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https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq.git
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6
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| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
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33bd0ab42d | ||
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b98fdb672d | ||
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3ba3172aaf | ||
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c00c223f3b | ||
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2f43b43225 |
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ jobs:
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run: cabal build --enable-tests
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- name: Test
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timeout-minutes: 40
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timeout-minutes: 30
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shell: bash
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run: cabal test --test-show-details=direct
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@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
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common:
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corrId - random BS, used as CbNonce
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entityId - p2r tlsUniq
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# setup
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s->p: "proxy", uri, auth?
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# unless connected
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p->r: "p_handshake"
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p<-r: "r_key", tls-signed dh pub
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s<-r: "r_key", tls-signed dh pub # reply entityId contains tlsUniq
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# working
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s ; generate random dh priv, make shared secret
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s->p: s2r("forward", random dh pub, SEND command blob)
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p->r: p2r("forward", random dh pub, s2r("forward", ...)))
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r->c@ "msg", ...
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p<-r: p2r("r_res", s2r("ok" / "error", error))
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s<-p@ s2r("ok" / "error", error)
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# expired
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p<-r@ p2r("error", "key expired")
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s<-p@ "error", "key expired"
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s ; reconnect
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+1
-1
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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name: simplexmq
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version: 5.6.2.2
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version: 5.7.0.0
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synopsis: SimpleXMQ message broker
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description: |
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This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,
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@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
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## Problem
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SMP protocol relays are chosen and can be controlled by the message recipients. It means that the recipients can find out IP addresses of message senders by modifying SMP relay code (or by using proxies and timing correlation), unless the senders use VPN or some overlay network. Tor is an adequate solution in most cases to mitigate it, but it requires additional technical knowledge to install and configure (even installing Orbot on Android is seen as "complex" by many users), and reduces usability because of higher latency.
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SMP protocol relays are chosen and can be controlled by the message recipients. It means that the recipients can find out IP addresses of message senders by modifying SMP relay code (or by using proxies and timing correlation), unless the senders use VPN or some overlay network. Tor is an audequate solution in most cases to mitigate it, but it requires additional technical knowledge to install and configure (even installing Orbot on Android is seen as "complex" by many users), and reduces usability because of higher latency.
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The lack of in-built IP address protection is the main concern of many users, particularly given that most people do not realize that it is lacking by default - without transport protection SimpleX is not perceived as a "whole product".
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The lack of in-built IP address protection is the main concern of many users, particularly given that most people do not realise that it is lacking by default - without transport protection SimpleX is not perceived as a "whole product".
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Similarly, XFTP protocol relays are chosen by senders, and they can be used to detect file recipients' IP addresses.
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@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Overall, this is not a viable or even appropriate option for the current stage.
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3. SMP / XFTP proxy.
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Introduce SMP and XFTP protocol extensions to allow message senders and file recipients to delegate the tasks of sending messages and receiving files to the proxies, so that peer-chosen relays can only observe IP addresses of the proxies and not of the users.
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Introduce SMP and XFTP protocol extenstions to allow message senders and file recipients to delegate the tasks of sending messages and receiving files to the proxies, so that peer-chosen relays can only observe IP addresses of the proxies and not of the users.
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Pros:
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- no dependency on and lower latency than via Tor
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@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Below considers this design.
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2. SMP proxy should not be able to observe queue addresses and their count on the destination relays. This requirement is not needed for XFTP proxies, as each file chunk is downloaded only once, so there is no need to hide its address.
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3. There must be no identifiers and ciphertext in common in outgoing and incoming traffic inside TLS (the current designs have this quality).
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3. There must be no identifiers and cyphertext in common in outgoing and incoming traffic inside TLS (the current designs have this quality).
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4. Traffic between the client and destination relays must be e2e encrypted, with MITM-by-proxy mitigated, relying on the relay identity (certificate fingerprint), ideally without any additional fingerprint in relay address.
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@@ -97,11 +97,11 @@ This would also reduce the difference in how the traffic looks to the observer -
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The flow of the messages will be:
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1. Client requests proxy to create session with the relay by sending `PRXY` command with the SMP relay address and optional proxy basic AUTH (below). It should be possible to batch multiple session requests into one block, to reduce traffic.
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1. Client requests proxy to create session with the relay by sending `server` command with the SMP relay address and optional proxy basic AUTH (below). It should be possible to batch multiple session requests into one block, to reduce traffic.
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2. Proxy connects to SMP relay, negotiating a shared secret via a handshake headers - it will be used to encrypt all sender blocks inside TLS (proxy-relay encryption). DH key returned by SMP relay in handshake will also be used to encrypt client commands, combining it with random per-command keys (sender-relay encryption, to hide metadata sent to the destination relay from proxy).
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2. Proxy connects to SMP relay, negotiating a shared secret in the handshake that will be used to encrypt all sender blocks inside TLS (proxy-relay encryption). SMP relay also returns in handshake its temporary DH key to agree e2e encryption with the client (sender-relay encryption, to hide metadata sent to the destination relay from proxy).
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3. Proxy replies to sender with `PKEY` message using "entityId" transmission field to indicate session ID for using in further requests, relay DH key for _s2r_ encryption with the client - this key is signed with the TLS online private key associated with the certificate (its fingerprint is included in the relay address), and the TLS session ID between proxy and relay (this session ID must be used in transmissions, to mitigate replay attacks as before).
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3. Proxy replies with `server_id` command including relay session ID to identify it in further requests, relay DH key for e2e encryption with the client - this key is signed with the TLS online private key associated with the certificate (its fingerprint is included in the relay address), and the TLS session ID between proxy and relay (this session ID must be used in transmissions, to mitigate replay attacks as before).
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A possible attack here is that proxy can use this TLS session to replay commands received from the client. Possibly, it could be mitigated with a bloom filter per proxy/SMP relay connection that would reject the repeated DH keys (that need to be used for replay), and also with DH key expiration (this mitigation should allow some acceptable rate of false positives from the bloom filter).
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@@ -113,11 +113,11 @@ It is important that the same public key from destination relay is returned to a
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*Unrelated cosideration for SMP protocol privacy improvement*: instead of signing commands to the destination relay, the sender could have a ratchet per queue agreed with the destination relay that would simply use authenticated encryption with per-message symmetric key to encrypt the message on the way to relay, and this encryption would be used as a proof of sender.
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4. Now the client sends `PFWD` to proxy, which it then forwards to SMP relay as `RFWD`, applying _p2r_ encryption layer.
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4. Now the client sends `forward` to proxy, which it then forwards to SMP relay, applying additional encryption layer.
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5. SMP relay sends `RRES` to proxy applying _p2r_ encryption layer, which it then forwards to the client as `PRES`, removing the _p2r_ encryption layer.
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5. SMP relay sends `response` to proxy applying additional encryption layer, which it then forwards to the client removing the additional encryption layer.
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Effectively it works as a simplified two-hop onion routing with the first relay (proxy) chosen by the sending client and the second relay chosen by the recipient, not only protecting senders' IP addresses from the recipients' relays, but also preventing recipients' relays from correlating senders' traffic to different queues, as TLS session is owned by the proxy now and it mixes the traffic from multiple senders. To correlate traffic to users, proxy and relay would have to combine their information. SMP relays are still able to correlate traffic to receiving users via transport session.
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||||
Effectively it works as a simplified two-hop onion routing with the first relay (proxy) chosen by the sending client and the second relay chosen by the recipient, not only protecting senders' IP addresses from the recipients' relays, but also preventing recipients relays from correlating senders' traffic to different queues, as TLS session is owned by the proxy now and it mixes the traffic from multiple senders. To correlate traffic to users, proxy and relay would have to combine their information. SMP relays are still able to correlate traffic to receiving users via transport session.
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||||
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||||
Sequence diagram for sending the message via SMP proxy:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -126,33 +126,33 @@ Sequence diagram for sending the message via SMP proxy:
|
||||
| sending | | SMP | | SMP | | receiving |
|
||||
| client | | proxy | | relay | | client |
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||||
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
|
||||
| `PRXY` | | |
|
||||
| -------------------------> | | |
|
||||
| `server` | | |
|
||||
| -------------------------> | create TLS session, get keys | |
|
||||
| | ------------------------------> | |
|
||||
| | SMP handshake | |
|
||||
| | <------------------------------ | |
|
||||
| `PKEY` | | |
|
||||
| `server_id` | (if doesn't exist) | |
|
||||
| <------------------------- | | |
|
||||
| | | |
|
||||
| `PFWD` (s2r) | | |
|
||||
| -------------------------> | | |
|
||||
| | `RFWD` (p2r) | |
|
||||
| TLS(F:s2r(SEND(e2e(msg)))) | | |
|
||||
| -------------------------> | TLS(F:p2r(s2r(SEND(e2e(msg))))) | |
|
||||
| | ------------------------------> | |
|
||||
| | `RRES` (p2r) | |
|
||||
| | <------------------------------ | |
|
||||
| `PRES` (s2r) | | `MSG` |
|
||||
| <------------------------- | | -----------------------> |
|
||||
| | | `ACK` |
|
||||
| | | |
|
||||
| | TLS(R:p2r(s2r(OK/ERR))) | |
|
||||
| TLS(R:s2r(OK/ERR)) | <------------------------------ | |
|
||||
| <------------------------- | | TLS(MSG(r2c(e2e(msg)))) |
|
||||
| | | -----------------------> |
|
||||
| | | |
|
||||
| | | TLS(ACK) |
|
||||
| | | <----------------------- |
|
||||
| | | |
|
||||
| | | |
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Below diagram shows the encrypttion layers for `PFWD`/`RFWD` commands and `RRES`/`PRES` responses:
|
||||
Below diagram shows the encrypttion layers for `forward` and `response` commands:
|
||||
|
||||
- s2r (added) - encryption between client and SMP relay, with relay key returned in relay handshake, with MITM by proxy mitigated by verifying the certificate fingerprint included in the relay address.
|
||||
- s2r (added) - encryption between client and SMP relay, with relay key returned in server_id command, with MITM by proxy mitigated by verifying the certificate fingerprint included in the relay address.
|
||||
- e2e (exists now) - end-to-end encryption per SMP queue, with double ratchet e2e encryption inside it.
|
||||
- p2r (added) - additional encryption between proxy and SMP relay with the shared secret agreed in the handshake, to mitigate traffic correlation inside TLS.
|
||||
- p2r (added) - additional encryption between proxy and SMP relay with key agreed in the handshake, to mitigate traffic correlation inside TLS. This key could also be signed by the same certificate, if we don't want to rely on TLS security.
|
||||
- r2c (exists now) additional encryption between SMP relay and client to prevent traffic correlation inside TLS.
|
||||
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||||
```
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||||
@@ -167,32 +167,27 @@ Below diagram shows the encrypttion layers for `PFWD`/`RFWD` commands and `RRES`
|
||||
----------------- ----------------- -- TLS -- ----------------- -----------------
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Question: should proxy declare its role in handshake? When proxy connects to SMP relay it would indicate in the handshake that it will act as a proxy and the SMP relay would expect the same `forward` commands and reply with `response`s.
|
||||
When proxy connects to SMP relay it would indicate in the handshake that it will use proxy protocol and the SMP relay would expect the same `forward` commands and reply with `response`s.
|
||||
|
||||
Common SMP transmission format (v4), for reference:
|
||||
Below syntax aims to fit in 16kb block using spare capacity in SMP protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
```abnf
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||||
paddedTransmission = <padded(transmission), 16384>
|
||||
transmission = signature signed
|
||||
signature = 0 ; empty signatures here
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||||
signed = sessionIdentifier corrId entityId (smpCommand / brokerMsg)
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proxy_block = padded(proxy_transmission, 16384)
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||||
proxy_transmission = corr_id relay_session_id proxy_command
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||||
corr_id = length *8 OCTET
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proxy_command = server / server_id / forward / response / error
|
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server = "S" address [relay_basic_auth] ; creates transport session between proxy and relay
|
||||
server_id = "I" relay_session_id tls_session_id signed_relay_key ;
|
||||
; session_id is the TLS session ID between proxy and relay, it has to be included inside encrypted block to prevent replay attacks
|
||||
forward = %s"F" random_dh_pub_key encrypted_block ; it's important that a new key is used for each command, to prevent any correlation by proxy or by destination relay
|
||||
response = %s"R" encrypted_block; response received from the destination SMP relay
|
||||
relay_session_id = length *8 OCTET
|
||||
error = %s"E" error
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- `corrId` is fully random each time and used as a nonce for encrypted blocks.
|
||||
- `entityId` carries tlsUniq from the current proxy-to-relay connection.
|
||||
- `smpCommand` gets extended with `s2p_command / p2r_command`.
|
||||
- `brokerMsg` gets extended with `r_key / r_response`.
|
||||
The overhead is: 1+8 (corrId) + 1+8 (relay_session_id) + 1 (command) + 1+32 (random_dh_pub_key) + 2 (original length) + 16 (auth tag for e2e encryption) + 16 (auth tag for proxy to relay encryption) = 86 bytes. The reserve for sent messages in SMP is ~84 bytes, so it should about fit with some reduced bytes somewhere.
|
||||
|
||||
```abnf
|
||||
s2p_command = proxy / forward
|
||||
p2r_command = p_handshake ; forward is
|
||||
proxy = %s"PRXY" SP relayUri SP basicAuth
|
||||
relayUri = length %s"smp://" serverIdentity "@" srvHost [":" port]
|
||||
forward = %s"PFWD" SP dhPublic SP encryptedBlock
|
||||
r_key = %s"PKEY" SP dhPublic
|
||||
r_response = %s"RRES" SP encryptedBlock
|
||||
dhPublic = length x509encoded
|
||||
```
|
||||
Another possible design is to allow mixing sent messages and normal SMP commands in the same transport connection, but it can make fitting in the block a bit harder, additional overhead would be: 1 (transmission count) + 2 (transmission size) + 1 (empty signature) = 4 bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
The above assumes that the client can only send one message to an SMP relay and then has to wait for response before sending the next message. Missing the response would cause re-delivery (further improvement is possible when proxy detects these redelieveries and not send them to relays but simply reply with the same response).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-2
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ cabal-version: 1.12
|
||||
-- see: https://github.com/sol/hpack
|
||||
|
||||
name: simplexmq
|
||||
version: 5.6.2.2
|
||||
version: 5.7.0.0
|
||||
synopsis: SimpleXMQ message broker
|
||||
description: This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,
|
||||
<./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Client.html client> and
|
||||
@@ -652,7 +652,6 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
|
||||
ServerTests
|
||||
SMPAgentClient
|
||||
SMPClient
|
||||
SMPProxyTests
|
||||
Util
|
||||
XFTPAgent
|
||||
XFTPCLI
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -97,8 +97,8 @@ defaultXFTPClientConfig =
|
||||
clientALPN = Just supportedXFTPhandshakes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
getXFTPClient :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> TransportSession FileResponse -> XFTPClientConfig -> (XFTPClient -> IO ()) -> IO (Either XFTPClientError XFTPClient)
|
||||
getXFTPClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN, xftpNetworkConfig, serverVRange} disconnected = runExceptT $ do
|
||||
getXFTPClient :: TransportSession FileResponse -> XFTPClientConfig -> (XFTPClient -> IO ()) -> IO (Either XFTPClientError XFTPClient)
|
||||
getXFTPClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN, xftpNetworkConfig, serverVRange} disconnected = runExceptT $ do
|
||||
let tcConfig = (transportClientConfig xftpNetworkConfig) {alpn = clientALPN}
|
||||
http2Config = xftpHTTP2Config tcConfig config
|
||||
username = proxyUsername transportSession
|
||||
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ getXFTPClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN
|
||||
thParams0 = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = VersionXFTP 1, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, batch = True}
|
||||
logDebug $ "Client negotiated handshake protocol: " <> tshow sessionALPN
|
||||
thParams@THandleParams {thVersion} <- case sessionALPN of
|
||||
Just "xftp/1" -> xftpClientHandshakeV1 g serverVRange keyHash http2Client thParams0
|
||||
Just "xftp/1" -> xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash http2Client thParams0
|
||||
Nothing -> pure thParams0
|
||||
_ -> throwError $ PCETransportError (TEHandshake VERSION)
|
||||
logDebug $ "Client negotiated protocol: " <> tshow thVersion
|
||||
@@ -120,13 +120,12 @@ getXFTPClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN
|
||||
atomically $ writeTVar clientVar $ Just c
|
||||
pure c
|
||||
|
||||
xftpClientHandshakeV1 :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> VersionRangeXFTP -> C.KeyHash -> HTTP2Client -> THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient)
|
||||
xftpClientHandshakeV1 g serverVRange keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) c@HTTP2Client {sessionId, serverKey} thParams0 = do
|
||||
xftpClientHandshakeV1 :: VersionRangeXFTP -> C.KeyHash -> HTTP2Client -> THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient)
|
||||
xftpClientHandshakeV1 serverVRange keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) c@HTTP2Client {sessionId, serverKey} thParams0 = do
|
||||
shs@XFTPServerHandshake {authPubKey = ck} <- getServerHandshake
|
||||
(v, sk) <- processServerHandshake shs
|
||||
(k, pk) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
|
||||
sendClientHandshake XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = k}
|
||||
pure thParams0 {thAuth = Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = sk, serverCertKey = ck, clientPrivKey = pk}, thVersion = v}
|
||||
sendClientHandshake XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = v, keyHash}
|
||||
pure thParams0 {thAuth = Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = sk, serverCertKey = ck, sessSecret = Nothing}, thVersion = v}
|
||||
where
|
||||
getServerHandshake :: ExceptT XFTPClientError IO XFTPServerHandshake
|
||||
getServerHandshake = do
|
||||
@@ -186,11 +185,9 @@ xftpClientError = \case
|
||||
|
||||
sendXFTPCommand :: forall p. FilePartyI p => XFTPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> XFTPFileId -> FileCommand p -> Maybe XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (FileResponse, HTTP2Body)
|
||||
sendXFTPCommand c@XFTPClient {thParams} pKey fId cmd chunkSpec_ = do
|
||||
-- TODO random corrId
|
||||
let corrIdUsedAsNonce = ""
|
||||
t <-
|
||||
liftEither . first PCETransportError $
|
||||
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams pKey (corrIdUsedAsNonce, fId, FileCmd (sFileParty @p) cmd)
|
||||
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams pKey ("", fId, FileCmd (sFileParty @p) cmd)
|
||||
sendXFTPTransmission c t chunkSpec_
|
||||
|
||||
sendXFTPTransmission :: XFTPClient -> ByteString -> Maybe XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (FileResponse, HTTP2Body)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import Control.Logger.Simple (logInfo)
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Trans (lift)
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import Data.Text (Text)
|
||||
@@ -61,15 +60,15 @@ newXFTPAgent config = do
|
||||
|
||||
type ME a = ExceptT XFTPClientAgentError IO a
|
||||
|
||||
getXFTPServerClient :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> XFTPClientAgent -> XFTPServer -> ME XFTPClient
|
||||
getXFTPServerClient g XFTPClientAgent {xftpClients, config} srv = do
|
||||
getXFTPServerClient :: XFTPClientAgent -> XFTPServer -> ME XFTPClient
|
||||
getXFTPServerClient XFTPClientAgent {xftpClients, config} srv = do
|
||||
atomically getClientVar >>= either newXFTPClient waitForXFTPClient
|
||||
where
|
||||
connectClient :: ME XFTPClient
|
||||
connectClient =
|
||||
ExceptT $
|
||||
first (XFTPClientAgentError srv)
|
||||
<$> getXFTPClient g (1, srv, Nothing) (xftpConfig config) clientDisconnected
|
||||
<$> getXFTPClient (1, srv, Nothing) (xftpConfig config) clientDisconnected
|
||||
|
||||
clientDisconnected :: XFTPClient -> IO ()
|
||||
clientDisconnected _ = do
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -333,9 +333,9 @@ cliSendFileOpts SendOptions {filePath, outputDir, numRecipients, xftpServers, re
|
||||
rKeys <- atomically $ L.fromList <$> replicateM numRecipients (C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g)
|
||||
digest <- liftIO $ getChunkDigest chunkSpec
|
||||
let ch = FileInfo {sndKey, size = fromIntegral chunkSize, digest}
|
||||
c <- withRetry retryCount $ getXFTPServerClient g a xftpServer
|
||||
c <- withRetry retryCount $ getXFTPServerClient a xftpServer
|
||||
(sndId, rIds) <- withRetry retryCount $ createXFTPChunk c spKey ch (L.map fst rKeys) auth
|
||||
withReconnect g a xftpServer retryCount $ \c' -> uploadXFTPChunk c' spKey sndId chunkSpec
|
||||
withReconnect a xftpServer retryCount $ \c' -> uploadXFTPChunk c' spKey sndId chunkSpec
|
||||
logInfo $ "uploaded chunk " <> tshow chunkNo
|
||||
uploaded <- atomically . stateTVar uploadedChunks $ \cs ->
|
||||
let cs' = fromIntegral chunkSize : cs in (sum cs', cs')
|
||||
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath,
|
||||
when (FileSize encSize /= size) $ throwError $ CLIError "File size mismatch"
|
||||
liftIO $ printNoNewLine "Decrypting file..."
