make fitting in the block a bit harder, additional overhead would be: 1 (transmission count) + 2 (transmission size) + 1 (empty signature) = 4 bytes.
-s2p_command = proxy / forward
-p2r_command = p_handshake ; forward is
-proxy = %s"PRXY" SP relayUri SP basicAuth
-relayUri = length %s"smp://" serverIdentity "@" srvHost [":" port]
-forward = %s"PFWD" SP dhPublic SP encryptedBlock
-r_key = %s"PKEY" SP dhPublic
-r_response = %s"RRES" SP encryptedBlock
-dhPublic = length x509encoded
-```
 
 The above assumes that the client can only send one message to an SMP relay and then has to wait for response before sending the next message. Missing the response would cause re-delivery (further improvement is possible when proxy detects these redelieveries and not send them to relays but simply reply with the same response).
 

simplexmq.cabal

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ cabal-version: 1.12
 -- see: https://github.com/sol/hpack
 
 name:           simplexmq
-version:        5.6.2.2
+version:        5.7.0.2
 synopsis:       SimpleXMQ message broker
 description:    This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,
                 <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Client.html client> and
@@ -652,7 +652,6 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
       ServerTests
       SMPAgentClient
       SMPClient
-      SMPProxyTests
       Util
       XFTPAgent
       XFTPCLI

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Client.hs

@@ -97,8 +97,8 @@ defaultXFTPClientConfig =
       clientALPN = Just supportedXFTPhandshakes
     }
 
-getXFTPClient :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> TransportSession FileResponse -> XFTPClientConfig -> (XFTPClient -> IO ()) -> IO (Either XFTPClientError XFTPClient)
+getXFTPClient :: TransportSession FileResponse -> XFTPClientConfig -> (XFTPClient -> IO ()) -> IO (Either XFTPClientError XFTPClient)
-getXFTPClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN, xftpNetworkConfig, serverVRange} disconnected = runExceptT $ do
+getXFTPClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN, xftpNetworkConfig, serverVRange} disconnected = runExceptT $ do
   let tcConfig = (transportClientConfig xftpNetworkConfig) {alpn = clientALPN}
       http2Config = xftpHTTP2Config tcConfig config
       username = proxyUsername transportSession
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ getXFTPClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN
       thParams0 = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = VersionXFTP 1, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, batch = True}
   logDebug $ "Client negotiated handshake protocol: " <> tshow sessionALPN
   thParams@THandleParams {thVersion} <- case sessionALPN of
-    Just "xftp/1" -> xftpClientHandshakeV1 g serverVRange keyHash http2Client thParams0
+    Just "xftp/1" -> xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash http2Client thParams0
     Nothing -> pure thParams0
     _ -> throwError $ PCETransportError (TEHandshake VERSION)
   logDebug $ "Client negotiated protocol: " <> tshow thVersion
@@ -120,13 +120,12 @@ getXFTPClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN
   atomically $ writeTVar clientVar $ Just c
   pure c
 
-xftpClientHandshakeV1 :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> VersionRangeXFTP -> C.KeyHash -> HTTP2Client -> THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient)
+xftpClientHandshakeV1 :: VersionRangeXFTP -> C.KeyHash -> HTTP2Client -> THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient)
-xftpClientHandshakeV1 g serverVRange keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) c@HTTP2Client {sessionId, serverKey} thParams0 = do
+xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) c@HTTP2Client {sessionId, serverKey} thParams0 = do
   shs@XFTPServerHandshake {authPubKey = ck} <- getServerHandshake
   (v, sk) <- processServerHandshake shs
-  (k, pk) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
+  sendClientHandshake XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = v, keyHash}
-  sendClientHandshake XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = k}
+  pure thParams0 {thAuth = Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = sk, serverCertKey = ck, sessSecret = Nothing}, thVersion = v}
-  pure thParams0 {thAuth = Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = sk, serverCertKey = ck, clientPrivKey = pk}, thVersion = v}
   where
     getServerHandshake :: ExceptT XFTPClientError IO XFTPServerHandshake
     getServerHandshake = do
@@ -186,11 +185,9 @@ xftpClientError = \case
 
 sendXFTPCommand :: forall p. FilePartyI p => XFTPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> XFTPFileId -> FileCommand p -> Maybe XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (FileResponse, HTTP2Body)
 sendXFTPCommand c@XFTPClient {thParams} pKey fId cmd chunkSpec_ = do
-  -- TODO random corrId
-  let corrIdUsedAsNonce = ""
   t <-
     liftEither . first PCETransportError $
-      xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams pKey (corrIdUsedAsNonce, fId, FileCmd (sFileParty @p) cmd)
+      xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams pKey ("", fId, FileCmd (sFileParty @p) cmd)
   sendXFTPTransmission c t chunkSpec_
 
 sendXFTPTransmission :: XFTPClient -> ByteString -> Maybe XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (FileResponse, HTTP2Body)

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Client/Agent.hs

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import Control.Logger.Simple (logInfo)
 import Control.Monad
 import Control.Monad.Except
 import Control.Monad.Trans (lift)
-import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
 import Data.Bifunctor (first)
 import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
 import Data.Text (Text)
@@ -61,15 +60,15 @@ newXFTPAgent config = do
 
 type ME a = ExceptT XFTPClientAgentError IO a
 
-getXFTPServerClient :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> XFTPClientAgent -> XFTPServer -> ME XFTPClient
+getXFTPServerClient :: XFTPClientAgent -> XFTPServer -> ME XFTPClient
-getXFTPServerClient g XFTPClientAgent {xftpClients, config} srv = do
+getXFTPServerClient XFTPClientAgent {xftpClients, config} srv = do
   atomically getClientVar >>= either newXFTPClient waitForXFTPClient
   where
     connectClient :: ME XFTPClient
     connectClient =
       ExceptT $
         first (XFTPClientAgentError srv)
-          <$> getXFTPClient g (1, srv, Nothing) (xftpConfig config) clientDisconnected
+          <$> getXFTPClient (1, srv, Nothing) (xftpConfig config) clientDisconnected
 
     clientDisconnected :: XFTPClient -> IO ()
     clientDisconnected _ = do

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Client/Main.hs

@@ -333,9 +333,9 @@ cliSendFileOpts SendOptions {filePath, outputDir, numRecipients, xftpServers, re
           rKeys <- atomically $ L.fromList <$> replicateM numRecipients (C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g)
           digest <- liftIO $ getChunkDigest chunkSpec
           let ch = FileInfo {sndKey, size = fromIntegral chunkSize, digest}
-          c <- withRetry retryCount $ getXFTPServerClient g a xftpServer
+          c <- withRetry retryCount $ getXFTPServerClient a xftpServer
           (sndId, rIds) <- withRetry retryCount $ createXFTPChunk c spKey ch (L.map fst rKeys) auth
-          withReconnect g a xftpServer retryCount $ \c' -> uploadXFTPChunk c' spKey sndId chunkSpec
+          withReconnect a xftpServer retryCount $ \c' -> uploadXFTPChunk c' spKey sndId chunkSpec
           logInfo $ "uploaded chunk " <> tshow chunkNo
           uploaded <- atomically . stateTVar uploadedChunks $ \cs ->
             let cs' = fromIntegral chunkSize : cs in (sum cs', cs')
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath,
       when (FileSize encSize /= size) $ throwError $ CLIError "File size mismatch"
       liftIO $ printNoNewLine "Decrypting file..."
       CryptoFile path _ <- withExceptT cliCryptoError $ decryptChunks encSize chunkPaths key nonce $ fmap CF.plain . getFilePath
-      forM_ chunks $ acknowledgeFileChunk g a
+      forM_ chunks $ acknowledgeFileChunk a
       whenM (doesPathExist encPath) $ removeDirectoryRecursive encPath
       liftIO $ do
         printNoNewLine $ "File downloaded: " <> path
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath,
       logInfo $ "downloading chunk " <> tshow chunkNo <> " from " <> showServer server <> "..."
       chunkPath <- uniqueCombine encPath $ show chunkNo
       let chunkSpec = XFTPRcvChunkSpec chunkPath (unFileSize chunkSize) (unFileDigest digest)
-      withReconnect g a server retryCount $ \c -> downloadXFTPChunk g c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId) chunkSpec
+      withReconnect a server retryCount $ \c -> downloadXFTPChunk g c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId) chunkSpec
       logInfo $ "downloaded chunk " <> tshow chunkNo <> " to " <> T.pack chunkPath
       downloaded <- atomically . stateTVar downloadedChunks $ \cs ->
         let cs' = fromIntegral (unFileSize chunkSize) : cs in (sum cs', cs')
@@ -472,12 +472,12 @@ cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath,
           ifM (doesDirectoryExist path) (uniqueCombine path name) $
             ifM (doesFileExist path) (throwError "File already exists") (pure path)
         _ -> (`uniqueCombine` name) . (</> "Downloads") =<< getHomeDirectory
-    acknowledgeFileChunk :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> XFTPClientAgent -> FileChunk -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
+    acknowledgeFileChunk :: XFTPClientAgent -> FileChunk -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
-    acknowledgeFileChunk g a FileChunk {replicas = replica : _} = do
+    acknowledgeFileChunk a FileChunk {replicas = replica : _} = do
       let FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey} = replica
-      c <- withRetry retryCount $ getXFTPServerClient g a server
+      c <- withRetry retryCount $ getXFTPServerClient a server
       withRetry retryCount $ ackXFTPChunk c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId)
-    acknowledgeFileChunk _ _ _ = throwError $ CLIError "chunk has no replicas"
+    acknowledgeFileChunk _ _ = throwError $ CLIError "chunk has no replicas"
 
 printProgress :: String -> Int64 -> Int64 -> IO ()
 printProgress s part total = printNoNewLine $ s <> " " <> show ((part * 100) `div` total) <> "%"
@@ -501,8 +501,7 @@ cliDeleteFile DeleteOptions {fileDescription, retryCount, yes} = do
     deleteFileChunk :: XFTPClientAgent -> FileChunk -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
     deleteFileChunk a FileChunk {chunkNo, replicas = replica : _} = do
       let FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey} = replica
-      g <- liftIO C.newRandom
+      withReconnect a server retryCount $ \c -> deleteXFTPChunk c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId)
-      withReconnect g a server retryCount $ \c -> deleteXFTPChunk c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId)
       logInfo $ "deleted chunk " <> tshow chunkNo <> " from " <> showServer server
     deleteFileChunk _ _ = throwError $ CLIError "chunk has no replicas"
 
@@ -570,9 +569,9 @@ prepareChunkSpecs filePath chunkSizes = reverse . snd $ foldl' addSpec (0, []) c
 getEncPath :: MonadIO m => Maybe FilePath -> String -> m FilePath
 getEncPath path name = (`uniqueCombine` (name <> ".encrypted")) =<< maybe (liftIO getCanonicalTemporaryDirectory) pure path
 
-withReconnect :: Show e => TVar ChaChaDRG -> XFTPClientAgent -> XFTPServer -> Int -> (XFTPClient -> ExceptT e IO a) -> ExceptT CLIError IO a
+withReconnect :: Show e => XFTPClientAgent -> XFTPServer -> Int -> (XFTPClient -> ExceptT e IO a) -> ExceptT CLIError IO a
-withReconnect g a srv n run = withRetry n $ do
+withReconnect a srv n run = withRetry n $ do
-  c <- withRetry n $ getXFTPServerClient g a srv
+  c <- withRetry n $ getXFTPServerClient a srv
   withExceptT (CLIError . show) (run c) `catchError` \e -> do
     liftIO $ closeXFTPServerClient a srv
     throwError e

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Protocol.hs

@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
     SndPublicAuthKey,
     Transmission,
     TransmissionForAuth (..),
-    CorrId (..),
     encodeTransmission,
     encodeTransmissionForAuth,
     messageTagP,
@@ -329,7 +328,7 @@ checkParty' c = case testEquality (sFileParty @p) (sFileParty @p') of
 xftpEncodeAuthTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
 xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams@THandleParams {thAuth} pKey (corrId, fId, msg) = do
   let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, fId, msg)
-  xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission thAuth (Just pKey) (C.cbNonce $ bs corrId) tForAuth
+  xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission thAuth (Just pKey) corrId tForAuth
 
 xftpEncodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion p -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
 xftpEncodeTransmission thParams (corrId, fId, msg) = do

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server.hs

@@ -141,11 +141,11 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
         processClientHandshake pk = do
           unless (B.length bodyHead == xftpBlockSize) $ throwError HANDSHAKE
           body <- liftHS $ C.unPad bodyHead
-          XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash, authPubKey} <- liftHS $ smpDecode body
+          XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash} <- liftHS $ smpDecode body
           kh <- asks serverIdentity
           unless (keyHash == kh) $ throwError HANDSHAKE
           unless (xftpVersion `isCompatible` supportedFileServerVRange) $ throwError HANDSHAKE
-          let auth = THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey = authPubKey, serverPrivKey = pk}
+          let auth = THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, sessSecret' = Nothing}
           atomically $ TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeAccepted auth xftpVersion) sessions
           liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseNoBody N.ok200 []
           pure Nothing

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Server/Main.hs

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import Options.Applicative
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description (FileSize (..))
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server (runXFTPServer)
-import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), defFileExpirationHours, defaultFileExpiration, defaultInactiveClientExpiration)
+import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), defFileExpirationHours, defaultFileExpiration, defaultInactiveClientExpiration, supportedXFTPhandshakes)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtoServerWithAuth (..), pattern XFTPServer)
@@ -180,7 +180,8 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
               serverStatsBackupFile = logStats $> combine logPath "file-server-stats.log",
               transportConfig =
                 defaultTransportServerConfig
-                  { logTLSErrors = fromMaybe False $ iniOnOff "TRANSPORT" "log_tls_errors" ini
+                  { logTLSErrors = fromMaybe False $ iniOnOff "TRANSPORT" "log_tls_errors" ini,
+                    alpn = Just supportedXFTPhandshakes
                   }
             }
 

src/Simplex/FileTransfer/Transport.hs

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 
 module Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport
   ( supportedFileServerVRange,
+    authCmdsXFTPVersion,
     xftpClientHandshakeStub,
     XFTPClientHandshake (..),
     -- xftpClientHandshake,
@@ -83,14 +84,17 @@ type THandleParamsXFTP p = THandleParams XFTPVersion p
 initialXFTPVersion :: VersionXFTP
 initialXFTPVersion = VersionXFTP 1
 
+authCmdsXFTPVersion :: VersionXFTP
+authCmdsXFTPVersion = VersionXFTP 2
+
 currentXFTPVersion :: VersionXFTP
 currentXFTPVersion = VersionXFTP 2
 
 supportedFileServerVRange :: VersionRangeXFTP
 supportedFileServerVRange = mkVersionRange initialXFTPVersion currentXFTPVersion
 
--- XFTP protocol does not support handshake
+-- XFTP protocol does not use this handshake method
-xftpClientHandshakeStub :: c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeXFTP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle XFTPVersion c 'TClient)
+xftpClientHandshakeStub :: c -> Maybe C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeXFTP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle XFTPVersion c 'TClient)
 xftpClientHandshakeStub _c _ks _keyHash _xftpVRange = throwError $ TEHandshake VERSION
 
 data XFTPServerHandshake = XFTPServerHandshake
@@ -104,19 +108,16 @@ data XFTPClientHandshake = XFTPClientHandshake
   { -- | agreed XFTP server protocol version
     xftpVersion :: VersionXFTP,
     -- | server identity - CA certificate fingerprint
-    keyHash :: C.KeyHash,
+    keyHash :: C.KeyHash
-    -- | pub key to agree shared secret for entity ID encryption, shared secret for command authorization is agreed using per-queue keys.
-    authPubKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519
   }
 
 instance Encoding XFTPClientHandshake where
-  smpEncode XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash, authPubKey} =
+  smpEncode XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash} =
-    smpEncode (xftpVersion, keyHash, authPubKey)
+    smpEncode (xftpVersion, keyHash)
   smpP = do
     (xftpVersion, keyHash) <- smpP
-    authPubKey <- smpP
     Tail _compat <- smpP
-    pure XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash, authPubKey}
+    pure XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash}
 
 instance Encoding XFTPServerHandshake where
   smpEncode XFTPServerHandshake {xftpVersionRange, sessionId, authPubKey} =

src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent.hs

@@ -618,14 +618,14 @@ newConnAsync c userId corrId enableNtfs cMode pqInitKeys subMode = do
 newConnNoQueues :: AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> SConnectionMode c -> PQSupport -> AM ConnId
 newConnNoQueues c userId connId enableNtfs cMode pqSupport = do
   g <- asks random
-  connAgentVersion <- asks $ maxVersion . ($ pqSupport) . smpAgentVRange . config
+  connAgentVersion <- asks $ maxVersion . smpAgentVRange . config
   let cData = ConnData {userId, connId, connAgentVersion, enableNtfs, lastExternalSndId = 0, deleted = False, ratchetSyncState = RSOk, pqSupport}
   withStore c $ \db -> createNewConn db g cData cMode
 
 joinConnAsync :: AgentClient -> UserId -> ACorrId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> PQSupport -> SubscriptionMode -> AM ConnId
 joinConnAsync c userId corrId enableNtfs cReqUri@CRInvitationUri {} cInfo pqSup subMode = do
   withInvLock c (strEncode cReqUri) "joinConnAsync" $ do
-    lift (compatibleInvitationUri cReqUri pqSup) >>= \case
+    lift (compatibleInvitationUri cReqUri) >>= \case
       Just (_, Compatible (CR.E2ERatchetParams v _ _ _), Compatible connAgentVersion) -> do
         g <- asks random
         let pqSupport = pqSup `CR.pqSupportAnd` versionPQSupport_ connAgentVersion (Just v)
@@ -729,16 +729,14 @@ newRcvConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs cMode clientData pqInitKeys subMode srv
   when enableNtfs $ do
     ns <- asks ntfSupervisor
     atomically $ sendNtfSubCommand ns (connId, NSCCreate)
-  let pqEnc = CR.connPQEncryption pqInitKeys
+  let crData = ConnReqUriData SSSimplex smpAgentVRange [qUri] clientData
-      crData = ConnReqUriData SSSimplex (smpAgentVRange pqEnc) [qUri] clientData
-      e2eVRange = e2eEncryptVRange pqEnc
   case cMode of
     SCMContact -> pure (connId, CRContactUri crData)
     SCMInvitation -> do
       g <- asks random
-      (pk1, pk2, pKem, e2eRcvParams) <- liftIO $ CR.generateRcvE2EParams g (maxVersion e2eVRange) (CR.initialPQEncryption pqInitKeys)
+      (pk1, pk2, pKem, e2eRcvParams) <- liftIO $ CR.generateRcvE2EParams g (maxVersion e2eEncryptVRange) (CR.initialPQEncryption pqInitKeys)
       withStore' c $ \db -> createRatchetX3dhKeys db connId pk1 pk2 pKem
-      pure (connId, CRInvitationUri crData $ toVersionRangeT e2eRcvParams e2eVRange)
+      pure (connId, CRInvitationUri crData $ toVersionRangeT e2eRcvParams e2eEncryptVRange)
 
 joinConn :: AgentClient -> UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> ConnInfo -> PQSupport -> SubscriptionMode -> AM ConnId
 joinConn c userId connId enableNtfs cReq cInfo pqSupport subMode = do
@@ -750,14 +748,14 @@ joinConn c userId connId enableNtfs cReq cInfo pqSupport subMode = do
 
 startJoinInvitation :: UserId -> ConnId -> Bool -> ConnectionRequestUri 'CMInvitation -> PQSupport -> AM (Compatible VersionSMPA, ConnData, NewSndQueue, CR.Ratchet 'C.X448, CR.SndE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448)
 startJoinInvitation userId connId enableNtfs cReqUri pqSup =
-  lift (compatibleInvitationUri cReqUri pqSup) >>= \case
+  lift (compatibleInvitationUri cReqUri) >>= \case
     Just (qInfo, (Compatible e2eRcvParams@(CR.E2ERatchetParams v _ rcDHRr kem_)), aVersion@(Compatible connAgentVersion)) -> do
       g <- asks random
       let pqSupport = pqSup `CR.pqSupportAnd` versionPQSupport_ connAgentVersion (Just v)
       (pk1, pk2, pKem, e2eSndParams) <- liftIO $ CR.generateSndE2EParams g v (CR.replyKEM_ v kem_ pqSupport)
       (_, rcDHRs) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
       rcParams <- liftEitherWith cryptoError $ CR.pqX3dhSnd pk1 pk2 pKem e2eRcvParams
-      maxSupported <- asks $ maxVersion . ($ pqSup) . e2eEncryptVRange . config
+      maxSupported <- asks $ maxVersion . e2eEncryptVRange . config
       let rcVs = CR.RatchetVersions {current = v, maxSupported}
           rc = CR.initSndRatchet rcVs rcDHRr rcDHRs rcParams
       q <- lift $ newSndQueue userId "" qInfo
@@ -767,29 +765,29 @@ startJoinInvitation userId connId enableNtfs cReqUri pqSup =
 
 connRequestPQSupport :: AgentClient -> PQSupport -> ConnectionRequestUri c -> IO (Maybe (VersionSMPA, PQSupport))
 connRequestPQSupport c pqSup cReq = withAgentEnv' c $ case cReq of
-  CRInvitationUri {} -> invPQSupported <$$> compatibleInvitationUri cReq pqSup
+  CRInvitationUri {} -> invPQSupported <$$> compatibleInvitationUri cReq
     where
       invPQSupported (_, Compatible (CR.E2ERatchetParams e2eV _ _ _), Compatible agentV) = (agentV, pqSup `CR.pqSupportAnd` versionPQSupport_ agentV (Just e2eV))
-  CRContactUri {} -> ctPQSupported <$$> compatibleContactUri cReq pqSup
+  CRContactUri {} -> ctPQSupported <$$> compatibleContactUri cReq
     where
       ctPQSupported (_, Compatible agentV) = (agentV, pqSup `CR.pqSupportAnd` versionPQSupport_ agentV Nothing)
 
