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@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ on:
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
build:
|
||||
name: build-${{ matrix.os }}
|
||||
name: build-${{ matrix.os }}-${{ matrix.ghc }}
|
||||
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
|
||||
strategy:
|
||||
fail-fast: false
|
||||
@@ -19,17 +19,22 @@ jobs:
|
||||
include:
|
||||
- os: ubuntu-20.04
|
||||
platform_name: 20_04-x86-64
|
||||
ghc: "8.10.7"
|
||||
- os: ubuntu-20.04
|
||||
platform_name: 20_04-x86-64
|
||||
ghc: "9.6.3"
|
||||
- os: ubuntu-22.04
|
||||
platform_name: 22_04-x86-64
|
||||
ghc: "9.6.3"
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Clone project
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v2
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v3
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Setup Haskell
|
||||
uses: haskell/actions/setup@v1
|
||||
uses: haskell-actions/setup@v2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
ghc-version: "8.10.7"
|
||||
cabal-version: "latest"
|
||||
ghc-version: ${{ matrix.ghc }}
|
||||
cabal-version: "3.10.1.0"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Cache dependencies
|
||||
uses: actions/cache@v2
|
||||
@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Create release
|
||||
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && matrix.os == 'ubuntu-20.04'
|
||||
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && matrix.os == 'ubuntu-20.04' && matrix.ghc == '9.6.3'
|
||||
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1
|
||||
with:
|
||||
body: |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
- ignore: {name: "Use underscore"}
|
||||
+103
-8
@@ -1,3 +1,98 @@
|
||||
# 5.5.3
|
||||
|
||||
Agent:
|
||||
- notification token API also returns active notifications server.
|
||||
- support file descriptions with redirection and file URIs.
|
||||
|
||||
Servers:
|
||||
- CLI commands for online key and certificate rotation.
|
||||
- Configure config and log paths via environment variables.
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.5.2
|
||||
|
||||
Extensible handshake for clients and SMP/NTF servers (ignore extra data).
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.5.1
|
||||
|
||||
SMP servers:
|
||||
- do not keep stats file open
|
||||
- additional stats about currently stored messages
|
||||
|
||||
Agent:
|
||||
- support multiple notification servers (only one can be used at a time).
|
||||
- expire messages after "quota exceeded" error after 7 days (instead of 21 days previously).
|
||||
- stabilize message delivery, remove unnecessary subscription retries and traffic.
|
||||
- improve database performance for message delivery.
|
||||
- fix sockets/memory leak - a very old bug "activated" by improvements in v5.5.0.
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.5.0
|
||||
|
||||
Code:
|
||||
- compatible with GHC 8.10.7 to support compilation for armv7a.
|
||||
- migrate to `crypton` from deprecated `cryptonite` (the seed for DRG is now sha512-hashed).
|
||||
- use ChaChaDRG for all random IDs, keys and nonces, only using hashed entropy as seed.
|
||||
- more efficient transaction batching in SMP protocol client and server.
|
||||
|
||||
Agent:
|
||||
- stabilize message reception and delivery, migrate message delivery to database queue.
|
||||
- additional event MSGNTF confirming that message received via notification is processed.
|
||||
- efficient processing of messages sent to multiple recipients with batched database transactions.
|
||||
- new worker abstraction for all queued tasks resilient to race conditions and some database errors.
|
||||
- many fixed race conditions.
|
||||
- background mode for iOS NSE.
|
||||
- additional error reporting to client on critical errors (to be show as alert in the clients).
|
||||
- functional api to get worker statistics.
|
||||
|
||||
SMP/XFTP servers:
|
||||
- fix socket and memory leak on servers with high load (inactive clients without subscriptions are disconnected after set time of inactivity).
|
||||
- control port improvements.
|
||||
- fix statistics for stored queues, messages and files.
|
||||
- make writing to store log atomic (fixes a rare bug in XFTP server).
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.4.0
|
||||
|
||||
Migrate to GHC 9.6.3
|
||||
|
||||
Agent:
|
||||
- database improvements:
|
||||
- track slow queries.
|
||||
- better performance.
|
||||
- "busy" error handling.
|
||||
- create parent folder when needed.
|
||||
- support closing and re-opening database.
|
||||
- SMP agent improvements
|
||||
- streaming for batched SMP commands.
|
||||
- fix asynchronous JOINing connection.
|
||||
- handle repeating JOINs without failure.
|
||||
- api to get subscribed connections.
|
||||
- return simplex:/ links as invitations.
|
||||
- fix memory leak.
|
||||
- XFTP improvements:
|
||||
- suspend when agent is suspended.
|
||||
- support locally encrypted files.
|
||||
- fixes - create empty file, prevent permanent error treated as temporary.
|
||||
- upgrade HTTP2 library (fixes error handling and flow control).
|
||||
- Remote control protocol (XRCP)
|
||||
|
||||
SMP server:
|
||||
- control port commands for GHC threads introspection.
|
||||
- allow creating new queues without subscriptions (required for iOS).
|
||||
|
||||
XFTP server:
|
||||
- allow 64kb file chunks.
|
||||
|
||||
NTF server:
|
||||
- faster startup.
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.3.0
|
||||
|
||||
Agent:
|
||||
- improve performance, track slow database queries.
|
||||
- support delivery receipts.
|
||||
|
||||
SMP server:
|
||||
- control port
|
||||
|
||||
# 5.2.0 (NTF server 1.5.0)
|
||||
|
||||
Agent:
|
||||
@@ -72,7 +167,7 @@ SMP agent:
|
||||
- batch connection deletion
|
||||
- improve asynchronous connection deletion – it may now be completed after the client is restarted as well.
|
||||
- improve subscription logic to retry if initial attempt fails.
|
||||
- end SMP client connection after a number of failed PINGs (defalt is 3).
|
||||
- end SMP client connection after a number of failed PINGs (default is 3).
|
||||
|
||||
# 4.3.0
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -105,7 +200,7 @@ SMP agent:
|
||||
|
||||
Notification server (v1.3.0):
|
||||
|
||||
- check token status when sending verification notificaiton.
|
||||
- check token status when sending verification notification.
|
||||
|
||||
# 4.1.0
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -124,15 +219,15 @@ SMP agent:
|
||||
SMP server:
|
||||
|
||||
- Basic authentication. The server address can now include an optional password that is required to create messaging queues, so the contacts who message you will not be able to receive messages via your server, unless you share with them the address with the password. It is recommended to enable basic authentication on all private servers by adding `create_password` parameter into AUTH section of server INI file (the previously deployed servers do not have this section, you need to add it).
|
||||
- Disable creating new queues completely with `new_queues: off` parameter in AUTH section of INI file - it can be used to simplify migrating the exising connections to another server.
|
||||
- Disable creating new queues completely with `new_queues: off` parameter in AUTH section of INI file - it can be used to simplify migrating the existing connections to another server.
|
||||
- Updated server CLI with changed defaults:
|
||||
- interactive server initialization, use -y flag to initalize the server non-interactively.
|
||||
- interactive server initialization, use -y flag to initialize the server non-interactively.
|
||||
- store log is now enabled by default, so messaging queues and messages are restored when the server is restarted (to restore undelivered messages the server needs to be stopped with SIGINT signal).
|
||||
- a random password is now generated by default during the server initialization.
|
||||
|
||||
SMP agent:
|
||||
|
||||
- API to test SMP servers. It connects to the server, creates and deletes a messaging queue. The new SimpleX Chat client uses this API to allow you to test that you have the correct server address, with the valid certificate fingerprint and pasword, before enabling the new server.
|
||||
- API to test SMP servers. It connects to the server, creates and deletes a messaging queue. The new SimpleX Chat client uses this API to allow you to test that you have the correct server address, with the valid certificate fingerprint and password, before enabling the new server.
|
||||
|
||||
# 3.4.0
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -178,9 +273,9 @@ SMP server and agent:
|
||||
|
||||
SMP server:
|
||||
|
||||
- restore undeliverd messages when the server is restarted.
|
||||
- restore undelivered messages when the server is restarted.
|
||||
- SMP protocol v3 to support push notification:
|
||||
- updated SEND and MSG to add message flags (for notification flag that contros whether the notification is sent and for any future extensions) and to move message meta-data sent to the recipient into the encrypted envelope.
|
||||
- updated SEND and MSG to add message flags (for notification flag that confirm whether the notification is sent and for any future extensions) and to move message meta-data sent to the recipient into the encrypted envelope.
|
||||
- update NKEY and NID to add e2e encryption keys (for the notification meta-data encryption between SMP server and the client), and update NMSG to include this meta-data.
|
||||
- update ACK command to include message ID (to avoid acknowledging unprocessed message).
|
||||
- add NDEL commands to remove notification subscription credentials from SMP queue.
|
||||
@@ -191,7 +286,7 @@ SMP agent:
|
||||
- new protocol for duplex connection handshake reducing traffic and connection time.
|
||||
- support for SMP notifications server and managing device token.
|
||||
- remove redundant FQDN validation from TLS handshake to prepare for access via Tor.
|
||||
- support for fully stopping agent and for termporary suspending agent operations.
|
||||
- support for fully stopping agent and for temporary suspending agent operations.
|
||||
- improve management of duplicate message delivery.
|
||||
|
||||
SMP notifications server v1.0:
|
||||
|
||||
+4
-4
@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ FROM ubuntu:${TAG} AS build
|
||||
### Build stage
|
||||
|
||||
# Install curl and git and simplexmq dependencies
|
||||
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl git build-essential libgmp3-dev zlib1g-dev llvm-12 llvm-12-dev libnuma-dev
|
||||
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl git build-essential libgmp3-dev zlib1g-dev llvm-12 llvm-12-dev libnuma-dev libssl-dev
|
||||
|
||||
# Specify bootstrap Haskell versions
|
||||
ENV BOOTSTRAP_HASKELL_GHC_VERSION=8.10.7
|
||||
ENV BOOTSTRAP_HASKELL_CABAL_VERSION=3.6.2.0
|
||||
ENV BOOTSTRAP_HASKELL_GHC_VERSION=9.6.3
|
||||
ENV BOOTSTRAP_HASKELL_CABAL_VERSION=3.10.1.0
|
||||
|
||||
# Install ghcup
|
||||
RUN curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://get-ghcup.haskell.org | BOOTSTRAP_HASKELL_NONINTERACTIVE=1 sh
|
||||
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ ENV PATH="/root/.cabal/bin:/root/.ghcup/bin:$PATH"
|
||||
|
||||
# Set both as default
|
||||
RUN ghcup set ghc "${BOOTSTRAP_HASKELL_GHC_VERSION}" && \
|
||||
ghcup set cabal
|
||||
ghcup set cabal "${BOOTSTRAP_HASKELL_CABAL_VERSION}"
|
||||
|
||||
COPY . /project
|
||||
WORKDIR /project
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
|
||||
module Main where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Logger.Simple
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI (getEnvPath)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Main
|
||||
|
||||
cfgPath :: FilePath
|
||||
cfgPath = "/etc/opt/simplex-notifications"
|
||||
defaultCfgPath :: FilePath
|
||||
defaultCfgPath = "/etc/opt/simplex-notifications"
|
||||
|
||||
logPath :: FilePath
|
||||
logPath = "/var/opt/simplex-notifications"
|
||||
defaultLogPath :: FilePath
|
||||
defaultLogPath = "/var/opt/simplex-notifications"
|
||||
|
||||
logCfg :: LogConfig
|
||||
logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
|
||||
@@ -15,4 +16,6 @@ logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
|
||||
main :: IO ()
|
||||
main = do
|
||||
setLogLevel LogDebug -- change to LogError in production
|
||||
cfgPath <- getEnvPath "NTF_SERVER_CFG_PATH" defaultCfgPath
|
||||
logPath <- getEnvPath "NTF_SERVER_LOG_PATH" defaultLogPath
|
||||
withGlobalLogging logCfg $ ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Server (runSMPAgent)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite (MigrationConfirmation (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (defaultNetworkConfig)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Memory (LockedBytes)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (TLS, Transport (..))
|
||||
|
||||
cfg :: AgentConfig
|
||||
@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ cfg = defaultAgentConfig
|
||||
agentDbFile :: String
|
||||
agentDbFile = "smp-agent.db"
|
||||
|
||||
agentDbKey :: String
|
||||
agentDbKey :: LockedBytes
|
||||
agentDbKey = ""
|
||||
|
||||
servers :: InitialAgentServers
|
||||
@@ -34,9 +35,10 @@ servers =
|
||||
logCfg :: LogConfig
|
||||
logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
|
||||
|
||||
-- Warning: this SMP agent server is experimental - it does not work correctly with multiple connected TCP clients in some cases.
|
||||
main :: IO ()
|
||||
main = do
|
||||
putStrLn $ "SMP agent listening on port " ++ tcpPort (cfg :: AgentConfig)
|
||||
setLogLevel LogInfo -- LogError
|
||||
Right st <- createAgentStore agentDbFile agentDbKey MCConsole
|
||||
Right st <- createAgentStore agentDbFile agentDbKey False MCConsole
|
||||
withGlobalLogging logCfg $ runSMPAgent (transport @TLS) cfg servers st
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Main where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Logger.Simple
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI (getEnvPath)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Main
|
||||
|
||||
cfgPath :: FilePath
|
||||
cfgPath = "/etc/opt/simplex"
|
||||
defaultCfgPath :: FilePath
|
||||
defaultCfgPath = "/etc/opt/simplex"
|
||||
|
||||
logPath :: FilePath
|
||||
logPath = "/var/opt/simplex"
|
||||
defaultLogPath :: FilePath
|
||||
defaultLogPath = "/var/opt/simplex"
|
||||
|
||||
logCfg :: LogConfig
|
||||
logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
|
||||
@@ -15,4 +18,6 @@ logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
|
||||
main :: IO ()
|
||||
main = do
|
||||
setLogLevel LogDebug
|
||||
cfgPath <- getEnvPath "SMP_SERVER_CFG_PATH" defaultCfgPath
|
||||
logPath <- getEnvPath "SMP_SERVER_LOG_PATH" defaultLogPath
|
||||
withGlobalLogging logCfg $ smpServerCLI cfgPath logPath
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
|
||||
module Main where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Logger.Simple
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI (getEnvPath)
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Main
|
||||
|
||||
cfgPath :: FilePath
|
||||
cfgPath = "/etc/opt/simplex-xftp"
|
||||
defaultCfgPath :: FilePath
|
||||
defaultCfgPath = "/etc/opt/simplex-xftp"
|
||||
|
||||
logPath :: FilePath
|
||||
logPath = "/var/opt/simplex-xftp"
|
||||
defaultLogPath :: FilePath
|
||||
defaultLogPath = "/var/opt/simplex-xftp"
|
||||
|
||||
logCfg :: LogConfig
|
||||
logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
|
||||
@@ -15,4 +16,6 @@ logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
|
||||
main :: IO ()
|
||||
main = do
|
||||
setLogLevel LogDebug -- change to LogError in production
|
||||
cfgPath <- getEnvPath "XFTP_SERVER_CFG_PATH" defaultCfgPath
|
||||
logPath <- getEnvPath "XFTP_SERVER_LOG_PATH" defaultLogPath
|
||||
withGlobalLogging logCfg $ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath
|
||||
|
||||
+9
-8
@@ -2,28 +2,29 @@ packages: .
|
||||
-- packages: . ../direct-sqlcipher ../sqlcipher-simple
|
||||
-- packages: . ../hs-socks
|
||||
-- packages: . ../http2
|
||||
-- packages: . ../network-transport
|
||||
|
||||
index-state: 2023-12-12T00:00:00Z
|
||||
|
||||
package cryptostore
|
||||
flags: +use_crypton
|
||||
|
||||
source-repository-package
|
||||
type: git
|
||||
location: https://github.com/simplex-chat/aeson.git
|
||||
tag: 3eb66f9a68f103b5f1489382aad89f5712a64db7
|
||||
tag: aab7b5a14d6c5ea64c64dcaee418de1bb00dcc2b
|
||||
|
||||
source-repository-package
|
||||
type: git
|
||||
location: https://github.com/simplex-chat/hs-socks.git
|
||||
tag: a30cc7a79a08d8108316094f8f2f82a0c5e1ac51
|
||||
|
||||
source-repository-package
|
||||
type: git
|
||||
location: https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/http2.git
|
||||
tag: b5a1b7200cf5bc7044af34ba325284271f6dff25
|
||||
|
||||
source-repository-package
|
||||
type: git
|
||||
location: https://github.com/simplex-chat/direct-sqlcipher.git
|
||||
tag: 34309410eb2069b029b8fc1872deb1e0db123294
|
||||
tag: f814ee68b16a9447fbb467ccc8f29bdd3546bfd9
|
||||
|
||||
source-repository-package
|
||||
type: git
|
||||
location: https://github.com/simplex-chat/sqlcipher-simple.git
|
||||
tag: 5e154a2aeccc33ead6c243ec07195ab673137221
|
||||
tag: a46bd361a19376c5211f1058908fc0ae6bf42446
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
# Streamlined NTRU Prime: sntrup761
|
||||
|
||||
The implementation of sntrup761 is the _exact_ copy from this [Internet draft](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-josefsson-ntruprime-streamlined-00.html).
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
#include <openssl/sha.h>
|
||||
#include "sha512.h"
|
||||
|
||||
void crypto_hash_sha512 (unsigned char *out,
|
||||
const unsigned char *in,
|
||||
unsigned long long inlen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
SHA512(in, inlen, out);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
void crypto_hash_sha512 (unsigned char *out,
|
||||
const unsigned char *in,
|
||||
unsigned long long inlen);
|
||||
+1035
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Derived from public domain source, written by (in alphabetical order):
|
||||
* - Daniel J. Bernstein
|
||||
* - Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup
|
||||
* - Tanja Lange
|
||||
* - Christine van Vredendaal
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef SNTRUP761_H
|
||||
#define SNTRUP761_H
|
||||
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <stdint.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#define SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE 1763
|
||||
#define SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE 1158
|
||||
#define SNTRUP761_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE 1039
|
||||
#define SNTRUP761_SIZE 32
|
||||
|
||||
typedef void sntrup761_random_func (void *ctx, size_t length, uint8_t *dst);
|
||||
|
||||
void
|
||||
sntrup761_keypair (uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk,
|
||||
void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
|
||||
|
||||
void
|
||||
sntrup761_enc (uint8_t *c, uint8_t *k, const uint8_t *pk,
|
||||
void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
|
||||
|
||||
void
|
||||
sntrup761_dec (uint8_t *k, const uint8_t *c, const uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* SNTRUP761_H */
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
|
||||
#ifndef __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__
|
||||
# define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#include <assert.h>
|
||||
#include <errno.h>
|
||||
#include <limits.h>
|
||||
#include <stddef.h>
|
||||
#include <stdio.h> // for debug prints
|
||||
#include <stdint.h>
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(HAVE_RAISE) && !defined(__wasm__)
|
||||
# include <signal.h>
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
|
||||
# include <sys/mman.h>
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H
|
||||
# include <sys/param.h>
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef _WIN32
|
||||
# include <windows.h>
|
||||
# include <wincrypt.h>
|
||||
#else
|
||||
# include <unistd.h>
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef HAVE_C_VARARRAYS
|
||||
# ifdef HAVE_ALLOCA_H
|
||||
# include <alloca.h>
|
||||
# elif !defined(alloca)
|
||||
# if defined(__clang__) || defined(__GNUC__)
|
||||
# define alloca __builtin_alloca
|
||||
# elif defined _AIX
|
||||
# define alloca __alloca
|
||||
# elif defined _MSC_VER
|
||||
# include <malloc.h>
|
||||
# define alloca _alloca
|
||||
# else
|
||||
# include <stddef.h>
|
||||
# ifdef __cplusplus
|
||||
extern "C"
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
void *alloca (size_t);
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
// #include "core.h"
|
||||
// #include "crypto_generichash.h"
|
||||
// #include "crypto_stream.h"
|
||||
// #include "randombytes.h"
|
||||
// #include "private/common.h"
|
||||
// #include "sodium_utils.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef ENOSYS
|
||||
# define ENOSYS ENXIO
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(_WIN32) && \
|
||||
(!defined(WINAPI_FAMILY) || WINAPI_FAMILY == WINAPI_FAMILY_DESKTOP_APP)
|
||||
# define WINAPI_DESKTOP
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#define CANARY_SIZE 16U
|
||||
#define GARBAGE_VALUE 0xdb
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef MAP_NOCORE
|
||||
# ifdef MAP_CONCEAL
|
||||
# define MAP_NOCORE MAP_CONCEAL
|
||||
# else
|
||||
# define MAP_NOCORE 0
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS)
|
||||
# define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#if defined(WINAPI_DESKTOP) || (defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(HAVE_MMAP)) || \
|
||||
defined(HAVE_POSIX_MEMALIGN)
|
||||
# define HAVE_ALIGNED_MALLOC
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(HAVE_MPROTECT) && \
|
||||
!(defined(PROT_NONE) && defined(PROT_READ) && defined(PROT_WRITE))
|
||||
# undef HAVE_MPROTECT
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#if defined(HAVE_ALIGNED_MALLOC) && \
|
||||
(defined(WINAPI_DESKTOP) || defined(HAVE_MPROTECT))
|
||||
# define HAVE_PAGE_PROTECTION
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#if !defined(MADV_DODUMP) && defined(MADV_CORE)
|
||||
# define MADV_DODUMP MADV_CORE
|
||||
# define MADV_DONTDUMP MADV_NOCORE
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE
|
||||
# ifdef PAGE_SIZE
|
||||
# define DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE PAGE_SIZE
|
||||
# else
|
||||
# define DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE 0x10000
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
static size_t page_size = DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE;
|
||||
static unsigned char canary[CANARY_SIZE];
|
||||
|
||||
/* LCOV_EXCL_START */
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_WEAK_SYMBOLS
|
||||
__attribute__((weak)) void
|
||||
_sodium_dummy_symbol_to_prevent_memzero_lto(void *const pnt,
|
||||
const size_t len);
|
||||
__attribute__((weak)) void
|
||||
_sodium_dummy_symbol_to_prevent_memzero_lto(void *const pnt,
|
||||
const size_t len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
(void) pnt; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
|
||||
(void) len; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
|
||||
|
||||
void
|
||||
sodium_memzero(void * const pnt, const size_t len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CRT_INLINE)
|
||||
SecureZeroMemory(pnt, len);
|
||||
#elif defined(HAVE_MEMSET_S)
|
||||
if (len > 0U && memset_s(pnt, (rsize_t) len, 0, (rsize_t) len) != 0) {
|
||||
sodium_misuse(); /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
|
||||
}
|
||||
#elif defined(HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO)
|
||||
explicit_bzero(pnt, len);
|
||||
#elif defined(HAVE_MEMSET_EXPLICIT)
|
||||
memset_explicit(pnt, 0, len);
|
||||
#elif defined(HAVE_EXPLICIT_MEMSET)
|
||||
explicit_memset(pnt, 0, len);
|
||||
#elif HAVE_WEAK_SYMBOLS
|
||||
if (len > 0U) {
|
||||
memset(pnt, 0, len);
|
||||
_sodium_dummy_symbol_to_prevent_memzero_lto(pnt, len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
# ifdef HAVE_INLINE_ASM
|
||||
__asm__ __volatile__ ("" : : "r"(pnt) : "memory");
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
#else
|
||||
volatile unsigned char *volatile pnt_ =
|
||||
(volatile unsigned char *volatile) pnt;
|
||||
size_t i = (size_t) 0U;
|
||||
|
||||
while (i < len) {
|
||||
pnt_[i++] = 0U;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void
|
||||
sodium_stackzero(const size_t len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_C_VARARRAYS
|
||||
unsigned char fodder[len];
|
||||
sodium_memzero(fodder, len);
|
||||
#elif HAVE_ALLOCA
|
||||
sodium_memzero(alloca(len), len);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_WEAK_SYMBOLS
|
||||
__attribute__((weak)) void
|
||||
_sodium_dummy_symbol_to_prevent_memcmp_lto(const unsigned char *b1,
|
||||
const unsigned char *b2,
|
||||
const size_t len);
|
||||
__attribute__((weak)) void
|
||||
_sodium_dummy_symbol_to_prevent_memcmp_lto(const unsigned char *b1,
|
||||
const unsigned char *b2,
|
||||
const size_t len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
(void) b1;
|
||||
(void) b2;
|
||||
(void) len;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
sodium_memcmp(const void *const b1_, const void *const b2_, size_t len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_WEAK_SYMBOLS
|
||||
const unsigned char *b1 = (const unsigned char *) b1_;
|
||||
const unsigned char *b2 = (const unsigned char *) b2_;
|
||||
#else
|
||||
const volatile unsigned char *volatile b1 =
|
||||
(const volatile unsigned char *volatile) b1_;
|
||||
const volatile unsigned char *volatile b2 =
|
||||
(const volatile unsigned char *volatile) b2_;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
size_t i;
|
||||
volatile unsigned char d = 0U;
|
||||
|
||||
#if HAVE_WEAK_SYMBOLS
|
||||
_sodium_dummy_symbol_to_prevent_memcmp_lto(b1, b2, len);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
for (i = 0U; i < len; i++) {
|
||||
d |= b1[i] ^ b2[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
return (1 & ((d - 1) >> 8)) - 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_WEAK_SYMBOLS
|
||||
__attribute__((weak)) void
|
||||
_sodium_dummy_symbol_to_prevent_compare_lto(const unsigned char *b1,
|
||||
const unsigned char *b2,
|
||||
const size_t len);
|
||||
__attribute__((weak)) void
|
||||
_sodium_dummy_symbol_to_prevent_compare_lto(const unsigned char *b1,
|
||||
const unsigned char *b2,
|
||||
const size_t len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
(void) b1;
|
||||
(void) b2;
|
||||
(void) len;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
sodium_compare(const unsigned char *b1_, const unsigned char *b2_, size_t len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_WEAK_SYMBOLS
|
||||
const unsigned char *b1 = b1_;
|
||||
const unsigned char *b2 = b2_;
|
||||
#else
|
||||
const volatile unsigned char *volatile b1 =
|
||||
(const volatile unsigned char *volatile) b1_;
|
||||
const volatile unsigned char *volatile b2 =
|
||||
(const volatile unsigned char *volatile) b2_;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
size_t i;
|
||||
volatile unsigned char gt = 0U;
|
||||
volatile unsigned char eq = 1U;
|
||||
uint16_t x1, x2;
|
||||
|
||||
#if HAVE_WEAK_SYMBOLS
|
||||
_sodium_dummy_symbol_to_prevent_compare_lto(b1, b2, len);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
i = len;
|
||||
while (i != 0U) {
|
||||
i--;
|
||||
x1 = b1[i];
|
||||
x2 = b2[i];
|
||||
gt |= (((unsigned int) x2 - (unsigned int) x1) >> 8) & eq;
|
||||
eq &= (((unsigned int) (x2 ^ x1)) - 1) >> 8;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return (int) (gt + gt + eq) - 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
sodium_is_zero(const unsigned char *n, const size_t nlen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t i;
|
||||
volatile unsigned char d = 0U;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0U; i < nlen; i++) {
|
||||
d |= n[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1 & ((d - 1) >> 8);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
_sodium_alloc_init(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_ALIGNED_MALLOC
|
||||
# if defined(_SC_PAGESIZE) && defined(HAVE_SYSCONF)
|
||||
long page_size_ = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
|
||||
if (page_size_ > 0L) {
|
||||
page_size = (size_t) page_size_;
|
||||
}
|
||||
# elif defined(WINAPI_DESKTOP)
|
||||
SYSTEM_INFO si;
|
||||
GetSystemInfo(&si);
|
||||
page_size = (size_t) si.dwPageSize;
|
||||
# elif !defined(PAGE_SIZE)
|
||||
# warning Unknown page size
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
if (page_size < CANARY_SIZE || page_size < sizeof(size_t)) {
|
||||
sodium_misuse(); /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
// randombytes_buf(canary, CANARY_SIZE);
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
sodium_mlock(void *const addr, const size_t len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
printf("sodium_mlock: %p (%zu)\n", addr, len);
|
||||
#if defined(MADV_DONTDUMP) && defined(HAVE_MADVISE)
|
||||
(void) madvise(addr, len, MADV_DONTDUMP);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_MLOCK
|
||||
return mlock(addr, len);
|
||||
#elif defined(WINAPI_DESKTOP)
|
||||
return -(VirtualLock(addr, len) == 0);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
errno = ENOSYS;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
sodium_munlock(void *const addr, const size_t len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
printf("sodium_munlock: %p (%zu)\n", addr, len);
|
||||
sodium_memzero(addr, len);
|
||||
#if defined(MADV_DODUMP) && defined(HAVE_MADVISE)
|
||||
(void) madvise(addr, len, MADV_DODUMP);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_MLOCK
|
||||
return munlock(addr, len);
|
||||
#elif defined(WINAPI_DESKTOP)
|
||||
return -(VirtualUnlock(addr, len) == 0);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
errno = ENOSYS;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int
|
||||
_mprotect_noaccess(void *ptr, size_t size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_MPROTECT
|
||||
return mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE);
|
||||
#elif defined(WINAPI_DESKTOP)
|
||||
DWORD old;
|
||||
return -(VirtualProtect(ptr, size, PAGE_NOACCESS, &old) == 0);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
errno = ENOSYS;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int
|
||||
_mprotect_readonly(void *ptr, size_t size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_MPROTECT
|
||||
return mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ);
|
||||
#elif defined(WINAPI_DESKTOP)
|
||||
DWORD old;
|
||||
return -(VirtualProtect(ptr, size, PAGE_READONLY, &old) == 0);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
errno = ENOSYS;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int
|
||||
_mprotect_readwrite(void *ptr, size_t size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_MPROTECT
|
||||
return mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
|
||||
#elif defined(WINAPI_DESKTOP)
|
||||
DWORD old;
|
||||
return -(VirtualProtect(ptr, size, PAGE_READWRITE, &old) == 0);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
errno = ENOSYS;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_ALIGNED_MALLOC
|
||||
|
||||
__attribute__((noreturn)) static void
|
||||
_out_of_bounds(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
# if defined(HAVE_RAISE) && !defined(__wasm__)
|
||||
# ifdef SIGPROT
|
||||
raise(SIGPROT);
|
||||
# elif defined(SIGSEGV)
|
||||
raise(SIGSEGV);
|
||||
# elif defined(SIGKILL)
|
||||
raise(SIGKILL);
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
abort(); /* not something we want any higher-level API to catch */
|
||||
} /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
|
||||
|
||||
static inline size_t
|
||||
_page_round(const size_t size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const size_t page_mask = page_size - 1U;
|
||||
|
||||
return (size + page_mask) & ~page_mask;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static __attribute__((malloc)) unsigned char *
|
||||
_alloc_aligned(const size_t size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
void *ptr;
|
||||
|
||||
# if defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(HAVE_MMAP)
|
||||
if ((ptr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
|
||||
MAP_ANON | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_NOCORE, -1, 0)) ==
|
||||
MAP_FAILED) {
|
||||
ptr = NULL; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
|
||||
} /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
|
||||
# elif defined(HAVE_POSIX_MEMALIGN)
|
||||
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, page_size, size) != 0) {
|
||||
ptr = NULL; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
|
||||
} /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
|
||||
# elif defined(WINAPI_DESKTOP)
|
||||
ptr = VirtualAlloc(NULL, size, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
|
||||
# else
|
||||
# error Bug
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
return (unsigned char *) ptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void
|
||||
_free_aligned(unsigned char *const ptr, const size_t size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
# if defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(HAVE_MMAP)
|
||||
(void) munmap(ptr, size);
|
||||
# elif defined(HAVE_POSIX_MEMALIGN)
|
||||
free(ptr);
|
||||
# elif defined(WINAPI_DESKTOP)
|
||||
VirtualFree(ptr, 0U, MEM_RELEASE);
|
||||
# else
|
||||
# error Bug
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static unsigned char *
|
||||
_unprotected_ptr_from_user_ptr(void *const ptr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
uintptr_t unprotected_ptr_u;
|
||||
unsigned char *canary_ptr;
|
||||
size_t page_mask;
|
||||
|
||||
canary_ptr = ((unsigned char *) ptr) - sizeof canary;
|
||||
page_mask = page_size - 1U;
|
||||
unprotected_ptr_u = ((uintptr_t) canary_ptr & (uintptr_t) ~page_mask);
|
||||
if (unprotected_ptr_u <= page_size * 2U) {
|
||||
sodium_misuse(); /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
|
||||
}
|
||||
return (unsigned char *) unprotected_ptr_u;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* HAVE_ALIGNED_MALLOC */
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef HAVE_ALIGNED_MALLOC
|
||||
static __attribute__((malloc)) void *
|
||||
_sodium_malloc(const size_t size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return malloc(size > (size_t) 0U ? size : (size_t) 1U);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
static __attribute__((malloc)) void *
|
||||
_sodium_malloc(const size_t size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
void *user_ptr;
|
||||
unsigned char *base_ptr;
|
||||
unsigned char *canary_ptr;
|
||||
unsigned char *unprotected_ptr;
|
||||
size_t size_with_canary;
|
||||
size_t total_size;
|
||||
size_t unprotected_size;
|
||||
|
||||
if (size >= (size_t) SIZE_MAX - page_size * 4U) {
|
||||
errno = ENOMEM;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (page_size <= sizeof canary || page_size < sizeof unprotected_size) {
|
||||
sodium_misuse(); /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
|
||||
}
|
||||
size_with_canary = (sizeof canary) + size;
|
||||
unprotected_size = _page_round(size_with_canary);
|
||||
total_size = page_size + page_size + unprotected_size + page_size;
|
||||
if ((base_ptr = _alloc_aligned(total_size)) == NULL) {
|
||||
return NULL; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
|
||||
}
|
||||
unprotected_ptr = base_ptr + page_size * 2U;
|
||||
_mprotect_noaccess(base_ptr + page_size, page_size);
|
||||
# ifndef HAVE_PAGE_PROTECTION
|
||||
memcpy(unprotected_ptr + unprotected_size, canary, sizeof canary);
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
_mprotect_noaccess(unprotected_ptr + unprotected_size, page_size);
|
||||
(void) sodium_mlock(unprotected_ptr, unprotected_size); /* not a hard error in the context of sodium_malloc() */
|
||||
canary_ptr =
|
||||
unprotected_ptr + _page_round(size_with_canary) - size_with_canary;
|
||||
user_ptr = canary_ptr + sizeof canary;
|
||||
memcpy(canary_ptr, canary, sizeof canary);
|
||||
memcpy(base_ptr, &unprotected_size, sizeof unprotected_size);
|
||||
_mprotect_readonly(base_ptr, page_size);
|
||||
assert(_unprotected_ptr_from_user_ptr(user_ptr) == unprotected_ptr);
|
||||
|
||||
return user_ptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* !HAVE_ALIGNED_MALLOC */
|
||||
|
||||
__attribute__((malloc)) void *
|
||||
sodium_malloc(const size_t size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
void *ptr;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((ptr = _sodium_malloc(size)) == NULL) {
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memset(ptr, (int) GARBAGE_VALUE, size);
|
||||
|
||||
return ptr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
__attribute__((malloc)) void *
|
||||
sodium_allocarray(size_t count, size_t size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (count > (size_t) 0U && size >= (size_t) SIZE_MAX / count) {
|
||||
errno = ENOMEM;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return sodium_malloc(count * size);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef HAVE_ALIGNED_MALLOC
|
||||
void
|
||||
sodium_free(void *ptr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
free(ptr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
void
|
||||
sodium_free(void *ptr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char *base_ptr;
|
||||
unsigned char *canary_ptr;
|
||||
unsigned char *unprotected_ptr;
|
||||
size_t total_size;
|
||||
size_t unprotected_size;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ptr == NULL) {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
canary_ptr = ((unsigned char *) ptr) - sizeof canary;
|
||||
unprotected_ptr = _unprotected_ptr_from_user_ptr(ptr);
|
||||
base_ptr = unprotected_ptr - page_size * 2U;
|
||||
memcpy(&unprotected_size, base_ptr, sizeof unprotected_size);
|
||||
total_size = page_size + page_size + unprotected_size + page_size;
|
||||
_mprotect_readwrite(base_ptr, total_size);
|
||||
if (sodium_memcmp(canary_ptr, canary, sizeof canary) != 0) {
|
||||
_out_of_bounds();
|
||||
}
|
||||
# ifndef HAVE_PAGE_PROTECTION
|
||||
if (sodium_memcmp(unprotected_ptr + unprotected_size, canary,
|
||||
sizeof canary) != 0) {
|
||||
_out_of_bounds();
|
||||
}
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
(void) sodium_munlock(unprotected_ptr, unprotected_size);
|
||||
_free_aligned(base_ptr, total_size);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* HAVE_ALIGNED_MALLOC */
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef HAVE_PAGE_PROTECTION
|
||||
static int
|
||||
_sodium_mprotect(void *ptr, int (*cb)(void *ptr, size_t size))
|
||||
{
|
||||
(void) ptr;
|
||||
(void) cb;
|
||||
errno = ENOSYS;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
static int
|
||||
_sodium_mprotect(void *ptr, int (*cb)(void *ptr, size_t size))
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char *base_ptr;
|
||||
unsigned char *unprotected_ptr;
|
||||
size_t unprotected_size;
|
||||
|
||||
unprotected_ptr = _unprotected_ptr_from_user_ptr(ptr);
|
||||
base_ptr = unprotected_ptr - page_size * 2U;
|
||||
memcpy(&unprotected_size, base_ptr, sizeof unprotected_size);
|
||||
|
||||
return cb(unprotected_ptr, unprotected_size);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
sodium_mprotect_noaccess(void *ptr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return _sodium_mprotect(ptr, _mprotect_noaccess);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
sodium_mprotect_readonly(void *ptr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return _sodium_mprotect(ptr, _mprotect_readonly);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
sodium_mprotect_readwrite(void *ptr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return _sodium_mprotect(ptr, _mprotect_readwrite);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
indentation: 2
|
||||
column-limit: none
|
||||
function-arrows: trailing
|
||||
comma-style: trailing
|
||||
import-export-style: trailing
|
||||
indent-wheres: true
|
||||
record-brace-space: true
|
||||
newlines-between-decls: 1
|
||||
haddock-style: single-line
|
||||
haddock-style-module: null
|
||||
let-style: inline
|
||||
in-style: right-align
|
||||
single-constraint-parens: never
|
||||
unicode: never
|
||||
respectful: true
|
||||
fixities:
|
||||
- infixr 9 .
|
||||
- infixr 8 .:, .:., .=
|
||||
- infixr 6 <>
|
||||
- infixr 5 ++
|
||||
- infixl 4 <$>, <$, $>, <$$>, <$?>
|
||||
- infixl 4 <*>, <*, *>, <**>
|
||||
- infix 4 ==, /=
|
||||
- infixr 3 &&
|
||||
- infixl 3 <|>
|
||||
- infixr 2 ||
|
||||
- infixl 1 >>, >>=
|
||||
- infixr 1 =<<, >=>, <=<
|
||||
- infixr 0 $, $!
|
||||
reexports: []
|
||||
+47
-22
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
name: simplexmq
|
||||
version: 5.3.0.1
|
||||
version: 5.6.0.0
|
||||
synopsis: SimpleXMQ message broker
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,
|
||||
@@ -20,9 +20,11 @@ category: Chat, Network, Web, System, Cryptography
|
||||
extra-source-files:
|
||||
- README.md
|
||||
- CHANGELOG.md
|
||||
- cbits/sha512.h
|
||||
- cbits/sntrup761.h
|
||||
|
||||
dependencies:
|
||||
- aeson == 2.0.*
|
||||
- aeson == 2.2.*
|
||||
- ansi-terminal >= 0.10 && < 0.12
|
||||
- asn1-encoding == 0.9.*
|
||||
- asn1-types == 0.3.*
|
||||
@@ -30,49 +32,46 @@ dependencies:
|
||||
- attoparsec == 0.14.*
|
||||
- base >= 4.14 && < 5
|
||||
- base64-bytestring >= 1.0 && < 1.3
|
||||
- bytestring == 0.10.*
|
||||
- case-insensitive == 1.2.*
|
||||
- composition == 1.0.*
|
||||
- constraints >= 0.12 && < 0.14
|
||||
- containers == 0.6.*
|
||||
- cryptonite >= 0.27 && < 0.30
|
||||
- cryptostore == 0.2.*
|
||||
- crypton == 0.34.*
|
||||
- crypton-x509 == 1.7.*
|
||||
- crypton-x509-store == 1.6.*
|
||||
- crypton-x509-validation == 1.6.*
|
||||
- cryptostore == 0.3.*
|
||||
- data-default == 0.7.*
|
||||
- direct-sqlcipher == 2.3.*
|
||||
- directory == 1.3.*
|
||||
- filepath == 1.4.*
|
||||
- hourglass == 0.2.*
|
||||
- http-types == 0.12.*
|
||||
- http2 == 4.1.*
|
||||
- generic-random >= 1.3 && < 1.5
|
||||
- http2 >= 4.2.2 && < 4.3
|
||||
- ini == 0.4.1
|
||||
- iproute == 1.7.*
|
||||
- iso8601-time == 0.1.*
|
||||
- memory == 0.15.*
|
||||
- mtl == 2.2.*
|
||||
- memory == 0.18.*
|
||||
- mtl >= 2.3.1 && < 3.0
|
||||
- network >= 3.1.2.7 && < 3.2
|
||||
- network-transport == 0.5.4
|
||||
- network-info >= 0.2 && < 0.3
|
||||
- network-transport == 0.5.6
|
||||
- network-udp >= 0.0 && < 0.1
|
||||
- optparse-applicative >= 0.15 && < 0.17
|
||||
- QuickCheck == 2.14.*
|
||||
- process == 1.6.*
|
||||
- random >= 1.1 && < 1.3
|
||||
- simple-logger == 0.1.*
|
||||
- socks == 0.6.*
|
||||
- sqlcipher-simple == 0.4.*
|
||||
- stm == 2.5.*
|
||||
- template-haskell == 2.16.*
|
||||
- temporary == 1.3.*
|
||||
- text == 1.2.*
|
||||
- time == 1.9.*
|
||||
- time-compat == 1.9.*
|
||||
- time == 1.12.*
|
||||
- time-manager == 0.0.*
|
||||
- tls >= 1.6.0 && < 1.7
|
||||
- transformers == 0.5.*
|
||||
- tls >= 1.7.0 && < 1.8
|
||||
- transformers == 0.6.*
|
||||
- unliftio == 0.2.*
|
||||
- unliftio-core == 0.2.*
|
||||
- websockets == 0.12.*
|
||||
- x509 == 1.7.*
|
||||
- x509-store == 1.6.*
|
||||
- x509-validation == 1.6.*
|
||||
- yaml == 0.11.*
|
||||
|
||||
flags:
|
||||
@@ -80,14 +79,34 @@ flags:
|
||||
description: Enable swift JSON format
|
||||
manual: True
|
||||
default: False
|
||||
use_crypton:
|
||||
description: Use crypton etc. in cryptostore
|
||||
manual: True
|
||||
default: True
|
||||
|
||||
when:
|
||||
- condition: flag(swift)
|
||||
cpp-options:
|
||||
- -DswiftJSON
|
||||
- condition: impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
|
||||
dependencies:
|
||||
- bytestring == 0.11.*
|
||||
- template-haskell == 2.20.*
|
||||
- text >= 2.0.1 && < 2.2
|
||||
- condition: impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
|
||||
dependencies:
|
||||
- bytestring == 0.10.*
|
||||
- template-haskell == 2.16.*
|
||||
- text >= 1.2.3.0 && < 1.3
|
||||
|
||||
library:
|
||||
source-dirs: src
|
||||
c-sources:
|
||||
- cbits/sha512.c
|
||||
- cbits/sntrup761.c
|
||||
- cbits/sodium/utils_memory.c
|
||||
include-dirs: cbits
|
||||
extra-libraries: crypto
|
||||
|
||||
executables:
|
||||
smp-server:
|
||||
@@ -97,6 +116,7 @@ executables:
|
||||
- simplexmq
|
||||
ghc-options:
|
||||
- -threaded
|
||||
- -rtsopts
|
||||
|
||||
ntf-server:
|
||||
source-dirs: apps/ntf-server
|
||||
@@ -105,6 +125,7 @@ executables:
|
||||
- simplexmq
|
||||
ghc-options:
|
||||
- -threaded
|
||||
- -rtsopts
|
||||
|
||||
xftp-server:
|
||||
source-dirs: apps/xftp-server
|
||||
@@ -113,6 +134,7 @@ executables:
|
||||
- simplexmq
|
||||
ghc-options:
|
||||
- -threaded
|
||||
- -rtsopts
|
||||
|
||||
smp-agent:
|
||||
source-dirs: apps/smp-agent
|
||||
@@ -121,6 +143,7 @@ executables:
|
||||
- simplexmq
|
||||
ghc-options:
|
||||
- -threaded
|
||||
- -rtsopts
|
||||
|
||||
xftp:
|
||||
source-dirs: apps/xftp
|
||||
@@ -129,6 +152,7 @@ executables:
|
||||
- simplexmq
|
||||
ghc-options:
|
||||
- -threaded
|
||||
- -rtsopts
|
||||
|
||||
tests:
|
||||
simplexmq-test:
|
||||
@@ -137,8 +161,9 @@ tests:
|
||||
dependencies:
|
||||
- simplexmq
|
||||
- deepseq == 1.4.*
|
||||
- hspec == 2.7.*
|
||||
- hspec-core == 2.7.*
|
||||
- generic-random == 1.5.*
|
||||
- hspec == 2.11.*
|
||||
- hspec-core == 2.11.*
|
||||
- HUnit == 1.6.*
|
||||
- QuickCheck == 2.14.*
|
||||
- silently == 1.2.*
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ Simplex messaging server implementations MUST NOT create, store or send to any o
|
||||
|
||||
- Snapshots of the database they use to store queues and messages (instead simplex messaging clients must manage redundancy by using more than one simplex messaging server). In-memory persistence is recommended.
|
||||
|
||||
- Any other information that may compromise privacy or [forward secrecy][4] of communication between clients using simplex messaging servers.
|
||||
- Any other information that may compromise privacy or [forward secrecy][4] of communication between clients using simplex messaging servers (the servers cannot compromise forward secrecy of any application layer protocol, such as double ratchet).
|
||||
|
||||
## Message delivery notifications
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -364,9 +364,9 @@ The clients can optionally instruct a dedicated push notification server to subs
|
||||
|
||||
[`SEND` command](#send-message) includes the notification flag to instruct SMP server whether to send the notification - this flag is forwarded to the recepient inside encrypted envelope, together with the timestamp and the message body, so even if TLS is compromised this flag cannot be used for traffic correlation.
|
||||
|
||||
## SMP Transmission andtransport block structure
|
||||
## SMP Transmission and transport block structure
|
||||
|
||||
Each transport block (SMP transmission) has a fixed size of 16384 bytes for traffic uniformity.
|
||||
Each transport block has a fixed size of 16384 bytes for traffic uniformity.
|
||||
|
||||
From SMP version 4 each block can contain multiple transmissions, version 3 blocks have 1 transmission.
|
||||
Some parts of SMP transmission are padded to a fixed size; this padding is uniformly added as a word16 encoded in network byte order - see `paddedString` syntax.
|
||||
@@ -387,17 +387,17 @@ Each transmission/block for SMP v3 between the client and the server must have t
|
||||
|
||||
```abnf
|
||||
paddedTransmission = <padded(transmission), 16384>
|
||||
transmission = [signature] SP signed
|
||||
signed = sessionIdentifier SP [corrId] SP [queueId] SP smpCommand
|
||||
transmission = signature signed
|
||||
signed = sessionIdentifier corrId queueId smpCommand
|
||||
; corrId is required in client commands and server responses,
|
||||
; it is empty in server notifications.
|
||||
corrId = 1*32(%x21-7F) ; any characters other than control/whitespace
|
||||
queueId = encoded ; max 32 bytes when decoded (24 bytes is used),
|
||||
corrId = length *OCTET
|
||||
queueId = length *OCTET
|
||||
; empty queue ID is used with "create" command and in some server responses
|
||||
signature = encoded
|
||||
signature = length *OCTET
|
||||
; empty signature can be used with "send" before the queue is secured with secure command
|
||||
; signature is always empty with "ping" and "serverMsg"
|
||||
encoded = <base64 encoded binary>
|
||||
length = 1*1 OCTET
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`base64` encoding should be used with padding, as defined in section 4 of [RFC 4648][9]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
|
||||
Scheme name: xftp
|
||||
|
||||
Status: Provisional
|
||||
|
||||
Applications/protocols that use this scheme name:
|
||||
This scheme is used for URIs of XFTP (SimpleX File Transfer Protocol) servers,
|
||||
a client-server protocol for asynchronous file transfer via relays,
|
||||
preserving file meta-data (including size and name) and content privacy.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact: Evgeny Poberezkin <ep@simplex.chat>
|
||||
|
||||
Change controller: Evgeny Poberezkin <ep@simplex.chat>
|
||||
|
||||
References:
|
||||
The syntax for server URIs in the provisional specification for SimpleX File Transfer Protocol:
|
||||
https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/rfcs/2022-12-26-simplex-file-transfer.md#server-address-syntax
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
||||
Scheme name: xrcp
|
||||
|
||||
Status: Provisional
|
||||
|
||||
Applications/protocols that use this scheme name:
|
||||
This scheme is used for URIs of controller sessions via SimpleX Remote Control protocol (XRCP),
|
||||
a protocol for remote access and management of hosts via insecure network.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact: Evgeny Poberezkin <ep@simplex.chat>
|
||||
|
||||
Change controller: Evgeny Poberezkin <ep@simplex.chat>
|
||||
|
||||
References:
|
||||
The syntax for server URIs in the provisional specification for SimpleX File Transfer Protocol:
|
||||
https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/rfcs/2023-10-25-remote-control.md#session-invitation
|
||||
@@ -149,6 +149,19 @@ parts:
|
||||
|
||||
This file description is sent to all recipients via normal messages, split to 15780 byte chunks if needed.
|
||||
|
||||
### Server address syntax
|
||||
|
||||
The server address is a URI with the following format:
|
||||
|
||||
```abnf
|
||||
xftpServerURI = %s"xftp://" xftpServer
|
||||
xftpServer = serverIdentity "@" srvHost [":" port]
|
||||
srvHost = <hostname> ; RFC1123, RFC5891
|
||||
port = 1*DIGIT
|
||||
serverIdentity = base64url
|
||||
base64url = <base64url encoded binary> ; RFC4648, section 5
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Receiving file
|
||||
|
||||
Having received the description, the recipient will:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
|
||||
# Re-sync encryption ratchets, queue rotation, message delivery receipts
|
||||
|
||||
This is very unfocussed doc outlining several problems that seem somewhat related, and some possible solution approaches.
|
||||
|
||||
## Problems
|
||||
|
||||
When old database backup is used, the sending client encrypts the messages in a way that the receiving client cannot decrypt them, because it does not store the old keys, and does not try to decrypt ratchet headers using the old keys. When receiving the messages, the client that uses the old database is unable to decrypt them, either the header or the message itself (if more than 500 messages are skipped, or if root ratchet step happened).
|
||||
|
||||
The same symptoms happen during the queue rotation, unfortunately, as we do not keep the history of received messages once they are acknowledged, so the client reports these error to the users.
|
||||
|
||||
While these are two different problems, to the users they manifest in the same way, so it is difficult to differentiate.
|
||||
|
||||
Another ratchet problem that should be solved as well is not deleting unused skipped keys after some time or some number of events, possibly it should be considered at the same time.
|
||||
|
||||
While it is tempting to consider delivery receipts as an isolated problem, it is somewhat coupled, as the requests to re-sync ratchets and to re-deliver skipped messages are effectively delivery receipts.
|
||||
|
||||
A naive solution to delivery receipts when each message is responded to with a confirmation has two downsides:
|
||||
|
||||
- it doubles the traffic.
|
||||
- in the absense of delays, it also leaks some information about the network latency, that can be used to track user's location.
|
||||
|
||||
Both problems can be mitigated by sending delivery receipts with a random delay, to confirm all messages sent, not each one. But this would only reduce the traffic when the sender sends many messages. Alternatively, we could think how to reduce the block size for SMP commands. The challenge is profile pictures and image previews, so to reduce traffic we need to start sending them as XFTP files, potentially with a smaller 64kb chunks (that would also increase preview quality).
|
||||
|
||||
## Solution for queue rotation
|
||||
|
||||
We need to:
|
||||
- store and show the rotation status in the UI to prevent attempts to rotate the queue multiple times.
|
||||
- process multiple message delivery events while there is a redundancy, to avoid errors in terminal.
|
||||
- differentiate between decryption errors during queue rotation - that would require keeping the messages for some time, at least keeping their IDs and hashes together with some additional status. In this case when duplicate or old message arrives, we can check whether this message was already processed, and do not show error if it was.
|
||||
|
||||
## Solution to re-sync ratchets
|
||||
|
||||
When we establish that the receiving client is indeed unable to decrypt messages, we should:
|
||||
- notify the user - it is already happening, but it happens in case of rotation as well.
|
||||
- optionally, notify another client that message was not decrypted - this effectively becomes a delivery receipt. That could be a separate command triggered by the user in the UI.
|
||||
- clients can get into this state at the same time, how do we handle concurrent requests? Possibly, we could design these messages so this is irrelevant whether the message is sent in response or not, and calculate the new ratchet keys once the clients have both the sent and received messages. After that both clients can send "ratchet reset" message:
|
||||
- EKEY - message containing a new set of keys to initialize the ratchets
|
||||
- EREADY - message confirming that the ratchet is ready, already e2e encrypted
|
||||
|
||||
The downside of this approach, is that unlike the initial handshake, where the second ratchet key is sent in e2e encrypted response, this message will be sent only encrypted with queue key. We could change this protocol by adding EREPLY message, and the clients would know to ingnore EKEY with bigger hash of the keys, so that the client who sent keys with smaller hash would be processing response from another client (that is if EKEY is received after EKEY is sent).