|
||||
CryptoFile path _ <- withExceptT cliCryptoError $ decryptChunks encSize chunkPaths key nonce $ fmap CF.plain . getFilePath
|
||||
forM_ chunks $ acknowledgeFileChunk g a
|
||||
forM_ chunks $ acknowledgeFileChunk a
|
||||
whenM (doesPathExist encPath) $ removeDirectoryRecursive encPath
|
||||
liftIO $ do
|
||||
printNoNewLine $ "File downloaded: " <> path
|
||||
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath,
|
||||
logInfo $ "downloading chunk " <> tshow chunkNo <> " from " <> showServer server <> "..."
|
||||
chunkPath <- uniqueCombine encPath $ show chunkNo
|
||||
let chunkSpec = XFTPRcvChunkSpec chunkPath (unFileSize chunkSize) (unFileDigest digest)
|
||||
withReconnect g a server retryCount $ \c -> downloadXFTPChunk g c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId) chunkSpec
|
||||
withReconnect a server retryCount $ \c -> downloadXFTPChunk g c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId) chunkSpec
|
||||
logInfo $ "downloaded chunk " <> tshow chunkNo <> " to " <> T.pack chunkPath
|
||||
downloaded <- atomically . stateTVar downloadedChunks $ \cs ->
|
||||
let cs' = fromIntegral (unFileSize chunkSize) : cs in (sum cs', cs')
|
||||
@@ -472,12 +472,12 @@ cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath,
|
||||
ifM (doesDirectoryExist path) (uniqueCombine path name) $
|
||||
ifM (doesFileExist path) (throwError "File already exists") (pure path)
|
||||
_ -> (`uniqueCombine` name) . (</> "Downloads") =<< getHomeDirectory
|
||||
acknowledgeFileChunk :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> XFTPClientAgent -> FileChunk -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
|
||||
acknowledgeFileChunk g a FileChunk {replicas = replica : _} = do
|
||||
acknowledgeFileChunk :: XFTPClientAgent -> FileChunk -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
|
||||
acknowledgeFileChunk a FileChunk {replicas = replica : _} = do
|
||||
let FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey} = replica
|
||||
c <- withRetry retryCount $ getXFTPServerClient g a server
|
||||
c <- withRetry retryCount $ getXFTPServerClient a server
|
||||
withRetry retryCount $ ackXFTPChunk c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId)
|
||||
acknowledgeFileChunk _ _ _ = throwError $ CLIError "chunk has no replicas"
|
||||
acknowledgeFileChunk _ _ = throwError $ CLIError "chunk has no replicas"
|
||||
|
||||
printProgress :: String -> Int64 -> Int64 -> IO ()
|
||||
printProgress s part total = printNoNewLine $ s <> " " <> show ((part * 100) `div` total) <> "%"
|
||||
@@ -501,8 +501,7 @@ cliDeleteFile DeleteOptions {fileDescription, retryCount, yes} = do
|
||||
deleteFileChunk :: XFTPClientAgent -> FileChunk -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
|
||||
deleteFileChunk a FileChunk {chunkNo, replicas = replica : _} = do
|
||||
let FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey} = replica
|
||||
g <- liftIO C.newRandom
|
||||
withReconnect g a server retryCount $ \c -> deleteXFTPChunk c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId)
|
||||
withReconnect a server retryCount $ \c -> deleteXFTPChunk c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId)
|
||||
logInfo $ "deleted chunk " <> tshow chunkNo <> " from " <> showServer server
|
||||
deleteFileChunk _ _ = throwError $ CLIError "chunk has no replicas"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -570,9 +569,9 @@ prepareChunkSpecs filePath chunkSizes = reverse . snd $ foldl' addSpec (0, []) c
|
||||
getEncPath :: MonadIO m => Maybe FilePath -> String -> m FilePath
|
||||
getEncPath path name = (`uniqueCombine` (name <> ".encrypted")) =<< maybe (liftIO getCanonicalTemporaryDirectory) pure path
|
||||
|
||||
withReconnect :: Show e => TVar ChaChaDRG -> XFTPClientAgent -> XFTPServer -> Int -> (XFTPClient -> ExceptT e IO a) -> ExceptT CLIError IO a
|
||||
withReconnect g a srv n run = withRetry n $ do
|
||||
c <- withRetry n $ getXFTPServerClient g a srv
|
||||
withReconnect :: Show e => XFTPClientAgent -> XFTPServer -> Int -> (XFTPClient -> ExceptT e IO a) -> ExceptT CLIError IO a
|
||||
withReconnect a srv n run = withRetry n $ do
|
||||
c <- withRetry n $ getXFTPServerClient a srv
|
||||
withExceptT (CLIError . show) (run c) `catchError` \e -> do
|
||||
liftIO $ closeXFTPServerClient a srv
|
||||
throwError e
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
SndPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
Transmission,
|
||||
TransmissionForAuth (..),
|
||||
CorrId (..),
|
||||
encodeTransmission,
|
||||
encodeTransmissionForAuth,
|
||||
messageTagP,
|
||||
@@ -329,7 +328,7 @@ checkParty' c = case testEquality (sFileParty @p) (sFileParty @p') of
|
||||
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
|
||||
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams@THandleParams {thAuth} pKey (corrId, fId, msg) = do
|
||||
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, fId, msg)
|
||||
xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission thAuth (Just pKey) (C.cbNonce $ bs corrId) tForAuth
|
||||
xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission thAuth (Just pKey) corrId tForAuth
|
||||
|
||||
xftpEncodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion p -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
|
||||
xftpEncodeTransmission thParams (corrId, fId, msg) = do
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -141,11 +141,11 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
|
||||
processClientHandshake pk = do
|
||||
unless (B.length bodyHead == xftpBlockSize) $ throwError HANDSHAKE
|
||||
body <- liftHS $ C.unPad bodyHead
|
||||
XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash, authPubKey} <- liftHS $ smpDecode body
|
||||
XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash} <- liftHS $ smpDecode body
|
||||
kh <- asks serverIdentity
|
||||
unless (keyHash == kh) $ throwError HANDSHAKE
|
||||
unless (xftpVersion `isCompatible` supportedFileServerVRange) $ throwError HANDSHAKE
|
||||
let auth = THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey = authPubKey, serverPrivKey = pk}
|
||||
let auth = THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, sessSecret' = Nothing}
|
||||
atomically $ TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeAccepted auth xftpVersion) sessions
|
||||
liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseNoBody N.ok200 []
|
||||
pure Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import Options.Applicative
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description (FileSize (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server (runXFTPServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), defFileExpirationHours, defaultFileExpiration, defaultInactiveClientExpiration)
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), defFileExpirationHours, defaultFileExpiration, defaultInactiveClientExpiration, supportedXFTPhandshakes)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtoServerWithAuth (..), pattern XFTPServer)
|
||||
@@ -180,7 +180,8 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
|
||||
serverStatsBackupFile = logStats $> combine logPath "file-server-stats.log",
|
||||
transportConfig =
|
||||
defaultTransportServerConfig
|
||||
{ logTLSErrors = fromMaybe False $ iniOnOff "TRANSPORT" "log_tls_errors" ini
|
||||
{ logTLSErrors = fromMaybe False $ iniOnOff "TRANSPORT" "log_tls_errors" ini,
|
||||
alpn = Just supportedXFTPhandshakes
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport
|
||||
( supportedFileServerVRange,
|
||||
authCmdsXFTPVersion,
|
||||
xftpClientHandshakeStub,
|
||||
XFTPClientHandshake (..),
|
||||
-- xftpClientHandshake,
|
||||
@@ -83,14 +84,17 @@ type THandleParamsXFTP p = THandleParams XFTPVersion p
|
||||
initialXFTPVersion :: VersionXFTP
|
||||
initialXFTPVersion = VersionXFTP 1
|
||||
|
||||
authCmdsXFTPVersion :: VersionXFTP
|
||||
authCmdsXFTPVersion = VersionXFTP 2
|
||||
|
||||
currentXFTPVersion :: VersionXFTP
|
||||
currentXFTPVersion = VersionXFTP 2
|
||||
|
||||
supportedFileServerVRange :: VersionRangeXFTP
|
||||
supportedFileServerVRange = mkVersionRange initialXFTPVersion currentXFTPVersion
|
||||
|
||||
-- XFTP protocol does not support handshake
|
||||
xftpClientHandshakeStub :: c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeXFTP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle XFTPVersion c 'TClient)
|
||||
-- XFTP protocol does not use this handshake method
|
||||
xftpClientHandshakeStub :: c -> Maybe C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeXFTP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle XFTPVersion c 'TClient)
|
||||
xftpClientHandshakeStub _c _ks _keyHash _xftpVRange = throwError $ TEHandshake VERSION
|
||||
|
||||
data XFTPServerHandshake = XFTPServerHandshake
|
||||
@@ -104,19 +108,16 @@ data XFTPClientHandshake = XFTPClientHandshake
|
||||
{ -- | agreed XFTP server protocol version
|
||||
xftpVersion :: VersionXFTP,
|
||||
-- | server identity - CA certificate fingerprint
|
||||
keyHash :: C.KeyHash,
|
||||
-- | pub key to agree shared secret for entity ID encryption, shared secret for command authorization is agreed using per-queue keys.
|
||||
authPubKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519
|
||||
keyHash :: C.KeyHash
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding XFTPClientHandshake where
|
||||
smpEncode XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash, authPubKey} =
|
||||
smpEncode (xftpVersion, keyHash, authPubKey)
|
||||
smpEncode XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash} =
|
||||
smpEncode (xftpVersion, keyHash)
|
||||
smpP = do
|
||||
(xftpVersion, keyHash) <- smpP
|
||||
authPubKey <- smpP
|
||||
Tail _compat <- smpP
|
||||
pure XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash, authPubKey}
|
||||
pure XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash}
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding XFTPServerHandshake where
|
||||
smpEncode XFTPServerHandshake {xftpVersionRange, sessionId, authPubKey} =
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ compatibleContactUri (CRContactUri ConnReqUriData {crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues =
|
||||
AgentConfig {smpClientVRange, smpAgentVRange} <- asks config
|
||||
pure $
|
||||
(,)
|
||||
<$> (qUri `compatibleVersion` smpClientVRange)
|
||||
<$> (qUri `compatibleVersion` smpClientVRange)
|
||||
<*> (crAgentVRange `compatibleVersion` smpAgentVRange pqSup)
|
||||
|
||||
versionPQSupport_ :: VersionSMPA -> Maybe CR.VersionE2E -> PQSupport
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -688,10 +688,9 @@ getXFTPServerClient c@AgentClient {active, xftpClients, workerSeq} tSess@(userId
|
||||
connectClient :: XFTPClientVar -> AM XFTPClient
|
||||
connectClient v = do
|
||||
cfg <- asks $ xftpCfg . config
|
||||
g <- asks random
|
||||
xftpNetworkConfig <- atomically $ getNetworkConfig c
|
||||
liftError' (protocolClientError XFTP $ B.unpack $ strEncode srv) $
|
||||
X.getXFTPClient g tSess cfg {xftpNetworkConfig} $
|
||||
X.getXFTPClient tSess cfg {xftpNetworkConfig} $
|
||||
clientDisconnected v
|
||||
|
||||
clientDisconnected :: XFTPClientVar -> XFTPClient -> IO ()
|
||||
@@ -703,8 +702,8 @@ getXFTPServerClient c@AgentClient {active, xftpClients, workerSeq} tSess@(userId
|
||||
|
||||
waitForProtocolClient :: ProtocolTypeI (ProtoType msg) => AgentClient -> TransportSession msg -> ClientVar msg -> AM (Client msg)
|
||||
waitForProtocolClient c (_, srv, _) v = do
|
||||
NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout} <- atomically $ getNetworkConfig c
|
||||
client_ <- liftIO $ tcpConnectTimeout `timeout` atomically (readTMVar $ sessionVar v)
|
||||
NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout} <- atomically $ getNetworkConfig c
|
||||
client_ <- liftIO $ (tcpConnectTimeout + tcpTimeout) `timeout` atomically (readTMVar $ sessionVar v)
|
||||
liftEither $ case client_ of
|
||||
Just (Right smpClient) -> Right smpClient
|
||||
Just (Left e) -> Left e
|
||||
@@ -1008,7 +1007,7 @@ runXFTPServerTest c userId (ProtoServerWithAuth srv auth) = do
|
||||
rcvPath <- getTempFilePath workDir
|
||||
liftIO $ do
|
||||
let tSess = (userId, srv, Nothing)
|
||||
X.getXFTPClient g tSess cfg {xftpNetworkConfig} (\_ -> pure ()) >>= \case
|
||||
X.getXFTPClient tSess cfg {xftpNetworkConfig} (\_ -> pure ()) >>= \case
|
||||
Right xftp -> withTestChunk filePath $ do
|
||||
(sndKey, spKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g
|
||||
(rcvKey, rpKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g
|
||||
|
||||
+56
-163
@@ -54,9 +54,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
|
||||
suspendSMPQueue,
|
||||
deleteSMPQueue,
|
||||
deleteSMPQueues,
|
||||
createSMPProxySession,
|
||||
proxySMPMessage,
|
||||
forwardSMPMessage,
|
||||
sendProtocolCommand,
|
||||
|
||||
-- * Supporting types and client configuration
|
||||
@@ -72,7 +69,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
|
||||
chooseTransportHost,
|
||||
proxyUsername,
|
||||
temporaryClientError,
|
||||
smpProxyError,
|
||||
ServerTransmission,
|
||||
ClientCommand,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -102,24 +98,22 @@ import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
|
||||
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime (..), getCurrentTime)
|
||||
import qualified Data.X509 as X
|
||||
import qualified Data.X509.Validation as XV
|
||||
import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
|
||||
import Numeric.Natural
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON, dropPrefix, enumJSON)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (SocksProxy, TransportClientConfig (..), TransportHost (..), runTransportClient)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (SocksProxy, TransportClientConfig (..), TransportHost (..), defaultTcpConnectTimeout, runTransportClient)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.KeepAlive
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets (WS)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, liftEitherWith, raceAny_, threadDelay')
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, raceAny_, threadDelay', whenM)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
|
||||
import System.Timeout (timeout)
|
||||
import UnliftIO (pooledMapConcurrentlyN)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | 'SMPClient' is a handle used to send commands to a specific SMP server.
|
||||
--
|
||||
@@ -136,11 +130,11 @@ data PClient v err msg = PClient
|
||||
transportSession :: TransportSession msg,
|
||||
transportHost :: TransportHost,
|
||||
tcpTimeout :: Int,
|
||||
batchDelay :: Maybe Int,
|
||||
rcvConcurrency :: Int,
|
||||
pingErrorCount :: TVar Int,
|
||||
clientCorrId :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
|
||||
sentCommands :: TMap CorrId (Request err msg),
|
||||
sndQ :: TBQueue ByteString,
|
||||
sndQ :: TBQueue (TVar Bool, ByteString),
|
||||
rcvQ :: TBQueue (NonEmpty (SignedTransmission err msg)),
|
||||
msgQ :: Maybe (TBQueue (ServerTransmission v msg))
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -172,7 +166,7 @@ smpClientStub g sessionId thVersion thAuth = do
|
||||
transportSession = (1, "smp://LcJUMfVhwD8yxjAiSaDzzGF3-kLG4Uh0Fl_ZIjrRwjI=@localhost:5001", Nothing),
|
||||
transportHost = "localhost",
|
||||
tcpTimeout = 15_000_000,
|
||||
batchDelay = Nothing,
|
||||
rcvConcurrency = 8,
|
||||
pingErrorCount,
|
||||
clientCorrId,
|
||||
sentCommands,
|
||||
@@ -215,6 +209,8 @@ data NetworkConfig = NetworkConfig
|
||||
tcpTimeout :: Int,
|
||||
-- | additional timeout per kilobyte (1024 bytes) to be sent
|
||||
tcpTimeoutPerKb :: Int64,
|
||||
-- | break response timeouts into groups, so later responses get later deadlines
|
||||
rcvConcurrency :: Int,
|
||||
-- | TCP keep-alive options, Nothing to skip enabling keep-alive
|
||||
tcpKeepAlive :: Maybe KeepAliveOpts,
|
||||
-- | period for SMP ping commands (microseconds, 0 to disable)
|
||||
@@ -235,9 +231,10 @@ defaultNetworkConfig =
|
||||
hostMode = HMOnionViaSocks,
|
||||
requiredHostMode = False,
|
||||
sessionMode = TSMUser,
|
||||
tcpConnectTimeout = 20_000_000,
|
||||
tcpConnectTimeout = defaultTcpConnectTimeout,
|
||||
tcpTimeout = 15_000_000,
|
||||
tcpTimeoutPerKb = 5_000,
|
||||
rcvConcurrency = 8,
|
||||
tcpKeepAlive = Just defaultKeepAliveOpts,
|
||||
smpPingInterval = 600_000_000, -- 10min
|
||||
smpPingCount = 3,
|
||||
@@ -245,8 +242,8 @@ defaultNetworkConfig =
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
transportClientConfig :: NetworkConfig -> TransportClientConfig
|
||||
transportClientConfig NetworkConfig {socksProxy, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors} =
|
||||
TransportClientConfig {socksProxy, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors, clientCredentials = Nothing, alpn = Nothing}
|
||||
transportClientConfig NetworkConfig {socksProxy, tcpConnectTimeout, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors} =
|
||||
TransportClientConfig {socksProxy, tcpConnectTimeout, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors, clientCredentials = Nothing, alpn = Nothing}
|
||||
{-# INLINE transportClientConfig #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- | protocol client configuration.