-compatibleInvitationUri :: ConnectionRequestUri 'CMInvitation -> PQSupport -> AM' (Maybe (Compatible SMPQueueInfo, Compatible (CR.RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448), Compatible VersionSMPA))
+compatibleInvitationUri :: ConnectionRequestUri 'CMInvitation -> AM' (Maybe (Compatible SMPQueueInfo, Compatible (CR.RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448), Compatible VersionSMPA))
-compatibleInvitationUri (CRInvitationUri ConnReqUriData {crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues = (qUri :| _)} e2eRcvParamsUri) pqSup = do
+compatibleInvitationUri (CRInvitationUri ConnReqUriData {crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues = (qUri :| _)} e2eRcvParamsUri) = do
   AgentConfig {smpClientVRange, smpAgentVRange, e2eEncryptVRange} <- asks config
   pure $
     (,,)
       <$> (qUri `compatibleVersion` smpClientVRange)
-      <*> (e2eRcvParamsUri `compatibleVersion` e2eEncryptVRange pqSup)
+      <*> (e2eRcvParamsUri `compatibleVersion` e2eEncryptVRange)
-      <*> (crAgentVRange `compatibleVersion` smpAgentVRange pqSup)
+      <*> (crAgentVRange `compatibleVersion` smpAgentVRange)
 
-compatibleContactUri :: ConnectionRequestUri 'CMContact -> PQSupport -> AM' (Maybe (Compatible SMPQueueInfo, Compatible VersionSMPA))
+compatibleContactUri :: ConnectionRequestUri 'CMContact -> AM' (Maybe (Compatible SMPQueueInfo, Compatible VersionSMPA))
-compatibleContactUri (CRContactUri ConnReqUriData {crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues = (qUri :| _)}) pqSup = do
+compatibleContactUri (CRContactUri ConnReqUriData {crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues = (qUri :| _)}) = do
   AgentConfig {smpClientVRange, smpAgentVRange} <- asks config
   pure $
     (,)
-      <$> (qUri `compatibleVersion` smpClientVRange)
+      <$> (qUri `compatibleVersion` smpClientVRange) 
-      <*> (crAgentVRange `compatibleVersion` smpAgentVRange pqSup)
+      <*> (crAgentVRange `compatibleVersion` smpAgentVRange)
 
 versionPQSupport_ :: VersionSMPA -> Maybe CR.VersionE2E -> PQSupport
 versionPQSupport_ agentV e2eV_ = PQSupport $ agentV >= pqdrSMPAgentVersion && maybe True (>= CR.pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion) e2eV_
@@ -812,7 +810,7 @@ joinConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs inv@CRInvitationUri {} cInfo pqSup subMod
         void $ withStore' c $ \db -> deleteConn db Nothing connId'
         throwError e
 joinConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs cReqUri@CRContactUri {} cInfo pqSup subMode srv =
-  lift (compatibleContactUri cReqUri pqSup) >>= \case
+  lift (compatibleContactUri cReqUri) >>= \case
     Just (qInfo, vrsn) -> do
       (connId', cReq) <- newConnSrv c userId connId enableNtfs SCMInvitation Nothing (CR.IKNoPQ pqSup) subMode srv
       sendInvitation c userId qInfo vrsn cReq cInfo
@@ -1219,7 +1217,7 @@ enqueueMessageB c reqs = do
     pure $ Right ((msgId, pqSecr), if null sqs' then Nothing else Just (cData, sqs', msgId))
   where
     storeSentMsg :: DB.Connection -> AgentConfig -> (ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue, Maybe PQEncryption, MsgFlags, AMessage) -> IO (Either AgentErrorType ((ConnData, NonEmpty SndQueue, Maybe PQEncryption, MsgFlags, AMessage), InternalId, PQEncryption))
-    storeSentMsg db cfg req@(cData@ConnData {connId, pqSupport}, sq :| _, pqEnc_, msgFlags, aMessage) = fmap (first storeError) $ runExceptT $ do
+    storeSentMsg db cfg req@(cData@ConnData {connId}, sq :| _, pqEnc_, msgFlags, aMessage) = fmap (first storeError) $ runExceptT $ do
       let AgentConfig {smpAgentVRange, e2eEncryptVRange} = cfg
       internalTs <- liftIO getCurrentTime
       (internalId, internalSndId, prevMsgHash) <- liftIO $ updateSndIds db connId
@@ -1227,10 +1225,9 @@ enqueueMessageB c reqs = do
           agentMsg = AgentMessage privHeader aMessage
           agentMsgStr = smpEncode agentMsg
           internalHash = C.sha256Hash agentMsgStr
-          currentE2EVersion = maxVersion $ e2eEncryptVRange PQSupportOff
+          currentE2EVersion = maxVersion e2eEncryptVRange
-      (encAgentMessage, pqEnc) <- agentRatchetEncrypt db cData agentMsgStr e2eEncUserMsgLength pqEnc_ currentE2EVersion
+      (encAgentMessage, pqEnc) <- agentRatchetEncrypt db cData agentMsgStr e2eEncAgentMsgLength pqEnc_ currentE2EVersion
-      -- agent version range is determined by the connection suppport of PQ encryption, that is may be enabled when message is sent
+      let agentVersion = maxVersion smpAgentVRange
-      let agentVersion = maxVersion $ smpAgentVRange pqSupport
           msgBody = smpEncode $ AgentMsgEnvelope {agentVersion, encAgentMessage}
           msgType = agentMessageType agentMsg
           msgData = SndMsgData {internalId, internalSndId, internalTs, msgType, msgFlags, msgBody, pqEncryption = pqEnc, internalHash, prevMsgHash}
@@ -1520,7 +1517,7 @@ synchronizeRatchet' c connId pqSupport' force = withConnLock c connId "synchroni
           let cData' = cData {pqSupport = pqSupport'} :: ConnData
           AgentConfig {e2eEncryptVRange} <- asks config
           g <- asks random
-          (pk1, pk2, pKem, e2eParams) <- liftIO $ CR.generateRcvE2EParams g (maxVersion $ e2eEncryptVRange pqSupport') pqSupport'
+          (pk1, pk2, pKem, e2eParams) <- liftIO $ CR.generateRcvE2EParams g (maxVersion e2eEncryptVRange) pqSupport'
           enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs c cData' sqs e2eParams
           withStore' c $ \db -> do
             setConnRatchetSync db connId RSStarted
@@ -2046,7 +2043,7 @@ data ACKd = ACKd | ACKPending
 -- | make sure to ACK or throw in each message processing branch
 -- it cannot be finally, unfortunately, as sometimes it needs to be ACK+DEL
 processSMPTransmission :: AgentClient -> ServerTransmission SMPVersion BrokerMsg -> AM ()
-processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v, sessId, rId, cmd) = do
+processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v, sessId, isResponse, rId, cmd) = do
   (rq, SomeConn _ conn) <- withStore c (\db -> getRcvConn db srv rId)
   processSMP rq conn $ toConnData conn
   where
@@ -2189,8 +2186,8 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
                       _ -> prohibited >> ack
                   _ -> prohibited >> ack
               updateConnVersion :: Connection c -> ConnData -> VersionSMPA -> AM (Connection c)
-              updateConnVersion conn' cData'@ConnData {pqSupport} msgAgentVersion = do
+              updateConnVersion conn' cData' msgAgentVersion = do
-                aVRange <- asks $ ($ pqSupport) . smpAgentVRange . config
+                aVRange <- asks $ smpAgentVRange . config
                 let msgAVRange = fromMaybe (versionToRange msgAgentVersion) $ safeVersionRange (minVersion aVRange) msgAgentVersion
                 case msgAVRange `compatibleVersion` aVRange of
                   Just (Compatible av)
@@ -2221,7 +2218,7 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
               ignored = pure "END from disconnected client - ignored"
           _ -> do
             logServer "<--" c srv rId $ "unexpected: " <> bshow cmd
-            notify . ERR $ BROKER (B.unpack $ strEncode srv) UNEXPECTED
+            notify . ERR $ BROKER (B.unpack $ strEncode srv) $ if isResponse then TIMEOUT else UNEXPECTED
         where
           notify :: forall e m. MonadIO m => AEntityI e => ACommand 'Agent e -> m ()
           notify = atomically . notify'
@@ -2256,19 +2253,17 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
             logServer "<--" c srv rId $ "MSG <CONF>:" <> logSecret srvMsgId
             AgentConfig {smpClientVRange, smpAgentVRange, e2eEncryptVRange} <- asks config
             let ConnData {pqSupport} = toConnData conn'
-                aVRange = smpAgentVRange pqSupport
-                e2eVRange = e2eEncryptVRange pqSupport
             unless
-              (agentVersion `isCompatible` aVRange && smpClientVersion `isCompatible` smpClientVRange)
+              (agentVersion `isCompatible` smpAgentVRange && smpClientVersion `isCompatible` smpClientVRange)
               (throwError $ AGENT A_VERSION)
             case status of
               New -> case (conn', e2eEncryption) of
                 -- party initiating connection
                 (RcvConnection _ _, Just (CR.AE2ERatchetParams _ e2eSndParams@(CR.E2ERatchetParams e2eVersion _ _ _))) -> do
-                  unless (e2eVersion `isCompatible` e2eVRange) (throwError $ AGENT A_VERSION)
+                  unless (e2eVersion `isCompatible` e2eEncryptVRange) (throwError $ AGENT A_VERSION)
                   (pk1, rcDHRs, pKem) <- withStore c (`getRatchetX3dhKeys` connId)
                   rcParams <- liftError cryptoError $ CR.pqX3dhRcv pk1 rcDHRs pKem e2eSndParams
-                  let rcVs = CR.RatchetVersions {current = e2eVersion, maxSupported = maxVersion e2eVRange}
+                  let rcVs = CR.RatchetVersions {current = e2eVersion, maxSupported = maxVersion e2eEncryptVRange}
                       pqSupport' = pqSupport `CR.pqSupportAnd` versionPQSupport_ agentVersion (Just e2eVersion)
                       rc = CR.initRcvRatchet rcVs rcDHRs rcParams pqSupport'
                   g <- asks random
@@ -2450,7 +2445,7 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
               ContactConnection {} -> do
                 -- show connection request even if invitaion via contact address is not compatible.
                 -- in case invitation not compatible, assume there is no PQ encryption support.
-                pqSupport <- lift $ maybe PQSupportOff pqSupported <$> compatibleInvitationUri connReq PQSupportOn
+                pqSupport <- lift $ maybe PQSupportOff pqSupported <$> compatibleInvitationUri connReq
                 g <- asks random
                 let newInv = NewInvitation {contactConnId = connId, connReq, recipientConnInfo = cInfo}
                 invId <- withStore c $ \db -> createInvitation db g newInv
@@ -2470,10 +2465,9 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {smpClients, subQ} (tSess@(_, srv, _), _v,
           newRatchetKey e2eOtherPartyParams@(CR.E2ERatchetParams e2eVersion k1Rcv k2Rcv _) conn'@(DuplexConnection cData'@ConnData {lastExternalSndId, pqSupport} _ sqs) =
             unlessM ratchetExists $ do
               AgentConfig {e2eEncryptVRange} <- asks config
-              let connE2EVRange = e2eEncryptVRange pqSupport
+              unless (e2eVersion `isCompatible` e2eEncryptVRange) (throwError $ AGENT A_VERSION)
-              unless (e2eVersion `isCompatible` connE2EVRange) (throwError $ AGENT A_VERSION)
               keys <- getSendRatchetKeys
-              let rcVs = CR.RatchetVersions {current = e2eVersion, maxSupported = maxVersion connE2EVRange}
+              let rcVs = CR.RatchetVersions {current = e2eVersion, maxSupported = maxVersion e2eEncryptVRange}
               initRatchet rcVs keys
               notifyAgreed
             where
@@ -2579,8 +2573,7 @@ confirmQueue (Compatible agentVersion) c cData@ConnData {connId, pqSupport} sq s
   where
     mkConfirmation :: AgentMessage -> AM MsgBody
     mkConfirmation aMessage = do
-      -- the version to be used when PQSupport is disabled
+      currentE2EVersion <- asks $ maxVersion . e2eEncryptVRange . config
-      currentE2EVersion <- asks $ maxVersion . ($ PQSupportOff) . e2eEncryptVRange . config
       withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
         void . liftIO $ updateSndIds db connId
         let pqEnc = CR.pqSupportToEnc pqSupport
@@ -2599,8 +2592,7 @@ enqueueConfirmation c cData sq connInfo e2eEncryption_ = do
 
 storeConfirmation :: AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> Maybe (CR.SndE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448) -> AgentMessage -> AM ()
 storeConfirmation c cData@ConnData {connId, pqSupport, connAgentVersion = v} sq e2eEncryption_ agentMsg = do
-  -- the version to be used when PQSupport is disabled
+  currentE2EVersion <- asks $ maxVersion . e2eEncryptVRange . config
-  currentE2EVersion <- asks $ maxVersion . ($ PQSupportOff) . e2eEncryptVRange . config
   withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
     internalTs <- liftIO getCurrentTime
     (internalId, internalSndId, prevMsgHash) <- liftIO $ updateSndIds db connId
@@ -2620,8 +2612,8 @@ enqueueRatchetKeyMsgs c cData (sq :| sqs) e2eEncryption = do
   mapM_ (lift . enqueueSavedMessage c cData msgId) $ filter isActiveSndQ sqs
 
 enqueueRatchetKey :: AgentClient -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> CR.RcvE2ERatchetParams 'C.X448 -> AM AgentMsgId
-enqueueRatchetKey c cData@ConnData {connId, pqSupport} sq e2eEncryption = do
+enqueueRatchetKey c cData@ConnData {connId} sq e2eEncryption = do
-  aVRange <- asks $ ($ pqSupport) . smpAgentVRange . config
+  aVRange <- asks $ smpAgentVRange . config
   msgId <- storeRatchetKey $ maxVersion aVRange
   lift $ submitPendingMsg c cData sq
   pure $ unId msgId

src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Client.hs

@@ -688,10 +688,9 @@ getXFTPServerClient c@AgentClient {active, xftpClients, workerSeq} tSess@(userId
     connectClient :: XFTPClientVar -> AM XFTPClient
     connectClient v = do
       cfg <- asks $ xftpCfg . config
-      g <- asks random
       xftpNetworkConfig <- atomically $ getNetworkConfig c
       liftError' (protocolClientError XFTP $ B.unpack $ strEncode srv) $
-        X.getXFTPClient g tSess cfg {xftpNetworkConfig} $
+        X.getXFTPClient tSess cfg {xftpNetworkConfig} $
           clientDisconnected v
 
     clientDisconnected :: XFTPClientVar -> XFTPClient -> IO ()
@@ -1008,7 +1007,7 @@ runXFTPServerTest c userId (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) = do
   rcvPath <- getTempFilePath workDir
   liftIO $ do
     let tSess = (userId, srv, Nothing)
-    X.getXFTPClient g tSess cfg {xftpNetworkConfig} (\_ -> pure ()) >>= \case
+    X.getXFTPClient tSess cfg {xftpNetworkConfig} (\_ -> pure ()) >>= \case
       Right xftp -> withTestChunk filePath $ do
         (sndKey, spKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g
         (rcvKey, rpKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g

src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Env/SQLite.hs

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations as Migrations
 import Simplex.Messaging.Client
 import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent ()
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
-import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (PQSupport, VersionRangeE2E, supportedE2EEncryptVRange)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (VersionRangeE2E, supportedE2EEncryptVRange)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Client (defaultNTFClientConfig)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Transport (NTFVersion)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Types
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ data AgentConfig = AgentConfig
     caCertificateFile :: FilePath,
     privateKeyFile :: FilePath,
     certificateFile :: FilePath,
-    e2eEncryptVRange :: PQSupport -> VersionRangeE2E,
+    e2eEncryptVRange :: VersionRangeE2E,
-    smpAgentVRange :: PQSupport -> VersionRangeSMPA,
+    smpAgentVRange :: VersionRangeSMPA,
     smpClientVRange :: VersionRangeSMPC
   }
 

src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Protocol.hs

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
     currentSMPAgentVersion,
     supportedSMPAgentVRange,
     e2eEncConnInfoLength,
-    e2eEncUserMsgLength,
+    e2eEncAgentMsgLength,
 
     -- * SMP agent protocol types
     ConnInfo,
@@ -272,16 +272,11 @@ deliveryRcptsSMPAgentVersion = VersionSMPA 4
 pqdrSMPAgentVersion :: VersionSMPA
 pqdrSMPAgentVersion = VersionSMPA 5
 
--- TODO v5.7 increase to 5
 currentSMPAgentVersion :: VersionSMPA
-currentSMPAgentVersion = VersionSMPA 4
+currentSMPAgentVersion = VersionSMPA 5
 
--- TODO v5.7 remove dependency of version range on whether PQ support is needed
+supportedSMPAgentVRange :: VersionRangeSMPA
-supportedSMPAgentVRange :: PQSupport -> VersionRangeSMPA
+supportedSMPAgentVRange = mkVersionRange duplexHandshakeSMPAgentVersion currentSMPAgentVersion
-supportedSMPAgentVRange pq =
-  mkVersionRange duplexHandshakeSMPAgentVersion $ case pq of
-    PQSupportOn -> pqdrSMPAgentVersion
-    PQSupportOff -> currentSMPAgentVersion
 
 -- it is shorter to allow all handshake headers,
 -- including E2E (double-ratchet) parameters and
@@ -292,8 +287,8 @@ e2eEncConnInfoLength v = \case
   PQSupportOn | v >= pqdrSMPAgentVersion -> 11122
   _ -> 14848
 
-e2eEncUserMsgLength :: VersionSMPA -> PQSupport -> Int
+e2eEncAgentMsgLength :: VersionSMPA -> PQSupport -> Int
-e2eEncUserMsgLength v = \case
+e2eEncAgentMsgLength v = \case
   -- reduced by 2222 (the increase of message ratchet header size)
   PQSupportOn | v >= pqdrSMPAgentVersion -> 13634
   _ -> 15856

src/Simplex/Messaging/Client.hs

@@ -54,9 +54,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
     suspendSMPQueue,
     deleteSMPQueue,
     deleteSMPQueues,
-    createSMPProxySession,
-    proxySMPMessage,
-    forwardSMPMessage,
     sendProtocolCommand,
 
     -- * Supporting types and client configuration
@@ -72,7 +69,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
     chooseTransportHost,
     proxyUsername,
     temporaryClientError,
-    smpProxyError,
     ServerTransmission,
     ClientCommand,
 
@@ -102,24 +98,22 @@ import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
 import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
 import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
 import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime (..), getCurrentTime)
-import qualified Data.X509 as X
-import qualified Data.X509.Validation as XV
 import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
 import Numeric.Natural
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
-import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
 import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON, dropPrefix, enumJSON)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
 import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (SocksProxy, TransportClientConfig (..), TransportHost (..), runTransportClient)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (SocksProxy, TransportClientConfig (..), TransportHost (..), defaultTcpConnectTimeout, runTransportClient)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.KeepAlive
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets (WS)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, liftEitherWith, raceAny_, threadDelay')
+import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, raceAny_, threadDelay', whenM)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Version
 import System.Timeout (timeout)
+import UnliftIO (pooledMapConcurrentlyN)
 
 -- | 'SMPClient' is a handle used to send commands to a specific SMP server.
 --
@@ -136,11 +130,11 @@ data PClient v err msg = PClient
     transportSession :: TransportSession msg,
     transportHost :: TransportHost,
     tcpTimeout :: Int,
-    batchDelay :: Maybe Int,
+    rcvConcurrency :: Int,
     pingErrorCount :: TVar Int,
     clientCorrId :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
     sentCommands :: TMap CorrId (Request err msg),
-    sndQ :: TBQueue ByteString,
+    sndQ :: TBQueue (TVar Bool, ByteString),
     rcvQ :: TBQueue (NonEmpty (SignedTransmission err msg)),
     msgQ :: Maybe (TBQueue (ServerTransmission v msg))
   }
@@ -172,7 +166,7 @@ smpClientStub g sessionId thVersion thAuth = do
               transportSession = (1, "smp://LcJUMfVhwD8yxjAiSaDzzGF3-kLG4Uh0Fl_ZIjrRwjI=@localhost:5001", Nothing),
               transportHost = "localhost",
               tcpTimeout = 15_000_000,
-              batchDelay = Nothing,
+              rcvConcurrency = 8,
               pingErrorCount,
               clientCorrId,
               sentCommands,
@@ -188,7 +182,7 @@ type SMPClient = ProtocolClient SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg
 type ClientCommand msg = (Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey, EntityId, ProtoCommand msg)
 
 -- | Type synonym for transmission from some SPM server queue.
-type ServerTransmission v msg = (TransportSession msg, Version v, SessionId, EntityId, msg)
+type ServerTransmission v msg = (TransportSession msg, Version v, SessionId, Bool, EntityId, msg)
 
 data HostMode
   = -- | prefer (or require) onion hosts when connecting via SOCKS proxy
@@ -215,6 +209,8 @@ data NetworkConfig = NetworkConfig
     tcpTimeout :: Int,
     -- | additional timeout per kilobyte (1024 bytes) to be sent
     tcpTimeoutPerKb :: Int64,
+    -- | break response timeouts into groups, so later responses get later deadlines
+    rcvConcurrency :: Int,
     -- | TCP keep-alive options, Nothing to skip enabling keep-alive
     tcpKeepAlive :: Maybe KeepAliveOpts,
     -- | period for SMP ping commands (microseconds, 0 to disable)
@@ -235,9 +231,10 @@ defaultNetworkConfig =
       hostMode = HMOnionViaSocks,
       requiredHostMode = False,
       sessionMode = TSMUser,
-      tcpConnectTimeout = 20_000_000,
+      tcpConnectTimeout = defaultTcpConnectTimeout,
       tcpTimeout = 15_000_000,
       tcpTimeoutPerKb = 5_000,
+      rcvConcurrency = 8,
       tcpKeepAlive = Just defaultKeepAliveOpts,
       smpPingInterval = 600_000_000, -- 10min
       smpPingCount = 3,
@@ -245,8 +242,8 @@ defaultNetworkConfig =
     }
 
 transportClientConfig :: NetworkConfig -> TransportClientConfig
-transportClientConfig NetworkConfig {socksProxy, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors} =
+transportClientConfig NetworkConfig {socksProxy, tcpConnectTimeout, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors} =
-  TransportClientConfig {socksProxy, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors, clientCredentials = Nothing, alpn = Nothing}
+  TransportClientConfig {socksProxy, tcpConnectTimeout, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors, clientCredentials = Nothing, alpn = Nothing}
 {-# INLINE transportClientConfig #-}
 
 -- | protocol client configuration.
@@ -259,8 +256,8 @@ data ProtocolClientConfig v = ProtocolClientConfig
     networkConfig :: NetworkConfig,
     -- | client-server protocol version range
     serverVRange :: VersionRange v,
-    -- | delay between sending batches of commands (microseconds)
+    -- | agree shared session secret (used in SMP proxy)
-    batchDelay :: Maybe Int
+    agreeSecret :: Bool
   }
 