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
A B
|
||||
|
||||
EKEY 1 -> <- EKEY 2 (e2e encrypted with per-queue key only)
|
||||
EKEY 2 <- -> EKEY 1
|
||||
1 < 2, wait 2 > 1, reply EREPLY 3 (e2e encrypted with ratchets)
|
||||
ratchet: 1, 3 ratchet: 3, 1
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Once ratchets are re-synched the clients could additionally request delivery of skipped messages. As ratchets being out of sync is not the only problem when messages can be lost, it may be managed independently from the ratchet re-sync. This problem seems tied with delivery receipts too, as requesting to re-deliver some messages automatically confirms that some other messages were delivered.
|
||||
|
||||
Alternatively, the request for ratchet sync can already contain the ID of the first failed message - that would allow the agent:
|
||||
- stop sending messages until ratchets are in sync.
|
||||
- re-deliver failed messages first.
|
||||
- only then deliver any pending messages.
|
||||
|
||||
This approach would probably result in a better UX (no out of order delivery), but requires tracking pending messages that are not attempted to deliver and to also insert old messages in the delivery queue with the old IDs.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
|
||||
# SMP and XFTP delivery relays
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
SimpleX network relies on SMP relays to hold sent messages while the recipient is offline. This design provides many advantages over pure p2p designs [1]. The threat model for relays is covered in [2].
|
||||
|
||||
The problem with this design is that the relays are chosen by the recipients, and they as a result can be used to record transport addresses of the senders.
|
||||
|
||||
Similar problem, but reversed, exists with XFTP design - XFTP relays are chosen by the senders and also can be modified to record transport addresses of the recipients.
|
||||
|
||||
The current solution to this problem is to use onion routing to access relays, and many users do it already. The downside is that it requires additional configuration and can be complex to some users.
|
||||
|
||||
## Solution approach
|
||||
|
||||
Add a second type of relays to the network design.
|
||||
|
||||
For SMP protocol, these relays would accept messages from the senders and deliver them to the recipients. If the recipient were to modify the relay used to receive the messages to also records senders' IP addresses, then they would only succeed in recording the IP address of the relay, not the sender.
|
||||
|
||||
Similar relay can be introduced for XFTP protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
The additional advantage of using the relays is the reduced number of network connections that need to be used, and reduced traffic.
|
||||
|
||||
Compared with Tor this approach has:
|
||||
- lower latency
|
||||
- no centralized components or the registry of the servers
|
||||
- still no visibility of the whole network to the relays, as sending relays do not need to randomly choose the next relay, but would forward the messages directly to the destination relay.
|
||||
|
||||
The downside of this approach is that relays will have more visibility of the network than in the current design.
|
||||
|
||||
## Implementation considerations
|
||||
|
||||
1. Should this new relays be included in the existing SMP and XFTP protocols and servers, or should they be designed as separate protocols and servers?
|
||||
|
||||
2. Should the client aim to choose the same host for delivery relay as the destination server (to reduce the traffic), if possible, or should it aim to choose a different host (to reduce metadata available to single host)? The answer to this would affect the answer to the first question.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
|
||||
# Protecting IP addresses of the users from their contacts
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
SMP protocol relays are chosen and can be controlled by the message recipients. It means that the recipients can find out IP addresses of message senders by modifying SMP relay code (or by using proxies and timing correlation), unless the senders use VPN or some overlay network. Tor is an audequate solution in most cases to mitigate it, but it requires additional technical knowledge to install and configure (even installing Orbot on Android is seen as "complex" by many users), and reduces usability because of higher latency.
|
||||
|
||||
The lack of in-built IP address protection is the main concern of many users, particularly given that most people do not realise that it is lacking by default - without transport protection SimpleX is not perceived as a "whole product".
|
||||
|
||||
Similarly, XFTP protocol relays are chosen by senders, and they can be used to detect file recipients' IP addresses.
|
||||
|
||||
## Possible solutions
|
||||
|
||||
1. Embed Tor in the client.
|
||||
|
||||
Pros:
|
||||
- no changes in the protocols/servers
|
||||
- acceptable threat model for most users
|
||||
- removes complexity of installing and configuring Tor
|
||||
- probably, the most attractive option for Tor users
|
||||
|
||||
Cons:
|
||||
- higher latency and error rate
|
||||
- higher resource usage
|
||||
- requires us updating Tor client regularly
|
||||
- restriction on Tor usage in some networks, so it would require supporting bridges in the app UI
|
||||
- legislative restrictions on Tor usage, so it may require supporting multiple app versions, and won't solve the problem where Tor is not embedded
|
||||
|
||||
2. Thin clients with hosted accounts.
|
||||
|
||||
Host some part of the current client on the server and have another part running on the devices.
|
||||
|
||||
Pros:
|
||||
- substantially reduces the traffic for mobile clients
|
||||
- probably the most attractive option for mass market users who expect to have an account on the server and be able to access it from multiple devices and via web.
|
||||
|
||||
Cons:
|
||||
- a lot of design and development
|
||||
- makes accounts visible to the server
|
||||
- the new protocol design to protect connections graph and message content from the hosting server.
|
||||
- quite different threat model
|
||||
|
||||
Overall, this is not a viable or even appropriate option for the current stage.
|
||||
|
||||
3. SMP / XFTP proxy.
|
||||
|
||||
Introduce SMP and XFTP protocol extenstions to allow message senders and file recipients to delegate the tasks of sending messages and receiving files to the proxies, so that peer-chosen relays can only observe IP addresses of the proxies and not of the users.
|
||||
|
||||
Pros:
|
||||
- no dependency on and lower latency than via Tor
|
||||
- reduces client traffic, both due to retries handled by these proxies and due to the smaller number of connections to the peer-chosen relays. The flip side is that additional commands (and traffic) are needed to create the sessions with relays.
|
||||
- higher transport privacy: protects IP addresses from peers and makes transport correlation harder.
|
||||
- additional function: retrying pending messages, while the queue is not secured yet, without extra traffic for the clients.
|
||||
- improves current threat model by preventing session-based correlation of the traffic by the destination relay (assuming no information sharing with the proxies), as there will be one session between proxy and destination relay, mixing traffic from multiple users.
|
||||
|
||||
Cons:
|
||||
- design and development cost
|
||||
- can undermine delivery stability
|
||||
|
||||
This seems an attractive option, both from technical (reasonable complexity) and positioning (moving SimpleX closer to mix networks, while still avoiding server list visibility) points of view, and it is in the middle between embedding Tor, which would make the product more niche and has downsides and development costs too, and thin clients, which is 10x+ more work, and also creates a different threat model, that is not very attractive for the current stage and users.
|
||||
|
||||
Below considers this design.
|
||||
|
||||
## SMP/XFTP proxy design
|
||||
|
||||
### Design requirements
|
||||
|
||||
1. To avoid increasing the complexity of self-hosting, we should not create additional server types, and existing SMP and XFTP servers should be extended to provide proxy functions.
|
||||
|
||||
2. SMP proxy should not be able to observe queue addresses and their count on the destination relays. This requirement is not needed for XFTP proxies, as each file chunk is downloaded only once, so there is no need to hide its address.
|
||||
|
||||
3. There must be no identifiers and cyphertext in common in outgoing and incoming traffic inside TLS (the current designs have this quality).
|
||||
|
||||
4. Traffic between the client and destination relays must be e2e encrypted, with MITM-by-proxy mitigated, relying on the relay identity (certificate fingerprint), ideally without any additional fingerprint in relay address.
|
||||
|
||||
5. SMP proxy should implement retry logic and hold messages while they are delivered. They also should return relay replies to the client. To avoid any additional traffic the client should just add "sent to proxy" status and only show "sent" once proxy returns the response from the destination relay - there should be no additional response from the proxy confirming acceptance to delivery.
|
||||
|
||||
This would also reduce the difference in how the traffic looks to the observer - sending via proxy may look similar to sending to the usual server (which can be further supported by friendly destination relays that could add latency for direct requests and reply quickly when response came via proxy and be undermined by hostile relays that would introduce some latency pattern to help traffic correlation. The latter problem can be mitigated by having a fixed response latency from proxy that may be "come back later for destination response").
|
||||
|
||||
6. Sending messages to groups have to be batched in the client to avoid multiple requests for destination relay sessions - such requests can be batched to proxy, even though it leaks _some_ metadata - which destination relays are used by a given sender's IP address, it also reduces the overhead from proxies – it could be an option based on the privacy slider.
|
||||
|
||||
6. SMP proxy may also increase utility and privacy of the platform:
|
||||
|
||||
- holding messages and retrying them for the new connections while the receiving queue is not secured yet.
|
||||
- add delays in message delivery to make traffic correlation harder (same can be done in SMP relays).
|
||||
|
||||
### Implementation considerations
|
||||
|
||||
1. Block size. Possibly, there is not enough spare capacity in the current 16kb block to fit additional headers, any necessary metadata and encryption authentication tags, in which case we cannot send SMP and SMP-proxy traffic in the same transport connection (in case the same server plays both roles). In which case we will need to negotiate role during connection handshake and define a different (sub-)protocol for SMP-proxy.
|
||||
|
||||
2. To be decided if we see it as extension of SMP protocol or as another protocol, irrespective of whether it's provided by the same or another server. Given different roles and block size it may be simpler to see it as a separate protocol, and which protocol is provided in the connection is determined during handshake.
|
||||
|
||||
3. We probably should aim to avoid changing agent/client logic and see it instead as transport concern that can be dynamically decided at a point of sending a message, based on the current configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
4. Configuration should probably allow to choose between not using proxies (particularly, during testing, when it would be the default), using proxies only for unknown relays, and using proxies for all relays (extra traffic, but more complex transport correlation - although randomizing this choice can be more beneficial to the transport privacy). The clients can aim to use proxy from another provider, to reduce the risks of sharing the information.
|
||||
|
||||
### SMP-proxy protocol
|
||||
|
||||
The flow of the messages will be:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Client requests proxy to create session with the relay by sending `server` command with the SMP relay address and optional proxy basic AUTH (below). It should be possible to batch multiple session requests into one block, to reduce traffic.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Proxy connects to SMP relay, negotiating a shared secret in the handshake that will be used to encrypt all sender blocks inside TLS (proxy-relay encryption). SMP relay also returns in handshake its temporary DH key to agree e2e encryption with the client (sender-relay encryption, to hide metadata sent to the destination relay from proxy).
|
||||
|
||||
3. Proxy replies with `server_id` command including relay session ID to identify it in further requests, relay DH key for e2e encryption with the client - this key is signed with the TLS online private key associated with the certificate (its fingerprint is included in the relay address), and the TLS session ID between proxy and relay (this session ID must be used in transmissions, to mitigate replay attacks as before).
|
||||
|
||||
A possible attack here is that proxy can use this TLS session to replay commands received from the client. Possibly, it could be mitigated with a bloom filter per proxy/SMP relay connection that would reject the repeated DH keys (that need to be used for replay), and also with DH key expiration (this mitigation should allow some acceptable rate of false positives from the bloom filter).
|
||||
|
||||
With 32 bits per key there will be ~1/1,000,000 false positives (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bloom_filter), and the filter would use ~32mb per each proxy connection if we reset relay key every 1000000 messages or more frequently. Given that the only commands accepted via relay would be SEND, replaying it would be interpreted by the receiving client as duplicate message delivery, so a small number of replayed messages won't cause any problems. But without mitigation it could be used to flood the receiving SMP relay queues with repeated messages, effectively causing DoS on these queues, even in case when SMP relays require basic auth to create queues.
|
||||
|
||||
Given that the client chooses proxy it has some trust to, maybe this replay attack risk can be accepted.
|
||||
|
||||
It is important that the same public key from destination relay is returned to all clients, so proxy does not need to repeat this request to know relays while the key did not expire, as using different keys for different clients would allow destination relays to correlate requests to the clients. A proxy that colludes with the destination relay can pass different public keys to the same client, but it is not changing threat model as colluding proxy can share information as well. It is also important that the client uses a new random key for each command, as using the same key would allow the destination relay to identify these commands as comming from the same user, and using a different key for each queue while would protect privacy of the user from the destination relay, would make it visible to the proxy how many different queues the client has on destination relay.
|
||||
|
||||
*Unrelated cosideration for SMP protocol privacy improvement*: instead of signing commands to the destination relay, the sender could have a ratchet per queue agreed with the destination relay that would simply use authenticated encryption with per-message symmetric key to encrypt the message on the way to relay, and this encryption would be used as a proof of sender.
|
||||
|
||||
4. Now the client sends `forward` to proxy, which it then forwards to SMP relay, applying additional encryption layer.
|
||||
|
||||
5. SMP relay sends `response` to proxy applying additional encryption layer, which it then forwards to the client removing the additional encryption layer.
|
||||
|
||||
Effectively it works as a simplified two-hop onion routing with the first relay (proxy) chosen by the sending client and the second relay chosen by the recipient, not only protecting senders' IP addresses from the recipients' relays, but also preventing recipients relays from correlating senders' traffic to different queues, as TLS session is owned by the proxy now and it mixes the traffic from multiple senders. To correlate traffic to users, proxy and relay would have to combine their information. SMP relays are still able to correlate traffic to receiving users via transport session.
|
||||
|
||||
Sequence diagram for sending the message via SMP proxy:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
|
||||
| sending | | SMP | | SMP | | receiving |
|
||||
| client | | proxy | | relay | | client |
|
||||
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
|
||||
| `server` | | |
|
||||
| -------------------------> | create TLS session, get keys | |
|
||||
| | ------------------------------> | |
|
||||
| `server_id` | (if doesn't exist) | |
|
||||
| <------------------------- | | |
|
||||
| | | |
|
||||
| TLS(F:s2r(SEND(e2e(msg)))) | | |
|
||||
| -------------------------> | TLS(F:p2r(s2r(SEND(e2e(msg))))) | |
|
||||
| | ------------------------------> | |
|
||||
| | | |
|
||||
| | TLS(R:p2r(s2r(OK/ERR))) | |
|
||||
| TLS(R:s2r(OK/ERR)) | <------------------------------ | |
|
||||
| <------------------------- | | TLS(MSG(r2c(e2e(msg)))) |
|
||||
| | | -----------------------> |
|
||||
| | | |
|
||||
| | | TLS(ACK) |
|
||||
| | | <----------------------- |
|
||||
| | | |
|
||||
| | | |
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Below diagram shows the encrypttion layers for `forward` and `response` commands:
|
||||
|
||||
- s2r (added) - encryption between client and SMP relay, with relay key returned in server_id command, with MITM by proxy mitigated by verifying the certificate fingerprint included in the relay address.
|
||||
- e2e (exists now) - end-to-end encryption per SMP queue, with double ratchet e2e encryption inside it.
|
||||
- p2r (added) - additional encryption between proxy and SMP relay with key agreed in the handshake, to mitigate traffic correlation inside TLS. This key could also be signed by the same certificate, if we don't want to rely on TLS security.
|
||||
- r2c (exists now) additional encryption between SMP relay and client to prevent traffic correlation inside TLS.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
----------------- ----------------- -- TLS -- ----------------- -----------------
|
||||
| | -- TLS -- | | -- p2r -- | | -- TLS -- | |
|
||||
| | -- s2r -- | | -- s2r -- | | -- r2c -- | |
|
||||
| sending | -- e2e -- | | -- e2e -- | | -- e2e -- | receiving |
|
||||
| client | MSG | SMP proxy | MSG | SMP relay | MSG | client |
|
||||
| | -- e2e -- | | -- e2e -- | | -- e2e -- | |
|
||||
| | -- s2r -- | | -- s2r -- | | -- r2c -- | |
|
||||
| | -- TLS -- | | -- p2r -- | | -- TLS -- | |
|
||||
----------------- ----------------- -- TLS -- ----------------- -----------------
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
When proxy connects to SMP relay it would indicate in the handshake that it will use proxy protocol and the SMP relay would expect the same `forward` commands and reply with `response`s.
|
||||
|
||||
Below syntax aims to fit in 16kb block using spare capacity in SMP protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
```abnf
|
||||
proxy_block = padded(proxy_transmission, 16384)
|
||||
proxy_transmission = corr_id relay_session_id proxy_command
|
||||
corr_id = length *8 OCTET
|
||||
proxy_command = server / server_id / forward / response / error
|
||||
server = "S" address [relay_basic_auth] ; creates transport session between proxy and relay
|
||||
server_id = "I" relay_session_id tls_session_id signed_relay_key ;
|
||||
; session_id is the TLS session ID between proxy and relay, it has to be included inside encrypted block to prevent replay attacks
|
||||
forward = %s"F" random_dh_pub_key encrypted_block ; it's important that a new key is used for each command, to prevent any correlation by proxy or by destination relay
|
||||
response = %s"R" encrypted_block; response received from the destination SMP relay
|
||||
relay_session_id = length *8 OCTET
|
||||
error = %s"E" error
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The overhead is: 1+8 (corrId) + 1+8 (relay_session_id) + 1 (command) + 1+32 (random_dh_pub_key) + 2 (original length) + 16 (auth tag for e2e encryption) + 16 (auth tag for proxy to relay encryption) = 86 bytes. The reserve for sent messages in SMP is ~84 bytes, so it should about fit with some reduced bytes somewhere.
|
||||
|
||||
Another possible design is to allow mixing sent messages and normal SMP commands in the same transport connection, but it can make fitting in the block a bit harder, additional overhead would be: 1 (transmission count) + 2 (transmission size) + 1 (empty signature) = 4 bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
The above assumes that the client can only send one message to an SMP relay and then has to wait for response before sending the next message. Missing the response would cause re-delivery (further improvement is possible when proxy detects these redelieveries and not send them to relays but simply reply with the same response).
|
||||
|
||||
### Threat model for SMP proxy and changes to threat model for SMP
|
||||
|
||||
#### SMP proxy
|
||||
|
||||
*can:*
|
||||
|
||||
- learn a user's IP address, as long as Tor is not used.
|
||||
|
||||
- learn when a user with a given IP address is online.
|
||||
|
||||
- know how many messages are sent from a given IP address and to a given destination SMP relay.
|
||||
|
||||
- drop all messages from a given IP address or to a given destination relay.
|
||||
|
||||
- unless SMP relay detects repeated public DH keys of senders, replay messages to a destination relay within a single session, causing either duplicate message delivery (which will be detected and ignored by the receiving clients), or, when receiving client is not connected to SMP relay, exhausting capacity of destination queues used within the session.
|
||||
|
||||
*cannot:*
|
||||
|
||||
- perform queue correlation (matching multiple queues to a single user), unless it has additional information from SMP relay.
|
||||
|
||||
- undetectably add, duplicate, or corrupt individual messages.
|
||||
|
||||
- undetectably drop individual messages, so long as a subsequent message is delivered.
|
||||
|
||||
- learn the contents of messages.
|
||||
|
||||
- learn the destination queues of messages.
|
||||
|
||||
- distinguish noise messages from regular messages except via timing regularities.
|
||||
|
||||
- compromise the user's end-to-end encryption with another user via an active attack.
|
||||
|
||||
- compromise the user's end-to-end encryption with destination relay via an active attack.
|
||||
|
||||
#### SMP relay accessed via SMP proxy
|
||||
|
||||
*still can:*
|
||||
|
||||
- perform recipients' queue correlation (matching multiple queues to a single recipient) via either a re-used transport connection, user's IP Address, or connection timing regularities
|
||||
|
||||
*no longer can:*
|
||||
|
||||
- perform senders' queue correlation (matching multiple queues to a single sender) via either a re-used transport connection, user's IP Address, or connection timing regularities, unless it has additional information from SMP proxy.
|
||||
|
||||
- learn a sender's IP address, track them through other IP addresses they use to access the same queue, and infer information (e.g. employer) based on the IP addresses, even if Tor is not used.
|
||||
|
||||
The rest of the threat model for SMP relays remains the same as in [overview](../protocol/overview-tjr.md#simplex-messaging-protocol-server).
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
|
||||
# SimpleX Remote Control protocol
|
||||
|
||||
Using profiles in SimpleX Chat mobile app from desktop app with minimal risk to the security/threat model of SimpleX protocols.
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
Synchronizing profiles that use double ratchet for e2e encryption is effectively impossible in a way that tolerates partitioning between devices without reducing security of double ratchet.
|
||||
|
||||
We are not considering replacing (or weakening) double ratchet to allow profile synchronization, as some other messengers did (e.g., Session). We are also not considering Signal model, when profile is known to the server and adding devices results in changing security code and no visibility of conversation history, as it would be substantially different from the current model, and also effectively weakens the security, as in practives most users don't revalidate security codes when they change.
|
||||
|
||||
## Solution
|
||||
|
||||
The proposed solution is a new remote access/control protocol, when the application on host device (usually mobile) acts as a server, and application on another device (usually desktop) acts as a controller usually running in the same local network.
|
||||
|
||||
Existing service discovery and remote control protocols known to us are vulnerable to spoofing, spamming and MITM attacks. This design aims to solve these problems.
|
||||
|
||||
## Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- Strong, cryptographically verified identity of the controller device, with the initial connection requiring out-of-band communication of public keys (QR code or link).
|
||||
- Identity verification of the host device during session handshake.
|
||||
- Protection against malicious "controllers" trying to make host connect to them instead of valid controller on the same network.
|
||||
- Protection against replay attacks, both during discovery and during control session.
|
||||
- Additional encryption layer inside TLS, with post-quantum algorithm in key agreement.
|
||||
- Protect host device from unauthorized access in case of controller compromise.
|
||||
- Post-compromised security - that is, even if long term secrets were copied from the controller, and host device was made to connect to malicious controller device, prevent malicious controller from accessing the host device data.
|
||||
- Allow general high-level interactions common for many applications:
|
||||
- RPC pattern for commands executed by the host application.
|
||||
- Events sent by host to update controller UI.
|
||||
- Uploading and downloading files between host and controller, either to be processed by the host or to be presented in the controller UI.
|
||||
|
||||
This design will allow application-level protocol that is quite close to how SimpleX Chat UI interacts with SimpleX Chat core - there is a similar RPC + events protocol and support for files. The application-level protocol is out of scope of this specification.
|
||||
|
||||
## Protocol phases
|
||||
|
||||
Protocol consists of four phases:
|
||||
- controller session invitation
|
||||
- establishing session TLS connection
|
||||
- session verification and protocol negotiation
|
||||
- session operation
|
||||
|
||||
### Session invitation
|
||||
|
||||
The invitation to the first session between host and controller pair MUST be shared out-of-band, to establish a long term identity keys/certificates of the controller to host device.
|
||||
|
||||
The subsequent sessions can be announced via an application-defined site-local multicast group, e.g. `224.0.0.251` (also used in mDNS/bonjour) and an application-defined port (SimpleX Chat uses 5227).
|
||||
|
||||
The session invitation contains this data:
|
||||
- supported version range for remote control protocol
|
||||
- application-specific information, e.g. device name, application name and supported version range, settings, etc.
|
||||
- session start time in seconds since epoch
|
||||
- if multicast is used, counter of announce packets sent by controller
|
||||
- network address (ipv4 address and port) of the controller
|
||||
- CA TLS certificate fingerprint of the controller - this is part of long term identity of the controller established during the first session, and repeated in the subsequent session announcements.
|
||||
- Session Ed25519 public key used to verify the announcement and commands - this mitigates the compromise of the long term signature key, as the controller will have to sign each command with this key first.
|
||||
- Long-term Ed25519 public key used to verify the announcement and commands - this is part of the long term controller identity.
|
||||
- Session X25519 DH key and sntrup761 KEM encapsulation key to agree session encryption (both for multicast announcement and for commands and responses in TLS), as described in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-josefsson-ntruprime-hybrid/. The new keys are used for each session, and if client key is already available (from the previous session), the computed shared secret will be used to encrypt the announcement multicast packet. The out-of-band invitation is unencrypted. These DH public key and KEM encapsulation key are always sent unencrypted. NaCL Cryptobox is used for encryption.
|
||||
|
||||
Host device decrypts (except the first session) and validates the invitation:
|
||||
- Session signature is valid.
|
||||
- Timestamp is within some window from the current time.
|
||||
- Long-term key signature is valid.
|
||||
- Long-term CA and signature key are the same as in the first session.
|
||||
- Some version in the offered range is supported.
|
||||
|
||||
OOB session invitation is a URI with this syntax:
|
||||
|
||||
```abnf
|
||||
sessionAddressUri = "xrcp://" encodedCAFingerprint "@" host ":" port "#/?" qsParams
|
||||
encodedCAFingerprint = base64url
|
||||
qsParams = param *("&" param)
|
||||
param = versionRangeParam / appInfoParam / sessionTsParam /
|
||||
sessPubKeyParam / idPubKeyParam / kemEncKeyParam / dhPubKeyParam /
|
||||
sessSignatureParam / idSignatureParam
|
||||
versionRangeParam = "v=" (versionParam / (versionParam "-" versionParam))
|
||||
versionParam = 1*DIGIT
|
||||
appInfoParam = "app=" escapedJSON ; optional
|
||||
sessionTsParam = "ts=" 1*DIGIT
|
||||
sessPubKeyParam = "skey=" base64url ; required
|
||||
idPubKeyParam = "idkey=" base64url ; required
|
||||
dhPubKeyParam = "dh=" base64url ; required
|
||||
sessSignatureParam = "ssig=" base64url ; required, signs the URI with this and idSignatureParam param removed
|
||||
idSignatureParam = "idsig=" base64url ; required, signs the URI with this param removed
|
||||
base64url = <base64url encoded binary> ; RFC4648, section 5
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Multicast session announcement is a binary encoded packet with this syntax:
|
||||
|
||||
```abnf
|
||||
sessionAddressPacket = dhPubKey nonce encrypted(unpaddedSize sessionAddress packetPad)
|
||||
dhPubKey = length x509encoded ; same as announced
|
||||
nonce = length *OCTET
|
||||
sessionAddress = largeLength sessionAddressUri ; as above
|
||||
length = 1*1 OCTET ; for binary data up to 255 bytes
|
||||
largeLength = 2*2 OCTET ; for binary data up to 65535 bytes
|
||||
packetPad = <pad packet size to 1450 bytes> ; possibly, we may need to move KEM agreement one step later,
|
||||
; with encapsulation key in HELLO block and KEM ciphertext in reply to HELLO.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Establishing session TLS connection
|
||||
|
||||
Host connects to controller via TCP session and validates CA credentials during TLS handshake. Controller acts as a TCP server in this connection, to avoid host device listening on a port, which might create an attack vector. During TLS handshake the controller's TCP server MUST present a self-signed two-certificate chain where the fingerprint of the first certificate MUST be the same as in the announcement.
|
||||
|
||||
Host device presents its own client certificate chain with CA representing a long-term identity of the host device.
|
||||
|
||||
### Session verification and protocol negotiation
|
||||
|
||||
Once TLS session is established, both the host and controller device present a "session security code" to the user who must match them (e.g., visually or via QR code scan) and confirm on the host device. The session security code must be a digest of tlsunique channel binding. As it is computed as a digest of the TLS handshake for both the controller and the host, it will validate that the same TLS certificates are used on both sides, and that the same TLS session is established, mitigating the possibility of MITM attack in the connection.
|
||||
|
||||
Once the session is confirmed by the user, the host device sends "hello" block to the controller. ALPN TLS extension is not used to obtain tlsunique prior to sending any packets.
|
||||
|
||||
Block size should be 16384 bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
Host HELLO must contain:
|
||||
- new session DH key - used to compute new shared secret with the controller keys from the announcement.
|
||||
- encrypted part of hello block (JSON object), containing:
|
||||
- chosen protocol version.
|
||||
- host CA TLS certificate fingerprint - part of host long term identity - must match the one presented in TLS handshake and the previous sessions, otherwise the connection is terminated.
|
||||
- KEM encapsulation key - used to compute new shared secret for the session.
|
||||
- additional application specific parameters, e.g host device name, application version, host settings or JSON encoding format.
|
||||
|
||||
Hello block syntax:
|
||||
|
||||
```abnf
|
||||
hostHello = unpaddedSize %s"HELLO " dhPubKey nonce encrypted(unpaddedSize hostHelloJSON helloPad) pad
|
||||
unpaddedSize = largeLength
|
||||
dhPubKey = length x509encoded
|
||||
pad = <pad block size to 16384 bytes>
|
||||
helloPad = <pad hello size to 12888 bytes>
|
||||
largeLength = 2*2 OCTET
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Controller decrypts (including the first session) and validates the received hello block:
|
||||
- Chosen versions are supported (must be within offered ranges).
|
||||
- CA fingerprint matches the one presented in TLS handshake and the previous sessions - in subsequent sessions TLS connection should be rejected if the fingerprint is different.
|
||||
|
||||
JTD schema for the encrypted part of host HELLO block `hostHelloJSON`:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"definitions": {
|
||||
"version": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"format": "[0-9]+"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"base64url": {
|
||||
"type": "string",
|
||||
"metadata": {
|
||||
"format": "base64url"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"v": {"ref": "version"},
|
||||
"ca": {"ref": "base64url"},
|
||||
"kem": {"ref": "base64url"}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"optionalProperties": {
|
||||
"app": {"properties": {}, "additionalProperties": true}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"additionalProperties": true
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Controller should reply with with `hello` or `error` response:
|
||||
|
||||
```abnf
|
||||
ctrlHello = unpaddedSize %s"HELLO " kemCyphertext nonce encrypted(unpaddedSize ctrlHelloJSON helloPad) pad
|
||||
; ctrlHelloJSON is encrypted with the hybrid secret,
|
||||
; including both previously agreed DH secret and KEM secret from kemCyphertext
|
||||
unpaddedSize = largeLength
|
||||
kemCyphertext = largeLength *OCTET
|
||||
pad = <pad block size to 16384 bytes>
|
||||
helloPad = <pad hello size to 12888 bytes>
|
||||
largeLength = 2*2 OCTET
|
||||
|
||||
ctrlError = unpaddedSize %s"ERROR " nonce encrypted(unpaddedSize ctrlErrorJSON helloPad) pad
|
||||
; ctrlErrorJSON is encrypted using previously agreed DH secret.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
JTD schema for the encrypted part of controller HELLO block `ctrlHelloJSON`:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"properties": {},
|
||||
"additionalProperties": true
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
JTD schema for the encrypted part of controller ERROR block `ctrlErrorJSON`:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"properties": {
|
||||
"message": {"type": "string"}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"additionalProperties": true
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Once controller replies HELLO to the valid host HELLO block, it should stop accepting new TCP connections.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Сontroller/host session operation
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol for communication during the session is out of scope of this protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
SimpleX Chat will use HTTP2 encoding, where host device acts as a server and controller acts as a client (these roles are reversed compared with TLS connection).
|
||||
|
||||
Payloads in the protocol must be encrypted using NaCL cryptobox using the hybrid shared secret agreed during session establishment.
|
||||
|
||||
Commands of the controller must be signed after the encryption using the controller's session and long term Ed25519 keys.
|
||||
|
||||
tlsunique channel binding from TLS session MUST be included in commands (included in the signed body).
|
||||
|
||||
The syntax for encrypted command and response body encoding:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
commandBody = encBody sessSignature idSignature (attachment / noAttachment)
|
||||
responseBody = encBody attachment; should match counter in the command
|
||||
encBody = nonce encLength32 encrypted(tlsunique counter body)
|
||||
attachment = %x01 nonce encLength32 encrypted(attachment)
|
||||
noAttachment = %x00
|
||||
tlsunique = length 1*OCTET
|
||||
counter = 8*8 OCTET ; int64
|
||||
encLength32 = 4*4 OCTET ; uint32, includes authTag
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If the command or response includes attachment, it's hash must be included in command/response and validated.
|
||||
|
||||
## Key agreement for announcement packet and for session
|
||||
|
||||
Initial announcement is shared out-of-band (URI with xrcp scheme), and it is not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
This announcement contains only DH keys, as KEM key is too large to include in QR code, which are used to agree encryption key for host HELLO block. The host HELLO block will containt DH key in plaintext part and KEM encapsulation (public) key in encrypted part, that will be used to determine the shared secret (using SHA256 over concatenated DH shared secret and KEM encapsulated secret) both for controller HELLO response (that contains KEM cyphertext in plaintext part) and subsequent session commands and responses.
|
||||
|
||||
During the next session the announcement is sent via encrypted multicast block. The shared key for this announcement and for host HELLO block is determined using the KEM shared secred from the previous session and DH shared secret computed using the host DH key from the previous session and the new controller DH key from the announcement.
|
||||
|
||||
For the session, the shared secred is computed again using the KEM shared secret encapsulated by the controller using the new KEM key from the HOST hello block and DH shared secret computed using the host DH key from HELLO block and the new controller DH key from the announcement.
|
||||
|
||||
To describe it in pseudocode:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
// session 1
|
||||
hostHelloSecret(1) = dhSecret(1)
|
||||
sessionSecret(1) = sha256(dhSecret(1) || kemSecret(1)) // to encrypt session 1 data, incl. controller hello
|
||||
dhSecret(1) = dh(hostHelloDhKey(1), controllerInvitationDhKey(1))
|
||||
kemCiphertext(1) = enc(kemSecret(1), kemEncKey(1))
|
||||
// kemEncKey is included in host HELLO, kemCiphertext - in controller HELLO
|
||||
kemSecret(1) = dec(kemCiphertext(1), kemDecKey(1))
|
||||
|
||||
// multicast announcement for session n
|
||||
announcementSecret(n) = sha256(dhSecret(n'))
|
||||
dhSecret(n') = dh(hostHelloDhKey(n - 1), controllerDhKey(n))
|
||||
|
||||
// session n
|
||||
hostHelloSecret(n) = dhSecret(n)
|
||||
sessionSecret(n) = sha256(dhSecret(n) || kemSecret(n)) // to encrypt session n data, incl. controller hello
|
||||
dhSecret(n) = dh(hostHelloDhKey(n), controllerDhKey(n))
|
||||
// controllerDhKey(n) is either from invitation or from multicast announcement
|
||||
kemCiphertext(n) = enc(kemSecret(n), kemEncKey(n))
|
||||
kemSecret(n) = dec(kemCiphertext(n), kemDecKey(n))
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If controller fails to store the new host DH key after receiving HELLO block, the encryption will become out of sync and the host won't be able to decrypt the next announcement. To mitigate it, the host should keep the last session DH key and also previous session DH key to try to decrypt the next announcement computing shared secret using both keys (first the new one, and in case it fails - the previous).
|
||||
|
||||
To decrypt multicast announcement, the host should try to decrypt it using the keys of all known (paired) remote controllers.
|
||||
|
||||
## Other options
|
||||
|
||||
The proposed design has these pros/cons:
|
||||
|
||||
Pros:
|
||||
- mobile host that has sensitive data doesn't act as TLS server.
|
||||
- multicast is optional - all sessions can happen via QR code only.
|
||||
|
||||
Cons:
|
||||
- reversing of client/server roles between TLS and HTTP2.
|
||||
- in the first session mobile host TLS client credentials are verified after TLS connection is accepted.
|
||||
- cannot be used with host that runs in VM.
|
||||
|
||||
The alternative design will use mobile host device as TLS server. The session negotiation process:
|
||||
|
||||
- desktop shares its initial credentials via QR code, only for the first session
|
||||
- mobile sends encrypted multicast with session address, TLS CA fingerprint, DH key in clear text
|
||||
- desktop connects to mobile
|
||||
- session tlsunique presented to users on both devices - either user would have to confirm session on both devices or the mobile would have to send an additional "ready" block.
|
||||
|
||||
Pros:
|
||||
- no reversing server role between TLS and HTTP2
|
||||
- TLS credentials are exchanged before TLS, so invalid credentials can be rejected during the handshake of the first session.
|
||||
- if some other way to pass data from host to controller is added, then it can be used with host running in VM.
|
||||
|
||||
Cons:
|
||||
- multicast is mandatory, as there is no efficient way to communicate from mobile to desktop.
|
||||
- still needs hello or confirmation on both devices
|
||||
- mobile is now acting as TLS server creating additional attack vector
|
||||
|
||||
In both proposed and alternative design mobile host has chat data, acts as HTTP2 server, commands are signed with desktop key presented out-of–band, and both commands and responses are encrypted inside TLS session.
|
||||
|
||||
Other considered options:
|
||||
- SSH - more work integrating it.
|
||||
- use SMP connection to negotiate TLS session - it seems wrong to require Internet connection to negotiate a local network connection between desktop and mobile.
|
||||
- other multicast service discovery protocols - quite insecure.
|
||||
|
||||
## Threat model
|
||||
|
||||
#### A passive network adversary able to monitor the site-local traffic:
|
||||
|
||||
*can:*
|
||||
- observe session times, duration and volume of the transmitted data between host and controller.
|
||||
|
||||
*cannot:*
|
||||
- observe the content of the transmitted data.
|
||||
- substitute the transmitted commands or responses.
|
||||
- replay transmitted commands or events from the hosts.
|
||||
|
||||
#### An active network adversary able to intercept and substitute the site-local traffic:
|
||||
|
||||
*can:*
|
||||
- prevent host and controller devices from establishing the session
|
||||
|
||||
*cannot:*
|
||||
- same as passive adversary, provided that user visually verified session code out-of-band.
|
||||
|
||||
#### An active adversary with the access to the network:
|
||||
|
||||
*can:*
|
||||
- spam controller device.
|
||||
|
||||
*cannot:*
|
||||
- compromise host or controller devices.
|
||||
|
||||
#### An active adversary with the access to the network who also observed OOB announcement:
|
||||
|
||||
*can:*
|
||||
- connect to controller instead of the host.
|
||||
- present incorrect data to the controller.
|
||||
|
||||
*cannot:*
|
||||
- connect to the host or make host connect to itself.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Compromised controller device:
|
||||
|
||||
*can:*
|
||||
- observe the content of the transmitted data.
|
||||
- access any data of the controlled host application, within the capabilities of the provided API.
|
||||
|
||||
*cannot:*
|
||||
- access other data on the host device.
|
||||
- compromise host device.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Compromised host device:
|
||||
|
||||
*can:*
|
||||
- present incorrect data to the controller.
|
||||
- incorrectly interpret controller commands.
|
||||
|
||||
*cannot:*
|
||||
- access controller data, even related to this host device.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
|
||||
# Sending large file descriptions
|
||||
|
||||
It is desirable to provide a QR code/URI from which a file can be downloaded. This way files may be addressed outside a chat client.
|
||||
Currently the `xftp` CLI tool can generate YAML file descriptions that can be used to receive a file.
|
||||
It is possible to pass such a description as an URI, but descriptions for files larger than ~8 MBs (two 4 MB chunks) would give QR codes that are difficult to process.
|
||||
A user can manually upload description and get a shorter one. Typically descriptions for files that are up to ~20 GBs would still be small enough to not require another pass, and that is way beyond any current (or, reasonable, fwiw) limitations.
|
||||
|
||||
It is possible to streamline this process, so any application using simplexmq agent can easily send file descriptions and follow redirects.
|
||||
A file description with a redirect contains an extra field with final file size and digest so it can be followed automatically.
|
||||
|
||||
The flow would be like this:
|
||||
|
||||
- Sending:
|
||||
1. Upload file as usual with `xftpSendFile`, get recipient file descriptions in `SFDONE` message.
|
||||
2. Upload one of the file descriptions with `xftpSendDescription`, get its redirect-description in its `SFDONE` message.
|
||||
3. Wrap in `FileDescriptionURI` and use `strEncode` to get a QR-sized URI.
|
||||
4. Show QR code / copy link.
|
||||
- Receiving:
|
||||
1. Scan QR code / paste link.
|
||||
2. Use `strDecode` and unwrap `FileDescriptionURI` to get `ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient`.
|
||||
3. Download it as usual with `xftpReceiveFile`, getting `RFDONE` message when the file is fully received.
|
||||
|
||||
It is not necesary to use redirect description if original description can be encoded to fit in 1002 characters. Beyond this size there is a significant jump in QR code complexity.
|
||||
It is possible to call `encodeFileDescriptionURI` right after upload to test if the URI fits and skip step 2.
|
||||
When `xftpReceiveFile` receives a decoded description that lacks `redirect` field, the procedure for downloading a file is the same as usual - download chunks and reassemble local file.
|
||||
|
||||
## Agent changes
|
||||
|
||||
### Sending
|
||||
|
||||
Sending and receiving files in agent is a multi-step process mediated by DB entries in `snd_files` and `rcv_files` tables.
|
||||
|
||||
`xftpSendDescription` is tasked with storing original description in a temporary locally-encrypted file, then creating upload task for it.
|
||||
|
||||
It is necessary to preserve redirect metadata so it can be attached to descriptions in the `SFDONE` message sent by a worker:
|
||||
|
||||
```sql
|
||||
ALTER TABLE snd_files ADD COLUMN redirect_size INTEGER;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE snd_files ADD COLUMN redirect_digest BLOB;
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Receiving
|
||||
|
||||
`xftpReceiveFile` gets a file description as an argument and knows if it should follow redirect procedure or run an ordinary download.
|
||||
For redirects it will prepare a `RcvFile` for redirect and then a placeholder, for the final file.
|
||||
Agent messages would be sent using the entity ID of the final file, which is stored along with redirect metadata in `RcvFile` for the redirect.
|
||||
|
||||
```sql
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files ADD COLUMN redirect_id INTEGER REFERENCES rcv_files ON DELETE CASCADE; -- for later updates
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files ADD COLUMN redirect_entity_id BLOB; -- for notifications
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files ADD COLUMN redirect_size INTEGER;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files ADD COLUMN redirect_digest BLOB;
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
These additional fields will exist on the file that is a short description to receive an actual description of the final file.
|
||||
|
||||
While a description YAML is being downloaded, the application will get `RFPROG` messages tagged for final entity, containing bytes downloaded so far and the total size from the original file.
|
||||
When the description is fully downloaded, the worker would decode description and check if the stated size and digest match the declared in redirect.
|
||||
Then it will replace placeholder description in `rcv_files` for destination file with the actual data from downloaded description.
|
||||
Finally, instead of sending `RFDONE` for redirect, it hands over work to chunk download worker, which will run exactly as if the user requested its download directly.
|
||||
An application will then receive `RFPROG` and `RFDONE` messages as usual.
|
||||
|
||||
## URI encoding
|
||||
|
||||
File description URIs use the same service schema `simplex:` or its `https://simplex.chat` (or any custom host) equivalent as do contact links and can be extracted from text and processed the same way.
|
||||
The path section is `/file` (with an optional trailing `/`).
|
||||
The payload is encoded in the "fragment" part of the link, using `#/?`, followed by a query string.
|
||||
File description is encoded first in a YAML document, then URL-encoded in under the key `d`.
|
||||
An application may want to pass extra parameters not necessary to download a file. Those go in the `_` key, encoded as a JSON dictionary.
|
||||
|
||||
An example link:
|
||||
|
||||
`simplex:/file#/?d=chunkSize%3A%2064kb%0Adigest%3A%20OtpnXkECTW4a18Eots2m3O22maeOCMqPUX4ulugIjgMEJfCpTYc_-T257Uw7s9bW_F0G5WBg5BioBWd4Z_OoCw%3D%3D%0Akey%3A%20rNR8_2SJuH7Qve43gV3zszL0R6oY5HSdRZT_paB-wfE%3D%0Anonce%3A%202oKwfK-w75nwyWp8_1Lv6QnQonIRtJmG%0Aparty%3A%20recipient%0Areplicas%3A%0A-%20chunks%3A%0A%20%20-%201%3ATdvaxMnG2Ph1e3QCx3-rpA%3D%3D%3AMC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEILdErEICvgrBCajDLTX2h3LXyMB7z5vrtLa3XVigJuf-%3ANS46KuYdgOWs6dUeMp7p2oF8rBQ9wQ2Ez6TW6Y6gHg0%3D%0A%20%20-%202%3AH5SRbtKYrXWVXTthrkeWzw%3D%3D%3AMC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEIGeEPNLt7lUGPfplwsoJLCDFnbIc5Hm31kz5X6rWXmgu%3A7QNRI-gvFx9UM-baXp3YVDli9pcfh3HGFKDhsA9JQHY%3D%0A%20%20-%203%3A_xjukkIl9WZFryUXT0h_TQ%3D%3D%3AMC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEIIRFBaL1HvUfePvKLuggwUrC_q_ZHd7v08IL9jhM7teC%3Aid2lgLMMjTGsR8SUogJuRdLoEHAc5SDQKFDqlZRSuEY%3D%0A%20%20server%3A%20xftp%3A%2F%2FLcJUMfVhwD8yxjAiSaDzzGF3-kLG4Uh0Fl_ZIjrRwjI%3D%40localhost%3A7002%0Asize%3A%20192kb%0A&_=%7B%22k%22:%22test%22%7D`
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
|
||||
# Repudiation for message senders
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
We use double ratchet protocol to send messages. One of its important qualities is the use of symmetric encryption with forward secrecy, when the new key to encrypt the message is rotated after each message. This provides senders ability to plausibly deny having sent some messages, without denying having sent others. While the recipients can prove to themselves that the message was indeed sent by the sender, because it was encrypted using authenticated encryption with associated data, the recipients cannot prove it to any third party - as the message could have been encrypted by themselves, as they also have the same symmetric keys.
|
||||
|
||||
To receive the messages, the recipients agree a message queue with the senders, and the commands sent to this queue are signed by the senders using the cryptographic key (Edwards curve key) of which the public counterpart was shared with the recipient in the confirmation message of SMP protocol (this confirmation message itself is not signed).
|
||||
|
||||
While it was never claimed that the messaging protocol provides deniability, the deniability is often mentioned as one of the important qualities of double ratchet algorithm used in the innermost layer of e2e encryption, so without explicit disclaimer of deniability limitations, it may be assumed by the users that the system as a whole provides the same level of deniability as the double ratchet algorithm, which currently is not the case.
|
||||
|
||||
While societal understanding and legal acceptance of repudiation is arguable, there was less than a decade since this quality became widely available in Signal - legal systems take longer to evolve. While the argument that the message was forged is unlikely to be accepted in the usual court cases with the ordinary people, it is likely to be considered in cases with high profile defendants, who can reasonably claim that they are the target of smear campaign and are being attributed something that they never sent - the statement that the message is forged is reasonable in such cases, and it provides plausible deniability, and the cryptographic experts invited to the hearing would attest to that.
|
||||
|
||||
It’s important to both continue providing repudiation quality in communication systems, when it is appropriate, and also to educate the users about when it can be used as a reasonable defence strategy, thus improving privacy of communication and making digital off-the-record communications possible and understood both by the society and by legal systems.
|
||||
|
||||
## Solution
|
||||
|
||||
The proposed solution is to avoid the use of signature algorithm for server command authorization, and instead use authenticated encryption to authorize the commands sent to the server queues. If this protocol change is adopted, it could be used both for senders and recipients commands, both for consistency, and also to provide the deniability to recipients about executing any commands on the servers, in a similar way.
|
||||
|
||||
The proposed approach is to use NaCl crypto_box that proves authentication and third party unforgeability and, unlike signature, repudiation guarantee. See [crypto_box docs](https://nacl.cr.yp.to/box.html):
|
||||
|
||||
> The crypto_box function is designed to meet the standard notions of privacy and third-party unforgeability for a public-key authenticated-encryption scheme using nonces. The crypto_box function is not meant to provide non-repudiation. On the contrary: the crypto_box function guarantees repudiability. A receiver can freely modify a boxed message, and therefore cannot convince third parties that this particular message came from the sender. The sender and receiver are nevertheless protected against forgeries by other parties. In the terminology of https://groups.google.com/group/sci.crypt/msg/ec5c18b23b11d82c, crypto_box uses "public-key authenticators" rather than "public-key signatures.”
|
||||
|
||||
DJB further writes in the link above:
|
||||
|
||||
> If you were already planning to encrypt the message, using another key derived from g^xy, then you don't have to do any extra public-key work. A secret-key authenticator is easier to implement than a public-key signature, and it takes less CPU time to compute.
|
||||
|
||||
So the proposed solution appears to have desired security qualities, without non-repudiation, that is undesirable in the context of private messaging.
|
||||
|
||||
When queue is created or secured, the recipient would provide a DH key (X25519) to the server (either their own or received from the sender), and the server would provide its own random X25519 key per session. Then, either the authenticator will be computed in this way:
|
||||
|
||||
```abnf
|
||||
transmission = authenticator authorized
|
||||
authenticator = crypto_box(sha512(authorized), secret = dh(client long term queue key, server session key), nonce = correlation ID)
|
||||
authorized = tlsunique correlationId queueId protocol_command ; same as the currently signed part of the transmission
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The authenticator is smaller in size than currently used signature size, freeing ~34 bytes from the transmission.
|
||||
|
||||
This allows to retain the protocol logic and make authentication scheme configurable, both by the clients and servers, e.g. some servers might be configured to use signature for non-repudiation, and clients may be configured to either agree or disagree to that, per conversation.
|
||||
|
||||
There is no required change in SMP command syntax other than allowing X25519 key instead of Ed signature keys passed to the server in NEW and KEY commands. We could add support for migration of the existing queues to the new authorization scheme, but it is not strictly required, as the clients provide a mechanism to rotate the receiving addresses (currently manually, and once automated all queues will be rotated). On another hand, per queue key and identifiers rotation is cheaper than negotiating the new queue (it can be done between client and server, without the involvement of another party), and could be considered as an independent improvement.
|
||||
|
||||
## Migration plan
|
||||
|
||||
As this new scheme breaks backward compatibility, as the new scheme requires additional keys in protocol handshake, and current implementation does not support forward compatible header extension, we have to migrate in multiple steps, to minimize any disruption to the users.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Upgrade clients for forward compatibility of the protocol handshake (ignore extra bytes) - 5.5.3.
|
||||
2. Add support for handshake and version negotiation to XFTP - 5.5.4 or 5.6.
|
||||
3. Upgrade clients to drop support of SMP earlier than v4 (batching) and also drop support of old double ratchet protocol and old handshake - 5.6.
|
||||
4. Upgrade servers to offer SMP v7 with support for new authorization - by the time 5.6 is released.
|
||||
5. Upgrade clients to require server support for SMP v7 / new authorization scheme and start using it - 5.7 or 5.8. At this point the old version of the servers will not be supported, as maintaining this backward compatibility would substantially increase the complexity and logic of the client - at the point of generating the key we do not even know which server version will be used.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
||||
# Transmission encryption
|
||||
|
||||
## Problems
|
||||
|
||||
### Protection of meta-data from sending proxy
|
||||
|
||||
The SEND commands and message queue IDs need to be encrypted so that sending proxy cannot see how many queues exist on each server.
|
||||
|
||||
Correlation IDs need to be random and can be re-used as nonces so that the destination relay cannot use the increasing correlation IDs that are sent in v6 of the protocol to track the sender.
|
||||
|
||||
### Protection of the traffic from the attacker who compromised TLS
|
||||
|
||||
Currently, even though different sending and receiving queue IDs are used, the attacker who compromised TLS could do statistical analysis and in this way correlate queue IDs of senders and recipients, and therefore correlate the senders and recipients.
|
||||
|
||||
## Possible solutions
|
||||
|
||||
1. Encrypt sent messages, other commands and their responses in the additional envelope, irrespective of whether proxy is used or not. In this case the requestion transmission could have this syntax:
|
||||
|
||||
```abnf
|
||||
encReqTransmission = pubKey nonce encrypted(reqTransmission)
|
||||
reqTransmission = respNonce entityId command
|
||||
|
||||
encRespTransmission = replyNonce encrypted(respTransmission)
|
||||
respTransmission = entityId command
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The keys to encrypt and decrypt both the command and responses would be computed as curve25519 from the key sent together with command and server session key. For the requests, the nonce has to be random and sent outside of the encrypted envelopt, but for the response respNonce would be taken from inside of the encrypted envelope and it would also be used for correlating commands and responses. This way the attacker who could compromise TLS would not be able to correlate the commands and responses, and also observe entity IDs.
|
||||
|
||||
2. The remaining question is to how encrypt and decrypt messages delivered not in response to the commands.
|
||||
|
||||
The possible options are:
|
||||
- restore client session key only for that purpose, but do not forward this key to the destination proxy for sent messages. Then the messages can be sent with a random replyNonce and the key would be computed from session keys. The advantage here is that we won't need to parameterize handles as both client and server would have session keys. The downside that we would have to either somehow differentiate messages and responses, either by some flag that would allow some correlation or just by the absense of replyNonce in the lookup map - that is if the client can find replyNonce, it would use the associated key to decrypt, and if not it would use session key.
|
||||
- use the same key that was sent with SUB or ACK command. This is much more complex, and would only have some upside if we were to introduce receiving proxies (to conceal transport sessions from the receiving relays for the recipients).
|
||||
@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ if [ ! -f "${confd}/file-server.ini" ]; then
|
||||
# Set quota
|
||||
case "${QUOTA}" in
|
||||
'') printf 'Please specify $QUOTA environment variable.\n'; exit 1 ;;
|
||||
*) set -- "$@" --quota "${QUOTA}" ;;
|
||||
*GB) QUOTA="$(printf ${QUOTA} | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')"; set -- "$@" --quota "${QUOTA}" ;;
|
||||
*gb) set -- "$@" --quota "${QUOTA}" ;;
|
||||
*) printf 'Wrong format. Format should be: 1gb, 10gb, 100gb.\n'; exit 1 ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
# Init the certificates and configs
|
||||
|
||||
+235
-142
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
|
||||
cabal-version: 1.12
|
||||
|
||||
-- This file has been generated from package.yaml by hpack version 0.35.1.