|
||||
@@ -259,8 +256,8 @@ data ProtocolClientConfig v = ProtocolClientConfig
|
||||
networkConfig :: NetworkConfig,
|
||||
-- | client-server protocol version range
|
||||
serverVRange :: VersionRange v,
|
||||
-- | delay between sending batches of commands (microseconds)
|
||||
batchDelay :: Maybe Int
|
||||
-- | agree shared session secret (used in SMP proxy)
|
||||
agreeSecret :: Bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Default protocol client configuration.
|
||||
@@ -271,7 +268,7 @@ defaultClientConfig serverVRange =
|
||||
defaultTransport = ("443", transport @TLS),
|
||||
networkConfig = defaultNetworkConfig,
|
||||
serverVRange,
|
||||
batchDelay = Nothing
|
||||
agreeSecret = False
|
||||
}
|
||||
{-# INLINE defaultClientConfig #-}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -280,7 +277,8 @@ defaultSMPClientConfig = defaultClientConfig supportedClientSMPRelayVRange
|
||||
{-# INLINE defaultSMPClientConfig #-}
|
||||
|
||||
data Request err msg = Request
|
||||
{ entityId :: EntityId,
|
||||
{ corrId :: CorrId,
|
||||
entityId :: EntityId,
|
||||
responseVar :: TMVar (Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -328,14 +326,14 @@ type TransportSession msg = (UserId, ProtoServer msg, Maybe EntityId)
|
||||
-- A single queue can be used for multiple 'SMPClient' instances,
|
||||
-- as 'SMPServerTransmission' includes server information.
|
||||
getProtocolClient :: forall v err msg. Protocol v err msg => TVar ChaChaDRG -> TransportSession msg -> ProtocolClientConfig v -> Maybe (TBQueue (ServerTransmission v msg)) -> (ProtocolClient v err msg -> IO ()) -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (ProtocolClient v err msg))
|
||||
getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize, networkConfig, serverVRange, batchDelay} msgQ disconnected = do
|
||||
getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize, networkConfig, serverVRange, agreeSecret} msgQ disconnected = do
|
||||
case chooseTransportHost networkConfig (host srv) of
|
||||
Right useHost ->
|
||||
(atomically (mkProtocolClient useHost) >>= runClient useTransport useHost)
|
||||
`catch` \(e :: IOException) -> pure . Left $ PCEIOError e
|
||||
Left e -> pure $ Left e
|
||||
where
|
||||
NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout, smpPingInterval} = networkConfig
|
||||
NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout, rcvConcurrency, smpPingInterval} = networkConfig
|
||||
mkProtocolClient :: TransportHost -> STM (PClient v err msg)
|
||||
mkProtocolClient transportHost = do
|
||||
connected <- newTVar False
|
||||
@@ -350,10 +348,10 @@ getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize
|
||||
transportSession,
|
||||
transportHost,
|
||||
tcpTimeout,
|
||||
batchDelay,
|
||||
pingErrorCount,
|
||||
clientCorrId,
|
||||
sentCommands,
|
||||
rcvConcurrency,
|
||||
sndQ,
|
||||
rcvQ,
|
||||
msgQ
|
||||
@@ -362,13 +360,17 @@ getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize
|
||||
runClient :: (ServiceName, ATransport) -> TransportHost -> PClient v err msg -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (ProtocolClient v err msg))
|
||||
runClient (port', ATransport t) useHost c = do
|
||||
cVar <- newEmptyTMVarIO
|
||||
let tcConfig = transportClientConfig networkConfig
|
||||
let (connectTimeout, tcConfig) = case transportClientConfig networkConfig of
|
||||
tcc@TransportClientConfig {socksProxy = Nothing} -> (tcpConnectTimeout, tcc)
|
||||
tcc@TransportClientConfig {socksProxy = Just _} ->
|
||||
let extended = tcpConnectTimeout + tcpTimeout -- typically, extra time for establishing TOR circuits
|
||||
in (extended, tcc {tcpConnectTimeout = extended} :: TransportClientConfig)
|
||||
username = proxyUsername transportSession
|
||||
action <-
|
||||
async $
|
||||
runTransportClient tcConfig (Just username) useHost port' (Just $ keyHash srv) (client t c cVar)
|
||||
`finally` atomically (tryPutTMVar cVar $ Left PCENetworkError)
|
||||
c_ <- tcpConnectTimeout `timeout` atomically (takeTMVar cVar)
|
||||
c_ <- (connectTimeout + tcpTimeout) `timeout` atomically (takeTMVar cVar)
|
||||
case c_ of
|
||||
Just (Right c') -> pure $ Right c' {action = Just action}
|
||||
Just (Left e) -> pure $ Left e
|
||||
@@ -382,7 +384,7 @@ getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize
|
||||
|
||||
client :: forall c. Transport c => TProxy c -> PClient v err msg -> TMVar (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (ProtocolClient v err msg)) -> c -> IO ()
|
||||
client _ c cVar h = do
|
||||
ks <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
|
||||
ks <- if agreeSecret then Just <$> atomically (C.generateKeyPair g) else pure Nothing
|
||||
runExceptT (protocolClientHandshake @v @err @msg h ks (keyHash srv) serverVRange) >>= \case
|
||||
Left e -> atomically . putTMVar cVar . Left $ PCETransportError e
|
||||
Right th@THandle {params} -> do
|
||||
@@ -395,7 +397,7 @@ getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize
|
||||
`finally` disconnected c'
|
||||
|
||||
send :: Transport c => ProtocolClient v err msg -> THandle v c 'TClient -> IO ()
|
||||
send ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}} h = forever $ atomically (readTBQueue sndQ) >>= tPutLog h
|
||||
send ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}} h = forever $ atomically (readTBQueue sndQ) >>= \(active, s) -> whenM (readTVarIO active) (void $ tPutLog h s)
|
||||
|
||||
receive :: Transport c => ProtocolClient v err msg -> THandle v c 'TClient -> IO ()
|
||||
receive ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {rcvQ}} h = forever $ tGet h >>= atomically . writeTBQueue rcvQ
|
||||
@@ -487,19 +489,6 @@ temporaryClientError = \case
|
||||
_ -> False
|
||||
{-# INLINE temporaryClientError #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- TODO keep error params
|
||||
smpProxyError :: SMPClientError -> ErrorType
|
||||
smpProxyError = \case
|
||||
PCEProtocolError _ -> PROXY PROTOCOL
|
||||
PCEResponseError _ -> PROXY RESPONSE
|
||||
PCEUnexpectedResponse _ -> PROXY UNEXPECTED
|
||||
PCEResponseTimeout -> PROXY TIMEOUT
|
||||
PCENetworkError -> PROXY NETWORK
|
||||
PCEIncompatibleHost -> PROXY BAD_HOST
|
||||
PCETransportError _ -> PROXY TRANSPORT
|
||||
PCECryptoError _ -> INTERNAL
|
||||
PCEIOError _ -> INTERNAL
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Create a new SMP queue.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#create-queue-command
|
||||
@@ -650,102 +639,6 @@ deleteSMPQueues :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (RcvPrivateAuthKey, RecipientId) -> IO
|
||||
deleteSMPQueues = okSMPCommands DEL
|
||||
{-# INLINE deleteSMPQueues #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- TODO picture
|
||||
|
||||
-- send PRXY :: SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> Command Sender
|
||||
-- receives PKEY :: SessionId -> X.CertificateChain -> X.SignedExact X.PubKey -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
createSMPProxySession :: SMPClient -> SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO (SessionId, VersionSMP, C.PublicKeyX25519)
|
||||
createSMPProxySession c relayServ@ProtocolServer {keyHash = C.KeyHash kh} proxyAuth =
|
||||
sendSMPCommand c Nothing "" (PRXY relayServ proxyAuth) >>= \case
|
||||
-- XXX: rfc says sessionId should be in the entityId of response
|
||||
PKEY sId vr (chain, key) -> do
|
||||
case supportedClientSMPRelayVRange `compatibleVersion` vr of
|
||||
Nothing -> throwE PCEIncompatibleHost -- TODO different error
|
||||
Just (Compatible v) -> liftEitherWith x509Error $ (sId,v,) <$> validateRelay chain key
|
||||
r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
where
|
||||
x509Error :: String -> SMPClientError
|
||||
x509Error _msg = PCEResponseError $ error "TODO: x509 error" -- TODO different error
|
||||
validateRelay :: X.CertificateChain -> X.SignedExact X.PubKey -> Either String C.PublicKeyX25519
|
||||
validateRelay (X.CertificateChain cert) exact = do
|
||||
serverKey <- case cert of
|
||||
[leaf, ca]
|
||||
| XV.Fingerprint kh == XV.getFingerprint ca X.HashSHA256 ->
|
||||
C.x509ToPublic (X.certPubKey . X.signedObject $ X.getSigned leaf, []) >>= C.pubKey
|
||||
_ -> throwError "bad certificate"
|
||||
pubKey <- C.verifyX509 serverKey exact
|
||||
C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey
|
||||
|
||||
-- consider how to process slow responses - is it handled somehow locally or delegated to the caller
|
||||
-- this method is used in the client
|
||||
-- sends PFWD :: C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> Command Sender
|
||||
-- receives PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
|
||||
proxySMPMessage ::
|
||||
SMPClient ->
|
||||
-- proxy session from PKEY
|
||||
SessionId ->
|
||||
VersionSMP ->
|
||||
C.PublicKeyX25519 ->
|
||||
-- message to deliver
|
||||
Maybe SndPrivateAuthKey ->
|
||||
SenderId ->
|
||||
MsgFlags ->
|
||||
MsgBody ->
|
||||
ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
-- TODO use version
|
||||
proxySMPMessage c@ProtocolClient {thParams = proxyThParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId = g}} sessionId _v serverKey spKey sId flags msg = do
|
||||
-- prepare params
|
||||
let serverThAuth = (\ta -> ta {serverPeerPubKey = serverKey}) <$> thAuth proxyThParams
|
||||
serverThParams = proxyThParams {sessionId, thAuth = serverThAuth}
|
||||
(cmdPubKey, cmdPrivKey) <- liftIO . atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.X25519 g
|
||||
let cmdSecret = C.dh' serverKey cmdPrivKey
|
||||
nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- liftIO . atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
|
||||
-- encode
|
||||
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth serverThParams (CorrId corrId, sId, Cmd SSender $ SEND flags msg)
|
||||
auth <- liftEitherWith PCETransportError $ authTransmission serverThAuth spKey nonce tForAuth
|
||||
b <- case batchTransmissions (batch serverThParams) (blockSize serverThParams) [Right (auth, tToSend)] of
|
||||
[] -> throwE $ PCETransportError TELargeMsg -- some other error. Internal?
|
||||
TBError e _ : _ -> throwE $ PCETransportError e -- large message error?
|
||||
TBTransmission s _ : _ -> pure s
|
||||
TBTransmissions s _ _ : _ -> pure s
|
||||
et <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt cmdSecret nonce b paddedProxiedMsgLength
|
||||
sendProtocolCommand_ c (Just nonce) Nothing sessionId (Cmd SProxiedClient (PFWD cmdPubKey et)) >>= \case
|
||||
-- TODO support PKEY + resend?
|
||||
PRES (EncResponse er) -> do
|
||||
t' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt cmdSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) er
|
||||
case tParse proxyThParams t' of
|
||||
t'' :| [] -> case tDecodeParseValidate proxyThParams t'' of
|
||||
(_auth, _signed, (_c, _e, r)) -> case r of -- TODO: verify
|
||||
Left e -> throwE $ PCEResponseError e
|
||||
Right OK -> pure ()
|
||||
Right (ERR e) -> throwE $ PCEProtocolError e
|
||||
Right u -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow u -- possibly differentiate unexpected response from server/proxy
|
||||
_ -> throwE $ PCETransportError TEBadBlock
|
||||
r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r -- from proxy
|
||||
|
||||
-- this method is used in the proxy
|
||||
-- sends RFWD :: EncFwdTransmission -> Command Sender
|
||||
-- receives RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
-- proxy should send PRES to the client with EncResponse
|
||||
forwardSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> CorrId -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO EncResponse
|
||||
forwardSMPMessage c@ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId = g}} fwdCorrId fwdKey fwdTransmission = do
|
||||
-- prepare params
|
||||
sessSecret <- case thAuth thParams of
|
||||
Nothing -> throwError $ PCEProtocolError INTERNAL -- different error - proxy didn't pass key?
|
||||
Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey, clientPrivKey} -> pure $ C.dh' serverPeerPubKey clientPrivKey
|
||||
nonce <- liftIO . atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
|
||||
-- wrap
|
||||
let fwdT = FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdKey, fwdTransmission}
|
||||
eft <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncFwdTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt sessSecret nonce (smpEncode fwdT) paddedForwardedMsgLength
|
||||
-- send
|
||||
sendProtocolCommand_ c (Just nonce) Nothing "" (Cmd SSender (RFWD eft)) >>= \case
|
||||
RRES (EncFwdResponse efr) -> do
|
||||
-- unwrap
|
||||
r' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt sessSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) efr
|
||||
FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = _, fwdResponse} <- liftEitherWith (const $ PCEResponseError BLOCK) $ smpDecode r'
|
||||
pure fwdResponse
|
||||
r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
|
||||
okSMPCommand :: PartyI p => Command p -> SMPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> QueueId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
okSMPCommand cmd c pKey qId =
|
||||
sendSMPCommand c (Just pKey) qId cmd >>= \case
|
||||
@@ -793,27 +686,26 @@ streamProtocolCommands c@ProtocolClient {thParams = THandleParams {batch, blockS
|
||||
mapM_ (cb <=< sendBatch c) bs
|
||||
|
||||
sendBatch :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> TransportBatch (Request err msg) -> IO [Response err msg]
|
||||
sendBatch c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}} b = do
|
||||
sendBatch c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {rcvConcurrency, sndQ}} b = do
|
||||
case b of
|
||||
TBError e Request {entityId} -> do
|
||||
putStrLn "send error: large message"
|
||||
pure [Response entityId $ Left $ PCETransportError e]
|
||||
TBTransmissions s n rs
|
||||
| n > 0 -> do
|
||||
atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ s
|
||||
mapConcurrently (getResponse c) rs
|
||||
active <- newTVarIO True
|
||||
atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ (active, s)
|
||||
pooledMapConcurrentlyN rcvConcurrency (getResponse c active) rs
|
||||
| otherwise -> pure []
|
||||
TBTransmission s r -> do
|
||||
atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ s
|
||||
(: []) <$> getResponse c r
|
||||
active <- newTVarIO True
|
||||
atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ (active, s)
|
||||
(: []) <$> getResponse c active r
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Send Protocol command
|
||||
sendProtocolCommand :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> EntityId -> ProtoCommand msg -> ExceptT (ProtocolClientError err) IO msg
|
||||
sendProtocolCommand c = sendProtocolCommand_ c Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
sendProtocolCommand_ :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> Maybe C.CbNonce -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> EntityId -> ProtoCommand msg -> ExceptT (ProtocolClientError err) IO msg
|
||||
sendProtocolCommand_ c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}, thParams = THandleParams {batch, blockSize}} nonce_ pKey entId cmd =
|
||||
ExceptT $ uncurry sendRecv =<< mkTransmission_ c nonce_ (pKey, entId, cmd)
|
||||
sendProtocolCommand c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}, thParams = THandleParams {batch, blockSize}} pKey entId cmd =
|
||||
ExceptT $ uncurry sendRecv =<< mkTransmission c (pKey, entId, cmd)
|
||||
where
|
||||
-- two separate "atomically" needed to avoid blocking
|
||||
sendRecv :: Either TransportError SentRawTransmission -> Request err msg -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg)
|
||||
@@ -821,46 +713,47 @@ sendProtocolCommand_ c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}, thParams = THan
|
||||
Left e -> pure . Left $ PCETransportError e
|
||||
Right t
|
||||
| B.length s > blockSize - 2 -> pure . Left $ PCETransportError TELargeMsg
|
||||
| otherwise -> atomically (writeTBQueue sndQ s) >> response <$> getResponse c r
|
||||
| otherwise -> do
|
||||
active <- newTVarIO True
|
||||
atomically (writeTBQueue sndQ (active, s))
|
||||
response <$> getResponse c active r
|
||||
where
|
||||
s
|
||||
| batch = tEncodeBatch1 t
|
||||
| otherwise = tEncode t
|
||||
|
||||
-- TODO switch to timeout or TimeManager that supports Int64
|
||||
getResponse :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> Request err msg -> IO (Response err msg)
|
||||
getResponse ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpTimeout, pingErrorCount}} Request {entityId, responseVar} = do
|
||||
getResponse :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> TVar Bool -> Request err msg -> IO (Response err msg)
|
||||
getResponse ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpTimeout, pingErrorCount, sentCommands}} active Request {corrId, entityId, responseVar} = do
|
||||
response <-
|
||||
timeout tcpTimeout (atomically (takeTMVar responseVar)) >>= \case
|
||||
-- BTW: another registerDelay candidate. Also, crashes caller with BlockedIndef.