 -- | Default protocol client configuration.
@@ -271,7 +268,7 @@ defaultClientConfig serverVRange =
       defaultTransport = ("443", transport @TLS),
       networkConfig = defaultNetworkConfig,
       serverVRange,
-      batchDelay = Nothing
+      agreeSecret = False
     }
 {-# INLINE defaultClientConfig #-}
 
@@ -280,7 +277,8 @@ defaultSMPClientConfig = defaultClientConfig supportedClientSMPRelayVRange
 {-# INLINE defaultSMPClientConfig #-}
 
 data Request err msg = Request
-  { entityId :: EntityId,
+  { corrId :: CorrId,
+    entityId :: EntityId,
     responseVar :: TMVar (Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg)
   }
 
@@ -328,14 +326,14 @@ type TransportSession msg = (UserId, ProtoServer msg, Maybe EntityId)
 -- A single queue can be used for multiple 'SMPClient' instances,
 -- as 'SMPServerTransmission' includes server information.
 getProtocolClient :: forall v err msg. Protocol v err msg => TVar ChaChaDRG -> TransportSession msg -> ProtocolClientConfig v -> Maybe (TBQueue (ServerTransmission v msg)) -> (ProtocolClient v err msg -> IO ()) -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (ProtocolClient v err msg))
-getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize, networkConfig, serverVRange, batchDelay} msgQ disconnected = do
+getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize, networkConfig, serverVRange, agreeSecret} msgQ disconnected = do
   case chooseTransportHost networkConfig (host srv) of
     Right useHost ->
       (atomically (mkProtocolClient useHost) >>= runClient useTransport useHost)
         `catch` \(e :: IOException) -> pure . Left $ PCEIOError e
     Left e -> pure $ Left e
   where
-    NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout, smpPingInterval} = networkConfig
+    NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout, rcvConcurrency, smpPingInterval} = networkConfig
     mkProtocolClient :: TransportHost -> STM (PClient v err msg)
     mkProtocolClient transportHost = do
       connected <- newTVar False
@@ -350,10 +348,10 @@ getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize
             transportSession,
             transportHost,
             tcpTimeout,
-            batchDelay,
             pingErrorCount,
             clientCorrId,
             sentCommands,
+            rcvConcurrency,
             sndQ,
             rcvQ,
             msgQ
@@ -382,7 +380,7 @@ getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize
 
     client :: forall c. Transport c => TProxy c -> PClient v err msg -> TMVar (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (ProtocolClient v err msg)) -> c -> IO ()
     client _ c cVar h = do
-      ks <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
+      ks <- if agreeSecret then Just <$> atomically (C.generateKeyPair g) else pure Nothing
       runExceptT (protocolClientHandshake @v @err @msg h ks (keyHash srv) serverVRange) >>= \case
         Left e -> atomically . putTMVar cVar . Left $ PCETransportError e
         Right th@THandle {params} -> do
@@ -395,7 +393,7 @@ getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize
             `finally` disconnected c'
 
     send :: Transport c => ProtocolClient v err msg -> THandle v c 'TClient -> IO ()
-    send ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}} h = forever $ atomically (readTBQueue sndQ) >>= tPutLog h
+    send ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}} h = forever $ atomically (readTBQueue sndQ) >>= \(active, s) -> whenM (readTVarIO active) (void $ tPutLog h s)
 
     receive :: Transport c => ProtocolClient v err msg -> THandle v c 'TClient -> IO ()
     receive ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {rcvQ}} h = forever $ tGet h >>= atomically . writeTBQueue rcvQ
@@ -415,16 +413,16 @@ getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize
     process c = forever $ atomically (readTBQueue $ rcvQ $ client_ c) >>= mapM_ (processMsg c)
 
     processMsg :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> SignedTransmission err msg -> IO ()
-    processMsg c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sentCommands}} (_, _, (corrId, entId, respOrErr)) =
+    processMsg c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sentCommands}} (_, _, (corrId, entId, respOrErr))
-      if B.null $ bs corrId
+      | isResponse =
-        then sendMsg respOrErr
-        else do
           atomically (TM.lookup corrId sentCommands) >>= \case
             Nothing -> sendMsg respOrErr
             Just Request {entityId, responseVar} -> atomically $ do
               TM.delete corrId sentCommands
               putTMVar responseVar $ response entityId
+      | otherwise = sendMsg respOrErr
       where
+        isResponse = not $ B.null $ bs corrId
         response entityId
           | entityId == entId =
               case respOrErr of
@@ -435,7 +433,7 @@ getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize
           | otherwise = Left . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow respOrErr
         sendMsg :: Either err msg -> IO ()
         sendMsg = \case
-          Right msg -> atomically $ mapM_ (`writeTBQueue` serverTransmission c entId msg) msgQ
+          Right msg -> atomically $ mapM_ (`writeTBQueue` serverTransmission c isResponse entId msg) msgQ
           Left e -> putStrLn $ "SMP client error: " <> show e
 
 proxyUsername :: TransportSession msg -> ByteString
@@ -487,19 +485,6 @@ temporaryClientError = \case
   _ -> False
 {-# INLINE temporaryClientError #-}
 
--- TODO keep error params
-smpProxyError :: SMPClientError -> ErrorType
-smpProxyError = \case
-  PCEProtocolError _ -> PROXY PROTOCOL
-  PCEResponseError _ -> PROXY RESPONSE
-  PCEUnexpectedResponse _ -> PROXY UNEXPECTED
-  PCEResponseTimeout -> PROXY TIMEOUT
-  PCENetworkError -> PROXY NETWORK
-  PCEIncompatibleHost -> PROXY BAD_HOST
-  PCETransportError _ -> PROXY TRANSPORT
-  PCECryptoError _ -> INTERNAL
-  PCEIOError _ -> INTERNAL
-
 -- | Create a new SMP queue.
 --
 -- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#create-queue-command
@@ -545,11 +530,11 @@ processSUBResponse c (Response rId r) = case r of
   Left e -> pure $ Left e
 
 writeSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> RecipientId -> BrokerMsg -> IO ()
-writeSMPMessage c rId msg = atomically $ mapM_ (`writeTBQueue` serverTransmission c rId msg) (msgQ $ client_ c)
+writeSMPMessage c rId msg = atomically $ mapM_ (`writeTBQueue` serverTransmission c False rId msg) (msgQ $ client_ c)
 
-serverTransmission :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> RecipientId -> msg -> ServerTransmission v msg
+serverTransmission :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> Bool -> RecipientId -> msg -> ServerTransmission v msg
-serverTransmission ProtocolClient {thParams = THandleParams {thVersion, sessionId}, client_ = PClient {transportSession}} entityId message =
+serverTransmission ProtocolClient {thParams = THandleParams {thVersion, sessionId}, client_ = PClient {transportSession}} isResponse entityId message =
-  (transportSession, thVersion, sessionId, entityId, message)
+  (transportSession, thVersion, sessionId, isResponse, entityId, message)
 
 -- | Get message from SMP queue. The server returns ERR PROHIBITED if a client uses SUB and GET via the same transport connection for the same queue
 --
@@ -650,102 +635,6 @@ deleteSMPQueues :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (RcvPrivateAuthKey, RecipientId) -> IO
 deleteSMPQueues = okSMPCommands DEL
 {-# INLINE deleteSMPQueues #-}
 
--- TODO picture
-
--- send PRXY :: SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> Command Sender
--- receives PKEY :: SessionId -> X.CertificateChain -> X.SignedExact X.PubKey -> BrokerMsg
-createSMPProxySession :: SMPClient -> SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO (SessionId, VersionSMP, C.PublicKeyX25519)
-createSMPProxySession c relayServ@ProtocolServer {keyHash = C.KeyHash kh} proxyAuth =
-  sendSMPCommand c Nothing "" (PRXY relayServ proxyAuth) >>= \case
-    -- XXX: rfc says sessionId should be in the entityId of response
-    PKEY sId vr (chain, key) -> do
-      case supportedClientSMPRelayVRange `compatibleVersion` vr of
-        Nothing -> throwE PCEIncompatibleHost -- TODO different error
-        Just (Compatible v) -> liftEitherWith x509Error $ (sId,v,) <$> validateRelay chain key
-    r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
-  where
-    x509Error :: String -> SMPClientError
-    x509Error _msg = PCEResponseError $ error "TODO: x509 error" -- TODO different error
-    validateRelay :: X.CertificateChain -> X.SignedExact X.PubKey -> Either String C.PublicKeyX25519
-    validateRelay (X.CertificateChain cert) exact = do
-      serverKey <- case cert of
-        [leaf, ca]
-          | XV.Fingerprint kh == XV.getFingerprint ca X.HashSHA256 ->
-              C.x509ToPublic (X.certPubKey . X.signedObject $ X.getSigned leaf, []) >>= C.pubKey
-        _ -> throwError "bad certificate"
-      pubKey <- C.verifyX509 serverKey exact
-      C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey
-
--- consider how to process slow responses - is it handled somehow locally or delegated to the caller
--- this method is used in the client
--- sends PFWD :: C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> Command Sender
--- receives PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
-proxySMPMessage ::
-  SMPClient ->
-  -- proxy session from PKEY
-  SessionId ->
-  VersionSMP ->
-  C.PublicKeyX25519 ->
-  -- message to deliver
-  Maybe SndPrivateAuthKey ->
-  SenderId ->
-  MsgFlags ->
-  MsgBody ->
-  ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
--- TODO use version
-proxySMPMessage c@ProtocolClient {thParams = proxyThParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId = g}} sessionId _v serverKey spKey sId flags msg = do
-  -- prepare params
-  let serverThAuth = (\ta -> ta {serverPeerPubKey = serverKey}) <$> thAuth proxyThParams
-      serverThParams = proxyThParams {sessionId, thAuth = serverThAuth}
-  (cmdPubKey, cmdPrivKey) <- liftIO . atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.X25519 g
-  let cmdSecret = C.dh' serverKey cmdPrivKey
-  nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- liftIO . atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
-  -- encode
-  let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth serverThParams (CorrId corrId, sId, Cmd SSender $ SEND flags msg)
-  auth <- liftEitherWith PCETransportError $ authTransmission serverThAuth spKey nonce tForAuth
-  b <- case batchTransmissions (batch serverThParams) (blockSize serverThParams) [Right (auth, tToSend)] of
-    [] -> throwE $ PCETransportError TELargeMsg -- some other error. Internal?
-    TBError e _ : _ -> throwE $ PCETransportError e -- large message error?
-    TBTransmission s _ : _ -> pure s
-    TBTransmissions s _ _ : _ -> pure s
-  et <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt cmdSecret nonce b paddedProxiedMsgLength
-  sendProtocolCommand_ c (Just nonce) Nothing sessionId (Cmd SProxiedClient (PFWD cmdPubKey et)) >>= \case
-    -- TODO support PKEY + resend?
-    PRES (EncResponse er) -> do
-      t' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt cmdSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) er
-      case tParse proxyThParams t' of
-        t'' :| [] -> case tDecodeParseValidate proxyThParams t'' of
-          (_auth, _signed, (_c, _e, r)) -> case r of -- TODO: verify
-            Left e -> throwE $ PCEResponseError e
-            Right OK -> pure ()
-            Right (ERR e) -> throwE $ PCEProtocolError e
-            Right u -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow u -- possibly differentiate unexpected response from server/proxy
-        _ -> throwE $ PCETransportError TEBadBlock
-    r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r -- from proxy
-
--- this method is used in the proxy
--- sends RFWD :: EncFwdTransmission -> Command Sender
--- receives RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg
--- proxy should send PRES to the client with EncResponse
-forwardSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> CorrId -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO EncResponse
-forwardSMPMessage c@ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId = g}} fwdCorrId fwdKey fwdTransmission = do
-  -- prepare params
-  sessSecret <- case thAuth thParams of
-    Nothing -> throwError $ PCEProtocolError INTERNAL -- different error - proxy didn't pass key?
-    Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey, clientPrivKey} -> pure $ C.dh' serverPeerPubKey clientPrivKey
-  nonce <- liftIO . atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
-  -- wrap
-  let fwdT = FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdKey, fwdTransmission}
-  eft <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncFwdTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt sessSecret nonce (smpEncode fwdT) paddedForwardedMsgLength
-  -- send
-  sendProtocolCommand_ c (Just nonce) Nothing "" (Cmd SSender (RFWD eft)) >>= \case
-    RRES (EncFwdResponse efr) -> do
-      -- unwrap
-      r' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt sessSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) efr
-      FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = _, fwdResponse} <- liftEitherWith (const $ PCEResponseError BLOCK) $ smpDecode r'
-      pure fwdResponse
-    r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
-
 okSMPCommand :: PartyI p => Command p -> SMPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> QueueId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
 okSMPCommand cmd c pKey qId =
   sendSMPCommand c (Just pKey) qId cmd >>= \case
@@ -793,27 +682,26 @@ streamProtocolCommands c@ProtocolClient {thParams = THandleParams {batch, blockS
   mapM_ (cb <=< sendBatch c) bs
 
 sendBatch :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> TransportBatch (Request err msg) -> IO [Response err msg]
-sendBatch c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}} b = do
+sendBatch c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {rcvConcurrency, sndQ}} b = do
   case b of
     TBError e Request {entityId} -> do
       putStrLn "send error: large message"
       pure [Response entityId $ Left $ PCETransportError e]
     TBTransmissions s n rs
       | n > 0 -> do
-          atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ s
+          active <- newTVarIO True
-          mapConcurrently (getResponse c) rs
+          atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ (active, s)
+          pooledMapConcurrentlyN rcvConcurrency (getResponse c active) rs
       | otherwise -> pure []
     TBTransmission s r -> do
-      atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ s
+      active <- newTVarIO True
-      (: []) <$> getResponse c r
+      atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ (active, s)
+      (: []) <$> getResponse c active r
 
 -- | Send Protocol command
 sendProtocolCommand :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> EntityId -> ProtoCommand msg -> ExceptT (ProtocolClientError err) IO msg
-sendProtocolCommand c = sendProtocolCommand_ c Nothing
+sendProtocolCommand c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpTimeout, sndQ}, thParams = THandleParams {batch, blockSize}} pKey entId cmd =
-
+  ExceptT $ uncurry sendRecv =<< mkTransmission c (pKey, entId, cmd)
-sendProtocolCommand_ :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> Maybe C.CbNonce -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> EntityId -> ProtoCommand msg -> ExceptT (ProtocolClientError err) IO msg
-sendProtocolCommand_ c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}, thParams = THandleParams {batch, blockSize}} nonce_ pKey entId cmd =
-  ExceptT $ uncurry sendRecv =<< mkTransmission_ c nonce_ (pKey, entId, cmd)
   where
     -- two separate "atomically" needed to avoid blocking
     sendRecv :: Either TransportError SentRawTransmission -> Request err msg -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg)
@@ -821,46 +709,50 @@ sendProtocolCommand_ c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}, thParams = THan
       Left e -> pure . Left $ PCETransportError e
       Right t
         | B.length s > blockSize - 2 -> pure . Left $ PCETransportError TELargeMsg
-        | otherwise -> atomically (writeTBQueue sndQ s) >> response <$> getResponse c r
+        | otherwise -> do
+            active <- newTVarIO True
+            timeout tcpSendTimeout (atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ (active, s)) >>= \case
+              Nothing -> pure $ Left PCEResponseTimeout
+              Just () -> response <$> getResponse c active r
         where
+          -- TODO: move to configuration
+          tcpSendTimeout = tcpTimeout * 3 -- conservative timeout, allowing some asymmetry in uplink
           s
             | batch = tEncodeBatch1 t
             | otherwise = tEncode t
 
 -- TODO switch to timeout or TimeManager that supports Int64
-getResponse :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> Request err msg -> IO (Response err msg)
+getResponse :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> TVar Bool -> Request err msg -> IO (Response err msg)
-getResponse ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpTimeout, pingErrorCount}} Request {entityId, responseVar} = do
+getResponse ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpTimeout, pingErrorCount, sentCommands}} active Request {corrId, entityId, responseVar} = do
   response <-
     timeout tcpTimeout (atomically (takeTMVar responseVar)) >>= \case
-      -- BTW: another registerDelay candidate. Also, crashes caller with BlockedIndef.
       Just r -> atomically (writeTVar pingErrorCount 0) $> r
-      Nothing -> pure $ Left PCEResponseTimeout
+      Nothing -> atomically (writeTVar active False >> TM.delete corrId sentCommands) $> Left PCEResponseTimeout
   pure Response {entityId, response}
 
-mkTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
+mkTransmission :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
-mkTransmission c = mkTransmission_ c Nothing
+mkTransmission ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCommands}} (pKey_, entId, cmd) = do
-
+  corrId <- atomically getNextCorrId
-mkTransmission_ :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> Maybe C.CbNonce -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
+  let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, entId, cmd)
-mkTransmission_ ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCommands}} nonce_ (pKey_, entId, cmd) = do
+      auth = authTransmission (thAuth thParams) pKey_ corrId tForAuth
-  nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- maybe (atomically $ C.randomCbNonce clientCorrId) pure nonce_
+  r <- atomically $ mkRequest corrId
-  let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, entId, cmd)
-      auth = authTransmission (thAuth thParams) pKey_ nonce tForAuth
-  r <- atomically $ mkRequest (CorrId corrId)
   pure ((,tToSend) <$> auth, r)
   where
+    getNextCorrId :: STM CorrId
+    getNextCorrId = CorrId <$> C.randomBytes 24 clientCorrId -- also used as nonce
     mkRequest :: CorrId -> STM (Request err msg)
     mkRequest corrId = do
-      r <- Request entId <$> newEmptyTMVar
+      r <- Request corrId entId <$> newEmptyTMVar
       TM.insert corrId r sentCommands
       pure r
 
-authTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient) -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> C.CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either TransportError (Maybe TransmissionAuth)
+authTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient) -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> CorrId -> ByteString -> Either TransportError (Maybe TransmissionAuth)
-authTransmission thAuth pKey_ nonce t = traverse authenticate pKey_
+authTransmission thAuth pKey_ (CorrId corrId) t = traverse authenticate pKey_
   where
     authenticate :: C.APrivateAuthKey -> Either TransportError TransmissionAuth
     authenticate (C.APrivateAuthKey a pk) = case a of
       C.SX25519 -> case thAuth of
-        Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k} -> Right $ TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk nonce t
+        Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k} -> Right $ TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk (C.cbNonce corrId) t
         Nothing -> Left TENoServerAuth
       C.SEd25519 -> sign pk
       C.SEd448 -> sign pk

src/Simplex/Messaging/Client/Agent.hs

@@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ data SMPClientAgent = SMPClientAgent
     agentQ :: TBQueue SMPClientAgentEvent,
     randomDrg :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
     smpClients :: TMap SMPServer SMPClientVar,
-    smpSessions :: TMap SessionId SMPClient,
     srvSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey),
     pendingSrvSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey),
     reconnections :: TVar [Async ()],
@@ -136,7 +135,6 @@ newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} randomDrg
   msgQ <- newTBQueue msgQSize
   agentQ <- newTBQueue agentQSize
   smpClients <- TM.empty
-  smpSessions <- TM.empty
   srvSubs <- TM.empty
   pendingSrvSubs <- TM.empty
   reconnections <- newTVar []
@@ -149,7 +147,6 @@ newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} randomDrg
         agentQ,
         randomDrg,
         smpClients,
-        smpSessions,
         srvSubs,
         pendingSrvSubs,
         reconnections,
@@ -158,7 +155,7 @@ newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} randomDrg
       }
 
 getSMPServerClient' :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO SMPClient
-getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, smpSessions, msgQ, randomDrg, workerSeq} srv =
+getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ, randomDrg, workerSeq} srv =
   atomically getClientVar >>= either newSMPClient waitForSMPClient
   where
     getClientVar :: STM (Either SMPClientVar SMPClientVar)
@@ -181,9 +178,7 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, smpSessions, msgQ,
           tryE (connectClient v) >>= \r -> case r of
             Right smp -> do
               logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ "Agent connected to " <> showServer srv
-              atomically $ do
+              atomically $ putTMVar (sessionVar v) r
-                putTMVar (sessionVar v) r
-                TM.insert (sessionId $ thParams smp) smp smpSessions
               successAction smp
             Left e -> do
               if e == PCENetworkError || e == PCEResponseTimeout
@@ -205,14 +200,13 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, smpSessions, msgQ,
     connectClient v = ExceptT $ getProtocolClient randomDrg (1, srv, Nothing) (smpCfg agentCfg) (Just msgQ) (clientDisconnected v)
 
     clientDisconnected :: SMPClientVar -> SMPClient -> IO ()
-    clientDisconnected v smp = do
+    clientDisconnected v _ = do
-      removeClientAndSubs v smp >>= (`forM_` serverDown)
+      removeClientAndSubs v >>= (`forM_` serverDown)
       logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ "Agent disconnected from " <> showServer srv
 
-    removeClientAndSubs :: SMPClientVar -> SMPClient -> IO (Maybe (Map SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey))
+    removeClientAndSubs :: SMPClientVar -> IO (Maybe (Map SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey))
-    removeClientAndSubs v smp = atomically $ do
+    removeClientAndSubs v = atomically $ do
       removeSessVar v srv smpClients
-      TM.delete (sessionId $ thParams smp) smpSessions
       TM.lookupDelete srv (srvSubs ca) >>= mapM updateSubs
       where
         updateSubs sVar = do
@@ -277,9 +271,6 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, smpSessions, msgQ,
     notify :: SMPClientAgentEvent -> IO ()
     notify evt = atomically $ writeTBQueue (agentQ ca) evt
 
-lookupSMPServerClient :: SMPClientAgent -> SessionId -> STM (Maybe SMPClient)
-lookupSMPServerClient SMPClientAgent {smpSessions} sessId = TM.lookup sessId smpSessions
-
 closeSMPClientAgent :: SMPClientAgent -> IO ()
 closeSMPClientAgent c = do
   closeSMPServerClients c

src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto.hs

@@ -141,7 +141,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
     sbEncrypt_,
     cbNonce,
     randomCbNonce,
-    reverseNonce,
 
     -- * NaCl crypto_secretbox
     SbKey (unSbKey),
@@ -757,8 +756,6 @@ data Signature (a :: Algorithm) where
   SignatureEd25519 :: Ed25519.Signature -> Signature Ed25519
   SignatureEd448 :: Ed448.Signature -> Signature Ed448
 