|
||||
-- This file has been generated from package.yaml by hpack version 0.35.0.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- see: https://github.com/sol/hpack
|
||||
|
||||
name: simplexmq
|
||||
version: 5.3.0.1
|
||||
version: 5.6.0.0
|
||||
synopsis: SimpleXMQ message broker
|
||||
description: This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,
|
||||
<./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Client.html client> and
|
||||
@@ -26,15 +26,23 @@ build-type: Simple
|
||||
extra-source-files:
|
||||
README.md
|
||||
CHANGELOG.md
|
||||
cbits/sha512.h
|
||||
cbits/sntrup761.h
|
||||
|
||||
flag swift
|
||||
description: Enable swift JSON format
|
||||
manual: True
|
||||
default: False
|
||||
|
||||
flag use_crypton
|
||||
description: Use crypton etc. in cryptostore
|
||||
manual: True
|
||||
default: True
|
||||
|
||||
library
|
||||
exposed-modules:
|
||||
Simplex.FileTransfer.Agent
|
||||
Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
|
||||
Simplex.FileTransfer.Client
|
||||
Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Agent
|
||||
Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Main
|
||||
@@ -43,6 +51,7 @@ library
|
||||
Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
|
||||
Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol
|
||||
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server
|
||||
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Control
|
||||
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env
|
||||
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Main
|
||||
Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats
|
||||
@@ -63,6 +72,7 @@ library
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Common
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.DB
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220101_initial
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220301_snd_queue_keys
|
||||
@@ -87,13 +97,25 @@ library
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230701_delivery_receipts
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230720_delete_expired_messages
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230722_indexes
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.TAsyncs
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230814_indexes
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230829_crypto_files
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20231222_command_created_at
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20231225_failed_work_items
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20240121_message_delivery_indexes
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20240124_file_redirect
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.TRcvQueues
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Client
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Memory
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.Defines
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.FFI
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.RNG
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Client
|
||||
@@ -102,6 +124,7 @@ library
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Env
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Main
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Push.APNS
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Push.APNS.Internal
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Stats
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Store
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.StoreLog
|
||||
@@ -121,26 +144,41 @@ library
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.STM
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.ServiceScheme
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.TMap
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Transport
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Buffer
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Credentials
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Client
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Server
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.KeepAlive
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Util
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Version
|
||||
Simplex.RemoteControl.Client
|
||||
Simplex.RemoteControl.Discovery
|
||||
Simplex.RemoteControl.Discovery.Multicast
|
||||
Simplex.RemoteControl.Invitation
|
||||
Simplex.RemoteControl.Types
|
||||
other-modules:
|
||||
Paths_simplexmq
|
||||
hs-source-dirs:
|
||||
src
|
||||
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns
|
||||
include-dirs:
|
||||
cbits
|
||||
c-sources:
|
||||
cbits/sha512.c
|
||||
cbits/sntrup761.c
|
||||
cbits/sodium/utils_memory.c
|
||||
extra-libraries:
|
||||
crypto
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
QuickCheck ==2.14.*
|
||||
, aeson ==2.0.*
|
||||
aeson ==2.2.*
|
||||
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
|
||||
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
|
||||
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
|
||||
@@ -148,27 +186,31 @@ library
|
||||
, attoparsec ==0.14.*
|
||||
, base >=4.14 && <5
|
||||
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
|
||||
, bytestring ==0.10.*
|
||||
, case-insensitive ==1.2.*
|
||||
, composition ==1.0.*
|
||||
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
|
||||
, containers ==0.6.*
|
||||
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
|
||||
, cryptostore ==0.2.*
|
||||
, crypton ==0.34.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509 ==1.7.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509-store ==1.6.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509-validation ==1.6.*
|
||||
, cryptostore ==0.3.*
|
||||
, data-default ==0.7.*
|
||||
, direct-sqlcipher ==2.3.*
|
||||
, directory ==1.3.*
|
||||
, filepath ==1.4.*
|
||||
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
|
||||
, hourglass ==0.2.*
|
||||
, http-types ==0.12.*
|
||||
, http2 ==4.1.*
|
||||
, http2 >=4.2.2 && <4.3
|
||||
, ini ==0.4.1
|
||||
, iproute ==1.7.*
|
||||
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
|
||||
, memory ==0.15.*
|
||||
, mtl ==2.2.*
|
||||
, memory ==0.18.*
|
||||
, mtl >=2.3.1 && <3.0
|
||||
, network >=3.1.2.7 && <3.2
|
||||
, network-transport ==0.5.4
|
||||
, network-info ==0.2.*
|
||||
, network-transport ==0.5.6
|
||||
, network-udp ==0.0.*
|
||||
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
|
||||
, process ==1.6.*
|
||||
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
|
||||
@@ -176,24 +218,28 @@ library
|
||||
, socks ==0.6.*
|
||||
, sqlcipher-simple ==0.4.*
|
||||
, stm ==2.5.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
|
||||
, temporary ==1.3.*
|
||||
, text ==1.2.*
|
||||
, time ==1.9.*
|
||||
, time-compat ==1.9.*
|
||||
, time ==1.12.*
|
||||
, time-manager ==0.0.*
|
||||
, tls >=1.6.0 && <1.7
|
||||
, transformers ==0.5.*
|
||||
, tls >=1.7.0 && <1.8
|
||||
, transformers ==0.6.*
|
||||
, unliftio ==0.2.*
|
||||
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
|
||||
, websockets ==0.12.*
|
||||
, x509 ==1.7.*
|
||||
, x509-store ==1.6.*
|
||||
, x509-validation ==1.6.*
|
||||
, yaml ==0.11.*
|
||||
default-language: Haskell2010
|
||||
if flag(swift)
|
||||
cpp-options: -DswiftJSON
|
||||
if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
bytestring ==0.11.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.20.*
|
||||
, text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
|
||||
if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
bytestring ==0.10.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
|
||||
, text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
|
||||
|
||||
executable ntf-server
|
||||
main-is: Main.hs
|
||||
@@ -201,10 +247,9 @@ executable ntf-server
|
||||
Paths_simplexmq
|
||||
hs-source-dirs:
|
||||
apps/ntf-server
|
||||
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded
|
||||
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded -rtsopts
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
QuickCheck ==2.14.*
|
||||
, aeson ==2.0.*
|
||||
aeson ==2.2.*
|
||||
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
|
||||
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
|
||||
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
|
||||
@@ -212,27 +257,31 @@ executable ntf-server
|
||||
, attoparsec ==0.14.*
|
||||
, base >=4.14 && <5
|
||||
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
|
||||
, bytestring ==0.10.*
|
||||
, case-insensitive ==1.2.*
|
||||
, composition ==1.0.*
|
||||
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
|
||||
, containers ==0.6.*
|
||||
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
|
||||
, cryptostore ==0.2.*
|
||||
, crypton ==0.34.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509 ==1.7.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509-store ==1.6.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509-validation ==1.6.*
|
||||
, cryptostore ==0.3.*
|
||||
, data-default ==0.7.*
|
||||
, direct-sqlcipher ==2.3.*
|
||||
, directory ==1.3.*
|
||||
, filepath ==1.4.*
|
||||
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
|
||||
, hourglass ==0.2.*
|
||||
, http-types ==0.12.*
|
||||
, http2 ==4.1.*
|
||||
, http2 >=4.2.2 && <4.3
|
||||
, ini ==0.4.1
|
||||
, iproute ==1.7.*
|
||||
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
|
||||
, memory ==0.15.*
|
||||
, mtl ==2.2.*
|
||||
, memory ==0.18.*
|
||||
, mtl >=2.3.1 && <3.0
|
||||
, network >=3.1.2.7 && <3.2
|
||||
, network-transport ==0.5.4
|
||||
, network-info ==0.2.*
|
||||
, network-transport ==0.5.6
|
||||
, network-udp ==0.0.*
|
||||
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
|
||||
, process ==1.6.*
|
||||
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
|
||||
@@ -241,24 +290,28 @@ executable ntf-server
|
||||
, socks ==0.6.*
|
||||
, sqlcipher-simple ==0.4.*
|
||||
, stm ==2.5.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
|
||||
, temporary ==1.3.*
|
||||
, text ==1.2.*
|
||||
, time ==1.9.*
|
||||
, time-compat ==1.9.*
|
||||
, time ==1.12.*
|
||||
, time-manager ==0.0.*
|
||||
, tls >=1.6.0 && <1.7
|
||||
, transformers ==0.5.*
|
||||
, tls >=1.7.0 && <1.8
|
||||
, transformers ==0.6.*
|
||||
, unliftio ==0.2.*
|
||||
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
|
||||
, websockets ==0.12.*
|
||||
, x509 ==1.7.*
|
||||
, x509-store ==1.6.*
|
||||
, x509-validation ==1.6.*
|
||||
, yaml ==0.11.*
|
||||
default-language: Haskell2010
|
||||
if flag(swift)
|
||||
cpp-options: -DswiftJSON
|
||||
if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
bytestring ==0.11.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.20.*
|
||||
, text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
|
||||
if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
bytestring ==0.10.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
|
||||
, text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
|
||||
|
||||
executable smp-agent
|
||||
main-is: Main.hs
|
||||
@@ -266,10 +319,9 @@ executable smp-agent
|
||||
Paths_simplexmq
|
||||
hs-source-dirs:
|
||||
apps/smp-agent
|
||||
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded
|
||||
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded -rtsopts
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
QuickCheck ==2.14.*
|
||||
, aeson ==2.0.*
|
||||
aeson ==2.2.*
|
||||
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
|
||||
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
|
||||
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
|
||||
@@ -277,27 +329,31 @@ executable smp-agent
|
||||
, attoparsec ==0.14.*
|
||||
, base >=4.14 && <5
|
||||
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
|
||||
, bytestring ==0.10.*
|
||||
, case-insensitive ==1.2.*
|
||||
, composition ==1.0.*
|
||||
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
|
||||
, containers ==0.6.*
|
||||
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
|
||||
, cryptostore ==0.2.*
|
||||
, crypton ==0.34.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509 ==1.7.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509-store ==1.6.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509-validation ==1.6.*
|
||||
, cryptostore ==0.3.*
|
||||
, data-default ==0.7.*
|
||||
, direct-sqlcipher ==2.3.*
|
||||
, directory ==1.3.*
|
||||
, filepath ==1.4.*
|
||||
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
|
||||
, hourglass ==0.2.*
|
||||
, http-types ==0.12.*
|
||||
, http2 ==4.1.*
|
||||
, http2 >=4.2.2 && <4.3
|
||||
, ini ==0.4.1
|
||||
, iproute ==1.7.*
|
||||
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
|
||||
, memory ==0.15.*
|
||||
, mtl ==2.2.*
|
||||
, memory ==0.18.*
|
||||
, mtl >=2.3.1 && <3.0
|
||||
, network >=3.1.2.7 && <3.2
|
||||
, network-transport ==0.5.4
|
||||
, network-info ==0.2.*
|
||||
, network-transport ==0.5.6
|
||||
, network-udp ==0.0.*
|
||||
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
|
||||
, process ==1.6.*
|
||||
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
|
||||
@@ -306,24 +362,28 @@ executable smp-agent
|
||||
, socks ==0.6.*
|
||||
, sqlcipher-simple ==0.4.*
|
||||
, stm ==2.5.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
|
||||
, temporary ==1.3.*
|
||||
, text ==1.2.*
|
||||
, time ==1.9.*
|
||||
, time-compat ==1.9.*
|
||||
, time ==1.12.*
|
||||
, time-manager ==0.0.*
|
||||
, tls >=1.6.0 && <1.7
|
||||
, transformers ==0.5.*
|
||||
, tls >=1.7.0 && <1.8
|
||||
, transformers ==0.6.*
|
||||
, unliftio ==0.2.*
|
||||
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
|
||||
, websockets ==0.12.*
|
||||
, x509 ==1.7.*
|
||||
, x509-store ==1.6.*
|
||||
, x509-validation ==1.6.*
|
||||
, yaml ==0.11.*
|
||||
default-language: Haskell2010
|
||||
if flag(swift)
|
||||
cpp-options: -DswiftJSON
|
||||
if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
bytestring ==0.11.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.20.*
|
||||
, text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
|
||||
if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
bytestring ==0.10.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
|
||||
, text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
|
||||
|
||||
executable smp-server
|
||||
main-is: Main.hs
|
||||
@@ -331,10 +391,9 @@ executable smp-server
|
||||
Paths_simplexmq
|
||||
hs-source-dirs:
|
||||
apps/smp-server
|
||||
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded
|
||||
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded -rtsopts
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
QuickCheck ==2.14.*
|
||||
, aeson ==2.0.*
|
||||
aeson ==2.2.*
|
||||
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
|
||||
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
|
||||
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
|
||||
@@ -342,27 +401,31 @@ executable smp-server
|
||||
, attoparsec ==0.14.*
|
||||
, base >=4.14 && <5
|
||||
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
|
||||
, bytestring ==0.10.*
|
||||
, case-insensitive ==1.2.*
|
||||
, composition ==1.0.*
|
||||
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
|
||||
, containers ==0.6.*
|
||||
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
|
||||
, cryptostore ==0.2.*
|
||||
, crypton ==0.34.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509 ==1.7.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509-store ==1.6.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509-validation ==1.6.*
|
||||
, cryptostore ==0.3.*
|
||||
, data-default ==0.7.*
|
||||
, direct-sqlcipher ==2.3.*
|
||||
, directory ==1.3.*
|
||||
, filepath ==1.4.*
|
||||
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
|
||||
, hourglass ==0.2.*
|
||||
, http-types ==0.12.*
|
||||
, http2 ==4.1.*
|
||||
, http2 >=4.2.2 && <4.3
|
||||
, ini ==0.4.1
|
||||
, iproute ==1.7.*
|
||||
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
|
||||
, memory ==0.15.*
|
||||
, mtl ==2.2.*
|
||||
, memory ==0.18.*
|
||||
, mtl >=2.3.1 && <3.0
|
||||
, network >=3.1.2.7 && <3.2
|
||||
, network-transport ==0.5.4
|
||||
, network-info ==0.2.*
|
||||
, network-transport ==0.5.6
|
||||
, network-udp ==0.0.*
|
||||
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
|
||||
, process ==1.6.*
|
||||
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
|
||||
@@ -371,24 +434,28 @@ executable smp-server
|
||||
, socks ==0.6.*
|
||||
, sqlcipher-simple ==0.4.*
|
||||
, stm ==2.5.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
|
||||
, temporary ==1.3.*
|
||||
, text ==1.2.*
|
||||
, time ==1.9.*
|
||||
, time-compat ==1.9.*
|
||||
, time ==1.12.*
|
||||
, time-manager ==0.0.*
|
||||
, tls >=1.6.0 && <1.7
|
||||
, transformers ==0.5.*
|
||||
, tls >=1.7.0 && <1.8
|
||||
, transformers ==0.6.*
|
||||
, unliftio ==0.2.*
|
||||
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
|
||||
, websockets ==0.12.*
|
||||
, x509 ==1.7.*
|
||||
, x509-store ==1.6.*
|
||||
, x509-validation ==1.6.*
|
||||
, yaml ==0.11.*
|
||||
default-language: Haskell2010
|
||||
if flag(swift)
|
||||
cpp-options: -DswiftJSON
|
||||
if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
bytestring ==0.11.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.20.*
|
||||
, text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
|
||||
if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
bytestring ==0.10.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
|
||||
, text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
|
||||
|
||||
executable xftp
|
||||
main-is: Main.hs
|
||||
@@ -396,10 +463,9 @@ executable xftp
|
||||
Paths_simplexmq
|
||||
hs-source-dirs:
|
||||
apps/xftp
|
||||
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded
|
||||
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded -rtsopts
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
QuickCheck ==2.14.*
|
||||
, aeson ==2.0.*
|
||||
aeson ==2.2.*
|
||||
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
|
||||
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
|
||||
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
|
||||
@@ -407,27 +473,31 @@ executable xftp
|
||||
, attoparsec ==0.14.*
|
||||
, base >=4.14 && <5
|
||||
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
|
||||
, bytestring ==0.10.*
|
||||
, case-insensitive ==1.2.*
|
||||
, composition ==1.0.*
|
||||
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
|
||||
, containers ==0.6.*
|
||||
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
|
||||
, cryptostore ==0.2.*
|
||||
, crypton ==0.34.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509 ==1.7.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509-store ==1.6.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509-validation ==1.6.*
|
||||
, cryptostore ==0.3.*
|
||||
, data-default ==0.7.*
|
||||
, direct-sqlcipher ==2.3.*
|
||||
, directory ==1.3.*
|
||||
, filepath ==1.4.*
|
||||
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
|
||||
, hourglass ==0.2.*
|
||||
, http-types ==0.12.*
|
||||
, http2 ==4.1.*
|
||||
, http2 >=4.2.2 && <4.3
|
||||
, ini ==0.4.1
|
||||
, iproute ==1.7.*
|
||||
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
|
||||
, memory ==0.15.*
|
||||
, mtl ==2.2.*
|
||||
, memory ==0.18.*
|
||||
, mtl >=2.3.1 && <3.0
|
||||
, network >=3.1.2.7 && <3.2
|
||||
, network-transport ==0.5.4
|
||||
, network-info ==0.2.*
|
||||
, network-transport ==0.5.6
|
||||
, network-udp ==0.0.*
|
||||
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
|
||||
, process ==1.6.*
|
||||
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
|
||||
@@ -436,24 +506,28 @@ executable xftp
|
||||
, socks ==0.6.*
|
||||
, sqlcipher-simple ==0.4.*
|
||||
, stm ==2.5.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
|
||||
, temporary ==1.3.*
|
||||
, text ==1.2.*
|
||||
, time ==1.9.*
|
||||
, time-compat ==1.9.*
|
||||
, time ==1.12.*
|
||||
, time-manager ==0.0.*
|
||||
, tls >=1.6.0 && <1.7
|
||||
, transformers ==0.5.*
|
||||
, tls >=1.7.0 && <1.8
|
||||
, transformers ==0.6.*
|
||||
, unliftio ==0.2.*
|
||||
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
|
||||
, websockets ==0.12.*
|
||||
, x509 ==1.7.*
|
||||
, x509-store ==1.6.*
|
||||
, x509-validation ==1.6.*
|
||||
, yaml ==0.11.*
|
||||
default-language: Haskell2010
|
||||
if flag(swift)
|
||||
cpp-options: -DswiftJSON
|
||||
if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
bytestring ==0.11.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.20.*
|
||||
, text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
|
||||
if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
bytestring ==0.10.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
|
||||
, text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
|
||||
|
||||
executable xftp-server
|
||||
main-is: Main.hs
|
||||
@@ -461,10 +535,9 @@ executable xftp-server
|
||||
Paths_simplexmq
|
||||
hs-source-dirs:
|
||||
apps/xftp-server
|
||||
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded
|
||||
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded -rtsopts
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
QuickCheck ==2.14.*
|
||||
, aeson ==2.0.*
|
||||
aeson ==2.2.*
|
||||
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
|
||||
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
|
||||
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
|
||||
@@ -472,27 +545,31 @@ executable xftp-server
|
||||
, attoparsec ==0.14.*
|
||||
, base >=4.14 && <5
|
||||
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
|
||||
, bytestring ==0.10.*
|
||||
, case-insensitive ==1.2.*
|
||||
, composition ==1.0.*
|
||||
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
|
||||
, containers ==0.6.*
|
||||
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
|
||||
, cryptostore ==0.2.*
|
||||
, crypton ==0.34.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509 ==1.7.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509-store ==1.6.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509-validation ==1.6.*
|
||||
, cryptostore ==0.3.*
|
||||
, data-default ==0.7.*
|
||||
, direct-sqlcipher ==2.3.*
|
||||
, directory ==1.3.*
|
||||
, filepath ==1.4.*
|
||||
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
|
||||
, hourglass ==0.2.*
|
||||
, http-types ==0.12.*
|
||||
, http2 ==4.1.*
|
||||
, http2 >=4.2.2 && <4.3
|
||||
, ini ==0.4.1
|
||||
, iproute ==1.7.*
|
||||
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
|
||||
, memory ==0.15.*
|
||||
, mtl ==2.2.*
|
||||
, memory ==0.18.*
|
||||
, mtl >=2.3.1 && <3.0
|
||||
, network >=3.1.2.7 && <3.2
|
||||
, network-transport ==0.5.4
|
||||
, network-info ==0.2.*
|
||||
, network-transport ==0.5.6
|
||||
, network-udp ==0.0.*
|
||||
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
|
||||
, process ==1.6.*
|
||||
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
|
||||
@@ -501,24 +578,28 @@ executable xftp-server
|
||||
, socks ==0.6.*
|
||||
, sqlcipher-simple ==0.4.*
|
||||
, stm ==2.5.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
|
||||
, temporary ==1.3.*
|
||||
, text ==1.2.*
|
||||
, time ==1.9.*
|
||||
, time-compat ==1.9.*
|
||||
, time ==1.12.*
|
||||
, time-manager ==0.0.*
|
||||
, tls >=1.6.0 && <1.7
|
||||
, transformers ==0.5.*
|
||||
, tls >=1.7.0 && <1.8
|
||||
, transformers ==0.6.*
|
||||
, unliftio ==0.2.*
|
||||
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
|
||||
, websockets ==0.12.*
|
||||
, x509 ==1.7.*
|
||||
, x509-store ==1.6.*
|
||||
, x509-validation ==1.6.*
|
||||
, yaml ==0.11.*
|
||||
default-language: Haskell2010
|
||||
if flag(swift)
|
||||
cpp-options: -DswiftJSON
|
||||
if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
bytestring ==0.11.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.20.*
|
||||
, text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
|
||||
if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
bytestring ==0.10.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
|
||||
, text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
|
||||
|
||||
test-suite simplexmq-test
|
||||
type: exitcode-stdio-1.0
|
||||
@@ -533,6 +614,8 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
|
||||
AgentTests.SchemaDump
|
||||
AgentTests.SQLiteTests
|
||||
CLITests
|
||||
CoreTests.BatchingTests
|
||||
CoreTests.CryptoFileTests
|
||||
CoreTests.CryptoTests
|
||||
CoreTests.EncodingTests
|
||||
CoreTests.ProtocolErrorTests
|
||||
@@ -542,6 +625,7 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
|
||||
FileDescriptionTests
|
||||
NtfClient
|
||||
NtfServerTests
|
||||
RemoteControl
|
||||
ServerTests
|
||||
SMPAgentClient
|
||||
SMPClient
|
||||
@@ -556,7 +640,7 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
HUnit ==1.6.*
|
||||
, QuickCheck ==2.14.*
|
||||
, aeson ==2.0.*
|
||||
, aeson ==2.2.*
|
||||
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
|
||||
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
|
||||
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
|
||||
@@ -564,31 +648,36 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
|
||||
, attoparsec ==0.14.*
|
||||
, base >=4.14 && <5
|
||||
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
|
||||
, bytestring ==0.10.*
|
||||
, case-insensitive ==1.2.*
|
||||
, composition ==1.0.*
|
||||
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
|
||||
, containers ==0.6.*
|
||||
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
|
||||
, cryptostore ==0.2.*
|
||||
, crypton ==0.34.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509 ==1.7.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509-store ==1.6.*
|
||||
, crypton-x509-validation ==1.6.*
|
||||
, cryptostore ==0.3.*
|
||||
, data-default ==0.7.*
|
||||
, deepseq ==1.4.*
|
||||
, direct-sqlcipher ==2.3.*
|
||||
, directory ==1.3.*
|
||||
, filepath ==1.4.*
|
||||
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
|
||||
, hspec ==2.7.*
|
||||
, hspec-core ==2.7.*
|
||||
, generic-random ==1.5.*
|
||||
, hourglass ==0.2.*
|
||||
, hspec ==2.11.*
|
||||
, hspec-core ==2.11.*
|
||||
, http-types ==0.12.*
|
||||
, http2 ==4.1.*
|
||||
, http2 >=4.2.2 && <4.3
|
||||
, ini ==0.4.1
|
||||
, iproute ==1.7.*
|
||||
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
|
||||
, main-tester ==0.2.*
|
||||
, memory ==0.15.*
|
||||
, mtl ==2.2.*
|
||||
, memory ==0.18.*
|
||||
, mtl >=2.3.1 && <3.0
|
||||
, network >=3.1.2.7 && <3.2
|
||||
, network-transport ==0.5.4
|
||||
, network-info ==0.2.*
|
||||
, network-transport ==0.5.6
|
||||
, network-udp ==0.0.*
|
||||
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
|
||||
, process ==1.6.*
|
||||
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
|
||||
@@ -598,22 +687,26 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
|
||||
, socks ==0.6.*
|
||||
, sqlcipher-simple ==0.4.*
|
||||
, stm ==2.5.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
|
||||
, temporary ==1.3.*
|
||||
, text ==1.2.*
|
||||
, time ==1.9.*
|
||||
, time-compat ==1.9.*
|
||||
, time ==1.12.*
|
||||
, time-manager ==0.0.*
|
||||
, timeit ==2.0.*
|
||||
, tls >=1.6.0 && <1.7
|
||||
, transformers ==0.5.*
|
||||
, tls >=1.7.0 && <1.8
|
||||
, transformers ==0.6.*
|
||||
, unliftio ==0.2.*
|
||||
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
|
||||
, websockets ==0.12.*
|
||||
, x509 ==1.7.*
|
||||
, x509-store ==1.6.*
|
||||
, x509-validation ==1.6.*
|
||||
, yaml ==0.11.*
|
||||
default-language: Haskell2010
|
||||
if flag(swift)
|
||||
cpp-options: -DswiftJSON
|
||||
if impl(ghc >= 9.6.2)
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
bytestring ==0.11.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.20.*
|
||||
, text >=2.0.1 && <2.2
|
||||
if impl(ghc < 9.6.2)
|
||||
build-depends:
|
||||
bytestring ==0.10.*
|
||||
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
|
||||
, text >=1.2.3.0 && <1.3
|
||||
|
||||
+240
-270
@@ -9,37 +9,32 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
|
||||
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-ambiguous-fields #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Agent
|
||||
( startWorkers,
|
||||
( startXFTPWorkers,
|
||||
closeXFTPAgent,
|
||||
toFSFilePath,
|
||||
-- Receiving files
|
||||
receiveFile,
|
||||
deleteRcvFile,
|
||||
xftpReceiveFile',
|
||||
xftpDeleteRcvFile',
|
||||
-- Sending files
|
||||
sendFileExperimental,
|
||||
sendFile,
|
||||
xftpSendFile',
|
||||
xftpSendDescription',
|
||||
deleteSndFileInternal,
|
||||
deleteSndFileRemote,
|
||||
)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent.STM (stateTVar)
|
||||
import Control.Logger.Simple (logError)
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Reader
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG, randomBytesGenerate)
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
|
||||
import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as U
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
|
||||
import Data.Composition ((.:))
|
||||
import Data.Int (Int64)
|
||||
import Data.List (foldl', isSuffixOf, partition, sortOn)
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (nonEmpty)
|
||||
import Data.List (foldl', sortOn)
|
||||
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
|
||||
import Data.Map (Map)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
|
||||
@@ -50,7 +45,8 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client (XFTPChunkSpec (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Main
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Crypto
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileParty (..), FilePartyI, SFileParty (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileParty (..), SFileParty (..))
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol as XFTP
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPRcvChunkSpec (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Types
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Util (removePath, uniqueCombine)
|
||||
@@ -60,57 +56,53 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File (CryptoFile (..), CryptoFileArgs)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File as CF
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (EntityId, XFTPServer, XFTPServerWithAuth)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (liftError, liftIOEither, tshow, unlessM, whenM)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String (strDecode, strEncode)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (EntityId, XFTPServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (liftError, tshow, unlessM, whenM)
|
||||
import System.FilePath (takeFileName, (</>))
|
||||
import UnliftIO
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Concurrent
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Directory
|
||||
|
||||
startWorkers :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> Maybe FilePath -> m ()
|
||||
startWorkers c workDir = do
|
||||
startXFTPWorkers :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> Maybe FilePath -> m ()
|
||||
startXFTPWorkers c workDir = do
|
||||
wd <- asks $ xftpWorkDir . xftpAgent
|
||||
atomically $ writeTVar wd workDir
|
||||
startRcvFiles
|
||||
startSndFiles
|
||||
startDelFiles
|
||||
cfg <- asks config
|
||||
startRcvFiles cfg
|
||||
startSndFiles cfg
|
||||
startDelFiles cfg
|
||||
where
|
||||
startRcvFiles = do
|
||||
rcvFilesTTL <- asks $ rcvFilesTTL . config
|
||||
startRcvFiles AgentConfig {rcvFilesTTL} = do
|
||||
pendingRcvServers <- withStore' c (`getPendingRcvFilesServers` rcvFilesTTL)
|
||||
forM_ pendingRcvServers $ \s -> addXFTPRcvWorker c (Just s)
|
||||
forM_ pendingRcvServers $ \s -> resumeXFTPRcvWork c (Just s)
|
||||
-- start local worker for files pending decryption,
|
||||
-- no need to make an extra query for the check
|
||||
-- as the worker will check the store anyway
|
||||
addXFTPRcvWorker c Nothing
|
||||
startSndFiles = do
|
||||
sndFilesTTL <- asks $ sndFilesTTL . config
|
||||
resumeXFTPRcvWork c Nothing
|
||||
startSndFiles AgentConfig {sndFilesTTL} = do
|
||||
-- start worker for files pending encryption/creation
|
||||
addXFTPSndWorker c Nothing
|
||||
resumeXFTPSndWork c Nothing
|
||||
pendingSndServers <- withStore' c (`getPendingSndFilesServers` sndFilesTTL)
|
||||
forM_ pendingSndServers $ \s -> addXFTPSndWorker c (Just s)
|
||||
startDelFiles = do
|
||||
rcvFilesTTL <- asks $ rcvFilesTTL . config
|
||||
forM_ pendingSndServers $ \s -> resumeXFTPSndWork c (Just s)
|
||||
startDelFiles AgentConfig {rcvFilesTTL} = do
|
||||
pendingDelServers <- withStore' c (`getPendingDelFilesServers` rcvFilesTTL)
|
||||
forM_ pendingDelServers $ addXFTPDelWorker c
|
||||
forM_ pendingDelServers $ resumeXFTPDelWork c
|
||||
|
||||
closeXFTPAgent :: MonadUnliftIO m => XFTPAgent -> m ()
|
||||
closeXFTPAgent XFTPAgent {xftpRcvWorkers, xftpSndWorkers} = do
|
||||
stopWorkers xftpRcvWorkers
|
||||
stopWorkers xftpSndWorkers
|
||||
closeXFTPAgent a = do
|
||||
stopWorkers $ xftpRcvWorkers a
|
||||
stopWorkers $ xftpSndWorkers a
|
||||
stopWorkers $ xftpDelWorkers a
|
||||
where
|
||||
stopWorkers wsSel = do
|
||||
ws <- atomically $ stateTVar wsSel (,M.empty)
|
||||
mapM_ (uninterruptibleCancel . snd) ws
|
||||
stopWorkers workers = atomically (swapTVar workers M.empty) >>= mapM_ (liftIO . cancelWorker)
|
||||
|
||||
receiveFile :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> m RcvFileId
|
||||
receiveFile c userId (ValidFileDescription fd@FileDescription {chunks}) = do
|
||||
g <- asks idsDrg
|
||||
xftpReceiveFile' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> Maybe CryptoFileArgs -> m RcvFileId
|
||||
xftpReceiveFile' c userId (ValidFileDescription fd@FileDescription {chunks, redirect}) cfArgs = do
|
||||
g <- asks random
|
||||
prefixPath <- getPrefixPath "rcv.xftp"
|
||||
createDirectory prefixPath
|
||||
let relPrefixPath = takeFileName prefixPath
|
||||
@@ -118,14 +110,26 @@ receiveFile c userId (ValidFileDescription fd@FileDescription {chunks}) = do
|
||||
relSavePath = relPrefixPath </> "xftp.decrypted"
|
||||
createDirectory =<< toFSFilePath relTmpPath
|
||||
createEmptyFile =<< toFSFilePath relSavePath
|
||||
fId <- withStore c $ \db -> createRcvFile db g userId fd relPrefixPath relTmpPath relSavePath
|
||||
forM_ chunks downloadChunk
|
||||
let saveFile = CryptoFile relSavePath cfArgs
|
||||
fId <- case redirect of
|
||||
Nothing -> withStore c $ \db -> createRcvFile db g userId fd relPrefixPath relTmpPath saveFile
|
||||
Just _ -> do
|
||||
-- prepare description paths
|
||||
let relTmpPathRedirect = relPrefixPath </> "xftp.redirect-encrypted"
|
||||
relSavePathRedirect = relPrefixPath </> "xftp.redirect-decrypted"
|
||||
createDirectory =<< toFSFilePath relTmpPathRedirect
|
||||
createEmptyFile =<< toFSFilePath relSavePathRedirect
|
||||
cfArgsRedirect <- atomically $ CF.randomArgs g
|
||||
let saveFileRedirect = CryptoFile relSavePathRedirect $ Just cfArgsRedirect
|
||||
-- create download tasks
|
||||
withStore c $ \db -> createRcvFileRedirect db g userId fd relPrefixPath relTmpPathRedirect saveFileRedirect relTmpPath saveFile
|
||||
forM_ chunks (downloadChunk c)
|
||||
pure fId
|
||||
where
|
||||
downloadChunk :: AgentMonad m => FileChunk -> m ()
|
||||
downloadChunk FileChunk {replicas = (FileChunkReplica {server} : _)} = do
|
||||
addXFTPRcvWorker c (Just server)
|
||||
downloadChunk _ = throwError $ INTERNAL "no replicas"
|
||||
|
||||
downloadChunk :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> FileChunk -> m ()
|
||||
downloadChunk c FileChunk {replicas = (FileChunkReplica {server} : _)} = do
|
||||
void $ getXFTPRcvWorker True c (Just server)
|
||||
downloadChunk _ _ = throwError $ INTERNAL "no replicas"
|
||||
|
||||
getPrefixPath :: AgentMonad m => String -> m FilePath
|
||||
getPrefixPath suffix = do
|
||||
@@ -138,59 +142,37 @@ toFSFilePath :: AgentMonad m => FilePath -> m FilePath
|
||||
toFSFilePath f = (</> f) <$> getXFTPWorkPath
|
||||
|
||||
createEmptyFile :: AgentMonad m => FilePath -> m ()
|
||||
createEmptyFile fPath = do
|
||||
h <- openFile fPath AppendMode
|
||||
liftIO $ B.hPut h "" >> hFlush h
|
||||
createEmptyFile fPath = liftIO $ B.writeFile fPath ""
|
||||
|
||||
addXFTPRcvWorker :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> Maybe XFTPServer -> m ()
|
||||
addXFTPRcvWorker c = addWorker c xftpRcvWorkers runXFTPRcvWorker runXFTPRcvLocalWorker
|
||||
resumeXFTPRcvWork :: AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> Maybe XFTPServer -> m ()
|
||||
resumeXFTPRcvWork = void .: getXFTPRcvWorker False
|
||||
|
||||
addWorker ::
|
||||
AgentMonad m =>
|
||||
AgentClient ->
|
||||
(XFTPAgent -> TMap (Maybe XFTPServer) (TMVar (), Async ())) ->
|
||||
(AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> TMVar () -> m ()) ->
|
||||
(AgentClient -> TMVar () -> m ()) ->
|
||||
Maybe XFTPServer ->
|
||||
m ()
|
||||
addWorker c wsSel runWorker runWorkerNoSrv srv_ = do
|
||||
ws <- asks $ wsSel . xftpAgent
|
||||
atomically (TM.lookup srv_ ws) >>= \case
|
||||
Nothing -> do
|
||||
doWork <- newTMVarIO ()
|
||||
let runWorker' = case srv_ of
|
||||
Just srv -> runWorker c srv doWork
|
||||
Nothing -> runWorkerNoSrv c doWork
|
||||
worker <- async $ runWorker' `agentFinally` atomically (TM.delete srv_ ws)
|
||||
atomically $ TM.insert srv_ (doWork, worker) ws
|
||||
Just (doWork, _) ->
|
||||
void . atomically $ tryPutTMVar doWork ()
|
||||
getXFTPRcvWorker :: AgentMonad' m => Bool -> AgentClient -> Maybe XFTPServer -> m Worker
|
||||
getXFTPRcvWorker hasWork c server = do
|
||||
ws <- asks $ xftpRcvWorkers . xftpAgent
|
||||
getAgentWorker "xftp_rcv" hasWork c server ws $
|
||||
maybe (runXFTPRcvLocalWorker c) (runXFTPRcvWorker c) server
|
||||
|
||||
runXFTPRcvWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> TMVar () -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPRcvWorker c srv doWork = do
|
||||
runXFTPRcvWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> Worker -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPRcvWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
|
||||
cfg <- asks config
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
void . atomically $ readTMVar doWork
|
||||
waitForWork doWork
|
||||
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
|
||||
runXFTPOperation
|
||||
runXFTPOperation cfg
|
||||
where
|
||||
noWorkToDo = void . atomically $ tryTakeTMVar doWork
|
||||
runXFTPOperation :: m ()
|
||||
runXFTPOperation = do
|
||||
rcvFilesTTL <- asks (rcvFilesTTL . config)
|
||||
nextChunk <- withStore' c $ \db -> getNextRcvChunkToDownload db srv rcvFilesTTL
|
||||
case nextChunk of
|
||||
Nothing -> noWorkToDo
|
||||
Just RcvFileChunk {rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, fileTmpPath, replicas = []} -> rcvWorkerInternalError c rcvFileId rcvFileEntityId (Just fileTmpPath) "chunk has no replicas"
|
||||
Just fc@RcvFileChunk {userId, rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, digest, fileTmpPath, replicas = replica@RcvFileChunkReplica {rcvChunkReplicaId, server, delay} : _} -> do
|
||||
ri <- asks $ reconnectInterval . config
|
||||
runXFTPOperation :: AgentConfig -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPOperation AgentConfig {rcvFilesTTL, reconnectInterval = ri, xftpNotifyErrsOnRetry = notifyOnRetry, xftpConsecutiveRetries} =
|
||||
withWork c doWork (\db -> getNextRcvChunkToDownload db srv rcvFilesTTL) $ \case
|
||||
RcvFileChunk {rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, fileTmpPath, replicas = []} -> rcvWorkerInternalError c rcvFileId rcvFileEntityId (Just fileTmpPath) "chunk has no replicas"
|
||||
fc@RcvFileChunk {userId, rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, digest, fileTmpPath, replicas = replica@RcvFileChunkReplica {rcvChunkReplicaId, server, delay} : _} -> do
|
||||
let ri' = maybe ri (\d -> ri {initialInterval = d, increaseAfter = 0}) delay
|
||||
withRetryInterval ri' $ \delay' loop ->
|
||||
withRetryIntervalLimit xftpConsecutiveRetries ri' $ \delay' loop ->
|
||||
downloadFileChunk fc replica
|
||||
`catchAgentError` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP rcv worker" (retryLoop loop e delay') (retryDone e) e
|
||||
where
|
||||
retryLoop loop e replicaDelay = do
|
||||
flip catchAgentError (\_ -> pure ()) $ do
|
||||
notifyOnRetry <- asks (xftpNotifyErrsOnRetry . config)
|
||||
when notifyOnRetry $ notify c rcvFileEntityId $ RFERR e
|
||||
closeXFTPServerClient c userId server digest
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> updateRcvChunkReplicaDelay db rcvChunkReplicaId replicaDelay
|
||||
@@ -204,15 +186,20 @@ runXFTPRcvWorker c srv doWork = do
|
||||
let chunkSpec = XFTPRcvChunkSpec chunkPath (unFileSize chunkSize) (unFileDigest digest)
|
||||
relChunkPath = fileTmpPath </> takeFileName chunkPath
|
||||
agentXFTPDownloadChunk c userId digest replica chunkSpec
|
||||
(complete, progress) <- withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
|
||||
atomically $ waitUntilForeground c
|
||||
(entityId, complete, progress) <- withStore c $ \db -> runExceptT $ do
|
||||
liftIO $ updateRcvFileChunkReceived db (rcvChunkReplicaId replica) rcvChunkId relChunkPath
|
||||
RcvFile {size = FileSize total, chunks} <- ExceptT $ getRcvFile db rcvFileId
|
||||
RcvFile {size = FileSize currentSize, chunks, redirect} <- ExceptT $ getRcvFile db rcvFileId
|
||||
let rcvd = receivedSize chunks
|
||||
complete = all chunkReceived chunks
|
||||
(entityId, total) = case redirect of
|
||||
Nothing -> (rcvFileEntityId, currentSize)
|
||||
Just RcvFileRedirect {redirectFileInfo = RedirectFileInfo {size = FileSize finalSize}, redirectEntityId} -> (redirectEntityId, finalSize)
|
||||
liftIO . when complete $ updateRcvFileStatus db rcvFileId RFSReceived
|
||||
pure (complete, RFPROG rcvd total)
|
||||
notify c rcvFileEntityId progress
|
||||
when complete $ addXFTPRcvWorker c Nothing
|
||||
pure (entityId, complete, RFPROG rcvd total)
|
||||
notify c entityId progress
|
||||
when complete . void $
|
||||
getXFTPRcvWorker True c Nothing
|
||||
where
|
||||
receivedSize :: [RcvFileChunk] -> Int64
|
||||
receivedSize = foldl' (\sz ch -> sz + receivedChunkSize ch) 0
|
||||
@@ -221,6 +208,12 @@ runXFTPRcvWorker c srv doWork = do
|
||||
| otherwise = 0
|
||||
chunkReceived RcvFileChunk {replicas} = any received replicas
|
||||
|
||||
-- The first call of action has n == 0, maxN is max number of retries
|
||||
withRetryIntervalLimit :: forall m. MonadIO m => Int -> RetryInterval -> (Int64 -> m () -> m ()) -> m ()
|
||||
withRetryIntervalLimit maxN ri action =
|
||||
withRetryIntervalCount ri $ \n delay loop ->
|
||||
when (n < maxN) $ action delay loop
|
||||
|
||||
retryOnError :: AgentMonad m => Text -> m a -> m a -> AgentErrorType -> m a
|
||||
retryOnError name loop done e = do
|
||||
logError $ name <> " error: " <> tshow e
|
||||
@@ -234,34 +227,55 @@ rcvWorkerInternalError c rcvFileId rcvFileEntityId tmpPath internalErrStr = do
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> updateRcvFileError db rcvFileId internalErrStr
|
||||
notify c rcvFileEntityId $ RFERR $ INTERNAL internalErrStr
|
||||
|
||||
runXFTPRcvLocalWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> TMVar () -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPRcvLocalWorker c doWork = do
|
||||
runXFTPRcvLocalWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> Worker -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPRcvLocalWorker c Worker {doWork} = do
|
||||
cfg <- asks config
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
void . atomically $ readTMVar doWork
|
||||
waitForWork doWork
|
||||
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
|
||||
runXFTPOperation
|
||||
runXFTPOperation cfg
|
||||
where
|
||||
runXFTPOperation :: m ()
|
||||
runXFTPOperation = do
|
||||
rcvFilesTTL <- asks (rcvFilesTTL . config)
|
||||
nextFile <- withStore' c (`getNextRcvFileToDecrypt` rcvFilesTTL)
|
||||
case nextFile of
|
||||
Nothing -> noWorkToDo
|
||||
Just f@RcvFile {rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, tmpPath} ->
|
||||
runXFTPOperation :: AgentConfig -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPOperation AgentConfig {rcvFilesTTL} =
|
||||
withWork c doWork (`getNextRcvFileToDecrypt` rcvFilesTTL) $
|
||||
\f@RcvFile {rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, tmpPath} ->
|
||||
decryptFile f `catchAgentError` (rcvWorkerInternalError c rcvFileId rcvFileEntityId tmpPath . show)
|
||||
noWorkToDo = void . atomically $ tryTakeTMVar doWork
|
||||
decryptFile :: RcvFile -> m ()
|
||||
decryptFile RcvFile {rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, key, nonce, tmpPath, savePath, status, chunks} = do
|
||||
decryptFile RcvFile {rcvFileId, rcvFileEntityId, size, digest, key, nonce, tmpPath, saveFile, status, chunks, redirect} = do
|
||||
let CryptoFile savePath cfArgs = saveFile
|
||||
fsSavePath <- toFSFilePath savePath
|
||||
when (status == RFSDecrypting) $
|
||||
whenM (doesFileExist fsSavePath) (removeFile fsSavePath >> createEmptyFile fsSavePath)
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> updateRcvFileStatus db rcvFileId RFSDecrypting
|
||||
chunkPaths <- getChunkPaths chunks
|
||||
encSize <- liftIO $ foldM (\s path -> (s +) . fromIntegral <$> getFileSize path) 0 chunkPaths
|
||||
void $ liftError (INTERNAL . show) $ decryptChunks encSize chunkPaths key nonce $ \_ -> pure fsSavePath
|
||||
notify c rcvFileEntityId $ RFDONE fsSavePath
|
||||
forM_ tmpPath (removePath <=< toFSFilePath)
|
||||
withStore' c (`updateRcvFileComplete` rcvFileId)
|
||||
when (FileSize encSize /= size) $ throwError $ XFTP XFTP.SIZE
|
||||
encDigest <- liftIO $ LC.sha512Hash <$> readChunks chunkPaths
|
||||
when (FileDigest encDigest /= digest) $ throwError $ XFTP XFTP.DIGEST
|
||||
let destFile = CryptoFile fsSavePath cfArgs
|
||||
void $ liftError (INTERNAL . show) $ decryptChunks encSize chunkPaths key nonce $ \_ -> pure destFile
|
||||
case redirect of
|
||||
Nothing -> do
|
||||
notify c rcvFileEntityId $ RFDONE fsSavePath
|
||||
forM_ tmpPath (removePath <=< toFSFilePath)
|
||||
atomically $ waitUntilForeground c
|
||||
withStore' c (`updateRcvFileComplete` rcvFileId)
|
||||
Just RcvFileRedirect {redirectFileInfo, redirectDbId} -> do
|
||||
let RedirectFileInfo {size = redirectSize, digest = redirectDigest} = redirectFileInfo
|
||||
forM_ tmpPath (removePath <=< toFSFilePath)
|
||||
atomically $ waitUntilForeground c
|
||||
withStore' c (`updateRcvFileComplete` rcvFileId)
|
||||
-- proceed with redirect
|
||||
yaml <- liftError (INTERNAL . show) (CF.readFile $ CryptoFile fsSavePath cfArgs) `finally` (toFSFilePath fsSavePath >>= removePath)
|
||||
next@FileDescription {chunks = nextChunks} <- case strDecode (LB.toStrict yaml) of
|
||||
Left _ -> throwError . XFTP $ XFTP.REDIRECT "decode error"
|
||||
Right (ValidFileDescription fd@FileDescription {size = dstSize, digest = dstDigest})
|
||||
| dstSize /= redirectSize -> throwError . XFTP $ XFTP.REDIRECT "size mismatch"
|
||||
| dstDigest /= redirectDigest -> throwError . XFTP $ XFTP.REDIRECT "digest mismatch"
|
||||
| otherwise -> pure fd
|
||||
-- register and download chunks from the actual file
|
||||
withStore c $ \db -> updateRcvFileRedirect db redirectDbId next
|
||||
forM_ nextChunks (downloadChunk c)
|
||||
where
|
||||
getChunkPaths :: [RcvFileChunk] -> m [FilePath]
|
||||
getChunkPaths [] = pure []
|
||||
@@ -272,138 +286,108 @@ runXFTPRcvLocalWorker c doWork = do
|
||||
getChunkPaths (RcvFileChunk {chunkTmpPath = Nothing} : _cs) =
|
||||
throwError $ INTERNAL "no chunk path"
|
||||
|
||||
deleteRcvFile :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> RcvFileId -> m ()
|
||||
deleteRcvFile c rcvFileEntityId = do
|
||||
RcvFile {rcvFileId, prefixPath, status} <- withStore c $ \db -> getRcvFileByEntityId db rcvFileEntityId
|
||||
if status == RFSComplete || status == RFSError
|
||||
then do
|
||||
removePath prefixPath
|
||||
withStore' c (`deleteRcvFile'` rcvFileId)
|
||||
else withStore' c (`updateRcvFileDeleted` rcvFileId)
|
||||
|
||||
sendFileExperimental :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> FilePath -> Int -> m SndFileId
|
||||
sendFileExperimental c@AgentClient {xftpServers} userId filePath numRecipients = do
|
||||
g <- asks idsDrg
|
||||
sndFileId <- liftIO $ randomId g 12
|
||||
xftpSrvs <- atomically $ TM.lookup userId xftpServers
|
||||
void $ forkIO $ sendCLI sndFileId $ maybe [] L.toList xftpSrvs
|
||||
pure sndFileId
|
||||
xftpDeleteRcvFile' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> RcvFileId -> m ()
|
||||
xftpDeleteRcvFile' c rcvFileEntityId = do
|
||||
rcvFile@RcvFile {rcvFileId} <- withStore c $ \db -> getRcvFileByEntityId db rcvFileEntityId
|
||||
handleError (const $ pure ()) $ withStore' c (`getRcvFileRedirects` rcvFileId) >>= mapM_ remove
|
||||
remove rcvFile
|
||||
where
|
||||
randomId :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> Int -> IO ByteString
|
||||
randomId gVar n = U.encode <$> (atomically . stateTVar gVar $ randomBytesGenerate n)
|
||||
sendCLI :: SndFileId -> [XFTPServerWithAuth] -> m ()
|
||||
sendCLI sndFileId xftpSrvs = do
|
||||
let fileName = takeFileName filePath
|
||||
workPath <- getXFTPWorkPath
|
||||
outputDir <- uniqueCombine workPath $ fileName <> ".descr"
|
||||
createDirectory outputDir
|
||||
let tempPath = workPath </> "snd"
|
||||
createDirectoryIfMissing False tempPath
|
||||
runSend fileName outputDir tempPath `catchAgentError` \e -> do
|
||||
cleanup outputDir tempPath
|
||||
notify c sndFileId $ SFERR e
|
||||
where
|
||||
runSend :: String -> FilePath -> FilePath -> m ()
|
||||
runSend fileName outputDir tempPath = do
|
||||
let sendOptions =
|
||||
SendOptions
|
||||
{ filePath,
|
||||
outputDir = Just outputDir,
|
||||
numRecipients,
|
||||
xftpServers = xftpSrvs,
|
||||
retryCount = 3,
|
||||
tempPath = Just tempPath,
|
||||
verbose = False
|
||||
}
|
||||
liftCLI $ cliSendFileOpts sendOptions False $ notify c sndFileId .: SFPROG
|
||||
(sndDescr, rcvDescrs) <- readDescrs outputDir fileName
|
||||
cleanup outputDir tempPath
|
||||
notify c sndFileId $ SFDONE sndDescr rcvDescrs
|
||||
cleanup :: FilePath -> FilePath -> m ()
|
||||
cleanup outputDir tempPath = do
|
||||
removePath tempPath
|
||||
removePath outputDir
|
||||
liftCLI :: ExceptT CLIError IO () -> m ()
|
||||
liftCLI = either (throwError . INTERNAL . show) pure <=< liftIO . runExceptT
|
||||
readDescrs :: FilePath -> FilePath -> m (ValidFileDescription 'FSender, [ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient])
|
||||
readDescrs outDir fileName = do
|
||||
let descrDir = outDir </> (fileName <> ".xftp")
|
||||
files <- listDirectory descrDir
|
||||
let (sdFiles, rdFiles) = partition ("snd.xftp.private" `isSuffixOf`) files
|
||||
sdFile = maybe "" (\l -> descrDir </> L.head l) (nonEmpty sdFiles)
|
||||
rdFiles' = map (descrDir </>) rdFiles
|
||||
(,) <$> readDescr sdFile <*> mapM readDescr rdFiles'
|
||||
readDescr :: FilePartyI p => FilePath -> m (ValidFileDescription p)
|
||||
readDescr f = liftIOEither $ first INTERNAL . strDecode <$> B.readFile f
|
||||
remove RcvFile {rcvFileId, prefixPath, status} =
|
||||
if status == RFSComplete || status == RFSError
|
||||
then do
|
||||
removePath prefixPath
|
||||
withStore' c (`deleteRcvFile'` rcvFileId)
|
||||
else withStore' c (`updateRcvFileDeleted` rcvFileId)
|
||||
|
||||
notify :: forall m e. (MonadUnliftIO m, AEntityI e) => AgentClient -> EntityId -> ACommand 'Agent e -> m ()
|
||||
notify c entId cmd = atomically $ writeTBQueue (subQ c) ("", entId, APC (sAEntity @e) cmd)
|
||||
|
||||
sendFile :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> FilePath -> Int -> m SndFileId
|
||||
sendFile c userId filePath numRecipients = do
|
||||
g <- asks idsDrg
|
||||
xftpSendFile' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> CryptoFile -> Int -> m SndFileId
|
||||
xftpSendFile' c userId file numRecipients = do
|
||||
g <- asks random
|
||||
prefixPath <- getPrefixPath "snd.xftp"
|
||||
createDirectory prefixPath
|
||||
let relPrefixPath = takeFileName prefixPath
|
||||
key <- liftIO C.randomSbKey
|
||||
nonce <- liftIO C.randomCbNonce
|
||||
key <- atomically $ C.randomSbKey g
|
||||
nonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
|
||||
-- saving absolute filePath will not allow to restore file encryption after app update, but it's a short window
|
||||
fId <- withStore c $ \db -> createSndFile db g userId numRecipients filePath relPrefixPath key nonce
|
||||
addXFTPSndWorker c Nothing
|
||||
fId <- withStore c $ \db -> createSndFile db g userId file numRecipients relPrefixPath key nonce Nothing
|
||||
void $ getXFTPSndWorker True c Nothing
|
||||
pure fId
|
||||
|
||||
addXFTPSndWorker :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> Maybe XFTPServer -> m ()
|
||||
addXFTPSndWorker c = addWorker c xftpSndWorkers runXFTPSndWorker runXFTPSndPrepareWorker
|
||||
xftpSendDescription' :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> UserId -> ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> Int -> m SndFileId
|
||||
xftpSendDescription' c userId (ValidFileDescription fdDirect@FileDescription {size, digest}) numRecipients = do
|
||||
g <- asks random
|
||||
prefixPath <- getPrefixPath "snd.xftp"
|
||||
createDirectory prefixPath
|
||||
let relPrefixPath = takeFileName prefixPath
|
||||
let directYaml = prefixPath </> "direct.yaml"
|
||||
cfArgs <- atomically $ CF.randomArgs g
|
||||
let file = CryptoFile directYaml (Just cfArgs)
|
||||
liftError (INTERNAL . show) $ CF.writeFile file (LB.fromStrict $ strEncode fdDirect)
|
||||
key <- atomically $ C.randomSbKey g
|
||||
nonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
|
||||
fId <- withStore c $ \db -> createSndFile db g userId file numRecipients relPrefixPath key nonce $ Just RedirectFileInfo {size, digest}
|
||||
void $ getXFTPSndWorker True c Nothing
|
||||
pure fId
|
||||
|
||||
runXFTPSndPrepareWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> TMVar () -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPSndPrepareWorker c doWork = do
|
||||
resumeXFTPSndWork :: AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> Maybe XFTPServer -> m ()
|
||||
resumeXFTPSndWork = void .: getXFTPSndWorker False
|
||||
|
||||
getXFTPSndWorker :: AgentMonad' m => Bool -> AgentClient -> Maybe XFTPServer -> m Worker
|
||||
getXFTPSndWorker hasWork c server = do
|
||||
ws <- asks $ xftpSndWorkers . xftpAgent
|
||||
getAgentWorker "xftp_snd" hasWork c server ws $
|
||||
maybe (runXFTPSndPrepareWorker c) (runXFTPSndWorker c) server
|
||||
|
||||
runXFTPSndPrepareWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> Worker -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPSndPrepareWorker c Worker {doWork} = do
|
||||
cfg <- asks config
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
void . atomically $ readTMVar doWork
|
||||
waitForWork doWork
|
||||
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
|
||||
runXFTPOperation
|
||||
runXFTPOperation cfg
|
||||
where
|
||||
runXFTPOperation :: m ()
|
||||
runXFTPOperation = do
|
||||
sndFilesTTL <- asks (sndFilesTTL . config)
|
||||
nextFile <- withStore' c (`getNextSndFileToPrepare` sndFilesTTL)
|
||||
case nextFile of
|
||||
Nothing -> noWorkToDo
|
||||
Just f@SndFile {sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, prefixPath} ->
|
||||
prepareFile f `catchAgentError` (sndWorkerInternalError c sndFileId sndFileEntityId prefixPath . show)
|
||||
noWorkToDo = void . atomically $ tryTakeTMVar doWork
|
||||
prepareFile :: SndFile -> m ()
|
||||
prepareFile SndFile {prefixPath = Nothing} =
|
||||
runXFTPOperation :: AgentConfig -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPOperation cfg@AgentConfig {sndFilesTTL} =
|
||||
withWork c doWork (`getNextSndFileToPrepare` sndFilesTTL) $
|
||||
\f@SndFile {sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, prefixPath} ->
|
||||
prepareFile cfg f `catchAgentError` (sndWorkerInternalError c sndFileId sndFileEntityId prefixPath . show)
|
||||
prepareFile :: AgentConfig -> SndFile -> m ()
|
||||
prepareFile _ SndFile {prefixPath = Nothing} =
|
||||
throwError $ INTERNAL "no prefix path"
|
||||
prepareFile sndFile@SndFile {sndFileId, userId, prefixPath = Just ppath, status} = do
|
||||
prepareFile cfg sndFile@SndFile {sndFileId, userId, prefixPath = Just ppath, status} = do
|
||||
SndFile {numRecipients, chunks} <-
|
||||
if status /= SFSEncrypted -- status is SFSNew or SFSEncrypting
|
||||
then do
|
||||
fsEncPath <- toFSFilePath $ sndFileEncPath ppath
|
||||
when (status == SFSEncrypting) $
|
||||
whenM (doesFileExist fsEncPath) $ removeFile fsEncPath
|
||||
when (status == SFSEncrypting) . whenM (doesFileExist fsEncPath) $
|
||||
removeFile fsEncPath
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndFileStatus db sndFileId SFSEncrypting
|
||||
(digest, chunkSpecsDigests) <- encryptFileForUpload sndFile fsEncPath
|
||||
withStore c $ \db -> do
|
||||
updateSndFileEncrypted db sndFileId digest chunkSpecsDigests
|
||||
getSndFile db sndFileId
|
||||
else pure sndFile
|
||||
maxRecipients <- asks (xftpMaxRecipientsPerRequest . config)
|
||||
let numRecipients' = min numRecipients maxRecipients
|
||||
-- concurrently?
|
||||
-- separate worker to create chunks? record retries and delay on snd_file_chunks?