|
||||
Just r -> atomically (writeTVar pingErrorCount 0) $> r
|
||||
Nothing -> pure $ Left PCEResponseTimeout
|
||||
Nothing -> atomically (writeTVar active False >> TM.delete corrId sentCommands) $> Left PCEResponseTimeout
|
||||
pure Response {entityId, response}
|
||||
|
||||
mkTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
|
||||
mkTransmission c = mkTransmission_ c Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
mkTransmission_ :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> Maybe C.CbNonce -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
|
||||
mkTransmission_ ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCommands}} nonce_ (pKey_, entId, cmd) = do
|
||||
nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- maybe (atomically $ C.randomCbNonce clientCorrId) pure nonce_
|
||||
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, entId, cmd)
|
||||
auth = authTransmission (thAuth thParams) pKey_ nonce tForAuth
|
||||
r <- atomically $ mkRequest (CorrId corrId)
|
||||
mkTransmission :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
|
||||
mkTransmission ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCommands}} (pKey_, entId, cmd) = do
|
||||
corrId <- atomically getNextCorrId
|
||||
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, entId, cmd)
|
||||
auth = authTransmission (thAuth thParams) pKey_ corrId tForAuth
|
||||
r <- atomically $ mkRequest corrId
|
||||
pure ((,tToSend) <$> auth, r)
|
||||
where
|
||||
getNextCorrId :: STM CorrId
|
||||
getNextCorrId = CorrId <$> C.randomBytes 24 clientCorrId -- also used as nonce
|
||||
mkRequest :: CorrId -> STM (Request err msg)
|
||||
mkRequest corrId = do
|
||||
r <- Request entId <$> newEmptyTMVar
|
||||
r <- Request corrId entId <$> newEmptyTMVar
|
||||
TM.insert corrId r sentCommands
|
||||
pure r
|
||||
|
||||
authTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient) -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> C.CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either TransportError (Maybe TransmissionAuth)
|
||||
authTransmission thAuth pKey_ nonce t = traverse authenticate pKey_
|
||||
authTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient) -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> CorrId -> ByteString -> Either TransportError (Maybe TransmissionAuth)
|
||||
authTransmission thAuth pKey_ (CorrId corrId) t = traverse authenticate pKey_
|
||||
where
|
||||
authenticate :: C.APrivateAuthKey -> Either TransportError TransmissionAuth
|
||||
authenticate (C.APrivateAuthKey a pk) = case a of
|
||||
C.SX25519 -> case thAuth of
|
||||
Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k} -> Right $ TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk nonce t
|
||||
Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k} -> Right $ TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk (C.cbNonce corrId) t
|
||||
Nothing -> Left TENoServerAuth
|
||||
C.SEd25519 -> sign pk
|
||||
C.SEd448 -> sign pk
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ data SMPClientAgent = SMPClientAgent
|
||||
agentQ :: TBQueue SMPClientAgentEvent,
|
||||
randomDrg :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
|
||||
smpClients :: TMap SMPServer SMPClientVar,
|
||||
smpSessions :: TMap SessionId SMPClient,
|
||||
srvSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey),
|
||||
pendingSrvSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey),
|
||||
reconnections :: TVar [Async ()],
|
||||
@@ -136,7 +135,6 @@ newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} randomDrg
|
||||
msgQ <- newTBQueue msgQSize
|
||||
agentQ <- newTBQueue agentQSize
|
||||
smpClients <- TM.empty
|
||||
smpSessions <- TM.empty
|
||||
srvSubs <- TM.empty
|
||||
pendingSrvSubs <- TM.empty
|
||||
reconnections <- newTVar []
|
||||
@@ -149,7 +147,6 @@ newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} randomDrg
|
||||
agentQ,
|
||||
randomDrg,
|
||||
smpClients,
|
||||
smpSessions,
|
||||
srvSubs,
|
||||
pendingSrvSubs,
|
||||
reconnections,
|
||||
@@ -158,7 +155,7 @@ newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} randomDrg
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
getSMPServerClient' :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO SMPClient
|
||||
getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, smpSessions, msgQ, randomDrg, workerSeq} srv =
|
||||
getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ, randomDrg, workerSeq} srv =
|
||||
atomically getClientVar >>= either newSMPClient waitForSMPClient
|
||||
where
|
||||
getClientVar :: STM (Either SMPClientVar SMPClientVar)
|
||||
@@ -166,8 +163,8 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, smpSessions, msgQ,
|
||||
|
||||
waitForSMPClient :: SMPClientVar -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO SMPClient
|
||||
waitForSMPClient v = do
|
||||
let ProtocolClientConfig {networkConfig = NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout}} = smpCfg agentCfg
|
||||
smpClient_ <- liftIO $ tcpConnectTimeout `timeout` atomically (readTMVar $ sessionVar v)
|
||||
let ProtocolClientConfig {networkConfig = NetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout, tcpTimeout}} = smpCfg agentCfg
|
||||
smpClient_ <- liftIO $ (tcpConnectTimeout + tcpTimeout) `timeout` atomically (readTMVar $ sessionVar v)
|
||||
liftEither $ case smpClient_ of
|
||||
Just (Right smpClient) -> Right smpClient
|
||||
Just (Left e) -> Left e
|
||||
@@ -181,9 +178,7 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, smpSessions, msgQ,
|
||||
tryE (connectClient v) >>= \r -> case r of
|
||||
Right smp -> do
|
||||
logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ "Agent connected to " <> showServer srv
|
||||
atomically $ do
|
||||
putTMVar (sessionVar v) r
|
||||
TM.insert (sessionId $ thParams smp) smp smpSessions
|
||||
atomically $ putTMVar (sessionVar v) r
|
||||
successAction smp
|
||||
Left e -> do
|
||||
if e == PCENetworkError || e == PCEResponseTimeout
|
||||
@@ -205,14 +200,13 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, smpSessions, msgQ,
|
||||
connectClient v = ExceptT $ getProtocolClient randomDrg (1, srv, Nothing) (smpCfg agentCfg) (Just msgQ) (clientDisconnected v)
|
||||
|
||||
clientDisconnected :: SMPClientVar -> SMPClient -> IO ()
|
||||
clientDisconnected v smp = do
|
||||
removeClientAndSubs v smp >>= (`forM_` serverDown)
|
||||
clientDisconnected v _ = do
|
||||
removeClientAndSubs v >>= (`forM_` serverDown)
|
||||
logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ "Agent disconnected from " <> showServer srv
|
||||
|
||||
removeClientAndSubs :: SMPClientVar -> SMPClient -> IO (Maybe (Map SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey))
|
||||
removeClientAndSubs v smp = atomically $ do
|
||||
removeClientAndSubs :: SMPClientVar -> IO (Maybe (Map SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey))
|
||||
removeClientAndSubs v = atomically $ do
|
||||
removeSessVar v srv smpClients
|
||||
TM.delete (sessionId $ thParams smp) smpSessions
|
||||
TM.lookupDelete srv (srvSubs ca) >>= mapM updateSubs
|
||||
where
|
||||
updateSubs sVar = do
|
||||
@@ -277,9 +271,6 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, smpSessions, msgQ,
|
||||
notify :: SMPClientAgentEvent -> IO ()
|
||||
notify evt = atomically $ writeTBQueue (agentQ ca) evt
|
||||
|
||||
lookupSMPServerClient :: SMPClientAgent -> SessionId -> STM (Maybe SMPClient)
|
||||
lookupSMPServerClient SMPClientAgent {smpSessions} sessId = TM.lookup sessId smpSessions
|
||||
|
||||
closeSMPClientAgent :: SMPClientAgent -> IO ()
|
||||
closeSMPClientAgent c = do
|
||||
closeSMPServerClients c
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -141,7 +141,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
|
||||
sbEncrypt_,
|
||||
cbNonce,
|
||||
randomCbNonce,
|
||||
reverseNonce,
|
||||
|
||||
-- * NaCl crypto_secretbox
|
||||
SbKey (unSbKey),
|
||||
@@ -757,8 +756,6 @@ data Signature (a :: Algorithm) where
|
||||
SignatureEd25519 :: Ed25519.Signature -> Signature Ed25519
|
||||
SignatureEd448 :: Ed448.Signature -> Signature Ed448
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (Signature a)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (Signature a)
|
||||
|
||||
data ASignature
|
||||
@@ -1293,9 +1290,6 @@ randomCbNonce = fmap CryptoBoxNonce . randomBytes 24
|
||||
randomBytes :: Int -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ByteString
|
||||
randomBytes n gVar = stateTVar gVar $ randomBytesGenerate n
|
||||
|
||||
reverseNonce :: CbNonce -> CbNonce
|
||||
reverseNonce (CryptoBoxNonce s) = CryptoBoxNonce (B.reverse s)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding CbNonce where
|
||||
smpEncode = unCbNonce
|
||||
smpP = CryptoBoxNonce <$> A.take 24
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ instance Encoding ANewNtfEntity where
|
||||
instance Protocol NTFVersion ErrorType NtfResponse where
|
||||
type ProtoCommand NtfResponse = NtfCmd
|
||||
type ProtoType NtfResponse = 'PNTF
|
||||
protocolClientHandshake = ntfClientHandshake
|
||||
protocolClientHandshake c _ks = ntfClientHandshake c
|
||||
protocolPing = NtfCmd SSubscription PING
|
||||
protocolError = \case
|
||||
NRErr e -> Just e
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Text as T
|
||||
import Network.Socket (HostName)
|
||||
import Options.Applicative
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgentConfig (..), defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server (runNtfServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Env (NtfServerConfig (..), defaultInactiveClientExpiration)
|
||||
@@ -31,9 +30,6 @@ import System.FilePath (combine)
|
||||
import System.IO (BufferMode (..), hSetBuffering, stderr, stdout)
|
||||
import Text.Read (readMaybe)
|
||||
|
||||
defaultSMPBatchDelay :: Int
|
||||
defaultSMPBatchDelay = 10000
|
||||
|
||||
ntfServerCLI :: FilePath -> FilePath -> IO ()
|
||||
ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
|
||||
getCliCommand' (cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile) serverVersion >>= \case
|
||||
@@ -87,9 +83,7 @@ ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
|
||||
\# host is only used to print server address on start\n"
|
||||
<> ("host: " <> host <> "\n")
|
||||
<> ("port: " <> defaultServerPort <> "\n")
|
||||
<> "log_tls_errors: off\n\
|
||||
\# delay between command batches sent to SMP relays (microseconds), 0 to disable\n"
|
||||
<> ("smp_batch_delay: " <> show defaultSMPBatchDelay <> "\n")
|
||||
<> "log_tls_errors: off\n"
|
||||
<> "websockets: off\n\n\
|
||||
\[INACTIVE_CLIENTS]\n\
|
||||
\# TTL and interval to check inactive clients\n\
|
||||
@@ -111,8 +105,6 @@ ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
|
||||
enableStoreLog = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "enable" ini
|
||||
logStats = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "log_stats" ini
|
||||
c = combine cfgPath . ($ defaultX509Config)
|
||||
smpBatchDelay = readIniDefault defaultSMPBatchDelay "TRANSPORT" "smp_batch_delay" ini
|
||||
batchDelay = if smpBatchDelay <= 0 then Nothing else Just smpBatchDelay
|
||||
serverConfig =
|
||||
NtfServerConfig
|
||||
{ transports = iniTransports ini,
|
||||
@@ -121,7 +113,7 @@ ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
|
||||
clientQSize = 64,
|
||||
subQSize = 512,
|
||||
pushQSize = 1048,
|
||||
smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig {smpCfg = (smpCfg defaultSMPClientAgentConfig) {batchDelay}},
|
||||
smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig,
|
||||
apnsConfig = defaultAPNSPushClientConfig,
|
||||
subsBatchSize = 900,
|
||||
inactiveClientExpiration =
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -68,9 +68,7 @@ data NtfClientHandshake = NtfClientHandshake
|
||||
{ -- | agreed SMP notifications server protocol version
|
||||
ntfVersion :: VersionNTF,
|
||||
-- | server identity - CA certificate fingerprint
|
||||
keyHash :: C.KeyHash,
|
||||
-- pub key to agree shared secret for entity ID encryption, shared secret for command authorization is agreed using per-queue keys.
|
||||
authPubKey :: Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519
|
||||
keyHash :: C.KeyHash
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding NtfServerHandshake where
|
||||
@@ -95,21 +93,11 @@ authEncryptCmdsP :: VersionNTF -> Parser a -> Parser (Maybe a)
|
||||
authEncryptCmdsP v p = if v >= authBatchCmdsNTFVersion then Just <$> p else pure Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding NtfClientHandshake where
|
||||
smpEncode NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion, keyHash, authPubKey} =
|
||||
smpEncode (ntfVersion, keyHash) <> encodeNtfAuthPubKey ntfVersion authPubKey
|
||||
smpEncode NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion, keyHash} =
|
||||
smpEncode (ntfVersion, keyHash)
|
||||
smpP = do
|
||||
(ntfVersion, keyHash) <- smpP
|
||||
-- TODO drop SMP v6: remove special parser and make key non-optional
|
||||
authPubKey <- ntfAuthPubKeyP ntfVersion
|
||||
pure NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion, keyHash, authPubKey}
|
||||
|
||||
ntfAuthPubKeyP :: VersionNTF -> Parser (Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519)
|
||||
ntfAuthPubKeyP v = if v >= authBatchCmdsNTFVersion then Just <$> smpP else pure Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
encodeNtfAuthPubKey :: VersionNTF -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> ByteString
|
||||
encodeNtfAuthPubKey v k
|
||||
| v >= authBatchCmdsNTFVersion = maybe "" smpEncode k
|
||||
| otherwise = ""
|
||||
pure NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion, keyHash}
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Notifcations server transport handshake.
|
||||
ntfServerHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => C.APrivateSignKey -> c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeNTF -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleNTF c 'TServer)
|
||||
@@ -118,16 +106,16 @@ ntfServerHandshake serverSignKey c (k, pk) kh ntfVRange = do
|
||||
let sk = C.signX509 serverSignKey $ C.publicToX509 k
|
||||
sendHandshake th $ NtfServerHandshake {sessionId, ntfVersionRange = ntfVRange, authPubKey = Just sk}
|
||||
getHandshake th >>= \case
|
||||
NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = k'}
|
||||
NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion = v, keyHash}
|
||||
| keyHash /= kh ->
|
||||
throwError $ TEHandshake IDENTITY
|
||||
| v `isCompatible` ntfVRange ->
|
||||
pure $ ntfThHandleServer th v pk k'
|
||||
pure $ ntfThHandleServer th v pk
|
||||
| otherwise -> throwError $ TEHandshake VERSION
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Notifcations server client transport handshake.
|
||||
ntfClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeNTF -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleNTF c 'TClient)
|
||||
ntfClientHandshake c (k, pk) keyHash ntfVRange = do
|
||||
ntfClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeNTF -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleNTF c 'TClient)
|
||||
ntfClientHandshake c keyHash ntfVRange = do
|
||||
let th@THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId}} = ntfTHandle c
|
||||
NtfServerHandshake {sessionId = sessId, ntfVersionRange, authPubKey = sk'} <- getHandshake th
|
||||
if sessionId /= sessId
|
||||
@@ -138,18 +126,18 @@ ntfClientHandshake c (k, pk) keyHash ntfVRange = do
|
||||
serverKey <- getServerVerifyKey c
|
||||
pubKey <- C.verifyX509 serverKey signedKey
|
||||
(,(getServerCerts c, signedKey)) <$> (C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey)
|
||||
sendHandshake th $ NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = Just k}
|
||||
pure $ ntfThHandleClient th v pk ck_
|
||||
sendHandshake th $ NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion = v, keyHash}
|
||||
pure $ ntfThHandleClient th v ck_
|
||||
Nothing -> throwError $ TEHandshake VERSION
|
||||
|
||||
ntfThHandleServer :: forall c. THandleNTF c 'TServer -> VersionNTF -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> THandleNTF c 'TServer
|
||||
ntfThHandleServer th v pk k_ =
|
||||
let thAuth = (\k -> THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey = k, serverPrivKey = pk}) <$> k_
|
||||
in ntfThHandle_ th v thAuth
|
||||
ntfThHandleServer :: forall c. THandleNTF c 'TServer -> VersionNTF -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> THandleNTF c 'TServer
|
||||
ntfThHandleServer th v pk =
|
||||
let thAuth = THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, sessSecret' = Nothing}
|
||||
in ntfThHandle_ th v (Just thAuth)
|
||||
|
||||
ntfThHandleClient :: forall c. THandleNTF c 'TClient -> VersionNTF -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)) -> THandleNTF c 'TClient
|
||||
ntfThHandleClient th v pk ck_ =
|
||||
let thAuth = (\(k, ck) -> THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k, serverCertKey = ck, clientPrivKey = pk}) <$> ck_
|
||||
ntfThHandleClient :: forall c. THandleNTF c 'TClient -> VersionNTF -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)) -> THandleNTF c 'TClient
|
||||
ntfThHandleClient th v ck_ =
|
||||
let thAuth = (\(k, ck) -> THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k, serverCertKey = ck, sessSecret = Nothing}) <$> ck_
|
||||
in ntfThHandle_ th v thAuth
|
||||
|
||||
ntfThHandle_ :: forall c p. THandleNTF c p -> VersionNTF -> Maybe (THandleAuth p) -> THandleNTF c p
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -43,8 +43,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
( -- * SMP protocol parameters
|
||||
supportedSMPClientVRange,
|
||||
maxMessageLength,
|
||||
paddedProxiedMsgLength,
|
||||
paddedForwardedMsgLength,
|
||||
e2eEncConfirmationLength,
|
||||
e2eEncMessageLength,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -58,7 +56,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
SubscriptionMode (..),
|
||||
Party (..),
|
||||
Cmd (..),
|
||||
DirectParty,
|
||||
BrokerMsg (..),
|
||||
SParty (..),
|
||||
PartyI (..),
|
||||
@@ -66,7 +63,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
ProtocolErrorType (..),
|
||||
ErrorType (..),
|
||||
CommandError (..),
|
||||
ProxyError (..),
|
||||
Transmission,
|
||||
TransmissionAuth (..),
|
||||
SignedTransmission,
|
||||
@@ -125,12 +121,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
EncNMsgMeta,
|
||||
SMPMsgMeta (..),
|
||||
NMsgMeta (..),
|
||||
EncFwdResponse (..),
|
||||
EncFwdTransmission (..),
|
||||
EncResponse (..),
|
||||
EncTransmission (..),
|
||||
FwdResponse (..),
|
||||
FwdTransmission (..),
|
||||
MsgFlags (..),
|
||||
initialSMPClientVersion,
|
||||
userProtocol,
|
||||
@@ -198,10 +188,7 @@ import Data.String
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..))
|
||||
import Data.Type.Equality
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word16)
|
||||
import qualified Data.X509 as X
|
||||
import GHC.TypeLits (ErrorMessage (..), TypeError, type (+))
|
||||
import qualified GHC.TypeLits as TE
|
||||
import qualified GHC.TypeLits as Type
|
||||
import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
@@ -244,20 +231,6 @@ supportedSMPClientVRange = mkVersionRange initialSMPClientVersion currentSMPClie
|
||||
maxMessageLength :: Int
|
||||
maxMessageLength = 16088
|
||||
|
||||
-- without signature works with min 16151 (fails with 16150)
|
||||
-- with Ed448: 16265 (fails with 16264)
|
||||
-- with Ed25519: 16215 (fails with 16214)
|
||||
-- with X25519: 16232 (fails with 16231)
|
||||
paddedProxiedMsgLength :: Int
|
||||
paddedProxiedMsgLength = 16232
|
||||
|
||||
-- without signature works with min 16239 (fails with 16238)
|
||||
-- with Ed448: 16353 (fails with 16352)
|
||||
-- with Ed25519: 16303 (fails with 16302)
|
||||
-- with X25519: 16320 (fails with 16319)
|
||||
paddedForwardedMsgLength :: Int
|
||||
paddedForwardedMsgLength = 16320
|
||||
|
||||
type MaxMessageLen = 16088
|
||||
|
||||
-- 16 extra bytes: 8 for timestamp and 8 for flags (7 flags and the space, only 1 flag is currently used)
|
||||
@@ -271,7 +244,7 @@ e2eEncMessageLength :: Int
|
||||
e2eEncMessageLength = 16032
|
||||
|
||||
-- | SMP protocol clients
|
||||
data Party = Recipient | Sender | Notifier | ProxiedClient
|
||||
data Party = Recipient | Sender | Notifier
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Singleton types for SMP protocol clients
|
||||
@@ -279,13 +252,11 @@ data SParty :: Party -> Type where
|
||||
SRecipient :: SParty Recipient
|
||||
SSender :: SParty Sender
|
||||
SNotifier :: SParty Notifier
|
||||
SProxiedClient :: SParty ProxiedClient
|
||||
|
||||
instance TestEquality SParty where
|
||||
testEquality SRecipient SRecipient = Just Refl
|
||||
testEquality SSender SSender = Just Refl
|
||||
testEquality SNotifier SNotifier = Just Refl
|
||||
testEquality SProxiedClient SProxiedClient = Just Refl
|
||||
testEquality _ _ = Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (SParty p)
|
||||
@@ -298,15 +269,6 @@ instance PartyI Sender where sParty = SSender
|
||||
|
||||
instance PartyI Notifier where sParty = SNotifier
|
||||
|
||||
instance PartyI ProxiedClient where sParty = SProxiedClient
|
||||
|
||||
type family DirectParty (p :: Party) :: Constraint where
|
||||
DirectParty Recipient = ()
|
||||
DirectParty Sender = ()
|
||||
DirectParty Notifier = ()
|
||||
DirectParty p =
|
||||
(Int ~ Bool, TypeError (Type.Text "Party " :<>: ShowType p :<>: Type.Text " is not direct"))
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Type for client command of any participant.