-deriving instance Eq (Signature a)
-
 deriving instance Show (Signature a)
 
 data ASignature
@@ -1293,9 +1290,6 @@ randomCbNonce = fmap CryptoBoxNonce . randomBytes 24
 randomBytes :: Int -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ByteString
 randomBytes n gVar = stateTVar gVar $ randomBytesGenerate n
 
-reverseNonce :: CbNonce -> CbNonce
-reverseNonce (CryptoBoxNonce s) = CryptoBoxNonce (B.reverse s)
-
 instance Encoding CbNonce where
   smpEncode = unCbNonce
   smpP = CryptoBoxNonce <$> A.take 24

src/Simplex/Messaging/Crypto/Ratchet.hs

@@ -143,16 +143,11 @@ kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion = VersionE2E 2
 pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion :: VersionE2E
 pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion = VersionE2E 3
 
--- TODO v5.7 increase to 3
 currentE2EEncryptVersion :: VersionE2E
-currentE2EEncryptVersion = VersionE2E 2
+currentE2EEncryptVersion = VersionE2E 3
 
--- TODO v5.7 remove dependency of version range on whether PQ encryption is used
+supportedE2EEncryptVRange :: VersionRangeE2E
-supportedE2EEncryptVRange :: PQSupport -> VersionRangeE2E
+supportedE2EEncryptVRange = mkVersionRange kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion currentE2EEncryptVersion
-supportedE2EEncryptVRange pq =
-  mkVersionRange kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion $ case pq of 
-    PQSupportOn -> pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion
-    PQSupportOff -> currentE2EEncryptVersion
 
 data RatchetKEMState
   = RKSProposed -- only KEM encapsulation key

src/Simplex/Messaging/Notifications/Protocol.hs

@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ instance Encoding ANewNtfEntity where
 instance Protocol NTFVersion ErrorType NtfResponse where
   type ProtoCommand NtfResponse = NtfCmd
   type ProtoType NtfResponse = 'PNTF
-  protocolClientHandshake = ntfClientHandshake
+  protocolClientHandshake c _ks = ntfClientHandshake c
   protocolPing = NtfCmd SSubscription PING
   protocolError = \case
     NRErr e -> Just e

src/Simplex/Messaging/Notifications/Server.hs

@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ ntfSubscriber NtfSubscriber {smpSubscribers, newSubQ, smpAgent = ca@SMPClientAge
 
     receiveSMP :: M ()
     receiveSMP = forever $ do
-      ((_, srv, _), _, _, ntfId, msg) <- atomically $ readTBQueue msgQ
+      ((_, srv, _), _, _, _, ntfId, msg) <- atomically $ readTBQueue msgQ
       let smpQueue = SMPQueueNtf srv ntfId
       case msg of
         SMP.NMSG nmsgNonce encNMsgMeta -> do

src/Simplex/Messaging/Notifications/Server/Main.hs

@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
 import qualified Data.Text as T
 import Network.Socket (HostName)
 import Options.Applicative
-import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgentConfig (..), defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server (runNtfServer)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Env (NtfServerConfig (..), defaultInactiveClientExpiration)
@@ -31,9 +30,6 @@ import System.FilePath (combine)
 import System.IO (BufferMode (..), hSetBuffering, stderr, stdout)
 import Text.Read (readMaybe)
 
-defaultSMPBatchDelay :: Int
-defaultSMPBatchDelay = 10000
-
 ntfServerCLI :: FilePath -> FilePath -> IO ()
 ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
   getCliCommand' (cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile) serverVersion >>= \case
@@ -87,9 +83,7 @@ ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
                \# host is only used to print server address on start\n"
             <> ("host: " <> host <> "\n")
             <> ("port: " <> defaultServerPort <> "\n")
-            <> "log_tls_errors: off\n\
+            <> "log_tls_errors: off\n"
-               \# delay between command batches sent to SMP relays (microseconds), 0 to disable\n"
-            <> ("smp_batch_delay: " <> show defaultSMPBatchDelay <> "\n")
             <> "websockets: off\n\n\
                \[INACTIVE_CLIENTS]\n\
                \# TTL and interval to check inactive clients\n\
@@ -111,8 +105,6 @@ ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
         enableStoreLog = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "enable" ini
         logStats = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "log_stats" ini
         c = combine cfgPath . ($ defaultX509Config)
-        smpBatchDelay = readIniDefault defaultSMPBatchDelay "TRANSPORT" "smp_batch_delay" ini
-        batchDelay = if smpBatchDelay <= 0 then Nothing else Just smpBatchDelay
         serverConfig =
           NtfServerConfig
             { transports = iniTransports ini,
@@ -121,7 +113,7 @@ ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
               clientQSize = 64,
               subQSize = 512,
               pushQSize = 1048,
-              smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig {smpCfg = (smpCfg defaultSMPClientAgentConfig) {batchDelay}},
+              smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig,
               apnsConfig = defaultAPNSPushClientConfig,
               subsBatchSize = 900,
               inactiveClientExpiration =

src/Simplex/Messaging/Notifications/Transport.hs

@@ -68,9 +68,7 @@ data NtfClientHandshake = NtfClientHandshake
   { -- | agreed SMP notifications server protocol version
     ntfVersion :: VersionNTF,
     -- | server identity - CA certificate fingerprint
-    keyHash :: C.KeyHash,
+    keyHash :: C.KeyHash
-    -- pub key to agree shared secret for entity ID encryption, shared secret for command authorization is agreed using per-queue keys.
-    authPubKey :: Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519
   }
 
 instance Encoding NtfServerHandshake where
@@ -95,21 +93,11 @@ authEncryptCmdsP :: VersionNTF -> Parser a -> Parser (Maybe a)
 authEncryptCmdsP v p = if v >= authBatchCmdsNTFVersion then Just <$> p else pure Nothing
 
 instance Encoding NtfClientHandshake where
-  smpEncode NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion, keyHash, authPubKey} =
+  smpEncode NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion, keyHash} =
-    smpEncode (ntfVersion, keyHash) <> encodeNtfAuthPubKey ntfVersion authPubKey
+    smpEncode (ntfVersion, keyHash)
   smpP = do
     (ntfVersion, keyHash) <- smpP
-    -- TODO drop SMP v6: remove special parser and make key non-optional
+    pure NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion, keyHash}
-    authPubKey <- ntfAuthPubKeyP ntfVersion
-    pure NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion, keyHash, authPubKey}
-
-ntfAuthPubKeyP :: VersionNTF -> Parser (Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519)
-ntfAuthPubKeyP v = if v >= authBatchCmdsNTFVersion then Just <$> smpP else pure Nothing
-
-encodeNtfAuthPubKey :: VersionNTF -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> ByteString
-encodeNtfAuthPubKey v k
-  | v >= authBatchCmdsNTFVersion = maybe "" smpEncode k
-  | otherwise = ""
 
 -- | Notifcations server transport handshake.
 ntfServerHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => C.APrivateSignKey -> c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeNTF -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleNTF c 'TServer)
@@ -118,16 +106,16 @@ ntfServerHandshake serverSignKey c (k, pk) kh ntfVRange = do
   let sk = C.signX509 serverSignKey $ C.publicToX509 k
   sendHandshake th $ NtfServerHandshake {sessionId, ntfVersionRange = ntfVRange, authPubKey = Just sk}
   getHandshake th >>= \case
-    NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = k'}
+    NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion = v, keyHash}
       | keyHash /= kh ->
           throwError $ TEHandshake IDENTITY
       | v `isCompatible` ntfVRange ->
-          pure $ ntfThHandleServer th v pk k'
+          pure $ ntfThHandleServer th v pk
       | otherwise -> throwError $ TEHandshake VERSION
 
 -- | Notifcations server client transport handshake.
-ntfClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeNTF -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleNTF c 'TClient)
+ntfClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeNTF -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleNTF c 'TClient)
-ntfClientHandshake c (k, pk) keyHash ntfVRange = do
+ntfClientHandshake c keyHash ntfVRange = do
   let th@THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId}} = ntfTHandle c
   NtfServerHandshake {sessionId = sessId, ntfVersionRange, authPubKey = sk'} <- getHandshake th
   if sessionId /= sessId
@@ -138,18 +126,18 @@ ntfClientHandshake c (k, pk) keyHash ntfVRange = do
           serverKey <- getServerVerifyKey c
           pubKey <- C.verifyX509 serverKey signedKey
           (,(getServerCerts c, signedKey)) <$> (C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey)
-        sendHandshake th $ NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = Just k}
+        sendHandshake th $ NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion = v, keyHash}
-        pure $ ntfThHandleClient th v pk ck_
+        pure $ ntfThHandleClient th v ck_
       Nothing -> throwError $ TEHandshake VERSION
 
-ntfThHandleServer :: forall c. THandleNTF c 'TServer -> VersionNTF -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> THandleNTF c 'TServer
+ntfThHandleServer :: forall c. THandleNTF c 'TServer -> VersionNTF -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> THandleNTF c 'TServer
-ntfThHandleServer th v pk k_ =
+ntfThHandleServer th v pk =
-  let thAuth = (\k -> THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey = k, serverPrivKey = pk}) <$> k_
+  let thAuth = THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, sessSecret' = Nothing}
-   in ntfThHandle_ th v thAuth
+   in ntfThHandle_ th v (Just thAuth)
 
-ntfThHandleClient :: forall c. THandleNTF c 'TClient -> VersionNTF -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)) -> THandleNTF c 'TClient
+ntfThHandleClient :: forall c. THandleNTF c 'TClient -> VersionNTF -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)) -> THandleNTF c 'TClient
-ntfThHandleClient th v pk ck_ =
+ntfThHandleClient th v ck_ =
-  let thAuth = (\(k, ck) -> THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k, serverCertKey = ck, clientPrivKey = pk}) <$> ck_
+  let thAuth = (\(k, ck) -> THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k, serverCertKey = ck, sessSecret = Nothing}) <$> ck_
    in ntfThHandle_ th v thAuth
 
 ntfThHandle_ :: forall c p. THandleNTF c p -> VersionNTF -> Maybe (THandleAuth p) -> THandleNTF c p

src/Simplex/Messaging/Protocol.hs

@@ -43,8 +43,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
   ( -- * SMP protocol parameters
     supportedSMPClientVRange,
     maxMessageLength,
-    paddedProxiedMsgLength,
-    paddedForwardedMsgLength,
     e2eEncConfirmationLength,
     e2eEncMessageLength,
 
@@ -58,7 +56,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
     SubscriptionMode (..),
     Party (..),
     Cmd (..),
-    DirectParty,
     BrokerMsg (..),
     SParty (..),
     PartyI (..),
@@ -66,7 +63,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
     ProtocolErrorType (..),
     ErrorType (..),
     CommandError (..),
-    ProxyError (..),
     Transmission,
     TransmissionAuth (..),
     SignedTransmission,
@@ -125,12 +121,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
     EncNMsgMeta,
     SMPMsgMeta (..),
     NMsgMeta (..),
-    EncFwdResponse (..),
-    EncFwdTransmission (..),
-    EncResponse (..),
-    EncTransmission (..),
-    FwdResponse (..),
-    FwdTransmission (..),
     MsgFlags (..),
     initialSMPClientVersion,
     userProtocol,
@@ -198,10 +188,7 @@ import Data.String
 import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..))
 import Data.Type.Equality
 import Data.Word (Word16)
-import qualified Data.X509 as X
 import GHC.TypeLits (ErrorMessage (..), TypeError, type (+))
-import qualified GHC.TypeLits as TE
-import qualified GHC.TypeLits as Type
 import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
@@ -244,20 +231,6 @@ supportedSMPClientVRange = mkVersionRange initialSMPClientVersion currentSMPClie
 maxMessageLength :: Int
 maxMessageLength = 16088
 
--- without signature works with min 16151 (fails with 16150)
--- with Ed448: 16265 (fails with 16264)
--- with Ed25519: 16215 (fails with 16214)
--- with X25519: 16232 (fails with 16231)
-paddedProxiedMsgLength :: Int
-paddedProxiedMsgLength = 16232
-
--- without signature works with min 16239 (fails with 16238)
--- with Ed448: 16353 (fails with 16352)
--- with Ed25519: 16303 (fails with 16302)
--- with X25519: 16320 (fails with 16319)
-paddedForwardedMsgLength :: Int
-paddedForwardedMsgLength = 16320
-
 type MaxMessageLen = 16088
 
 -- 16 extra bytes: 8 for timestamp and 8 for flags (7 flags and the space, only 1 flag is currently used)
@@ -265,13 +238,13 @@ type MaxRcvMessageLen = MaxMessageLen + 16 -- 16104, the padded size is 16106
 
 -- it is shorter to allow per-queue e2e encryption DH key in the "public" header
 e2eEncConfirmationLength :: Int
-e2eEncConfirmationLength = 15936
+e2eEncConfirmationLength = 15920 -- 15881 .. 15976
 
 e2eEncMessageLength :: Int
-e2eEncMessageLength = 16032
+e2eEncMessageLength = 16016 -- 16004 .. 16021
 
 -- | SMP protocol clients
-data Party = Recipient | Sender | Notifier | ProxiedClient
+data Party = Recipient | Sender | Notifier
   deriving (Show)
 
 -- | Singleton types for SMP protocol clients
@@ -279,13 +252,11 @@ data SParty :: Party -> Type where
   SRecipient :: SParty Recipient
   SSender :: SParty Sender
   SNotifier :: SParty Notifier
-  SProxiedClient :: SParty ProxiedClient
 
 instance TestEquality SParty where
   testEquality SRecipient SRecipient = Just Refl
   testEquality SSender SSender = Just Refl
   testEquality SNotifier SNotifier = Just Refl
-  testEquality SProxiedClient SProxiedClient = Just Refl
   testEquality _ _ = Nothing
 
 deriving instance Show (SParty p)
@@ -298,15 +269,6 @@ instance PartyI Sender where sParty = SSender
 
 instance PartyI Notifier where sParty = SNotifier
 
-instance PartyI ProxiedClient where sParty = SProxiedClient
-
-type family DirectParty (p :: Party) :: Constraint where
-  DirectParty Recipient = ()
-  DirectParty Sender = ()
-  DirectParty Notifier = ()
-  DirectParty p =
-    (Int ~ Bool, TypeError (Type.Text "Party " :<>: ShowType p :<>: Type.Text " is not direct"))
-
 -- | Type for client command of any participant.
 data Cmd = forall p. PartyI p => Cmd (SParty p) (Command p)
 
@@ -397,17 +359,6 @@ data Command (p :: Party) where
   PING :: Command Sender
   -- SMP notification subscriber commands
   NSUB :: Command Notifier
-  PRXY :: SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> Command ProxiedClient -- request a relay server connection by URI
-  -- Transmission to proxy:
-  -- - entity ID: ID of the session with relay returned in PKEY (response to PRXY)
-  -- - corrId: also used as a nonce to encrypt transmission to relay, corrId + 1 - from relay
-  -- - key (1st param in the command) is used to agree DH secret for this particular transmission and its response
-  -- Encrypted transmission should include session ID (tlsunique) from proxy-relay connection.
-  PFWD :: C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> Command ProxiedClient -- use CorrId as CbNonce, client to proxy
-  -- Transmission forwarded to relay:
-  -- - entity ID: empty
-  -- - corrId: unique correlation ID between proxy and relay, also used as a nonce to encrypt forwarded transmission
-  RFWD :: EncFwdTransmission -> Command Sender -- use CorrId as CbNonce, proxy to relay
 
 deriving instance Show (Command p)
 
@@ -433,25 +384,6 @@ instance Encoding SubscriptionMode where
       'C' -> pure SMOnlyCreate
       _ -> fail "bad SubscriptionMode"
 
-newtype EncTransmission = EncTransmission ByteString
-  deriving (Show)
-
-data FwdTransmission = FwdTransmission
-  { fwdCorrId :: CorrId,
-    fwdKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519,
-    fwdTransmission :: EncTransmission
-  }
-
-instance Encoding FwdTransmission where
-  smpEncode FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t} =
-    smpEncode (corrId, fwdKey, Tail t)
-  smpP = do
-    (corrId, fwdKey, Tail t) <- smpP
-    pure FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t}
-
-newtype EncFwdTransmission = EncFwdTransmission ByteString
-  deriving (Show)
-
 data BrokerMsg where
   -- SMP broker messages (responses, client messages, notifications)
   IDS :: QueueIdsKeys -> BrokerMsg
@@ -461,10 +393,6 @@ data BrokerMsg where
   MSG :: RcvMessage -> BrokerMsg
   NID :: NotifierId -> RcvNtfPublicDhKey -> BrokerMsg
   NMSG :: C.CbNonce -> EncNMsgMeta -> BrokerMsg
-  -- Should include certificate chain
-  PKEY :: SessionId -> VersionRangeSMP -> (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey) -> BrokerMsg -- TLS-signed server key for proxy shared secret and initial sender key
-  RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg -- relay to proxy
-  PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
   END :: BrokerMsg
   OK :: BrokerMsg
   ERR :: ErrorType -> BrokerMsg
@@ -477,24 +405,6 @@ data RcvMessage = RcvMessage
   }
   deriving (Eq, Show)
 
-newtype EncFwdResponse = EncFwdResponse ByteString
-  deriving (Eq, Show)
-
-data FwdResponse = FwdResponse
-  { fwdCorrId :: CorrId,
-    fwdResponse :: EncResponse
-  }
-
-instance Encoding FwdResponse where
-  smpEncode FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t} =
-    smpEncode (corrId, Tail t)
-  smpP = do
-    (corrId, Tail t) <- smpP
-    pure FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t}
-
-newtype EncResponse = EncResponse ByteString
-  deriving (Eq, Show)
-
 -- | received message without server/recipient encryption
 data Message
   = Message
@@ -657,9 +567,6 @@ data CommandTag (p :: Party) where
   DEL_ :: CommandTag Recipient
   SEND_ :: CommandTag Sender
   PING_ :: CommandTag Sender
-  PRXY_ :: CommandTag ProxiedClient
-  PFWD_ :: CommandTag ProxiedClient
-  RFWD_ :: CommandTag Sender
   NSUB_ :: CommandTag Notifier
 
 data CmdTag = forall p. PartyI p => CT (SParty p) (CommandTag p)
@@ -673,9 +580,6 @@ data BrokerMsgTag
   | MSG_
   | NID_
   | NMSG_
-  | PKEY_
-  | RRES_
-  | PRES_
   | END_
   | OK_
   | ERR_
@@ -703,9 +607,6 @@ instance PartyI p => Encoding (CommandTag p) where
     DEL_ -> "DEL"
     SEND_ -> "SEND"
     PING_ -> "PING"
-    PRXY_ -> "PRXY"
-    PFWD_ -> "PFWD"
-    RFWD_ -> "RFWD"
     NSUB_ -> "NSUB"
   smpP = messageTagP
 
@@ -722,9 +623,6 @@ instance ProtocolMsgTag CmdTag where
     "DEL" -> Just $ CT SRecipient DEL_
     "SEND" -> Just $ CT SSender SEND_
     "PING" -> Just $ CT SSender PING_
-    "PRXY" -> Just $ CT SProxiedClient PRXY_
-    "PFWD" -> Just $ CT SProxiedClient PFWD_
-    "RFWD" -> Just $ CT SSender RFWD_
     "NSUB" -> Just $ CT SNotifier NSUB_
     _ -> Nothing
 
@@ -741,9 +639,6 @@ instance Encoding BrokerMsgTag where
     MSG_ -> "MSG"
     NID_ -> "NID"
     NMSG_ -> "NMSG"
-    PKEY_ -> "PKEY"
-    RRES_ -> "RRES"
-    PRES_ -> "PRES"
     END_ -> "END"
     OK_ -> "OK"
     ERR_ -> "ERR"
@@ -756,9 +651,6 @@ instance ProtocolMsgTag BrokerMsgTag where
     "MSG" -> Just MSG_
     "NID" -> Just NID_
     "NMSG" -> Just NMSG_
-    "PKEY" -> Just PKEY_
-    "RRES" -> Just RRES_
-    "PRES" -> Just PRES_
     "END" -> Just END_
     "OK" -> Just OK_
     "ERR" -> Just ERR_
@@ -937,7 +829,7 @@ type family UserProtocol (p :: ProtocolType) :: Constraint where
   UserProtocol PSMP = ()
   UserProtocol PXFTP = ()
   UserProtocol a =
-    (Int ~ Bool, TypeError (TE.Text "Servers for protocol " :<>: ShowType a :<>: TE.Text " cannot be configured by the users"))
+    (Int ~ Bool, TypeError (Text "Servers for protocol " :<>: ShowType a :<>: Text " cannot be configured by the users"))
 
 userProtocol :: SProtocolType p -> Maybe (Dict (UserProtocol p))
 userProtocol = \case
@@ -1146,8 +1038,6 @@ data ErrorType
     SESSION
   | -- | SMP command is unknown or has invalid syntax
     CMD {cmdErr :: CommandError}
-  | -- | error from proxied relay
-    PROXY {proxyErr :: ProxyError}
   | -- | command authorization error - bad signature or non-existing SMP queue
     AUTH
   | -- | SMP queue capacity is exceeded on the server
@@ -1156,8 +1046,6 @@ data ErrorType
     NO_MSG
   | -- | sent message is too large (> maxMessageLength = 16088 bytes)
     LARGE_MSG
-  | -- | relay public key is expired
-    EXPIRED
   | -- | internal server error
     INTERNAL
   | -- | used internally, never returned by the server (to be removed)
@@ -1167,12 +1055,8 @@ data ErrorType
 instance StrEncoding ErrorType where
   strEncode = \case
     CMD e -> "CMD " <> bshow e
-    PROXY e -> "PROXY " <> bshow e
     e -> bshow e
-  strP =
+  strP = "CMD " *> (CMD <$> parseRead1) <|> parseRead1
-    "CMD " *> (CMD <$> parseRead1)
-      <|> "PROXY " *> (PROXY <$> parseRead1)
-      <|> parseRead1
 
 -- | SMP command error type.
 data CommandError
@@ -1190,22 +1074,6 @@ data CommandError
     NO_ENTITY
   deriving (Eq, Read, Show)
 