|
||||
forM_ (filter (not . chunkCreated) chunks) $ createChunk numRecipients'
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndFileStatus db sndFileId SFSUploading
|
||||
where
|
||||
AgentConfig {xftpMaxRecipientsPerRequest = maxRecipients, messageRetryInterval = ri} = cfg
|
||||
encryptFileForUpload :: SndFile -> FilePath -> m (FileDigest, [(XFTPChunkSpec, FileDigest)])
|
||||
encryptFileForUpload SndFile {key, nonce, filePath} fsEncPath = do
|
||||
let fileName = takeFileName filePath
|
||||
fileSize <- fromInteger <$> getFileSize filePath
|
||||
encryptFileForUpload SndFile {key, nonce, srcFile} fsEncPath = do
|
||||
let CryptoFile {filePath} = srcFile
|
||||
fileName = takeFileName filePath
|
||||
fileSize <- liftIO $ fromInteger <$> CF.getFileContentsSize srcFile
|
||||
when (fileSize > maxFileSize) $ throwError $ INTERNAL "max file size exceeded"
|
||||
let fileHdr = smpEncode FileHeader {fileName, fileExtra = Nothing}
|
||||
fileSize' = fromIntegral (B.length fileHdr) + fileSize
|
||||
chunkSizes = prepareChunkSizes $ fileSize' + fileSizeLen + authTagSize
|
||||
chunkSizes' = map fromIntegral chunkSizes
|
||||
encSize = sum chunkSizes'
|
||||
void $ liftError (INTERNAL . show) $ encryptFile filePath fileHdr key nonce fileSize' encSize fsEncPath
|
||||
void $ liftError (INTERNAL . show) $ encryptFile srcFile fileHdr key nonce fileSize' encSize fsEncPath
|
||||
digest <- liftIO $ LC.sha512Hash <$> LB.readFile fsEncPath
|
||||
let chunkSpecs = prepareChunkSpecs fsEncPath chunkSizes
|
||||
chunkDigests <- map FileDigest <$> mapM (liftIO . getChunkDigest) chunkSpecs
|
||||
@@ -416,10 +400,9 @@ runXFTPSndPrepareWorker c doWork = do
|
||||
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
|
||||
(replica, ProtoServerWithAuth srv _) <- tryCreate
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> createSndFileReplica db ch replica
|
||||
addXFTPSndWorker c $ Just srv
|
||||
void $ getXFTPSndWorker True c (Just srv)
|
||||
where
|
||||
tryCreate = do
|
||||
ri <- asks $ messageRetryInterval . config
|
||||
usedSrvs <- newTVarIO ([] :: [XFTPServer])
|
||||
withRetryInterval (riFast ri) $ \_ loop ->
|
||||
createWithNextSrv usedSrvs
|
||||
@@ -439,45 +422,41 @@ sndWorkerInternalError c sndFileId sndFileEntityId prefixPath internalErrStr = d
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndFileError db sndFileId internalErrStr
|
||||
notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFERR $ INTERNAL internalErrStr
|
||||
|
||||
runXFTPSndWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> TMVar () -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPSndWorker c srv doWork = do
|
||||
runXFTPSndWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> Worker -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPSndWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
|
||||
cfg <- asks config
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
void . atomically $ readTMVar doWork
|
||||
waitForWork doWork
|
||||
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
|
||||
runXFTPOperation
|
||||
runXFTPOperation cfg
|
||||
where
|
||||
noWorkToDo = void . atomically $ tryTakeTMVar doWork
|
||||
runXFTPOperation :: m ()
|
||||
runXFTPOperation = do
|
||||
sndFilesTTL <- asks (sndFilesTTL . config)
|
||||
nextChunk <- withStore' c $ \db -> getNextSndChunkToUpload db srv sndFilesTTL
|
||||
case nextChunk of
|
||||
Nothing -> noWorkToDo
|
||||
Just SndFileChunk {sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, filePrefixPath, replicas = []} -> sndWorkerInternalError c sndFileId sndFileEntityId (Just filePrefixPath) "chunk has no replicas"
|
||||
Just fc@SndFileChunk {userId, sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, filePrefixPath, digest, replicas = replica@SndFileChunkReplica {sndChunkReplicaId, server, delay} : _} -> do
|
||||
ri <- asks $ reconnectInterval . config
|
||||
runXFTPOperation :: AgentConfig -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPOperation cfg@AgentConfig {sndFilesTTL, reconnectInterval = ri, xftpNotifyErrsOnRetry = notifyOnRetry, xftpConsecutiveRetries} = do
|
||||
withWork c doWork (\db -> getNextSndChunkToUpload db srv sndFilesTTL) $ \case
|
||||
SndFileChunk {sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, filePrefixPath, replicas = []} -> sndWorkerInternalError c sndFileId sndFileEntityId (Just filePrefixPath) "chunk has no replicas"
|
||||
fc@SndFileChunk {userId, sndFileId, sndFileEntityId, filePrefixPath, digest, replicas = replica@SndFileChunkReplica {sndChunkReplicaId, server, delay} : _} -> do
|
||||
let ri' = maybe ri (\d -> ri {initialInterval = d, increaseAfter = 0}) delay
|
||||
withRetryInterval ri' $ \delay' loop ->
|
||||
uploadFileChunk fc replica
|
||||
withRetryIntervalLimit xftpConsecutiveRetries ri' $ \delay' loop ->
|
||||
uploadFileChunk cfg fc replica
|
||||
`catchAgentError` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP snd worker" (retryLoop loop e delay') (retryDone e) e
|
||||
where
|
||||
retryLoop loop e replicaDelay = do
|
||||
flip catchAgentError (\_ -> pure ()) $ do
|
||||
notifyOnRetry <- asks (xftpNotifyErrsOnRetry . config)
|
||||
when notifyOnRetry $ notify c sndFileEntityId $ SFERR e
|
||||
closeXFTPServerClient c userId server digest
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> updateSndChunkReplicaDelay db sndChunkReplicaId replicaDelay
|
||||
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
|
||||
loop
|
||||
retryDone e = sndWorkerInternalError c sndFileId sndFileEntityId (Just filePrefixPath) (show e)
|
||||
uploadFileChunk :: SndFileChunk -> SndFileChunkReplica -> m ()
|
||||
uploadFileChunk sndFileChunk@SndFileChunk {sndFileId, userId, chunkSpec = chunkSpec@XFTPChunkSpec {filePath}, digest = chunkDigest} replica = do
|
||||
uploadFileChunk :: AgentConfig -> SndFileChunk -> SndFileChunkReplica -> m ()
|
||||
uploadFileChunk AgentConfig {xftpMaxRecipientsPerRequest = maxRecipients} sndFileChunk@SndFileChunk {sndFileId, userId, chunkSpec = chunkSpec@XFTPChunkSpec {filePath}, digest = chunkDigest} replica = do
|
||||
replica'@SndFileChunkReplica {sndChunkReplicaId} <- addRecipients sndFileChunk replica
|
||||
fsFilePath <- toFSFilePath filePath
|
||||
unlessM (doesFileExist fsFilePath) $ throwError $ INTERNAL "encrypted file doesn't exist on upload"
|
||||
let chunkSpec' = chunkSpec {filePath = fsFilePath} :: XFTPChunkSpec
|
||||
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
|
||||
agentXFTPUploadChunk c userId chunkDigest replica' chunkSpec'
|
||||
atomically $ waitUntilForeground c
|
||||
sf@SndFile {sndFileEntityId, prefixPath, chunks} <- withStore c $ \db -> do
|
||||
updateSndChunkReplicaStatus db sndChunkReplicaId SFRSUploaded
|
||||
getSndFile db sndFileId
|
||||
@@ -496,23 +475,22 @@ runXFTPSndWorker c srv doWork = do
|
||||
| length rcvIdsKeys > numRecipients = throwError $ INTERNAL "too many recipients"
|
||||
| length rcvIdsKeys == numRecipients = pure cr
|
||||
| otherwise = do
|
||||
maxRecipients <- asks $ xftpMaxRecipientsPerRequest . config
|
||||
let numRecipients' = min (numRecipients - length rcvIdsKeys) maxRecipients
|
||||
rcvIdsKeys' <- agentXFTPAddRecipients c userId chunkDigest cr numRecipients'
|
||||
cr' <- withStore' c $ \db -> addSndChunkReplicaRecipients db cr $ L.toList rcvIdsKeys'
|
||||
addRecipients ch cr'
|
||||
let numRecipients' = min (numRecipients - length rcvIdsKeys) maxRecipients
|
||||
rcvIdsKeys' <- agentXFTPAddRecipients c userId chunkDigest cr numRecipients'
|
||||
cr' <- withStore' c $ \db -> addSndChunkReplicaRecipients db cr $ L.toList rcvIdsKeys'
|
||||
addRecipients ch cr'
|
||||
sndFileToDescrs :: SndFile -> m (ValidFileDescription 'FSender, [ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient])
|
||||
sndFileToDescrs SndFile {digest = Nothing} = throwError $ INTERNAL "snd file has no digest"
|
||||
sndFileToDescrs SndFile {chunks = []} = throwError $ INTERNAL "snd file has no chunks"
|
||||
sndFileToDescrs SndFile {digest = Just digest, key, nonce, chunks = chunks@(fstChunk : _)} = do
|
||||
sndFileToDescrs SndFile {digest = Just digest, key, nonce, chunks = chunks@(fstChunk : _), redirect} = do
|
||||
let chunkSize = FileSize $ sndChunkSize fstChunk
|
||||
size = FileSize $ sum $ map (fromIntegral . sndChunkSize) chunks
|
||||
-- snd description
|
||||
sndDescrChunks <- mapM toSndDescrChunk chunks
|
||||
let fdSnd = FileDescription {party = SFSender, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, chunks = sndDescrChunks}
|
||||
let fdSnd = FileDescription {party = SFSender, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, chunks = sndDescrChunks, redirect = Nothing}
|
||||
validFdSnd <- either (throwError . INTERNAL) pure $ validateFileDescription fdSnd
|
||||
-- rcv descriptions
|
||||
let fdRcv = FileDescription {party = SFRecipient, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, chunks = []}
|
||||
let fdRcv = FileDescription {party = SFRecipient, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, chunks = [], redirect}
|
||||
fdRcvs = createRcvFileDescriptions fdRcv chunks
|
||||
validFdRcvs <- either (throwError . INTERNAL) pure $ mapM validateFileDescription fdRcvs
|
||||
pure (validFdSnd, validFdRcvs)
|
||||
@@ -541,7 +519,7 @@ runXFTPSndWorker c srv doWork = do
|
||||
rcvChunks :: [[FileChunk]]
|
||||
rcvChunks = map (sortChunks . M.elems) $ M.elems $ foldl' addRcvChunk M.empty rcvReplicas
|
||||
sortChunks :: [FileChunk] -> [FileChunk]
|
||||
sortChunks = map reverseReplicas . sortOn (chunkNo :: FileChunk -> Int)
|
||||
sortChunks = map reverseReplicas . sortOn (\FileChunk {chunkNo} -> chunkNo)
|
||||
reverseReplicas ch@FileChunk {replicas} = (ch :: FileChunk) {replicas = reverse replicas}
|
||||
addRcvChunk :: Map Int (Map Int FileChunk) -> SentRecipientReplica -> Map Int (Map Int FileChunk)
|
||||
addRcvChunk m SentRecipientReplica {chunkNo, server, rcvNo, replicaId, replicaKey, digest, chunkSize} =
|
||||
@@ -584,55 +562,47 @@ deleteSndFileRemote c userId sndFileEntityId (ValidFileDescription FileDescripti
|
||||
deleteFileChunk :: FileChunk -> m ()
|
||||
deleteFileChunk FileChunk {digest, replicas = replica@FileChunkReplica {server} : _} = do
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> createDeletedSndChunkReplica db userId replica digest
|
||||
addXFTPDelWorker c server
|
||||
void $ getXFTPDelWorker True c server
|
||||
deleteFileChunk _ = pure ()
|
||||
|
||||
addXFTPDelWorker :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> m ()
|
||||
addXFTPDelWorker c srv = do
|
||||
ws <- asks $ xftpDelWorkers . xftpAgent
|
||||
atomically (TM.lookup srv ws) >>= \case
|
||||
Nothing -> do
|
||||
doWork <- newTMVarIO ()
|
||||
worker <- async $ runXFTPDelWorker c srv doWork `agentFinally` atomically (TM.delete srv ws)
|
||||
atomically $ TM.insert srv (doWork, worker) ws
|
||||
Just (doWork, _) ->
|
||||
void . atomically $ tryPutTMVar doWork ()
|
||||
resumeXFTPDelWork :: AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> m ()
|
||||
resumeXFTPDelWork = void .: getXFTPDelWorker False
|
||||
|
||||
runXFTPDelWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> TMVar () -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPDelWorker c srv doWork = do
|
||||
getXFTPDelWorker :: AgentMonad' m => Bool -> AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> m Worker
|
||||
getXFTPDelWorker hasWork c server = do
|
||||
ws <- asks $ xftpDelWorkers . xftpAgent
|
||||
getAgentWorker "xftp_del" hasWork c server ws $ runXFTPDelWorker c server
|
||||
|
||||
runXFTPDelWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> XFTPServer -> Worker -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPDelWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
|
||||
cfg <- asks config
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
void . atomically $ readTMVar doWork
|
||||
waitForWork doWork
|
||||
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
|
||||
runXFTPOperation
|
||||
runXFTPOperation cfg
|
||||
where
|
||||
noWorkToDo = void . atomically $ tryTakeTMVar doWork
|
||||
runXFTPOperation :: m ()
|
||||
runXFTPOperation = do
|
||||
runXFTPOperation :: AgentConfig -> m ()
|
||||
runXFTPOperation AgentConfig {rcvFilesTTL, reconnectInterval = ri, xftpNotifyErrsOnRetry = notifyOnRetry, xftpConsecutiveRetries} = do
|
||||
-- no point in deleting files older than rcv ttl, as they will be expired on server
|
||||
rcvFilesTTL <- asks (rcvFilesTTL . config)
|
||||
nextReplica <- withStore' c $ \db -> getNextDeletedSndChunkReplica db srv rcvFilesTTL
|
||||
case nextReplica of
|
||||
Nothing -> noWorkToDo
|
||||
Just replica@DeletedSndChunkReplica {deletedSndChunkReplicaId, userId, server, chunkDigest, delay} -> do
|
||||
ri <- asks $ reconnectInterval . config
|
||||
withWork c doWork (\db -> getNextDeletedSndChunkReplica db srv rcvFilesTTL) processDeletedReplica
|
||||
where
|
||||
processDeletedReplica replica@DeletedSndChunkReplica {deletedSndChunkReplicaId, userId, server, chunkDigest, delay} = do
|
||||
let ri' = maybe ri (\d -> ri {initialInterval = d, increaseAfter = 0}) delay
|
||||
withRetryInterval ri' $ \delay' loop ->
|
||||
deleteChunkReplica replica
|
||||
withRetryIntervalLimit xftpConsecutiveRetries ri' $ \delay' loop ->
|
||||
deleteChunkReplica
|
||||
`catchAgentError` \e -> retryOnError "XFTP del worker" (retryLoop loop e delay') (retryDone e) e
|
||||
where
|
||||
retryLoop loop e replicaDelay = do
|
||||
flip catchAgentError (\_ -> pure ()) $ do
|
||||
notifyOnRetry <- asks (xftpNotifyErrsOnRetry . config)
|
||||
when notifyOnRetry $ notify c "" $ SFERR e
|
||||
closeXFTPServerClient c userId server chunkDigest
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> updateDeletedSndChunkReplicaDelay db deletedSndChunkReplicaId replicaDelay
|
||||
atomically $ assertAgentForeground c
|
||||
loop
|
||||
retryDone e = delWorkerInternalError c deletedSndChunkReplicaId e
|
||||
deleteChunkReplica :: DeletedSndChunkReplica -> m ()
|
||||
deleteChunkReplica replica@DeletedSndChunkReplica {userId, deletedSndChunkReplicaId} = do
|
||||
agentXFTPDeleteChunk c userId replica
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> deleteDeletedSndChunkReplica db deletedSndChunkReplicaId
|
||||
retryDone = delWorkerInternalError c deletedSndChunkReplicaId
|
||||
deleteChunkReplica = do
|
||||
agentXFTPDeleteChunk c userId replica
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> deleteDeletedSndChunkReplica db deletedSndChunkReplicaId
|
||||
|
||||
delWorkerInternalError :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> Int64 -> AgentErrorType -> m ()
|
||||
delWorkerInternalError c deletedSndChunkReplicaId e = do
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
||||
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks where
|
||||
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word32)
|
||||
|
||||
serverChunkSizes :: [Word32]
|
||||
serverChunkSizes = [chunkSize0, chunkSize1, chunkSize2, chunkSize3]
|
||||
{-# INLINE serverChunkSizes #-}
|
||||
|
||||
chunkSize0 :: Word32
|
||||
chunkSize0 = kb 64
|
||||
{-# INLINE chunkSize0 #-}
|
||||
|
||||
chunkSize1 :: Word32
|
||||
chunkSize1 = kb 256
|
||||
{-# INLINE chunkSize1 #-}
|
||||
|
||||
chunkSize2 :: Word32
|
||||
chunkSize2 = mb 1
|
||||
{-# INLINE chunkSize2 #-}
|
||||
|
||||
chunkSize3 :: Word32
|
||||
chunkSize3 = mb 4
|
||||
{-# INLINE chunkSize3 #-}
|
||||
|
||||
kb :: Integral a => a -> a
|
||||
kb n = 1024 * n
|
||||
{-# INLINE kb #-}
|
||||
|
||||
mb :: Integral a => a -> a
|
||||
mb n = 1024 * kb n
|
||||
{-# INLINE mb #-}
|
||||
|
||||
gb :: Integral a => a -> a
|
||||
gb n = 1024 * mb n
|
||||
{-# INLINE gb #-}
|
||||
@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Builder (Builder, byteString)
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
@@ -43,10 +45,11 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
RecipientId,
|
||||
SenderId,
|
||||
)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (supportedParameters)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (THandleParams (..), supportedParameters)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportClientConfig, TransportHost)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Client
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, liftEitherError, whenM)
|
||||
import UnliftIO
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Directory
|
||||
@@ -54,6 +57,7 @@ import UnliftIO.Directory
|
||||
data XFTPClient = XFTPClient
|
||||
{ http2Client :: HTTP2Client,
|
||||
transportSession :: TransportSession FileResponse,
|
||||
thParams :: THandleParams,
|
||||
config :: XFTPClientConfig
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -95,7 +99,9 @@ getXFTPClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {xftpNetworkC
|
||||
let usePort = if null port then "443" else port
|
||||
clientDisconnected = readTVarIO clientVar >>= mapM_ disconnected
|
||||
http2Client <- liftEitherError xftpClientError $ getVerifiedHTTP2Client (Just username) useHost usePort (Just keyHash) Nothing http2Config clientDisconnected
|
||||
let c = XFTPClient {http2Client, transportSession, config}
|
||||
let HTTP2Client {sessionId} = http2Client
|
||||
thParams = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = currentXFTPVersion, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, batch = True}
|
||||
c = XFTPClient {http2Client, thParams, transportSession, config}
|
||||
atomically $ writeTVar clientVar $ Just c
|
||||
pure c
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -108,7 +114,7 @@ xftpClientServer = B.unpack . strEncode . snd3 . transportSession
|
||||
snd3 (_, s, _) = s
|
||||
|
||||
xftpTransportHost :: XFTPClient -> TransportHost
|
||||
xftpTransportHost = (host :: HClient -> TransportHost) . client_ . http2Client
|
||||
xftpTransportHost XFTPClient {http2Client = HTTP2Client {client_ = HClient {host}}} = host
|
||||
|
||||
xftpSessionTs :: XFTPClient -> UTCTime
|
||||
xftpSessionTs = sessionTs . http2Client
|
||||
@@ -128,37 +134,41 @@ xftpClientError = \case
|
||||
HCNetworkError -> PCENetworkError
|
||||
HCIOError e -> PCEIOError e
|
||||
|
||||
sendXFTPCommand :: forall p. FilePartyI p => XFTPClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> XFTPFileId -> FileCommand p -> Maybe XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (FileResponse, HTTP2Body)
|
||||
sendXFTPCommand XFTPClient {config, http2Client = http2@HTTP2Client {sessionId}} pKey fId cmd chunkSpec_ = do
|
||||
sendXFTPCommand :: forall p. FilePartyI p => XFTPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> XFTPFileId -> FileCommand p -> Maybe XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (FileResponse, HTTP2Body)
|
||||
sendXFTPCommand c@XFTPClient {thParams} pKey fId cmd chunkSpec_ = do
|
||||
t <-
|
||||
liftEither . first PCETransportError $
|
||||
xftpEncodeTransmission sessionId (Just pKey) ("", fId, FileCmd (sFileParty @p) cmd)
|
||||
let req = H.requestStreaming N.methodPost "/" [] $ streamBody t
|
||||
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams pKey ("", fId, FileCmd (sFileParty @p) cmd)
|
||||
sendXFTPTransmission c t chunkSpec_
|
||||
|
||||
sendXFTPTransmission :: XFTPClient -> ByteString -> Maybe XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (FileResponse, HTTP2Body)
|
||||
sendXFTPTransmission XFTPClient {config, thParams, http2Client} t chunkSpec_ = do
|
||||
let req = H.requestStreaming N.methodPost "/" [] streamBody
|
||||
reqTimeout = (\XFTPChunkSpec {chunkSize} -> chunkTimeout config chunkSize) <$> chunkSpec_
|
||||
HTTP2Response {respBody = body@HTTP2Body {bodyHead}} <- liftEitherError xftpClientError $ sendRequest http2 req reqTimeout
|
||||
HTTP2Response {respBody = body@HTTP2Body {bodyHead}} <- liftEitherError xftpClientError $ sendRequest http2Client req reqTimeout
|
||||
when (B.length bodyHead /= xftpBlockSize) $ throwError $ PCEResponseError BLOCK
|
||||
-- TODO validate that the file ID is the same as in the request?
|
||||
(_, _, (_, _fId, respOrErr)) <- liftEither . first PCEResponseError $ xftpDecodeTransmission sessionId bodyHead
|
||||
(_, _, (_, _fId, respOrErr)) <- liftEither . first PCEResponseError $ xftpDecodeTransmission thParams bodyHead
|
||||
case respOrErr of
|
||||
Right r -> case protocolError r of
|
||||
Just e -> throwError $ PCEProtocolError e
|
||||
_ -> pure (r, body)
|
||||
Left e -> throwError $ PCEResponseError e
|
||||
where
|
||||
streamBody :: ByteString -> (Builder -> IO ()) -> IO () -> IO ()
|
||||
streamBody t send done = do
|
||||
streamBody :: (Builder -> IO ()) -> IO () -> IO ()
|
||||
streamBody send done = do
|
||||
send $ byteString t
|
||||
forM_ chunkSpec_ $ \XFTPChunkSpec {filePath, chunkOffset, chunkSize} ->
|
||||
withFile filePath ReadMode $ \h -> do
|
||||
hSeek h AbsoluteSeek $ fromIntegral chunkOffset
|
||||
sendFile h send $ fromIntegral chunkSize
|
||||
hSendFile h send $ fromIntegral chunkSize
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
createXFTPChunk ::
|
||||
XFTPClient ->
|
||||
C.APrivateSignKey ->
|
||||
C.APrivateAuthKey ->
|
||||
FileInfo ->
|
||||
NonEmpty C.APublicVerifyKey ->
|
||||
NonEmpty C.APublicAuthKey ->
|
||||
Maybe BasicAuth ->
|
||||
ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (SenderId, NonEmpty RecipientId)
|
||||
createXFTPChunk c spKey file rcps auth_ =
|
||||
@@ -166,19 +176,19 @@ createXFTPChunk c spKey file rcps auth_ =
|
||||
(FRSndIds sId rIds, body) -> noFile body (sId, rIds)
|
||||
(r, _) -> throwError . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
|
||||
addXFTPRecipients :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> XFTPFileId -> NonEmpty C.APublicVerifyKey -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (NonEmpty RecipientId)
|
||||
addXFTPRecipients :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> XFTPFileId -> NonEmpty C.APublicAuthKey -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (NonEmpty RecipientId)
|
||||
addXFTPRecipients c spKey fId rcps =
|
||||
sendXFTPCommand c spKey fId (FADD rcps) Nothing >>= \case
|
||||
(FRRcvIds rIds, body) -> noFile body rIds
|
||||
(r, _) -> throwError . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
|
||||
uploadXFTPChunk :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> XFTPFileId -> XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
|
||||
uploadXFTPChunk :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> XFTPFileId -> XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
|
||||
uploadXFTPChunk c spKey fId chunkSpec =
|
||||
sendXFTPCommand c spKey fId FPUT (Just chunkSpec) >>= okResponse
|
||||
|
||||
downloadXFTPChunk :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> XFTPFileId -> XFTPRcvChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
|
||||
downloadXFTPChunk c@XFTPClient {config} rpKey fId chunkSpec@XFTPRcvChunkSpec {filePath, chunkSize} = do
|
||||
(rDhKey, rpDhKey) <- liftIO C.generateKeyPair'
|
||||
downloadXFTPChunk :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> XFTPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> XFTPFileId -> XFTPRcvChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
|
||||
downloadXFTPChunk g c@XFTPClient {config} rpKey fId chunkSpec@XFTPRcvChunkSpec {filePath, chunkSize} = do
|
||||
(rDhKey, rpDhKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
|
||||
sendXFTPCommand c rpKey fId (FGET rDhKey) Nothing >>= \case
|
||||
(FRFile sDhKey cbNonce, HTTP2Body {bodyHead = _bg, bodySize = _bs, bodyPart}) -> case bodyPart of
|
||||
-- TODO atm bodySize is set to 0, so chunkSize will be incorrect - validate once set
|
||||
@@ -198,12 +208,22 @@ downloadXFTPChunk c@XFTPClient {config} rpKey fId chunkSpec@XFTPRcvChunkSpec {fi
|
||||
chunkTimeout :: XFTPClientConfig -> Word32 -> Int
|
||||
chunkTimeout config chunkSize = fromIntegral $ (fromIntegral chunkSize * uploadTimeoutPerMb config) `div` mb 1
|
||||
|
||||
deleteXFTPChunk :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> SenderId -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
|
||||
deleteXFTPChunk :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> SenderId -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
|
||||
deleteXFTPChunk c spKey sId = sendXFTPCommand c spKey sId FDEL Nothing >>= okResponse
|
||||
|
||||
ackXFTPChunk :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> RecipientId -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
|
||||
ackXFTPChunk :: XFTPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> RecipientId -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
|
||||
ackXFTPChunk c rpKey rId = sendXFTPCommand c rpKey rId FACK Nothing >>= okResponse
|
||||
|
||||
pingXFTP :: XFTPClient -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
|
||||
pingXFTP c@XFTPClient {thParams} = do
|
||||
t <-
|
||||
liftEither . first PCETransportError $
|
||||
xftpEncodeTransmission thParams ("", "", FileCmd SFRecipient PING)
|
||||
(r, _) <- sendXFTPTransmission c t Nothing
|
||||
case r of
|
||||
FRPong -> pure ()
|
||||
_ -> throwError $ PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
|
||||
okResponse :: (FileResponse, HTTP2Body) -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
|
||||
okResponse = \case
|
||||
(FROk, body) -> noFile body ()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
|
||||
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Agent where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Logger.Simple (logInfo)
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +22,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtocolServer (..), XFTPServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (catchAll_, tryError)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (catchAll_)
|
||||
import UnliftIO
|
||||
|
||||
type XFTPClientVar = TMVar (Either XFTPClientAgentError XFTPClient)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
|
||||
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-ambiguous-fields #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Main
|
||||
( SendOptions (..),
|
||||
@@ -17,9 +18,6 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Main
|
||||
cliSendFileOpts,
|
||||
prepareChunkSizes,
|
||||
prepareChunkSpecs,
|
||||
chunkSize1,
|
||||
chunkSize2,
|
||||
chunkSize3,
|
||||
maxFileSize,
|
||||
fileSizeLen,
|
||||
getChunkDigest,
|
||||
@@ -27,11 +25,10 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Main
|
||||
)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent.STM (stateTVar)
|
||||
import Control.Logger.Simple
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (getRandomBytes)
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
@@ -49,6 +46,7 @@ import qualified Data.Text as T
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word32)
|
||||
import GHC.Records (HasField (getField))
|
||||
import Options.Applicative
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Agent
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client.Presets
|
||||
@@ -59,11 +57,13 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPRcvChunkSpec (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Types
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Util (uniqueCombine)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File (CryptoFile (..), FTCryptoError (..))
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File as CF
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String (StrEncoding (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parseAll)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtoServerWithAuth (..), SenderId, SndPrivateSignKey, XFTPServer, XFTPServerWithAuth)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtoServerWithAuth (..), SenderId, SndPrivateAuthKey, XFTPServer, XFTPServerWithAuth)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI (getCliCommand')
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (groupAllOn, ifM, tshow, whenM)
|
||||
import System.Exit (exitFailure)
|
||||
@@ -76,15 +76,6 @@ import UnliftIO.Directory
|
||||
xftpClientVersion :: String
|
||||
xftpClientVersion = "1.0.1"
|
||||
|
||||
chunkSize1 :: Word32
|
||||
chunkSize1 = kb 256
|
||||
|
||||
chunkSize2 :: Word32
|
||||
chunkSize2 = mb 1
|
||||
|
||||
chunkSize3 :: Word32
|
||||
chunkSize3 = mb 4
|
||||
|
||||
maxFileSize :: Int64
|
||||
maxFileSize = gb 1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -102,6 +93,7 @@ cliCryptoError = \case
|
||||
FTCECryptoError e -> CLIError $ "Error decrypting file: " <> show e
|
||||
FTCEInvalidHeader e -> CLIError $ "Invalid file header: " <> e
|
||||
FTCEInvalidAuthTag -> CLIError "Error decrypting file: incorrect auth tag"
|
||||
FTCEInvalidFileSize -> CLIError "Error decrypting file: incorrect file size"
|
||||
FTCEFileIOError e -> CLIError $ "File IO error: " <> show e
|
||||
|
||||
data CliCommand
|
||||
@@ -217,7 +209,7 @@ cliCommandP =
|
||||
data SentFileChunk = SentFileChunk
|
||||
{ chunkNo :: Int,
|
||||
sndId :: SenderId,
|
||||
sndPrivateKey :: SndPrivateSignKey,
|
||||
sndPrivateKey :: SndPrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
chunkSize :: FileSize Word32,
|
||||
digest :: FileDigest,
|
||||
replicas :: [SentFileChunkReplica]
|
||||
@@ -226,7 +218,7 @@ data SentFileChunk = SentFileChunk
|
||||
|
||||
data SentFileChunkReplica = SentFileChunkReplica
|
||||
{ server :: XFTPServer,
|
||||
recipients :: [(ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateSignKey)]
|
||||
recipients :: [(ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateAuthKey)]
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -235,7 +227,7 @@ data SentRecipientReplica = SentRecipientReplica
|
||||
server :: XFTPServer,
|
||||
rcvNo :: Int,
|
||||
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
|
||||
replicaKey :: C.APrivateSignKey,
|
||||
replicaKey :: C.APrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
digest :: FileDigest,
|
||||
chunkSize :: FileSize Word32
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -272,10 +264,11 @@ cliSendFileOpts :: SendOptions -> Bool -> (Int64 -> Int64 -> IO ()) -> ExceptT C
|
||||
cliSendFileOpts SendOptions {filePath, outputDir, numRecipients, xftpServers, retryCount, tempPath, verbose} printInfo notifyProgress = do
|
||||
let (_, fileName) = splitFileName filePath
|
||||
liftIO $ when printInfo $ printNoNewLine "Encrypting file..."
|
||||
(encPath, fdRcv, fdSnd, chunkSpecs, encSize) <- encryptFileForUpload fileName
|
||||
g <- liftIO C.newRandom
|
||||
(encPath, fdRcv, fdSnd, chunkSpecs, encSize) <- encryptFileForUpload g fileName
|
||||
liftIO $ when printInfo $ printNoNewLine "Uploading file..."
|
||||
uploadedChunks <- newTVarIO []
|
||||
sentChunks <- uploadFile chunkSpecs uploadedChunks encSize
|
||||
sentChunks <- uploadFile g chunkSpecs uploadedChunks encSize
|
||||
whenM (doesFileExist encPath) $ removeFile encPath
|
||||
-- TODO if only small chunks, use different default size
|
||||
liftIO $ do
|
||||
@@ -288,28 +281,29 @@ cliSendFileOpts SendOptions {filePath, outputDir, numRecipients, xftpServers, re
|
||||
putStrLn "Pass file descriptions to the recipient(s):"
|
||||
forM_ fdRcvPaths putStrLn
|
||||
where
|
||||
encryptFileForUpload :: String -> ExceptT CLIError IO (FilePath, FileDescription 'FRecipient, FileDescription 'FSender, [XFTPChunkSpec], Int64)
|
||||
encryptFileForUpload fileName = do
|
||||
encryptFileForUpload :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> String -> ExceptT CLIError IO (FilePath, FileDescription 'FRecipient, FileDescription 'FSender, [XFTPChunkSpec], Int64)
|
||||
encryptFileForUpload g fileName = do
|
||||
fileSize <- fromInteger <$> getFileSize filePath
|
||||
when (fileSize > maxFileSize) $ throwError $ CLIError $ "Files bigger than " <> maxFileSizeStr <> " are not supported"
|
||||
encPath <- getEncPath tempPath "xftp"
|
||||
key <- liftIO C.randomSbKey
|
||||
nonce <- liftIO C.randomCbNonce
|
||||
key <- atomically $ C.randomSbKey g
|
||||
nonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
|
||||
let fileHdr = smpEncode FileHeader {fileName, fileExtra = Nothing}
|
||||
fileSize' = fromIntegral (B.length fileHdr) + fileSize
|
||||
chunkSizes = prepareChunkSizes $ fileSize' + fileSizeLen + authTagSize
|
||||
defChunkSize = head chunkSizes
|
||||
chunkSizes' = map fromIntegral chunkSizes
|
||||
encSize = sum chunkSizes'
|
||||
withExceptT (CLIError . show) $ encryptFile filePath fileHdr key nonce fileSize' encSize encPath
|
||||
srcFile = CF.plain filePath
|
||||
withExceptT (CLIError . show) $ encryptFile srcFile fileHdr key nonce fileSize' encSize encPath
|
||||
digest <- liftIO $ LC.sha512Hash <$> LB.readFile encPath
|
||||
let chunkSpecs = prepareChunkSpecs encPath chunkSizes
|
||||
fdRcv = FileDescription {party = SFRecipient, size = FileSize encSize, digest = FileDigest digest, key, nonce, chunkSize = FileSize defChunkSize, chunks = []}
|
||||
fdSnd = FileDescription {party = SFSender, size = FileSize encSize, digest = FileDigest digest, key, nonce, chunkSize = FileSize defChunkSize, chunks = []}
|
||||
fdRcv = FileDescription {party = SFRecipient, size = FileSize encSize, digest = FileDigest digest, key, nonce, chunkSize = FileSize defChunkSize, chunks = [], redirect = Nothing}
|
||||
fdSnd = FileDescription {party = SFSender, size = FileSize encSize, digest = FileDigest digest, key, nonce, chunkSize = FileSize defChunkSize, chunks = [], redirect = Nothing}
|
||||
logInfo $ "encrypted file to " <> tshow encPath
|
||||
pure (encPath, fdRcv, fdSnd, chunkSpecs, encSize)
|
||||
uploadFile :: [XFTPChunkSpec] -> TVar [Int64] -> Int64 -> ExceptT CLIError IO [SentFileChunk]
|
||||
uploadFile chunks uploadedChunks encSize = do
|
||||
uploadFile :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> [XFTPChunkSpec] -> TVar [Int64] -> Int64 -> ExceptT CLIError IO [SentFileChunk]
|
||||
uploadFile g chunks uploadedChunks encSize = do
|
||||
a <- atomically $ newXFTPAgent defaultXFTPClientAgentConfig
|
||||
gen <- newTVarIO =<< liftIO newStdGen
|
||||
let xftpSrvs = fromMaybe defaultXFTPServers (nonEmpty xftpServers)
|
||||
@@ -325,8 +319,8 @@ cliSendFileOpts SendOptions {filePath, outputDir, numRecipients, xftpServers, re
|
||||
uploadFileChunk :: XFTPClientAgent -> (Int, XFTPChunkSpec, XFTPServerWithAuth) -> ExceptT CLIError IO (Int, SentFileChunk)
|
||||
uploadFileChunk a (chunkNo, chunkSpec@XFTPChunkSpec {chunkSize}, ProtoServerWithAuth xftpServer auth) = do
|
||||
logInfo $ "uploading chunk " <> tshow chunkNo <> " to " <> showServer xftpServer <> "..."
|
||||
(sndKey, spKey) <- liftIO $ C.generateSignatureKeyPair C.SEd25519
|
||||
rKeys <- liftIO $ L.fromList <$> replicateM numRecipients (C.generateSignatureKeyPair C.SEd25519)
|
||||
(sndKey, spKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g
|
||||
rKeys <- atomically $ L.fromList <$> replicateM numRecipients (C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd25519 g)
|
||||
digest <- liftIO $ getChunkDigest chunkSpec
|
||||
let ch = FileInfo {sndKey, size = fromIntegral chunkSize, digest}
|
||||
c <- withRetry retryCount $ getXFTPServerClient a xftpServer
|
||||
@@ -367,7 +361,7 @@ cliSendFileOpts SendOptions {filePath, outputDir, numRecipients, xftpServers, re
|
||||
rcvChunks :: [[FileChunk]]
|
||||
rcvChunks = map (sortChunks . M.elems) $ M.elems $ foldl' addRcvChunk M.empty rcvReplicas
|
||||
sortChunks :: [FileChunk] -> [FileChunk]
|
||||
sortChunks = map reverseReplicas . sortOn (chunkNo :: FileChunk -> Int)
|
||||
sortChunks = map reverseReplicas . sortOn (\FileChunk {chunkNo} -> chunkNo)
|
||||
reverseReplicas ch@FileChunk {replicas} = (ch :: FileChunk) {replicas = reverse replicas}
|
||||
addRcvChunk :: Map Int (Map Int FileChunk) -> SentRecipientReplica -> Map Int (Map Int FileChunk)
|
||||
addRcvChunk m SentRecipientReplica {chunkNo, server, rcvNo, replicaId, replicaKey, digest, chunkSize} =
|
||||
@@ -394,7 +388,7 @@ cliSendFileOpts SendOptions {filePath, outputDir, numRecipients, xftpServers, re
|
||||
sentChunks
|
||||
-- SentFileChunk having sndId and sndPrivateKey represents the current implementation's limitation
|
||||
-- that sender uploads each chunk only to one server, so we can use the first replica's server for FileChunkReplica
|
||||
sndReplicas :: [SentFileChunkReplica] -> ChunkReplicaId -> C.APrivateSignKey -> [FileChunkReplica]
|
||||
sndReplicas :: [SentFileChunkReplica] -> ChunkReplicaId -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> [FileChunkReplica]
|
||||
sndReplicas [] _ _ = []
|
||||
sndReplicas (SentFileChunkReplica {server} : _) replicaId replicaKey = [FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey}]
|
||||
writeFileDescriptions :: String -> [FileDescription 'FRecipient] -> FileDescription 'FSender -> IO ([FilePath], FilePath)
|
||||
@@ -417,36 +411,39 @@ getChunkDigest XFTPChunkSpec {filePath = chunkPath, chunkOffset, chunkSize} =
|
||||
|
||||
cliReceiveFile :: ReceiveOptions -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
|
||||
cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath, verbose, yes} =
|
||||
getFileDescription' fileDescription >>= receiveFile
|
||||
getFileDescription' fileDescription >>= receive
|
||||
where
|
||||
receiveFile :: ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
|
||||
receiveFile (ValidFileDescription FileDescription {size, digest, key, nonce, chunks}) = do
|
||||
receive :: ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> ExceptT CLIError IO ()
|
||||
receive (ValidFileDescription FileDescription {size, digest, key, nonce, chunks}) = do
|
||||
encPath <- getEncPath tempPath "xftp"
|
||||
createDirectory encPath
|
||||
a <- atomically $ newXFTPAgent defaultXFTPClientAgentConfig
|
||||
liftIO $ printNoNewLine "Downloading file..."
|
||||
downloadedChunks <- newTVarIO []
|
||||
let srv FileChunk {replicas} = server (head replicas :: FileChunkReplica)
|
||||
let srv FileChunk {replicas} = case replicas of
|
||||
[] -> error "empty FileChunk.replicas"
|
||||
FileChunkReplica {server} : _ -> server
|
||||
srvChunks = groupAllOn srv chunks
|
||||
chunkPaths <- map snd . sortOn fst . concat <$> pooledForConcurrentlyN 16 srvChunks (mapM $ downloadFileChunk a encPath size downloadedChunks)
|
||||
g <- liftIO C.newRandom
|
||||
chunkPaths <- map snd . sortOn fst . concat <$> pooledForConcurrentlyN 16 srvChunks (mapM $ downloadFileChunk g a encPath size downloadedChunks)
|
||||
encDigest <- liftIO $ LC.sha512Hash <$> readChunks chunkPaths
|
||||
when (encDigest /= unFileDigest digest) $ throwError $ CLIError "File digest mismatch"
|
||||
encSize <- liftIO $ foldM (\s path -> (s +) . fromIntegral <$> getFileSize path) 0 chunkPaths
|
||||
when (FileSize encSize /= size) $ throwError $ CLIError "File size mismatch"
|
||||
liftIO $ printNoNewLine "Decrypting file..."
|
||||
path <- withExceptT cliCryptoError $ decryptChunks encSize chunkPaths key nonce getFilePath
|
||||
CryptoFile path _ <- withExceptT cliCryptoError $ decryptChunks encSize chunkPaths key nonce $ fmap CF.plain . getFilePath
|
||||
forM_ chunks $ acknowledgeFileChunk a
|
||||
whenM (doesPathExist encPath) $ removeDirectoryRecursive encPath
|
||||
liftIO $ do
|
||||
printNoNewLine $ "File downloaded: " <> path
|
||||
removeFD yes fileDescription
|
||||
downloadFileChunk :: XFTPClientAgent -> FilePath -> FileSize Int64 -> TVar [Int64] -> FileChunk -> ExceptT CLIError IO (Int, FilePath)
|
||||
downloadFileChunk a encPath (FileSize encSize) downloadedChunks FileChunk {chunkNo, chunkSize, digest, replicas = replica : _} = do
|
||||
downloadFileChunk :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> XFTPClientAgent -> FilePath -> FileSize Int64 -> TVar [Int64] -> FileChunk -> ExceptT CLIError IO (Int, FilePath)
|
||||
downloadFileChunk g a encPath (FileSize encSize) downloadedChunks FileChunk {chunkNo, chunkSize, digest, replicas = replica : _} = do
|
||||
let FileChunkReplica {server, replicaId, replicaKey} = replica
|
||||
logInfo $ "downloading chunk " <> tshow chunkNo <> " from " <> showServer server <> "..."
|
||||
chunkPath <- uniqueCombine encPath $ show chunkNo
|
||||
let chunkSpec = XFTPRcvChunkSpec chunkPath (unFileSize chunkSize) (unFileDigest digest)
|
||||
withReconnect a server retryCount $ \c -> downloadXFTPChunk c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId) chunkSpec
|
||||
withReconnect a server retryCount $ \c -> downloadXFTPChunk g c replicaKey (unChunkReplicaId replicaId) chunkSpec
|
||||
logInfo $ "downloaded chunk " <> tshow chunkNo <> " to " <> T.pack chunkPath
|
||||
downloaded <- atomically . stateTVar downloadedChunks $ \cs ->
|
||||
let cs' = fromIntegral (unFileSize chunkSize) : cs in (sum cs', cs')
|
||||
@@ -454,7 +451,7 @@ cliReceiveFile ReceiveOptions {fileDescription, filePath, retryCount, tempPath,
|
||||
printProgress "Downloaded" downloaded encSize
|
||||
when verbose $ putStrLn ""
|
||||
pure (chunkNo, chunkPath)
|
||||
downloadFileChunk _ _ _ _ _ = throwError $ CLIError "chunk has no replicas"
|
||||
downloadFileChunk _ _ _ _ _ _ = throwError $ CLIError "chunk has no replicas"
|
||||
getFilePath :: String -> ExceptT String IO FilePath
|
||||
getFilePath name =
|
||||
case filePath of
|
||||
@@ -504,10 +501,9 @@ cliFileDescrInfo InfoOptions {fileDescription} = do
|
||||
printParty
|
||||
putStrLn $ "File download size: " <> strEnc size
|
||||
putStrLn "File server(s):"
|
||||
forM_ replicas $ \srvReplicas -> do
|
||||
let srv = replicaServer $ head srvReplicas
|
||||
chSizes = map (\FileServerReplica {chunkSize = chSize_} -> unFileSize $ fromMaybe chunkSize chSize_) srvReplicas
|
||||
putStrLn $ strEnc srv <> ": " <> strEnc (FileSize $ sum chSizes)
|
||||
forM_ replicas $ \srvReplicas@(FileServerReplica {server} :| _) -> do
|
||||
let chSizes = fmap (\FileServerReplica {chunkSize = chSize_} -> unFileSize $ fromMaybe chunkSize chSize_) srvReplicas
|
||||
putStrLn $ strEnc server <> ": " <> strEnc (FileSize $ sum chSizes)
|
||||
where
|
||||
printParty :: IO ()
|
||||
printParty = case party of
|
||||
@@ -529,7 +525,10 @@ getFileDescription' path =
|
||||
prepareChunkSizes :: Int64 -> [Word32]
|
||||
prepareChunkSizes size' = prepareSizes size'
|
||||
where
|
||||
(smallSize, bigSize) = if size' > size34 chunkSize3 then (chunkSize2, chunkSize3) else (chunkSize1, chunkSize2)
|
||||
(smallSize, bigSize)
|
||||
| size' > size34 chunkSize3 = (chunkSize2, chunkSize3)
|
||||
| size' > size34 chunkSize2 = (chunkSize1, chunkSize2)
|
||||
| otherwise = (chunkSize0, chunkSize1)
|
||||
size34 sz = (fromIntegral sz * 3) `div` 4
|
||||
prepareSizes 0 = []
|
||||
prepareSizes size
|
||||
@@ -572,11 +571,11 @@ withRetry retryCount = withRetry' retryCount . withExceptT (CLIError . show)
|
||||
removeFD :: Bool -> FilePath -> IO ()
|
||||
removeFD yes fd
|
||||
| yes = do
|
||||
removeFile fd
|
||||
putStrLn $ "\nFile description " <> fd <> " is deleted."
|
||||
removeFile fd
|
||||
putStrLn $ "\nFile description " <> fd <> " is deleted."
|
||||
| otherwise = do
|
||||
y <- liftIO . getConfirmation $ "\nFile description " <> fd <> " can't be used again. Delete it"
|
||||
when y $ removeFile fd
|
||||
y <- liftIO . getConfirmation $ "\nFile description " <> fd <> " can't be used again. Delete it"
|
||||
when y $ removeFile fd
|
||||
|
||||
getConfirmation :: String -> IO Bool
|
||||
getConfirmation prompt = do
|
||||
@@ -595,7 +594,8 @@ cliRandomFile RandomFileOptions {filePath, fileSize = FileSize size} = do
|
||||
putStrLn $ "File created: " <> filePath
|
||||
where
|
||||
saveRandomFile h sz = do
|
||||
bytes <- getRandomBytes $ fromIntegral $ min mb' sz
|
||||
g <- C.newRandom
|
||||
bytes <- atomically $ C.randomBytes (fromIntegral $ min mb' sz) g
|
||||
B.hPut h bytes
|
||||
when (sz > mb') $ saveRandomFile h (sz - mb')
|
||||
mb' = mb 1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Crypto where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
|
||||
@@ -16,6 +17,8 @@ import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
|
||||
import Data.Int (Int64)
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Types (FileHeader (..), authTagSize)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File (CryptoFile (..), FTCryptoError (..))
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File as CF
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy (LazyByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
@@ -23,54 +26,55 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Util (liftEitherWith)
|
||||
import UnliftIO
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Directory (removeFile)
|
||||
|
||||
encryptFile :: FilePath -> ByteString -> C.SbKey -> C.CbNonce -> Int64 -> Int64 -> FilePath -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO ()
|
||||
encryptFile filePath fileHdr key nonce fileSize' encSize encFile = do
|
||||
encryptFile :: CryptoFile -> ByteString -> C.SbKey -> C.CbNonce -> Int64 -> Int64 -> FilePath -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO ()
|
||||
encryptFile srcFile fileHdr key nonce fileSize' encSize encFile = do
|
||||
sb <- liftEitherWith FTCECryptoError $ LC.sbInit key nonce
|
||||
withFile filePath ReadMode $ \r -> withFile encFile WriteMode $ \w -> do
|
||||
CF.withFile srcFile ReadMode $ \r -> withFile encFile WriteMode $ \w -> do
|
||||
let lenStr = smpEncode fileSize'
|
||||
(hdr, !sb') = LC.sbEncryptChunk sb $ lenStr <> fileHdr
|
||||
padLen = encSize - authTagSize - fileSize' - 8
|
||||
liftIO $ B.hPut w hdr
|
||||
sb2 <- encryptChunks r w (sb', fileSize' - fromIntegral (B.length fileHdr))
|
||||
CF.hGetTag r
|
||||
sb3 <- encryptPad w (sb2, padLen)
|
||||
let tag = BA.convert $ LC.sbAuth sb3
|
||||
liftIO $ B.hPut w tag
|
||||
where
|
||||
encryptChunks r = encryptChunks_ $ liftIO . B.hGet r . fromIntegral
|
||||
encryptChunks r = encryptChunks_ $ liftIO . CF.hGet r . fromIntegral
|
||||
encryptPad = encryptChunks_ $ \sz -> pure $ B.replicate (fromIntegral sz) '#'
|
||||
encryptChunks_ :: (Int64 -> IO ByteString) -> Handle -> (LC.SbState, Int64) -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO LC.SbState
|
||||
encryptChunks_ get w (!sb, !len)
|
||||
| len == 0 = pure sb
|
||||
| otherwise = do
|
||||
let chSize = min len 65536
|
||||
ch <- liftIO $ get chSize
|
||||
when (B.length ch /= fromIntegral chSize) $ throwError $ FTCEFileIOError "encrypting file: unexpected EOF"
|
||||
let (ch', sb') = LC.sbEncryptChunk sb ch
|
||||
liftIO $ B.hPut w ch'
|
||||
encryptChunks_ get w (sb', len - chSize)
|
||||
let chSize = min len 65536
|
||||
ch <- liftIO $ get chSize
|
||||
when (B.length ch /= fromIntegral chSize) $ throwError $ FTCEFileIOError "encrypting file: unexpected EOF"
|
||||
let (ch', sb') = LC.sbEncryptChunk sb ch
|
||||
liftIO $ B.hPut w ch'
|
||||
encryptChunks_ get w (sb', len - chSize)
|
||||
|
||||
decryptChunks :: Int64 -> [FilePath] -> C.SbKey -> C.CbNonce -> (String -> ExceptT String IO String) -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO FilePath
|
||||
decryptChunks :: Int64 -> [FilePath] -> C.SbKey -> C.CbNonce -> (String -> ExceptT String IO CryptoFile) -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO CryptoFile
|
||||
decryptChunks _ [] _ _ _ = throwError $ FTCEInvalidHeader "empty"
|
||||
decryptChunks encSize (chPath : chPaths) key nonce getFilePath = case reverse chPaths of
|
||||
decryptChunks encSize (chPath : chPaths) key nonce getDestFile = case reverse chPaths of
|
||||
[] -> do
|
||||
(!authOk, !f) <- liftEither . first FTCECryptoError . LC.sbDecryptTailTag key nonce (encSize - authTagSize) =<< liftIO (LB.readFile chPath)
|
||||
unless authOk $ throwError FTCEInvalidAuthTag
|
||||
(FileHeader {fileName}, !f') <- parseFileHeader f
|
||||
path <- withExceptT FTCEFileIOError $ getFilePath fileName
|
||||
liftIO $ LB.writeFile path f'
|
||||
pure path
|
||||
destFile <- withExceptT FTCEFileIOError $ getDestFile fileName
|
||||
CF.writeFile destFile f'
|
||||
pure destFile
|
||||
lastPath : chPaths' -> do
|
||||
(state, expectedLen, ch) <- decryptFirstChunk
|
||||
(FileHeader {fileName}, ch') <- parseFileHeader ch
|
||||
path <- withExceptT FTCEFileIOError $ getFilePath fileName
|
||||
authOk <- liftIO . withFile path WriteMode $ \h -> do
|
||||
liftIO $ LB.hPut h ch'
|
||||
destFile@(CryptoFile path _) <- withExceptT FTCEFileIOError $ getDestFile fileName
|
||||
authOk <- CF.withFile destFile WriteMode $ \h -> liftIO $ do
|
||||
CF.hPut h ch'
|
||||
state' <- foldM (decryptChunk h) state $ reverse chPaths'
|
||||
decryptLastChunk h state' expectedLen
|
||||
unless authOk $ do
|
||||
removeFile path
|
||||
throwError FTCEInvalidAuthTag
|
||||
pure path
|
||||
pure destFile
|
||||
where
|
||||
decryptFirstChunk = do
|
||||
sb <- liftEitherWith FTCECryptoError $ LC.sbInit key nonce
|
||||
@@ -83,7 +87,7 @@ decryptChunks encSize (chPath : chPaths) key nonce getFilePath = case reverse ch
|
||||
ch <- LB.readFile chPth
|
||||
let len' = len + LB.length ch
|
||||
(ch', sb') = LC.sbDecryptChunkLazy sb ch
|
||||
LB.hPut h ch'
|
||||
CF.hPut h ch'
|
||||
pure (sb', len')
|
||||
decryptLastChunk h (!sb, !len) expectedLen = do
|
||||
ch <- LB.readFile lastPath
|
||||
@@ -93,7 +97,8 @@ decryptChunks encSize (chPath : chPaths) key nonce getFilePath = case reverse ch
|
||||
len' = len + LB.length ch2
|
||||
ch3 = LB.take (LB.length ch2 - len' + expectedLen) ch2
|
||||
tag :: ByteString = BA.convert (LC.sbAuth sb')
|
||||
LB.hPut h ch3
|
||||
CF.hPut h ch3
|
||||
CF.hPutTag h
|
||||
pure $ B.length tag'' == 16 && BA.constEq tag'' tag
|
||||
where
|
||||
parseFileHeader :: LazyByteString -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO (FileHeader, LazyByteString)
|
||||
@@ -106,10 +111,3 @@ decryptChunks encSize (chPath : chPaths) key nonce getFilePath = case reverse ch
|
||||
|
||||
readChunks :: [FilePath] -> IO LB.ByteString
|
||||
readChunks = foldM (\s path -> (s <>) <$> LB.readFile path) ""
|
||||
|
||||
data FTCryptoError
|
||||
= FTCECryptoError C.CryptoError
|
||||
| FTCEInvalidHeader String
|
||||
| FTCEInvalidAuthTag
|
||||
| FTCEFileIOError String
|
||||
deriving (Show, Eq, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveGeneric #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
|
||||
@@ -8,9 +7,12 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
|
||||
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-ambiguous-fields #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
|
||||
( FileDescription (..),
|
||||
RedirectFileInfo (..),
|
||||
AFileDescription (..),
|
||||
ValidFileDescription, -- constructor is not exported, use pattern
|
||||
pattern ValidFileDescription,
|
||||
@@ -25,11 +27,14 @@ module Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
|
||||
YAMLServerReplicas (..), -- for tests
|
||||
validateFileDescription,
|
||||
groupReplicasByServer,
|
||||
replicaServer,
|
||||
fdSeparator,
|
||||
kb,
|
||||
mb,
|
||||
gb,
|
||||
FileDescriptionURI (..),
|
||||
FileClientData,
|
||||
fileDescriptionURI,
|
||||
qrSizeLimit,
|
||||
)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +42,7 @@ import Control.Applicative (optional)
|
||||
import Control.Monad ((<=<))
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON, ToJSON)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
|
||||
import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 (Parser)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
|
||||
@@ -44,21 +50,27 @@ import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import Data.Int (Int64)
|
||||
import Data.List (foldl', sortOn)
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
|
||||
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
|
||||
import Data.Map (Map)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Map as M
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
|
||||
import Data.String
|
||||
import Data.Text (Text)
|
||||
import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word32)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Yaml as Y
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.FromField (FromField (..))
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.ToField (ToField (..))
|
||||
import GHC.Generics (Generic)
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.QueryString
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parseAll)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON, parseAll)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (XFTPServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, groupAllOn, (<$?>))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.ServiceScheme (ServiceScheme (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, safeDecodeUtf8, (<$?>))
|
||||
|
||||
data FileDescription (p :: FileParty) = FileDescription
|
||||
{ party :: SFileParty p,
|
||||
@@ -67,7 +79,14 @@ data FileDescription (p :: FileParty) = FileDescription
|
||||
key :: C.SbKey,
|
||||
nonce :: C.CbNonce,
|
||||
chunkSize :: FileSize Word32,
|
||||
chunks :: [FileChunk]
|
||||
chunks :: [FileChunk],
|
||||
redirect :: Maybe RedirectFileInfo
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data RedirectFileInfo = RedirectFileInfo
|
||||
{ size :: FileSize Int64,
|
||||
digest :: FileDigest
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -116,7 +135,7 @@ data FileChunk = FileChunk
|
||||
data FileChunkReplica = FileChunkReplica
|
||||
{ server :: XFTPServer,
|
||||
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
|
||||
replicaKey :: C.APrivateSignKey
|
||||
replicaKey :: C.APrivateAuthKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -145,34 +164,42 @@ data YAMLFileDescription = YAMLFileDescription
|
||||
key :: C.SbKey,
|
||||
nonce :: C.CbNonce,
|
||||
chunkSize :: String,
|
||||
replicas :: [YAMLServerReplicas]
|
||||
replicas :: [YAMLServerReplicas],
|
||||
redirect :: Maybe RedirectFileInfo
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic, FromJSON)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON YAMLFileDescription where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON J.defaultOptions
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding J.defaultOptions
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data YAMLServerReplicas = YAMLServerReplicas
|
||||
{ server :: XFTPServer,
|
||||
chunks :: [String]
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic, FromJSON)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON YAMLServerReplicas where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON J.defaultOptions
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding J.defaultOptions
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data FileServerReplica = FileServerReplica
|
||||
{ chunkNo :: Int,
|
||||
server :: XFTPServer,
|
||||
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
|
||||
replicaKey :: C.APrivateSignKey,
|
||||
replicaKey :: C.APrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
digest :: Maybe FileDigest,
|
||||
chunkSize :: Maybe (FileSize Word32)
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
newtype FileSize a = FileSize {unFileSize :: a}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON a => FromJSON (FileSize a) where
|
||||
parseJSON v = FileSize <$> Y.parseJSON v
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON a => ToJSON (FileSize a) where
|
||||
toJSON = Y.toJSON . unFileSize
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''YAMLServerReplicas)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''RedirectFileInfo)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''YAMLFileDescription)
|
||||
|
||||
instance FilePartyI p => StrEncoding (ValidFileDescription p) where
|
||||
strEncode (ValidFD fd) = strEncode fd
|
||||
strDecode s = strDecode s >>= (\(AVFD fd) -> checkParty fd)
|
||||
@@ -199,11 +226,11 @@ validateFileDescription fd@FileDescription {size, chunks}
|
||||
| chunksSize chunks /= unFileSize size = Left "chunks total size is different than file size"
|
||||
| otherwise = Right $ ValidFD fd
|
||||
where
|
||||
chunkNos = map (chunkNo :: FileChunk -> Int) chunks
|
||||
chunkNos = map (\FileChunk {chunkNo} -> chunkNo) chunks
|
||||
chunksSize = fromIntegral . foldl' (\s FileChunk {chunkSize} -> s + unFileSize chunkSize) 0
|
||||
|
||||
encodeFileDescription :: FileDescription p -> YAMLFileDescription
|
||||
encodeFileDescription FileDescription {party, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, chunks} =
|
||||
encodeFileDescription FileDescription {party, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, chunks, redirect} =
|
||||
YAMLFileDescription
|
||||
{ party = toFileParty party,
|
||||
size = B.unpack $ strEncode size,
|
||||
@@ -211,12 +238,39 @@ encodeFileDescription FileDescription {party, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSiz
|
||||
key,
|
||||
nonce,
|
||||
chunkSize = B.unpack $ strEncode chunkSize,
|
||||
replicas = encodeFileReplicas chunkSize chunks
|
||||
replicas = encodeFileReplicas chunkSize chunks,
|
||||
redirect
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
newtype FileSize a = FileSize {unFileSize :: a}
|
||||
data FileDescriptionURI = FileDescriptionURI
|
||||
{ scheme :: ServiceScheme,
|
||||
description :: ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient,
|
||||
clientData :: Maybe FileClientData -- JSON-encoded extensions to pass in a link
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
type FileClientData = Text
|
||||
|
||||
fileDescriptionURI :: ValidFileDescription 'FRecipient -> FileDescriptionURI
|
||||
fileDescriptionURI vfd = FileDescriptionURI SSSimplex vfd mempty
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding FileDescriptionURI where
|
||||
strEncode FileDescriptionURI {scheme, description, clientData} = mconcat [strEncode scheme, "/file", "#/?", queryStr]
|
||||
where
|
||||
queryStr = strEncode $ QSP QEscape qs
|
||||
qs = ("desc", strEncode description) : maybe [] (\cd -> [("data", encodeUtf8 cd)]) clientData
|
||||
strP = do
|
||||
scheme <- strP
|
||||
_ <- "/file" <* optional (A.char '/') <* "#/?"
|
||||
query <- strP
|
||||
description <- queryParam "desc" query
|
||||
let clientData = safeDecodeUtf8 <$> queryParamStr "data" query
|
||||
pure FileDescriptionURI {scheme, description, clientData}
|
||||
|
||||
-- | URL length in QR code before jumping up to a next size.
|
||||
qrSizeLimit :: Int
|
||||
qrSizeLimit = 1002 -- ~2 chunks in URLencoded YAML with some spare size for server hosts
|
||||
|
||||
instance (Integral a, Show a) => StrEncoding (FileSize a) where
|
||||
strEncode (FileSize b)
|
||||
| b' /= 0 = bshow b
|
||||
@@ -236,42 +290,27 @@ instance (Integral a, Show a) => StrEncoding (FileSize a) where
|
||||
A.decimal
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
kb :: Integral a => a -> a
|
||||
kb n = 1024 * n
|
||||
{-# INLINE kb #-}
|
||||
|
||||
mb :: Integral a => a -> a
|
||||
mb n = 1024 * kb n
|
||||
{-# INLINE mb #-}
|
||||
|
||||
gb :: Integral a => a -> a
|
||||
gb n = 1024 * mb n
|
||||
{-# INLINE gb #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance (Integral a, Show a) => IsString (FileSize a) where
|
||||
fromString = either error id . strDecode . B.pack
|
||||
|
||||
instance (FromField a) => FromField (FileSize a) where fromField f = FileSize <$> fromField f
|
||||
instance FromField a => FromField (FileSize a) where fromField f = FileSize <$> fromField f
|
||||
|
||||
instance (ToField a) => ToField (FileSize a) where toField (FileSize s) = toField s
|
||||
instance ToField a => ToField (FileSize a) where toField (FileSize s) = toField s
|
||||
|
||||
groupReplicasByServer :: FileSize Word32 -> [FileChunk] -> [[FileServerReplica]]
|
||||
groupReplicasByServer :: FileSize Word32 -> [FileChunk] -> [NonEmpty FileServerReplica]
|
||||
groupReplicasByServer defChunkSize =
|
||||
groupAllOn replicaServer . unfoldChunksToReplicas defChunkSize
|
||||
L.groupAllWith (\FileServerReplica {server} -> server) . unfoldChunksToReplicas defChunkSize
|
||||
|
||||
encodeFileReplicas :: FileSize Word32 -> [FileChunk] -> [YAMLServerReplicas]
|
||||
encodeFileReplicas defChunkSize =
|
||||
map encodeServerReplicas . groupReplicasByServer defChunkSize
|
||||
where
|
||||
encodeServerReplicas fs =
|
||||
encodeServerReplicas fs@(FileServerReplica {server} :| _) =
|
||||
YAMLServerReplicas
|
||||
{ server = replicaServer $ head fs, -- groupAllOn guarantees that fs is not empty
|
||||
chunks = map (B.unpack . encodeServerReplica) fs
|
||||
{ server,
|
||||
chunks = map (B.unpack . encodeServerReplica) $ L.toList fs
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
replicaServer :: FileServerReplica -> XFTPServer
|
||||
replicaServer = server
|
||||
|
||||
encodeServerReplica :: FileServerReplica -> ByteString
|
||||
encodeServerReplica FileServerReplica {chunkNo, replicaId, replicaKey, digest, chunkSize} =
|
||||
bshow chunkNo
|
||||
@@ -302,13 +341,13 @@ unfoldChunksToReplicas defChunkSize = concatMap chunkReplicas
|
||||
in FileServerReplica {chunkNo, server, replicaId, replicaKey, digest = digest', chunkSize = chunkSize'}
|
||||
|
||||
decodeFileDescription :: YAMLFileDescription -> Either String AFileDescription
|
||||
decodeFileDescription YAMLFileDescription {party, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, replicas} = do
|
||||
decodeFileDescription YAMLFileDescription {party, size, digest, key, nonce, chunkSize, replicas, redirect} = do
|
||||
size' <- strDecode $ B.pack size
|
||||
chunkSize' <- strDecode $ B.pack chunkSize
|
||||
replicas' <- decodeFileParts replicas
|
||||
chunks <- foldReplicasToChunks chunkSize' replicas'
|
||||
pure $ case aFileParty party of
|
||||
AFP party' -> AFD FileDescription {party = party', size = size', digest, key, nonce, chunkSize = chunkSize', chunks}
|
||||
AFP party' -> AFD FileDescription {party = party', size = size', digest, key, nonce, chunkSize = chunkSize', chunks, redirect}
|
||||
where
|
||||
decodeFileParts = fmap concat . mapM decodeYAMLServerReplicas
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -323,7 +362,7 @@ foldReplicasToChunks :: FileSize Word32 -> [FileServerReplica] -> Either String
|
||||
foldReplicasToChunks defChunkSize fs = do
|
||||
sd <- foldSizesDigests fs
|
||||
-- TODO validate (check that chunks match) or in separate function
|
||||
sortOn (chunkNo :: FileChunk -> Int) . map reverseReplicas . M.elems <$> foldChunks sd fs
|
||||
sortOn (\FileChunk {chunkNo} -> chunkNo) . map reverseReplicas . M.elems <$> foldChunks sd fs
|
||||
where
|
||||
foldSizesDigests :: [FileServerReplica] -> Either String (Map Int (FileSize Word32), Map Int FileDigest)
|
||||
foldSizesDigests = foldl' addSizeDigest $ Right (M.empty, M.empty)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveGeneric #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE MultiParamTypeClasses #-}
|
||||
@@ -7,6 +6,8 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
|
||||
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-unticked-promoted-constructors #-}
|
||||
@@ -14,8 +15,7 @@
|
||||
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON, ToJSON)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
|
||||
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
@@ -25,8 +25,7 @@ import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
|
||||
import Data.Type.Equality
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word32)
|
||||
import GHC.Generics (Generic)
|
||||
import Generic.Random (genericArbitraryU)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (authTransmission)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
@@ -41,25 +40,24 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
ProtocolMsgTag (..),
|
||||
ProtocolType (..),
|
||||
RcvPublicDhKey,
|
||||
RcvPublicVerifyKey,
|
||||
RcvPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
RecipientId,
|
||||
SenderId,
|
||||
SentRawTransmission,
|
||||
SignedTransmission,
|
||||
SndPublicVerifyKey,
|
||||
SndPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
Transmission,
|
||||
TransmissionForAuth (..),
|
||||
encodeTransmissionForAuth,
|
||||
encodeTransmission,
|
||||
messageTagP,
|
||||
tDecodeParseValidate,
|
||||
tEncode,
|
||||
tEncodeBatch,
|
||||
tEncodeBatch1,
|
||||
tParse,
|
||||
_smpP,
|
||||
)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (SessionId, TransportError (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (THandleParams (..), TransportError (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, (<$?>))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
|
||||
import Test.QuickCheck (Arbitrary (..))