|
||||
data Cmd = forall p. PartyI p => Cmd (SParty p) (Command p)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -397,17 +359,6 @@ data Command (p :: Party) where
|
||||
PING :: Command Sender
|
||||
-- SMP notification subscriber commands
|
||||
NSUB :: Command Notifier
|
||||
PRXY :: SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> Command ProxiedClient -- request a relay server connection by URI
|
||||
-- Transmission to proxy:
|
||||
-- - entity ID: ID of the session with relay returned in PKEY (response to PRXY)
|
||||
-- - corrId: also used as a nonce to encrypt transmission to relay, corrId + 1 - from relay
|
||||
-- - key (1st param in the command) is used to agree DH secret for this particular transmission and its response
|
||||
-- Encrypted transmission should include session ID (tlsunique) from proxy-relay connection.
|
||||
PFWD :: C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> Command ProxiedClient -- use CorrId as CbNonce, client to proxy
|
||||
-- Transmission forwarded to relay:
|
||||
-- - entity ID: empty
|
||||
-- - corrId: unique correlation ID between proxy and relay, also used as a nonce to encrypt forwarded transmission
|
||||
RFWD :: EncFwdTransmission -> Command Sender -- use CorrId as CbNonce, proxy to relay
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (Command p)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -433,25 +384,6 @@ instance Encoding SubscriptionMode where
|
||||
'C' -> pure SMOnlyCreate
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad SubscriptionMode"
|
||||
|
||||
newtype EncTransmission = EncTransmission ByteString
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data FwdTransmission = FwdTransmission
|
||||
{ fwdCorrId :: CorrId,
|
||||
fwdKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519,
|
||||
fwdTransmission :: EncTransmission
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding FwdTransmission where
|
||||
smpEncode FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t} =
|
||||
smpEncode (corrId, fwdKey, Tail t)
|
||||
smpP = do
|
||||
(corrId, fwdKey, Tail t) <- smpP
|
||||
pure FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t}
|
||||
|
||||
newtype EncFwdTransmission = EncFwdTransmission ByteString
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data BrokerMsg where
|
||||
-- SMP broker messages (responses, client messages, notifications)
|
||||
IDS :: QueueIdsKeys -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
@@ -461,10 +393,6 @@ data BrokerMsg where
|
||||
MSG :: RcvMessage -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
NID :: NotifierId -> RcvNtfPublicDhKey -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
NMSG :: C.CbNonce -> EncNMsgMeta -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
-- Should include certificate chain
|
||||
PKEY :: SessionId -> VersionRangeSMP -> (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey) -> BrokerMsg -- TLS-signed server key for proxy shared secret and initial sender key
|
||||
RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg -- relay to proxy
|
||||
PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
|
||||
END :: BrokerMsg
|
||||
OK :: BrokerMsg
|
||||
ERR :: ErrorType -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
@@ -477,24 +405,6 @@ data RcvMessage = RcvMessage
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
newtype EncFwdResponse = EncFwdResponse ByteString
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data FwdResponse = FwdResponse
|
||||
{ fwdCorrId :: CorrId,
|
||||
fwdResponse :: EncResponse
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding FwdResponse where
|
||||
smpEncode FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t} =
|
||||
smpEncode (corrId, Tail t)
|
||||
smpP = do
|
||||
(corrId, Tail t) <- smpP
|
||||
pure FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t}
|
||||
|
||||
newtype EncResponse = EncResponse ByteString
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | received message without server/recipient encryption
|
||||
data Message
|
||||
= Message
|
||||
@@ -657,9 +567,6 @@ data CommandTag (p :: Party) where
|
||||
DEL_ :: CommandTag Recipient
|
||||
SEND_ :: CommandTag Sender
|
||||
PING_ :: CommandTag Sender
|
||||
PRXY_ :: CommandTag ProxiedClient
|
||||
PFWD_ :: CommandTag ProxiedClient
|
||||
RFWD_ :: CommandTag Sender
|
||||
NSUB_ :: CommandTag Notifier
|
||||
|
||||
data CmdTag = forall p. PartyI p => CT (SParty p) (CommandTag p)
|
||||
@@ -673,9 +580,6 @@ data BrokerMsgTag
|
||||
| MSG_
|
||||
| NID_
|
||||
| NMSG_
|
||||
| PKEY_
|
||||
| RRES_
|
||||
| PRES_
|
||||
| END_
|
||||
| OK_
|
||||
| ERR_
|
||||
@@ -703,9 +607,6 @@ instance PartyI p => Encoding (CommandTag p) where
|
||||
DEL_ -> "DEL"
|
||||
SEND_ -> "SEND"
|
||||
PING_ -> "PING"
|
||||
PRXY_ -> "PRXY"
|
||||
PFWD_ -> "PFWD"
|
||||
RFWD_ -> "RFWD"
|
||||
NSUB_ -> "NSUB"
|
||||
smpP = messageTagP
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -722,9 +623,6 @@ instance ProtocolMsgTag CmdTag where
|
||||
"DEL" -> Just $ CT SRecipient DEL_
|
||||
"SEND" -> Just $ CT SSender SEND_
|
||||
"PING" -> Just $ CT SSender PING_
|
||||
"PRXY" -> Just $ CT SProxiedClient PRXY_
|
||||
"PFWD" -> Just $ CT SProxiedClient PFWD_
|
||||
"RFWD" -> Just $ CT SSender RFWD_
|
||||
"NSUB" -> Just $ CT SNotifier NSUB_
|
||||
_ -> Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -741,9 +639,6 @@ instance Encoding BrokerMsgTag where
|
||||
MSG_ -> "MSG"
|
||||
NID_ -> "NID"
|
||||
NMSG_ -> "NMSG"
|
||||
PKEY_ -> "PKEY"
|
||||
RRES_ -> "RRES"
|
||||
PRES_ -> "PRES"
|
||||
END_ -> "END"
|
||||
OK_ -> "OK"
|
||||
ERR_ -> "ERR"
|
||||
@@ -756,9 +651,6 @@ instance ProtocolMsgTag BrokerMsgTag where
|
||||
"MSG" -> Just MSG_
|
||||
"NID" -> Just NID_
|
||||
"NMSG" -> Just NMSG_
|
||||
"PKEY" -> Just PKEY_
|
||||
"RRES" -> Just RRES_
|
||||
"PRES" -> Just PRES_
|
||||
"END" -> Just END_
|
||||
"OK" -> Just OK_
|
||||
"ERR" -> Just ERR_
|
||||
@@ -937,7 +829,7 @@ type family UserProtocol (p :: ProtocolType) :: Constraint where
|
||||
UserProtocol PSMP = ()
|
||||
UserProtocol PXFTP = ()
|
||||
UserProtocol a =
|
||||
(Int ~ Bool, TypeError (TE.Text "Servers for protocol " :<>: ShowType a :<>: TE.Text " cannot be configured by the users"))
|
||||
(Int ~ Bool, TypeError (Text "Servers for protocol " :<>: ShowType a :<>: Text " cannot be configured by the users"))
|
||||
|
||||
userProtocol :: SProtocolType p -> Maybe (Dict (UserProtocol p))
|
||||
userProtocol = \case
|
||||
@@ -1146,8 +1038,6 @@ data ErrorType
|
||||
SESSION
|
||||
| -- | SMP command is unknown or has invalid syntax
|
||||
CMD {cmdErr :: CommandError}
|
||||
| -- | error from proxied relay
|
||||
PROXY {proxyErr :: ProxyError}
|
||||
| -- | command authorization error - bad signature or non-existing SMP queue
|
||||
AUTH
|
||||
| -- | SMP queue capacity is exceeded on the server
|
||||
@@ -1156,8 +1046,6 @@ data ErrorType
|
||||
NO_MSG
|
||||
| -- | sent message is too large (> maxMessageLength = 16088 bytes)
|
||||
LARGE_MSG
|
||||
| -- | relay public key is expired
|
||||
EXPIRED
|
||||
| -- | internal server error
|
||||
INTERNAL
|
||||
| -- | used internally, never returned by the server (to be removed)
|
||||
@@ -1167,12 +1055,8 @@ data ErrorType
|
||||
instance StrEncoding ErrorType where
|
||||
strEncode = \case
|
||||
CMD e -> "CMD " <> bshow e
|
||||
PROXY e -> "PROXY " <> bshow e
|
||||
e -> bshow e
|
||||
strP =
|
||||
"CMD " *> (CMD <$> parseRead1)
|
||||
<|> "PROXY " *> (PROXY <$> parseRead1)
|
||||
<|> parseRead1
|
||||
strP = "CMD " *> (CMD <$> parseRead1) <|> parseRead1
|
||||
|
||||
-- | SMP command error type.
|
||||
data CommandError
|
||||
@@ -1190,22 +1074,6 @@ data CommandError
|
||||
NO_ENTITY
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Read, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
-- TODO keep error params
|
||||
data ProxyError
|
||||
= -- | Correctly parsed SMP server ERR response.
|
||||
-- This error is forwarded to the agent client as `ERR SMP err`.
|
||||
PROTOCOL -- {protocolErr :: String}
|
||||
| -- | Invalid server response that failed to parse.
|
||||
-- Forwarded to the agent client as `ERR BROKER RESPONSE`.
|
||||
RESPONSE -- {responseErr :: String}
|
||||
| UNEXPECTED
|
||||
| TIMEOUT
|
||||
| NETWORK
|
||||
| BAD_HOST
|
||||
| NO_SESSION
|
||||
| TRANSPORT -- {transportErr :: TransportError}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Read, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | SMP transmission parser.
|
||||
transmissionP :: THandleParams v p -> Parser RawTransmission
|
||||
transmissionP THandleParams {sessionId, implySessId} = do
|
||||
@@ -1224,7 +1092,7 @@ transmissionP THandleParams {sessionId, implySessId} = do
|
||||
class (ProtocolEncoding v err msg, ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg), Show err, Show msg) => Protocol v err msg | msg -> v, msg -> err where
|
||||
type ProtoCommand msg = cmd | cmd -> msg
|
||||
type ProtoType msg = (sch :: ProtocolType) | sch -> msg
|
||||
protocolClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRange v -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle v c 'TClient)
|
||||
protocolClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> Maybe C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRange v -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle v c 'TClient)
|
||||
protocolPing :: ProtoCommand msg
|
||||
protocolError :: msg -> Maybe err
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1267,9 +1135,6 @@ instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType (Command p) where
|
||||
SEND flags msg -> e (SEND_, ' ', flags, ' ', Tail msg)
|
||||
PING -> e PING_
|
||||
NSUB -> e NSUB_
|
||||
PRXY host auth_ -> e (PRXY_, ' ', host, auth_)
|
||||
PFWD pubKey (EncTransmission s) -> e (PFWD_, ' ', pubKey, Tail s)
|
||||
RFWD (EncFwdTransmission s) -> e (RFWD_, ' ', Tail s)
|
||||
where
|
||||
e :: Encoding a => a -> ByteString
|
||||
e = smpEncode
|
||||
@@ -1279,33 +1144,24 @@ instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType (Command p) where
|
||||
fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @SMPVersion @ErrorType @BrokerMsg
|
||||
{-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
|
||||
|
||||
checkCredentials (auth, _, entId, _) cmd = case cmd of
|
||||
checkCredentials (auth, _, queueId, _) cmd = case cmd of
|
||||
-- NEW must have signature but NOT queue ID
|
||||
NEW {}
|
||||
| isNothing auth -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| not (B.null entId) -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
|
||||
| not (B.null queueId) -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
|
||||
| otherwise -> Right cmd
|
||||
-- SEND must have queue ID, signature is not always required
|
||||
SEND {}
|
||||
| B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
|
||||
| B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
|
||||
| otherwise -> Right cmd
|
||||
PING -> noAuthCmd
|
||||
PRXY {} -> noAuthCmd
|
||||
PFWD {}
|
||||
| B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
|
||||
| isNothing auth -> Right cmd
|
||||
-- PING must not have queue ID or signature
|
||||
PING
|
||||
| isNothing auth && B.null queueId -> Right cmd
|
||||
| otherwise -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
|
||||
RFWD _ -> noAuthCmd
|
||||
-- other client commands must have both signature and queue ID
|
||||
_
|
||||
| isNothing auth || B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| isNothing auth || B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| otherwise -> Right cmd
|
||||
where
|
||||
-- command must not have entity ID (queue or session ID) or signature
|
||||
noAuthCmd :: Either ErrorType (Command p)
|
||||
noAuthCmd
|
||||
| isNothing auth && B.null entId = Right cmd
|
||||
| otherwise = Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
|
||||
|
||||
instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType Cmd where
|
||||
type Tag Cmd = CmdTag
|
||||
@@ -1333,11 +1189,6 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType Cmd where
|
||||
Cmd SSender <$> case tag of
|
||||
SEND_ -> SEND <$> _smpP <*> (unTail <$> _smpP)
|
||||
PING_ -> pure PING
|
||||
RFWD_ -> RFWD <$> (EncFwdTransmission . unTail <$> _smpP)
|
||||
CT SProxiedClient tag ->
|
||||
Cmd SProxiedClient <$> case tag of
|
||||
PFWD_ -> PFWD <$> _smpP <*> (EncTransmission . unTail <$> smpP)
|
||||
PRXY_ -> PRXY <$> _smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
CT SNotifier NSUB_ -> pure $ Cmd SNotifier NSUB
|
||||
|
||||
fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @SMPVersion @ErrorType @BrokerMsg
|
||||
@@ -1353,9 +1204,6 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
e (MSG_, ' ', msgId, Tail body)
|
||||
NID nId srvNtfDh -> e (NID_, ' ', nId, srvNtfDh)
|
||||
NMSG nmsgNonce encNMsgMeta -> e (NMSG_, ' ', nmsgNonce, encNMsgMeta)
|
||||
PKEY sid vr (cert, key) -> e (PKEY_, ' ', sid, vr, C.encodeCertChain cert, C.SignedObject key)
|
||||
RRES (EncFwdResponse encBlock) -> e (RRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
|
||||
PRES (EncResponse encBlock) -> e (PRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
|
||||
END -> e END_
|
||||
OK -> e OK_
|
||||
ERR err -> e (ERR_, ' ', err)
|
||||
@@ -1373,9 +1221,6 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
IDS_ -> IDS <$> (QIK <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP)
|
||||
NID_ -> NID <$> _smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
NMSG_ -> NMSG <$> _smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
PKEY_ -> PKEY <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> ((,) <$> C.certChainP <*> (C.getSignedExact <$> smpP))
|
||||
RRES_ -> RRES <$> (EncFwdResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
|
||||
PRES_ -> PRES <$> (EncResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
|
||||
END_ -> pure END
|
||||
OK_ -> pure OK
|
||||
ERR_ -> ERR <$> _smpP
|
||||
@@ -1388,24 +1233,19 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
PEBlock -> BLOCK
|
||||
{-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
|
||||
|
||||
checkCredentials (_, _, entId, _) cmd = case cmd of
|
||||
checkCredentials (_, _, queueId, _) cmd = case cmd of
|
||||
-- IDS response should not have queue ID
|
||||
IDS _ -> Right cmd
|
||||
-- ERR response does not always have queue ID
|
||||
ERR _ -> Right cmd
|
||||
-- PONG response must not have queue ID
|
||||
PONG -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
PKEY {} -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
RRES _ -> noEntityMsg
|
||||
PONG
|
||||
| B.null queueId -> Right cmd
|
||||
| otherwise -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
|
||||
-- other broker responses must have queue ID
|
||||
_
|
||||
| B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
|
||||
| B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
|
||||
| otherwise -> Right cmd
|
||||
where
|
||||
noEntityMsg :: Either ErrorType BrokerMsg
|
||||
noEntityMsg
|
||||
| B.null entId = Right cmd
|
||||
| otherwise = Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Parse SMP protocol commands and broker messages
|
||||
parseProtocol :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err msg => Version v -> ByteString -> Either err msg
|
||||
@@ -1428,10 +1268,8 @@ instance Encoding ErrorType where
|
||||
BLOCK -> "BLOCK"
|
||||
SESSION -> "SESSION"
|
||||
CMD err -> "CMD " <> smpEncode err
|
||||
PROXY err -> "PROXY " <> smpEncode err
|
||||
AUTH -> "AUTH"
|
||||
QUOTA -> "QUOTA"
|
||||
EXPIRED -> "EXPIRED"
|
||||
NO_MSG -> "NO_MSG"
|
||||
LARGE_MSG -> "LARGE_MSG"
|
||||
INTERNAL -> "INTERNAL"
|
||||
@@ -1442,10 +1280,8 @@ instance Encoding ErrorType where
|
||||
"BLOCK" -> pure BLOCK
|
||||
"SESSION" -> pure SESSION
|
||||
"CMD" -> CMD <$> _smpP
|
||||
"PROXY" -> PROXY <$> _smpP
|
||||
"AUTH" -> pure AUTH
|
||||
"QUOTA" -> pure QUOTA
|
||||
"EXPIRED" -> pure EXPIRED
|
||||
"NO_MSG" -> pure NO_MSG
|
||||
"LARGE_MSG" -> pure LARGE_MSG
|
||||
"INTERNAL" -> pure INTERNAL
|
||||
@@ -1468,29 +1304,7 @@ instance Encoding CommandError where
|
||||
"NO_AUTH" -> pure NO_AUTH
|
||||
"HAS_AUTH" -> pure HAS_AUTH
|
||||
"NO_ENTITY" -> pure NO_ENTITY
|
||||
"NO_QUEUE" -> pure NO_ENTITY -- for backward compatibility
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad command error type"
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding ProxyError where
|
||||
smpEncode e = case e of
|
||||
PROTOCOL -> "PROTOCOL"
|
||||
RESPONSE -> "RESPONSE"
|
||||
UNEXPECTED -> "UNEXPECTED"
|
||||
TIMEOUT -> "TIMEOUT"
|
||||
NETWORK -> "NETWORK"
|
||||
BAD_HOST -> "BAD_HOST"
|
||||
NO_SESSION -> "NO_SESSION"
|
||||
TRANSPORT -> "TRANSPORT"
|
||||
smpP =
|
||||
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
|
||||
"PROTOCOL" -> pure PROTOCOL
|
||||
"RESPONSE" -> pure RESPONSE
|
||||
"UNEXPECTED" -> pure UNEXPECTED
|
||||
"TIMEOUT" -> pure TIMEOUT
|
||||
"NETWORK" -> pure NETWORK
|
||||
"BAD_HOST" -> pure BAD_HOST
|
||||
"NO_SESSION" -> pure NO_SESSION
|
||||
"TRANSPORT" -> pure TRANSPORT
|
||||
"NO_QUEUE" -> pure NO_ENTITY
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad command error type"
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Send signed SMP transmission to TCP transport.