--- TODO keep error params
-data ProxyError
-  = -- | Correctly parsed SMP server ERR response.
-    -- This error is forwarded to the agent client as `ERR SMP err`.
-    PROTOCOL -- {protocolErr :: String}
-  | -- | Invalid server response that failed to parse.
-    -- Forwarded to the agent client as `ERR BROKER RESPONSE`.
-    RESPONSE -- {responseErr :: String}
-  | UNEXPECTED
-  | TIMEOUT
-  | NETWORK
-  | BAD_HOST
-  | NO_SESSION
-  | TRANSPORT -- {transportErr :: TransportError}
-  deriving (Eq, Read, Show)
-
 -- | SMP transmission parser.
 transmissionP :: THandleParams v p -> Parser RawTransmission
 transmissionP THandleParams {sessionId, implySessId} = do
@@ -1224,7 +1092,7 @@ transmissionP THandleParams {sessionId, implySessId} = do
 class (ProtocolEncoding v err msg, ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg), Show err, Show msg) => Protocol v err msg | msg -> v, msg -> err where
   type ProtoCommand msg = cmd | cmd -> msg
   type ProtoType msg = (sch :: ProtocolType) | sch -> msg
-  protocolClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRange v -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle v c 'TClient)
+  protocolClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> Maybe C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRange v -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle v c 'TClient)
   protocolPing :: ProtoCommand msg
   protocolError :: msg -> Maybe err
 
@@ -1267,9 +1135,6 @@ instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType (Command p) where
     SEND flags msg -> e (SEND_, ' ', flags, ' ', Tail msg)
     PING -> e PING_
     NSUB -> e NSUB_
-    PRXY host auth_ -> e (PRXY_, ' ', host, auth_)
-    PFWD pubKey (EncTransmission s) -> e (PFWD_, ' ', pubKey, Tail s)
-    RFWD (EncFwdTransmission s) -> e (RFWD_, ' ', Tail s)
     where
       e :: Encoding a => a -> ByteString
       e = smpEncode
@@ -1279,33 +1144,24 @@ instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType (Command p) where
   fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @SMPVersion @ErrorType @BrokerMsg
   {-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
 
-  checkCredentials (auth, _, entId, _) cmd = case cmd of
+  checkCredentials (auth, _, queueId, _) cmd = case cmd of
     -- NEW must have signature but NOT queue ID
     NEW {}
       | isNothing auth -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
-      | not (B.null entId) -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
+      | not (B.null queueId) -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
       | otherwise -> Right cmd
     -- SEND must have queue ID, signature is not always required
     SEND {}
-      | B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
+      | B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
       | otherwise -> Right cmd
-    PING -> noAuthCmd
+    -- PING must not have queue ID or signature
-    PRXY {} -> noAuthCmd
+    PING
-    PFWD {}
+      | isNothing auth && B.null queueId -> Right cmd
-      | B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
-      | isNothing auth -> Right cmd
       | otherwise -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
-    RFWD _ -> noAuthCmd
     -- other client commands must have both signature and queue ID
     _
-      | isNothing auth || B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
+      | isNothing auth || B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
       | otherwise -> Right cmd
-    where
-      -- command must not have entity ID (queue or session ID) or signature
-      noAuthCmd :: Either ErrorType (Command p)
-      noAuthCmd
-        | isNothing auth && B.null entId = Right cmd
-        | otherwise = Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
 
 instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType Cmd where
   type Tag Cmd = CmdTag
@@ -1333,11 +1189,6 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType Cmd where
       Cmd SSender <$> case tag of
         SEND_ -> SEND <$> _smpP <*> (unTail <$> _smpP)
         PING_ -> pure PING
-        RFWD_ -> RFWD <$> (EncFwdTransmission . unTail <$> _smpP)
-    CT SProxiedClient tag ->
-      Cmd SProxiedClient <$> case tag of
-        PFWD_ -> PFWD <$> _smpP <*> (EncTransmission . unTail <$> smpP)
-        PRXY_ -> PRXY <$> _smpP <*> smpP
     CT SNotifier NSUB_ -> pure $ Cmd SNotifier NSUB
 
   fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @SMPVersion @ErrorType @BrokerMsg
@@ -1353,9 +1204,6 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
       e (MSG_, ' ', msgId, Tail body)
     NID nId srvNtfDh -> e (NID_, ' ', nId, srvNtfDh)
     NMSG nmsgNonce encNMsgMeta -> e (NMSG_, ' ', nmsgNonce, encNMsgMeta)
-    PKEY sid vr (cert, key) -> e (PKEY_, ' ', sid, vr, C.encodeCertChain cert, C.SignedObject key)
-    RRES (EncFwdResponse encBlock) -> e (RRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
-    PRES (EncResponse encBlock) -> e (PRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
     END -> e END_
     OK -> e OK_
     ERR err -> e (ERR_, ' ', err)
@@ -1373,9 +1221,6 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
     IDS_ -> IDS <$> (QIK <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP)
     NID_ -> NID <$> _smpP <*> smpP
     NMSG_ -> NMSG <$> _smpP <*> smpP
-    PKEY_ -> PKEY <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> ((,) <$> C.certChainP <*> (C.getSignedExact <$> smpP))
-    RRES_ -> RRES <$> (EncFwdResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
-    PRES_ -> PRES <$> (EncResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
     END_ -> pure END
     OK_ -> pure OK
     ERR_ -> ERR <$> _smpP
@@ -1388,24 +1233,19 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
     PEBlock -> BLOCK
   {-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
 
-  checkCredentials (_, _, entId, _) cmd = case cmd of
+  checkCredentials (_, _, queueId, _) cmd = case cmd of
     -- IDS response should not have queue ID
     IDS _ -> Right cmd
     -- ERR response does not always have queue ID
     ERR _ -> Right cmd
     -- PONG response must not have queue ID
-    PONG -> noEntityMsg
+    PONG
-    PKEY {} -> noEntityMsg
+      | B.null queueId -> Right cmd
-    RRES _ -> noEntityMsg
+      | otherwise -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
     -- other broker responses must have queue ID
     _
-      | B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
+      | B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
       | otherwise -> Right cmd
-    where
-      noEntityMsg :: Either ErrorType BrokerMsg
-      noEntityMsg
-        | B.null entId = Right cmd
-        | otherwise = Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
 
 -- | Parse SMP protocol commands and broker messages
 parseProtocol :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err msg => Version v -> ByteString -> Either err msg
@@ -1428,10 +1268,8 @@ instance Encoding ErrorType where
     BLOCK -> "BLOCK"
     SESSION -> "SESSION"
     CMD err -> "CMD " <> smpEncode err
-    PROXY err -> "PROXY " <> smpEncode err
     AUTH -> "AUTH"
     QUOTA -> "QUOTA"
-    EXPIRED -> "EXPIRED"
     NO_MSG -> "NO_MSG"
     LARGE_MSG -> "LARGE_MSG"
     INTERNAL -> "INTERNAL"
@@ -1442,10 +1280,8 @@ instance Encoding ErrorType where
       "BLOCK" -> pure BLOCK
       "SESSION" -> pure SESSION
       "CMD" -> CMD <$> _smpP
-      "PROXY" -> PROXY <$> _smpP
       "AUTH" -> pure AUTH
       "QUOTA" -> pure QUOTA
-      "EXPIRED" -> pure EXPIRED
       "NO_MSG" -> pure NO_MSG
       "LARGE_MSG" -> pure LARGE_MSG
       "INTERNAL" -> pure INTERNAL
@@ -1468,29 +1304,7 @@ instance Encoding CommandError where
       "NO_AUTH" -> pure NO_AUTH
       "HAS_AUTH" -> pure HAS_AUTH
       "NO_ENTITY" -> pure NO_ENTITY
-      "NO_QUEUE" -> pure NO_ENTITY -- for backward compatibility
+      "NO_QUEUE" -> pure NO_ENTITY
-      _ -> fail "bad command error type"
-
-instance Encoding ProxyError where
-  smpEncode e = case e of
-    PROTOCOL -> "PROTOCOL"
-    RESPONSE -> "RESPONSE"
-    UNEXPECTED -> "UNEXPECTED"
-    TIMEOUT -> "TIMEOUT"
-    NETWORK -> "NETWORK"
-    BAD_HOST -> "BAD_HOST"
-    NO_SESSION -> "NO_SESSION"
-    TRANSPORT -> "TRANSPORT"
-  smpP =
-    A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
-      "PROTOCOL" -> pure PROTOCOL
-      "RESPONSE" -> pure RESPONSE
-      "UNEXPECTED" -> pure UNEXPECTED
-      "TIMEOUT" -> pure TIMEOUT
-      "NETWORK" -> pure NETWORK
-      "BAD_HOST" -> pure BAD_HOST
-      "NO_SESSION" -> pure NO_SESSION
-      "TRANSPORT" -> pure TRANSPORT
       _ -> fail "bad command error type"
 
 -- | Send signed SMP transmission to TCP transport.
@@ -1630,6 +1444,4 @@ $(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''MsgFlags)
 
 $(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''CommandError)
 
-$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''ProxyError)
-
 $(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''ErrorType)

src/Simplex/Messaging/Server.hs

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
 
 -- |
 -- Module      : Simplex.Messaging.Server
@@ -42,7 +43,6 @@ import Control.Monad
 import Control.Monad.Except
 import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
 import Control.Monad.Reader
-import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
 import Crypto.Random
 import Data.Bifunctor (first)
 import Data.ByteString.Base64 (encode)
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ import Data.Functor (($>))
 import Data.Int (Int64)
 import qualified Data.IntMap.Strict as IM
 import Data.List (intercalate)
-import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
 import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
 import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
 import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
@@ -68,10 +67,8 @@ import GHC.Stats (getRTSStats)
 import GHC.TypeLits (KnownNat)
 import Network.Socket (ServiceName, Socket, socketToHandle)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Lock
-import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClient (thParams), forwardSMPMessage, smpProxyError)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgent (..), SMPClientAgentEvent (..), getSMPServerClient', lookupSMPServerClient)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
-import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
+import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding (Encoding (smpEncode))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Control
@@ -93,7 +90,6 @@ import System.Exit (exitFailure)
 import System.IO (hPrint, hPutStrLn, hSetNewlineMode, universalNewlineMode)
 import System.Mem.Weak (deRefWeak)
 import UnliftIO (timeout)
-import UnliftIO.Async (mapConcurrently)
 import UnliftIO.Concurrent
 import UnliftIO.Directory (doesFileExist, renameFile)
 import UnliftIO.Exception
@@ -126,13 +122,11 @@ type M a = ReaderT Env IO a
 smpServer :: TMVar Bool -> ServerConfig -> M ()
 smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
   s <- asks server
-  pa <- asks proxyAgent
   expired <- restoreServerMessages
   restoreServerStats expired
   raceAny_
     ( serverThread s "server subscribedQ" subscribedQ subscribers subscriptions cancelSub
         : serverThread s "server ntfSubscribedQ" ntfSubscribedQ Env.notifiers ntfSubscriptions (\_ -> pure ())
-        : receiveFromProxyAgent pa
         : map runServer transports <> expireMessagesThread_ cfg <> serverStatsThread_ cfg <> controlPortThread_ cfg
     )
     `finally` withLock' (savingLock s) "final" (saveServer False)
@@ -185,19 +179,6 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
           mkWeakThreadId t >>= atomically . modifyTVar' (endThreads c) . IM.insert tId
           atomically $ TM.lookupDelete qId (clientSubs c)
 
-    receiveFromProxyAgent :: ProxyAgent -> M ()
-    receiveFromProxyAgent ProxyAgent {smpAgent = SMPClientAgent {agentQ}} =
-      forever $
-        atomically (readTBQueue agentQ) >>= \case
-          CAConnected srv -> logInfo $ "SMP server connected " <> showServer' srv
-          CADisconnected srv [] -> logInfo $ "SMP server disconnected " <> showServer' srv
-          CADisconnected srv subs -> logError $ "SMP server disconnected " <> showServer' srv <> " / subscriptions: " <> tshow (length subs)
-          CAReconnected srv -> logInfo $ "SMP server reconnected " <> showServer' srv
-          CAResubscribed srv subs -> logError $ "SMP server resubscribed " <> showServer' srv <> " / subscriptions: " <> tshow (length subs)
-          CASubError srv errs -> logError $ "SMP server subscription errors " <> showServer' srv <> " / errors: " <> tshow (length errs)
-      where
-        showServer' = decodeLatin1 . strEncode . host
-
     expireMessagesThread_ :: ServerConfig -> [M ()]
     expireMessagesThread_ ServerConfig {messageExpiration = Just msgExp} = [expireMessages msgExp]
     expireMessagesThread_ _ = []
@@ -333,7 +314,7 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
               CPResume -> withAdminRole $ hPutStrLn h "resume not implemented"
               CPClients -> withAdminRole $ do
                 active <- unliftIO u (asks clients) >>= readTVarIO
-                hPutStrLn h "clientId,sessionId,connected,createdAt,rcvActiveAt,sndActiveAt,age,subscriptions"
+                hPutStrLn h $ "clientId,sessionId,connected,createdAt,rcvActiveAt,sndActiveAt,age,subscriptions"
                 forM_ (IM.toList active) $ \(cid, Client {sessionId, connected, createdAt, rcvActiveAt, sndActiveAt, subscriptions}) -> do
                   connected' <- bshow <$> readTVarIO connected
                   rcvActiveAt' <- strEncode <$> readTVarIO rcvActiveAt
@@ -429,7 +410,7 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
                     hPutStrLn h "AUTH"
 
 runClientTransport :: Transport c => THandleSMP c 'TServer -> M ()
-runClientTransport th@THandle {params = thParams@THandleParams {thVersion, sessionId}} = do
+runClientTransport th@THandle {params = THandleParams {thVersion, sessionId}} = do
   q <- asks $ tbqSize . config
   ts <- liftIO getSystemTime
   active <- asks clients
@@ -441,7 +422,7 @@ runClientTransport th@THandle {params = thParams@THandleParams {thVersion, sessi
   s <- asks server
   expCfg <- asks $ inactiveClientExpiration . config
   labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId
-  raceAny_ ([liftIO $ send th c, client thParams c s, receive th c] <> disconnectThread_ c expCfg)
+  raceAny_ ([liftIO $ send th c, client c s, receive th c] <> disconnectThread_ c expCfg)
     `finally` clientDisconnected c
   where
     disconnectThread_ c (Just expCfg) = [liftIO $ disconnectTransport th (rcvActiveAt c) (sndActiveAt c) expCfg (noSubscriptions c)]
@@ -482,19 +463,19 @@ receive th@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth}} Client {rcvQ, sndQ, rcvActi
   forever $ do
     ts <- L.toList <$> liftIO (tGet th)
     atomically . writeTVar rcvActiveAt =<< liftIO getSystemTime
-    (errs, cmds) <- partitionEithers <$> mapM cmdAction ts
+    as <- partitionEithers <$> mapM cmdAction ts
-    write sndQ errs
+    write sndQ $ fst as
-    write rcvQ cmds
+    write rcvQ $ snd as
   where
     cmdAction :: SignedTransmission ErrorType Cmd -> M (Either (Transmission BrokerMsg) (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd))
-    cmdAction (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, entId, cmdOrError)) =
+    cmdAction (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, queueId, cmdOrError)) =
       case cmdOrError of
-        Left e -> pure $ Left (corrId, entId, ERR e)
+        Left e -> pure $ Left (corrId, queueId, ERR e)
-        Right cmd -> verified <$> verifyTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (bs corrId)) <$> thAuth) tAuth authorized entId cmd
+        Right cmd -> verified <$> verifyTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (bs corrId)) <$> thAuth) tAuth authorized queueId cmd
           where
             verified = \case
-              VRVerified qr -> Right (qr, (corrId, entId, cmd))
+              VRVerified qr -> Right (qr, (corrId, queueId, cmd))
-              VRFailed -> Left (corrId, entId, ERR AUTH)
+              VRFailed -> Left (corrId, queueId, ERR AUTH)
     write q = mapM_ (atomically . writeTBQueue q) . L.nonEmpty
 
 send :: Transport c => THandleSMP c 'TServer -> Client -> IO ()
@@ -541,18 +522,16 @@ verifyTransmission auth_ tAuth authorized queueId cmd =
     -- SEND will be accepted without authorization before the queue is secured with KEY command
     Cmd SSender SEND {} -> verifyQueue (\q -> Just q `verified` maybe (isNothing tAuth) verify (senderKey q)) <$> get SSender
     Cmd SSender PING -> pure $ VRVerified Nothing
-    Cmd SSender RFWD {} -> pure $ VRVerified Nothing
     -- NSUB will not be accepted without authorization
-    Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> verifyQueue (\q -> maybe dummyVerify (\n -> Just q `verifiedWith` notifierKey n) (notifier q)) <$> get SNotifier
+    Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> verifyQueue (\q -> maybe dummyVerify (Just q `verifiedWith`) (notifierKey <$> notifier q)) <$> get SNotifier
-    Cmd SProxiedClient _ -> pure $ VRVerified Nothing
   where
     verify = verifyCmdAuthorization auth_ tAuth authorized
     dummyVerify = verify (dummyAuthKey tAuth) `seq` VRFailed
     verifyQueue :: (QueueRec -> VerificationResult) -> Either ErrorType QueueRec -> VerificationResult
-    verifyQueue = either (const dummyVerify)
+    verifyQueue = either (\_ -> dummyVerify)
     verified q cond = if cond then VRVerified q else VRFailed
     verifiedWith q k = q `verified` verify k
-    get :: DirectParty p => SParty p -> M (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
+    get :: SParty p -> M (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
     get party = do
       st <- asks queueStore
       atomically $ getQueue st party queueId
@@ -602,55 +581,25 @@ dummyKeyEd448 = "MEMwBQYDK2VxAzoA6ibQc9XpkSLtwrf7PLvp81qW/etiumckVFImCMRdftcG/Xo
 dummyKeyX25519 :: C.PublicKey 'C.X25519
 dummyKeyX25519 = "MCowBQYDK2VuAyEA4JGSMYht18H4mas/jHeBwfcM7jLwNYJNOAhi2/g4RXg="
 
-client :: THandleParams SMPVersion 'TServer -> Client -> Server -> M ()
+client :: Client -> Server -> M ()
-client thParams' clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessionId} Server {subscribedQ, ntfSubscribedQ, notifiers} = do
+client clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessionId} Server {subscribedQ, ntfSubscribedQ, notifiers} = do
   labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " commands"
-  forever $ do
+  forever $
-    (proxied, rs) <- partitionEithers . L.toList <$> (mapM processCommand =<< atomically (readTBQueue rcvQ))
+    atomically (readTBQueue rcvQ)
-    forM_ (L.nonEmpty rs) reply
+      >>= mapM processCommand
-    -- TODO cancel this thread if the client gets disconnected
+      >>= atomically . writeTBQueue sndQ
-    -- TODO limit client concurrency
-    forM_ (L.nonEmpty proxied) $ \cmds -> forkIO $ mapConcurrently processProxiedCmd cmds >>= reply
   where
-    reply :: MonadIO m => NonEmpty (Transmission BrokerMsg) -> m ()
+    processCommand :: (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd) -> M (Transmission BrokerMsg)
-    reply = atomically . writeTBQueue sndQ
-    processProxiedCmd :: Transmission (Command 'ProxiedClient) -> M (Transmission BrokerMsg)
-    processProxiedCmd (corrId, sessId, command) = (corrId, sessId,) <$> case command of
-      PRXY srv auth -> ifM allowProxy getRelay (pure $ ERR AUTH)
-        where
-          allowProxy = do
-            ServerConfig {allowSMPProxy, newQueueBasicAuth} <- asks config
-            pure $ allowSMPProxy && maybe True ((== auth) . Just) newQueueBasicAuth
-          getRelay = do
-            ProxyAgent {smpAgent} <- asks proxyAgent
-            -- TODO catch IO errors too
-            liftIO $ proxyResp <$> runExceptT (getSMPServerClient' smpAgent srv)
-            where
-              proxyResp = \case
-                Right smp ->
-                  let THandleParams {sessionId = srvSessId, thAuth} = thParams smp
-                      vr = supportedServerSMPRelayVRange
-                   in case thAuth of
-                        Just THAuthClient {serverCertKey} -> PKEY srvSessId vr serverCertKey
-                        Nothing -> ERR $ PROXY TRANSPORT -- TODO different error?
-                Left err -> ERR $ smpProxyError err
-      PFWD pubKey encBlock -> do
-        ProxyAgent {smpAgent} <- asks proxyAgent
-        atomically (lookupSMPServerClient smpAgent sessId) >>= \case
-          Just smp -> liftIO $ either (ERR . smpProxyError) PRES <$> runExceptT (forwardSMPMessage smp corrId pubKey encBlock)
-          Nothing -> pure $ ERR $ PROXY NO_SESSION
-    processCommand :: (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd) -> M (Either (Transmission (Command 'ProxiedClient)) (Transmission BrokerMsg))
     processCommand (qr_, (corrId, queueId, cmd)) = do
       st <- asks queueStore
       case cmd of
-        Cmd SProxiedClient command -> pure $ Left (corrId, queueId, command)
+        Cmd SSender command ->
-        Cmd SSender command -> Right <$> case command of
+          case command of
-          SEND flags msgBody -> withQueue $ \qr -> sendMessage qr flags msgBody
+            SEND flags msgBody -> withQueue $ \qr -> sendMessage qr flags msgBody
-          PING -> pure (corrId, "", PONG)
+            PING -> pure (corrId, "", PONG)
-          RFWD encBlock -> (corrId, "",) <$> processForwardedCommand encBlock
+        Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> subscribeNotifications
-        Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> Right <$> subscribeNotifications
         Cmd SRecipient command ->
-          Right <$> case command of
+          case command of
             NEW rKey dhKey auth subMode ->
               ifM
                 allowNew
@@ -914,59 +863,6 @@ client thParams' clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessi
                   encNMsgMeta = C.cbEncrypt rcvNtfDhSecret cbNonce (smpEncode msgMeta) 128
               pure . (cbNonce,) $ fromRight "" encNMsgMeta
 