|
||||
|
||||
currentXFTPVersion :: Version
|
||||
currentXFTPVersion = 1
|
||||
@@ -69,14 +67,7 @@ xftpBlockSize = 16384
|
||||
|
||||
-- | File protocol clients
|
||||
data FileParty = FRecipient | FSender
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic)
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON FileParty where
|
||||
parseJSON = J.genericParseJSON . enumJSON $ dropPrefix "F"
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON FileParty where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON . enumJSON $ dropPrefix "F"
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding . enumJSON $ dropPrefix "F"
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data SFileParty :: FileParty -> Type where
|
||||
SFRecipient :: SFileParty FRecipient
|
||||
@@ -161,8 +152,8 @@ instance Protocol XFTPErrorType FileResponse where
|
||||
_ -> Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
data FileCommand (p :: FileParty) where
|
||||
FNEW :: FileInfo -> NonEmpty RcvPublicVerifyKey -> Maybe BasicAuth -> FileCommand FSender
|
||||
FADD :: NonEmpty RcvPublicVerifyKey -> FileCommand FSender
|
||||
FNEW :: FileInfo -> NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> Maybe BasicAuth -> FileCommand FSender
|
||||
FADD :: NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> FileCommand FSender
|
||||
FPUT :: FileCommand FSender
|
||||
FDEL :: FileCommand FSender
|
||||
FGET :: RcvPublicDhKey -> FileCommand FRecipient
|
||||
@@ -176,7 +167,7 @@ data FileCmd = forall p. FilePartyI p => FileCmd (SFileParty p) (FileCommand p)
|
||||
deriving instance Show FileCmd
|
||||
|
||||
data FileInfo = FileInfo
|
||||
{ sndKey :: SndPublicVerifyKey,
|
||||
{ sndKey :: SndPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
size :: Word32,
|
||||
digest :: ByteString
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -203,18 +194,18 @@ instance FilePartyI p => ProtocolEncoding XFTPErrorType (FileCommand p) where
|
||||
fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @XFTPErrorType @FileResponse
|
||||
{-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
|
||||
|
||||
checkCredentials (sig, _, fileId, _) cmd = case cmd of
|
||||
checkCredentials (auth, _, fileId, _) cmd = case cmd of
|
||||
-- FNEW must not have signature and chunk ID
|
||||
FNEW {}
|
||||
| isNothing sig -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| isNothing auth -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| not (B.null fileId) -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
|
||||
| otherwise -> Right cmd
|
||||
PING
|
||||
| isNothing sig && B.null fileId -> Right cmd
|
||||
| isNothing auth && B.null fileId -> Right cmd
|
||||
| otherwise -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
|
||||
-- other client commands must have both signature and queue ID
|
||||
_
|
||||
| isNothing sig || B.null fileId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| isNothing auth || B.null fileId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| otherwise -> Right cmd
|
||||
|
||||
instance ProtocolEncoding XFTPErrorType FileCmd where
|
||||
@@ -351,23 +342,23 @@ data XFTPErrorType
|
||||
HAS_FILE
|
||||
| -- | file IO error
|
||||
FILE_IO
|
||||
| -- | bad redirect data
|
||||
REDIRECT {redirectError :: String}
|
||||
| -- | internal server error
|
||||
INTERNAL
|
||||
| -- | used internally, never returned by the server (to be removed)
|
||||
DUPLICATE_ -- not part of SMP protocol, used internally
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON XFTPErrorType where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Read, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding XFTPErrorType where
|
||||
strEncode = \case
|
||||
CMD e -> "CMD " <> bshow e
|
||||
REDIRECT e -> "REDIRECT " <> bshow e
|
||||
e -> bshow e
|
||||
strP = "CMD " *> (CMD <$> parseRead1) <|> parseRead1
|
||||
|
||||
instance Arbitrary XFTPErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
|
||||
strP =
|
||||
"CMD " *> (CMD <$> parseRead1)
|
||||
<|> "REDIRECT " *> (REDIRECT <$> parseRead A.takeByteString)
|
||||
<|> parseRead1
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding XFTPErrorType where
|
||||
smpEncode = \case
|
||||
@@ -382,6 +373,7 @@ instance Encoding XFTPErrorType where
|
||||
NO_FILE -> "NO_FILE"
|
||||
HAS_FILE -> "HAS_FILE"
|
||||
FILE_IO -> "FILE_IO"
|
||||
REDIRECT err -> "REDIRECT " <> smpEncode err
|
||||
INTERNAL -> "INTERNAL"
|
||||
DUPLICATE_ -> "DUPLICATE_"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -398,6 +390,7 @@ instance Encoding XFTPErrorType where
|
||||
"NO_FILE" -> pure NO_FILE
|
||||
"HAS_FILE" -> pure HAS_FILE
|
||||
"FILE_IO" -> pure FILE_IO
|
||||
"REDIRECT" -> REDIRECT <$> _smpP
|
||||
"INTERNAL" -> pure INTERNAL
|
||||
"DUPLICATE_" -> pure DUPLICATE_
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad error type"
|
||||
@@ -412,23 +405,27 @@ checkParty' c = case testEquality (sFileParty @p) (sFileParty @p') of
|
||||
Just Refl -> Just c
|
||||
_ -> Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
xftpEncodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding e c => SessionId -> Maybe C.APrivateSignKey -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
|
||||
xftpEncodeTransmission sessionId pKey (corrId, fId, msg) = do
|
||||
let t = encodeTransmission currentXFTPVersion sessionId (corrId, fId, msg)
|
||||
xftpEncodeBatch1 $ signTransmission t
|
||||
where
|
||||
signTransmission :: ByteString -> SentRawTransmission
|
||||
signTransmission t = ((`C.sign` t) <$> pKey, t)
|
||||
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding e c => THandleParams -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
|
||||
xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams pKey (corrId, fId, msg) = do
|
||||
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, fId, msg)
|
||||
xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission Nothing (Just pKey) corrId tForAuth
|
||||
|
||||
xftpEncodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding e c => THandleParams -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
|
||||
xftpEncodeTransmission thParams (corrId, fId, msg) = do
|
||||
let t = encodeTransmission thParams (corrId, fId, msg)
|
||||
xftpEncodeBatch1 (Nothing, t)
|
||||
|
||||
-- this function uses batch syntax but puts only one transmission in the batch
|
||||
xftpEncodeBatch1 :: (Maybe C.ASignature, ByteString) -> Either TransportError ByteString
|
||||
xftpEncodeBatch1 (sig, t) =
|
||||
let t' = tEncodeBatch 1 . smpEncode . Large $ tEncode (sig, t)
|
||||
in first (const TELargeMsg) $ C.pad t' xftpBlockSize
|
||||
xftpEncodeBatch1 :: SentRawTransmission -> Either TransportError ByteString
|
||||
xftpEncodeBatch1 t = first (const TELargeMsg) $ C.pad (tEncodeBatch1 t) xftpBlockSize
|
||||
|
||||
xftpDecodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding e c => SessionId -> ByteString -> Either XFTPErrorType (SignedTransmission e c)
|
||||
xftpDecodeTransmission sessionId t = do
|
||||
xftpDecodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding e c => THandleParams -> ByteString -> Either XFTPErrorType (SignedTransmission e c)
|
||||
xftpDecodeTransmission thParams t = do
|
||||
t' <- first (const BLOCK) $ C.unPad t
|
||||
case tParse True t' of
|
||||
t'' :| [] -> Right $ tDecodeParseValidate sessionId currentXFTPVersion t''
|
||||
case tParse thParams t' of
|
||||
t'' :| [] -> Right $ tDecodeParseValidate thParams t''
|
||||
_ -> Left BLOCK
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (enumJSON $ dropPrefix "F") ''FileParty)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''XFTPErrorType)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
|
||||
@@ -12,10 +13,9 @@
|
||||
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Logger.Simple
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift (MonadUnliftIO)
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Reader
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (getRandomBytes)
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as B64
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Builder (byteString)
|
||||
@@ -32,9 +32,13 @@ import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime (..), diffTimeToPicoseconds, getCurrentTime)
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..), getSystemTime)
|
||||
import Data.Time.Format.ISO8601 (iso8601Show)
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word32)
|
||||
import GHC.IO.Handle (hSetNewlineMode)
|
||||
import GHC.Stats (getRTSStats)
|
||||
import qualified Network.HTTP.Types as N
|
||||
import qualified Network.HTTP2.Server as H
|
||||
import Network.Socket
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Control
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
|
||||
@@ -43,24 +47,34 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CorrId, RcvPublicDhKey, RcvPublicVerifyKey, RecipientId)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server (dummyVerifyCmd, verifyCmdSignature)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CorrId, RcvPublicDhKey, RcvPublicAuthKey, RecipientId, TransmissionAuth)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server (dummyVerifyCmd, verifyCmdAuthorization)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (THandleParams (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Buffer (trimCR)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Server
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (runTCPServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
|
||||
import System.Exit (exitFailure)
|
||||
import System.FilePath ((</>))
|
||||
import System.IO (BufferMode (..), hPutStrLn, hSetBuffering)
|
||||
import UnliftIO (IOMode (..), withFile)
|
||||
import System.IO (hPrint, hPutStrLn, universalNewlineMode)
|
||||
import UnliftIO
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Concurrent (threadDelay)
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Directory (doesFileExist, removeFile, renameFile)
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Exception
|
||||
import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
|
||||
|
||||
type M a = ReaderT XFTPEnv IO a
|
||||
|
||||
data XFTPTransportRequest =
|
||||
XFTPTransportRequest
|
||||
{ thParams :: THandleParams,
|
||||
reqBody :: HTTP2Body,
|
||||
request :: H.Request,
|
||||
sendResponse :: H.Response -> IO ()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
runXFTPServer :: XFTPServerConfig -> IO ()
|
||||
runXFTPServer cfg = do
|
||||
started <- newEmptyTMVarIO
|
||||
@@ -70,18 +84,19 @@ runXFTPServerBlocking :: TMVar Bool -> XFTPServerConfig -> IO ()
|
||||
runXFTPServerBlocking started cfg = newXFTPServerEnv cfg >>= runReaderT (xftpServer cfg started)
|
||||
|
||||
xftpServer :: XFTPServerConfig -> TMVar Bool -> M ()
|
||||
xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig} started = do
|
||||
xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpiration} started = do
|
||||
restoreServerStats
|
||||
raceAny_ (runServer : expireFilesThread_ cfg <> serverStatsThread_ cfg) `finally` stopServer
|
||||
raceAny_ (runServer : expireFilesThread_ cfg <> serverStatsThread_ cfg <> controlPortThread_ cfg) `finally` stopServer
|
||||
where
|
||||
runServer :: M ()
|
||||
runServer = do
|
||||
serverParams <- asks tlsServerParams
|
||||
env <- ask
|
||||
liftIO $
|
||||
runHTTP2Server started xftpPort defaultHTTP2BufferSize serverParams transportConfig $ \sessionId r sendResponse -> do
|
||||
runHTTP2Server started xftpPort defaultHTTP2BufferSize serverParams transportConfig inactiveClientExpiration $ \sessionId r sendResponse -> do
|
||||
reqBody <- getHTTP2Body r xftpBlockSize
|
||||
processRequest HTTP2Request {sessionId, request = r, reqBody, sendResponse} `runReaderT` env
|
||||
let thParams = THandleParams {sessionId, blockSize = xftpBlockSize, thVersion = currentXFTPVersion, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, batch = True}
|
||||
processRequest XFTPTransportRequest {thParams, request = r, reqBody, sendResponse} `runReaderT` env
|
||||
|
||||
stopServer :: M ()
|
||||
stopServer = do
|
||||
@@ -103,16 +118,19 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig} started = do
|
||||
forM_ sIds $ \sId -> do
|
||||
threadDelay 100000
|
||||
atomically (expiredFilePath st sId old)
|
||||
>>= mapM_ (remove $ delete st sId)
|
||||
>>= mapM_ (maybeRemove $ delete st sId)
|
||||
where
|
||||
maybeRemove del = maybe del (remove del)
|
||||
remove del filePath =
|
||||
ifM
|
||||
(doesFileExist filePath)
|
||||
(removeFile filePath >> del `catch` \(e :: SomeException) -> logError $ "failed to remove expired file " <> tshow filePath <> ": " <> tshow e)
|
||||
((removeFile filePath >> del) `catch` \(e :: SomeException) -> logError $ "failed to remove expired file " <> tshow filePath <> ": " <> tshow e)
|
||||
del
|
||||
delete st sId = do
|
||||
withFileLog (`logDeleteFile` sId)
|
||||
void $ atomically $ deleteFile st sId
|
||||
FileServerStats {filesExpired} <- asks serverStats
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' filesExpired (+ 1)
|
||||
|
||||
serverStatsThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig -> [M ()]
|
||||
serverStatsThread_ XFTPServerConfig {logStatsInterval = Just interval, logStatsStartTime, serverStatsLogFile} =
|
||||
@@ -124,7 +142,7 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig} started = do
|
||||
initialDelay <- (startAt -) . fromIntegral . (`div` 1000000_000000) . diffTimeToPicoseconds . utctDayTime <$> liftIO getCurrentTime
|
||||
liftIO $ putStrLn $ "server stats log enabled: " <> statsFilePath
|
||||
liftIO $ threadDelay' $ 1_000_000 * (initialDelay + if initialDelay < 0 then 86_400 else 0)
|
||||
FileServerStats {fromTime, filesCreated, fileRecipients, filesUploaded, filesDeleted, filesDownloaded, fileDownloads, fileDownloadAcks, filesCount, filesSize} <- asks serverStats
|
||||
FileServerStats {fromTime, filesCreated, fileRecipients, filesUploaded, filesExpired, filesDeleted, filesDownloaded, fileDownloads, fileDownloadAcks, filesCount, filesSize} <- asks serverStats
|
||||
let interval = 1_000_000 * logInterval
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
withFile statsFilePath AppendMode $ \h -> liftIO $ do
|
||||
@@ -134,12 +152,13 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig} started = do
|
||||
filesCreated' <- atomically $ swapTVar filesCreated 0
|
||||
fileRecipients' <- atomically $ swapTVar fileRecipients 0
|
||||
filesUploaded' <- atomically $ swapTVar filesUploaded 0
|
||||
filesExpired' <- atomically $ swapTVar filesExpired 0
|
||||
filesDeleted' <- atomically $ swapTVar filesDeleted 0
|
||||
files <- atomically $ periodStatCounts filesDownloaded ts
|
||||
fileDownloads' <- atomically $ swapTVar fileDownloads 0
|
||||
fileDownloadAcks' <- atomically $ swapTVar fileDownloadAcks 0
|
||||
filesCount' <- atomically $ swapTVar filesCount 0
|
||||
filesSize' <- atomically $ swapTVar filesSize 0
|
||||
filesCount' <- readTVarIO filesCount
|
||||
filesSize' <- readTVarIO filesSize
|
||||
hPutStrLn h $
|
||||
intercalate
|
||||
","
|
||||
@@ -154,35 +173,77 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig} started = do
|
||||
show fileDownloads',
|
||||
show fileDownloadAcks',
|
||||
show filesCount',
|
||||
show filesSize'
|
||||
show filesSize',
|
||||
show filesExpired'
|
||||
]
|
||||
liftIO $ threadDelay' interval
|
||||
|
||||
controlPortThread_ :: XFTPServerConfig -> [M ()]
|
||||
controlPortThread_ XFTPServerConfig {controlPort = Just port} = [runCPServer port]
|
||||
controlPortThread_ _ = []
|
||||
|
||||
runCPServer :: ServiceName -> M ()
|
||||
runCPServer port = do
|
||||
cpStarted <- newEmptyTMVarIO
|
||||
u <- askUnliftIO
|
||||
liftIO $ do
|
||||
labelMyThread "control port server"
|
||||
runTCPServer cpStarted port $ runCPClient u
|
||||
where
|
||||
runCPClient :: UnliftIO (ReaderT XFTPEnv IO) -> Socket -> IO ()
|
||||
runCPClient u sock = do
|
||||
labelMyThread "control port client"
|
||||
h <- socketToHandle sock ReadWriteMode
|
||||
hSetBuffering h LineBuffering
|
||||
hSetNewlineMode h universalNewlineMode
|
||||
hPutStrLn h "XFTP server control port\n'help' for supported commands"
|
||||
cpLoop h
|
||||
where
|
||||
cpLoop h = do
|
||||
s <- B.hGetLine h
|
||||
case strDecode $ trimCR s of
|
||||
Right CPQuit -> hClose h
|
||||
Right cmd -> processCP h cmd >> cpLoop h
|
||||
Left err -> hPutStrLn h ("error: " <> err) >> cpLoop h
|
||||
processCP h = \case
|
||||
CPStatsRTS -> E.tryAny getRTSStats >>= either (hPrint h) (hPrint h)
|
||||
CPDelete fileId -> unliftIO u $ do
|
||||
fs <- asks store
|
||||
r <- runExceptT $ do
|
||||
let asSender = ExceptT . atomically $ getFile fs SFSender fileId
|
||||
let asRecipient = ExceptT . atomically $ getFile fs SFRecipient fileId
|
||||
(fr, _) <- asSender `catchError` const asRecipient
|
||||
ExceptT $ deleteServerFile_ fr
|
||||
liftIO . hPutStrLn h $ either (\e -> "error: " <> show e) (\() -> "ok") r
|
||||
CPHelp -> hPutStrLn h "commands: stats-rts, delete, help, quit"
|
||||
CPQuit -> pure ()
|
||||
CPSkip -> pure ()
|
||||
|
||||
data ServerFile = ServerFile
|
||||
{ filePath :: FilePath,
|
||||
fileSize :: Word32,
|
||||
sbState :: LC.SbState
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
processRequest :: HTTP2Request -> M ()
|
||||
processRequest HTTP2Request {sessionId, reqBody = body@HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sendResponse}
|
||||
processRequest :: XFTPTransportRequest -> M ()
|
||||
processRequest XFTPTransportRequest {thParams, reqBody = body@HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sendResponse}
|
||||
| B.length bodyHead /= xftpBlockSize = sendXFTPResponse ("", "", FRErr BLOCK) Nothing
|
||||
| otherwise = do
|
||||
case xftpDecodeTransmission sessionId bodyHead of
|
||||
Right (sig_, signed, (corrId, fId, cmdOrErr)) -> do
|
||||
case cmdOrErr of
|
||||
Right cmd -> do
|
||||
verifyXFTPTransmission sig_ signed fId cmd >>= \case
|
||||
VRVerified req -> uncurry send =<< processXFTPRequest body req
|
||||
VRFailed -> send (FRErr AUTH) Nothing
|
||||
Left e -> send (FRErr e) Nothing
|
||||
where
|
||||
send resp = sendXFTPResponse (corrId, fId, resp)
|
||||
Left e -> sendXFTPResponse ("", "", FRErr e) Nothing
|
||||
case xftpDecodeTransmission thParams bodyHead of
|
||||
Right (sig_, signed, (corrId, fId, cmdOrErr)) -> do
|
||||
case cmdOrErr of
|
||||
Right cmd -> do
|
||||
verifyXFTPTransmission sig_ signed fId cmd >>= \case
|
||||
VRVerified req -> uncurry send =<< processXFTPRequest body req
|
||||
VRFailed -> send (FRErr AUTH) Nothing
|
||||
Left e -> send (FRErr e) Nothing
|
||||
where
|
||||
send resp = sendXFTPResponse (corrId, fId, resp)
|
||||
Left e -> sendXFTPResponse ("", "", FRErr e) Nothing
|
||||
where
|
||||
sendXFTPResponse :: (CorrId, XFTPFileId, FileResponse) -> Maybe ServerFile -> M ()
|
||||
sendXFTPResponse (corrId, fId, resp) serverFile_ = do
|
||||
let t_ = xftpEncodeTransmission sessionId Nothing (corrId, fId, resp)
|
||||
let t_ = xftpEncodeTransmission thParams (corrId, fId, resp)
|
||||
liftIO $ sendResponse $ H.responseStreaming N.ok200 [] $ streamBody t_
|
||||
where
|
||||
streamBody t_ send done = do
|
||||
@@ -199,10 +260,10 @@ processRequest HTTP2Request {sessionId, reqBody = body@HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sen
|
||||
|
||||
data VerificationResult = VRVerified XFTPRequest | VRFailed
|
||||
|
||||
verifyXFTPTransmission :: Maybe C.ASignature -> ByteString -> XFTPFileId -> FileCmd -> M VerificationResult
|
||||
verifyXFTPTransmission sig_ signed fId cmd =
|
||||
verifyXFTPTransmission :: Maybe TransmissionAuth -> ByteString -> XFTPFileId -> FileCmd -> M VerificationResult
|
||||
verifyXFTPTransmission tAuth authorized fId cmd =
|
||||
case cmd of
|
||||
FileCmd SFSender (FNEW file rcps auth) -> pure $ XFTPReqNew file rcps auth `verifyWith` sndKey file
|
||||
FileCmd SFSender (FNEW file rcps auth') -> pure $ XFTPReqNew file rcps auth' `verifyWith` sndKey file
|
||||
FileCmd SFRecipient PING -> pure $ VRVerified XFTPReqPing
|
||||
FileCmd party _ -> verifyCmd party
|
||||
where
|
||||
@@ -213,8 +274,9 @@ verifyXFTPTransmission sig_ signed fId cmd =
|
||||
where
|
||||
verify = \case
|
||||
Right (fr, k) -> XFTPReqCmd fId fr cmd `verifyWith` k
|
||||
_ -> maybe False (dummyVerifyCmd signed) sig_ `seq` VRFailed
|
||||
req `verifyWith` k = if verifyCmdSignature sig_ signed k then VRVerified req else VRFailed
|
||||
_ -> maybe False (dummyVerifyCmd Nothing authorized) tAuth `seq` VRFailed
|
||||
-- TODO verify with DH authorization
|
||||
req `verifyWith` k = if verifyCmdAuthorization Nothing tAuth authorized k then VRVerified req else VRFailed
|
||||
|
||||
processXFTPRequest :: HTTP2Body -> XFTPRequest -> M (FileResponse, Maybe ServerFile)
|
||||
processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
|
||||
@@ -235,7 +297,7 @@ processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
|
||||
XFTPReqPing -> noFile FRPong
|
||||
where
|
||||
noFile resp = pure (resp, Nothing)
|
||||
createFile :: FileInfo -> NonEmpty RcvPublicVerifyKey -> M FileResponse
|
||||
createFile :: FileInfo -> NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> M FileResponse
|
||||
createFile file rks = do
|
||||
st <- asks store
|
||||
r <- runExceptT $ do
|
||||
@@ -259,7 +321,7 @@ processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
|
||||
retryAdd n $ \sId -> runExceptT $ do
|
||||
ExceptT $ addFile st sId file ts
|
||||
pure sId
|
||||
addRecipientRetry :: FileStore -> Int -> XFTPFileId -> RcvPublicVerifyKey -> M (Either XFTPErrorType FileRecipient)
|
||||
addRecipientRetry :: FileStore -> Int -> XFTPFileId -> RcvPublicAuthKey -> M (Either XFTPErrorType FileRecipient)
|
||||
addRecipientRetry st n sId rpk =
|
||||
retryAdd n $ \rId -> runExceptT $ do
|
||||
let rcp = FileRecipient rId rpk
|
||||
@@ -272,7 +334,7 @@ processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
|
||||
atomically (add fId) >>= \case
|
||||
Left DUPLICATE_ -> retryAdd (n - 1) add
|
||||
r -> pure r
|
||||
addRecipients :: XFTPFileId -> NonEmpty RcvPublicVerifyKey -> M FileResponse
|
||||
addRecipients :: XFTPFileId -> NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey -> M FileResponse
|
||||
addRecipients sId rks = do
|
||||
st <- asks store
|
||||
r <- runExceptT $ do
|
||||
@@ -317,9 +379,10 @@ processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
|
||||
sendServerFile FileRec {senderId, filePath, fileInfo = FileInfo {size}} rDhKey = do
|
||||
readTVarIO filePath >>= \case
|
||||
Just path -> do
|
||||
(sDhKey, spDhKey) <- liftIO C.generateKeyPair'
|
||||
g <- asks random
|
||||
(sDhKey, spDhKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
|
||||
let dhSecret = C.dh' rDhKey spDhKey
|
||||
cbNonce <- liftIO C.randomCbNonce
|
||||
cbNonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
|
||||
case LC.cbInit dhSecret cbNonce of
|
||||
Right sbState -> do
|
||||
stats <- asks serverStats
|
||||
@@ -330,21 +393,7 @@ processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
|
||||
_ -> pure (FRErr NO_FILE, Nothing)
|
||||
|
||||
deleteServerFile :: FileRec -> M FileResponse
|
||||
deleteServerFile FileRec {senderId, fileInfo, filePath} = do
|
||||
withFileLog (`logDeleteFile` senderId)
|
||||
r <- runExceptT $ do
|
||||
path <- readTVarIO filePath
|
||||
stats <- asks serverStats
|
||||
ExceptT $ first (\(_ :: SomeException) -> FILE_IO) <$> try (forM_ path $ \p -> whenM (doesFileExist p) (removeFile p >> deletedStats stats))
|
||||
st <- asks store
|
||||
void $ atomically $ deleteFile st senderId
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (filesDeleted stats) (+ 1)
|
||||
pure FROk
|
||||
either (pure . FRErr) pure r
|
||||
where
|
||||
deletedStats stats = do
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (filesCount stats) (subtract 1)
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (filesSize stats) (subtract $ fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)
|
||||
deleteServerFile fr = either FRErr (\() -> FROk) <$> deleteServerFile_ fr
|
||||
|
||||
logFileError :: SomeException -> IO ()
|
||||
logFileError e = logError $ "Error deleting file: " <> tshow e
|
||||
@@ -358,13 +407,28 @@ processXFTPRequest HTTP2Body {bodyPart} = \case
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (fileDownloadAcks stats) (+ 1)
|
||||
pure FROk
|
||||
|
||||
deleteServerFile_ :: FileRec -> M (Either XFTPErrorType ())
|
||||
deleteServerFile_ FileRec {senderId, fileInfo, filePath} = do
|
||||
withFileLog (`logDeleteFile` senderId)
|
||||
runExceptT $ do
|
||||
path <- readTVarIO filePath
|
||||
stats <- asks serverStats
|
||||
ExceptT $ first (\(_ :: SomeException) -> FILE_IO) <$> try (forM_ path $ \p -> whenM (doesFileExist p) (removeFile p >> deletedStats stats))
|
||||
st <- asks store
|
||||
void $ atomically $ deleteFile st senderId
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (filesDeleted stats) (+ 1)
|
||||
where
|
||||
deletedStats stats = do
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (filesCount stats) (subtract 1)
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (filesSize stats) (subtract $ fromIntegral $ size fileInfo)
|
||||
|
||||
randomId :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader XFTPEnv m) => Int -> m ByteString
|
||||
randomId n = do
|
||||
gVar <- asks idsDrg
|
||||
atomically (C.pseudoRandomBytes n gVar)
|
||||
randomId n = atomically . C.randomBytes n =<< asks random
|
||||
|
||||
getFileId :: M XFTPFileId
|
||||
getFileId = liftIO . getRandomBytes =<< asks (fileIdSize . config)
|
||||
getFileId = do
|
||||
size <- asks (fileIdSize . config)
|
||||
atomically . C.randomBytes size =<< asks random
|
||||
|
||||
withFileLog :: (MonadIO m, MonadReader XFTPEnv m) => (StoreLog 'WriteMode -> IO a) -> m ()
|
||||
withFileLog action = liftIO . mapM_ action =<< asks storeLog
|
||||
@@ -390,14 +454,17 @@ restoreServerStats = asks (serverStatsBackupFile . config) >>= mapM_ restoreStat
|
||||
restoreStats f = whenM (doesFileExist f) $ do
|
||||
logInfo $ "restoring server stats from file " <> T.pack f
|
||||
liftIO (strDecode <$> B.readFile f) >>= \case
|
||||
Right d -> do
|
||||
Right d@FileServerStatsData {_filesCount = statsFilesCount, _filesSize = statsFilesSize} -> do
|
||||
s <- asks serverStats
|
||||
fs <- readTVarIO . files =<< asks store
|
||||
let _filesCount = length $ M.keys fs
|
||||
_filesSize = M.foldl' (\n -> (n +) . fromIntegral . size . fileInfo) 0 fs
|
||||
FileStore {files, usedStorage} <- asks store
|
||||
_filesCount <- M.size <$> readTVarIO files
|
||||
_filesSize <- readTVarIO usedStorage
|
||||
atomically $ setFileServerStats s d {_filesCount, _filesSize}
|
||||
renameFile f $ f <> ".bak"
|
||||
logInfo "server stats restored"
|
||||
when (statsFilesCount /= _filesCount) $ logWarn $ "Files count differs: stats: " <> tshow statsFilesCount <> ", store: " <> tshow _filesCount
|
||||
when (statsFilesSize /= _filesSize) $ logWarn $ "Files size differs: stats: " <> tshow statsFilesSize <> ", store: " <> tshow _filesSize
|
||||
logInfo $ "Restored " <> tshow (_filesSize `div` 1048576) <> " MBs in " <> tshow _filesCount <> " files"
|
||||
Left e -> do
|
||||
logInfo $ "error restoring server stats: " <> T.pack e
|
||||
liftIO exitFailure
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Control where
|
||||
|
||||
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
|
||||
import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
|
||||
data ControlProtocol
|
||||
= CPStatsRTS
|
||||
| CPDelete ByteString
|
||||
| CPHelp
|
||||
| CPQuit
|
||||
| CPSkip
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding ControlProtocol where
|
||||
strEncode = \case
|
||||
CPStatsRTS -> "stats-rts"
|
||||
CPDelete bs -> "delete " <> strEncode bs
|
||||
CPHelp -> "help"
|
||||
CPQuit -> "quit"
|
||||
CPSkip -> ""
|
||||
strP =
|
||||
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
|
||||
"stats-rts" -> pure CPStatsRTS
|
||||
"delete" -> CPDelete <$> (A.space *> strP)
|
||||
"help" -> pure CPHelp
|
||||
"quit" -> pure CPQuit
|
||||
"" -> pure CPSkip
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad ControlProtocol command"
|
||||
@@ -24,15 +24,16 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.StoreLog
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BasicAuth, RcvPublicVerifyKey)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BasicAuth, RcvPublicAuthKey)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (loadFingerprint, loadTLSServerParams, TransportServerConfig)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (TransportServerConfig, loadFingerprint, loadTLSServerParams)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (tshow)
|
||||
import System.IO (IOMode (..))
|
||||
import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
|
||||
data XFTPServerConfig = XFTPServerConfig
|
||||
{ xftpPort :: ServiceName,
|
||||
controlPort :: Maybe ServiceName,
|
||||
fileIdSize :: Int,
|
||||
storeLogFile :: Maybe FilePath,
|
||||
filesPath :: FilePath,
|
||||
@@ -46,6 +47,8 @@ data XFTPServerConfig = XFTPServerConfig
|
||||
newFileBasicAuth :: Maybe BasicAuth,
|
||||
-- | time after which the files can be removed and check interval, seconds
|
||||
fileExpiration :: Maybe ExpirationConfig,
|
||||
-- | time after which inactive clients can be disconnected and check interval, seconds
|
||||
inactiveClientExpiration :: Maybe ExpirationConfig,
|
||||
-- CA certificate private key is not needed for initialization
|
||||
caCertificateFile :: FilePath,
|
||||
privateKeyFile :: FilePath,
|
||||
@@ -58,11 +61,18 @@ data XFTPServerConfig = XFTPServerConfig
|
||||
transportConfig :: TransportServerConfig
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
defaultInactiveClientExpiration :: ExpirationConfig
|
||||
defaultInactiveClientExpiration =
|
||||
ExpirationConfig
|
||||
{ ttl = 43200, -- seconds, 12 hours
|
||||
checkInterval = 3600 -- seconds, 1 hours
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
data XFTPEnv = XFTPEnv
|
||||
{ config :: XFTPServerConfig,
|
||||
store :: FileStore,
|
||||
storeLog :: Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode),
|
||||
idsDrg :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
|
||||
random :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
|
||||
serverIdentity :: C.KeyHash,
|
||||
tlsServerParams :: T.ServerParams,
|
||||
serverStats :: FileServerStats
|
||||
@@ -80,7 +90,7 @@ defaultFileExpiration =
|
||||
|
||||
newXFTPServerEnv :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => XFTPServerConfig -> m XFTPEnv
|
||||
newXFTPServerEnv config@XFTPServerConfig {storeLogFile, fileSizeQuota, caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile} = do
|
||||
idsDrg <- drgNew >>= newTVarIO
|
||||
random <- liftIO C.newRandom
|
||||
store <- atomically newFileStore
|
||||
storeLog <- liftIO $ mapM (`readWriteFileStore` store) storeLogFile
|
||||
used <- readTVarIO (usedStorage store)
|
||||
@@ -90,9 +100,9 @@ newXFTPServerEnv config@XFTPServerConfig {storeLogFile, fileSizeQuota, caCertifi
|
||||
tlsServerParams <- liftIO $ loadTLSServerParams caCertificateFile certificateFile privateKeyFile
|
||||
Fingerprint fp <- liftIO $ loadFingerprint caCertificateFile
|
||||
serverStats <- atomically . newFileServerStats =<< liftIO getCurrentTime
|
||||
pure XFTPEnv {config, store, storeLog, idsDrg, tlsServerParams, serverIdentity = C.KeyHash fp, serverStats}
|
||||
pure XFTPEnv {config, store, storeLog, random, tlsServerParams, serverIdentity = C.KeyHash fp, serverStats}
|
||||
|
||||
data XFTPRequest
|
||||
= XFTPReqNew FileInfo (NonEmpty RcvPublicVerifyKey) (Maybe BasicAuth)
|
||||
= XFTPReqNew FileInfo (NonEmpty RcvPublicAuthKey) (Maybe BasicAuth)
|
||||
| XFTPReqCmd XFTPFileId FileRec FileCmd
|
||||
| XFTPReqPing
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,14 +16,16 @@ import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Text as T
|
||||
import Network.Socket (HostName)
|
||||
import Options.Applicative
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description (FileSize (..), kb, mb)
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Chunks
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description (FileSize (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server (runXFTPServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), defaultFileExpiration, defFileExpirationHours)
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Env (XFTPServerConfig (..), defFileExpirationHours, defaultFileExpiration, defaultInactiveClientExpiration)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtoServerWithAuth (..), pattern XFTPServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (simplexMQVersion)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (TransportServerConfig (..), defaultTransportServerConfig)
|
||||
import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing, doesFileExist)
|
||||
@@ -31,9 +33,6 @@ import System.FilePath (combine)
|
||||
import System.IO (BufferMode (..), hSetBuffering, stderr, stdout)
|
||||
import Text.Read (readMaybe)
|
||||
|
||||
xftpServerVersion :: String
|
||||
xftpServerVersion = "1.0.1"
|
||||
|
||||
xftpServerCLI :: FilePath -> FilePath -> IO ()
|
||||
xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
|
||||
getCliCommand' (cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile) serverVersion >>= \case
|
||||
@@ -41,6 +40,10 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
|
||||
doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
|
||||
True -> exitError $ "Error: server is already initialized (" <> iniFile <> " exists).\nRun `" <> executableName <> " start`."
|
||||
_ -> initializeServer opts
|
||||
OnlineCert certOpts ->
|
||||
doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
|
||||
True -> genOnline cfgPath certOpts
|
||||
_ -> exitError $ "Error: server is not initialized (" <> iniFile <> " does not exist).\nRun `" <> executableName <> " init`."
|
||||
Start ->
|
||||
doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
|
||||
True -> readIniFile iniFile >>= either exitError runServer
|
||||
@@ -52,7 +55,7 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
|
||||
putStrLn "Deleted configuration and log files"
|
||||
where
|
||||
iniFile = combine cfgPath "file-server.ini"
|
||||
serverVersion = "SimpleX XFTP server v" <> xftpServerVersion
|
||||
serverVersion = "SimpleX XFTP server v" <> simplexMQVersion
|
||||
defaultServerPort = "443"
|
||||
executableName = "file-server"
|
||||
storeLogFilePath = combine logPath "file-server-store.log"
|
||||
@@ -99,10 +102,17 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
|
||||
<> ("host: " <> host <> "\n")
|
||||
<> ("port: " <> defaultServerPort <> "\n")
|
||||
<> "log_tls_errors: off\n\
|
||||
\# control_port: 5226\n\
|
||||
\\n\
|
||||
\[FILES]\n"
|
||||
<> ("path: " <> filesPath <> "\n")
|
||||
<> ("storage_quota: " <> B.unpack (strEncode fileSizeQuota) <> "\n")
|
||||
<> "\n\
|
||||
\[INACTIVE_CLIENTS]\n\
|
||||
\# TTL and interval to check inactive clients\n\
|
||||
\disconnect: off\n"
|
||||
<> ("# ttl: " <> show (ttl defaultInactiveClientExpiration) <> "\n")
|
||||
<> ("# check_interval: " <> show (checkInterval defaultInactiveClientExpiration) <> "\n")
|
||||
runServer ini = do
|
||||
hSetBuffering stdout LineBuffering
|
||||
hSetBuffering stderr LineBuffering
|
||||
@@ -117,13 +127,16 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
|
||||
enableStoreLog = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "enable" ini
|
||||
logStats = settingIsOn "STORE_LOG" "log_stats" ini
|
||||
c = combine cfgPath . ($ defaultX509Config)
|
||||
printXFTPConfig XFTPServerConfig {allowNewFiles, newFileBasicAuth, xftpPort, storeLogFile, fileExpiration} = do
|
||||
printXFTPConfig XFTPServerConfig {allowNewFiles, newFileBasicAuth, xftpPort, storeLogFile, fileExpiration, inactiveClientExpiration} = do
|
||||
putStrLn $ case storeLogFile of
|
||||
Just f -> "Store log: " <> f
|
||||
_ -> "Store log disabled."
|
||||
putStrLn $ case fileExpiration of
|
||||
Just ExpirationConfig {ttl} -> "expiring files after " <> showTTL ttl
|
||||
_ -> "not expiring files"
|
||||
putStrLn $ case inactiveClientExpiration of
|
||||
Just ExpirationConfig {ttl, checkInterval} -> "expiring clients inactive for " <> show ttl <> " seconds every " <> show checkInterval <> " seconds"
|
||||
_ -> "not expiring inactive clients"
|
||||
putStrLn $
|
||||
"Uploading new files "
|
||||
<> if allowNewFiles
|
||||
@@ -134,17 +147,25 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
|
||||
serverConfig =
|
||||
XFTPServerConfig
|
||||
{ xftpPort = T.unpack $ strictIni "TRANSPORT" "port" ini,
|
||||
controlPort = either (const Nothing) (Just . T.unpack) $ lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "control_port" ini,
|
||||
fileIdSize = 16,
|
||||
storeLogFile = enableStoreLog $> storeLogFilePath,
|
||||
filesPath = T.unpack $ strictIni "FILES" "path" ini,
|
||||
fileSizeQuota = either error unFileSize <$> strDecodeIni "FILES" "storage_quota" ini,
|
||||
allowedChunkSizes = [kb 256, mb 1, mb 4],
|
||||
allowedChunkSizes = serverChunkSizes,
|
||||
allowNewFiles = fromMaybe True $ iniOnOff "AUTH" "new_files" ini,
|
||||
newFileBasicAuth = either error id <$> strDecodeIni "AUTH" "create_password" ini,
|
||||
fileExpiration =
|
||||
Just defaultFileExpiration
|
||||
{ ttl = 3600 * readIniDefault defFileExpirationHours "STORE_LOG" "expire_files_hours" ini
|
||||
},
|
||||
Just
|
||||
defaultFileExpiration
|
||||
{ ttl = 3600 * readIniDefault defFileExpirationHours "STORE_LOG" "expire_files_hours" ini
|
||||
},
|
||||
inactiveClientExpiration =
|
||||
settingIsOn "INACTIVE_CLIENTS" "disconnect" ini
|
||||
$> ExpirationConfig
|
||||
{ ttl = readStrictIni "INACTIVE_CLIENTS" "ttl" ini,
|
||||
checkInterval = readStrictIni "INACTIVE_CLIENTS" "check_interval" ini
|
||||
},
|
||||
caCertificateFile = c caCrtFile,
|
||||
privateKeyFile = c serverKeyFile,
|
||||
certificateFile = c serverCrtFile,
|
||||
@@ -160,6 +181,7 @@ xftpServerCLI cfgPath logPath = do
|
||||
|
||||
data CliCommand
|
||||
= Init InitOptions
|
||||
| OnlineCert CertOptions
|
||||
| Start
|
||||
| Delete
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -177,6 +199,7 @@ cliCommandP :: FilePath -> FilePath -> FilePath -> Parser CliCommand
|
||||
cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile =
|
||||
hsubparser
|
||||
( command "init" (info (Init <$> initP) (progDesc $ "Initialize server - creates " <> cfgPath <> " and " <> logPath <> " directories and configuration files"))
|
||||
<> command "cert" (info (OnlineCert <$> certOptionsP) (progDesc $ "Generate new online TLS server credentials (configuration: " <> iniFile <> ")"))
|
||||
<> command "start" (info (pure Start) (progDesc $ "Start server (configuration: " <> iniFile <> ")"))
|
||||
<> command "delete" (info (pure Delete) (progDesc "Delete configuration and log files"))
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Stats where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
|
||||
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import Data.Int (Int64)
|
||||
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@ data FileServerStats = FileServerStats
|
||||
filesCreated :: TVar Int,
|
||||
fileRecipients :: TVar Int,
|
||||
filesUploaded :: TVar Int,
|
||||
filesExpired :: TVar Int,
|
||||
filesDeleted :: TVar Int,
|
||||
filesDownloaded :: PeriodStats SenderId,
|
||||
fileDownloads :: TVar Int,
|
||||
@@ -31,6 +33,7 @@ data FileServerStatsData = FileServerStatsData
|
||||
_filesCreated :: Int,
|
||||
_fileRecipients :: Int,
|
||||
_filesUploaded :: Int,
|
||||
_filesExpired :: Int,
|
||||
_filesDeleted :: Int,
|
||||
_filesDownloaded :: PeriodStatsData SenderId,
|
||||
_fileDownloads :: Int,
|
||||
@@ -46,13 +49,14 @@ newFileServerStats ts = do
|
||||
filesCreated <- newTVar 0
|
||||
fileRecipients <- newTVar 0
|
||||
filesUploaded <- newTVar 0
|
||||
filesExpired <- newTVar 0
|
||||
filesDeleted <- newTVar 0
|
||||
filesDownloaded <- newPeriodStats
|
||||
fileDownloads <- newTVar 0
|
||||
fileDownloadAcks <- newTVar 0
|
||||
filesCount <- newTVar 0
|
||||
filesSize <- newTVar 0
|
||||
pure FileServerStats {fromTime, filesCreated, fileRecipients, filesUploaded, filesDeleted, filesDownloaded, fileDownloads, fileDownloadAcks, filesCount, filesSize}
|
||||
pure FileServerStats {fromTime, filesCreated, fileRecipients, filesUploaded, filesExpired, filesDeleted, filesDownloaded, fileDownloads, fileDownloadAcks, filesCount, filesSize}
|
||||
|
||||
getFileServerStatsData :: FileServerStats -> STM FileServerStatsData
|
||||
getFileServerStatsData s = do
|
||||
@@ -60,13 +64,14 @@ getFileServerStatsData s = do
|
||||
_filesCreated <- readTVar $ filesCreated s
|
||||
_fileRecipients <- readTVar $ fileRecipients s
|
||||
_filesUploaded <- readTVar $ filesUploaded s
|
||||
_filesExpired <- readTVar $ filesExpired s
|
||||
_filesDeleted <- readTVar $ filesDeleted s
|
||||
_filesDownloaded <- getPeriodStatsData $ filesDownloaded s
|
||||
_fileDownloads <- readTVar $ fileDownloads s
|
||||
_fileDownloadAcks <- readTVar $ fileDownloadAcks s
|
||||
_filesCount <- readTVar $ filesCount s
|
||||
_filesSize <- readTVar $ filesSize s
|
||||
pure FileServerStatsData {_fromTime, _filesCreated, _fileRecipients, _filesUploaded, _filesDeleted, _filesDownloaded, _fileDownloads, _fileDownloadAcks, _filesCount, _filesSize}
|
||||
pure FileServerStatsData {_fromTime, _filesCreated, _fileRecipients, _filesUploaded, _filesExpired, _filesDeleted, _filesDownloaded, _fileDownloads, _fileDownloadAcks, _filesCount, _filesSize}
|
||||
|
||||
setFileServerStats :: FileServerStats -> FileServerStatsData -> STM ()
|
||||
setFileServerStats s d = do
|
||||
@@ -74,6 +79,7 @@ setFileServerStats s d = do
|
||||
writeTVar (filesCreated s) $! _filesCreated d
|
||||
writeTVar (fileRecipients s) $! _fileRecipients d
|
||||
writeTVar (filesUploaded s) $! _filesUploaded d
|
||||
writeTVar (filesExpired s) $! _filesExpired d
|
||||
writeTVar (filesDeleted s) $! _filesDeleted d
|
||||
setPeriodStats (filesDownloaded s) $! _filesDownloaded d
|
||||
writeTVar (fileDownloads s) $! _fileDownloads d
|
||||
@@ -82,13 +88,16 @@ setFileServerStats s d = do
|
||||
writeTVar (filesSize s) $! _filesSize d
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding FileServerStatsData where
|
||||
strEncode FileServerStatsData {_fromTime, _filesCreated, _fileRecipients, _filesUploaded, _filesDeleted, _filesDownloaded, _fileDownloads, _fileDownloadAcks} =
|
||||
strEncode FileServerStatsData {_fromTime, _filesCreated, _fileRecipients, _filesUploaded, _filesExpired, _filesDeleted, _filesDownloaded, _fileDownloads, _fileDownloadAcks, _filesCount, _filesSize} =
|
||||
B.unlines
|
||||
[ "fromTime=" <> strEncode _fromTime,
|
||||
"filesCreated=" <> strEncode _filesCreated,
|
||||
"fileRecipients=" <> strEncode _fileRecipients,
|
||||
"filesUploaded=" <> strEncode _filesUploaded,
|
||||
"filesExpired=" <> strEncode _filesExpired,
|
||||
"filesDeleted=" <> strEncode _filesDeleted,
|
||||
"filesCount=" <> strEncode _filesCount,
|
||||
"filesSize=" <> strEncode _filesSize,
|
||||
"filesDownloaded:",
|
||||
strEncode _filesDownloaded,
|
||||
"fileDownloads=" <> strEncode _fileDownloads,
|
||||
@@ -99,8 +108,11 @@ instance StrEncoding FileServerStatsData where
|
||||
_filesCreated <- "filesCreated=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
|
||||
_fileRecipients <- "fileRecipients=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
|
||||
_filesUploaded <- "filesUploaded=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
|
||||
_filesExpired <- "filesExpired=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine <|> pure 0
|
||||
_filesDeleted <- "filesDeleted=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
|
||||
_filesCount <- "filesCount=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine <|> pure 0
|
||||
_filesSize <- "filesSize=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine <|> pure 0
|
||||
_filesDownloaded <- "filesDownloaded:" *> A.endOfLine *> strP <* A.endOfLine
|
||||
_fileDownloads <- "fileDownloads=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
|
||||
_fileDownloadAcks <- "fileDownloadAcks=" *> strP <* A.endOfLine
|
||||
pure FileServerStatsData {_fromTime, _filesCreated, _fileRecipients, _filesUploaded, _filesDeleted, _filesDownloaded, _fileDownloads, _fileDownloadAcks, _filesCount = 0, _filesSize = 0}
|
||||
pure FileServerStatsData {_fromTime, _filesCreated, _fileRecipients, _filesUploaded, _filesExpired, _filesDeleted, _filesDownloaded, _fileDownloads, _fileDownloadAcks, _filesCount, _filesSize}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,14 +31,14 @@ import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..), SFileParty (..), XFTPErrorType (..), XFTPFileId)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (RcvPublicVerifyKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (RcvPublicAuthKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (ifM, ($>>=))
|
||||
|
||||
data FileStore = FileStore
|
||||
{ files :: TMap SenderId FileRec,
|
||||
recipients :: TMap RecipientId (SenderId, RcvPublicVerifyKey),
|
||||
recipients :: TMap RecipientId (SenderId, RcvPublicAuthKey),
|
||||
usedStorage :: TVar Int64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ data FileRec = FileRec
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq)
|
||||
|
||||
data FileRecipient = FileRecipient RecipientId RcvPublicVerifyKey
|
||||
data FileRecipient = FileRecipient RecipientId RcvPublicAuthKey
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding FileRecipient where
|
||||
strEncode (FileRecipient rId rKey) = strEncode rId <> ":" <> strEncode rKey
|
||||
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ deleteRecipient FileStore {recipients} rId FileRec {recipientIds} = do
|
||||
TM.delete rId recipients
|
||||
modifyTVar' recipientIds $ S.delete rId
|
||||
|
||||
getFile :: FileStore -> SFileParty p -> XFTPFileId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType (FileRec, C.APublicVerifyKey))
|
||||
getFile :: FileStore -> SFileParty p -> XFTPFileId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType (FileRec, C.APublicAuthKey))
|
||||
getFile st party fId = case party of
|
||||
SFSender -> withFile st fId $ pure . Right . (\f -> (f, sndKey $ fileInfo f))
|
||||
SFRecipient ->
|
||||
@@ -121,12 +121,12 @@ getFile st party fId = case party of
|
||||
Just (sId, rKey) -> withFile st sId $ pure . Right . (,rKey)
|
||||
_ -> pure $ Left AUTH
|
||||
|
||||
expiredFilePath :: FileStore -> XFTPFileId -> Int64 -> STM (Maybe FilePath)
|
||||
expiredFilePath :: FileStore -> XFTPFileId -> Int64 -> STM (Maybe (Maybe FilePath))
|
||||
expiredFilePath FileStore {files} sId old =
|
||||
TM.lookup sId files
|
||||
$>>= \FileRec {filePath, createdAt} ->
|
||||
if systemSeconds createdAt < old
|
||||
then readTVar filePath
|
||||
then Just <$> readTVar filePath
|
||||
else pure Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
ackFile :: FileStore -> RecipientId -> STM (Either XFTPErrorType ())
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime)
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileInfo (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Server.Store
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (RcvPublicVerifyKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (RcvPublicAuthKey, RecipientId, SenderId)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, whenM)
|
||||
import System.Directory (doesFileExist, renameFile)
|
||||
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ writeFileStore s FileStore {files, recipients} = do
|
||||
allRcps <- readTVarIO recipients
|
||||
readTVarIO files >>= mapM_ (logFile allRcps)
|
||||
where
|
||||
logFile :: Map RecipientId (SenderId, RcvPublicVerifyKey) -> FileRec -> IO ()
|
||||
logFile :: Map RecipientId (SenderId, RcvPublicAuthKey) -> FileRec -> IO ()
|
||||
logFile allRcps FileRec {senderId, fileInfo, filePath, recipientIds, createdAt} = do
|
||||
logAddFile s senderId fileInfo createdAt
|
||||
(rcpErrs, rcps) <- M.mapEither getRcp . M.fromSet id <$> readTVarIO recipientIds
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,32 +1,34 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE MultiWayIf #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport
|
||||
( supportedFileServerVRange,
|
||||
XFTPRcvChunkSpec (..),
|
||||
sendFile,
|
||||
ReceiveFileError (..),
|
||||
receiveFile,
|
||||
sendEncFile,
|
||||
receiveEncFile,
|
||||
receiveSbFile,
|
||||
)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
import qualified Control.Exception as E
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Control.Monad.IO.Class
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Builder (Builder, byteString)
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word32)
|
||||
import GHC.IO.Handle.Internals (ioe_EOF)
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (XFTPErrorType (..))