|
||||
@@ -1630,6 +1444,4 @@ $(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''MsgFlags)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''CommandError)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''ProxyError)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''ErrorType)
|
||||
|
||||
+29
-133
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- |
|
||||
-- Module : Simplex.Messaging.Server
|
||||
@@ -42,7 +43,6 @@ import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Reader
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
|
||||
import Crypto.Random
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Base64 (encode)
|
||||
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ import Data.Functor (($>))
|
||||
import Data.Int (Int64)
|
||||
import qualified Data.IntMap.Strict as IM
|
||||
import Data.List (intercalate)
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
|
||||
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
|
||||
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
|
||||
@@ -68,10 +67,8 @@ import GHC.Stats (getRTSStats)
|
||||
import GHC.TypeLits (KnownNat)
|
||||
import Network.Socket (ServiceName, Socket, socketToHandle)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Lock
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClient (thParams), forwardSMPMessage, smpProxyError)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgent (..), SMPClientAgentEvent (..), getSMPServerClient', lookupSMPServerClient)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding (Encoding (smpEncode))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Control
|
||||
@@ -93,7 +90,6 @@ import System.Exit (exitFailure)
|
||||
import System.IO (hPrint, hPutStrLn, hSetNewlineMode, universalNewlineMode)
|
||||
import System.Mem.Weak (deRefWeak)
|
||||
import UnliftIO (timeout)
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Async (mapConcurrently)
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Concurrent
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Directory (doesFileExist, renameFile)
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Exception
|
||||
@@ -126,13 +122,11 @@ type M a = ReaderT Env IO a
|
||||
smpServer :: TMVar Bool -> ServerConfig -> M ()
|
||||
smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
|
||||
s <- asks server
|
||||
pa <- asks proxyAgent
|
||||
expired <- restoreServerMessages
|
||||
restoreServerStats expired
|
||||
raceAny_
|
||||
( serverThread s "server subscribedQ" subscribedQ subscribers subscriptions cancelSub
|
||||
: serverThread s "server ntfSubscribedQ" ntfSubscribedQ Env.notifiers ntfSubscriptions (\_ -> pure ())
|
||||
: receiveFromProxyAgent pa
|
||||
: map runServer transports <> expireMessagesThread_ cfg <> serverStatsThread_ cfg <> controlPortThread_ cfg
|
||||
)
|
||||
`finally` withLock' (savingLock s) "final" (saveServer False)
|
||||
@@ -185,19 +179,6 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
|
||||
mkWeakThreadId t >>= atomically . modifyTVar' (endThreads c) . IM.insert tId
|
||||
atomically $ TM.lookupDelete qId (clientSubs c)
|
||||
|
||||
receiveFromProxyAgent :: ProxyAgent -> M ()
|
||||
receiveFromProxyAgent ProxyAgent {smpAgent = SMPClientAgent {agentQ}} =
|
||||
forever $
|
||||
atomically (readTBQueue agentQ) >>= \case
|
||||
CAConnected srv -> logInfo $ "SMP server connected " <> showServer' srv
|
||||
CADisconnected srv [] -> logInfo $ "SMP server disconnected " <> showServer' srv
|
||||
CADisconnected srv subs -> logError $ "SMP server disconnected " <> showServer' srv <> " / subscriptions: " <> tshow (length subs)
|
||||
CAReconnected srv -> logInfo $ "SMP server reconnected " <> showServer' srv
|
||||
CAResubscribed srv subs -> logError $ "SMP server resubscribed " <> showServer' srv <> " / subscriptions: " <> tshow (length subs)
|
||||
CASubError srv errs -> logError $ "SMP server subscription errors " <> showServer' srv <> " / errors: " <> tshow (length errs)
|
||||
where
|
||||
showServer' = decodeLatin1 . strEncode . host
|
||||
|
||||
expireMessagesThread_ :: ServerConfig -> [M ()]
|
||||
expireMessagesThread_ ServerConfig {messageExpiration = Just msgExp} = [expireMessages msgExp]
|
||||
expireMessagesThread_ _ = []
|
||||
@@ -333,7 +314,7 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
|
||||
CPResume -> withAdminRole $ hPutStrLn h "resume not implemented"
|
||||
CPClients -> withAdminRole $ do
|
||||
active <- unliftIO u (asks clients) >>= readTVarIO
|
||||
hPutStrLn h "clientId,sessionId,connected,createdAt,rcvActiveAt,sndActiveAt,age,subscriptions"
|
||||
hPutStrLn h $ "clientId,sessionId,connected,createdAt,rcvActiveAt,sndActiveAt,age,subscriptions"
|
||||
forM_ (IM.toList active) $ \(cid, Client {sessionId, connected, createdAt, rcvActiveAt, sndActiveAt, subscriptions}) -> do
|
||||
connected' <- bshow <$> readTVarIO connected
|
||||
rcvActiveAt' <- strEncode <$> readTVarIO rcvActiveAt
|
||||
@@ -429,7 +410,7 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
|
||||
hPutStrLn h "AUTH"
|
||||
|
||||
runClientTransport :: Transport c => THandleSMP c 'TServer -> M ()
|
||||
runClientTransport th@THandle {params = thParams@THandleParams {thVersion, sessionId}} = do
|
||||
runClientTransport th@THandle {params = THandleParams {thVersion, sessionId}} = do
|
||||
q <- asks $ tbqSize . config
|
||||
ts <- liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
active <- asks clients
|
||||
@@ -441,7 +422,7 @@ runClientTransport th@THandle {params = thParams@THandleParams {thVersion, sessi
|
||||
s <- asks server
|
||||
expCfg <- asks $ inactiveClientExpiration . config
|
||||
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId
|
||||
raceAny_ ([liftIO $ send th c, client thParams c s, receive th c] <> disconnectThread_ c expCfg)
|
||||
raceAny_ ([liftIO $ send th c, client c s, receive th c] <> disconnectThread_ c expCfg)
|
||||
`finally` clientDisconnected c
|
||||
where
|
||||
disconnectThread_ c (Just expCfg) = [liftIO $ disconnectTransport th (rcvActiveAt c) (sndActiveAt c) expCfg (noSubscriptions c)]
|
||||
@@ -482,19 +463,19 @@ receive th@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth}} Client {rcvQ, sndQ, rcvActi
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
ts <- L.toList <$> liftIO (tGet th)
|
||||
atomically . writeTVar rcvActiveAt =<< liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
(errs, cmds) <- partitionEithers <$> mapM cmdAction ts
|
||||
write sndQ errs
|
||||
write rcvQ cmds
|
||||
as <- partitionEithers <$> mapM cmdAction ts
|
||||
write sndQ $ fst as
|
||||
write rcvQ $ snd as
|
||||
where
|
||||
cmdAction :: SignedTransmission ErrorType Cmd -> M (Either (Transmission BrokerMsg) (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd))
|
||||
cmdAction (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, entId, cmdOrError)) =
|
||||
cmdAction (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, queueId, cmdOrError)) =
|
||||
case cmdOrError of
|
||||
Left e -> pure $ Left (corrId, entId, ERR e)
|
||||
Right cmd -> verified <$> verifyTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (bs corrId)) <$> thAuth) tAuth authorized entId cmd
|
||||
Left e -> pure $ Left (corrId, queueId, ERR e)
|
||||
Right cmd -> verified <$> verifyTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (bs corrId)) <$> thAuth) tAuth authorized queueId cmd
|
||||
where
|
||||
verified = \case
|
||||
VRVerified qr -> Right (qr, (corrId, entId, cmd))
|
||||
VRFailed -> Left (corrId, entId, ERR AUTH)
|
||||
VRVerified qr -> Right (qr, (corrId, queueId, cmd))
|
||||
VRFailed -> Left (corrId, queueId, ERR AUTH)
|
||||
write q = mapM_ (atomically . writeTBQueue q) . L.nonEmpty
|
||||
|
||||
send :: Transport c => THandleSMP c 'TServer -> Client -> IO ()
|
||||
@@ -541,18 +522,16 @@ verifyTransmission auth_ tAuth authorized queueId cmd =
|
||||
-- SEND will be accepted without authorization before the queue is secured with KEY command
|
||||
Cmd SSender SEND {} -> verifyQueue (\q -> Just q `verified` maybe (isNothing tAuth) verify (senderKey q)) <$> get SSender
|
||||
Cmd SSender PING -> pure $ VRVerified Nothing
|
||||
Cmd SSender RFWD {} -> pure $ VRVerified Nothing
|
||||
-- NSUB will not be accepted without authorization
|
||||
Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> verifyQueue (\q -> maybe dummyVerify (\n -> Just q `verifiedWith` notifierKey n) (notifier q)) <$> get SNotifier
|
||||
Cmd SProxiedClient _ -> pure $ VRVerified Nothing
|
||||
Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> verifyQueue (\q -> maybe dummyVerify (Just q `verifiedWith`) (notifierKey <$> notifier q)) <$> get SNotifier
|
||||
where
|
||||
verify = verifyCmdAuthorization auth_ tAuth authorized
|
||||
dummyVerify = verify (dummyAuthKey tAuth) `seq` VRFailed
|
||||
verifyQueue :: (QueueRec -> VerificationResult) -> Either ErrorType QueueRec -> VerificationResult
|
||||
verifyQueue = either (const dummyVerify)
|
||||
verifyQueue = either (\_ -> dummyVerify)
|
||||
verified q cond = if cond then VRVerified q else VRFailed
|
||||
verifiedWith q k = q `verified` verify k
|
||||
get :: DirectParty p => SParty p -> M (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
|
||||
get :: SParty p -> M (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
|
||||
get party = do
|
||||
st <- asks queueStore
|
||||
atomically $ getQueue st party queueId
|
||||
@@ -602,55 +581,25 @@ dummyKeyEd448 = "MEMwBQYDK2VxAzoA6ibQc9XpkSLtwrf7PLvp81qW/etiumckVFImCMRdftcG/Xo
|
||||
dummyKeyX25519 :: C.PublicKey 'C.X25519
|
||||
dummyKeyX25519 = "MCowBQYDK2VuAyEA4JGSMYht18H4mas/jHeBwfcM7jLwNYJNOAhi2/g4RXg="
|
||||
|
||||
client :: THandleParams SMPVersion 'TServer -> Client -> Server -> M ()
|
||||
client thParams' clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessionId} Server {subscribedQ, ntfSubscribedQ, notifiers} = do
|
||||
client :: Client -> Server -> M ()
|
||||
client clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessionId} Server {subscribedQ, ntfSubscribedQ, notifiers} = do
|
||||
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " commands"
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
(proxied, rs) <- partitionEithers . L.toList <$> (mapM processCommand =<< atomically (readTBQueue rcvQ))
|
||||
forM_ (L.nonEmpty rs) reply
|
||||
-- TODO cancel this thread if the client gets disconnected
|
||||
-- TODO limit client concurrency
|
||||
forM_ (L.nonEmpty proxied) $ \cmds -> forkIO $ mapConcurrently processProxiedCmd cmds >>= reply
|
||||
forever $
|
||||
atomically (readTBQueue rcvQ)
|
||||
>>= mapM processCommand
|
||||
>>= atomically . writeTBQueue sndQ
|
||||
where
|
||||
reply :: MonadIO m => NonEmpty (Transmission BrokerMsg) -> m ()
|
||||
reply = atomically . writeTBQueue sndQ
|
||||
processProxiedCmd :: Transmission (Command 'ProxiedClient) -> M (Transmission BrokerMsg)
|
||||
processProxiedCmd (corrId, sessId, command) = (corrId, sessId,) <$> case command of
|
||||
PRXY srv auth -> ifM allowProxy getRelay (pure $ ERR AUTH)
|
||||
where
|
||||
allowProxy = do
|
||||
ServerConfig {allowSMPProxy, newQueueBasicAuth} <- asks config
|
||||
pure $ allowSMPProxy && maybe True ((== auth) . Just) newQueueBasicAuth
|
||||
getRelay = do
|
||||
ProxyAgent {smpAgent} <- asks proxyAgent
|
||||
-- TODO catch IO errors too
|
||||
liftIO $ proxyResp <$> runExceptT (getSMPServerClient' smpAgent srv)
|
||||
where
|
||||
proxyResp = \case
|
||||
Right smp ->
|
||||
let THandleParams {sessionId = srvSessId, thAuth} = thParams smp
|
||||
vr = supportedServerSMPRelayVRange
|
||||
in case thAuth of
|
||||
Just THAuthClient {serverCertKey} -> PKEY srvSessId vr serverCertKey
|
||||
Nothing -> ERR $ PROXY TRANSPORT -- TODO different error?
|
||||
Left err -> ERR $ smpProxyError err
|
||||
PFWD pubKey encBlock -> do
|
||||
ProxyAgent {smpAgent} <- asks proxyAgent
|
||||
atomically (lookupSMPServerClient smpAgent sessId) >>= \case
|
||||
Just smp -> liftIO $ either (ERR . smpProxyError) PRES <$> runExceptT (forwardSMPMessage smp corrId pubKey encBlock)
|
||||
Nothing -> pure $ ERR $ PROXY NO_SESSION
|
||||
processCommand :: (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd) -> M (Either (Transmission (Command 'ProxiedClient)) (Transmission BrokerMsg))
|
||||
processCommand :: (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd) -> M (Transmission BrokerMsg)
|
||||
processCommand (qr_, (corrId, queueId, cmd)) = do
|
||||
st <- asks queueStore
|
||||
case cmd of
|
||||
Cmd SProxiedClient command -> pure $ Left (corrId, queueId, command)
|
||||
Cmd SSender command -> Right <$> case command of
|
||||
SEND flags msgBody -> withQueue $ \qr -> sendMessage qr flags msgBody
|
||||
PING -> pure (corrId, "", PONG)
|
||||
RFWD encBlock -> (corrId, "",) <$> processForwardedCommand encBlock
|
||||
Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> Right <$> subscribeNotifications
|
||||
Cmd SSender command ->
|
||||
case command of
|
||||
SEND flags msgBody -> withQueue $ \qr -> sendMessage qr flags msgBody
|
||||
PING -> pure (corrId, "", PONG)
|
||||
Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> subscribeNotifications
|
||||
Cmd SRecipient command ->
|
||||
Right <$> case command of
|
||||
case command of
|
||||
NEW rKey dhKey auth subMode ->
|
||||
ifM
|
||||
allowNew
|
||||
@@ -914,59 +863,6 @@ client thParams' clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessi
|
||||
encNMsgMeta = C.cbEncrypt rcvNtfDhSecret cbNonce (smpEncode msgMeta) 128
|
||||
pure . (cbNonce,) $ fromRight "" encNMsgMeta
|
||||
|
||||
processForwardedCommand :: EncFwdTransmission -> M BrokerMsg
|
||||
processForwardedCommand (EncFwdTransmission s) = fmap (either id id) . runExceptT $ do
|
||||
-- TODO error
|
||||
THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey, serverPrivKey} <- maybe (throwError $ ERR INTERNAL) pure thAuth
|
||||
-- TODO compute during handshake?
|
||||
let sessSecret = C.dh' clientPeerPubKey serverPrivKey
|
||||
proxyNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs corrId
|
||||
-- TODO error
|
||||
s' <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ C.cbDecrypt sessSecret proxyNonce s
|
||||
-- TODO error
|
||||
FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission et} <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ smpDecode s'
|
||||
-- TODO error - this error is reported to proxy, as we failed to get to client's transmission
|
||||
let clientSecret = C.dh' fwdKey serverPrivKey
|
||||
clientNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs fwdCorrId
|
||||
b <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ C.cbDecrypt clientSecret clientNonce et
|
||||
-- only allowing single forwarded transactions
|
||||
let t' = tDecodeParseValidate thParams' $ L.head $ tParse thParams' b
|
||||
clntThAuth = Just $ THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey = fwdKey, serverPrivKey}
|
||||
-- TODO error
|
||||
r <-
|
||||
lift (rejectOrVerify clntThAuth t') >>= \case
|
||||
Left r -> pure r
|
||||
Right t''@(_, (corrId', entId', _)) ->
|
||||
-- Left will not be returned by processCommand, as only SEND command is allowed
|
||||
fromRight (corrId', entId', ERR INTERNAL) <$> lift (processCommand t'')
|
||||
|
||||
-- encode response
|
||||
r' <- case batchTransmissions (batch thParams') (blockSize thParams') [Right (Nothing, encodeTransmission thParams' r)] of
|
||||
[] -> throwE $ ERR INTERNAL -- TODO error
|
||||
TBError _ _ : _ -> throwE $ ERR INTERNAL -- TODO error
|
||||
TBTransmission b' _ : _ -> pure b'
|
||||
TBTransmissions b' _ _ : _ -> pure b'
|
||||
-- encrypt to client
|
||||
r2 <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ EncResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt clientSecret (C.reverseNonce clientNonce) r' paddedProxiedMsgLength
|
||||
-- encrypt to proxy
|
||||
let fr = FwdResponse {fwdCorrId, fwdResponse = r2}
|
||||
r3 <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ EncFwdResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt sessSecret (C.reverseNonce proxyNonce) (smpEncode fr) paddedForwardedMsgLength
|
||||
pure $ RRES r3
|
||||
where
|
||||
internalErr _ = ERR INTERNAL -- TODO errors
|
||||
THandleParams {thAuth} = thParams'
|
||||
rejectOrVerify :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmission ErrorType Cmd -> M (Either (Transmission BrokerMsg) (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd))
|
||||
rejectOrVerify clntThAuth (tAuth, authorized, (corrId', entId', cmdOrError)) =
|
||||
case cmdOrError of
|
||||
Left e -> pure $ Left (corrId', entId', ERR e)
|
||||
-- flags msgBody -> withQueue $ \qr -> sendMessage qr flags msgBody
|
||||
Right cmd'@(Cmd SSender SEND {}) -> verified <$> verifyTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (bs corrId')) <$> clntThAuth) tAuth authorized entId' cmd'
|
||||
where
|
||||
verified = \case
|
||||
VRVerified qr -> Right (qr, (corrId', entId', cmd'))
|
||||
VRFailed -> Left (corrId', entId', ERR AUTH)
|
||||
Right _ -> pure $ Left (corrId', entId', ERR $ CMD PROHIBITED)
|
||||
|
||||
deliverMessage :: T.Text -> QueueRec -> RecipientId -> TVar Sub -> MsgQueue -> Maybe Message -> M (Transmission BrokerMsg)
|
||||
deliverMessage name qr rId sub q msg_ = time (name <> " deliver") $ do
|
||||
readTVarIO sub >>= \case
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
|
||||
import qualified Network.TLS as T
|
||||
import Numeric.Natural
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Lock
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgent, SMPClientAgentConfig, newSMPClientAgent)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto (KeyHash (..))