-        processForwardedCommand :: EncFwdTransmission -> M BrokerMsg
-        processForwardedCommand (EncFwdTransmission s) = fmap (either id id) . runExceptT $ do
-          -- TODO error
-          THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey, serverPrivKey} <- maybe (throwError $ ERR INTERNAL) pure thAuth
-          -- TODO compute during handshake?
-          let sessSecret = C.dh' clientPeerPubKey serverPrivKey
-              proxyNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs corrId
-          -- TODO error
-          s' <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ C.cbDecrypt sessSecret proxyNonce s
-          -- TODO error
-          FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission et} <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ smpDecode s'
-          -- TODO error - this error is reported to proxy, as we failed to get to client's transmission
-          let clientSecret = C.dh' fwdKey serverPrivKey
-              clientNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs fwdCorrId
-          b <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ C.cbDecrypt clientSecret clientNonce et
-          -- only allowing single forwarded transactions
-          let t' = tDecodeParseValidate thParams' $ L.head $ tParse thParams' b
-              clntThAuth = Just $ THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey = fwdKey, serverPrivKey}
-          -- TODO error
-          r <-
-            lift (rejectOrVerify clntThAuth t') >>= \case
-              Left r -> pure r
-              Right t''@(_, (corrId', entId', _)) ->
-                -- Left will not be returned by processCommand, as only SEND command is allowed
-                fromRight (corrId', entId', ERR INTERNAL) <$> lift (processCommand t'')
-
-          -- encode response
-          r' <- case batchTransmissions (batch thParams') (blockSize thParams') [Right (Nothing, encodeTransmission thParams' r)] of
-            [] -> throwE $ ERR INTERNAL -- TODO error
-            TBError _ _ : _ -> throwE $ ERR INTERNAL -- TODO error
-            TBTransmission b' _ : _ -> pure b'
-            TBTransmissions b' _ _ : _ -> pure b'
-          -- encrypt to client
-          r2 <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ EncResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt clientSecret (C.reverseNonce clientNonce) r' paddedProxiedMsgLength
-          -- encrypt to proxy
-          let fr = FwdResponse {fwdCorrId, fwdResponse = r2}
-          r3 <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ EncFwdResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt sessSecret (C.reverseNonce proxyNonce) (smpEncode fr) paddedForwardedMsgLength
-          pure $ RRES r3
-          where
-            internalErr _ = ERR INTERNAL -- TODO errors
-            THandleParams {thAuth} = thParams'
-            rejectOrVerify :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmission ErrorType Cmd -> M (Either (Transmission BrokerMsg) (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd))
-            rejectOrVerify clntThAuth (tAuth, authorized, (corrId', entId', cmdOrError)) =
-              case cmdOrError of
-                Left e -> pure $ Left (corrId', entId', ERR e)
-                -- flags msgBody -> withQueue $ \qr -> sendMessage qr flags msgBody
-                Right cmd'@(Cmd SSender SEND {}) -> verified <$> verifyTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (bs corrId')) <$> clntThAuth) tAuth authorized entId' cmd'
-                  where
-                    verified = \case
-                      VRVerified qr -> Right (qr, (corrId', entId', cmd'))
-                      VRFailed -> Left (corrId', entId', ERR AUTH)
-                Right _ -> pure $ Left (corrId', entId', ERR $ CMD PROHIBITED)
-
         deliverMessage :: T.Text -> QueueRec -> RecipientId -> TVar Sub -> MsgQueue -> Maybe Message -> M (Transmission BrokerMsg)
         deliverMessage name qr rId sub q msg_ = time (name <> " deliver") $ do
           readTVarIO sub >>= \case

src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Env/STM.hs

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
 import qualified Network.TLS as T
 import Numeric.Natural
 import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Lock
-import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgent, SMPClientAgentConfig, newSMPClientAgent)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto (KeyHash (..))
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
@@ -34,7 +33,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
 import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport, VersionRangeSMP, VersionSMP)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport, VersionSMP, VersionRangeSMP)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (SocketState, TransportServerConfig, loadFingerprint, loadTLSServerParams, newSocketState)
 import System.IO (IOMode (..))
 import System.Mem.Weak (Weak)
@@ -80,9 +79,7 @@ data ServerConfig = ServerConfig
     -- | TCP transport config
     transportConfig :: TransportServerConfig,
     -- | run listener on control port
-    controlPort :: Maybe ServiceName,
+    controlPort :: Maybe ServiceName
-    smpAgentCfg :: SMPClientAgentConfig,
-    allowSMPProxy :: Bool -- auth is the same with `newQueueBasicAuth`
   }
 
 defMsgExpirationDays :: Int64
@@ -113,9 +110,8 @@ data Env = Env
     tlsServerParams :: T.ServerParams,
     serverStats :: ServerStats,
     sockets :: SocketState,
-    clientSeq :: TVar ClientId,
+    clientSeq :: TVar Int,
-    clients :: TVar (IntMap Client),
+    clients :: TVar (IntMap Client)
-    proxyAgent :: ProxyAgent -- senders served on this proxy
   }
 
 data Server = Server
@@ -126,14 +122,8 @@ data Server = Server
     savingLock :: Lock
   }
 
-data ProxyAgent = ProxyAgent
-  { smpAgent :: SMPClientAgent
-  }
-
-type ClientId = Int
-
 data Client = Client
-  { clientId :: ClientId,
+  { clientId :: Int,
     subscriptions :: TMap RecipientId (TVar Sub),
     ntfSubscriptions :: TMap NotifierId (),
     rcvQ :: TBQueue (NonEmpty (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd)),
@@ -145,8 +135,7 @@ data Client = Client
     connected :: TVar Bool,
     createdAt :: SystemTime,
     rcvActiveAt :: TVar SystemTime,
-    sndActiveAt :: TVar SystemTime,
+    sndActiveAt :: TVar SystemTime
-    proxyClient_ :: TVar (Maybe C.DhSecretX25519) -- this client is actually an SMP proxy
   }
 
 data SubscriptionThread = NoSub | SubPending | SubThread (Weak ThreadId) | ProhibitSub
@@ -165,7 +154,7 @@ newServer = do
   savingLock <- createLock
   return Server {subscribedQ, subscribers, ntfSubscribedQ, notifiers, savingLock}
 
-newClient :: TVar ClientId -> Natural -> VersionSMP -> ByteString -> SystemTime -> STM Client
+newClient :: TVar Int -> Natural -> VersionSMP -> ByteString -> SystemTime -> STM Client
 newClient nextClientId qSize thVersion sessionId createdAt = do
   clientId <- stateTVar nextClientId $ \next -> (next, next + 1)
   subscriptions <- TM.empty
@@ -177,8 +166,7 @@ newClient nextClientId qSize thVersion sessionId createdAt = do
   connected <- newTVar True
   rcvActiveAt <- newTVar createdAt
   sndActiveAt <- newTVar createdAt
-  proxyClient_ <- newTVar Nothing
+  return Client {clientId, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, endThreads, endThreadSeq, thVersion, sessionId, connected, createdAt, rcvActiveAt, sndActiveAt}
-  return Client {clientId, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, endThreads, endThreadSeq, thVersion, sessionId, connected, createdAt, rcvActiveAt, sndActiveAt, proxyClient_}
 
 newSubscription :: SubscriptionThread -> STM Sub
 newSubscription subThread = do
@@ -186,7 +174,7 @@ newSubscription subThread = do
   return Sub {subThread, delivered}
 
 newEnv :: ServerConfig -> IO Env
-newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile, storeLogFile, smpAgentCfg} = do
+newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile, storeLogFile} = do
   server <- atomically newServer
   queueStore <- atomically newQueueStore
   msgStore <- atomically newMsgStore
@@ -199,8 +187,7 @@ newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile,
   sockets <- atomically newSocketState
   clientSeq <- newTVarIO 0
   clients <- newTVarIO mempty
-  proxyAgent <- atomically $ newSMPProxyAgent smpAgentCfg random
+  return Env {config, server, serverIdentity, queueStore, msgStore, random, storeLog, tlsServerParams, serverStats, sockets, clientSeq, clients}
-  return Env {config, server, serverIdentity, queueStore, msgStore, random, storeLog, tlsServerParams, serverStats, sockets, clientSeq, clients, proxyAgent}
   where
     restoreQueues :: QueueStore -> FilePath -> IO (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
     restoreQueues QueueStore {queues, senders, notifiers} f = do
@@ -216,8 +203,3 @@ newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile,
     addNotifier q = case notifier q of
       Nothing -> id
       Just NtfCreds {notifierId} -> M.insert notifierId (recipientId q)
-
-newSMPProxyAgent :: SMPClientAgentConfig -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ProxyAgent
-newSMPProxyAgent smpAgentCfg random = do
-  smpAgent <- newSMPClientAgent smpAgentCfg random
-  pure ProxyAgent {smpAgent}

src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/Main.hs

@@ -18,8 +18,6 @@ import qualified Data.Text as T
 import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
 import Network.Socket (HostName)
 import Options.Applicative
-import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..))
-import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgentConfig (..), defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BasicAuth (..), ProtoServerWithAuth (ProtoServerWithAuth), pattern SMPServer)
@@ -27,11 +25,10 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server (runSMPServer)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM (ServerConfig (..), defMsgExpirationDays, defaultInactiveClientExpiration, defaultMessageExpiration)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (simplexMQVersion, supportedServerSMPRelayVRange, batchCmdsSMPVersion, sendingProxySMPVersion)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (simplexMQVersion, supportedServerSMPRelayVRange)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (TransportServerConfig (..), defaultTransportServerConfig)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Util (safeDecodeUtf8)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Version (mkVersionRange)
 import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing, doesFileExist)
 import System.FilePath (combine)
 import System.IO (BufferMode (..), hSetBuffering, stderr, stdout)
@@ -216,9 +213,7 @@ smpServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
                 defaultTransportServerConfig
                   { logTLSErrors = fromMaybe False $ iniOnOff "TRANSPORT" "log_tls_errors" ini
                   },
-              controlPort = either (const Nothing) (Just . T.unpack) $ lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "control_port" ini,
+              controlPort = either (const Nothing) (Just . T.unpack) $ lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "control_port" ini
-              smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig {smpCfg = (smpCfg defaultSMPClientAgentConfig) {serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion}},
-              allowSMPProxy = True -- TODO: "get from INI"
             }
 
 data CliCommand
@@ -310,3 +305,4 @@ cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile =
       pure InitOptions {enableStoreLog, logStats, signAlgorithm, ip, fqdn, password, scripted}
     parseBasicAuth :: ReadM ServerPassword
     parseBasicAuth = eitherReader $ fmap ServerPassword . strDecode . B.pack
+

src/Simplex/Messaging/Server/QueueStore/STM.hs

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ addQueue QueueStore {queues, senders} q@QueueRec {recipientId = rId, senderId =
   where
     hasId = (||) <$> TM.member rId queues <*> TM.member sId senders
 
-getQueue :: DirectParty p => QueueStore -> SParty p -> QueueId -> STM (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
+getQueue :: QueueStore -> SParty p -> QueueId -> STM (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
 getQueue QueueStore {queues, senders, notifiers} party qId =
   toResult <$> (mapM readTVar =<< getVar)
   where

src/Simplex/Messaging/Transport.hs

@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
     basicAuthSMPVersion,
     subModeSMPVersion,
     authCmdsSMPVersion,
-    sendingProxySMPVersion,
     simplexMQVersion,
     smpBlockSize,
     TransportConfig (..),
@@ -79,7 +78,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
   )
 where
 
-import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
+import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
 import Control.Monad (forM)
 import Control.Monad.Except
 import Control.Monad.Trans.Except (throwE)
@@ -115,11 +114,6 @@ import UnliftIO.STM
 
 -- * Transport parameters
 
--- min size it works with:
--- unsigned message: 16292 (paddedProxiedMsgLength = 16151, paddedForwardedMsgLength = 16239)
--- Ed448: 16406 (16384 + 22, fails with 21)
--- Ed25519: 16356
--- X25519: 16381
 smpBlockSize :: Int
 smpBlockSize = 16384
 
@@ -155,9 +149,6 @@ subModeSMPVersion = VersionSMP 6
 authCmdsSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
 authCmdsSMPVersion = VersionSMP 7
 
-sendingProxySMPVersion :: VersionSMP
-sendingProxySMPVersion = VersionSMP 8
-
 currentClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
 currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 6
 
@@ -345,14 +336,14 @@ data THandleParams v p = THandleParams
 
 data THandleAuth (p :: TransportPeer) where
   THAuthClient ::
-    { serverPeerPubKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519, -- used only in the client to combine with per-queue key
+    { serverPeerPubKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519, -- used by the client to combine with client's private per-queue key
-      serverCertKey :: (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey), -- the key here is clientPrivKey signed with server certificate
+      serverCertKey :: (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey), -- the key here is serverPeerPubKey signed with server certificate
-      clientPrivKey :: C.PrivateKeyX25519 -- used to combine with peer's per-queue key (currently only in the server)
+      sessSecret :: Maybe C.DhSecretX25519 -- session secret (will be used in SMP proxy only)
     } ->
     THandleAuth 'TClient
   THAuthServer ::
-    { clientPeerPubKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519, -- used only in the client to combine with per-queue key
+    { serverPrivKey :: C.PrivateKeyX25519, -- used by the server to combine with client's public per-queue key
-      serverPrivKey :: C.PrivateKeyX25519 -- used to combine with peer's per-queue key (currently only in the server)
+      sessSecret' :: Maybe C.DhSecretX25519 -- session secret (will be used in SMP proxy only)
     } ->
     THandleAuth 'TServer
 
@@ -363,7 +354,6 @@ data ServerHandshake = ServerHandshake
   { smpVersionRange :: VersionRangeSMP,
     sessionId :: SessionId,
     -- pub key to agree shared secrets for command authorization and entity ID encryption.
-    -- todo C.PublicKeyX25519
     authPubKey :: Maybe (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)
   }
 
@@ -409,7 +399,7 @@ encodeAuthEncryptCmds v k
   | otherwise = ""
 
 authEncryptCmdsP :: VersionSMP -> Parser a -> Parser (Maybe a)
-authEncryptCmdsP v p = if v >= authCmdsSMPVersion then Just <$> p else pure Nothing
+authEncryptCmdsP v p = if v >= authCmdsSMPVersion then optional p else pure Nothing
 
 -- | Error of SMP encrypted transport over TCP.
 data TransportError
@@ -490,8 +480,8 @@ smpServerHandshake serverSignKey c (k, pk) kh smpVRange = do
 -- | Client SMP transport handshake.
 --
 -- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#appendix-a
-smpClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeSMP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleSMP c 'TClient)
+smpClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> Maybe C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeSMP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleSMP c 'TClient)
-smpClientHandshake c (k, pk) keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) smpVRange = do
+smpClientHandshake c ks_ keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) smpVRange = do
   let th@THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId}} = smpTHandle c
   ServerHandshake {sessionId = sessId, smpVersionRange, authPubKey} <- getHandshake th
   if sessionId /= sessId
@@ -506,18 +496,18 @@ smpClientHandshake c (k, pk) keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) smpVRange = do
             serverKey <- getServerVerifyKey c
             pubKey <- C.verifyX509 serverKey exact
             (,certKey) <$> (C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey)
-        sendHandshake th $ ClientHandshake {smpVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = Just k}
+        sendHandshake th $ ClientHandshake {smpVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = fst <$> ks_}
-        pure $ smpThHandleClient th v pk ck_
+        pure $ smpThHandleClient th v (snd <$> ks_) ck_
       Nothing -> throwE $ TEHandshake VERSION
 
 smpThHandleServer :: forall c. THandleSMP c 'TServer -> VersionSMP -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> THandleSMP c 'TServer
 smpThHandleServer th v pk k_ =
-  let thAuth = (\k -> THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey = k, serverPrivKey = pk}) <$> k_
+  let thAuth = THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, sessSecret' = (`C.dh'` pk) <$> k_}
-   in smpThHandle_ th v thAuth
+   in smpThHandle_ th v (Just thAuth)
 
-smpThHandleClient :: forall c. THandleSMP c 'TClient -> VersionSMP -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)) -> THandleSMP c 'TClient
+smpThHandleClient :: forall c. THandleSMP c 'TClient -> VersionSMP -> Maybe C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)) -> THandleSMP c 'TClient
-smpThHandleClient th v pk ck_ =
+smpThHandleClient th v pk_ ck_ =
-  let thAuth = (\(k, ck) -> THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k, serverCertKey = ck, clientPrivKey = pk}) <$> ck_
+  let thAuth = (\(k, ck) -> THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k, serverCertKey = ck, sessSecret = C.dh' k <$> pk_}) <$> ck_
    in smpThHandle_ th v thAuth
 
 smpThHandle_ :: forall c p. THandleSMP c p -> VersionSMP -> Maybe (THandleAuth p) -> THandleSMP c p

src/Simplex/Messaging/Transport/Client.hs

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE NumericUnderscores #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
 
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client
     runTLSTransportClient,
     smpClientHandshake,
     defaultSMPPort,
+    defaultTcpConnectTimeout,
     defaultTransportClientConfig,
     defaultSocksProxy,
     TransportClientConfig (..),
@@ -52,6 +54,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.KeepAlive
 import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, (<$?>), catchAll, tshow)
 import System.IO.Error
+import System.Timeout (timeout)
 import Text.Read (readMaybe)
 import UnliftIO.Exception (IOException)
 import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
@@ -112,6 +115,7 @@ instance IsString (NonEmpty TransportHost) where fromString = parseString strDec
 
 data TransportClientConfig = TransportClientConfig
   { socksProxy :: Maybe SocksProxy,
+    tcpConnectTimeout :: Int,
     tcpKeepAlive :: Maybe KeepAliveOpts,
     logTLSErrors :: Bool,
     clientCredentials :: Maybe (X.CertificateChain, T.PrivKey),
@@ -119,8 +123,12 @@ data TransportClientConfig = TransportClientConfig
   }
   deriving (Eq, Show)
 
+-- time to resolve host, connect socket, set up TLS
+defaultTcpConnectTimeout :: Int
+defaultTcpConnectTimeout = 25_000_000
+
 defaultTransportClientConfig :: TransportClientConfig
-defaultTransportClientConfig = TransportClientConfig Nothing (Just defaultKeepAliveOpts) True Nothing Nothing
+defaultTransportClientConfig = TransportClientConfig Nothing defaultTcpConnectTimeout (Just defaultKeepAliveOpts) True Nothing Nothing
 
 clientTransportConfig :: TransportClientConfig -> TransportConfig
 clientTransportConfig TransportClientConfig {logTLSErrors} =
@@ -131,7 +139,7 @@ runTransportClient :: Transport c => TransportClientConfig -> Maybe ByteString -
 runTransportClient = runTLSTransportClient supportedParameters Nothing
 
 runTLSTransportClient :: Transport c => T.Supported -> Maybe XS.CertificateStore -> TransportClientConfig -> Maybe ByteString -> TransportHost -> ServiceName -> Maybe C.KeyHash -> (c -> IO a) -> IO a
-runTLSTransportClient tlsParams caStore_ cfg@TransportClientConfig {socksProxy, tcpKeepAlive, clientCredentials, alpn} proxyUsername host port keyHash client = do
+runTLSTransportClient tlsParams caStore_ cfg@TransportClientConfig {socksProxy, tcpConnectTimeout, tcpKeepAlive, clientCredentials, alpn} proxyUsername host port keyHash client = do
   serverCert <- newEmptyTMVarIO
   let hostName = B.unpack $ strEncode host
       clientParams = mkTLSClientParams tlsParams caStore_ hostName port keyHash clientCredentials alpn serverCert
@@ -142,13 +150,19 @@ runTLSTransportClient tlsParams caStore_ cfg@TransportClientConfig {socksProxy,
     sock <- connectTCP port
     mapM_ (setSocketKeepAlive sock) tcpKeepAlive `catchAll` \e -> logError ("Error setting TCP keep-alive" <> tshow e)
     let tCfg = clientTransportConfig cfg
-    connectTLS (Just hostName) tCfg clientParams sock >>= \tls -> do
+    tcpConnectTimeout `timeout` connectTLS (Just hostName) tCfg clientParams sock >>= \case
-      chain <- atomically (tryTakeTMVar serverCert) >>= \case
+      Nothing -> do
-        Nothing -> do
+        close sock
-          logError "onServerCertificate didn't fire or failed to get cert chain"
+        logError "connection timed out"
-          closeTLS tls >> error "onServerCertificate failed"
+        fail "connection timed out"
-        Just c -> pure c
+      Just tls -> do
-      getClientConnection tCfg chain tls
+        chain <-
+          atomically (tryTakeTMVar serverCert) >>= \case
+            Nothing -> do
+              logError "onServerCertificate didn't fire or failed to get cert chain"
+              closeTLS tls >> error "onServerCertificate failed"
+            Just c -> pure c
+        getClientConnection tCfg chain tls
   client c `E.finally` closeConnection c
   where
     hostAddr = \case

src/Simplex/Messaging/Transport/HTTP2/Client.hs

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import Numeric.Natural (Natural)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN, SessionId, TLS (tlsALPN), getServerCerts, getServerVerifyKey, tlsUniq)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportClientConfig (..), TransportHost (..), runTLSTransportClient)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportClientConfig (..), TransportHost (..), defaultTcpConnectTimeout, runTLSTransportClient)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
 import Simplex.Messaging.Util (eitherToMaybe)
 import UnliftIO.STM
@@ -70,8 +70,16 @@ defaultHTTP2ClientConfig :: HTTP2ClientConfig
 defaultHTTP2ClientConfig =
   HTTP2ClientConfig
     { qSize = 64,
-      connTimeout = 10000000,
+      connTimeout = defaultTcpConnectTimeout,
-      transportConfig = TransportClientConfig Nothing Nothing True Nothing Nothing,
+      transportConfig =
+        TransportClientConfig
+          { socksProxy = Nothing,
+            tcpConnectTimeout = defaultTcpConnectTimeout,
+            tcpKeepAlive = Nothing,
+            logTLSErrors = True,
+            clientCredentials = Nothing,
+            alpn = Nothing
+          },
       bufferSize = defaultHTTP2BufferSize,
       bodyHeadSize = 16384,
       suportedTLSParams = http2TLSParams