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
|
||||
import System.IO (Handle, IOMode (..), withFile)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,18 +42,6 @@ data XFTPRcvChunkSpec = XFTPRcvChunkSpec
|
||||
supportedFileServerVRange :: VersionRange
|
||||
supportedFileServerVRange = mkVersionRange 1 1
|
||||
|
||||
fileBlockSize :: Int
|
||||
fileBlockSize = 16 * 1024
|
||||
|
||||
sendFile :: Handle -> (Builder -> IO ()) -> Word32 -> IO ()
|
||||
sendFile h send = go
|
||||
where
|
||||
go 0 = pure ()
|
||||
go sz =
|
||||
getFileChunk h sz >>= \ch -> do
|
||||
send $ byteString ch
|
||||
go $ sz - fromIntegral (B.length ch)
|
||||
|
||||
sendEncFile :: Handle -> (Builder -> IO ()) -> LC.SbState -> Word32 -> IO ()
|
||||
sendEncFile h send = go
|
||||
where
|
||||
@@ -64,46 +54,42 @@ sendEncFile h send = go
|
||||
send (byteString encCh) `E.catch` \(e :: E.SomeException) -> print e >> E.throwIO e
|
||||
go sbState' $ sz - fromIntegral (B.length ch)
|
||||
|
||||
getFileChunk :: Handle -> Word32 -> IO ByteString
|
||||
getFileChunk h sz =
|
||||
B.hGet h fileBlockSize >>= \case
|
||||
"" -> ioe_EOF
|
||||
ch -> pure $ B.take (fromIntegral sz) ch -- sz >= xftpBlockSize
|
||||
|
||||
receiveFile :: (Int -> IO ByteString) -> XFTPRcvChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO ()
|
||||
receiveFile getBody = receiveFile_ receive
|
||||
where
|
||||
receive h sz = do
|
||||
ch <- getBody fileBlockSize
|
||||
let chSize = fromIntegral $ B.length ch
|
||||
if
|
||||
| chSize > sz -> pure $ Left SIZE
|
||||
| chSize > 0 -> B.hPut h ch >> receive h (sz - chSize)
|
||||
| sz == 0 -> pure $ Right ()
|
||||
| otherwise -> pure $ Left SIZE
|
||||
receive h sz = hReceiveFile getBody h sz >>= \sz' -> pure $ if sz' == 0 then Right () else Left SIZE
|
||||
|
||||
receiveEncFile :: (Int -> IO ByteString) -> LC.SbState -> XFTPRcvChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO ()
|
||||
receiveEncFile getBody = receiveFile_ . receive
|
||||
where
|
||||
receive sbState h sz = do
|
||||
receive sbState h sz = first err <$> receiveSbFile getBody h sbState sz
|
||||
err RFESize = SIZE
|
||||
err RFECrypto = CRYPTO
|
||||
|
||||
data ReceiveFileError = RFESize | RFECrypto
|
||||
|
||||
receiveSbFile :: (Int -> IO ByteString) -> Handle -> LC.SbState -> Word32 -> IO (Either ReceiveFileError ())
|
||||
receiveSbFile getBody h = receive
|
||||
where
|
||||
receive sbState sz = do
|
||||
ch <- getBody fileBlockSize
|
||||
let chSize = fromIntegral $ B.length ch
|
||||
if
|
||||
| chSize > sz + authSz -> pure $ Left SIZE
|
||||
| chSize > 0 -> do
|
||||
| chSize > sz + authSz -> pure $ Left RFESize
|
||||
| chSize > 0 -> do
|
||||
let (ch', rest) = B.splitAt (fromIntegral sz) ch
|
||||
(decCh, sbState') = LC.sbDecryptChunk sbState ch'
|
||||
sz' = sz - fromIntegral (B.length ch')
|
||||
B.hPut h decCh
|
||||
if sz' > 0
|
||||
then receive sbState' h sz'
|
||||
then receive sbState' sz'
|
||||
else do
|
||||
let tag' = B.take C.authTagSize rest
|
||||
tagSz = B.length tag'
|
||||
tag = LC.sbAuth sbState'
|
||||
tag'' <- if tagSz == C.authTagSize then pure tag' else (tag' <>) <$> getBody (C.authTagSize - tagSz)
|
||||
pure $ if BA.constEq tag'' tag then Right () else Left CRYPTO
|
||||
| otherwise -> pure $ Left SIZE
|
||||
pure $ if BA.constEq tag'' tag then Right () else Left RFECrypto
|
||||
| otherwise -> pure $ Left RFESize
|
||||
authSz = fromIntegral C.authTagSize
|
||||
|
||||
receiveFile_ :: (Handle -> Word32 -> IO (Either XFTPErrorType ())) -> XFTPRcvChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPErrorType IO ()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import Simplex.FileTransfer.Client (XFTPChunkSpec (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol (RcvFileId, SndFileId)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File (CryptoFile (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (fromTextField_)
|
||||
@@ -46,10 +47,11 @@ data RcvFile = RcvFile
|
||||
key :: C.SbKey,
|
||||
nonce :: C.CbNonce,
|
||||
chunkSize :: FileSize Word32,
|
||||
redirect :: Maybe RcvFileRedirect,
|
||||
chunks :: [RcvFileChunk],
|
||||
prefixPath :: FilePath,
|
||||
tmpPath :: Maybe FilePath,
|
||||
savePath :: FilePath,
|
||||
saveFile :: CryptoFile,
|
||||
status :: RcvFileStatus,
|
||||
deleted :: Bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -100,13 +102,20 @@ data RcvFileChunkReplica = RcvFileChunkReplica
|
||||
{ rcvChunkReplicaId :: Int64,
|
||||
server :: XFTPServer,
|
||||
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
|
||||
replicaKey :: C.APrivateSignKey,
|
||||
replicaKey :: C.APrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
received :: Bool,
|
||||
delay :: Maybe Int64,
|
||||
retries :: Int
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data RcvFileRedirect = RcvFileRedirect
|
||||
{ redirectDbId :: DBRcvFileId,
|
||||
redirectEntityId :: RcvFileId,
|
||||
redirectFileInfo :: RedirectFileInfo
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
-- Sending files
|
||||
|
||||
type DBSndFileId = Int64
|
||||
@@ -120,10 +129,11 @@ data SndFile = SndFile
|
||||
key :: C.SbKey,
|
||||
nonce :: C.CbNonce,
|
||||
chunks :: [SndFileChunk],
|
||||
filePath :: FilePath,
|
||||
srcFile :: CryptoFile,
|
||||
prefixPath :: Maybe FilePath,
|
||||
status :: SndFileStatus,
|
||||
deleted :: Bool
|
||||
deleted :: Bool,
|
||||
redirect :: Maybe RedirectFileInfo
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -180,8 +190,8 @@ sndChunkSize SndFileChunk {chunkSpec = XFTPChunkSpec {chunkSize}} = chunkSize
|
||||
data NewSndChunkReplica = NewSndChunkReplica
|
||||
{ server :: XFTPServer,
|
||||
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
|
||||
replicaKey :: C.APrivateSignKey,
|
||||
rcvIdsKeys :: [(ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateSignKey)]
|
||||
replicaKey :: C.APrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
rcvIdsKeys :: [(ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateAuthKey)]
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -189,8 +199,8 @@ data SndFileChunkReplica = SndFileChunkReplica
|
||||
{ sndChunkReplicaId :: Int64,
|
||||
server :: XFTPServer,
|
||||
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
|
||||
replicaKey :: C.APrivateSignKey,
|
||||
rcvIdsKeys :: [(ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateSignKey)],
|
||||
replicaKey :: C.APrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
rcvIdsKeys :: [(ChunkReplicaId, C.APrivateAuthKey)],
|
||||
replicaStatus :: SndFileReplicaStatus,
|
||||
delay :: Maybe Int64,
|
||||
retries :: Int
|
||||
@@ -220,7 +230,7 @@ data DeletedSndChunkReplica = DeletedSndChunkReplica
|
||||
userId :: Int64,
|
||||
server :: XFTPServer,
|
||||
replicaId :: ChunkReplicaId,
|
||||
replicaKey :: C.APrivateSignKey,
|
||||
replicaKey :: C.APrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
chunkDigest :: FileDigest,
|
||||
delay :: Maybe Int64,
|
||||
retries :: Int
|
||||
|
||||
+580
-508
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
|
||||
defaultAgentConfig,
|
||||
defaultReconnectInterval,
|
||||
tryAgentError,
|
||||
tryAgentError',
|
||||
catchAgentError,
|
||||
agentFinally,
|
||||
Env (..),
|
||||
@@ -27,9 +28,13 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
|
||||
NtfSupervisor (..),
|
||||
NtfSupervisorCommand (..),
|
||||
XFTPAgent (..),
|
||||
Worker (..),
|
||||
RestartCount (..),
|
||||
updateRestartCount,
|
||||
)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Reader
|
||||
@@ -38,6 +43,7 @@ import Data.Int (Int64)
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
|
||||
import Data.Map (Map)
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock (NominalDiffTime, nominalDay)
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..))
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word16)
|
||||
import Network.Socket
|
||||
import Numeric.Natural
|
||||
@@ -49,7 +55,9 @@ import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations as Migrations
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent ()
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Memory (LockedBytes)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Ratchet (supportedE2EEncryptVRange)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Client (defaultNTFClientConfig)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Types
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (NtfServer, XFTPServer, XFTPServerWithAuth, supportedSMPClientVRange)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
@@ -75,7 +83,8 @@ data InitialAgentServers = InitialAgentServers
|
||||
|
||||
data AgentConfig = AgentConfig
|
||||
{ tcpPort :: ServiceName,
|
||||
cmdSignAlg :: C.SignAlg,
|
||||
rcvAuthAlg :: C.AuthAlg,
|
||||
sndAuthAlg :: C.AuthAlg,
|
||||
connIdBytes :: Int,
|
||||
tbqSize :: Natural,
|
||||
smpCfg :: ProtocolClientConfig,
|
||||
@@ -85,13 +94,17 @@ data AgentConfig = AgentConfig
|
||||
messageRetryInterval :: RetryInterval2,
|
||||
messageTimeout :: NominalDiffTime,
|
||||
helloTimeout :: NominalDiffTime,
|
||||
quotaExceededTimeout :: NominalDiffTime,
|
||||
initialCleanupDelay :: Int64,
|
||||
cleanupInterval :: Int64,
|
||||
cleanupStepInterval :: Int,
|
||||
maxWorkerRestartsPerMin :: Int,
|
||||
maxSubscriptionTimeouts :: Int,
|
||||
storedMsgDataTTL :: NominalDiffTime,
|
||||
rcvFilesTTL :: NominalDiffTime,
|
||||
sndFilesTTL :: NominalDiffTime,
|
||||
xftpNotifyErrsOnRetry :: Bool,
|
||||
xftpConsecutiveRetries :: Int,
|
||||
xftpMaxRecipientsPerRequest :: Int,
|
||||
deleteErrorCount :: Int,
|
||||
ntfCron :: Word16,
|
||||
@@ -104,8 +117,7 @@ data AgentConfig = AgentConfig
|
||||
certificateFile :: FilePath,
|
||||
e2eEncryptVRange :: VersionRange,
|
||||
smpAgentVRange :: VersionRange,
|
||||
smpClientVRange :: VersionRange,
|
||||
initialClientId :: Int
|
||||
smpClientVRange :: VersionRange
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
defaultReconnectInterval :: RetryInterval
|
||||
@@ -126,13 +138,10 @@ defaultMessageRetryInterval =
|
||||
maxInterval = 60_000000
|
||||
},
|
||||
riSlow =
|
||||
-- TODO: these timeouts can be increased in v5.0 once most clients are updated
|
||||
-- to resume sending on QCONT messages.
|
||||
-- After that local message expiration period should be also increased.
|
||||
RetryInterval
|
||||
{ initialInterval = 60_000000,
|
||||
{ initialInterval = 180_000000, -- 3 minutes
|
||||
increaseAfter = 60_000000,
|
||||
maxInterval = 3600_000000 -- 1 hour
|
||||
maxInterval = 3 * 3600_000000 -- 3 hours
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -140,30 +149,39 @@ defaultAgentConfig :: AgentConfig
|
||||
defaultAgentConfig =
|
||||
AgentConfig
|
||||
{ tcpPort = "5224",
|
||||
cmdSignAlg = C.SignAlg C.SEd448,
|
||||
-- while the current client version supports X25519, it can only be enabled once support for SMP v6 is dropped,
|
||||
-- and all servers are required to support v7 to be compatible.
|
||||
rcvAuthAlg = C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, -- this will stay as Ed25519
|
||||
sndAuthAlg = C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, -- TODO replace with X25519 when switching to v7
|
||||
connIdBytes = 12,
|
||||
tbqSize = 64,
|
||||
smpCfg = defaultClientConfig {defaultTransport = (show defaultSMPPort, transport @TLS)},
|
||||
ntfCfg = defaultClientConfig {defaultTransport = ("443", transport @TLS)},
|
||||
smpCfg = defaultSMPClientConfig {defaultTransport = (show defaultSMPPort, transport @TLS)},
|
||||
ntfCfg = defaultNTFClientConfig {defaultTransport = ("443", transport @TLS)},
|
||||
xftpCfg = defaultXFTPClientConfig,
|
||||
reconnectInterval = defaultReconnectInterval,
|
||||
messageRetryInterval = defaultMessageRetryInterval,
|
||||
messageTimeout = 2 * nominalDay,
|
||||
helloTimeout = 2 * nominalDay,
|
||||
quotaExceededTimeout = 7 * nominalDay,
|
||||
initialCleanupDelay = 30 * 1000000, -- 30 seconds
|
||||
cleanupInterval = 30 * 60 * 1000000, -- 30 minutes
|
||||
cleanupStepInterval = 200000, -- 200ms
|
||||
maxWorkerRestartsPerMin = 5,
|
||||
-- 3 consecutive subscription timeouts will result in alert to the user
|
||||
-- this is a fallback, as the timeout set to 3x of expected timeout, to avoid potential locking.
|
||||
maxSubscriptionTimeouts = 3,
|
||||
storedMsgDataTTL = 21 * nominalDay,
|
||||
rcvFilesTTL = 2 * nominalDay,
|
||||
sndFilesTTL = nominalDay,
|
||||
xftpNotifyErrsOnRetry = True,
|
||||
xftpConsecutiveRetries = 3,
|
||||
xftpMaxRecipientsPerRequest = 200,
|
||||
deleteErrorCount = 10,
|
||||
ntfCron = 20, -- minutes
|
||||
ntfWorkerDelay = 100000, -- microseconds
|
||||
ntfSMPWorkerDelay = 500000, -- microseconds
|
||||
ntfSubCheckInterval = nominalDay,
|
||||
ntfMaxMessages = 4,
|
||||
ntfMaxMessages = 3,
|
||||
-- CA certificate private key is not needed for initialization
|
||||
-- ! we do not generate these
|
||||
caCertificateFile = "/etc/opt/simplex-agent/ca.crt",
|
||||
@@ -171,37 +189,36 @@ defaultAgentConfig =
|
||||
certificateFile = "/etc/opt/simplex-agent/agent.crt",
|
||||
e2eEncryptVRange = supportedE2EEncryptVRange,
|
||||
smpAgentVRange = supportedSMPAgentVRange,
|
||||
smpClientVRange = supportedSMPClientVRange,
|
||||
initialClientId = 0
|
||||
smpClientVRange = supportedSMPClientVRange
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
data Env = Env
|
||||
{ config :: AgentConfig,
|
||||
store :: SQLiteStore,
|
||||
idsDrg :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
|
||||
clientCounter :: TVar Int,
|
||||
random :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
|
||||
randomServer :: TVar StdGen,
|
||||
ntfSupervisor :: NtfSupervisor,
|
||||
xftpAgent :: XFTPAgent
|
||||
xftpAgent :: XFTPAgent,
|
||||
multicastSubscribers :: TMVar Int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
newSMPAgentEnv :: AgentConfig -> SQLiteStore -> IO Env
|
||||
newSMPAgentEnv config@AgentConfig {initialClientId} store = do
|
||||
idsDrg <- newTVarIO =<< liftIO drgNew
|
||||
clientCounter <- newTVarIO initialClientId
|
||||
newSMPAgentEnv config store = do
|
||||
random <- C.newRandom
|
||||
randomServer <- newTVarIO =<< liftIO newStdGen
|
||||
ntfSupervisor <- atomically . newNtfSubSupervisor $ tbqSize config
|
||||
xftpAgent <- atomically newXFTPAgent
|
||||
pure Env {config, store, idsDrg, clientCounter, randomServer, ntfSupervisor, xftpAgent}
|
||||
multicastSubscribers <- newTMVarIO 0
|
||||
pure Env {config, store, random, randomServer, ntfSupervisor, xftpAgent, multicastSubscribers}
|
||||
|
||||
createAgentStore :: FilePath -> String -> MigrationConfirmation -> IO (Either MigrationError SQLiteStore)
|
||||
createAgentStore dbFilePath dbKey = createSQLiteStore dbFilePath dbKey Migrations.app
|
||||
createAgentStore :: FilePath -> LockedBytes -> Bool -> MigrationConfirmation -> IO (Either MigrationError SQLiteStore)
|
||||
createAgentStore dbFilePath dbKey keepKey = createSQLiteStore dbFilePath dbKey keepKey Migrations.app
|
||||
|
||||
data NtfSupervisor = NtfSupervisor
|
||||
{ ntfTkn :: TVar (Maybe NtfToken),
|
||||
ntfSubQ :: TBQueue (ConnId, NtfSupervisorCommand),
|
||||
ntfWorkers :: TMap NtfServer (TMVar (), Async ()),
|
||||
ntfSMPWorkers :: TMap SMPServer (TMVar (), Async ())
|
||||
ntfWorkers :: TMap NtfServer Worker,
|
||||
ntfSMPWorkers :: TMap SMPServer Worker
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
data NtfSupervisorCommand = NSCCreate | NSCDelete | NSCSmpDelete | NSCNtfWorker NtfServer | NSCNtfSMPWorker SMPServer
|
||||
@@ -218,9 +235,9 @@ newNtfSubSupervisor qSize = do
|
||||
data XFTPAgent = XFTPAgent
|
||||
{ -- if set, XFTP file paths will be considered as relative to this directory
|
||||
xftpWorkDir :: TVar (Maybe FilePath),
|
||||
xftpRcvWorkers :: TMap (Maybe XFTPServer) (TMVar (), Async ()),
|
||||
xftpSndWorkers :: TMap (Maybe XFTPServer) (TMVar (), Async ()),
|
||||
xftpDelWorkers :: TMap XFTPServer (TMVar (), Async ())
|
||||
xftpRcvWorkers :: TMap (Maybe XFTPServer) Worker,
|
||||
xftpSndWorkers :: TMap (Maybe XFTPServer) Worker,
|
||||
xftpDelWorkers :: TMap XFTPServer Worker
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
newXFTPAgent :: STM XFTPAgent
|
||||
@@ -235,6 +252,11 @@ tryAgentError :: AgentMonad m => m a -> m (Either AgentErrorType a)
|
||||
tryAgentError = tryAllErrors mkInternal
|
||||
{-# INLINE tryAgentError #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- unlike runExceptT, this ensures we catch IO exceptions as well
|
||||
tryAgentError' :: AgentMonad' m => ExceptT AgentErrorType m a -> m (Either AgentErrorType a)
|
||||
tryAgentError' = fmap join . runExceptT . tryAgentError
|
||||
{-# INLINE tryAgentError' #-}
|
||||
|
||||
catchAgentError :: AgentMonad m => m a -> (AgentErrorType -> m a) -> m a
|
||||
catchAgentError = catchAllErrors mkInternal
|
||||
{-# INLINE catchAgentError #-}
|
||||
@@ -246,3 +268,20 @@ agentFinally = allFinally mkInternal
|
||||
mkInternal :: SomeException -> AgentErrorType
|
||||
mkInternal = INTERNAL . show
|
||||
{-# INLINE mkInternal #-}
|
||||
|
||||
data Worker = Worker
|
||||
{ workerId :: Int,
|
||||
doWork :: TMVar (),
|
||||
action :: TMVar (Maybe (Async ())),
|
||||
restarts :: TVar RestartCount
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
data RestartCount = RestartCount
|
||||
{ restartMinute :: Int64,
|
||||
restartCount :: Int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
updateRestartCount :: SystemTime -> RestartCount -> RestartCount
|
||||
updateRestartCount t (RestartCount minute count) = do
|
||||
let min' = systemSeconds t `div` 60
|
||||
in RestartCount min' $ if minute == min' then count + 1 else 1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +1,18 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Lock where
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Lock
|
||||
( Lock,
|
||||
createLock,
|
||||
withLock,
|
||||
withGetLock,
|
||||
withGetLocks,
|
||||
)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Monad (void)
|
||||
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
|
||||
import Data.Functor (($>))
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Async (forConcurrently)
|
||||
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
|
||||
import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,9 +28,22 @@ withLock lock name =
|
||||
(atomically $ putTMVar lock name)
|
||||
(void . atomically $ takeTMVar lock)
|
||||
|
||||
withGetLock :: MonadUnliftIO m => STM Lock -> String -> m a -> m a
|
||||
withGetLock getLock name a =
|
||||
withGetLock :: MonadUnliftIO m => (k -> STM Lock) -> k -> String -> m a -> m a
|
||||
withGetLock getLock key name a =
|
||||
E.bracket
|
||||
(atomically $ getLock >>= \l -> putTMVar l name $> l)
|
||||
(atomically $ getPutLock getLock key name)
|
||||
(atomically . takeTMVar)
|
||||
(const a)
|
||||
|
||||
withGetLocks :: MonadUnliftIO m => (k -> STM Lock) -> [k] -> String -> m a -> m a
|
||||
withGetLocks getLock keys name = E.bracket holdLocks releaseLocks . const
|
||||
where
|
||||
holdLocks = forConcurrently keys $ \key -> atomically $ getPutLock getLock key name
|
||||
-- only this withGetLocks would be holding the locks,
|
||||
-- so it's safe to combine all lock releases into one transaction
|
||||
releaseLocks = atomically . mapM_ takeTMVar
|
||||
|
||||
-- getLock and putTMVar can be in one transaction on the assumption that getLock doesn't write in case the lock already exists,
|
||||
-- and in case it is created and added to some shared resource (we use TMap) it also helps avoid contention for the newly created lock.
|
||||
getPutLock :: (k -> STM Lock) -> k -> String -> STM Lock
|
||||
getPutLock getLock key name = getLock key >>= \l -> putTMVar l name $> l
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
|
||||
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-ambiguous-fields #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.NtfSubSupervisor
|
||||
( runNtfSupervisor,
|
||||
@@ -17,7 +18,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.NtfSubSupervisor
|
||||
)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent.STM (stateTVar)
|
||||
import Control.Logger.Simple (logError, logInfo)
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
@@ -37,9 +37,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent ()
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Protocol (NtfSubStatus (..), NtfTknStatus (..), SMPQueueNtf (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Types
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (NtfServer, ProtocolServer, SMPServer, sameSrvAddr)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (NtfServer, SMPServer, sameSrvAddr)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (diffToMicroseconds, threadDelay', tshow, unlessM)
|
||||
import System.Random (randomR)
|
||||
import UnliftIO
|
||||
@@ -51,13 +49,13 @@ runNtfSupervisor c = do
|
||||
ns <- asks ntfSupervisor
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
cmd@(connId, _) <- atomically . readTBQueue $ ntfSubQ ns
|
||||
handleError connId . agentOperationBracket c AONtfNetwork waitUntilActive $
|
||||
handleErr connId . agentOperationBracket c AONtfNetwork waitUntilActive $
|
||||
runExceptT (processNtfSub c cmd) >>= \case
|
||||
Left e -> notifyErr connId e
|
||||
Right _ -> return ()
|
||||
where
|
||||
handleError :: ConnId -> m () -> m ()
|
||||
handleError connId = E.handle $ \(e :: E.SomeException) -> do
|
||||
handleErr :: ConnId -> m () -> m ()
|
||||
handleErr connId = E.handle $ \(e :: E.SomeException) -> do
|
||||
logError $ "runNtfSupervisor error " <> tshow e
|
||||
notifyErr connId e
|
||||
notifyErr connId e = notifyInternalError c connId $ "runNtfSupervisor error " <> show e
|
||||
@@ -74,16 +72,16 @@ processNtfSub c (connId, cmd) = do
|
||||
logInfo $ "processNtfSub, NSCCreate - a = " <> tshow a
|
||||
case a of
|
||||
Nothing -> do
|
||||
withNtfServer c $ \ntfServer -> do
|
||||
withTokenServer $ \ntfServer -> do
|
||||
case clientNtfCreds of
|
||||
Just ClientNtfCreds {notifierId} -> do
|
||||
let newSub = newNtfSubscription connId smpServer (Just notifierId) ntfServer NASKey
|
||||
withStore c $ \db -> createNtfSubscription db newSub $ NtfSubNTFAction NSACreate
|
||||
addNtfNTFWorker ntfServer
|
||||
void $ getNtfNTFWorker True c ntfServer
|
||||
Nothing -> do
|
||||
let newSub = newNtfSubscription connId smpServer Nothing ntfServer NASNew
|
||||
withStore c $ \db -> createNtfSubscription db newSub $ NtfSubSMPAction NSASmpKey
|
||||
addNtfSMPWorker smpServer
|
||||
void $ getNtfSMPWorker True c smpServer
|
||||
(Just (sub@NtfSubscription {ntfSubStatus, ntfServer = subNtfServer, smpServer = smpServer', ntfQueueId}, action_)) -> do
|
||||
case (clientNtfCreds, ntfQueueId) of
|
||||
(Just ClientNtfCreds {notifierId}, Just ntfQueueId')
|
||||
@@ -99,84 +97,74 @@ processNtfSub c (connId, cmd) = do
|
||||
Just (action, _)
|
||||
-- subscription was marked for deletion / is being deleted
|
||||
| isDeleteNtfSubAction action -> do
|
||||
if ntfSubStatus == NASNew || ntfSubStatus == NASOff || ntfSubStatus == NASDeleted
|
||||
then resetSubscription
|
||||
else withNtfServer c $ \ntfServer -> do
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> supervisorUpdateNtfSub db sub {ntfServer} (NtfSubNTFAction NSACreate)
|
||||
addNtfNTFWorker ntfServer
|
||||
if ntfSubStatus == NASNew || ntfSubStatus == NASOff || ntfSubStatus == NASDeleted
|
||||
then resetSubscription
|
||||
else withTokenServer $ \ntfServer -> do
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> supervisorUpdateNtfSub db sub {ntfServer} (NtfSubNTFAction NSACreate)
|
||||
void $ getNtfNTFWorker True c ntfServer
|
||||
| otherwise -> case action of
|
||||
NtfSubNTFAction _ -> addNtfNTFWorker subNtfServer
|
||||
NtfSubSMPAction _ -> addNtfSMPWorker smpServer
|
||||
NtfSubNTFAction _ -> void $ getNtfNTFWorker True c subNtfServer
|
||||
NtfSubSMPAction _ -> void $ getNtfSMPWorker True c smpServer
|
||||
rotate :: m ()
|
||||
rotate = do
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> supervisorUpdateNtfSub db sub (NtfSubNTFAction NSARotate)
|
||||
addNtfNTFWorker subNtfServer
|
||||
void $ getNtfNTFWorker True c subNtfServer
|
||||
resetSubscription :: m ()
|
||||
resetSubscription =
|
||||
withNtfServer c $ \ntfServer -> do
|
||||
withTokenServer $ \ntfServer -> do
|
||||
let sub' = sub {ntfQueueId = Nothing, ntfServer, ntfSubId = Nothing, ntfSubStatus = NASNew}
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> supervisorUpdateNtfSub db sub' (NtfSubSMPAction NSASmpKey)
|
||||
addNtfSMPWorker smpServer
|
||||
void $ getNtfSMPWorker True c smpServer
|
||||
NSCDelete -> do
|
||||
sub_ <- withStore' c $ \db -> do
|
||||
supervisorUpdateNtfAction db connId (NtfSubNTFAction NSADelete)
|
||||
getNtfSubscription db connId
|
||||
logInfo $ "processNtfSub, NSCDelete - sub_ = " <> tshow sub_
|
||||
case sub_ of
|
||||
(Just (NtfSubscription {ntfServer}, _)) -> addNtfNTFWorker ntfServer
|
||||
(Just (NtfSubscription {ntfServer}, _)) -> void $ getNtfNTFWorker True c ntfServer
|
||||
_ -> pure () -- err "NSCDelete - no subscription"
|
||||
NSCSmpDelete -> do
|
||||
withStore' c (`getPrimaryRcvQueue` connId) >>= \case
|
||||
Right rq@RcvQueue {server = smpServer} -> do
|
||||
logInfo $ "processNtfSub, NSCSmpDelete - rq = " <> tshow rq
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> supervisorUpdateNtfAction db connId (NtfSubSMPAction NSASmpDelete)
|
||||
addNtfSMPWorker smpServer
|
||||
void $ getNtfSMPWorker True c smpServer
|
||||
_ -> notifyInternalError c connId "NSCSmpDelete - no rcv queue"
|
||||
NSCNtfWorker ntfServer -> addNtfNTFWorker ntfServer
|
||||
NSCNtfSMPWorker smpServer -> addNtfSMPWorker smpServer
|
||||
where
|
||||
addNtfNTFWorker = addWorker ntfWorkers runNtfWorker
|
||||
addNtfSMPWorker = addWorker ntfSMPWorkers runNtfSMPWorker
|
||||
addWorker ::
|
||||
(NtfSupervisor -> TMap (ProtocolServer s) (TMVar (), Async ())) ->
|
||||
(AgentClient -> ProtocolServer s -> TMVar () -> m ()) ->
|
||||
ProtocolServer s ->
|
||||
m ()
|
||||
addWorker wsSel runWorker srv = do
|
||||
ws <- asks $ wsSel . ntfSupervisor
|
||||
atomically (TM.lookup srv ws) >>= \case
|
||||
Nothing -> do
|
||||
doWork <- newTMVarIO ()
|
||||
worker <- async $ runWorker c srv doWork `agentFinally` atomically (TM.delete srv ws)
|
||||
atomically $ TM.insert srv (doWork, worker) ws
|
||||
Just (doWork, _) ->
|
||||
void . atomically $ tryPutTMVar doWork ()
|
||||
NSCNtfWorker ntfServer -> void $ getNtfNTFWorker True c ntfServer
|
||||
NSCNtfSMPWorker smpServer -> void $ getNtfSMPWorker True c smpServer
|
||||
|
||||
withNtfServer :: AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> (NtfServer -> m ()) -> m ()
|
||||
withNtfServer c action = getNtfServer c >>= mapM_ action
|
||||
getNtfNTFWorker :: AgentMonad' m => Bool -> AgentClient -> NtfServer -> m Worker
|
||||
getNtfNTFWorker hasWork c server = do
|
||||
ws <- asks $ ntfWorkers . ntfSupervisor
|
||||
getAgentWorker "ntf_ntf" hasWork c server ws $ runNtfWorker c server
|
||||
|
||||
runNtfWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> NtfServer -> TMVar () -> m ()
|
||||
runNtfWorker c srv doWork = do
|
||||
getNtfSMPWorker :: AgentMonad' m => Bool -> AgentClient -> SMPServer -> m Worker
|
||||
getNtfSMPWorker hasWork c server = do
|
||||
ws <- asks $ ntfSMPWorkers . ntfSupervisor
|
||||
getAgentWorker "ntf_smp" hasWork c server ws $ runNtfSMPWorker c server
|
||||
|
||||
withTokenServer :: AgentMonad' m => (NtfServer -> m ()) -> m ()
|
||||
withTokenServer action = getNtfToken >>= mapM_ (\NtfToken {ntfServer} -> action ntfServer)
|
||||
|
||||
runNtfWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> NtfServer -> Worker -> m ()
|
||||
runNtfWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
|
||||
delay <- asks $ ntfWorkerDelay . config
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
void . atomically $ readTMVar doWork
|
||||
waitForWork doWork
|
||||
agentOperationBracket c AONtfNetwork throwWhenInactive runNtfOperation
|
||||
threadDelay delay
|
||||
where
|
||||
runNtfOperation :: m ()
|
||||
runNtfOperation = do
|
||||
nextSub_ <- withStore' c (`getNextNtfSubNTFAction` srv)
|
||||
logInfo $ "runNtfWorker, nextSub_ " <> tshow nextSub_
|
||||
case nextSub_ of
|
||||
Nothing -> noWorkToDo
|
||||
Just a@(NtfSubscription {connId}, _, _) -> do
|
||||
runNtfOperation =
|
||||
withWork c doWork (`getNextNtfSubNTFAction` srv) $
|
||||
\nextSub@(NtfSubscription {connId}, _, _) -> do
|
||||
logInfo $ "runNtfWorker, nextSub " <> tshow nextSub
|
||||
ri <- asks $ reconnectInterval . config
|
||||
withRetryInterval ri $ \_ loop ->
|
||||
processAction a
|
||||
processSub nextSub
|
||||
`catchAgentError` retryOnError c "NtfWorker" loop (workerInternalError c connId . show)
|
||||
noWorkToDo = void . atomically $ tryTakeTMVar doWork
|
||||
processAction :: (NtfSubscription, NtfSubNTFAction, NtfActionTs) -> m ()
|
||||
processAction (sub@NtfSubscription {connId, smpServer, ntfSubId}, action, actionTs) = do
|
||||
processSub :: (NtfSubscription, NtfSubNTFAction, NtfActionTs) -> m ()
|
||||
processSub (sub@NtfSubscription {connId, smpServer, ntfSubId}, action, actionTs) = do
|
||||
ts <- liftIO getCurrentTime
|
||||
unlessM (rescheduleAction doWork ts actionTs) $
|
||||
case action of
|
||||
@@ -240,27 +228,24 @@ runNtfWorker c srv doWork = do
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db ->
|
||||
updateNtfSubscription db sub {ntfSubStatus = toStatus} toAction actionTs'
|
||||
|
||||
runNtfSMPWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SMPServer -> TMVar () -> m ()
|
||||
runNtfSMPWorker c srv doWork = do
|
||||
runNtfSMPWorker :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SMPServer -> Worker -> m ()
|
||||
runNtfSMPWorker c srv Worker {doWork} = do
|
||||
delay <- asks $ ntfSMPWorkerDelay . config
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
void . atomically $ readTMVar doWork
|
||||
waitForWork doWork
|
||||
agentOperationBracket c AONtfNetwork throwWhenInactive runNtfSMPOperation
|
||||
threadDelay delay
|
||||
where
|
||||
runNtfSMPOperation = do
|
||||
nextSub_ <- withStore' c (`getNextNtfSubSMPAction` srv)
|
||||
logInfo $ "runNtfSMPWorker, nextSub_ " <> tshow nextSub_
|
||||
case nextSub_ of
|
||||
Nothing -> noWorkToDo
|
||||
Just a@(NtfSubscription {connId}, _, _) -> do
|
||||
runNtfSMPOperation =
|
||||
withWork c doWork (`getNextNtfSubSMPAction` srv) $
|
||||
\nextSub@(NtfSubscription {connId}, _, _) -> do
|
||||
logInfo $ "runNtfSMPWorker, nextSub " <> tshow nextSub
|
||||
ri <- asks $ reconnectInterval . config
|
||||
withRetryInterval ri $ \_ loop ->
|
||||
processAction a
|
||||
processSub nextSub
|
||||
`catchAgentError` retryOnError c "NtfSMPWorker" loop (workerInternalError c connId . show)
|
||||
noWorkToDo = void . atomically $ tryTakeTMVar doWork
|
||||
processAction :: (NtfSubscription, NtfSubSMPAction, NtfActionTs) -> m ()
|
||||
processAction (sub@NtfSubscription {connId, ntfServer}, smpAction, actionTs) = do
|
||||
processSub :: (NtfSubscription, NtfSubSMPAction, NtfActionTs) -> m ()
|
||||
processSub (sub@NtfSubscription {connId, ntfServer}, smpAction, actionTs) = do
|
||||
ts <- liftIO getCurrentTime
|
||||
unlessM (rescheduleAction doWork ts actionTs) $
|
||||
case smpAction of
|
||||
@@ -268,9 +253,10 @@ runNtfSMPWorker c srv doWork = do
|
||||
getNtfToken >>= \case
|
||||
Just NtfToken {ntfTknStatus = NTActive, ntfMode = NMInstant} -> do
|
||||
rq <- withStore c (`getPrimaryRcvQueue` connId)
|
||||
C.SignAlg a <- asks (cmdSignAlg . config)
|
||||
(ntfPublicKey, ntfPrivateKey) <- liftIO $ C.generateSignatureKeyPair a
|
||||
(rcvNtfPubDhKey, rcvNtfPrivDhKey) <- liftIO C.generateKeyPair'
|
||||
C.AuthAlg a <- asks (rcvAuthAlg . config)
|
||||
g <- asks random
|
||||
(ntfPublicKey, ntfPrivateKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair a g
|
||||
(rcvNtfPubDhKey, rcvNtfPrivDhKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
|
||||
(notifierId, rcvNtfSrvPubDhKey) <- enableQueueNotifications c rq ntfPublicKey rcvNtfPubDhKey
|
||||
let rcvNtfDhSecret = C.dh' rcvNtfSrvPubDhKey rcvNtfPrivDhKey
|
||||
withStore' c $ \db -> do
|
||||
@@ -290,11 +276,11 @@ rescheduleAction :: AgentMonad' m => TMVar () -> UTCTime -> UTCTime -> m Bool
|
||||
rescheduleAction doWork ts actionTs
|
||||
| actionTs <= ts = pure False
|
||||
| otherwise = do
|
||||
void . atomically $ tryTakeTMVar doWork
|
||||
void . forkIO $ do
|
||||
liftIO $ threadDelay' $ diffToMicroseconds $ diffUTCTime actionTs ts
|
||||
void . atomically $ tryPutTMVar doWork ()
|
||||
pure True
|
||||
void . atomically $ tryTakeTMVar doWork
|
||||
void . forkIO $ do
|
||||
liftIO $ threadDelay' $ diffToMicroseconds $ diffUTCTime actionTs ts
|
||||
atomically $ hasWorkToDo' doWork
|
||||
pure True
|
||||
|
||||
retryOnError :: AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> Text -> m () -> (AgentErrorType -> m ()) -> AgentErrorType -> m ()
|
||||
retryOnError c name loop done e = do
|
||||
@@ -342,13 +328,10 @@ instantNotifications = \case
|
||||
|
||||
closeNtfSupervisor :: MonadUnliftIO m => NtfSupervisor -> m ()
|
||||
closeNtfSupervisor ns = do
|
||||
cancelNtfWorkers_ $ ntfWorkers ns
|
||||
cancelNtfWorkers_ $ ntfSMPWorkers ns
|
||||
|
||||
cancelNtfWorkers_ :: MonadUnliftIO m => TMap (ProtocolServer s) (TMVar (), Async ()) -> m ()
|
||||
cancelNtfWorkers_ wsVar = do
|
||||
ws <- atomically $ stateTVar wsVar (,M.empty)
|
||||
mapM_ (uninterruptibleCancel . snd) ws
|
||||
stopWorkers $ ntfWorkers ns
|
||||
stopWorkers $ ntfSMPWorkers ns
|
||||
where
|
||||
stopWorkers workers = atomically (swapTVar workers M.empty) >>= mapM_ (liftIO . cancelWorker)
|
||||
|
||||
getNtfServer :: AgentMonad' m => AgentClient -> m (Maybe NtfServer)
|
||||
getNtfServer c = do
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveGeneric #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
|
||||
@@ -13,6 +12,7 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
|
||||
-- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/agent-protocol.md
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
|
||||
( -- * Protocol parameters
|
||||
ratchetSyncSMPAgentVersion,
|
||||
deliveryRcptsSMPAgentVersion,
|
||||
supportedSMPAgentVRange,
|
||||
e2eEncConnInfoLength,
|
||||
e2eEncUserMsgLength,
|
||||
@@ -80,6 +82,8 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
|
||||
SMPServerWithAuth,
|
||||
SrvLoc (..),
|
||||
SMPQueue (..),
|
||||
qAddress,
|
||||
sameQueue,
|
||||
sameQAddress,
|
||||
noAuthSrv,
|
||||
SMPQueueUri (..),
|
||||
@@ -95,7 +99,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
|
||||
AConnectionRequestUri (..),
|
||||
ConnReqUriData (..),
|
||||
CRClientData,
|
||||
ConnReqScheme (..),
|
||||
ServiceScheme,
|
||||
simplexChat,
|
||||
AgentErrorType (..),
|
||||
CommandErrorType (..),
|
||||
@@ -149,7 +153,7 @@ import Control.Monad (unless)
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except (runExceptT, throwError)
|
||||
import Control.Monad.IO.Class
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
|
||||
import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 (Parser)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Base64
|
||||
@@ -162,7 +166,7 @@ import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
|
||||
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
|
||||
import Data.Map (Map)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Map as M
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (isJust)
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe, isJust)
|
||||
import Data.Text (Text)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Text as T
|
||||
import Data.Text.Encoding (decodeLatin1, encodeUtf8)
|
||||
@@ -174,8 +178,6 @@ import Data.Typeable ()
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word32)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.FromField
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.ToField
|
||||
import GHC.Generics (Generic)
|
||||
import Generic.Random (genericArbitraryU)
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Description
|
||||
import Simplex.FileTransfer.Protocol (FileParty (..), XFTPErrorType)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.QueryString
|
||||
@@ -193,32 +195,50 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
MsgId,
|
||||
NMsgMeta,
|
||||
ProtocolServer (..),
|
||||
SMPMsgMeta,
|
||||
SMPServer,
|
||||
SMPServerWithAuth,
|
||||
SndPublicVerifyKey,
|
||||
SrvLoc (..),
|
||||
SndPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
SubscriptionMode,
|
||||
legacyEncodeServer,
|
||||
legacyServerP,
|
||||
legacyStrEncodeServer,
|
||||
noAuthSrv,
|
||||
sameSrvAddr,
|
||||
srvHostnamesSMPClientVersion,
|
||||
pattern ProtoServerWithAuth,
|
||||
pattern SMPServer,
|
||||
)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.ServiceScheme
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (Transport (..), TransportError, serializeTransportError, transportErrorP)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost, TransportHosts_ (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
|
||||
import Test.QuickCheck (Arbitrary (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.RemoteControl.Types
|
||||
import Text.Read
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Exception (Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
-- SMP agent protocol version history:
|
||||
-- 1 - binary protocol encoding (1/1/2022)
|
||||
-- 2 - "duplex" (more efficient) connection handshake (6/9/2022)
|
||||
-- 3 - support ratchet renegotiation (6/30/2023)
|
||||
-- 4 - delivery receipts (7/13/2023)
|
||||
|
||||
duplexHandshakeSMPAgentVersion :: Version
|
||||
duplexHandshakeSMPAgentVersion = 2
|
||||
|
||||
ratchetSyncSMPAgentVersion :: Version
|
||||
ratchetSyncSMPAgentVersion = 3
|
||||
|
||||
deliveryRcptsSMPAgentVersion :: Version
|
||||
deliveryRcptsSMPAgentVersion = 4
|
||||
|
||||
currentSMPAgentVersion :: Version
|
||||
currentSMPAgentVersion = 4
|
||||
|
||||
supportedSMPAgentVRange :: VersionRange
|
||||
supportedSMPAgentVRange = mkVersionRange 1 currentSMPAgentVersion
|
||||
supportedSMPAgentVRange = mkVersionRange duplexHandshakeSMPAgentVersion currentSMPAgentVersion
|
||||
|
||||
-- it is shorter to allow all handshake headers,
|
||||
-- including E2E (double-ratchet) parameters and
|
||||
@@ -313,9 +333,9 @@ type ConnInfo = ByteString
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Parameterized type for SMP agent protocol commands and responses from all participants.
|
||||
data ACommand (p :: AParty) (e :: AEntity) where
|
||||
NEW :: Bool -> AConnectionMode -> ACommand Client AEConn -- response INV
|
||||
NEW :: Bool -> AConnectionMode -> SubscriptionMode -> ACommand Client AEConn -- response INV
|
||||
INV :: AConnectionRequestUri -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
JOIN :: Bool -> AConnectionRequestUri -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Client AEConn -- response OK
|
||||
JOIN :: Bool -> AConnectionRequestUri -> SubscriptionMode -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Client AEConn -- response OK
|
||||
CONF :: ConfirmationId -> [SMPServer] -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Agent AEConn -- ConnInfo is from sender, [SMPServer] will be empty only in v1 handshake
|
||||
LET :: ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Client AEConn -- ConnInfo is from client
|
||||
REQ :: InvitationId -> NonEmpty SMPServer -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Agent AEConn -- ConnInfo is from sender
|
||||
@@ -335,9 +355,11 @@ data ACommand (p :: AParty) (e :: AEntity) where
|
||||
MID :: AgentMsgId -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
SENT :: AgentMsgId -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
MERR :: AgentMsgId -> AgentErrorType -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
MERRS :: NonEmpty AgentMsgId -> AgentErrorType -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
MSG :: MsgMeta -> MsgFlags -> MsgBody -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
MSGNTF :: SMPMsgMeta -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
ACK :: AgentMsgId -> Maybe MsgReceiptInfo -> ACommand Client AEConn
|
||||
RCVD :: MsgMeta -> NonEmpty MsgReceipt -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
RCVD :: MsgMeta -> NonEmpty MsgReceipt -> ACommand Agent AEConn
|
||||
SWCH :: ACommand Client AEConn
|
||||
OFF :: ACommand Client AEConn
|
||||
DEL :: ACommand Client AEConn
|
||||
@@ -395,7 +417,9 @@ data ACommandTag (p :: AParty) (e :: AEntity) where
|
||||
MID_ :: ACommandTag Agent AEConn
|
||||
SENT_ :: ACommandTag Agent AEConn
|
||||
MERR_ :: ACommandTag Agent AEConn
|
||||
MERRS_ :: ACommandTag Agent AEConn
|
||||
MSG_ :: ACommandTag Agent AEConn
|
||||
MSGNTF_ :: ACommandTag Agent AEConn
|
||||
ACK_ :: ACommandTag Client AEConn
|
||||
RCVD_ :: ACommandTag Agent AEConn
|
||||
SWCH_ :: ACommandTag Client AEConn
|
||||
@@ -448,7 +472,9 @@ aCommandTag = \case
|
||||
MID _ -> MID_
|
||||
SENT _ -> SENT_
|
||||
MERR {} -> MERR_
|
||||
MERRS {} -> MERRS_
|
||||
MSG {} -> MSG_
|
||||
MSGNTF {} -> MSGNTF_
|
||||
ACK {} -> ACK_
|
||||
RCVD {} -> RCVD_
|
||||
SWCH -> SWCH_
|
||||
@@ -611,13 +637,11 @@ data RcvQueueInfo = RcvQueueInfo
|
||||
rcvSwitchStatus :: Maybe RcvSwitchStatus,
|
||||
canAbortSwitch :: Bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON RcvQueueInfo where toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding J.defaultOptions {J.omitNothingFields = True}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding RcvQueueInfo where
|
||||
strEncode RcvQueueInfo {rcvServer, rcvSwitchStatus, canAbortSwitch} =
|
||||
"srv=" <> strEncode rcvServer
|
||||
("srv=" <> strEncode rcvServer)
|
||||
<> maybe "" (\switch -> ";switch=" <> strEncode switch) rcvSwitchStatus
|
||||
<> (";can_abort_switch=" <> strEncode canAbortSwitch)
|
||||
strP = do
|
||||
@@ -630,9 +654,7 @@ data SndQueueInfo = SndQueueInfo
|
||||
{ sndServer :: SMPServer,
|
||||
sndSwitchStatus :: Maybe SndSwitchStatus
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON SndQueueInfo where toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding J.defaultOptions {J.omitNothingFields = True}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding SndQueueInfo where
|
||||
strEncode SndQueueInfo {sndServer, sndSwitchStatus} =
|
||||
@@ -649,11 +671,11 @@ data ConnectionStats = ConnectionStats
|
||||
ratchetSyncState :: RatchetSyncState,
|
||||
ratchetSyncSupported :: Bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic)
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding ConnectionStats where
|
||||
strEncode ConnectionStats {connAgentVersion, rcvQueuesInfo, sndQueuesInfo, ratchetSyncState, ratchetSyncSupported} =
|
||||
"agent_version=" <> strEncode connAgentVersion
|
||||
("agent_version=" <> strEncode connAgentVersion)
|
||||
<> (" rcv=" <> strEncodeList rcvQueuesInfo)
|
||||
<> (" snd=" <> strEncodeList sndQueuesInfo)
|
||||
<> (" sync=" <> strEncode ratchetSyncState)
|
||||
@@ -666,8 +688,6 @@ instance StrEncoding ConnectionStats where
|
||||
ratchetSyncSupported <- " sync_supported=" *> strP
|
||||
pure ConnectionStats {connAgentVersion, rcvQueuesInfo, sndQueuesInfo, ratchetSyncState, ratchetSyncSupported}
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON ConnectionStats where toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding J.defaultOptions
|
||||
|
||||
data NotificationsMode = NMPeriodic | NMInstant
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -685,6 +705,9 @@ instance ToJSON NotificationsMode where
|
||||
toEncoding = strToJEncoding
|
||||
toJSON = strToJSON
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON NotificationsMode where
|
||||
parseJSON = strParseJSON "NotificationsMode"
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToField NotificationsMode where toField = toField . strEncode
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromField NotificationsMode where fromField = blobFieldDecoder $ parseAll strP
|
||||
@@ -771,7 +794,7 @@ instance StrEncoding MsgMeta where
|
||||
|
||||
data SMPConfirmation = SMPConfirmation
|
||||
{ -- | sender's public key to use for authentication of sender's commands at the recepient's server
|
||||
senderKey :: SndPublicVerifyKey,
|
||||
senderKey :: SndPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
-- | sender's DH public key for simple per-queue e2e encryption
|
||||
e2ePubKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519,
|
||||
-- | sender's information to be associated with the connection, e.g. sender's profile information
|
||||
@@ -838,9 +861,10 @@ instance Encoding AgentMsgEnvelope where
|
||||
-- or in case of AgentInvitation - in plain text body)
|
||||
-- AgentRatchetInfo is not encrypted with double ratchet, but with per-queue E2E encryption
|
||||
data AgentMessage
|
||||
= AgentConnInfo ConnInfo
|
||||
| -- AgentConnInfoReply is only used in duplexHandshake mode (v2), allowing to include reply queue(s) in the initial confirmation.
|
||||
-- It makes REPLY message unnecessary.
|
||||
= -- used by the initiating party when confirming reply queue
|
||||
AgentConnInfo ConnInfo
|
||||
| -- AgentConnInfoReply is used by accepting party in duplexHandshake mode (v2), allowing to include reply queue(s) in the initial confirmation.
|
||||
-- It made removed REPLY message unnecessary.
|
||||
AgentConnInfoReply (NonEmpty SMPQueueInfo) ConnInfo
|
||||
| AgentRatchetInfo ByteString
|
||||
| AgentMessage APrivHeader AMessage
|
||||
@@ -922,8 +946,6 @@ agentMessageType = \case
|
||||
-- until the queue is secured - the OK response from the server instead of initial AUTH errors confirms it.
|
||||
-- - in v2 duplexHandshake it is sent only once, when it is known that the queue was secured.
|
||||
HELLO -> AM_HELLO_
|
||||
-- REPLY is only used in v1
|
||||
REPLY _ -> AM_REPLY_
|
||||
A_MSG _ -> AM_A_MSG_
|
||||
A_RCVD {} -> AM_A_RCVD_
|
||||
QCONT _ -> AM_QCONT_
|
||||
@@ -948,7 +970,6 @@ instance Encoding APrivHeader where
|
||||
|
||||
data AMsgType
|
||||
= HELLO_
|
||||
| REPLY_
|
||||
| A_MSG_
|
||||
| A_RCVD_
|
||||
| QCONT_
|
||||
@@ -962,7 +983,6 @@ data AMsgType
|
||||
instance Encoding AMsgType where
|
||||
smpEncode = \case
|
||||
HELLO_ -> "H"
|
||||
REPLY_ -> "R"
|
||||
A_MSG_ -> "M"
|
||||
A_RCVD_ -> "V"
|
||||
QCONT_ -> "QC"
|
||||
@@ -974,7 +994,6 @@ instance Encoding AMsgType where
|
||||
smpP =
|
||||
A.anyChar >>= \case
|
||||
'H' -> pure HELLO_
|
||||
'R' -> pure REPLY_
|
||||
'M' -> pure A_MSG_
|
||||
'V' -> pure A_RCVD_
|
||||
'Q' ->
|
||||
@@ -994,18 +1013,16 @@ instance Encoding AMsgType where
|
||||
data AMessage
|
||||
= -- | the first message in the queue to validate it is secured
|
||||
HELLO
|
||||
| -- | reply queues information
|
||||
REPLY (NonEmpty SMPQueueInfo)
|
||||
| -- | agent envelope for the client message
|
||||
A_MSG MsgBody
|
||||
| -- | agent envelope for delivery receipt
|
||||
| -- | agent envelope for delivery receipt
|
||||
A_RCVD (NonEmpty AMessageReceipt)
|
||||
| -- | the message instructing the client to continue sending messages (after ERR QUOTA)
|
||||
QCONT SndQAddr
|
||||
| -- add queue to connection (sent by recipient), with optional address of the replaced queue
|
||||
QADD (NonEmpty (SMPQueueUri, Maybe SndQAddr))
|
||||
| -- key to secure the added queues and agree e2e encryption key (sent by sender)
|
||||
QKEY (NonEmpty (SMPQueueInfo, SndPublicVerifyKey))
|
||||
QKEY (NonEmpty (SMPQueueInfo, SndPublicAuthKey))
|
||||
| -- inform that the queues are ready to use (sent by recipient)
|
||||
QUSE (NonEmpty (SndQAddr, Bool))
|
||||
| -- sent by the sender to test new queues and to complete switching
|
||||
@@ -1038,7 +1055,7 @@ instance StrEncoding MsgReceiptStatus where
|
||||
MROk -> "ok"
|
||||
MRBadMsgHash -> "badMsgHash"
|
||||
strP =
|
||||
A.takeWhile1 (/= ' ') >>= \ case
|
||||
A.takeWhile1 (/= ' ') >>= \case
|
||||
"ok" -> pure MROk
|
||||
"badMsgHash" -> pure MRBadMsgHash
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad MsgReceiptStatus"
|
||||
@@ -1047,6 +1064,9 @@ instance ToJSON MsgReceiptStatus where
|
||||
toJSON = strToJSON
|
||||
toEncoding = strToJEncoding
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON MsgReceiptStatus where
|
||||
parseJSON = strParseJSON "MsgReceiptStatus"
|
||||
|
||||
type MsgReceiptInfo = ByteString
|
||||
|
||||
type SndQAddr = (SMPServer, SMP.SenderId)
|
||||
@@ -1054,7 +1074,6 @@ type SndQAddr = (SMPServer, SMP.SenderId)
|
||||
instance Encoding AMessage where
|
||||
smpEncode = \case
|
||||
HELLO -> smpEncode HELLO_
|
||||
REPLY smpQueues -> smpEncode (REPLY_, smpQueues)
|
||||
A_MSG body -> smpEncode (A_MSG_, Tail body)
|
||||
A_RCVD mrs -> smpEncode (A_RCVD_, mrs)
|
||||
QCONT addr -> smpEncode (QCONT_, addr)
|
||||
@@ -1067,7 +1086,6 @@ instance Encoding AMessage where
|
||||
smpP
|
||||
>>= \case
|
||||
HELLO_ -> pure HELLO
|
||||
REPLY_ -> REPLY <$> smpP
|
||||
A_MSG_ -> A_MSG . unTail <$> smpP
|
||||
A_RCVD_ -> A_RCVD <$> smpP
|
||||
QCONT_ -> QCONT <$> smpP
|
||||
@@ -1115,20 +1133,25 @@ instance forall m. ConnectionModeI m => StrEncoding (ConnectionRequestUri m) whe
|
||||
instance StrEncoding AConnectionRequestUri where
|
||||
strEncode (ACR _ cr) = strEncode cr
|
||||
strP = do
|
||||
crScheme <- strP
|
||||
_crScheme :: ServiceScheme <- strP
|
||||
crMode <- A.char '/' *> crModeP <* optional (A.char '/') <* "#/?"
|
||||
query <- strP
|
||||
crAgentVRange <- queryParam "v" query
|
||||
aVRange <- queryParam "v" query
|
||||
crSmpQueues <- queryParam "smp" query
|
||||
let crClientData = safeDecodeUtf8 <$> queryParamStr "data" query
|
||||
let crData = ConnReqUriData {crScheme, crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues, crClientData}
|
||||
let crData = ConnReqUriData {crScheme = SSSimplex, crAgentVRange = aVRange, crSmpQueues, crClientData}
|
||||
case crMode of
|
||||
CMInvitation -> do
|
||||
crE2eParams <- queryParam "e2e" query
|
||||
pure . ACR SCMInvitation $ CRInvitationUri crData crE2eParams
|
||||
CMContact -> pure . ACR SCMContact $ CRContactUri crData
|
||||
-- contact links are adjusted to the minimum version supported by the agent
|
||||
-- to preserve compatibility with the old links published online
|
||||
CMContact -> pure . ACR SCMContact $ CRContactUri crData {crAgentVRange = adjustAgentVRange aVRange}
|
||||
where
|
||||
crModeP = "invitation" $> CMInvitation <|> "contact" $> CMContact
|
||||
adjustAgentVRange vr =
|
||||
let v = max duplexHandshakeSMPAgentVersion $ minVersion vr
|
||||
in fromMaybe vr $ safeVersionRange v (max v $ maxVersion vr)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ConnectionModeI m => FromJSON (ConnectionRequestUri m) where
|
||||
parseJSON = strParseJSON "ConnectionRequestUri"
|
||||
@@ -1195,8 +1218,15 @@ updateSMPServerHosts srv@ProtocolServer {host} = case host of
|
||||
|
||||
class SMPQueue q where
|
||||
qServer :: q -> SMPServer
|
||||
qAddress :: q -> (SMPServer, SMP.QueueId)
|
||||
sameQueue :: (SMPServer, SMP.QueueId) -> q -> Bool
|
||||
queueId :: q -> SMP.QueueId
|
||||
|
||||
qAddress :: SMPQueue q => q -> (SMPServer, SMP.QueueId)
|
||||
qAddress q = (qServer q, queueId q)
|
||||
{-# INLINE qAddress #-}
|
||||
|
||||
sameQueue :: SMPQueue q => (SMPServer, SMP.QueueId) -> q -> Bool
|
||||
sameQueue addr q = sameQAddress addr (qAddress q)
|
||||
{-# INLINE sameQueue #-}
|
||||
|
||||
data SMPQueueInfo = SMPQueueInfo {clientVersion :: Version, queueAddress :: SMPQueueAddress}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
@@ -1241,26 +1271,20 @@ data SMPQueueAddress = SMPQueueAddress
|
||||
instance SMPQueue SMPQueueUri where
|
||||
qServer SMPQueueUri {queueAddress} = qServer queueAddress
|
||||
{-# INLINE qServer #-}
|
||||
qAddress SMPQueueUri {queueAddress} = qAddress queueAddress
|
||||
{-# INLINE qAddress #-}
|
||||
sameQueue addr q = sameQAddress addr (qAddress q)
|
||||
{-# INLINE sameQueue #-}
|
||||
queueId SMPQueueUri {queueAddress} = queueId queueAddress
|
||||
{-# INLINE queueId #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance SMPQueue SMPQueueInfo where
|
||||
qServer SMPQueueInfo {queueAddress} = qServer queueAddress
|
||||
{-# INLINE qServer #-}
|
||||
qAddress SMPQueueInfo {queueAddress} = qAddress queueAddress
|
||||
{-# INLINE qAddress #-}
|
||||
sameQueue addr q = sameQAddress addr (qAddress q)
|
||||
{-# INLINE sameQueue #-}
|
||||
queueId SMPQueueInfo {queueAddress} = queueId queueAddress
|
||||
{-# INLINE queueId #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance SMPQueue SMPQueueAddress where
|
||||
qServer SMPQueueAddress {smpServer} = smpServer
|
||||
{-# INLINE qServer #-}
|
||||
qAddress SMPQueueAddress {smpServer, senderId} = (smpServer, senderId)
|
||||
{-# INLINE qAddress #-}
|
||||
sameQueue addr q = sameQAddress addr (qAddress q)
|
||||
{-# INLINE sameQueue #-}
|
||||
queueId SMPQueueAddress {senderId} = senderId
|
||||
{-# INLINE queueId #-}
|
||||
|
||||
sameQAddress :: (SMPServer, SMP.QueueId) -> (SMPServer, SMP.QueueId) -> Bool
|
||||
sameQAddress (srv, qId) (srv', qId') = sameSrvAddr srv srv' && qId == qId'
|
||||
@@ -1268,7 +1292,7 @@ sameQAddress (srv, qId) (srv', qId') = sameSrvAddr srv srv' && qId == qId'
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding SMPQueueUri where
|
||||
strEncode (SMPQueueUri vr SMPQueueAddress {smpServer = srv, senderId = qId, dhPublicKey})
|
||||
| minVersion vr > 1 = strEncode srv <> "/" <> strEncode qId <> "#/?" <> query queryParams
|
||||
| minVersion vr >= srvHostnamesSMPClientVersion = strEncode srv <> "/" <> strEncode qId <> "#/?" <> query queryParams
|
||||
| otherwise = legacyStrEncodeServer srv <> "/" <> strEncode qId <> "#/?" <> query (queryParams <> srvParam)
|
||||
where
|
||||
query = strEncode . QSP QEscape
|
||||
@@ -1280,7 +1304,7 @@ instance StrEncoding SMPQueueUri where
|
||||
senderId <- strP <* optional (A.char '/') <* A.char '#'
|
||||
(vr, hs, dhPublicKey) <- unversioned <|> versioned
|
||||
let srv' = srv {host = h :| host <> hs}
|
||||
smpServer = if maxVersion vr == 1 then updateSMPServerHosts srv' else srv'
|
||||
smpServer = if maxVersion vr < srvHostnamesSMPClientVersion then updateSMPServerHosts srv' else srv'
|
||||
pure $ SMPQueueUri vr SMPQueueAddress {smpServer, senderId, dhPublicKey}
|
||||
where
|
||||
unversioned = (versionToRange 1,[],) <$> strP <* A.endOfInput
|
||||
@@ -1319,7 +1343,7 @@ instance Eq AConnectionRequestUri where
|
||||
deriving instance Show AConnectionRequestUri
|
||||
|
||||
data ConnReqUriData = ConnReqUriData
|
||||
{ crScheme :: ConnReqScheme,
|
||||
{ crScheme :: ServiceScheme,
|
||||
crAgentVRange :: VersionRange,
|
||||
crSmpQueues :: NonEmpty SMPQueueUri,
|
||||
crClientData :: Maybe CRClientData
|
||||
@@ -1328,20 +1352,6 @@ data ConnReqUriData = ConnReqUriData
|
||||
|
||||
type CRClientData = Text
|
||||
|
||||
data ConnReqScheme = CRSSimplex | CRSAppServer SrvLoc
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding ConnReqScheme where
|
||||
strEncode = \case
|
||||
CRSSimplex -> "simplex:"
|
||||
CRSAppServer srv -> "https://" <> strEncode srv
|
||||
strP =
|
||||
"simplex:" $> CRSSimplex
|
||||
<|> "https://" *> (CRSAppServer <$> strP)
|
||||
|
||||
simplexChat :: ConnReqScheme
|
||||
simplexChat = CRSAppServer $ SrvLoc "simplex.chat" ""
|
||||
|
||||
-- | SMP queue status.