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
@@ -34,7 +33,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport, VersionRangeSMP, VersionSMP)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport, VersionSMP, VersionRangeSMP)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (SocketState, TransportServerConfig, loadFingerprint, loadTLSServerParams, newSocketState)
|
||||
import System.IO (IOMode (..))
|
||||
import System.Mem.Weak (Weak)
|
||||
@@ -80,9 +79,7 @@ data ServerConfig = ServerConfig
|
||||
-- | TCP transport config
|
||||
transportConfig :: TransportServerConfig,
|
||||
-- | run listener on control port
|
||||
controlPort :: Maybe ServiceName,
|
||||
smpAgentCfg :: SMPClientAgentConfig,
|
||||
allowSMPProxy :: Bool -- auth is the same with `newQueueBasicAuth`
|
||||
controlPort :: Maybe ServiceName
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
defMsgExpirationDays :: Int64
|
||||
@@ -113,9 +110,8 @@ data Env = Env
|
||||
tlsServerParams :: T.ServerParams,
|
||||
serverStats :: ServerStats,
|
||||
sockets :: SocketState,
|
||||
clientSeq :: TVar ClientId,
|
||||
clients :: TVar (IntMap Client),
|
||||
proxyAgent :: ProxyAgent -- senders served on this proxy
|
||||
clientSeq :: TVar Int,
|
||||
clients :: TVar (IntMap Client)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
data Server = Server
|
||||
@@ -126,14 +122,8 @@ data Server = Server
|
||||
savingLock :: Lock
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
data ProxyAgent = ProxyAgent
|
||||
{ smpAgent :: SMPClientAgent
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type ClientId = Int
|
||||
|
||||
data Client = Client
|
||||
{ clientId :: ClientId,
|
||||
{ clientId :: Int,
|
||||
subscriptions :: TMap RecipientId (TVar Sub),
|
||||
ntfSubscriptions :: TMap NotifierId (),
|
||||
rcvQ :: TBQueue (NonEmpty (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd)),
|
||||
@@ -145,8 +135,7 @@ data Client = Client
|
||||
connected :: TVar Bool,
|
||||
createdAt :: SystemTime,
|
||||
rcvActiveAt :: TVar SystemTime,
|
||||
sndActiveAt :: TVar SystemTime,
|
||||
proxyClient_ :: TVar (Maybe C.DhSecretX25519) -- this client is actually an SMP proxy
|
||||
sndActiveAt :: TVar SystemTime
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
data SubscriptionThread = NoSub | SubPending | SubThread (Weak ThreadId) | ProhibitSub
|
||||
@@ -165,7 +154,7 @@ newServer = do
|
||||
savingLock <- createLock
|
||||
return Server {subscribedQ, subscribers, ntfSubscribedQ, notifiers, savingLock}
|
||||
|
||||
newClient :: TVar ClientId -> Natural -> VersionSMP -> ByteString -> SystemTime -> STM Client
|
||||
newClient :: TVar Int -> Natural -> VersionSMP -> ByteString -> SystemTime -> STM Client
|
||||
newClient nextClientId qSize thVersion sessionId createdAt = do
|
||||
clientId <- stateTVar nextClientId $ \next -> (next, next + 1)
|
||||
subscriptions <- TM.empty
|
||||
@@ -177,8 +166,7 @@ newClient nextClientId qSize thVersion sessionId createdAt = do
|
||||
connected <- newTVar True
|
||||
rcvActiveAt <- newTVar createdAt
|
||||
sndActiveAt <- newTVar createdAt
|
||||
proxyClient_ <- newTVar Nothing
|
||||
return Client {clientId, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, endThreads, endThreadSeq, thVersion, sessionId, connected, createdAt, rcvActiveAt, sndActiveAt, proxyClient_}
|
||||
return Client {clientId, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, endThreads, endThreadSeq, thVersion, sessionId, connected, createdAt, rcvActiveAt, sndActiveAt}
|
||||
|
||||
newSubscription :: SubscriptionThread -> STM Sub
|
||||
newSubscription subThread = do
|
||||
@@ -186,7 +174,7 @@ newSubscription subThread = do
|
||||
return Sub {subThread, delivered}
|
||||
|
||||
newEnv :: ServerConfig -> IO Env
|
||||
newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile, storeLogFile, smpAgentCfg} = do
|
||||
newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile, storeLogFile} = do
|
||||
server <- atomically newServer
|
||||
queueStore <- atomically newQueueStore
|
||||
msgStore <- atomically newMsgStore
|
||||
@@ -199,8 +187,7 @@ newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile,
|
||||
sockets <- atomically newSocketState
|
||||
clientSeq <- newTVarIO 0
|
||||
clients <- newTVarIO mempty
|
||||
proxyAgent <- atomically $ newSMPProxyAgent smpAgentCfg random
|
||||
return Env {config, server, serverIdentity, queueStore, msgStore, random, storeLog, tlsServerParams, serverStats, sockets, clientSeq, clients, proxyAgent}
|
||||
return Env {config, server, serverIdentity, queueStore, msgStore, random, storeLog, tlsServerParams, serverStats, sockets, clientSeq, clients}
|
||||
where
|
||||
restoreQueues :: QueueStore -> FilePath -> IO (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
|
||||
restoreQueues QueueStore {queues, senders, notifiers} f = do
|
||||
@@ -216,8 +203,3 @@ newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile,
|
||||
addNotifier q = case notifier q of
|
||||
Nothing -> id
|
||||
Just NtfCreds {notifierId} -> M.insert notifierId (recipientId q)
|
||||
|
||||
newSMPProxyAgent :: SMPClientAgentConfig -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ProxyAgent
|
||||
newSMPProxyAgent smpAgentCfg random = do
|
||||
smpAgent <- newSMPClientAgent smpAgentCfg random
|
||||
pure ProxyAgent {smpAgent}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,8 +18,6 @@ import qualified Data.Text as T
|
||||
import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
|
||||
import Network.Socket (HostName)
|
||||
import Options.Applicative
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgentConfig (..), defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BasicAuth (..), ProtoServerWithAuth (ProtoServerWithAuth), pattern SMPServer)
|
||||
@@ -27,11 +25,10 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server (runSMPServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM (ServerConfig (..), defMsgExpirationDays, defaultInactiveClientExpiration, defaultMessageExpiration)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (simplexMQVersion, supportedServerSMPRelayVRange, batchCmdsSMPVersion, sendingProxySMPVersion)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (simplexMQVersion, supportedServerSMPRelayVRange)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (TransportServerConfig (..), defaultTransportServerConfig)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (safeDecodeUtf8)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version (mkVersionRange)
|
||||
import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing, doesFileExist)
|
||||
import System.FilePath (combine)
|
||||
import System.IO (BufferMode (..), hSetBuffering, stderr, stdout)
|
||||
@@ -216,9 +213,7 @@ smpServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
|
||||
defaultTransportServerConfig
|
||||
{ logTLSErrors = fromMaybe False $ iniOnOff "TRANSPORT" "log_tls_errors" ini
|
||||
},
|
||||
controlPort = either (const Nothing) (Just . T.unpack) $ lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "control_port" ini,
|
||||
smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig {smpCfg = (smpCfg defaultSMPClientAgentConfig) {serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion}},
|
||||
allowSMPProxy = True -- TODO: "get from INI"
|
||||
controlPort = either (const Nothing) (Just . T.unpack) $ lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "control_port" ini
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
data CliCommand
|
||||
@@ -310,3 +305,4 @@ cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile =
|
||||
pure InitOptions {enableStoreLog, logStats, signAlgorithm, ip, fqdn, password, scripted}
|
||||
parseBasicAuth :: ReadM ServerPassword
|
||||
parseBasicAuth = eitherReader $ fmap ServerPassword . strDecode . B.pack
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ addQueue QueueStore {queues, senders} q@QueueRec {recipientId = rId, senderId =
|
||||
where
|
||||
hasId = (||) <$> TM.member rId queues <*> TM.member sId senders
|
||||
|
||||
getQueue :: DirectParty p => QueueStore -> SParty p -> QueueId -> STM (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
|
||||
getQueue :: QueueStore -> SParty p -> QueueId -> STM (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
|
||||
getQueue QueueStore {queues, senders, notifiers} party qId =
|
||||
toResult <$> (mapM readTVar =<< getVar)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
|
||||
basicAuthSMPVersion,
|
||||
subModeSMPVersion,
|
||||
authCmdsSMPVersion,
|
||||
sendingProxySMPVersion,
|
||||
simplexMQVersion,
|
||||
smpBlockSize,
|
||||
TransportConfig (..),
|
||||
@@ -79,7 +78,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
|
||||
)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
|
||||
import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
|
||||
import Control.Monad (forM)
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except (throwE)
|
||||
@@ -115,11 +114,6 @@ import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
|
||||
-- * Transport parameters
|
||||
|
||||
-- min size it works with:
|
||||
-- unsigned message: 16292 (paddedProxiedMsgLength = 16151, paddedForwardedMsgLength = 16239)
|
||||
-- Ed448: 16406 (16384 + 22, fails with 21)
|
||||
-- Ed25519: 16356
|
||||
-- X25519: 16381
|
||||
smpBlockSize :: Int
|
||||
smpBlockSize = 16384
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -155,9 +149,6 @@ subModeSMPVersion = VersionSMP 6
|
||||
authCmdsSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
authCmdsSMPVersion = VersionSMP 7
|
||||
|
||||
sendingProxySMPVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
sendingProxySMPVersion = VersionSMP 8
|
||||
|
||||
currentClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
|
||||
currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 6
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -345,14 +336,14 @@ data THandleParams v p = THandleParams
|
||||
|
||||
data THandleAuth (p :: TransportPeer) where
|
||||
THAuthClient ::
|
||||
{ serverPeerPubKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519, -- used only in the client to combine with per-queue key
|
||||
serverCertKey :: (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey), -- the key here is clientPrivKey signed with server certificate
|
||||
clientPrivKey :: C.PrivateKeyX25519 -- used to combine with peer's per-queue key (currently only in the server)
|
||||
{ serverPeerPubKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519, -- used by the client to combine with client's private per-queue key
|
||||
serverCertKey :: (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey), -- the key here is serverPeerPubKey signed with server certificate
|
||||
sessSecret :: Maybe C.DhSecretX25519 -- session secret (will be used in SMP proxy only)
|
||||
} ->
|
||||
THandleAuth 'TClient
|
||||
THAuthServer ::
|
||||
{ clientPeerPubKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519, -- used only in the client to combine with per-queue key
|
||||
serverPrivKey :: C.PrivateKeyX25519 -- used to combine with peer's per-queue key (currently only in the server)
|
||||
{ serverPrivKey :: C.PrivateKeyX25519, -- used by the server to combine with client's public per-queue key
|
||||
sessSecret' :: Maybe C.DhSecretX25519 -- session secret (will be used in SMP proxy only)
|
||||
} ->
|
||||
THandleAuth 'TServer
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -363,7 +354,6 @@ data ServerHandshake = ServerHandshake
|
||||
{ smpVersionRange :: VersionRangeSMP,
|
||||
sessionId :: SessionId,
|
||||
-- pub key to agree shared secrets for command authorization and entity ID encryption.
|
||||
-- todo C.PublicKeyX25519
|
||||
authPubKey :: Maybe (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -409,7 +399,7 @@ encodeAuthEncryptCmds v k
|
||||
| otherwise = ""
|
||||
|
||||
authEncryptCmdsP :: VersionSMP -> Parser a -> Parser (Maybe a)
|
||||
authEncryptCmdsP v p = if v >= authCmdsSMPVersion then Just <$> p else pure Nothing
|
||||
authEncryptCmdsP v p = if v >= authCmdsSMPVersion then optional p else pure Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Error of SMP encrypted transport over TCP.
|
||||
data TransportError
|
||||
@@ -490,8 +480,8 @@ smpServerHandshake serverSignKey c (k, pk) kh smpVRange = do
|
||||
-- | Client SMP transport handshake.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#appendix-a
|
||||
smpClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeSMP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleSMP c 'TClient)
|
||||
smpClientHandshake c (k, pk) keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) smpVRange = do
|
||||
smpClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> Maybe C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeSMP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleSMP c 'TClient)
|
||||
smpClientHandshake c ks_ keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) smpVRange = do
|
||||
let th@THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId}} = smpTHandle c
|
||||
ServerHandshake {sessionId = sessId, smpVersionRange, authPubKey} <- getHandshake th
|
||||
if sessionId /= sessId
|
||||
@@ -506,18 +496,18 @@ smpClientHandshake c (k, pk) keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) smpVRange = do
|
||||
serverKey <- getServerVerifyKey c
|
||||
pubKey <- C.verifyX509 serverKey exact
|
||||
(,certKey) <$> (C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey)
|
||||
sendHandshake th $ ClientHandshake {smpVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = Just k}
|
||||
pure $ smpThHandleClient th v pk ck_
|
||||
sendHandshake th $ ClientHandshake {smpVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = fst <$> ks_}
|
||||
pure $ smpThHandleClient th v (snd <$> ks_) ck_
|
||||
Nothing -> throwE $ TEHandshake VERSION
|
||||
|
||||
smpThHandleServer :: forall c. THandleSMP c 'TServer -> VersionSMP -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> THandleSMP c 'TServer
|
||||
smpThHandleServer th v pk k_ =
|
||||
let thAuth = (\k -> THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey = k, serverPrivKey = pk}) <$> k_
|
||||
in smpThHandle_ th v thAuth
|
||||
let thAuth = THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk, sessSecret' = (`C.dh'` pk) <$> k_}
|
||||
in smpThHandle_ th v (Just thAuth)
|
||||
|
||||
smpThHandleClient :: forall c. THandleSMP c 'TClient -> VersionSMP -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)) -> THandleSMP c 'TClient
|
||||
smpThHandleClient th v pk ck_ =
|
||||
let thAuth = (\(k, ck) -> THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k, serverCertKey = ck, clientPrivKey = pk}) <$> ck_
|
||||
smpThHandleClient :: forall c. THandleSMP c 'TClient -> VersionSMP -> Maybe C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)) -> THandleSMP c 'TClient
|
||||
smpThHandleClient th v pk_ ck_ =
|
||||
let thAuth = (\(k, ck) -> THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k, serverCertKey = ck, sessSecret = C.dh' k <$> pk_}) <$> ck_
|
||||
in smpThHandle_ th v thAuth
|
||||
|
||||
smpThHandle_ :: forall c p. THandleSMP c p -> VersionSMP -> Maybe (THandleAuth p) -> THandleSMP c p
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client
|
||||
runTLSTransportClient,
|
||||
smpClientHandshake,
|
||||
defaultSMPPort,
|
||||
defaultTcpConnectTimeout,
|
||||
defaultTransportClientConfig,
|
||||
defaultSocksProxy,
|
||||
TransportClientConfig (..),
|
||||
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.KeepAlive
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, (<$?>), catchAll, tshow)
|
||||
import System.IO.Error
|
||||
import System.Timeout (timeout)
|
||||
import Text.Read (readMaybe)
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Exception (IOException)
|
||||
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
|
||||
@@ -112,6 +114,7 @@ instance IsString (NonEmpty TransportHost) where fromString = parseString strDec
|
||||
|
||||
data TransportClientConfig = TransportClientConfig
|
||||
{ socksProxy :: Maybe SocksProxy,
|
||||
tcpConnectTimeout :: Int,
|
||||
tcpKeepAlive :: Maybe KeepAliveOpts,
|
||||
logTLSErrors :: Bool,
|
||||
clientCredentials :: Maybe (X.CertificateChain, T.PrivKey),
|
||||
@@ -119,8 +122,12 @@ data TransportClientConfig = TransportClientConfig
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
-- time to resolve host, connect socket, set up TLS
|
||||
defaultTcpConnectTimeout :: Int
|
||||
defaultTcpConnectTimeout = 10000000
|
||||
|
||||
defaultTransportClientConfig :: TransportClientConfig
|
||||
defaultTransportClientConfig = TransportClientConfig Nothing (Just defaultKeepAliveOpts) True Nothing Nothing
|
||||
defaultTransportClientConfig = TransportClientConfig Nothing defaultTcpConnectTimeout (Just defaultKeepAliveOpts) True Nothing Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
clientTransportConfig :: TransportClientConfig -> TransportConfig
|
||||
clientTransportConfig TransportClientConfig {logTLSErrors} =
|
||||
@@ -131,7 +138,7 @@ runTransportClient :: Transport c => TransportClientConfig -> Maybe ByteString -
|
||||
runTransportClient = runTLSTransportClient supportedParameters Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
runTLSTransportClient :: Transport c => T.Supported -> Maybe XS.CertificateStore -> TransportClientConfig -> Maybe ByteString -> TransportHost -> ServiceName -> Maybe C.KeyHash -> (c -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
runTLSTransportClient tlsParams caStore_ cfg@TransportClientConfig {socksProxy, tcpKeepAlive, clientCredentials, alpn} proxyUsername host port keyHash client = do
|
||||
runTLSTransportClient tlsParams caStore_ cfg@TransportClientConfig {socksProxy, tcpConnectTimeout, tcpKeepAlive, clientCredentials, alpn} proxyUsername host port keyHash client = do
|
||||
serverCert <- newEmptyTMVarIO
|
||||
let hostName = B.unpack $ strEncode host
|
||||
clientParams = mkTLSClientParams tlsParams caStore_ hostName port keyHash clientCredentials alpn serverCert
|
||||
@@ -142,13 +149,19 @@ runTLSTransportClient tlsParams caStore_ cfg@TransportClientConfig {socksProxy,
|
||||
sock <- connectTCP port
|
||||
mapM_ (setSocketKeepAlive sock) tcpKeepAlive `catchAll` \e -> logError ("Error setting TCP keep-alive" <> tshow e)
|
||||
let tCfg = clientTransportConfig cfg
|
||||
connectTLS (Just hostName) tCfg clientParams sock >>= \tls -> do
|
||||
chain <- atomically (tryTakeTMVar serverCert) >>= \case
|
||||
Nothing -> do
|
||||
logError "onServerCertificate didn't fire or failed to get cert chain"
|
||||
closeTLS tls >> error "onServerCertificate failed"
|
||||
Just c -> pure c
|
||||
getClientConnection tCfg chain tls
|
||||
timeout tcpConnectTimeout (connectTLS (Just hostName) tCfg clientParams sock) >>= \case
|
||||
Nothing -> do
|
||||
close sock
|
||||
logError "connection timed out"
|
||||
fail "connection timed out"
|
||||
Just tls -> do
|
||||
chain <-
|
||||
atomically (tryTakeTMVar serverCert) >>= \case
|
||||
Nothing -> do
|
||||
logError "onServerCertificate didn't fire or failed to get cert chain"
|
||||
closeTLS tls >> error "onServerCertificate failed"
|
||||
Just c -> pure c
|
||||
getClientConnection tCfg chain tls
|
||||
client c `E.finally` closeConnection c
|
||||
where
|
||||
hostAddr = \case
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import Numeric.Natural (Natural)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN, SessionId, TLS (tlsALPN), getServerCerts, getServerVerifyKey, tlsUniq)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportClientConfig (..), TransportHost (..), runTLSTransportClient)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportClientConfig (..), TransportHost (..), defaultTcpConnectTimeout, runTLSTransportClient)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (eitherToMaybe)
|
||||
import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
@@ -71,7 +71,15 @@ defaultHTTP2ClientConfig =
|
||||
HTTP2ClientConfig
|
||||
{ qSize = 64,
|
||||
connTimeout = 10000000,
|
||||
transportConfig = TransportClientConfig Nothing Nothing True Nothing Nothing,
|
||||
transportConfig =
|
||||
TransportClientConfig
|
||||
{ socksProxy = Nothing,
|
||||
tcpConnectTimeout = defaultTcpConnectTimeout,
|
||||
tcpKeepAlive = Nothing,
|
||||
logTLSErrors = True,
|
||||
clientCredentials = Nothing,
|
||||
alpn = Nothing
|
||||
},
|
||||
bufferSize = defaultHTTP2BufferSize,
|
||||
bodyHeadSize = 16384,
|
||||
suportedTLSParams = http2TLSParams
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -281,12 +281,12 @@ randomSUB_ :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => C.SAlgorithm a -> VersionSM
|
||||
randomSUB_ a v sessId = do
|
||||
g <- C.newRandom
|
||||
rId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 24 g
|
||||
nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
|
||||
corrId <- atomically $ CorrId <$> C.randomBytes 24 g
|
||||
(rKey, rpKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair a g
|
||||
thAuth_ <- testTHandleAuth v g rKey
|
||||
let thParams = testTHandleParams v sessId
|
||||
TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, rId, Cmd SRecipient SUB)
|
||||
pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just rpKey) nonce tForAuth
|
||||
TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, rId, Cmd SRecipient SUB)
|
||||
pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just rpKey) corrId tForAuth
|
||||
|
||||
randomSUBCmd :: ProtocolClient SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg -> IO (PCTransmission ErrorType BrokerMsg)
|
||||
randomSUBCmd = randomSUBCmd_ C.SEd25519
|
||||
@@ -311,13 +311,13 @@ randomSEND_ :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => C.SAlgorithm a -> VersionS
|
||||
randomSEND_ a v sessId len = do
|
||||
g <- C.newRandom
|
||||
sId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 24 g
|
||||
nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
|
||||
corrId <- atomically $ CorrId <$> C.randomBytes 3 g
|
||||
(sKey, spKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair a g
|
||||
thAuth_ <- testTHandleAuth v g sKey
|
||||
msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes len g
|
||||
let thParams = testTHandleParams v sessId
|
||||
TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, sId, Cmd SSender $ SEND noMsgFlags msg)
|
||||
pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just spKey) nonce tForAuth
|
||||
TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, sId, Cmd SSender $ SEND noMsgFlags msg)
|
||||
pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just spKey) corrId tForAuth
|
||||
|
||||
testTHandleParams :: VersionSMP -> ByteString -> THandleParams SMPVersion 'TClient
|
||||
testTHandleParams v sessionId =
|
||||
@@ -333,14 +333,13 @@ testTHandleParams v sessionId =
|
||||
testTHandleAuth :: VersionSMP -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> C.APublicAuthKey -> IO (Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient))
|
||||
testTHandleAuth v g (C.APublicAuthKey a serverPeerPubKey) = case a of
|
||||
C.SX25519 | v >= authCmdsSMPVersion -> do
|
||||
(_, clientPrivKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.X25519 g
|
||||
ca <- head <$> XS.readCertificates "tests/fixtures/ca.crt"
|
||||
serverCert <- head <$> XS.readCertificates "tests/fixtures/server.crt"
|
||||
serverKey <- head <$> XF.readKeyFile "tests/fixtures/server.key"
|
||||
signKey <- either error pure $ C.x509ToPrivate (serverKey, []) >>= C.privKey @C.APrivateSignKey
|
||||
(serverAuthPub, _) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.X25519 g
|
||||
let serverCertKey = (X.CertificateChain [serverCert, ca], C.signX509 signKey $ C.toPubKey C.publicToX509 serverAuthPub)
|
||||
pure $ Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey, serverCertKey, clientPrivKey}
|
||||
pure $ Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey, serverCertKey, sessSecret = Nothing}
|
||||
_ -> pure Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
randomSENDCmd :: ProtocolClient SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg -> Int -> IO (PCTransmission ErrorType BrokerMsg)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
|
||||
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -Wno-orphans #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module CoreTests.ProtocolErrorTests where
|
||||
@@ -13,10 +14,9 @@ import GHC.Generics (Generic)
|
||||
import Generic.Random (genericArbitraryU)
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol as Agent
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CommandError (..), ErrorType (..), ProxyError (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CommandError (..), ErrorType (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (HandshakeError (..), TransportError (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.RemoteControl.Types (RCErrorType (..))