tests/AgentTests.hs

@@ -214,14 +214,13 @@ testDuplexConnection _ alice bob = testDuplexConnection' (alice, IKPQOn) (bob, P
 testDuplexConnection' :: (HasCallStack, Transport c) => (c, InitialKeys) -> (c, PQSupport) -> IO ()
 testDuplexConnection' (alice, aPQ) (bob, bPQ) = do
   let pq = pqConnectionMode aPQ bPQ
-      pqSup = CR.pqEncToSupport pq
   ("1", "bob", Right (INV cReq)) <- alice #: ("1", "bob", "NEW T INV" <> pqConnModeStr aPQ <> " subscribe")
   let cReq' = strEncode cReq
   bob #: ("11", "alice", "JOIN T " <> cReq' <> enableKEMStr bPQ <> " subscribe 14\nbob's connInfo") #> ("11", "alice", OK)
   ("", "bob", Right (A.CONF confId pqSup' _ "bob's connInfo")) <- (alice <#:)
-  pqSup' `shouldBe` pqSup
+  pqSup' `shouldBe` CR.connPQEncryption aPQ
   alice #: ("2", "bob", "LET " <> confId <> " 16\nalice's connInfo") #> ("2", "bob", OK)
-  bob <# ("", "alice", A.INFO pqSup "alice's connInfo")
+  bob <# ("", "alice", A.INFO bPQ "alice's connInfo")
   bob <# ("", "alice", CON pq)
   alice <# ("", "bob", CON pq)
   -- message IDs 1 to 3 get assigned to control messages, so first MSG is assigned ID 4
@@ -253,15 +252,14 @@ testDuplexConnRandomIds _ alice bob = testDuplexConnRandomIds' (alice, IKPQOn) (
 testDuplexConnRandomIds' :: (HasCallStack, Transport c) => (c, InitialKeys) -> (c, PQSupport) -> IO ()
 testDuplexConnRandomIds' (alice, aPQ) (bob, bPQ) = do
   let pq = pqConnectionMode aPQ bPQ
-      pqSup = CR.pqEncToSupport pq
   ("1", bobConn, Right (INV cReq)) <- alice #: ("1", "", "NEW T INV" <> pqConnModeStr aPQ <> " subscribe")
   let cReq' = strEncode cReq
   ("11", aliceConn, Right OK) <- bob #: ("11", "", "JOIN T " <> cReq' <> enableKEMStr bPQ <> " subscribe 14\nbob's connInfo")
   ("", bobConn', Right (A.CONF confId pqSup' _ "bob's connInfo")) <- (alice <#:)
-  pqSup' `shouldBe` pqSup
+  pqSup' `shouldBe` CR.connPQEncryption aPQ
   bobConn' `shouldBe` bobConn
   alice #: ("2", bobConn, "LET " <> confId <> " 16\nalice's connInfo") =#> \case ("2", c, OK) -> c == bobConn; _ -> False
-  bob <# ("", aliceConn, A.INFO pqSup "alice's connInfo")
+  bob <# ("", aliceConn, A.INFO bPQ "alice's connInfo")
   bob <# ("", aliceConn, CON pq)
   alice <# ("", bobConn, CON pq)
   alice #: ("2", bobConn, "SEND F :hello") #> ("2", bobConn, A.MID 4 pq)
@@ -291,17 +289,15 @@ testContactConnection (alice, aPQ) (bob, bPQ) (tom, tPQ) = do
   ("1", "alice_contact", Right (INV cReq)) <- alice #: ("1", "alice_contact", "NEW T CON" <> pqConnModeStr aPQ <> " subscribe")
   let cReq' = strEncode cReq
       abPQ = pqConnectionMode aPQ bPQ
-      abPQSup = CR.pqEncToSupport abPQ
       aPQMode = CR.connPQEncryption aPQ
 
   bob #: ("11", "alice", "JOIN T " <> cReq' <> enableKEMStr bPQ <> " subscribe 14\nbob's connInfo") #> ("11", "alice", OK)
-  ("", "alice_contact", Right (A.REQ aInvId pqSup' _ "bob's connInfo")) <- (alice <#:)
+  ("", "alice_contact", Right (A.REQ aInvId PQSupportOn _ "bob's connInfo")) <- (alice <#:)
-  pqSup' `shouldBe` bPQ
   alice #: ("2", "bob", "ACPT " <> aInvId <> enableKEMStr aPQMode <> " 16\nalice's connInfo") #> ("2", "bob", OK)
   ("", "alice", Right (A.CONF bConfId pqSup'' _ "alice's connInfo")) <- (bob <#:)
-  pqSup'' `shouldBe` abPQSup
+  pqSup'' `shouldBe` bPQ
   bob #: ("12", "alice", "LET " <> bConfId <> " 16\nbob's connInfo 2") #> ("12", "alice", OK)
-  alice <# ("", "bob", A.INFO abPQSup "bob's connInfo 2")
+  alice <# ("", "bob", A.INFO (CR.connPQEncryption aPQ) "bob's connInfo 2")
   alice <# ("", "bob", CON abPQ)
   bob <# ("", "alice", CON abPQ)
   alice #: ("3", "bob", "SEND F :hi") #> ("3", "bob", A.MID 4 abPQ)
@@ -310,15 +306,13 @@ testContactConnection (alice, aPQ) (bob, bPQ) (tom, tPQ) = do
   bob #: ("13", "alice", "ACK 4") #> ("13", "alice", OK)
 
   let atPQ = pqConnectionMode aPQ tPQ
-      atPQSup = CR.pqEncToSupport atPQ
   tom #: ("21", "alice", "JOIN T " <> cReq' <> enableKEMStr tPQ <> " subscribe 14\ntom's connInfo") #> ("21", "alice", OK)
-  ("", "alice_contact", Right (A.REQ aInvId' pqSup3 _ "tom's connInfo")) <- (alice <#:)
+  ("", "alice_contact", Right (A.REQ aInvId' PQSupportOn _ "tom's connInfo")) <- (alice <#:)
-  pqSup3 `shouldBe` tPQ
   alice #: ("4", "tom", "ACPT " <> aInvId' <> enableKEMStr aPQMode <> " 16\nalice's connInfo") #> ("4", "tom", OK)
   ("", "alice", Right (A.CONF tConfId pqSup4 _ "alice's connInfo")) <- (tom <#:)
-  pqSup4 `shouldBe` atPQSup
+  pqSup4 `shouldBe` tPQ
   tom #: ("22", "alice", "LET " <> tConfId <> " 16\ntom's connInfo 2") #> ("22", "alice", OK)
-  alice <# ("", "tom", A.INFO atPQSup "tom's connInfo 2")
+  alice <# ("", "tom", A.INFO (CR.connPQEncryption aPQ) "tom's connInfo 2")
   alice <# ("", "tom", CON atPQ)
   tom <# ("", "alice", CON atPQ)
   alice #: ("5", "tom", "SEND F :hi there") #> ("5", "tom", A.MID 4 atPQ)
@@ -329,22 +323,20 @@ testContactConnection (alice, aPQ) (bob, bPQ) (tom, tPQ) = do
 testContactConnRandomIds :: Transport c => (c, InitialKeys) -> (c, PQSupport) -> IO ()
 testContactConnRandomIds (alice, aPQ) (bob, bPQ) = do
   let pq = pqConnectionMode aPQ bPQ
-      pqSup = CR.pqEncToSupport pq
   ("1", aliceContact, Right (INV cReq)) <- alice #: ("1", "", "NEW T CON" <> pqConnModeStr aPQ <> " subscribe")
   let cReq' = strEncode cReq
 
   ("11", aliceConn, Right OK) <- bob #: ("11", "", "JOIN T " <> cReq' <> enableKEMStr bPQ <> " subscribe 14\nbob's connInfo")
-  ("", aliceContact', Right (A.REQ aInvId pqSup' _ "bob's connInfo")) <- (alice <#:)
+  ("", aliceContact', Right (A.REQ aInvId PQSupportOn _ "bob's connInfo")) <- (alice <#:)
-  pqSup' `shouldBe` bPQ
   aliceContact' `shouldBe` aliceContact
 
   ("2", bobConn, Right OK) <- alice #: ("2", "", "ACPT " <> aInvId <> enableKEMStr (CR.connPQEncryption aPQ) <> " 16\nalice's connInfo")
   ("", aliceConn', Right (A.CONF bConfId pqSup'' _ "alice's connInfo")) <- (bob <#:)
-  pqSup'' `shouldBe` pqSup
+  pqSup'' `shouldBe` bPQ
   aliceConn' `shouldBe` aliceConn
 
   bob #: ("12", aliceConn, "LET " <> bConfId <> " 16\nbob's connInfo 2") #> ("12", aliceConn, OK)
-  alice <# ("", bobConn, A.INFO pqSup "bob's connInfo 2")
+  alice <# ("", bobConn, A.INFO (CR.connPQEncryption aPQ) "bob's connInfo 2")
   alice <# ("", bobConn, CON pq)
   bob <# ("", aliceConn, CON pq)
 
@@ -358,7 +350,7 @@ testRejectContactRequest _ alice bob = do
   ("1", "a_contact", Right (INV cReq)) <- alice #: ("1", "a_contact", "NEW T CON subscribe")
   let cReq' = strEncode cReq
   bob #: ("11", "alice", "JOIN T " <> cReq' <> " subscribe 10\nbob's info") #> ("11", "alice", OK)
-  ("", "a_contact", Right (A.REQ aInvId PQSupportOff _ "bob's info")) <- (alice <#:)
+  ("", "a_contact", Right (A.REQ aInvId PQSupportOn _ "bob's info")) <- (alice <#:)
   -- RJCT must use correct contact connection
   alice #: ("2a", "bob", "RJCT " <> aInvId) #> ("2a", "bob", ERR $ CONN NOT_FOUND)
   alice #: ("2b", "a_contact", "RJCT " <> aInvId) #> ("2b", "a_contact", OK)
@@ -571,12 +563,11 @@ connect' (h1, name1, pqMode1) (h2, name2, pqMode2) = do
   ("c1", _, Right (INV cReq)) <- h1 #: ("c1", name2, "NEW T INV" <> pqConnModeStr pqMode1 <> " subscribe")
   let cReq' = strEncode cReq
       pq = pqConnectionMode pqMode1 pqMode2
-      pqSup = CR.pqEncToSupport pq
   h2 #: ("c2", name1, "JOIN T " <> cReq' <> enableKEMStr pqMode2 <> " subscribe 5\ninfo2") #> ("c2", name1, OK)
   ("", _, Right (A.CONF connId pqSup' _ "info2")) <- (h1 <#:)
-  pqSup' `shouldBe` pqSup
+  pqSup' `shouldBe` CR.connPQEncryption pqMode1
   h1 #: ("c3", name2, "LET " <> connId <> " 5\ninfo1") #> ("c3", name2, OK)
-  h2 <# ("", name1, A.INFO pqSup "info1")
+  h2 <# ("", name1, A.INFO pqMode2 "info1")
   h2 <# ("", name1, CON pq)
   h1 <# ("", name2, CON pq)
 

tests/AgentTests/ConnectionRequestTests.hs

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ testE2ERatchetParams :: RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448
 testE2ERatchetParams = E2ERatchetParamsUri (mkVersionRange (VersionE2E 1) (VersionE2E 1)) testDhPubKey testDhPubKey Nothing
 
 testE2ERatchetParams12 :: RcvE2ERatchetParamsUri 'C.X448
-testE2ERatchetParams12 = E2ERatchetParamsUri (supportedE2EEncryptVRange PQSupportOn) testDhPubKey testDhPubKey Nothing
+testE2ERatchetParams12 = E2ERatchetParamsUri supportedE2EEncryptVRange testDhPubKey testDhPubKey Nothing
 
 connectionRequest :: AConnectionRequestUri
 connectionRequest =
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ connectionRequestCurrentRange :: AConnectionRequestUri
 connectionRequestCurrentRange =
   ACR SCMInvitation $
     CRInvitationUri
-      connReqData {crAgentVRange = supportedSMPAgentVRange PQSupportOn, crSmpQueues = [queueV1, queueV1]}
+      connReqData {crAgentVRange = supportedSMPAgentVRange, crSmpQueues = [queueV1, queueV1]}
       testE2ERatchetParams12
 
 connectionRequestClientDataEmpty :: AConnectionRequestUri

tests/AgentTests/DoubleRatchetTests.hs

@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ fullMsgLen :: Ratchet a -> Int
 fullMsgLen Ratchet {rcSupportKEM, rcVersion} = headerLenLength + fullHeaderLen v rcSupportKEM + C.authTagSize + paddedMsgLen
   where
     v = current rcVersion
-    headerLenLength = case rcSupportKEM of
+    headerLenLength
-      PQSupportOn | v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion -> 3 -- two bytes are added because of two Large used in new encoding
+      | v >= pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion = 3 -- two bytes are added because of two Large used in new encoding
-      _ -> 1
+      | otherwise = 1
 
 testMessageHeader :: forall a. AlgorithmI a => VersionE2E -> C.SAlgorithm a -> Expectation
 testMessageHeader v _ = do
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ initRatchets = do
   Right paramsBob <- pure $ pqX3dhSnd pkBob1 pkBob2 Nothing e2eAlice
   Right paramsAlice <- runExceptT $ pqX3dhRcv pkAlice1 pkAlice2 Nothing e2eBob
   (_, pkBob3) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
-  let vs = testRatchetVersions PQSupportOff
+  let vs = testRatchetVersions
       bob = initSndRatchet vs (C.publicKey pkAlice2) pkBob3 paramsBob
       alice = initRcvRatchet vs pkAlice2 paramsAlice PQSupportOff
   pure (alice, bob, encrypt' noSndKEM, decrypt' noRcvKEM, (\#>))
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ initRatchetsKEMProposed = do
   Right paramsBob <- pure $ pqX3dhSnd pkBob1 pkBob2 pKemParams_ e2eAlice
   Right paramsAlice <- runExceptT $ pqX3dhRcv pkAlice1 pkAlice2 Nothing e2eBob
   (_, pkBob3) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
-  let vs = testRatchetVersions PQSupportOn
+  let vs = testRatchetVersions
       bob = initSndRatchet vs (C.publicKey pkAlice2) pkBob3 paramsBob
       alice = initRcvRatchet vs pkAlice2 paramsAlice PQSupportOn
   pure (alice, bob, encrypt' hasSndKEM, decrypt' hasRcvKEM, (!#>))
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ initRatchetsKEMAccepted = do
   Right paramsBob <- pure $ pqX3dhSnd pkBob1 pkBob2 pKemParams_ e2eAlice
   Right paramsAlice <- runExceptT $ pqX3dhRcv pkAlice1 pkAlice2 pKem_ e2eBob
   (_, pkBob3) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
-  let vs = testRatchetVersions PQSupportOn
+  let vs = testRatchetVersions
       bob = initSndRatchet vs (C.publicKey pkAlice2) pkBob3 paramsBob
       alice = initRcvRatchet vs pkAlice2 paramsAlice PQSupportOn
   pure (alice, bob, encrypt' hasSndKEM, decrypt' hasRcvKEM, (!#>))
@@ -572,14 +572,14 @@ initRatchetsKEMProposedAgain = do
   Right paramsBob <- pure $ pqX3dhSnd pkBob1 pkBob2 pKemParams_ e2eAlice
   Right paramsAlice <- runExceptT $ pqX3dhRcv pkAlice1 pkAlice2 pKem_ e2eBob
   (_, pkBob3) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
-  let vs = testRatchetVersions PQSupportOn
+  let vs = testRatchetVersions
       bob = initSndRatchet vs (C.publicKey pkAlice2) pkBob3 paramsBob
       alice = initRcvRatchet vs pkAlice2 paramsAlice PQSupportOn
   pure (alice, bob, encrypt' hasSndKEM, decrypt' hasRcvKEM, (!#>))
 
-testRatchetVersions :: PQSupport -> RatchetVersions
+testRatchetVersions :: RatchetVersions
-testRatchetVersions pq =
+testRatchetVersions =
-  let v = maxVersion $ supportedE2EEncryptVRange pq
+  let v = maxVersion supportedE2EEncryptVRange
    in RatchetVersions v v
 
 encrypt_ :: AlgorithmI a => Maybe PQEncryption -> (TVar ChaChaDRG, Ratchet a, SkippedMsgKeys) -> ByteString -> IO (Either CryptoError (ByteString, Ratchet a, SkippedMsgDiff))

tests/AgentTests/FunctionalAPITests.hs

@@ -187,9 +187,9 @@ agentCfgVPrev :: AgentConfig
 agentCfgVPrev =
   agentCfg
     { sndAuthAlg = C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519,
-      smpAgentVRange = \_ -> prevRange $ smpAgentVRange agentCfg PQSupportOff,
+      smpAgentVRange = prevRange $ smpAgentVRange agentCfg,
       smpClientVRange = prevRange $ smpClientVRange agentCfg,
-      e2eEncryptVRange = \_ -> prevRange $ e2eEncryptVRange agentCfg PQSupportOff,
+      e2eEncryptVRange = prevRange $ e2eEncryptVRange agentCfg,
       smpCfg = smpCfgVPrev
     }
 
@@ -198,14 +198,14 @@ agentCfgV7 :: AgentConfig
 agentCfgV7 =
   agentCfg
     { sndAuthAlg = C.AuthAlg C.SX25519,
-      smpAgentVRange = \_ -> V.mkVersionRange duplexHandshakeSMPAgentVersion $ max pqdrSMPAgentVersion currentSMPAgentVersion,
+      smpAgentVRange = V.mkVersionRange duplexHandshakeSMPAgentVersion $ max pqdrSMPAgentVersion currentSMPAgentVersion,
-      e2eEncryptVRange = \_ -> V.mkVersionRange CR.kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion $ max CR.pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion CR.currentE2EEncryptVersion,
+      e2eEncryptVRange = V.mkVersionRange CR.kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion $ max CR.pqRatchetE2EEncryptVersion CR.currentE2EEncryptVersion,
       smpCfg = smpCfgV7,
       ntfCfg = ntfCfgV2
     }
 
 agentCfgRatchetVPrev :: AgentConfig
-agentCfgRatchetVPrev = agentCfg {e2eEncryptVRange = \_ -> prevRange $ e2eEncryptVRange agentCfg PQSupportOff}
+agentCfgRatchetVPrev = agentCfg {e2eEncryptVRange = prevRange $ e2eEncryptVRange agentCfg}
 
 prevRange :: VersionRange v -> VersionRange v
 prevRange vr = vr {maxVersion = max (minVersion vr) (prevVersion $ maxVersion vr)}
@@ -546,28 +546,27 @@ testEnablePQEncryption =
     (a, 4, "msg 1") \#>\ b
     (b, 5, "msg 2") \#>\ a
     -- 45 bytes is used by agent message envelope inside double ratchet message envelope
-    let largeMsg g' pqEnc = atomically $ C.randomBytes (e2eEncUserMsgLength pqdrSMPAgentVersion pqEnc - 45) g'
+    let largeMsg g' pqEnc = atomically $ C.randomBytes (e2eEncAgentMsgLength pqdrSMPAgentVersion pqEnc - 45) g'
     lrg <- largeMsg g PQSupportOff
     (a, 6, lrg) \#>\ b
     (b, 7, lrg) \#>\ a
-    -- enabling PQ encryption
-    (a, 8, lrg) \#>! b
-    (b, 9, lrg) \#>! a
     -- switched to smaller envelopes (before reporting PQ encryption enabled)
     sml <- largeMsg g PQSupportOn
     -- fail because of message size
     Left (A.CMD LARGE) <- tryError $ A.sendMessage ca bId PQEncOn SMP.noMsgFlags lrg
-    (11, PQEncOff) <- A.sendMessage ca bId PQEncOn SMP.noMsgFlags sml
+    (9, PQEncOff) <- A.sendMessage ca bId PQEncOn SMP.noMsgFlags sml
-    get ca =##> \case ("", connId, SENT 11) -> connId == bId; _ -> False
+    get ca =##> \case ("", connId, SENT 9) -> connId == bId; _ -> False
-    get cb =##> \case ("", connId, MsgErr' 10 MsgSkipped {} PQEncOff msg') -> connId == aId && msg' == sml; _ -> False
+    get cb =##> \case ("", connId, MsgErr' 8 MsgSkipped {} PQEncOff msg') -> connId == aId && msg' == sml; _ -> False
-    ackMessage cb aId 10 Nothing
+    ackMessage cb aId 8 Nothing
     -- -- fail in reply to sync IDss
     Left (A.CMD LARGE) <- tryError $ A.sendMessage cb aId PQEncOn SMP.noMsgFlags lrg
-    (12, PQEncOn) <- A.sendMessage cb aId PQEncOn SMP.noMsgFlags sml
+    (10, PQEncOff) <- A.sendMessage cb aId PQEncOn SMP.noMsgFlags sml
-    get cb =##> \case ("", connId, SENT 12) -> connId == aId; _ -> False
+    get cb =##> \case ("", connId, SENT 10) -> connId == aId; _ -> False
-    get ca =##> \case ("", connId, MsgErr' 12 MsgSkipped {} PQEncOn msg') -> connId == bId && msg' == sml; _ -> False
+    get ca =##> \case ("", connId, MsgErr' 10 MsgSkipped {} PQEncOff msg') -> connId == bId && msg' == sml; _ -> False
-    ackMessage ca bId 12 Nothing
+    ackMessage ca bId 10 Nothing
+    (a, 11, sml) \#>! b
     -- PQ encryption now enabled
+    (b, 12, sml) !#>! a
     (a, 13, sml) !#>! b
     (b, 14, sml) !#>! a
     -- disabling PQ encryption
@@ -797,8 +796,8 @@ testAllowConnectionClientRestart t = do
 
 testIncreaseConnAgentVersion :: HasCallStack => ATransport -> IO ()
 testIncreaseConnAgentVersion t = do
-  alice <- getSMPAgentClient' 1 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = \_ -> mkVersionRange 1 2} initAgentServers testDB
+  alice <- getSMPAgentClient' 1 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 1 2} initAgentServers testDB
-  bob <- getSMPAgentClient' 2 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = \_ -> mkVersionRange 1 2} initAgentServers testDB2
+  bob <- getSMPAgentClient' 2 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 1 2} initAgentServers testDB2
   withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn t testPort $ \_ -> do
     (aliceId, bobId) <- runRight $ do
       (aliceId, bobId) <- makeConnection_ PQSupportOff alice bob
@@ -810,7 +809,7 @@ testIncreaseConnAgentVersion t = do
     -- version doesn't increase if incompatible
 
     disposeAgentClient alice
-    alice2 <- getSMPAgentClient' 3 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = \_ -> mkVersionRange 1 3} initAgentServers testDB
+    alice2 <- getSMPAgentClient' 3 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 1 3} initAgentServers testDB
 
     runRight_ $ do
       subscribeConnection alice2 bobId
@@ -821,7 +820,7 @@ testIncreaseConnAgentVersion t = do
     -- version increases if compatible
 
     disposeAgentClient bob
-    bob2 <- getSMPAgentClient' 4 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = \_ -> mkVersionRange 1 3} initAgentServers testDB2
+    bob2 <- getSMPAgentClient' 4 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 1 3} initAgentServers testDB2
 
     runRight_ $ do
       subscribeConnection bob2 aliceId
@@ -832,7 +831,7 @@ testIncreaseConnAgentVersion t = do
     -- version doesn't decrease, even if incompatible
 
     disposeAgentClient alice2
-    alice3 <- getSMPAgentClient' 5 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = \_ -> mkVersionRange 2 2} initAgentServers testDB
+    alice3 <- getSMPAgentClient' 5 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 2 2} initAgentServers testDB
 
     runRight_ $ do
       subscribeConnection alice3 bobId
@@ -841,7 +840,7 @@ testIncreaseConnAgentVersion t = do
       checkVersion bob2 aliceId 3
 
     disposeAgentClient bob2
-    bob3 <- getSMPAgentClient' 6 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = \_ -> mkVersionRange 1 1} initAgentServers testDB2
+    bob3 <- getSMPAgentClient' 6 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 1 1} initAgentServers testDB2
 
     runRight_ $ do
       subscribeConnection bob3 aliceId
@@ -858,8 +857,8 @@ checkVersion c connId v = do
 
 testIncreaseConnAgentVersionMaxCompatible :: HasCallStack => ATransport -> IO ()
 testIncreaseConnAgentVersionMaxCompatible t = do
-  alice <- getSMPAgentClient' 1 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = \_ -> mkVersionRange 1 2} initAgentServers testDB
+  alice <- getSMPAgentClient' 1 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 1 2} initAgentServers testDB
-  bob <- getSMPAgentClient' 2 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = \_ -> mkVersionRange 1 2} initAgentServers testDB2
+  bob <- getSMPAgentClient' 2 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 1 2} initAgentServers testDB2
   withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn t testPort $ \_ -> do
     (aliceId, bobId) <- runRight $ do
       (aliceId, bobId) <- makeConnection_ PQSupportOff alice bob
@@ -871,7 +870,7 @@ testIncreaseConnAgentVersionMaxCompatible t = do
     -- version increases to max compatible
 
     disposeAgentClient alice
-    alice2 <- getSMPAgentClient' 3 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = \_ -> mkVersionRange 1 3} initAgentServers testDB
+    alice2 <- getSMPAgentClient' 3 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 1 3} initAgentServers testDB
     disposeAgentClient bob
     bob2 <- getSMPAgentClient' 4 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = supportedSMPAgentVRange} initAgentServers testDB2
 