|
||||
data QueueStatus
|
||||
= -- | queue is created
|
||||
@@ -1377,7 +1387,7 @@ type AgentMsgId = Int64
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Result of received message integrity validation.
|
||||
data MsgIntegrity = MsgOk | MsgError {errorInfo :: MsgErrorType}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic)
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding MsgIntegrity where
|
||||
strP = "OK" $> MsgOk <|> "ERR " *> (MsgError <$> strP)
|
||||
@@ -1385,20 +1395,13 @@ instance StrEncoding MsgIntegrity where
|
||||
MsgOk -> "OK"
|
||||
MsgError e -> "ERR " <> strEncode e
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON MsgIntegrity where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON $ sumTypeJSON fstToLower
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding $ sumTypeJSON fstToLower
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON MsgIntegrity where
|
||||
parseJSON = J.genericParseJSON $ sumTypeJSON fstToLower
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Error of message integrity validation.
|
||||
data MsgErrorType
|
||||
= MsgSkipped {fromMsgId :: AgentMsgId, toMsgId :: AgentMsgId}
|
||||
| MsgBadId {msgId :: AgentMsgId}
|
||||
| MsgBadHash
|
||||
| MsgDuplicate
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic)
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding MsgErrorType where
|
||||
strP =
|
||||
@@ -1413,13 +1416,6 @@ instance StrEncoding MsgErrorType where
|
||||
MsgBadHash -> "HASH"
|
||||
MsgDuplicate -> "DUPLICATE"
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON MsgErrorType where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON $ sumTypeJSON fstToLower
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding $ sumTypeJSON fstToLower
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON MsgErrorType where
|
||||
parseJSON = J.genericParseJSON $ sumTypeJSON fstToLower
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Error type used in errors sent to agent clients.
|
||||
data AgentErrorType
|
||||
= -- | command or response error
|
||||
@@ -1432,19 +1428,19 @@ data AgentErrorType
|
||||
NTF {ntfErr :: ErrorType}
|
||||
| -- | XFTP protocol errors forwarded to agent clients
|
||||
XFTP {xftpErr :: XFTPErrorType}
|
||||
| -- | XRCP protocol errors forwarded to agent clients
|
||||
RCP {rcpErr :: RCErrorType}
|
||||
| -- | SMP server errors
|
||||
BROKER {brokerAddress :: String, brokerErr :: BrokerErrorType}
|
||||
| -- | errors of other agents
|
||||
AGENT {agentErr :: SMPAgentError}
|
||||
| -- | agent implementation or dependency errors
|
||||
INTERNAL {internalErr :: String}
|
||||
| -- | critical agent errors that should be shown to the user, optionally with restart button
|
||||
CRITICAL {offerRestart :: Bool, criticalErr :: String}
|
||||
| -- | agent inactive
|
||||
INACTIVE
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Generic, Show, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON AgentErrorType where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | SMP agent protocol command or response error.
|
||||
data CommandErrorType
|
||||
@@ -1458,11 +1454,7 @@ data CommandErrorType
|
||||
SIZE
|
||||
| -- | message does not fit in SMP block
|
||||
LARGE
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON CommandErrorType where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Read, Show, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Connection error.
|
||||
data ConnectionErrorType
|
||||
@@ -1476,11 +1468,7 @@ data ConnectionErrorType
|
||||
NOT_ACCEPTED
|
||||
| -- | connection not available on reply confirmation/HELLO after timeout
|
||||
NOT_AVAILABLE
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON ConnectionErrorType where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Read, Show, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | SMP server errors.
|
||||
data BrokerErrorType
|
||||
@@ -1496,11 +1484,7 @@ data BrokerErrorType
|
||||
TRANSPORT {transportErr :: TransportError}
|
||||
| -- | command response timeout
|
||||
TIMEOUT
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON BrokerErrorType where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Read, Show, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Errors of another SMP agent.
|
||||
data SMPAgentError
|
||||
@@ -1517,7 +1501,7 @@ data SMPAgentError
|
||||
A_DUPLICATE
|
||||
| -- | error in the message to add/delete/etc queue in connection
|
||||
A_QUEUE {queueErr :: String}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Read, Show, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
data AgentCryptoError
|
||||
= -- | AES decryption error
|
||||
@@ -1530,11 +1514,9 @@ data AgentCryptoError
|
||||
RATCHET_EARLIER Word32
|
||||
| -- | too many skipped messages
|
||||
RATCHET_SKIPPED Word32
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON AgentCryptoError where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
| -- | ratchet synchronization error
|
||||
RATCHET_SYNC
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Read, Show, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding AgentCryptoError where
|
||||
strP =
|
||||
@@ -1543,16 +1525,14 @@ instance StrEncoding AgentCryptoError where
|
||||
<|> "RATCHET_HEADER" $> RATCHET_HEADER
|
||||
<|> "RATCHET_EARLIER " *> (RATCHET_EARLIER <$> strP)
|
||||
<|> "RATCHET_SKIPPED " *> (RATCHET_SKIPPED <$> strP)
|
||||
<|> "RATCHET_SYNC" $> RATCHET_SYNC
|
||||
strEncode = \case
|
||||
DECRYPT_AES -> "DECRYPT_AES"
|
||||
DECRYPT_CB -> "DECRYPT_CB"
|
||||
RATCHET_HEADER -> "RATCHET_HEADER"
|
||||
RATCHET_EARLIER n -> "RATCHET_EARLIER " <> strEncode n
|
||||
RATCHET_SKIPPED n -> "RATCHET_SKIPPED " <> strEncode n
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON SMPAgentError where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
RATCHET_SYNC -> "RATCHET_SYNC"
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding AgentErrorType where
|
||||
strP =
|
||||
@@ -1561,6 +1541,7 @@ instance StrEncoding AgentErrorType where
|
||||
<|> "SMP " *> (SMP <$> strP)
|
||||
<|> "NTF " *> (NTF <$> strP)
|
||||
<|> "XFTP " *> (XFTP <$> strP)
|
||||
<|> "RCP " *> (RCP <$> strP)
|
||||
<|> "BROKER " *> (BROKER <$> textP <* " RESPONSE " <*> (RESPONSE <$> textP))
|
||||
<|> "BROKER " *> (BROKER <$> textP <* " TRANSPORT " <*> (TRANSPORT <$> transportErrorP))
|
||||
<|> "BROKER " *> (BROKER <$> textP <* A.space <*> parseRead1)
|
||||
@@ -1568,6 +1549,7 @@ instance StrEncoding AgentErrorType where
|
||||
<|> "AGENT QUEUE " *> (AGENT . A_QUEUE <$> parseRead A.takeByteString)
|
||||
<|> "AGENT " *> (AGENT <$> parseRead1)
|
||||
<|> "INTERNAL " *> (INTERNAL <$> parseRead A.takeByteString)
|
||||
<|> "CRITICAL " *> (CRITICAL <$> parseRead1 <* A.space <*> parseRead A.takeByteString)
|
||||
<|> "INACTIVE" $> INACTIVE
|
||||
where
|
||||
textP = T.unpack . safeDecodeUtf8 <$> A.takeTill (== ' ')
|
||||
@@ -1577,6 +1559,7 @@ instance StrEncoding AgentErrorType where
|
||||
SMP e -> "SMP " <> strEncode e
|
||||
NTF e -> "NTF " <> strEncode e
|
||||
XFTP e -> "XFTP " <> strEncode e
|
||||
RCP e -> "RCP " <> strEncode e
|
||||
BROKER srv (RESPONSE e) -> "BROKER " <> text srv <> " RESPONSE " <> text e
|
||||
BROKER srv (TRANSPORT e) -> "BROKER " <> text srv <> " TRANSPORT " <> serializeTransportError e
|
||||
BROKER srv e -> "BROKER " <> text srv <> " " <> bshow e
|
||||
@@ -1584,22 +1567,11 @@ instance StrEncoding AgentErrorType where
|
||||
AGENT (A_QUEUE e) -> "AGENT QUEUE " <> bshow e
|
||||
AGENT e -> "AGENT " <> bshow e
|
||||
INTERNAL e -> "INTERNAL " <> bshow e
|
||||
CRITICAL restart e -> "CRITICAL " <> bshow restart <> " " <> bshow e
|
||||
INACTIVE -> "INACTIVE"
|
||||
where
|
||||
text = encodeUtf8 . T.pack
|
||||
|
||||
instance Arbitrary AgentErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
|
||||
|
||||
instance Arbitrary CommandErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
|
||||
|
||||
instance Arbitrary ConnectionErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
|
||||
|
||||
instance Arbitrary BrokerErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
|
||||
|
||||
instance Arbitrary SMPAgentError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
|
||||
|
||||
instance Arbitrary AgentCryptoError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
|
||||
|
||||
cryptoErrToSyncState :: AgentCryptoError -> RatchetSyncState
|
||||
cryptoErrToSyncState = \case
|
||||
DECRYPT_AES -> RSAllowed
|
||||
@@ -1607,6 +1579,7 @@ cryptoErrToSyncState = \case
|
||||
RATCHET_HEADER -> RSRequired
|
||||
RATCHET_EARLIER _ -> RSAllowed
|
||||
RATCHET_SKIPPED _ -> RSRequired
|
||||
RATCHET_SYNC -> RSRequired
|
||||
|
||||
-- | SMP agent command and response parser for commands passed via network (only parses binary length)
|
||||
networkCommandP :: Parser ACmd
|
||||
@@ -1642,7 +1615,9 @@ instance StrEncoding ACmdTag where
|
||||
"MID" -> ct MID_
|
||||
"SENT" -> ct SENT_
|
||||
"MERR" -> ct MERR_
|
||||
"MERRS" -> ct MERRS_
|
||||
"MSG" -> ct MSG_
|
||||
"MSGNTF" -> ct MSGNTF_
|
||||
"ACK" -> t ACK_
|
||||
"RCVD" -> ct RCVD_
|
||||
"SWCH" -> t SWCH_
|
||||
@@ -1697,7 +1672,9 @@ instance (APartyI p, AEntityI e) => StrEncoding (ACommandTag p e) where
|
||||
MID_ -> "MID"
|
||||
SENT_ -> "SENT"
|
||||
MERR_ -> "MERR"
|
||||
MERRS_ -> "MERRS"
|
||||
MSG_ -> "MSG"
|
||||
MSGNTF_ -> "MSGNTF"
|
||||
ACK_ -> "ACK"
|
||||
RCVD_ -> "RCVD"
|
||||
SWCH_ -> "SWCH"
|
||||
@@ -1736,8 +1713,8 @@ commandP binaryP =
|
||||
>>= \case
|
||||
ACmdTag SClient e cmd ->
|
||||
ACmd SClient e <$> case cmd of
|
||||
NEW_ -> s (NEW <$> strP_ <*> strP)
|
||||
JOIN_ -> s (JOIN <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> binaryP)
|
||||
NEW_ -> s (NEW <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> (strP <|> pure SMP.SMSubscribe))
|
||||
JOIN_ -> s (JOIN <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> (strP_ <|> pure SMP.SMSubscribe) <*> binaryP)
|
||||
LET_ -> s (LET <$> A.takeTill (== ' ') <* A.space <*> binaryP)
|
||||
ACPT_ -> s (ACPT <$> A.takeTill (== ' ') <* A.space <*> binaryP)
|
||||
RJCT_ -> s (RJCT <$> A.takeByteString)
|
||||
@@ -1765,7 +1742,9 @@ commandP binaryP =
|
||||
MID_ -> s (MID <$> A.decimal)
|
||||
SENT_ -> s (SENT <$> A.decimal)
|
||||
MERR_ -> s (MERR <$> A.decimal <* A.space <*> strP)
|
||||
MERRS_ -> s (MERRS <$> strP_ <*> strP)
|
||||
MSG_ -> s (MSG <$> strP <* A.space <*> smpP <* A.space <*> binaryP)
|
||||
MSGNTF_ -> s (MSGNTF <$> strP)
|
||||
RCVD_ -> s (RCVD <$> strP <* A.space <*> strP)
|
||||
DEL_RCVQ_ -> s (DEL_RCVQ <$> strP_ <*> strP_ <*> strP)
|
||||
DEL_CONN_ -> pure DEL_CONN
|
||||
@@ -1798,9 +1777,9 @@ parseCommand = parse (commandP A.takeByteString) $ CMD SYNTAX
|
||||
-- | Serialize SMP agent command.
|
||||
serializeCommand :: ACommand p e -> ByteString
|
||||
serializeCommand = \case
|
||||
NEW ntfs cMode -> s (NEW_, ntfs, cMode)
|
||||
NEW ntfs cMode subMode -> s (NEW_, ntfs, cMode, subMode)
|
||||
INV cReq -> s (INV_, cReq)
|
||||
JOIN ntfs cReq cInfo -> s (JOIN_, ntfs, cReq, Str $ serializeBinary cInfo)
|
||||
JOIN ntfs cReq subMode cInfo -> s (JOIN_, ntfs, cReq, subMode, Str $ serializeBinary cInfo)
|
||||
CONF confId srvs cInfo -> B.unwords [s CONF_, confId, strEncodeList srvs, serializeBinary cInfo]
|
||||
LET confId cInfo -> B.unwords [s LET_, confId, serializeBinary cInfo]
|
||||
REQ invId srvs cInfo -> B.unwords [s REQ_, invId, s srvs, serializeBinary cInfo]
|
||||
@@ -1816,11 +1795,13 @@ serializeCommand = \case
|
||||
SWITCH dir phase srvs -> s (SWITCH_, dir, phase, srvs)
|
||||
RSYNC rrState cryptoErr cstats -> s (RSYNC_, rrState, cryptoErr, cstats)
|
||||
SEND msgFlags msgBody -> B.unwords [s SEND_, smpEncode msgFlags, serializeBinary msgBody]
|
||||
MID mId -> s (MID_, Str $ bshow mId)
|
||||
SENT mId -> s (SENT_, Str $ bshow mId)
|
||||
MERR mId e -> s (MERR_, Str $ bshow mId, e)
|
||||
MID mId -> s (MID_, mId)
|
||||
SENT mId -> s (SENT_, mId)
|
||||
MERR mId e -> s (MERR_, mId, e)
|
||||
MERRS mIds e -> s (MERRS_, mIds, e)
|
||||
MSG msgMeta msgFlags msgBody -> B.unwords [s MSG_, s msgMeta, smpEncode msgFlags, serializeBinary msgBody]
|
||||
ACK mId rcptInfo_ -> s (ACK_, Str $ bshow mId) <> maybe "" (B.cons ' ' . serializeBinary) rcptInfo_
|
||||
MSGNTF smpMsgMeta -> s (MSGNTF_, smpMsgMeta)
|
||||
ACK mId rcptInfo_ -> s (ACK_, mId) <> maybe "" (B.cons ' ' . serializeBinary) rcptInfo_
|
||||
RCVD msgMeta rcpts -> s (RCVD_, msgMeta, rcpts)
|
||||
SWCH -> s SWCH_
|
||||
OFF -> s OFF_
|
||||
@@ -1905,7 +1886,7 @@ tGet party h = liftIO (tGetRaw h) >>= tParseLoadBody
|
||||
APC e <$$> case cmd of
|
||||
SEND msgFlags body -> SEND msgFlags <$$> getBody body
|
||||
MSG msgMeta msgFlags body -> MSG msgMeta msgFlags <$$> getBody body
|
||||
JOIN ntfs qUri cInfo -> JOIN ntfs qUri <$$> getBody cInfo
|
||||
JOIN ntfs qUri subMode cInfo -> JOIN ntfs qUri subMode <$$> getBody cInfo
|
||||
CONF confId srvs cInfo -> CONF confId srvs <$$> getBody cInfo
|
||||
LET confId cInfo -> LET confId <$$> getBody cInfo
|
||||
REQ invId srvs cInfo -> REQ invId srvs <$$> getBody cInfo
|
||||
@@ -1925,3 +1906,25 @@ tGet party h = liftIO (tGetRaw h) >>= tParseLoadBody
|
||||
unless (B.null s) $ throwError $ CMD SIZE
|
||||
pure body
|
||||
Nothing -> return . Left $ CMD SYNTAX
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''RcvQueueInfo)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''SndQueueInfo)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''ConnectionStats)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON fstToLower) ''MsgErrorType)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON fstToLower) ''MsgIntegrity)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''CommandErrorType)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''ConnectionErrorType)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''BrokerErrorType)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''AgentCryptoError)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''SMPAgentError)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''AgentErrorType)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
|
||||
@@ -9,6 +8,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
|
||||
RetryIntervalMode (..),
|
||||
RI2State (..),
|
||||
withRetryInterval,
|
||||
withRetryIntervalCount,
|
||||
withRetryLock2,
|
||||
updateRetryInterval2,
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -49,15 +49,18 @@ data RetryIntervalMode = RISlow | RIFast
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
withRetryInterval :: forall m a. MonadIO m => RetryInterval -> (Int64 -> m a -> m a) -> m a
|
||||
withRetryInterval ri action = callAction 0 $ initialInterval ri
|
||||
withRetryInterval ri = withRetryIntervalCount ri . const
|
||||
|
||||
withRetryIntervalCount :: forall m a. MonadIO m => RetryInterval -> (Int -> Int64 -> m a -> m a) -> m a
|
||||
withRetryIntervalCount ri action = callAction 0 0 $ initialInterval ri
|
||||
where
|
||||
callAction :: Int64 -> Int64 -> m a
|
||||
callAction elapsed delay = action delay loop
|
||||
callAction :: Int -> Int64 -> Int64 -> m a
|
||||
callAction n elapsed delay = action n delay loop
|
||||
where
|
||||
loop = do
|
||||
liftIO $ threadDelay' delay
|
||||
let elapsed' = elapsed + delay
|
||||
callAction elapsed' $ nextDelay elapsed' delay ri
|
||||
callAction (n + 1) elapsed' $ nextDelay elapsed' delay ri
|
||||
|
||||
-- This function allows action to toggle between slow and fast retry intervals.
|
||||
withRetryLock2 :: forall m. MonadIO m => RetryInterval2 -> TMVar () -> (RI2State -> (RetryIntervalMode -> m ()) -> m ()) -> m ()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Server
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Logger.Simple (logInfo)
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift (MonadUnliftIO)
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Reader
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (MonadRandom)
|
||||
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite (SQLiteStore)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport (..), TProxy, Transport (..), simplexMQVersion)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (loadTLSServerParams, runTransportServer, defaultTransportServerConfig)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (defaultTransportServerConfig, loadTLSServerParams, runTransportServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow)
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Async (race_)
|
||||
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
|
||||
@@ -34,23 +34,25 @@ import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
-- See a full agent executable here: https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/apps/smp-agent/Main.hs
|
||||
runSMPAgent :: (MonadRandom m, MonadUnliftIO m) => ATransport -> AgentConfig -> InitialAgentServers -> SQLiteStore -> m ()
|
||||
runSMPAgent t cfg initServers store =
|
||||
runSMPAgentBlocking t cfg initServers store =<< newEmptyTMVarIO
|
||||
runSMPAgentBlocking t cfg initServers store 0 =<< newEmptyTMVarIO
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Runs an SMP agent as a TCP service using passed configuration with signalling.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- This function uses passed TMVar to signal when the server is ready to accept TCP requests (True)
|
||||
-- and when it is disconnected from the TCP socket once the server thread is killed (False).
|
||||
runSMPAgentBlocking :: (MonadRandom m, MonadUnliftIO m) => ATransport -> AgentConfig -> InitialAgentServers -> SQLiteStore -> TMVar Bool -> m ()
|
||||
runSMPAgentBlocking (ATransport t) cfg@AgentConfig {tcpPort, caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile} initServers store started = do
|
||||
runSMPAgentBlocking :: (MonadRandom m, MonadUnliftIO m) => ATransport -> AgentConfig -> InitialAgentServers -> SQLiteStore -> Int -> TMVar Bool -> m ()
|
||||
runSMPAgentBlocking (ATransport t) cfg@AgentConfig {tcpPort, caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile} initServers store initClientId started = do
|
||||
liftIO (newSMPAgentEnv cfg store) >>= runReaderT (smpAgent t)
|
||||
where
|
||||
smpAgent :: forall c m'. (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m', MonadReader Env m') => TProxy c -> m' ()
|
||||
smpAgent _ = do
|
||||
-- tlsServerParams is not in Env to avoid breaking functional API w/t key and certificate generation
|
||||
tlsServerParams <- liftIO $ loadTLSServerParams caCertificateFile certificateFile privateKeyFile
|
||||
clientId <- newTVarIO initClientId
|
||||
runTransportServer started tcpPort tlsServerParams defaultTransportServerConfig $ \(h :: c) -> do
|
||||
liftIO . putLn h $ "Welcome to SMP agent v" <> B.pack simplexMQVersion
|
||||
c <- getAgentClient initServers
|
||||
cId <- atomically $ stateTVar clientId $ \i -> (i + 1, i + 1)
|
||||
c <- getAgentClient cId initServers
|
||||
logConnection c True
|
||||
race_ (connectClient h c) (runAgentClient c)
|
||||
`E.finally` disconnectAgentClient c
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ConstraintKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
@@ -34,13 +37,13 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
MsgFlags,
|
||||
MsgId,
|
||||
NotifierId,
|
||||
NtfPrivateSignKey,
|
||||
NtfPublicVerifyKey,
|
||||
QueueId,
|
||||
NtfPrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
NtfPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
RcvDhSecret,
|
||||
RcvNtfDhSecret,
|
||||
RcvPrivateSignKey,
|
||||
SndPrivateSignKey,
|
||||
RcvPrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
SndPrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
SndPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util ((<$?>))
|
||||
@@ -48,15 +51,33 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Version
|
||||
|
||||
-- * Queue types
|
||||
|
||||
data QueueStored = QSStored | QSNew
|
||||
|
||||
data SQueueStored (q :: QueueStored) where
|
||||
SQSStored :: SQueueStored 'QSStored
|
||||
SQSNew :: SQueueStored 'QSNew
|
||||
|
||||
data DBQueueId (q :: QueueStored) where
|
||||
DBQueueId :: Int64 -> DBQueueId 'QSStored
|
||||
DBNewQueue :: DBQueueId 'QSNew
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (DBQueueId q)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (DBQueueId q)
|
||||
|
||||
type RcvQueue = StoredRcvQueue 'QSStored
|
||||
|
||||
type NewRcvQueue = StoredRcvQueue 'QSNew
|
||||
|
||||
-- | A receive queue. SMP queue through which the agent receives messages from a sender.
|
||||
data RcvQueue = RcvQueue
|
||||
data StoredRcvQueue (q :: QueueStored) = RcvQueue
|
||||
{ userId :: UserId,
|
||||
connId :: ConnId,
|
||||
server :: SMPServer,
|
||||
-- | recipient queue ID
|
||||
rcvId :: SMP.RecipientId,
|
||||
-- | key used by the recipient to sign transmissions
|
||||
rcvPrivateKey :: RcvPrivateSignKey,
|
||||
-- | key used by the recipient to authorize transmissions
|
||||
rcvPrivateKey :: RcvPrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
-- | shared DH secret used to encrypt/decrypt message bodies from server to recipient
|
||||
rcvDhSecret :: RcvDhSecret,
|
||||
-- | private DH key related to public sent to sender out-of-band (to agree simple per-queue e2e)
|
||||
@@ -68,7 +89,7 @@ data RcvQueue = RcvQueue
|
||||
-- | queue status
|
||||
status :: QueueStatus,
|
||||
-- | database queue ID (within connection)
|
||||
dbQueueId :: Int64,
|
||||
dbQueueId :: DBQueueId q,
|
||||
-- | True for a primary or a next primary queue of the connection (next if dbReplaceQueueId is set)
|
||||
primary :: Bool,
|
||||
-- | database queue ID to replace, Nothing if this queue is not replacing another, `Just Nothing` is used for replacing old queues
|
||||
@@ -99,9 +120,9 @@ canAbortRcvSwitch = maybe False canAbort . rcvSwchStatus
|
||||
RSReceivedMessage -> False
|
||||
|
||||
data ClientNtfCreds = ClientNtfCreds
|
||||
{ -- | key pair to be used by the notification server to sign transmissions
|
||||
ntfPublicKey :: NtfPublicVerifyKey,
|
||||
ntfPrivateKey :: NtfPrivateSignKey,
|
||||
{ -- | key pair to be used by the notification server to authorize transmissions
|
||||
ntfPublicKey :: NtfPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
ntfPrivateKey :: NtfPrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
-- | queue ID to be used by the notification server for NSUB command
|
||||
notifierId :: NotifierId,
|
||||
-- | shared DH secret used to encrypt/decrypt notification metadata (NMsgMeta) from server to recipient
|
||||
@@ -109,16 +130,21 @@ data ClientNtfCreds = ClientNtfCreds
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
type SndQueue = StoredSndQueue 'QSStored
|
||||
|
||||
type NewSndQueue = StoredSndQueue 'QSNew
|
||||
|
||||
-- | A send queue. SMP queue through which the agent sends messages to a recipient.
|
||||
data SndQueue = SndQueue
|
||||
data StoredSndQueue (q :: QueueStored) = SndQueue
|
||||
{ userId :: UserId,
|
||||
connId :: ConnId,
|
||||
server :: SMPServer,
|
||||
-- | sender queue ID
|
||||
sndId :: SMP.SenderId,
|
||||
-- | key pair used by the sender to sign transmissions
|
||||
sndPublicKey :: Maybe C.APublicVerifyKey,
|
||||
sndPrivateKey :: SndPrivateSignKey,
|
||||
-- | key pair used by the sender to authorize transmissions
|
||||
-- TODO combine keys to key pair so that types match
|
||||
sndPublicKey :: Maybe SndPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
sndPrivateKey :: SndPrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
-- | DH public key used to negotiate per-queue e2e encryption
|
||||
e2ePubKey :: Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519,
|
||||
-- | shared DH secret agreed for simple per-queue e2e encryption
|
||||
@@ -126,7 +152,7 @@ data SndQueue = SndQueue
|
||||
-- | queue status
|
||||
status :: QueueStatus,
|
||||
-- | database queue ID (within connection)
|
||||
dbQueueId :: Int64,
|
||||
dbQueueId :: DBQueueId q,
|
||||
-- | True for a primary or a next primary queue of the connection (next if dbReplaceQueueId is set)
|
||||
primary :: Bool,
|
||||
-- | ID of the queue this one is replacing
|
||||
@@ -144,18 +170,14 @@ sndQueueInfo SndQueue {server, sndSwchStatus} =
|
||||
instance SMPQueue RcvQueue where
|
||||
qServer RcvQueue {server} = server
|
||||
{-# INLINE qServer #-}
|
||||
qAddress RcvQueue {server, rcvId} = (server, rcvId)
|
||||
{-# INLINE qAddress #-}
|
||||
sameQueue addr q = sameQAddress addr (qAddress q)
|
||||
{-# INLINE sameQueue #-}
|
||||
queueId RcvQueue {rcvId} = rcvId
|
||||
{-# INLINE queueId #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance SMPQueue SndQueue where
|
||||
qServer SndQueue {server} = server
|
||||
{-# INLINE qServer #-}
|
||||
qAddress SndQueue {server, sndId} = (server, sndId)
|
||||
{-# INLINE qAddress #-}
|
||||
sameQueue addr q = sameQAddress addr (qAddress q)
|
||||
{-# INLINE sameQueue #-}
|
||||
queueId SndQueue {sndId} = sndId
|
||||
{-# INLINE queueId #-}
|
||||
|
||||
findQ :: SMPQueue q => (SMPServer, SMP.QueueId) -> NonEmpty q -> Maybe q
|
||||
findQ = find . sameQueue
|
||||
@@ -189,32 +211,27 @@ updatedQs q = L.map $ \q' -> if dbQId q == dbQId q' then q else q'
|
||||
class SMPQueue q => SMPQueueRec q where
|
||||
qUserId :: q -> UserId
|
||||
qConnId :: q -> ConnId
|
||||
queueId :: q -> QueueId
|
||||
dbQId :: q -> Int64
|
||||
dbReplaceQId :: q -> Maybe Int64
|
||||
|
||||
instance SMPQueueRec RcvQueue where
|
||||
qUserId = userId
|
||||
qUserId RcvQueue {userId} = userId
|
||||
{-# INLINE qUserId #-}
|
||||
qConnId = connId
|
||||
qConnId RcvQueue {connId} = connId
|
||||
{-# INLINE qConnId #-}
|
||||
queueId = rcvId
|
||||
{-# INLINE queueId #-}
|
||||
dbQId = dbQueueId
|
||||
dbQId RcvQueue {dbQueueId = DBQueueId qId} = qId
|
||||
{-# INLINE dbQId #-}
|
||||
dbReplaceQId = dbReplaceQueueId
|
||||
dbReplaceQId RcvQueue {dbReplaceQueueId} = dbReplaceQueueId
|
||||
{-# INLINE dbReplaceQId #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance SMPQueueRec SndQueue where
|
||||
qUserId = userId
|
||||
qUserId SndQueue {userId} = userId
|
||||
{-# INLINE qUserId #-}
|
||||
qConnId = connId
|
||||
qConnId SndQueue {connId} = connId
|
||||
{-# INLINE qConnId #-}
|
||||
queueId = sndId
|
||||
{-# INLINE queueId #-}
|
||||
dbQId = dbQueueId
|
||||
dbQId SndQueue {dbQueueId = DBQueueId qId} = qId
|
||||
{-# INLINE dbQId #-}
|
||||
dbReplaceQId = dbReplaceQueueId
|
||||
dbReplaceQId SndQueue {dbReplaceQueueId} = dbReplaceQueueId
|
||||
{-# INLINE dbReplaceQId #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- * Connection types
|
||||
@@ -300,7 +317,6 @@ data ConnData = ConnData
|
||||
userId :: UserId,
|
||||
connAgentVersion :: Version,
|
||||
enableNtfs :: Bool,
|
||||
duplexHandshake :: Maybe Bool, -- added in agent protocol v2
|
||||
lastExternalSndId :: PrevExternalSndId,
|
||||
deleted :: Bool,
|
||||
ratchetSyncState :: RatchetSyncState
|
||||
@@ -309,14 +325,8 @@ data ConnData = ConnData
|
||||
|
||||
-- this function should be mirrored in the clients
|
||||
ratchetSyncAllowed :: ConnData -> Bool
|
||||
ratchetSyncAllowed cData@ConnData {ratchetSyncState} =
|
||||
ratchetSyncSupported' cData && (ratchetSyncState `elem` ([RSAllowed, RSRequired] :: [RatchetSyncState]))
|
||||
|
||||
ratchetSyncSupported' :: ConnData -> Bool
|
||||
ratchetSyncSupported' ConnData {connAgentVersion} = connAgentVersion >= 3
|
||||
|
||||
messageRcptsSupported :: ConnData -> Bool
|
||||
messageRcptsSupported ConnData {connAgentVersion} = connAgentVersion >= 4
|
||||
ratchetSyncAllowed ConnData {ratchetSyncState, connAgentVersion} =
|
||||
connAgentVersion >= ratchetSyncSMPAgentVersion && (ratchetSyncState `elem` ([RSAllowed, RSRequired] :: [RatchetSyncState]))
|
||||
|
||||
-- this function should be mirrored in the clients
|
||||
ratchetSyncSendProhibited :: ConnData -> Bool
|
||||
@@ -324,7 +334,8 @@ ratchetSyncSendProhibited ConnData {ratchetSyncState} =
|
||||
ratchetSyncState `elem` ([RSRequired, RSStarted, RSAgreed] :: [RatchetSyncState])
|
||||
|
||||
data PendingCommand = PendingCommand
|
||||
{ corrId :: ACorrId,
|
||||
{ cmdId :: AsyncCmdId,
|
||||
corrId :: ACorrId,
|
||||
userId :: UserId,
|
||||
connId :: ConnId,
|
||||
command :: AgentCommand
|
||||
@@ -372,11 +383,11 @@ instance StrEncoding AgentCommandTag where
|
||||
data InternalCommand
|
||||
= ICAck SMP.RecipientId MsgId
|
||||
| ICAckDel SMP.RecipientId MsgId InternalId
|
||||
| ICAllowSecure SMP.RecipientId SMP.SndPublicVerifyKey
|
||||
| ICDuplexSecure SMP.RecipientId SMP.SndPublicVerifyKey
|
||||
| ICAllowSecure SMP.RecipientId SMP.SndPublicAuthKey
|
||||
| ICDuplexSecure SMP.RecipientId SMP.SndPublicAuthKey
|
||||
| ICDeleteConn
|
||||
| ICDeleteRcvQueue SMP.RecipientId
|
||||
| ICQSecure SMP.RecipientId SMP.SndPublicVerifyKey
|
||||
| ICQSecure SMP.RecipientId SMP.SndPublicAuthKey
|
||||
| ICQDelete SMP.RecipientId
|
||||
|
||||
data InternalCommandTag
|
||||
@@ -600,6 +611,8 @@ data StoreError
|
||||
SEServerNotFound
|
||||
| -- | Connection already used.
|
||||
SEConnDuplicate
|
||||
| -- | Confirmed snd queue already exists.
|
||||
SESndQueueExists
|
||||
| -- | Wrong connection type, e.g. "send" connection when "receive" or "duplex" is expected, or vice versa.
|
||||
-- 'upgradeRcvConnToDuplex' and 'upgradeSndConnToDuplex' do not allow duplex connections - they would also return this error.
|
||||
SEBadConnType ConnType
|
||||
@@ -627,4 +640,6 @@ data StoreError
|
||||
SEFileNotFound
|
||||
| -- | XFTP Deleted snd chunk replica not found.
|
||||
SEDeletedSndChunkReplicaNotFound
|
||||
| -- | Error when reading work item that suspends worker - do not use!
|
||||
SEWorkItemError ByteString
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -1,28 +1,39 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Common
|
||||
( SQLiteStore (..),
|
||||
withConnection,
|
||||
withConnection',
|
||||
withTransaction,
|
||||
withTransaction',
|
||||
withTransactionCtx,
|
||||
dbBusyLoop,
|
||||
storeKey,
|
||||
)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent (threadDelay)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock (diffUTCTime, getCurrentTime)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple (SQLError)
|
||||
import qualified Database.SQLite.Simple as DB
|
||||
import qualified Database.SQLite.Simple as SQL
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.DB as DB
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Memory (LockedBytes)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (diffToMilliseconds)
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Exception (bracket)
|
||||
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
|
||||
import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
|
||||
storeKey :: LockedBytes -> Bool -> Maybe LockedBytes
|
||||
storeKey key keepKey = if keepKey || BA.null key then Just key else Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
data SQLiteStore = SQLiteStore
|
||||
{ dbFilePath :: FilePath,
|
||||
dbEncrypted :: TVar Bool,
|
||||
dbKey :: TVar (Maybe LockedBytes),
|
||||
dbConnection :: TMVar DB.Connection,
|
||||
dbClosed :: TVar Bool,
|
||||
dbNew :: Bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,17 +43,23 @@ withConnection SQLiteStore {dbConnection} =
|
||||
(atomically $ takeTMVar dbConnection)
|
||||
(atomically . putTMVar dbConnection)
|
||||
|
||||
withTransaction :: forall a. SQLiteStore -> (DB.Connection -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
withConnection' :: SQLiteStore -> (SQL.Connection -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
withConnection' st action = withConnection st $ action . DB.conn
|
||||
|
||||
withTransaction :: SQLiteStore -> (DB.Connection -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
withTransaction = withTransactionCtx Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
withTransactionCtx :: forall a. Maybe String -> SQLiteStore -> (DB.Connection -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
withTransactionCtx ctx_ st action = withConnection st $ \db -> dbBusyLoop (transactionWithCtx db)
|
||||
withTransaction' :: SQLiteStore -> (SQL.Connection -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
withTransaction' st action = withTransaction st $ action . DB.conn
|
||||
|
||||
withTransactionCtx :: Maybe String -> SQLiteStore -> (DB.Connection -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
withTransactionCtx ctx_ st action = withConnection st $ dbBusyLoop . transactionWithCtx
|
||||
where
|
||||
transactionWithCtx db = case ctx_ of
|
||||
Nothing -> DB.withImmediateTransaction db (action db)
|
||||
transactionWithCtx db@DB.Connection {conn} = case ctx_ of
|
||||
Nothing -> SQL.withImmediateTransaction conn $ action db
|
||||
Just ctx -> do
|
||||
t1 <- getCurrentTime
|
||||
r <- DB.withImmediateTransaction db (action db)
|
||||
r <- SQL.withImmediateTransaction conn $ action db
|
||||
t2 <- getCurrentTime
|
||||
putStrLn $ "withTransactionCtx start :: " <> show t1 <> " :: " <> ctx
|
||||
putStrLn $ "withTransactionCtx end :: " <> show t2 <> " :: " <> ctx <> " :: duration=" <> show (diffToMilliseconds $ diffUTCTime t2 t1)
|
||||
@@ -54,7 +71,7 @@ dbBusyLoop action = loop 500 3000000
|
||||
loop :: Int -> Int -> IO a
|
||||
loop t tLim =
|
||||
action `E.catch` \(e :: SQLError) ->
|
||||
if tLim > t && DB.sqlError e == DB.ErrorBusy
|
||||
if tLim > t && SQL.sqlError e == SQL.ErrorBusy
|
||||
then do
|
||||
threadDelay t
|
||||
loop (t * 9 `div` 8) (tLim - t)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE StrictData #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.DB
|
||||
( Connection (..),
|
||||
SlowQueryStats (..),
|
||||
open,
|
||||
close,
|
||||
execute,
|
||||
execute_,
|
||||
executeNamed,
|
||||
executeMany,
|
||||
query,
|
||||
query_,
|
||||
queryNamed,
|
||||
)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent.STM
|
||||
import Control.Monad (when)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
|
||||
import Data.Int (Int64)
|
||||
import Data.Time (diffUTCTime, getCurrentTime)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple (FromRow, NamedParam, Query, ToRow)
|
||||
import qualified Database.SQLite.Simple as SQL
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (diffToMilliseconds)
|
||||
|
||||
data Connection = Connection
|
||||
{ conn :: SQL.Connection,
|
||||
slow :: TMap Query SlowQueryStats
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
data SlowQueryStats = SlowQueryStats
|
||||
{ count :: Int64,
|
||||
timeMax :: Int64,
|
||||
timeAvg :: Int64
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
timeIt :: TMap Query SlowQueryStats -> Query -> IO a -> IO a
|
||||
timeIt slow sql a = do
|
||||
t <- getCurrentTime
|
||||
r <- a
|
||||
t' <- getCurrentTime
|
||||
let diff = diffToMilliseconds $ diffUTCTime t' t
|
||||
atomically $ when (diff > 5) $ TM.alter (updateQueryStats diff) sql slow
|
||||
pure r
|
||||
where
|
||||
updateQueryStats :: Int64 -> Maybe SlowQueryStats -> Maybe SlowQueryStats
|
||||
updateQueryStats diff Nothing = Just $ SlowQueryStats 1 diff diff
|
||||
updateQueryStats diff (Just SlowQueryStats {count, timeMax, timeAvg}) =
|
||||
Just $
|
||||
SlowQueryStats
|
||||
{ count = count + 1,
|
||||
timeMax = max timeMax diff,
|
||||
timeAvg = (timeAvg * count + diff) `div` (count + 1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
open :: String -> IO Connection
|
||||
open f = do
|
||||
conn <- SQL.open f
|
||||
slow <- atomically $ TM.empty
|
||||
pure Connection {conn, slow}
|
||||
|
||||
close :: Connection -> IO ()
|
||||
close = SQL.close . conn
|
||||
|
||||
execute :: ToRow q => Connection -> Query -> q -> IO ()
|
||||
execute Connection {conn, slow} sql = timeIt slow sql . SQL.execute conn sql
|
||||
{-# INLINE execute #-}
|
||||
|
||||
execute_ :: Connection -> Query -> IO ()
|
||||
execute_ Connection {conn, slow} sql = timeIt slow sql $ SQL.execute_ conn sql
|
||||
{-# INLINE execute_ #-}
|
||||
|
||||
executeNamed :: Connection -> Query -> [NamedParam] -> IO ()
|
||||
executeNamed Connection {conn, slow} sql = timeIt slow sql . SQL.executeNamed conn sql
|
||||
{-# INLINE executeNamed #-}
|
||||
|
||||
executeMany :: ToRow q => Connection -> Query -> [q] -> IO ()
|
||||
executeMany Connection {conn, slow} sql = timeIt slow sql . SQL.executeMany conn sql
|
||||
{-# INLINE executeMany #-}
|
||||
|
||||
query :: (ToRow q, FromRow r) => Connection -> Query -> q -> IO [r]
|
||||
query Connection {conn, slow} sql = timeIt slow sql . SQL.query conn sql
|
||||
{-# INLINE query #-}
|
||||
|
||||
query_ :: FromRow r => Connection -> Query -> IO [r]
|
||||
query_ Connection {conn, slow} sql = timeIt slow sql $ SQL.query_ conn sql
|
||||
{-# INLINE query_ #-}
|
||||
|
||||
queryNamed :: FromRow r => Connection -> Query -> [NamedParam] -> IO [r]
|
||||
queryNamed Connection {conn, slow} sql = timeIt slow sql . SQL.queryNamed conn sql
|
||||
{-# INLINE queryNamed #-}
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''SlowQueryStats)
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveGeneric #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedLists #-}
|
||||
@@ -27,8 +26,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Monad (forM_, when)
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (ToJSON)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
|
||||
import Data.List (intercalate, sortOn)
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Map as M
|
||||
@@ -40,7 +38,6 @@ import Database.SQLite.Simple (Connection, Only (..), Query (..))
|
||||
import qualified Database.SQLite.Simple as DB
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
|
||||
import qualified Database.SQLite3 as SQLite3
|
||||
import GHC.Generics (Generic)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol (extraSMPServerHosts)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Common
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20220101_initial
|
||||
@@ -66,6 +63,12 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230615_ratchet_sync
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230701_delivery_receipts
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230720_delete_expired_messages
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230722_indexes
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230814_indexes
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230829_crypto_files
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20231222_command_created_at
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20231225_failed_work_items
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20240121_message_delivery_indexes
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20240124_file_redirect
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (dropPrefix, sumTypeJSON)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost)
|
||||
@@ -97,7 +100,13 @@ schemaMigrations =
|
||||
("m20230615_ratchet_sync", m20230615_ratchet_sync, Just down_m20230615_ratchet_sync),
|
||||
("m20230701_delivery_receipts", m20230701_delivery_receipts, Just down_m20230701_delivery_receipts),
|
||||
("m20230720_delete_expired_messages", m20230720_delete_expired_messages, Just down_m20230720_delete_expired_messages),
|
||||
("m20230722_indexes", m20230722_indexes, Just down_m20230722_indexes)
|
||||
("m20230722_indexes", m20230722_indexes, Just down_m20230722_indexes),
|
||||
("m20230814_indexes", m20230814_indexes, Just down_m20230814_indexes),
|
||||
("m20230829_crypto_files", m20230829_crypto_files, Just down_m20230829_crypto_files),
|
||||
("m20231222_command_created_at", m20231222_command_created_at, Just down_m20231222_command_created_at),
|
||||
("m20231225_failed_work_items", m20231225_failed_work_items, Just down_m20231225_failed_work_items),
|
||||
("m20240121_message_delivery_indexes", m20240121_message_delivery_indexes, Just down_m20240121_message_delivery_indexes),
|
||||
("m20240124_file_redirect", m20240124_file_redirect, Just down_m20240124_file_redirect)
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
|
||||
@@ -107,7 +116,7 @@ app = sortOn name $ map migration schemaMigrations
|
||||
migration (name, up, down) = Migration {name, up = fromQuery up, down = fromQuery <$> down}
|
||||
|
||||
get :: SQLiteStore -> [Migration] -> IO (Either MTRError MigrationsToRun)
|
||||
get st migrations = migrationsToRun migrations <$> withTransaction st getCurrent
|
||||
get st migrations = migrationsToRun migrations <$> withTransaction' st getCurrent
|
||||
|
||||
getCurrent :: Connection -> IO [Migration]
|
||||
getCurrent db = map toMigration <$> DB.query_ db "SELECT name, down FROM migrations ORDER BY name ASC;"
|
||||
@@ -117,25 +126,28 @@ getCurrent db = map toMigration <$> DB.query_ db "SELECT name, down FROM migrati
|
||||
run :: SQLiteStore -> MigrationsToRun -> IO ()
|
||||
run st = \case
|
||||
MTRUp [] -> pure ()
|
||||
MTRUp ms -> mapM_ runUp ms >> withConnection st (`execSQL` "VACUUM;")
|
||||
MTRUp ms -> mapM_ runUp ms >> withConnection' st (`execSQL` "VACUUM;")
|
||||
MTRDown ms -> mapM_ runDown $ reverse ms
|
||||
MTRNone -> pure ()
|
||||
where
|
||||
runUp Migration {name, up, down} = withTransaction st $ \db -> do
|
||||
runUp Migration {name, up, down} = withTransaction' st $ \db -> do
|
||||
when (name == "m20220811_onion_hosts") $ updateServers db
|
||||
insert db >> execSQL db up
|
||||
insert db >> execSQL db up'
|
||||
where
|
||||
insert db = DB.execute db "INSERT INTO migrations (name, down, ts) VALUES (?,?,?)" . (name,down,) =<< getCurrentTime
|
||||
up'
|
||||
| dbNew st && name == "m20230110_users" = fromQuery new_m20230110_users
|
||||
| otherwise = up
|
||||
updateServers db = forM_ (M.assocs extraSMPServerHosts) $ \(h, h') ->
|
||||
let hs = decodeLatin1 . strEncode $ ([h, h'] :: NonEmpty TransportHost)
|
||||
in DB.execute db "UPDATE servers SET host = ? WHERE host = ?" (hs, decodeLatin1 $ strEncode h)
|
||||
runDown DownMigration {downName, downQuery} = withTransaction st $ \db -> do
|
||||
runDown DownMigration {downName, downQuery} = withTransaction' st $ \db -> do
|
||||
execSQL db downQuery
|
||||
DB.execute db "DELETE FROM migrations WHERE name = ?" (Only downName)
|
||||
execSQL db = SQLite3.exec $ DB.connectionHandle db
|
||||
|
||||
initialize :: SQLiteStore -> IO ()
|
||||
initialize st = withTransaction st $ \db -> do
|
||||
initialize st = withTransaction' st $ \db -> do
|
||||
cs :: [Text] <- map fromOnly <$> DB.query_ db "SELECT name FROM pragma_table_info('migrations')"
|
||||
case cs of
|
||||
[] -> createMigrations db
|
||||
@@ -165,11 +177,7 @@ data MigrationsToRun = MTRUp [Migration] | MTRDown [DownMigration] | MTRNone
|
||||
data MTRError
|
||||
= MTRENoDown {dbMigrations :: [String]}
|
||||
| MTREDifferent {appMigration :: String, dbMigration :: String}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON MTRError where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON . sumTypeJSON $ dropPrefix "MTRE"
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding . sumTypeJSON $ dropPrefix "MTRE"
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
mtrErrorDescription :: MTRError -> String
|
||||
mtrErrorDescription = \case
|
||||
@@ -188,3 +196,5 @@ migrationsToRun [] dbMs
|
||||
migrationsToRun (a : as) (d : ds)
|
||||
| name a == name d = migrationsToRun as ds
|
||||
| otherwise = Left $ MTREDifferent (name a) (name d)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON $ dropPrefix "MTRE") ''MTRError)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,3 +27,24 @@ UPDATE connections SET user_id = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
PRAGMA ignore_check_constraints=OFF;
|
||||
|]
|
||||
|
||||
-- This is executed in the new database
|
||||
-- It does not create new user record
|
||||
new_m20230110_users :: Query
|
||||
new_m20230110_users =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
PRAGMA ignore_check_constraints=ON;
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE TABLE users (
|
||||
user_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE connections ADD COLUMN user_id INTEGER CHECK (user_id NOT NULL)
|
||||
REFERENCES users ON DELETE CASCADE;
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_connections_user ON connections(user_id);
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_commands_conn_id ON commands(conn_id);
|
||||
|
||||
PRAGMA ignore_check_constraints=OFF;
|
||||
|]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230814_indexes where
|
||||
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
|
||||
|
||||
m20230814_indexes :: Query
|
||||
m20230814_indexes =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_messages_internal_snd_id_ts;
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_internal_ts ON messages(internal_ts);
|
||||
|]
|
||||
|
||||
down_m20230814_indexes :: Query
|
||||
down_m20230814_indexes =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_messages_internal_ts;
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_internal_snd_id_ts ON messages(internal_snd_id, internal_ts);
|
||||
|]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20230829_crypto_files where
|
||||
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
|
||||
|
||||
m20230829_crypto_files :: Query
|
||||
m20230829_crypto_files =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files ADD COLUMN save_file_key BLOB;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files ADD COLUMN save_file_nonce BLOB;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE snd_files ADD COLUMN src_file_key BLOB;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE snd_files ADD COLUMN src_file_nonce BLOB;
|
||||
|]
|
||||
|
||||
down_m20230829_crypto_files :: Query
|
||||
down_m20230829_crypto_files =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files DROP COLUMN save_file_key;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files DROP COLUMN save_file_nonce;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE snd_files DROP COLUMN src_file_key;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE snd_files DROP COLUMN src_file_nonce;
|
||||
|]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20231222_command_created_at where
|
||||
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
|
||||
|
||||
m20231222_command_created_at :: Query
|
||||
m20231222_command_created_at =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
ALTER TABLE commands ADD COLUMN created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT('1970-01-01 00:00:00');
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_commands_server_commands ON commands(host, port, created_at, command_id);
|
||||
|]
|
||||
|
||||
down_m20231222_command_created_at :: Query
|
||||
down_m20231222_command_created_at =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_commands_server_commands;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE commands DROP COLUMN created_at;
|
||||
|]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20231225_failed_work_items where
|
||||
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
|
||||
|
||||
m20231225_failed_work_items :: Query
|
||||
m20231225_failed_work_items =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
ALTER TABLE snd_message_deliveries ADD COLUMN failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE commands ADD COLUMN failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE ntf_subscriptions ADD COLUMN ntf_failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE ntf_subscriptions ADD COLUMN smp_failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files ADD COLUMN failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE snd_files ADD COLUMN failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE deleted_snd_chunk_replicas ADD COLUMN failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0;
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_rcv_files_status_created_at ON rcv_files(status, created_at);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_snd_files_status_created_at ON snd_files(status, created_at);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_snd_files_snd_file_entity_id ON snd_files(snd_file_entity_id);
|
||||
|]
|
||||
|
||||
down_m20231225_failed_work_items :: Query
|
||||
down_m20231225_failed_work_items =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_rcv_files_status_created_at;
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_snd_files_status_created_at;
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_snd_files_snd_file_entity_id;
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE snd_message_deliveries DROP COLUMN failed;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE commands DROP COLUMN failed;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE ntf_subscriptions DROP COLUMN ntf_failed;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE ntf_subscriptions DROP COLUMN smp_failed;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files DROP COLUMN failed;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE snd_files DROP COLUMN failed;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE deleted_snd_chunk_replicas DROP COLUMN failed;
|
||||
|]
|
||||
+20
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20240121_message_delivery_indexes where
|
||||
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
|
||||
|
||||
m20240121_message_delivery_indexes :: Query
|
||||
m20240121_message_delivery_indexes =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_snd_expired ON messages(conn_id, internal_snd_id, internal_ts);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_snd_message_deliveries_expired ON snd_message_deliveries(conn_id, snd_queue_id, failed, internal_id);
|
||||
|]
|
||||
|
||||
down_m20240121_message_delivery_indexes :: Query
|
||||
down_m20240121_message_delivery_indexes =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_messages_snd_expired;
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_snd_message_deliveries_expired;
|
||||
|]
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations.M20240124_file_redirect where
|
||||
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Query)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
|
||||
|
||||
m20240124_file_redirect :: Query
|
||||
m20240124_file_redirect =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
ALTER TABLE snd_files ADD COLUMN redirect_size INTEGER;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE snd_files ADD COLUMN redirect_digest BLOB;
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files ADD COLUMN redirect_id INTEGER REFERENCES rcv_files ON DELETE SET NULL;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files ADD COLUMN redirect_entity_id BLOB;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files ADD COLUMN redirect_size INTEGER;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files ADD COLUMN redirect_digest BLOB;
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_rcv_files_redirect_id on rcv_files(redirect_id);
|
||||
|]
|
||||
|
||||
down_m20240124_file_redirect :: Query
|
||||
down_m20240124_file_redirect =
|
||||
[sql|
|
||||
DROP INDEX idx_rcv_files_redirect_id;
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE snd_files DROP COLUMN redirect_size;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE snd_files DROP COLUMN redirect_digest;
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files DROP COLUMN redirect_id;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files DROP COLUMN redirect_entity_id;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files DROP COLUMN redirect_size;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE rcv_files DROP COLUMN redirect_digest;
|
||||
|]
|
||||
@@ -213,6 +213,8 @@ CREATE TABLE ntf_subscriptions(
|
||||
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT(datetime('now')),
|
||||
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT(datetime('now')),
|
||||
smp_server_key_hash BLOB,
|
||||
ntf_failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
|
||||
smp_failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
|
||||
PRIMARY KEY(conn_id),
|
||||
FOREIGN KEY(smp_host, smp_port) REFERENCES servers(host, port)
|
||||
ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE,
|
||||
@@ -229,6 +231,8 @@ CREATE TABLE commands(
|
||||
command BLOB NOT NULL,
|
||||
agent_version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
|
||||
server_key_hash BLOB,
|
||||
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT('1970-01-01 00:00:00'),
|
||||
failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
|
||||
FOREIGN KEY(host, port) REFERENCES servers
|
||||
ON DELETE RESTRICT ON UPDATE CASCADE
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -237,6 +241,7 @@ CREATE TABLE snd_message_deliveries(
|
||||
conn_id BLOB NOT NULL REFERENCES connections ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||||
snd_queue_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||||
internal_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||||
failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
|
||||
FOREIGN KEY(conn_id, internal_id) REFERENCES messages ON DELETE CASCADE DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE sqlite_sequence(name,seq);
|
||||
@@ -271,6 +276,13 @@ CREATE TABLE rcv_files(
|
||||
error TEXT,
|
||||
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT(datetime('now')),
|
||||
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT(datetime('now')),
|
||||
save_file_key BLOB,
|
||||
save_file_nonce BLOB,
|
||||
failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
|
||||
redirect_id INTEGER REFERENCES rcv_files ON DELETE SET NULL,
|
||||
redirect_entity_id BLOB,
|
||||
redirect_size INTEGER,
|
||||
redirect_digest BLOB,
|
||||
UNIQUE(rcv_file_entity_id)
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE rcv_file_chunks(
|
||||
@@ -311,6 +323,12 @@ CREATE TABLE snd_files(
|
||||
error TEXT,
|
||||
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT(datetime('now')),
|
||||
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT(datetime('now'))
|
||||
,
|
||||
src_file_key BLOB,
|
||||
src_file_nonce BLOB,
|
||||
failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
|
||||
redirect_size INTEGER,
|
||||
redirect_digest BLOB
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE snd_file_chunks(
|
||||
snd_file_chunk_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
|
||||
@@ -354,6 +372,8 @@ CREATE TABLE deleted_snd_chunk_replicas(
|
||||
retries INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
|
||||
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT(datetime('now')),
|
||||
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT(datetime('now'))
|
||||
,
|
||||
failed INTEGER DEFAULT 0
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE TABLE encrypted_rcv_message_hashes(
|
||||
encrypted_rcv_message_hash_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
|
||||
@@ -467,13 +487,31 @@ CREATE INDEX idx_snd_messages_rcpt_internal_id ON snd_messages(
|
||||
conn_id,
|
||||
rcpt_internal_id
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_internal_snd_id_ts ON messages(
|
||||
internal_snd_id,
|
||||
internal_ts
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_processed_ratchet_key_hashes_created_at ON processed_ratchet_key_hashes(
|
||||
created_at
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_encrypted_rcv_message_hashes_created_at ON encrypted_rcv_message_hashes(
|
||||
created_at
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_internal_ts ON messages(internal_ts);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_commands_server_commands ON commands(
|
||||
host,
|
||||
port,
|
||||
created_at,
|
||||
command_id
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_rcv_files_status_created_at ON rcv_files(status, created_at);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_snd_files_status_created_at ON snd_files(status, created_at);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_snd_files_snd_file_entity_id ON snd_files(snd_file_entity_id);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_messages_snd_expired ON messages(
|
||||
conn_id,
|
||||
internal_snd_id,
|
||||
internal_ts
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_snd_message_deliveries_expired ON snd_message_deliveries(
|
||||
conn_id,
|
||||
snd_queue_id,
|
||||
failed,
|
||||
internal_id
|
||||
);
|
||||
CREATE INDEX idx_rcv_files_redirect_id on rcv_files(redirect_id);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.TAsyncs where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent.STM (stateTVar)
|
||||
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift (MonadUnliftIO)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Async (Async, async)
|
||||
import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
|
||||
data TAsyncs = TAsyncs
|
||||
{ actionId :: TVar Int,
|
||||
actions :: TMap Int (Async ())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
newTAsyncs :: STM TAsyncs
|
||||
newTAsyncs = TAsyncs <$> newTVar 0 <*> TM.empty
|
||||
|
||||
newAsyncAction :: MonadUnliftIO m => (Int -> m ()) -> TAsyncs -> m ()
|
||||
newAsyncAction action as = do
|
||||
aId <- atomically $ stateTVar (actionId as) $ \i -> (i + 1, i + 1)
|
||||
a <- async $ action aId
|
||||
atomically $ TM.insert aId a $ actions as
|
||||
|
||||
removeAsyncAction :: Int -> TAsyncs -> STM ()
|
||||
removeAsyncAction aId = TM.delete aId . actions
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.TRcvQueues
|
||||
( TRcvQueues,
|
||||
( TRcvQueues (getRcvQueues),
|
||||
empty,
|
||||
clear,
|
||||
deleteConn,
|
||||
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.TRcvQueues
|
||||
deleteQueue,
|
||||
getSessQueues,
|
||||
getDelSessQueues,
|
||||
qKey,
|
||||
)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,12 +18,12 @@ import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
|
||||
import Data.Set (Set)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Set as S
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol (ConnId, UserId)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store (RcvQueue (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store (RcvQueue, StoredRcvQueue (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (RecipientId, SMPServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
|
||||
|
||||
newtype TRcvQueues = TRcvQueues (TMap (UserId, SMPServer, RecipientId) RcvQueue)
|
||||
newtype TRcvQueues = TRcvQueues {getRcvQueues :: TMap (UserId, SMPServer, RecipientId) RcvQueue}
|
||||
|
||||
empty :: STM TRcvQueues
|
||||
empty = TRcvQueues <$> TM.empty
|
||||
|
||||
+236
-170
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveGeneric #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
|
||||
@@ -10,8 +9,9 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedLists #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- |
|
||||
-- Module : Simplex.Messaging.Client
|
||||
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Client
|
||||
( -- * Connect (disconnect) client to (from) SMP server
|
||||
TransportSession,
|
||||
ProtocolClient (thVersion, sessionId, sessionTs),
|
||||
ProtocolClient (thParams, sessionTs),
|
||||
SMPClient,
|
||||
getProtocolClient,
|
||||
closeProtocolClient,
|
||||
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
|
||||
createSMPQueue,
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueue,
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueues,
|
||||
streamSubscribeSMPQueues,
|
||||
getSMPMessage,
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueueNotifications,
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueuesNtfs,
|
||||
@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
|
||||
NetworkConfig (..),
|
||||
TransportSessionMode (..),
|
||||
defaultClientConfig,
|
||||
defaultSMPClientConfig,
|
||||
defaultNetworkConfig,
|
||||
transportClientConfig,
|
||||
chooseTransportHost,
|
||||
@@ -69,6 +71,12 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
|
||||
temporaryClientError,
|
||||
ServerTransmission,
|
||||
ClientCommand,
|
||||
|
||||
-- * For testing
|
||||
PCTransmission,
|
||||
mkTransmission,
|
||||
authTransmission,
|
||||
clientStub,
|
||||
)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -77,27 +85,25 @@ import Control.Concurrent.STM
|
||||
import Control.Exception
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.IO.Class (liftIO)
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import Data.Either (rights)
|
||||
import Data.Foldable (foldl')
|
||||
import Data.Functor (($>))
|
||||
import Data.Int (Int64)
|
||||
import Data.List (find)
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..), (<|))
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
|
||||
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime, getCurrentTime)
|
||||
import GHC.Generics (Generic)
|
||||
import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
|
||||
import Numeric.Natural
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (dropPrefix, enumJSON)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON, dropPrefix, enumJSON)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
|
||||
@@ -113,12 +119,9 @@ import System.Timeout (timeout)
|
||||
-- Use 'getSMPClient' to connect to an SMP server and create a client handle.