|
||||
import Test.Hspec
|
||||
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ protocolErrorTests = modifyMaxSuccess (const 1000) $ do
|
||||
|| strDecode (strEncode err) == Right err
|
||||
where
|
||||
errHasSpaces = \case
|
||||
BROKER srv (Agent.RESPONSE e) -> hasSpaces srv || hasSpaces e
|
||||
BROKER srv (RESPONSE e) -> hasSpaces srv || hasSpaces e
|
||||
BROKER srv _ -> hasSpaces srv
|
||||
_ -> False
|
||||
hasSpaces s = ' ' `B.elem` encodeUtf8 (T.pack s)
|
||||
@@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ deriving instance Generic ErrorType
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Generic CommandError
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Generic ProxyError
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Generic TransportError
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Generic HandshakeError
|
||||
@@ -80,8 +78,6 @@ instance Arbitrary ErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
|
||||
|
||||
instance Arbitrary CommandError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
|
||||
|
||||
instance Arbitrary ProxyError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
|
||||
|
||||
instance Arbitrary TransportError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
|
||||
|
||||
instance Arbitrary HandshakeError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-4
@@ -73,10 +73,8 @@ ntfTestStoreLogFile = "tests/tmp/ntf-server-store.log"
|
||||
testNtfClient :: Transport c => (THandleNTF c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
testNtfClient client = do
|
||||
Right host <- pure $ chooseTransportHost defaultNetworkConfig testHost
|
||||
runTransportClient defaultTransportClientConfig Nothing host ntfTestPort (Just testKeyHash) $ \h -> do
|
||||
g <- C.newRandom
|
||||
ks <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
|
||||
runExceptT (ntfClientHandshake h ks testKeyHash supportedClientNTFVRange) >>= \case
|
||||
runTransportClient defaultTransportClientConfig Nothing host ntfTestPort (Just testKeyHash) $ \h ->
|
||||
runExceptT (ntfClientHandshake h testKeyHash supportedClientNTFVRange) >>= \case
|
||||
Right th -> client th
|
||||
Left e -> error $ show e
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Server (runSMPAgentBlocking)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite (MigrationConfirmation (..), SQLiteStore (dbNew))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Common (withTransaction')
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..), chooseTransportHost, defaultSMPClientConfig, defaultNetworkConfig)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..), chooseTransportHost, defaultNetworkConfig, defaultSMPClientConfig)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Client (defaultNTFClientConfig)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parseAll)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (NtfServer, ProtoServerWithAuth)
|
||||
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ agentCfg =
|
||||
certificateFile = "tests/fixtures/server.crt"
|
||||
}
|
||||
where
|
||||
networkConfig = defaultNetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout = 3_000_000, tcpTimeout = 2_000_000}
|
||||
networkConfig = defaultNetworkConfig {tcpConnectTimeout = 1_000_000, tcpTimeout = 2_000_000}
|
||||
|
||||
fastRetryInterval :: RetryInterval
|
||||
fastRetryInterval = defaultReconnectInterval {initialInterval = 50_000}
|
||||
|
||||
+4
-21
@@ -16,8 +16,7 @@ import Control.Monad.Except (runExceptT)
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
|
||||
import Network.Socket
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..), chooseTransportHost, defaultNetworkConfig)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgentConfig (..), defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (chooseTransportHost, defaultNetworkConfig)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
@@ -74,14 +73,8 @@ testSMPClient = testSMPClientVR supportedClientSMPRelayVRange
|
||||
testSMPClientVR :: Transport c => VersionRangeSMP -> (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
testSMPClientVR vr client = do
|
||||
Right useHost <- pure $ chooseTransportHost defaultNetworkConfig testHost
|
||||
testSMPClient_ useHost testPort vr client
|
||||
|
||||
testSMPClient_ :: Transport c => TransportHost -> ServiceName -> VersionRangeSMP -> (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
testSMPClient_ host port vr client = do
|
||||
runTransportClient defaultTransportClientConfig Nothing host port (Just testKeyHash) $ \h -> do
|
||||
g <- C.newRandom
|
||||
ks <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
|
||||
runExceptT (smpClientHandshake h ks testKeyHash vr) >>= \case
|
||||
runTransportClient defaultTransportClientConfig Nothing useHost testPort (Just testKeyHash) $ \h ->
|
||||
runExceptT (smpClientHandshake h Nothing testKeyHash vr) >>= \case
|
||||
Right th -> client th
|
||||
Left e -> error $ show e
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -112,22 +105,12 @@ cfg =
|
||||
certificateFile = "tests/fixtures/server.crt",
|
||||
smpServerVRange = supportedServerSMPRelayVRange,
|
||||
transportConfig = defaultTransportServerConfig,
|
||||
controlPort = Nothing,
|
||||
smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig,
|
||||
allowSMPProxy = False
|
||||
controlPort = Nothing
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cfgV7 :: ServerConfig
|
||||
cfgV7 = cfg {smpServerVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion authCmdsSMPVersion}
|
||||
|
||||
proxyCfg :: ServerConfig
|
||||
proxyCfg =
|
||||
cfgV7
|
||||
{ allowSMPProxy = True,
|
||||
smpServerVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion,
|
||||
smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig {smpCfg = (smpCfg defaultSMPClientAgentConfig) {serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn :: HasCallStack => ATransport -> ServiceName -> (HasCallStack => ThreadId -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn t = withSmpServerConfigOn t cfg {storeLogFile = Just testStoreLogFile, storeMsgsFile = Just testStoreMsgsFile, serverStatsBackupFile = Just testServerStatsBackupFile}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module SMPProxyTests where
|
||||
|
||||
import AgentTests.FunctionalAPITests (runRight_)
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import SMPAgentClient (testSMPServer, testSMPServer2)
|
||||
import SMPClient
|
||||
import qualified SMPClient as SMP
|
||||
import ServerTests (decryptMsgV3, sendRecv)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM (ServerConfig (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version (mkVersionRange)
|
||||
import Test.Hspec
|
||||
import UnliftIO
|
||||
|
||||
smpProxyTests :: Spec
|
||||
smpProxyTests = do
|
||||
describe "server configuration" $ do
|
||||
it "refuses proxy handshake unless enabled" testNoProxy
|
||||
it "checks basic auth in proxy requests" testProxyAuth
|
||||
describe "proxy requests" $ do
|
||||
describe "bad relay URIs" $ do
|
||||
xit "host not resolved" todo
|
||||
xit "when SMP port blackholed" todo
|
||||
xit "no SMP service at host/port" todo
|
||||
xit "bad SMP fingerprint" todo
|
||||
xit "batching proxy requests" todo
|
||||
describe "forwarding requests" $ do
|
||||
describe "deliver message via SMP proxy" $ do
|
||||
it "same server" $
|
||||
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ -> do
|
||||
let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
|
||||
let relayServ = proxyServ
|
||||
deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
|
||||
it "different servers" $
|
||||
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ ->
|
||||
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfgV7 testPort2 $ \_ -> do
|
||||
let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
|
||||
let relayServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort2 SMP.testKeyHash
|
||||
deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
|
||||
xit "max message size, Ed448 keys" $
|
||||
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ ->
|
||||
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfgV7 testPort2 $ \_ -> do
|
||||
g <- C.newRandom
|
||||
msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
|
||||
msg' <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
|
||||
let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
|
||||
let relayServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort2 SMP.testKeyHash
|
||||
deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd448 msg msg'
|
||||
it "max message size, Ed25519 keys" $
|
||||
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ ->
|
||||
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfgV7 testPort2 $ \_ -> do
|
||||
g <- C.newRandom
|
||||
msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
|
||||
msg' <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
|
||||
let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
|
||||
let relayServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort2 SMP.testKeyHash
|
||||
deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd25519 msg msg'
|
||||
it "max message size, X25519 keys" $
|
||||
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ ->
|
||||
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfgV7 testPort2 $ \_ -> do
|
||||
g <- C.newRandom
|
||||
msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
|
||||
msg' <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
|
||||
let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
|
||||
let relayServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort2 SMP.testKeyHash
|
||||
deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SX25519 msg msg'
|
||||
xit "sender-proxy-relay-recipient works" todo
|
||||
xit "similar timing for proxied and direct sends" todo
|
||||
|
||||
deliverMessageViaProxy :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => SMPServer -> SMPServer -> C.SAlgorithm a -> ByteString -> ByteString -> IO ()
|
||||
deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ alg msg msg' = do
|
||||
g <- C.newRandom
|
||||
-- set up proxy
|
||||
Right pc <- getProtocolClient g (1, proxyServ, Nothing) defaultSMPClientConfig {serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion} Nothing (\_ -> pure ())
|
||||
THAuthClient {} <- maybe (fail "getProtocolClient returned no thAuth") pure $ thAuth $ thParams pc
|
||||
-- set up relay
|
||||
msgQ <- newTBQueueIO 4
|
||||
Right rc <- getProtocolClient g (2, relayServ, Nothing) defaultSMPClientConfig {serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion authCmdsSMPVersion} (Just msgQ) (\_ -> pure ())
|
||||
runRight_ $ do
|
||||
-- prepare receiving queue
|
||||
(rPub, rPriv) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair alg g
|
||||
(rdhPub, rdhPriv :: C.PrivateKeyX25519) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
|
||||
QIK {rcvId, sndId, rcvPublicDhKey = srvDh} <- createSMPQueue rc (rPub, rPriv) rdhPub (Just "correct") SMSubscribe
|
||||
let dec = decryptMsgV3 $ C.dh' srvDh rdhPriv
|
||||
-- get proxy session
|
||||
(sessId, v, relayKey) <- createSMPProxySession pc relayServ (Just "correct")
|
||||
-- send via proxy to unsecured queue
|
||||
proxySMPMessage pc sessId v relayKey Nothing sndId noMsgFlags msg
|
||||
-- receive 1
|
||||
(_tSess, _v, _sid, _ety, MSG RcvMessage {msgId, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody encBody}) <- atomically $ readTBQueue msgQ
|
||||
liftIO $ dec msgId encBody `shouldBe` Right msg
|
||||
ackSMPMessage rc rPriv rcvId msgId
|
||||
-- secure queue
|
||||
(sPub, sPriv) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair alg g
|
||||
secureSMPQueue rc rPriv rcvId sPub
|
||||
-- send via proxy to secured queue
|
||||
proxySMPMessage pc sessId v relayKey (Just sPriv) sndId noMsgFlags msg'
|
||||
-- receive 2
|
||||
(_tSess, _v, _sid, _ety, MSG RcvMessage {msgId = msgId', msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody encBody'}) <- atomically $ readTBQueue msgQ
|
||||
liftIO $ dec msgId' encBody' `shouldBe` Right msg'
|
||||
ackSMPMessage rc rPriv rcvId msgId'
|
||||
|
||||
proxyVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
|
||||
proxyVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion
|
||||
|
||||
testNoProxy :: IO ()
|
||||
testNoProxy = do
|
||||
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfg testPort2 $ \_ -> do
|
||||
testSMPClient_ "127.0.0.1" testPort2 proxyVRange $ \(th :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient) -> do
|
||||
(_, _, (_corrId, _entityId, reply)) <- sendRecv th (Nothing, "0", "", PRXY testSMPServer Nothing)
|
||||
reply `shouldBe` Right (ERR AUTH)
|
||||
|
||||
testProxyAuth :: IO ()
|
||||
testProxyAuth = do
|
||||
withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfgAuth testPort $ \_ -> do
|
||||
testSMPClient_ "127.0.0.1" testPort proxyVRange $ \(th :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient) -> do
|
||||
(_, _s, (_corrId, _entityId, reply)) <- sendRecv th (Nothing, "0", "", PRXY testSMPServer2 $ Just "wrong")
|
||||
reply `shouldBe` Right (ERR AUTH)
|
||||
where
|
||||
proxyCfgAuth = proxyCfg {newQueueBasicAuth = Just "correct"}
|
||||
|
||||
todo :: IO ()
|
||||
todo = do
|
||||
fail "TODO"
|
||||
@@ -931,6 +931,8 @@ instance Eq C.ASignature where
|
||||
Just Refl -> s == s'
|
||||
_ -> False
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (C.Signature a)
|
||||
|
||||
syntaxTests :: ATransport -> Spec
|
||||
syntaxTests (ATransport t) = do
|
||||
it "unknown command" $ ("", "abcd", "1234", ('H', 'E', 'L', 'L', 'O')) >#> ("", "abcd", "1234", ERR $ CMD UNKNOWN)
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-3
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ import GHC.IO.Exception (IOException (..))
|
||||
import qualified GHC.IO.Exception as IOException
|
||||
import NtfServerTests (ntfServerTests)
|
||||
import RemoteControl (remoteControlTests)
|
||||
import SMPProxyTests (smpProxyTests)
|
||||
import ServerTests
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (TLS, Transport (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets (WS)
|
||||
@@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ main = do
|
||||
$ do
|
||||
describe "Agent SQLite schema dump" schemaDumpTest
|
||||
describe "Core tests" $ do
|
||||
xdescribe "Batching tests" batchingTests
|
||||
describe "Batching tests" batchingTests
|
||||
describe "Encoding tests" encodingTests
|
||||
describe "Protocol error tests" protocolErrorTests
|
||||
describe "Version range" versionRangeTests
|
||||
@@ -60,7 +59,6 @@ main = do
|
||||
describe "SMP server via WebSockets" $ serverTests (transport @WS)
|
||||
describe "Notifications server" $ ntfServerTests (transport @TLS)
|
||||
describe "SMP client agent" $ agentTests (transport @TLS)
|
||||
describe "SMP proxy" smpProxyTests
|
||||
describe "XFTP" $ do
|
||||
describe "XFTP server" xftpServerTests
|
||||
describe "XFTP file description" fileDescriptionTests
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-4
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server (runXFTPServerBlocking)
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), defaultFileExpiration, defaultInactiveClientExpiration, supportedXFTPhandshakes)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (XFTPServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server
|
||||
@@ -133,8 +132,7 @@ testXFTPClient :: HasCallStack => (HasCallStack => XFTPClient -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
testXFTPClient = testXFTPClientWith testXFTPClientConfig
|
||||
|
||||
testXFTPClientWith :: HasCallStack => XFTPClientConfig -> (HasCallStack => XFTPClient -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
testXFTPClientWith cfg client = do
|
||||
g <- C.newRandom
|
||||
getXFTPClient g (1, testXFTPServer, Nothing) cfg (\_ -> pure ()) >>= \case
|
||||
testXFTPClientWith cfg client =
|
||||
getXFTPClient (1, testXFTPServer, Nothing) cfg (\_ -> pure ()) >>= \case
|
||||
Right c -> client c
|
||||
Left e -> error $ show e
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -219,8 +219,7 @@ testFileChunkExpiration = withXFTPServerCfg testXFTPServerConfig {fileExpiration
|
||||
testInactiveClientExpiration :: Expectation
|
||||
testInactiveClientExpiration = withXFTPServerCfg testXFTPServerConfig {inactiveClientExpiration} $ \_ -> runRight_ $ do
|
||||
disconnected <- newEmptyTMVarIO
|
||||
g <- liftIO C.newRandom
|
||||
c <- ExceptT $ getXFTPClient g (1, testXFTPServer, Nothing) testXFTPClientConfig (\_ -> atomically $ putTMVar disconnected ())
|
||||
c <- ExceptT $ getXFTPClient (1, testXFTPServer, Nothing) testXFTPClientConfig (\_ -> atomically $ putTMVar disconnected ())
|
||||
pingXFTP c
|
||||
liftIO $ do
|
||||
threadDelay 100000
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user