@@ -886,8 +885,8 @@ testIncreaseConnAgentVersionMaxCompatible t = do
 
 testIncreaseConnAgentVersionStartDifferentVersion :: HasCallStack => ATransport -> IO ()
 testIncreaseConnAgentVersionStartDifferentVersion t = do
-  alice <- getSMPAgentClient' 1 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = \_ -> mkVersionRange 1 2} initAgentServers testDB
+  alice <- getSMPAgentClient' 1 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 1 2} initAgentServers testDB
-  bob <- getSMPAgentClient' 2 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = \_ -> mkVersionRange 1 3} initAgentServers testDB2
+  bob <- getSMPAgentClient' 2 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 1 3} initAgentServers testDB2
   withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn t testPort $ \_ -> do
     (aliceId, bobId) <- runRight $ do
       (aliceId, bobId) <- makeConnection_ PQSupportOff alice bob
@@ -899,7 +898,7 @@ testIncreaseConnAgentVersionStartDifferentVersion t = do
     -- version increases to max compatible
 
     disposeAgentClient alice
-    alice2 <- getSMPAgentClient' 3 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = \_ -> mkVersionRange 1 3} initAgentServers testDB
+    alice2 <- getSMPAgentClient' 3 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 1 3} initAgentServers testDB
 
     runRight_ $ do
       subscribeConnection alice2 bobId
@@ -2454,8 +2453,8 @@ testDeliveryReceipts =
 
 testDeliveryReceiptsVersion :: HasCallStack => ATransport -> IO ()
 testDeliveryReceiptsVersion t = do
-  a <- getSMPAgentClient' 1 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = \_ -> mkVersionRange 1 3} initAgentServers testDB
+  a <- getSMPAgentClient' 1 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 1 3} initAgentServers testDB
-  b <- getSMPAgentClient' 2 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = \_ -> mkVersionRange 1 3} initAgentServers testDB2
+  b <- getSMPAgentClient' 2 agentCfg {smpAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 1 3} initAgentServers testDB2
   withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn t testPort $ \_ -> do
     (aId, bId) <- runRight $ do
       (aId, bId) <- makeConnection_ PQSupportOff a b
@@ -2482,8 +2481,8 @@ testDeliveryReceiptsVersion t = do
       subscribeConnection a' bId
       subscribeConnection b' aId
       exchangeGreetingsMsgId_ PQEncOff 6 a' bId b' aId
-      checkVersion a' bId 4
+      checkVersion a' bId 5
-      checkVersion b' aId 4
+      checkVersion b' aId 5
       (8, PQEncOff) <- A.sendMessage a' bId PQEncOn SMP.noMsgFlags "hello"
       get a' ##> ("", bId, SENT 8)
       get b' =##> \case ("", c, Msg' 8 PQEncOff "hello") -> c == aId; _ -> False

tests/CoreTests/BatchingTests.hs

@@ -281,12 +281,12 @@ randomSUB_ :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => C.SAlgorithm a -> VersionSM
 randomSUB_ a v sessId = do
   g <- C.newRandom
   rId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 24 g
-  nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
+  corrId <- atomically $ CorrId <$> C.randomBytes 24 g
   (rKey, rpKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair a g
   thAuth_ <- testTHandleAuth v g rKey
   let thParams = testTHandleParams v sessId
-      TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, rId, Cmd SRecipient SUB)
+      TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, rId, Cmd SRecipient SUB)
-  pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just rpKey) nonce tForAuth
+  pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just rpKey) corrId tForAuth
 
 randomSUBCmd :: ProtocolClient SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg -> IO (PCTransmission ErrorType BrokerMsg)
 randomSUBCmd = randomSUBCmd_ C.SEd25519
@@ -311,13 +311,13 @@ randomSEND_ :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => C.SAlgorithm a -> VersionS
 randomSEND_ a v sessId len = do
   g <- C.newRandom
   sId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 24 g
-  nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
+  corrId <- atomically $ CorrId <$> C.randomBytes 3 g
   (sKey, spKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair a g
   thAuth_ <- testTHandleAuth v g sKey
   msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes len g
   let thParams = testTHandleParams v sessId
-      TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, sId, Cmd SSender $ SEND noMsgFlags msg)
+      TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, sId, Cmd SSender $ SEND noMsgFlags msg)
-  pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just spKey) nonce tForAuth
+  pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just spKey) corrId tForAuth
 
 testTHandleParams :: VersionSMP -> ByteString -> THandleParams SMPVersion 'TClient
 testTHandleParams v sessionId =
@@ -333,14 +333,13 @@ testTHandleParams v sessionId =
 testTHandleAuth :: VersionSMP -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> C.APublicAuthKey -> IO (Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient))
 testTHandleAuth v g (C.APublicAuthKey a serverPeerPubKey) = case a of
   C.SX25519 | v >= authCmdsSMPVersion -> do
-    (_, clientPrivKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.X25519 g
     ca <- head <$> XS.readCertificates "tests/fixtures/ca.crt"
     serverCert <- head <$> XS.readCertificates "tests/fixtures/server.crt"
     serverKey <- head <$> XF.readKeyFile "tests/fixtures/server.key"
     signKey <- either error pure $ C.x509ToPrivate (serverKey, []) >>= C.privKey @C.APrivateSignKey
     (serverAuthPub, _) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.X25519 g
     let serverCertKey = (X.CertificateChain [serverCert, ca], C.signX509 signKey $ C.toPubKey C.publicToX509 serverAuthPub)
-    pure $ Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey, serverCertKey, clientPrivKey}
+    pure $ Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey, serverCertKey, sessSecret = Nothing}
   _ -> pure Nothing
 
 randomSENDCmd :: ProtocolClient SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg -> Int -> IO (PCTransmission ErrorType BrokerMsg)

tests/CoreTests/ProtocolErrorTests.hs

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
 {-# OPTIONS_GHC -Wno-orphans #-}
 
 module CoreTests.ProtocolErrorTests where
@@ -13,10 +14,9 @@ import GHC.Generics (Generic)
 import Generic.Random (genericArbitraryU)
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
-import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol as Agent
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
-import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CommandError (..), ErrorType (..), ProxyError (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CommandError (..), ErrorType (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (HandshakeError (..), TransportError (..))
 import Simplex.RemoteControl.Types (RCErrorType (..))
 import Test.Hspec
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ protocolErrorTests = modifyMaxSuccess (const 1000) $ do
         || strDecode (strEncode err) == Right err
   where
     errHasSpaces = \case
-      BROKER srv (Agent.RESPONSE e) -> hasSpaces srv || hasSpaces e
+      BROKER srv (RESPONSE e) -> hasSpaces srv || hasSpaces e
       BROKER srv _ -> hasSpaces srv
       _ -> False
     hasSpaces s = ' ' `B.elem` encodeUtf8 (T.pack s)
@@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ deriving instance Generic ErrorType
 
 deriving instance Generic CommandError
 
-deriving instance Generic ProxyError
-
 deriving instance Generic TransportError
 
 deriving instance Generic HandshakeError
@@ -80,8 +78,6 @@ instance Arbitrary ErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
 
 instance Arbitrary CommandError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
 
-instance Arbitrary ProxyError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
-
 instance Arbitrary TransportError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
 
 instance Arbitrary HandshakeError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU

tests/NtfClient.hs

@@ -73,10 +73,8 @@ ntfTestStoreLogFile = "tests/tmp/ntf-server-store.log"
 testNtfClient :: Transport c => (THandleNTF c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
 testNtfClient client = do
   Right host <- pure $ chooseTransportHost defaultNetworkConfig testHost
-  runTransportClient defaultTransportClientConfig Nothing host ntfTestPort (Just testKeyHash) $ \h -> do
+  runTransportClient defaultTransportClientConfig Nothing host ntfTestPort (Just testKeyHash) $ \h ->
-    g <- C.newRandom
+    runExceptT (ntfClientHandshake h testKeyHash supportedClientNTFVRange) >>= \case
-    ks <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
-    runExceptT (ntfClientHandshake h ks testKeyHash supportedClientNTFVRange) >>= \case
       Right th -> client th
       Left e -> error $ show e
 

tests/SMPAgentClient.hs

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
 import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Server (runSMPAgentBlocking)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite (MigrationConfirmation (..), SQLiteStore (dbNew))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Common (withTransaction')
-import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..), chooseTransportHost, defaultSMPClientConfig, defaultNetworkConfig)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..), chooseTransportHost, defaultNetworkConfig, defaultSMPClientConfig)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Client (defaultNTFClientConfig)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parseAll)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (NtfServer, ProtoServerWithAuth)
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ agentCfg =
       certificateFile = "tests/fixtures/server.crt"
     }
   where
-    networkConfig = defaultNetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout = 3_000_000, tcpTimeout = 2_000_000}
+    networkConfig = defaultNetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout = 1_000_000, tcpTimeout = 2_000_000}
 
 fastRetryInterval :: RetryInterval
 fastRetryInterval = defaultReconnectInterval {initialInterval = 50_000}

tests/SMPClient.hs

@@ -16,8 +16,7 @@ import Control.Monad.Except (runExceptT)
 import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
 import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
 import Network.Socket
-import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..), chooseTransportHost, defaultNetworkConfig)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Client (chooseTransportHost, defaultNetworkConfig)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgentConfig (..), defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
@@ -74,14 +73,8 @@ testSMPClient = testSMPClientVR supportedClientSMPRelayVRange
 testSMPClientVR :: Transport c => VersionRangeSMP -> (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
 testSMPClientVR vr client = do
   Right useHost <- pure $ chooseTransportHost defaultNetworkConfig testHost
-  testSMPClient_ useHost testPort vr client
+  runTransportClient defaultTransportClientConfig Nothing useHost testPort (Just testKeyHash) $ \h ->
-
+    runExceptT (smpClientHandshake h Nothing testKeyHash vr) >>= \case
-testSMPClient_ :: Transport c => TransportHost -> ServiceName -> VersionRangeSMP -> (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
-testSMPClient_ host port vr client = do
-  runTransportClient defaultTransportClientConfig Nothing host port (Just testKeyHash) $ \h -> do
-    g <- C.newRandom
-    ks <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
-    runExceptT (smpClientHandshake h ks testKeyHash vr) >>= \case
       Right th -> client th
       Left e -> error $ show e
 
@@ -112,22 +105,12 @@ cfg =
       certificateFile = "tests/fixtures/server.crt",
       smpServerVRange = supportedServerSMPRelayVRange,
       transportConfig = defaultTransportServerConfig,
-      controlPort = Nothing,
+      controlPort = Nothing
-      smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig,
-      allowSMPProxy = False
     }
 
 cfgV7 :: ServerConfig
 cfgV7 = cfg {smpServerVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion authCmdsSMPVersion}
 
-proxyCfg :: ServerConfig
-proxyCfg =
-  cfgV7
-    { allowSMPProxy = True, 
-      smpServerVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion,
-      smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig {smpCfg = (smpCfg defaultSMPClientAgentConfig) {serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion}}
-    }
-
 withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn :: HasCallStack => ATransport -> ServiceName -> (HasCallStack => ThreadId -> IO a) -> IO a
 withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn t = withSmpServerConfigOn t cfg {storeLogFile = Just testStoreLogFile, storeMsgsFile = Just testStoreMsgsFile, serverStatsBackupFile = Just testServerStatsBackupFile}
 

tests/SMPProxyTests.hs

@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
-{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
-{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
-{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
-{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
-{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
-{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
-{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
-{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
-
-module SMPProxyTests where
-
-import AgentTests.FunctionalAPITests (runRight_)
-import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
-import SMPAgentClient (testSMPServer, testSMPServer2)
-import SMPClient
-import qualified SMPClient as SMP
-import ServerTests (decryptMsgV3, sendRecv)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Client
-import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
-import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
-import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM (ServerConfig (..))
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
-import Simplex.Messaging.Version (mkVersionRange)
-import Test.Hspec
-import UnliftIO
-
-smpProxyTests :: Spec
-smpProxyTests = do
-  describe "server configuration" $ do
-    it "refuses proxy handshake unless enabled" testNoProxy
-    it "checks basic auth in proxy requests" testProxyAuth
-  describe "proxy requests" $ do
-    describe "bad relay URIs" $ do
-      xit "host not resolved" todo
-      xit "when SMP port blackholed" todo
-      xit "no SMP service at host/port" todo
-      xit "bad SMP fingerprint" todo
-    xit "batching proxy requests" todo
-  describe "forwarding requests" $ do
-    describe "deliver message via SMP proxy" $ do
-      it "same server" $
-        withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ -> do
-          let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
-          let relayServ = proxyServ
-          deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
-      it "different servers" $
-        withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ ->
-          withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfgV7 testPort2 $ \_ -> do
-            let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
-            let relayServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort2 SMP.testKeyHash
-            deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
-      xit "max message size, Ed448 keys" $
-        withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ ->
-          withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfgV7 testPort2 $ \_ -> do
-            g <- C.newRandom
-            msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
-            msg' <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
-            let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
-            let relayServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort2 SMP.testKeyHash
-            deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd448 msg msg'
-      it "max message size, Ed25519 keys" $
-        withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ ->
-          withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfgV7 testPort2 $ \_ -> do
-            g <- C.newRandom
-            msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
-            msg' <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
-            let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
-            let relayServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort2 SMP.testKeyHash
-            deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd25519 msg msg'
-      it "max message size, X25519 keys" $
-        withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ ->
-          withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfgV7 testPort2 $ \_ -> do
-            g <- C.newRandom
-            msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
-            msg' <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
-            let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
-            let relayServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort2 SMP.testKeyHash
-            deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SX25519 msg msg'
-    xit "sender-proxy-relay-recipient works" todo
-    xit "similar timing for proxied and direct sends" todo
-
-deliverMessageViaProxy :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => SMPServer -> SMPServer -> C.SAlgorithm a -> ByteString -> ByteString -> IO ()
-deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ alg msg msg' = do
-  g <- C.newRandom
-  -- set up proxy
-  Right pc <- getProtocolClient g (1, proxyServ, Nothing) defaultSMPClientConfig {serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion} Nothing (\_ -> pure ())
-  THAuthClient {} <- maybe (fail "getProtocolClient returned no thAuth") pure $ thAuth $ thParams pc
-  -- set up relay
-  msgQ <- newTBQueueIO 4
-  Right rc <- getProtocolClient g (2, relayServ, Nothing) defaultSMPClientConfig {serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion authCmdsSMPVersion} (Just msgQ) (\_ -> pure ())
-  runRight_ $ do
-    -- prepare receiving queue
-    (rPub, rPriv) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair alg g
-    (rdhPub, rdhPriv :: C.PrivateKeyX25519) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
-    QIK {rcvId, sndId, rcvPublicDhKey = srvDh} <- createSMPQueue rc (rPub, rPriv) rdhPub (Just "correct") SMSubscribe
-    let dec = decryptMsgV3 $ C.dh' srvDh rdhPriv
-    -- get proxy session
-    (sessId, v, relayKey) <- createSMPProxySession pc relayServ (Just "correct")
-    -- send via proxy to unsecured queue
-    proxySMPMessage pc sessId v relayKey Nothing sndId noMsgFlags msg
-    -- receive 1
-    (_tSess, _v, _sid, _ety, MSG RcvMessage {msgId, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody encBody}) <- atomically $ readTBQueue msgQ
-    liftIO $ dec msgId encBody `shouldBe` Right msg
-    ackSMPMessage rc rPriv rcvId msgId
-    -- secure queue
-    (sPub, sPriv) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair alg g
-    secureSMPQueue rc rPriv rcvId sPub
-    -- send via proxy to secured queue
-    proxySMPMessage pc sessId v relayKey (Just sPriv) sndId noMsgFlags msg'
-    -- receive 2
-    (_tSess, _v, _sid, _ety, MSG RcvMessage {msgId = msgId', msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody encBody'}) <- atomically $ readTBQueue msgQ
-    liftIO $ dec msgId' encBody' `shouldBe` Right msg'
-    ackSMPMessage rc rPriv rcvId msgId'
-
-proxyVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
-proxyVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion
-
-testNoProxy :: IO ()
-testNoProxy = do
-  withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfg testPort2 $ \_ -> do
-    testSMPClient_ "127.0.0.1" testPort2 proxyVRange $ \(th :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient) -> do
-      (_, _, (_corrId, _entityId, reply)) <- sendRecv th (Nothing, "0", "", PRXY testSMPServer Nothing)
-      reply `shouldBe` Right (ERR AUTH)
-
-testProxyAuth :: IO ()
-testProxyAuth = do
-  withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfgAuth testPort $ \_ -> do
-    testSMPClient_ "127.0.0.1" testPort proxyVRange $ \(th :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient) -> do
-      (_, _s, (_corrId, _entityId, reply)) <- sendRecv th (Nothing, "0", "", PRXY testSMPServer2 $ Just "wrong")
-      reply `shouldBe` Right (ERR AUTH)
-  where
-    proxyCfgAuth = proxyCfg {newQueueBasicAuth = Just "correct"}
-
-todo :: IO ()
-todo = do
-  fail "TODO"

tests/ServerTests.hs

@@ -931,6 +931,8 @@ instance Eq C.ASignature where
     Just Refl -> s == s'
     _ -> False
 
+deriving instance Eq (C.Signature a)
+
 syntaxTests :: ATransport -> Spec
 syntaxTests (ATransport t) = do
   it "unknown command" $ ("", "abcd", "1234", ('H', 'E', 'L', 'L', 'O')) >#> ("", "abcd", "1234", ERR $ CMD UNKNOWN)

tests/Test.hs

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ import GHC.IO.Exception (IOException (..))
 import qualified GHC.IO.Exception as IOException
 import NtfServerTests (ntfServerTests)
 import RemoteControl (remoteControlTests)
-import SMPProxyTests (smpProxyTests)
 import ServerTests
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (TLS, Transport (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets (WS)
@@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ main = do
       $ do
         describe "Agent SQLite schema dump" schemaDumpTest
         describe "Core tests" $ do
-          xdescribe "Batching tests" batchingTests
+          describe "Batching tests" batchingTests
           describe "Encoding tests" encodingTests
           describe "Protocol error tests" protocolErrorTests
           describe "Version range" versionRangeTests
@@ -60,7 +59,6 @@ main = do
         describe "SMP server via WebSockets" $ serverTests (transport @WS)
         describe "Notifications server" $ ntfServerTests (transport @TLS)
         describe "SMP client agent" $ agentTests (transport @TLS)
-        describe "SMP proxy" smpProxyTests
         describe "XFTP" $ do
           describe "XFTP server" xftpServerTests
           describe "XFTP file description" fileDescriptionTests

tests/XFTPClient.hs

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server (runXFTPServerBlocking)
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), defaultFileExpiration, defaultInactiveClientExpiration, supportedXFTPhandshakes)
-import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (XFTPServer)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server
@@ -133,8 +132,7 @@ testXFTPClient :: HasCallStack => (HasCallStack => XFTPClient -> IO a) -> IO a
 testXFTPClient = testXFTPClientWith testXFTPClientConfig
 
 testXFTPClientWith :: HasCallStack => XFTPClientConfig -> (HasCallStack => XFTPClient -> IO a) -> IO a
-testXFTPClientWith cfg client = do
+testXFTPClientWith cfg client =
-  g <- C.newRandom
+  getXFTPClient (1, testXFTPServer, Nothing) cfg (\_ -> pure ()) >>= \case
-  getXFTPClient g (1, testXFTPServer, Nothing) cfg (\_ -> pure ()) >>= \case
     Right c -> client c
     Left e -> error $ show e

tests/XFTPServerTests.hs

@@ -219,8 +219,7 @@ testFileChunkExpiration = withXFTPServerCfg testXFTPServerConfig {fileExpiration
 testInactiveClientExpiration :: Expectation
 testInactiveClientExpiration = withXFTPServerCfg testXFTPServerConfig {inactiveClientExpiration} $ \_ -> runRight_ $ do
   disconnected <- newEmptyTMVarIO
-  g <- liftIO C.newRandom
+  c <- ExceptT $ getXFTPClient (1, testXFTPServer, Nothing) testXFTPClientConfig (\_ -> atomically $ putTMVar disconnected ())
-  c <- ExceptT $ getXFTPClient g (1, testXFTPServer, Nothing) testXFTPClientConfig (\_ -> atomically $ putTMVar disconnected ())
   pingXFTP c
   liftIO $ do
     threadDelay 100000