|
||||
data ProtocolClient err msg = ProtocolClient
|
||||
{ action :: Maybe (Async ()),
|
||||
sessionId :: SessionId,
|
||||
thParams :: THandleParams,
|
||||
sessionTs :: UTCTime,
|
||||
thVersion :: Version,
|
||||
timeoutPerBlock :: Int,
|
||||
blockSize :: Int,
|
||||
batch :: Bool,
|
||||
client_ :: PClient err msg
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -129,20 +132,57 @@ data PClient err msg = PClient
|
||||
tcpTimeout :: Int,
|
||||
batchDelay :: Maybe Int,
|
||||
pingErrorCount :: TVar Int,
|
||||
clientCorrId :: TVar Natural,
|
||||
clientCorrId :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
|
||||
sentCommands :: TMap CorrId (Request err msg),
|
||||
sndQ :: TBQueue (NonEmpty SentRawTransmission),
|
||||
sndQ :: TBQueue ByteString,
|
||||
rcvQ :: TBQueue (NonEmpty (SignedTransmission err msg)),
|
||||
msgQ :: Maybe (TBQueue (ServerTransmission msg))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type SMPClient = ProtocolClient ErrorType SMP.BrokerMsg
|
||||
clientStub :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> ByteString -> Version -> Maybe THandleAuth -> STM (ProtocolClient err msg)
|
||||
clientStub g sessionId thVersion thAuth = do
|
||||
connected <- newTVar False
|
||||
clientCorrId <- C.newRandomDRG g
|
||||
sentCommands <- TM.empty
|
||||
sndQ <- newTBQueue 100
|
||||
rcvQ <- newTBQueue 100
|
||||
return
|
||||
ProtocolClient
|
||||
{ action = Nothing,
|
||||
thParams =
|
||||
THandleParams
|
||||
{ sessionId,
|
||||
thVersion,
|
||||
thAuth,
|
||||
blockSize = smpBlockSize,
|
||||
implySessId = thVersion >= authCmdsSMPVersion,
|
||||
batch = True
|
||||
},
|
||||
sessionTs = undefined,
|
||||
timeoutPerBlock = undefined,
|
||||
client_ =
|
||||
PClient
|
||||
{ connected,
|
||||
transportSession = undefined,
|
||||
transportHost = undefined,
|
||||
tcpTimeout = undefined,
|
||||
batchDelay = Nothing,
|
||||
pingErrorCount = undefined,
|
||||
clientCorrId,
|
||||
sentCommands,
|
||||
sndQ,
|
||||
rcvQ,
|
||||
msgQ = Nothing
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type SMPClient = ProtocolClient ErrorType BrokerMsg
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Type for client command data
|
||||
type ClientCommand msg = (Maybe C.APrivateSignKey, QueueId, ProtoCommand msg)
|
||||
type ClientCommand msg = (Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey, EntityId, ProtoCommand msg)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Type synonym for transmission from some SPM server queue.
|
||||
type ServerTransmission msg = (TransportSession msg, Version, SessionId, QueueId, msg)
|
||||
type ServerTransmission msg = (TransportSession msg, Version, SessionId, EntityId, msg)
|
||||
|
||||
data HostMode
|
||||
= -- | prefer (or require) onion hosts when connecting via SOCKS proxy
|
||||
@@ -151,14 +191,7 @@ data HostMode
|
||||
HMOnion
|
||||
| -- | prefer (or require) public hosts
|
||||
HMPublic
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic)
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON HostMode where
|
||||
parseJSON = J.genericParseJSON . enumJSON $ dropPrefix "HM"
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON HostMode where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON . enumJSON $ dropPrefix "HM"
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding . enumJSON $ dropPrefix "HM"
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | network configuration for the client
|
||||
data NetworkConfig = NetworkConfig
|
||||
@@ -184,21 +217,10 @@ data NetworkConfig = NetworkConfig
|
||||
smpPingCount :: Int,
|
||||
logTLSErrors :: Bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic, FromJSON)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON NetworkConfig where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON J.defaultOptions {J.omitNothingFields = True}
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding J.defaultOptions {J.omitNothingFields = True}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data TransportSessionMode = TSMUser | TSMEntity
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON TransportSessionMode where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON . enumJSON $ dropPrefix "TSM"
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding . enumJSON $ dropPrefix "TSM"
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON TransportSessionMode where
|
||||
parseJSON = J.genericParseJSON . enumJSON $ dropPrefix "TSM"
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
defaultNetworkConfig :: NetworkConfig
|
||||
defaultNetworkConfig =
|
||||
@@ -207,9 +229,9 @@ defaultNetworkConfig =
|
||||
hostMode = HMOnionViaSocks,
|
||||
requiredHostMode = False,
|
||||
sessionMode = TSMUser,
|
||||
tcpConnectTimeout = 15_000_000,
|
||||
tcpTimeout = 10_000_000,
|
||||
tcpTimeoutPerKb = 20_000, -- 20ms, should be less than 130ms to avoid Int overflow on 32 bit systems
|
||||
tcpConnectTimeout = 20_000_000,
|
||||
tcpTimeout = 15_000_000,
|
||||
tcpTimeoutPerKb = 45_000, -- 45ms, should be less than 130ms to avoid Int overflow on 32 bit systems
|
||||
tcpKeepAlive = Just defaultKeepAliveOpts,
|
||||
smpPingInterval = 600_000_000, -- 10min
|
||||
smpPingCount = 3,
|
||||
@@ -218,7 +240,7 @@ defaultNetworkConfig =
|
||||
|
||||
transportClientConfig :: NetworkConfig -> TransportClientConfig
|
||||
transportClientConfig NetworkConfig {socksProxy, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors} =
|
||||
TransportClientConfig {socksProxy, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors}
|
||||
TransportClientConfig {socksProxy, tcpKeepAlive, logTLSErrors, clientCredentials = Nothing}
|
||||
|
||||
-- | protocol client configuration.
|
||||
data ProtocolClientConfig = ProtocolClientConfig
|
||||
@@ -235,22 +257,28 @@ data ProtocolClientConfig = ProtocolClientConfig
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Default protocol client configuration.
|
||||
defaultClientConfig :: ProtocolClientConfig
|
||||
defaultClientConfig =
|
||||
defaultClientConfig :: VersionRange -> ProtocolClientConfig
|
||||
defaultClientConfig serverVRange =
|
||||
ProtocolClientConfig
|
||||
{ qSize = 64,
|
||||
defaultTransport = ("443", transport @TLS),
|
||||
networkConfig = defaultNetworkConfig,
|
||||
serverVRange = supportedSMPServerVRange,
|
||||
serverVRange,
|
||||
batchDelay = Nothing
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
defaultSMPClientConfig :: ProtocolClientConfig
|
||||
defaultSMPClientConfig = defaultClientConfig supportedClientSMPRelayVRange
|
||||
|
||||
data Request err msg = Request
|
||||
{ queueId :: QueueId,
|
||||
responseVar :: TMVar (Response err msg)
|
||||
{ entityId :: EntityId,
|
||||
responseVar :: TMVar (Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type Response err msg = Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg
|
||||
data Response err msg = Response
|
||||
{ entityId :: EntityId,
|
||||
response :: Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
chooseTransportHost :: NetworkConfig -> NonEmpty TransportHost -> Either (ProtocolClientError err) TransportHost
|
||||
chooseTransportHost NetworkConfig {socksProxy, hostMode, requiredHostMode} hosts =
|
||||
@@ -287,8 +315,8 @@ type TransportSession msg = (UserId, ProtoServer msg, Maybe EntityId)
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- A single queue can be used for multiple 'SMPClient' instances,
|
||||
-- as 'SMPServerTransmission' includes server information.
|
||||
getProtocolClient :: forall err msg. Protocol err msg => TransportSession msg -> ProtocolClientConfig -> Maybe (TBQueue (ServerTransmission msg)) -> (ProtocolClient err msg -> IO ()) -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (ProtocolClient err msg))
|
||||
getProtocolClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize, networkConfig, serverVRange, batchDelay} msgQ disconnected = do
|
||||
getProtocolClient :: forall err msg. Protocol err msg => TVar ChaChaDRG -> TransportSession msg -> ProtocolClientConfig -> Maybe (TBQueue (ServerTransmission msg)) -> (ProtocolClient err msg -> IO ()) -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (ProtocolClient err msg))
|
||||
getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize, networkConfig, serverVRange, batchDelay} msgQ disconnected = do
|
||||
case chooseTransportHost networkConfig (host srv) of
|
||||
Right useHost ->
|
||||
(atomically (mkProtocolClient useHost) >>= runClient useTransport useHost)
|
||||
@@ -300,7 +328,7 @@ getProtocolClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize,
|
||||
mkProtocolClient transportHost = do
|
||||
connected <- newTVar False
|
||||
pingErrorCount <- newTVar 0
|
||||
clientCorrId <- newTVar 0
|
||||
clientCorrId <- C.newRandomDRG g
|
||||
sentCommands <- TM.empty
|
||||
sndQ <- newTBQueue qSize
|
||||
rcvQ <- newTBQueue qSize
|
||||
@@ -327,12 +355,12 @@ getProtocolClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize,
|
||||
action <-
|
||||
async $
|
||||
runTransportClient tcConfig (Just username) useHost port' (Just $ keyHash srv) (client t c cVar)
|
||||
`finally` atomically (putTMVar cVar $ Left PCENetworkError)
|
||||
`finally` atomically (tryPutTMVar cVar $ Left PCENetworkError)
|
||||
c_ <- tcpConnectTimeout `timeout` atomically (takeTMVar cVar)
|
||||
pure $ case c_ of
|
||||
Just (Right c') -> Right c' {action = Just action}
|
||||
Just (Left e) -> Left e
|
||||
Nothing -> Left PCENetworkError
|
||||
case c_ of
|
||||
Just (Right c') -> pure $ Right c' {action = Just action}
|
||||
Just (Left e) -> pure $ Left e
|
||||
Nothing -> cancel action $> Left PCENetworkError
|
||||
|
||||
useTransport :: (ServiceName, ATransport)
|
||||
useTransport = case port srv of
|
||||
@@ -341,13 +369,14 @@ getProtocolClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize,
|
||||
p -> (p, transport @TLS)
|
||||
|
||||
client :: forall c. Transport c => TProxy c -> PClient err msg -> TMVar (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (ProtocolClient err msg)) -> c -> IO ()
|
||||
client _ c cVar h =
|
||||
runExceptT (protocolClientHandshake @err @msg h (keyHash srv) serverVRange) >>= \case
|
||||
client _ c cVar h = do
|
||||
ks <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
|
||||
runExceptT (protocolClientHandshake @err @msg h ks (keyHash srv) serverVRange) >>= \case
|
||||
Left e -> atomically . putTMVar cVar . Left $ PCETransportError e
|
||||
Right th@THandle {sessionId, thVersion, blockSize, batch} -> do
|
||||
Right th@THandle {params} -> do
|
||||
sessionTs <- getCurrentTime
|
||||
let timeoutPerBlock = (blockSize * tcpTimeoutPerKb) `div` 1024
|
||||
c' = ProtocolClient {action = Nothing, client_ = c, sessionId, thVersion, sessionTs, timeoutPerBlock, blockSize, batch}
|
||||
let timeoutPerBlock = (blockSize params * tcpTimeoutPerKb) `div` 1024
|
||||
c' = ProtocolClient {action = Nothing, client_ = c, thParams = params, sessionTs, timeoutPerBlock}
|
||||
atomically $ do
|
||||
writeTVar (connected c) True
|
||||
putTMVar cVar $ Right c'
|
||||
@@ -355,7 +384,7 @@ getProtocolClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize,
|
||||
`finally` disconnected c'
|
||||
|
||||
send :: Transport c => ProtocolClient err msg -> THandle c -> IO ()
|
||||
send ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}} h = forever $ atomically (readTBQueue sndQ) >>= tPut h batchDelay
|
||||
send ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}} h = forever $ atomically (readTBQueue sndQ) >>= tPutLog h
|
||||
|
||||
receive :: Transport c => ProtocolClient err msg -> THandle c -> IO ()
|
||||
receive ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {rcvQ}} h = forever $ tGet h >>= atomically . writeTBQueue rcvQ
|
||||
@@ -375,26 +404,27 @@ getProtocolClient transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize,
|
||||
process c = forever $ atomically (readTBQueue $ rcvQ $ client_ c) >>= mapM_ (processMsg c)
|
||||
|
||||
processMsg :: ProtocolClient err msg -> SignedTransmission err msg -> IO ()
|
||||
processMsg c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sentCommands}} (_, _, (corrId, qId, respOrErr)) =
|
||||
processMsg c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sentCommands}} (_, _, (corrId, entId, respOrErr)) =
|
||||
if B.null $ bs corrId
|
||||
then sendMsg respOrErr
|
||||
else do
|
||||
atomically (TM.lookup corrId sentCommands) >>= \case
|
||||
Nothing -> sendMsg respOrErr
|
||||
Just Request {queueId, responseVar} -> atomically $ do
|
||||
Just Request {entityId, responseVar} -> atomically $ do
|
||||
TM.delete corrId sentCommands
|
||||
putTMVar responseVar $
|
||||
if queueId == qId
|
||||
then case respOrErr of
|
||||
Left e -> Left $ PCEResponseError e
|
||||
Right r -> case protocolError r of
|
||||
Just e -> Left $ PCEProtocolError e
|
||||
_ -> Right r
|
||||
else Left . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow respOrErr
|
||||
putTMVar responseVar $ response entityId
|
||||
where
|
||||
response entityId
|
||||
| entityId == entId =
|
||||
case respOrErr of
|
||||
Left e -> Left $ PCEResponseError e
|
||||
Right r -> case protocolError r of
|
||||
Just e -> Left $ PCEProtocolError e
|
||||
_ -> Right r
|
||||
| otherwise = Left . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow respOrErr
|
||||
sendMsg :: Either err msg -> IO ()
|
||||
sendMsg = \case
|
||||
Right msg -> atomically $ mapM_ (`writeTBQueue` serverTransmission c qId msg) msgQ
|
||||
Right msg -> atomically $ mapM_ (`writeTBQueue` serverTransmission c entId msg) msgQ
|
||||
Left e -> putStrLn $ "SMP client error: " <> show e
|
||||
|
||||
proxyUsername :: TransportSession msg -> ByteString
|
||||
@@ -448,20 +478,20 @@ temporaryClientError = \case
|
||||
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#create-queue-command
|
||||
createSMPQueue ::
|
||||
SMPClient ->
|
||||
RcvPrivateSignKey ->
|
||||
RcvPublicVerifyKey ->
|
||||
C.AAuthKeyPair -> -- SMP v6 - signature key pair, SMP v7 - DH key pair
|
||||
RcvPublicDhKey ->
|
||||
Maybe BasicAuth ->
|
||||
SubscriptionMode ->
|
||||
ExceptT SMPClientError IO QueueIdsKeys
|
||||
createSMPQueue c rpKey rKey dhKey auth =
|
||||
sendSMPCommand c (Just rpKey) "" (NEW rKey dhKey auth) >>= \case
|
||||
createSMPQueue c (rKey, rpKey) dhKey auth subMode =
|
||||
sendSMPCommand c (Just rpKey) "" (NEW rKey dhKey auth subMode) >>= \case
|
||||
IDS qik -> pure qik
|
||||
r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Subscribe to the SMP queue.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#subscribe-to-queue
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueue :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateSignKey -> RecipientId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueue :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateAuthKey -> RecipientId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueue c rpKey rId =
|
||||
sendSMPCommand c (Just rpKey) rId SUB >>= \case
|
||||
OK -> return ()
|
||||
@@ -469,27 +499,35 @@ subscribeSMPQueue c rpKey rId =
|
||||
r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Subscribe to multiple SMP queues batching commands if supported.
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueues :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (RcvPrivateSignKey, RecipientId) -> IO (NonEmpty (Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueues c qs = sendProtocolCommands c cs >>= mapM response . L.zip qs
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueues :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (RcvPrivateAuthKey, RecipientId) -> IO (NonEmpty (Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueues c qs = sendProtocolCommands c cs >>= mapM (processSUBResponse c)
|
||||
where
|
||||
cs = L.map (\(rpKey, rId) -> (Just rpKey, rId, Cmd SRecipient SUB)) qs
|
||||
response ((_, rId), r) = case r of
|
||||
Right OK -> pure $ Right ()
|
||||
Right cmd@MSG {} -> writeSMPMessage c rId cmd $> Right ()
|
||||
Right r' -> pure . Left . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r'
|
||||
Left e -> pure $ Left e
|
||||
|
||||
streamSubscribeSMPQueues :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (RcvPrivateAuthKey, RecipientId) -> ([(RecipientId, Either SMPClientError ())] -> IO ()) -> IO ()
|
||||
streamSubscribeSMPQueues c qs cb = streamProtocolCommands c cs $ mapM process >=> cb
|
||||
where
|
||||
cs = L.map (\(rpKey, rId) -> (Just rpKey, rId, Cmd SRecipient SUB)) qs
|
||||
process r@(Response rId _) = (rId,) <$> processSUBResponse c r
|
||||
|
||||
processSUBResponse :: SMPClient -> Response ErrorType BrokerMsg -> IO (Either SMPClientError ())
|
||||
processSUBResponse c (Response rId r) = case r of
|
||||
Right OK -> pure $ Right ()
|
||||
Right cmd@MSG {} -> writeSMPMessage c rId cmd $> Right ()
|
||||
Right r' -> pure . Left . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r'
|
||||
Left e -> pure $ Left e
|
||||
|
||||
writeSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> RecipientId -> BrokerMsg -> IO ()
|
||||
writeSMPMessage c rId msg = atomically $ mapM_ (`writeTBQueue` serverTransmission c rId msg) (msgQ $ client_ c)
|
||||
|
||||
serverTransmission :: ProtocolClient err msg -> RecipientId -> msg -> ServerTransmission msg
|
||||
serverTransmission ProtocolClient {thVersion, sessionId, client_ = PClient {transportSession}} entityId message =
|
||||
serverTransmission ProtocolClient {thParams = THandleParams {thVersion, sessionId}, client_ = PClient {transportSession}} entityId message =
|
||||
(transportSession, thVersion, sessionId, entityId, message)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Get message from SMP queue. The server returns ERR PROHIBITED if a client uses SUB and GET via the same transport connection for the same queue
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- https://github.covm/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#receive-a-message-from-the-queue
|
||||
getSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateSignKey -> RecipientId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO (Maybe RcvMessage)
|
||||
getSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateAuthKey -> RecipientId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO (Maybe RcvMessage)
|
||||
getSMPMessage c rpKey rId =
|
||||
sendSMPCommand c (Just rpKey) rId GET >>= \case
|
||||
OK -> pure Nothing
|
||||
@@ -499,52 +537,52 @@ getSMPMessage c rpKey rId =
|
||||
-- | Subscribe to the SMP queue notifications.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#subscribe-to-queue-notifications
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueueNotifications :: SMPClient -> NtfPrivateSignKey -> NotifierId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueueNotifications :: SMPClient -> NtfPrivateAuthKey -> NotifierId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueueNotifications = okSMPCommand NSUB
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Subscribe to multiple SMP queues notifications batching commands if supported.
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueuesNtfs :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (NtfPrivateSignKey, NotifierId) -> IO (NonEmpty (Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueuesNtfs :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (NtfPrivateAuthKey, NotifierId) -> IO (NonEmpty (Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
subscribeSMPQueuesNtfs = okSMPCommands NSUB
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Secure the SMP queue by adding a sender public key.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#secure-queue-command
|
||||
secureSMPQueue :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateSignKey -> RecipientId -> SndPublicVerifyKey -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
secureSMPQueue :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateAuthKey -> RecipientId -> SndPublicAuthKey -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
secureSMPQueue c rpKey rId senderKey = okSMPCommand (KEY senderKey) c rpKey rId
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Enable notifications for the queue for push notifications server.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#enable-notifications-command
|
||||
enableSMPQueueNotifications :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateSignKey -> RecipientId -> NtfPublicVerifyKey -> RcvNtfPublicDhKey -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO (NotifierId, RcvNtfPublicDhKey)
|
||||
enableSMPQueueNotifications :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateAuthKey -> RecipientId -> NtfPublicAuthKey -> RcvNtfPublicDhKey -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO (NotifierId, RcvNtfPublicDhKey)
|
||||
enableSMPQueueNotifications c rpKey rId notifierKey rcvNtfPublicDhKey =
|
||||
sendSMPCommand c (Just rpKey) rId (NKEY notifierKey rcvNtfPublicDhKey) >>= \case
|
||||
NID nId rcvNtfSrvPublicDhKey -> pure (nId, rcvNtfSrvPublicDhKey)
|
||||
r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Enable notifications for the multiple queues for push notifications server.
|
||||
enableSMPQueuesNtfs :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (RcvPrivateSignKey, RecipientId, NtfPublicVerifyKey, RcvNtfPublicDhKey) -> IO (NonEmpty (Either SMPClientError (NotifierId, RcvNtfPublicDhKey)))
|
||||
enableSMPQueuesNtfs c qs = L.map response <$> sendProtocolCommands c cs
|
||||
enableSMPQueuesNtfs :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (RcvPrivateAuthKey, RecipientId, NtfPublicAuthKey, RcvNtfPublicDhKey) -> IO (NonEmpty (Either SMPClientError (NotifierId, RcvNtfPublicDhKey)))
|
||||
enableSMPQueuesNtfs c qs = L.map process <$> sendProtocolCommands c cs
|
||||
where
|
||||
cs = L.map (\(rpKey, rId, notifierKey, rcvNtfPublicDhKey) -> (Just rpKey, rId, Cmd SRecipient $ NKEY notifierKey rcvNtfPublicDhKey)) qs
|
||||
response = \case
|
||||
process (Response _ r) = case r of
|
||||
Right (NID nId rcvNtfSrvPublicDhKey) -> Right (nId, rcvNtfSrvPublicDhKey)
|
||||
Right r -> Left . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
Right r' -> Left . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r'
|
||||
Left e -> Left e
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Disable notifications for the queue for push notifications server.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#disable-notifications-command
|
||||
disableSMPQueueNotifications :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateSignKey -> RecipientId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
disableSMPQueueNotifications :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateAuthKey -> RecipientId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
disableSMPQueueNotifications = okSMPCommand NDEL
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Disable notifications for multiple queues for push notifications server.
|
||||
disableSMPQueuesNtfs :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (RcvPrivateSignKey, RecipientId) -> IO (NonEmpty (Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
disableSMPQueuesNtfs :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (RcvPrivateAuthKey, RecipientId) -> IO (NonEmpty (Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
disableSMPQueuesNtfs = okSMPCommands NDEL
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Send SMP message.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#send-message
|
||||
sendSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> Maybe SndPrivateSignKey -> SenderId -> MsgFlags -> MsgBody -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
sendSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> Maybe SndPrivateAuthKey -> SenderId -> MsgFlags -> MsgBody -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
sendSMPMessage c spKey sId flags msg =
|
||||
sendSMPCommand c spKey sId (SEND flags msg) >>= \case
|
||||
OK -> pure ()
|
||||
@@ -553,7 +591,7 @@ sendSMPMessage c spKey sId flags msg =
|
||||
-- | Acknowledge message delivery (server deletes the message).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#acknowledge-message-delivery
|
||||
ackSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateSignKey -> QueueId -> MsgId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
ackSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateAuthKey -> QueueId -> MsgId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
ackSMPMessage c rpKey rId msgId =
|
||||
sendSMPCommand c (Just rpKey) rId (ACK msgId) >>= \case
|
||||
OK -> return ()
|
||||
@@ -564,108 +602,136 @@ ackSMPMessage c rpKey rId msgId =
|
||||
-- The existing messages from the queue will still be delivered.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#suspend-queue
|
||||
suspendSMPQueue :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateSignKey -> QueueId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
suspendSMPQueue :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateAuthKey -> QueueId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
suspendSMPQueue = okSMPCommand OFF
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Irreversibly delete SMP queue and all messages in it.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#delete-queue
|
||||
deleteSMPQueue :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateSignKey -> RecipientId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
deleteSMPQueue :: SMPClient -> RcvPrivateAuthKey -> RecipientId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
deleteSMPQueue = okSMPCommand DEL
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Delete multiple SMP queues batching commands if supported.
|
||||
deleteSMPQueues :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (RcvPrivateSignKey, RecipientId) -> IO (NonEmpty (Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
deleteSMPQueues :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (RcvPrivateAuthKey, RecipientId) -> IO (NonEmpty (Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
deleteSMPQueues = okSMPCommands DEL
|
||||
|
||||
okSMPCommand :: PartyI p => Command p -> SMPClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> QueueId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
okSMPCommand :: PartyI p => Command p -> SMPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> QueueId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
okSMPCommand cmd c pKey qId =
|
||||
sendSMPCommand c (Just pKey) qId cmd >>= \case
|
||||
OK -> return ()
|
||||
r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
|
||||
okSMPCommands :: PartyI p => Command p -> SMPClient -> NonEmpty (C.APrivateSignKey, QueueId) -> IO (NonEmpty (Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
okSMPCommands cmd c qs = L.map response <$> sendProtocolCommands c cs
|
||||
okSMPCommands :: PartyI p => Command p -> SMPClient -> NonEmpty (C.APrivateAuthKey, QueueId) -> IO (NonEmpty (Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
okSMPCommands cmd c qs = L.map process <$> sendProtocolCommands c cs
|
||||
where
|
||||
aCmd = Cmd sParty cmd
|
||||
cs = L.map (\(pKey, qId) -> (Just pKey, qId, aCmd)) qs
|
||||
response = \case
|
||||
process (Response _ r) = case r of
|
||||
Right OK -> Right ()
|
||||
Right r -> Left . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
Right r' -> Left . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r'
|
||||
Left e -> Left e
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Send SMP command
|
||||
sendSMPCommand :: PartyI p => SMPClient -> Maybe C.APrivateSignKey -> QueueId -> Command p -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO BrokerMsg
|
||||
sendSMPCommand :: PartyI p => SMPClient -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> QueueId -> Command p -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO BrokerMsg
|
||||
sendSMPCommand c pKey qId cmd = sendProtocolCommand c pKey qId (Cmd sParty cmd)
|
||||
|
||||
type PCTransmission err msg = (SentRawTransmission, TMVar (Response err msg))
|
||||
type PCTransmission err msg = (Either TransportError SentRawTransmission, Request err msg)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Send multiple commands with batching and collect responses
|
||||
-- It will result in Int overflow on 32 bit platform for a large number of blocks (~13.4k blocks / ~1.2m subscriptions)
|
||||
-- TODO switch to timeout or TimeManager that supports Int64
|
||||
sendProtocolCommands :: forall err msg. ProtocolEncoding err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient err msg -> NonEmpty (ClientCommand msg) -> IO (NonEmpty (Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg))
|
||||
sendProtocolCommands c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ, tcpTimeout, batchDelay}, batch, blockSize, timeoutPerBlock} cs = do
|
||||
(h :| ts) <- mapM (runExceptT . mkTransmission c) cs
|
||||
let h' :: Either (ProtocolClientError err) (PCTransmission err msg, Int) = (,timeoutPerBlock) <$> h
|
||||
batchSz = if batch then either (const 0) tSize h else 0
|
||||
ts' :: NonEmpty (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (PCTransmission err msg, Int)) =
|
||||
L.reverse . fst3 $ foldl' batchTimeouts ([h'], timeoutPerBlock, batchSz) ts
|
||||
ts_ :: (Maybe (NonEmpty SentRawTransmission)) =
|
||||
L.nonEmpty . map (fst . fst) . rights $ L.toList ts'
|
||||
mapM_ (atomically . writeTBQueue sndQ) ts_
|
||||
forConcurrently ts' $ \case
|
||||
Right ((_t, r), bt) -> withTimeout c (tcpTimeout + bt) (atomically $ takeTMVar r)
|
||||
Left e -> pure $ Left e
|
||||
sendProtocolCommands :: forall err msg. ProtocolEncoding err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient err msg -> NonEmpty (ClientCommand msg) -> IO (NonEmpty (Response err msg))
|
||||
sendProtocolCommands c@ProtocolClient {thParams = THandleParams {batch, blockSize}} cs = do
|
||||
bs <- batchTransmissions' batch blockSize <$> mapM (mkTransmission c) cs
|
||||
validate . concat =<< mapM (sendBatch c) bs
|
||||
where
|
||||
fst3 (x, _, _) = x
|
||||
-- tSize calculation matches the batching logic in tPut that does actual breaking of transmissions into blocks
|
||||
tSize :: PCTransmission err msg -> Int
|
||||
tSize ((sig, t), _) = maybe 0 C.signatureSize sig + B.length t + 3 -- 1 byte for signature size + 2 bytes for transmission size
|
||||
batchTimeouts :: (NonEmpty (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (PCTransmission err msg, Int)), Int, Int) -> Either (ProtocolClientError err) (PCTransmission err msg) -> (NonEmpty (Either (ProtocolClientError err) (PCTransmission err msg, Int)), Int, Int)
|
||||
batchTimeouts (ts, bt, batchSz) = \case
|
||||
Left e -> (Left e <| ts, bt, batchSz)
|
||||
Right t
|
||||
| not batch ->
|
||||
(Right (t, bt') <| ts, bt', 0)
|
||||
| batchSz' + 1 > blockSize ->
|
||||
(Right (t, bt') <| ts, bt', tSz)
|
||||
| otherwise -> -- same block in the batch
|
||||
(Right (t, bt) <| ts, bt, batchSz') -- 1 byte for the number of transmissions in the batch
|
||||
where
|
||||
batchSz' = batchSz + tSz
|
||||
bt' = bt + timeoutPerBlock + fromMaybe 0 batchDelay
|
||||
tSz = tSize t
|
||||
validate :: [Response err msg] -> IO (NonEmpty (Response err msg))
|
||||
validate rs
|
||||
| diff == 0 = pure $ L.fromList rs
|
||||
| diff > 0 = do
|
||||
putStrLn "send error: fewer responses than expected"
|
||||
pure $ L.fromList $ rs <> replicate diff (Response "" $ Left $ PCETransportError TEBadBlock)
|
||||
| otherwise = do
|
||||
putStrLn "send error: more responses than expected"
|
||||
pure $ L.fromList $ take (L.length cs) rs
|
||||
where
|
||||
diff = L.length cs - length rs
|
||||
|
||||
streamProtocolCommands :: forall err msg. ProtocolEncoding err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient err msg -> NonEmpty (ClientCommand msg) -> ([Response err msg] -> IO ()) -> IO ()
|
||||
streamProtocolCommands c@ProtocolClient {thParams = THandleParams {batch, blockSize}} cs cb = do
|
||||
bs <- batchTransmissions' batch blockSize <$> mapM (mkTransmission c) cs
|
||||
mapM_ (cb <=< sendBatch c) bs
|
||||
|
||||
sendBatch :: ProtocolClient err msg -> TransportBatch (Request err msg) -> IO [Response err msg]
|
||||
sendBatch c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}} b = do
|
||||
case b of
|
||||
TBError e Request {entityId} -> do
|
||||
putStrLn "send error: large message"
|
||||
pure [Response entityId $ Left $ PCETransportError e]
|
||||
TBTransmissions s n rs
|
||||
| n > 0 -> do
|
||||
atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ s
|
||||
mapConcurrently (getResponse c) rs
|
||||
| otherwise -> pure []
|
||||
TBTransmission s r -> do
|
||||
atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ s
|
||||
(: []) <$> getResponse c r
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Send Protocol command
|
||||
sendProtocolCommand :: forall err msg. ProtocolEncoding err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient err msg -> Maybe C.APrivateSignKey -> QueueId -> ProtoCommand msg -> ExceptT (ProtocolClientError err) IO msg
|
||||
sendProtocolCommand c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ, tcpTimeout}} pKey qId cmd = do
|
||||
(t, r) <- mkTransmission c (pKey, qId, cmd)
|
||||
ExceptT $ sendRecv t r
|
||||
sendProtocolCommand :: forall err msg. ProtocolEncoding err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient err msg -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> EntityId -> ProtoCommand msg -> ExceptT (ProtocolClientError err) IO msg
|
||||
sendProtocolCommand c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}, thParams = THandleParams {batch, blockSize}} pKey entId cmd =
|
||||
ExceptT $ uncurry sendRecv =<< mkTransmission c (pKey, entId, cmd)
|
||||
where
|
||||
-- two separate "atomically" needed to avoid blocking
|
||||
sendRecv :: SentRawTransmission -> TMVar (Response err msg) -> IO (Response err msg)
|
||||
sendRecv t r = atomically (writeTBQueue sndQ [t]) >> withTimeout c tcpTimeout (atomically $ takeTMVar r)
|
||||
sendRecv :: Either TransportError SentRawTransmission -> Request err msg -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg)
|
||||
sendRecv t_ r = case t_ of
|
||||
Left e -> pure . Left $ PCETransportError e
|
||||
Right t
|
||||
| B.length s > blockSize - 2 -> pure . Left $ PCETransportError TELargeMsg
|
||||
| otherwise -> atomically (writeTBQueue sndQ s) >> response <$> getResponse c r
|
||||
where
|
||||
s
|
||||
| batch = tEncodeBatch1 t
|
||||
| otherwise = tEncode t
|
||||
|
||||
withTimeout :: ProtocolClient err msg -> Int -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg) -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg)
|
||||
withTimeout ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {pingErrorCount}} t a = do
|
||||
timeout t a >>= \case
|
||||
Just r -> atomically (writeTVar pingErrorCount 0) >> pure r
|
||||
_ -> pure $ Left PCEResponseTimeout
|
||||
-- TODO switch to timeout or TimeManager that supports Int64
|
||||
getResponse :: ProtocolClient err msg -> Request err msg -> IO (Response err msg)
|
||||
getResponse ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpTimeout, pingErrorCount}} Request {entityId, responseVar} = do
|
||||
response <-
|
||||
timeout tcpTimeout (atomically (takeTMVar responseVar)) >>= \case
|
||||
Just r -> atomically (writeTVar pingErrorCount 0) $> r
|
||||
Nothing -> pure $ Left PCEResponseTimeout
|
||||
pure Response {entityId, response}
|
||||
|
||||
mkTransmission :: forall err msg. ProtocolEncoding err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient err msg -> ClientCommand msg -> ExceptT (ProtocolClientError err) IO (PCTransmission err msg)
|
||||
mkTransmission ProtocolClient {sessionId, thVersion, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCommands}} (pKey, qId, cmd) = do
|
||||
corrId <- liftIO $ atomically getNextCorrId
|
||||
let t = signTransmission $ encodeTransmission thVersion sessionId (corrId, qId, cmd)
|
||||
r <- liftIO . atomically $ mkRequest corrId
|
||||
pure (t, r)
|
||||
mkTransmission :: forall err msg. ProtocolEncoding err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient err msg -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
|
||||
mkTransmission ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCommands}} (pKey_, entId, cmd) = do
|
||||
corrId <- atomically getNextCorrId
|
||||
let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, entId, cmd)
|
||||
auth = authTransmission (thAuth thParams) pKey_ corrId tForAuth
|
||||
r <- atomically $ mkRequest corrId
|
||||
pure ((,tToSend) <$> auth, r)
|
||||
where
|
||||
getNextCorrId :: STM CorrId
|
||||
getNextCorrId = do
|
||||
i <- stateTVar clientCorrId $ \i -> (i, i + 1)
|
||||
pure . CorrId $ bshow i
|
||||
signTransmission :: ByteString -> SentRawTransmission
|
||||
signTransmission t = ((`C.sign` t) <$> pKey, t)
|
||||
mkRequest :: CorrId -> STM (TMVar (Response err msg))
|
||||
getNextCorrId = CorrId <$> C.randomBytes 24 clientCorrId -- also used as nonce
|
||||
mkRequest :: CorrId -> STM (Request err msg)
|
||||
mkRequest corrId = do
|
||||
r <- newEmptyTMVar
|
||||
TM.insert corrId (Request qId r) sentCommands
|
||||
r <- Request entId <$> newEmptyTMVar
|
||||
TM.insert corrId r sentCommands
|
||||
pure r
|
||||
|
||||
authTransmission :: Maybe THandleAuth -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> CorrId -> ByteString -> Either TransportError (Maybe TransmissionAuth)
|
||||
authTransmission thAuth pKey_ (CorrId corrId) t = traverse authenticate pKey_
|
||||
where
|
||||
authenticate :: C.APrivateAuthKey -> Either TransportError TransmissionAuth
|
||||
authenticate (C.APrivateAuthKey a pk) = case a of
|
||||
C.SX25519 -> case thAuth of
|
||||
Just THandleAuth {peerPubKey} -> Right $ TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate peerPubKey pk (C.cbNonce corrId) t
|
||||
Nothing -> Left TENoServerAuth
|
||||
C.SEd25519 -> sign pk
|
||||
C.SEd448 -> sign pk
|
||||
sign :: forall a. (C.AlgorithmI a, C.SignatureAlgorithm a) => C.PrivateKey a -> Either TransportError TransmissionAuth
|
||||
sign pk = Right $ TASignature $ C.ASignature (C.sAlgorithm @a) (C.sign' pk t)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (enumJSON $ dropPrefix "HM") ''HostMode)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (enumJSON $ dropPrefix "TSM") ''TransportSessionMode)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''NetworkConfig)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,10 +14,12 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent where
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent (forkIO)
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent.Async (Async, uninterruptibleCancel)
|
||||
import Control.Logger.Simple
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (first, bimap)
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (bimap, first)
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import Data.Either (partitionEithers)
|
||||
@@ -35,11 +37,11 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BrokerMsg, ProtocolServer (..), QueueId, SMPServer, NtfPrivateSignKey, NotifierId, RcvPrivateSignKey, RecipientId)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BrokerMsg, NotifierId, NtfPrivateAuthKey, ProtocolServer (..), QueueId, RcvPrivateAuthKey, RecipientId, SMPServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (catchAll_, tryE, ($>>=), toChunks)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (catchAll_, toChunks, ($>>=))
|
||||
import System.Timeout (timeout)
|
||||
import UnliftIO (async)
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Exception (Exception)
|
||||
@@ -73,7 +75,7 @@ data SMPClientAgentConfig = SMPClientAgentConfig
|
||||
defaultSMPClientAgentConfig :: SMPClientAgentConfig
|
||||
defaultSMPClientAgentConfig =
|
||||
SMPClientAgentConfig
|
||||
{ smpCfg = defaultClientConfig {defaultTransport = ("5223", transport @TLS)},
|
||||
{ smpCfg = defaultSMPClientConfig {defaultTransport = ("5223", transport @TLS)},
|
||||
reconnectInterval =
|
||||
RetryInterval
|
||||
{ initialInterval = second,
|
||||
@@ -91,9 +93,10 @@ data SMPClientAgent = SMPClientAgent
|
||||
{ agentCfg :: SMPClientAgentConfig,
|
||||
msgQ :: TBQueue (ServerTransmission BrokerMsg),
|
||||
agentQ :: TBQueue SMPClientAgentEvent,
|
||||
randomDrg :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
|
||||
smpClients :: TMap SMPServer SMPClientVar,
|
||||
srvSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateSignKey),
|
||||
pendingSrvSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateSignKey),
|
||||
srvSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey),
|
||||
pendingSrvSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey),
|
||||
reconnections :: TVar [Async ()],
|
||||
asyncClients :: TVar [Async ()]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -110,8 +113,8 @@ instance (MonadUnliftIO m, Exception e) => MonadUnliftIO (ExceptT e m) where
|
||||
withRunInIO $ \run ->
|
||||
exceptToIO $ run . (either (E.throwIO . InternalException) return <=< runExceptT)
|
||||
|
||||
newSMPClientAgent :: SMPClientAgentConfig -> STM SMPClientAgent
|
||||
newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} = do
|
||||
newSMPClientAgent :: SMPClientAgentConfig -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM SMPClientAgent
|
||||
newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} randomDrg = do
|
||||
msgQ <- newTBQueue msgQSize
|
||||
agentQ <- newTBQueue agentQSize
|
||||
smpClients <- TM.empty
|
||||
@@ -119,10 +122,10 @@ newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} = do
|
||||
pendingSrvSubs <- TM.empty
|
||||
reconnections <- newTVar []
|
||||
asyncClients <- newTVar []
|
||||
pure SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, msgQ, agentQ, smpClients, srvSubs, pendingSrvSubs, reconnections, asyncClients}
|
||||
pure SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, msgQ, agentQ, randomDrg, smpClients, srvSubs, pendingSrvSubs, reconnections, asyncClients}
|
||||
|
||||
getSMPServerClient' :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO SMPClient
|
||||
getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ} srv =
|
||||
getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ, randomDrg} srv =
|
||||
atomically getClientVar >>= either newSMPClient waitForSMPClient
|
||||
where
|
||||
getClientVar :: STM (Either SMPClientVar SMPClientVar)
|
||||
@@ -170,14 +173,14 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ} srv =
|
||||
void $ tryConnectClient (const reconnectClient) loop
|
||||
|
||||
connectClient :: ExceptT SMPClientError IO SMPClient
|
||||
connectClient = ExceptT $ getProtocolClient (1, srv, Nothing) (smpCfg agentCfg) (Just msgQ) clientDisconnected
|
||||
connectClient = ExceptT $ getProtocolClient randomDrg (1, srv, Nothing) (smpCfg agentCfg) (Just msgQ) clientDisconnected
|
||||
|
||||
clientDisconnected :: SMPClient -> IO ()
|
||||
clientDisconnected _ = do
|
||||
removeClientAndSubs >>= (`forM_` serverDown)
|
||||
logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ "Agent disconnected from " <> showServer srv
|
||||
|
||||
removeClientAndSubs :: IO (Maybe (Map SMPSub C.APrivateSignKey))
|
||||
removeClientAndSubs :: IO (Maybe (Map SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey))
|
||||
removeClientAndSubs = atomically $ do
|
||||
TM.delete srv smpClients
|
||||
TM.lookupDelete srv (srvSubs ca) >>= mapM updateSubs
|
||||
@@ -193,7 +196,7 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ} srv =
|
||||
Just v -> TM.union ss v
|
||||
_ -> TM.insert srv sVar ps
|
||||
|
||||
serverDown :: Map SMPSub C.APrivateSignKey -> IO ()
|
||||
serverDown :: Map SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey -> IO ()
|
||||
serverDown ss = unless (M.null ss) $ do
|
||||
notify . CADisconnected srv $ M.keysSet ss
|
||||
void $ runExceptT reconnectServer
|
||||
@@ -223,21 +226,21 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ} srv =
|
||||
SPNotifier -> True
|
||||
SPRecipient -> False
|
||||
|
||||
subscribe_ :: SMPClient -> SMPSubParty -> [(SMPSub, C.APrivateSignKey)] -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
subscribe_ :: SMPClient -> SMPSubParty -> [(SMPSub, C.APrivateAuthKey)] -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
subscribe_ smp party = mapM_ subscribeBatch . toChunks (agentSubsBatchSize agentCfg)
|
||||
where
|
||||
subscribeBatch subs' = do
|
||||
let subs'' :: (NonEmpty (QueueId, C.APrivateSignKey)) = L.map (first snd) subs'
|
||||
let subs'' :: (NonEmpty (QueueId, C.APrivateAuthKey)) = L.map (first snd) subs'
|
||||
rs <- liftIO $ smpSubscribeQueues party ca smp srv subs''
|
||||
let rs' :: (NonEmpty ((SMPSub, C.APrivateSignKey), Either SMPClientError ())) =
|
||||
let rs' :: (NonEmpty ((SMPSub, C.APrivateAuthKey), Either SMPClientError ())) =
|
||||
L.zipWith (first . const) subs' rs
|
||||
rs'' :: [Either (SMPSub, SMPClientError) (SMPSub, C.APrivateSignKey)] =
|
||||
rs'' :: [Either (SMPSub, SMPClientError) (SMPSub, C.APrivateAuthKey)] =
|
||||
map (\(sub, r) -> bimap (fst sub,) (const sub) r) $ L.toList rs'
|
||||
(errs, oks) = partitionEithers rs''
|
||||
(tempErrs, finalErrs) = partition (temporaryClientError . snd) errs
|
||||
mapM_ (atomically . addSubscription ca srv) oks
|
||||
mapM_ (liftIO . notify . CAResubscribed srv) $ L.nonEmpty $ map fst oks
|
||||
mapM_ (atomically . removePendingSubscription ca srv . fst) finalErrs
|
||||
mapM_ (atomically . removePendingSubscription ca srv . fst) finalErrs
|
||||
mapM_ (liftIO . notify . CASubError srv) $ L.nonEmpty finalErrs
|
||||
mapM_ (throwE . snd) $ listToMaybe tempErrs
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -269,44 +272,45 @@ withSMP ca srv action = (getSMPServerClient' ca srv >>= action) `catchE` logSMPE
|
||||
liftIO $ putStrLn $ "SMP error (" <> show srv <> "): " <> show e
|
||||
throwE e
|
||||
|
||||
subscribeQueue :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> (SMPSub, C.APrivateSignKey) -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
subscribeQueue :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> (SMPSub, C.APrivateAuthKey) -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
subscribeQueue ca srv sub = do
|
||||
atomically $ addPendingSubscription ca srv sub
|
||||
withSMP ca srv $ \smp -> subscribe_ smp `catchE` handleError
|
||||
withSMP ca srv $ \smp -> subscribe_ smp `catchE` handleErr
|
||||
where
|
||||
subscribe_ smp = do
|
||||
smpSubscribe smp sub
|
||||
atomically $ addSubscription ca srv sub
|
||||
|
||||
handleError e = do
|
||||
handleErr e = do
|
||||
atomically . when (e /= PCENetworkError && e /= PCEResponseTimeout) $
|
||||
removePendingSubscription ca srv $ fst sub
|
||||
removePendingSubscription ca srv (fst sub)
|
||||
throwE e
|
||||
|
||||
subscribeQueuesSMP :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> NonEmpty (RecipientId, RcvPrivateSignKey) -> IO (NonEmpty (RecipientId, Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
subscribeQueuesSMP :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> NonEmpty (RecipientId, RcvPrivateAuthKey) -> IO (NonEmpty (RecipientId, Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
subscribeQueuesSMP = subscribeQueues_ SPRecipient
|
||||
|
||||
subscribeQueuesNtfs :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> NonEmpty (NotifierId, NtfPrivateSignKey) -> IO (NonEmpty (NotifierId, Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
subscribeQueuesNtfs :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> NonEmpty (NotifierId, NtfPrivateAuthKey) -> IO (NonEmpty (NotifierId, Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
subscribeQueuesNtfs = subscribeQueues_ SPNotifier
|
||||
|
||||
subscribeQueues_ :: SMPSubParty -> SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> NonEmpty (QueueId, C.APrivateSignKey) -> IO (NonEmpty (QueueId, Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
subscribeQueues_ :: SMPSubParty -> SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> NonEmpty (QueueId, C.APrivateAuthKey) -> IO (NonEmpty (QueueId, Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
subscribeQueues_ party ca srv subs = do
|
||||
atomically $ forM_ subs $ addPendingSubscription ca srv . first (party,)
|
||||
runExceptT (getSMPServerClient' ca srv) >>= \case
|
||||
Left e -> pure $ L.map ((,Left e) . fst) subs
|
||||
Right smp -> smpSubscribeQueues party ca smp srv subs
|
||||
|
||||
smpSubscribeQueues :: SMPSubParty -> SMPClientAgent -> SMPClient -> SMPServer -> NonEmpty (QueueId, C.APrivateSignKey) -> IO (NonEmpty (QueueId, Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
smpSubscribeQueues :: SMPSubParty -> SMPClientAgent -> SMPClient -> SMPServer -> NonEmpty (QueueId, C.APrivateAuthKey) -> IO (NonEmpty (QueueId, Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
smpSubscribeQueues party ca smp srv subs = do
|
||||
rs <- L.zip subs <$> subscribe smp (L.map swap subs)
|
||||
atomically $ forM rs $ \(sub, r) -> (fst sub,) <$> case r of
|
||||
Right () -> do
|
||||
addSubscription ca srv $ first (party,) sub
|
||||
pure $ Right ()
|
||||
Left e -> do
|
||||
when (e /= PCENetworkError && e /= PCEResponseTimeout) $
|
||||
removePendingSubscription ca srv $ (party,) $ fst sub
|
||||
pure $ Left e
|
||||
atomically $ forM rs $ \(sub, r) ->
|
||||
(fst sub,) <$> case r of
|
||||
Right () -> do
|
||||
addSubscription ca srv $ first (party,) sub
|
||||
pure $ Right ()
|
||||
Left e -> do
|
||||
when (e /= PCENetworkError && e /= PCEResponseTimeout) $
|
||||
removePendingSubscription ca srv (party, fst sub)
|
||||
pure $ Left e
|
||||
where
|
||||
subscribe = case party of
|
||||
SPRecipient -> subscribeSMPQueues
|
||||
@@ -316,22 +320,22 @@ showServer :: SMPServer -> ByteString
|
||||
showServer ProtocolServer {host, port} =
|
||||
strEncode host <> B.pack (if null port then "" else ':' : port)
|
||||
|
||||
smpSubscribe :: SMPClient -> (SMPSub, C.APrivateSignKey) -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
smpSubscribe :: SMPClient -> (SMPSub, C.APrivateAuthKey) -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
|
||||
smpSubscribe smp ((party, queueId), privKey) = subscribe_ smp privKey queueId
|
||||
where
|
||||
subscribe_ = case party of
|
||||
SPRecipient -> subscribeSMPQueue
|
||||
SPNotifier -> subscribeSMPQueueNotifications
|
||||
|
||||
addSubscription :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> (SMPSub, C.APrivateSignKey) -> STM ()
|
||||
addSubscription :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> (SMPSub, C.APrivateAuthKey) -> STM ()
|
||||
addSubscription ca srv sub = do
|
||||
addSub_ (srvSubs ca) srv sub
|
||||
removePendingSubscription ca srv $ fst sub
|
||||
|
||||
addPendingSubscription :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> (SMPSub, C.APrivateSignKey) -> STM ()
|
||||
addPendingSubscription :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> (SMPSub, C.APrivateAuthKey) -> STM ()
|
||||
addPendingSubscription = addSub_ . pendingSrvSubs
|
||||
|
||||
addSub_ :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateSignKey) -> SMPServer -> (SMPSub, C.APrivateSignKey) -> STM ()
|
||||
addSub_ :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey) -> SMPServer -> (SMPSub, C.APrivateAuthKey) -> STM ()
|
||||
addSub_ subs srv (s, key) =
|
||||
TM.lookup srv subs >>= \case
|
||||
Just m -> TM.insert s key m
|
||||
@@ -343,11 +347,11 @@ removeSubscription = removeSub_ . srvSubs
|
||||
removePendingSubscription :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> SMPSub -> STM ()
|
||||
removePendingSubscription = removeSub_ . pendingSrvSubs
|
||||
|
||||
removeSub_ :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateSignKey) -> SMPServer -> SMPSub -> STM ()
|
||||
removeSub_ :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey) -> SMPServer -> SMPSub -> STM ()
|
||||
removeSub_ subs srv s = TM.lookup srv subs >>= mapM_ (TM.delete s)
|
||||
|
||||
getSubKey :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateSignKey) -> SMPServer -> SMPSub -> STM (Maybe C.APrivateSignKey)
|
||||
getSubKey :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey) -> SMPServer -> SMPSub -> STM (Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey)
|
||||
getSubKey subs srv s = TM.lookup srv subs $>>= TM.lookup s
|
||||
|
||||
hasSub :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateSignKey) -> SMPServer -> SMPSub -> STM Bool
|
||||
hasSub :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey) -> SMPServer -> SMPSub -> STM Bool
|
||||
hasSub subs srv s = maybe (pure False) (TM.member s) =<< TM.lookup srv subs
|
||||
|
||||
+305
-41
@@ -3,10 +3,12 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE MultiParamTypeClasses #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
|
||||
@@ -35,11 +37,13 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
|
||||
Algorithm (..),
|
||||
SAlgorithm (..),
|
||||
Alg (..),
|
||||
SignAlg (..),
|
||||
AuthAlg (..),
|
||||
DhAlg (..),
|
||||
DhAlgorithm,
|
||||
PrivateKey (..),
|
||||
PublicKey (..),
|
||||
PrivateKeyEd25519,
|
||||
PublicKeyEd25519,
|
||||
PrivateKeyX25519,
|
||||
PublicKeyX25519,
|
||||
PrivateKeyX448,
|
||||
@@ -50,20 +54,32 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
|
||||
APublicVerifyKey (..),
|
||||
APrivateDhKey (..),
|
||||
APublicDhKey (..),
|
||||
APrivateAuthKey (..),
|
||||
APublicAuthKey (..),
|
||||
CryptoPublicKey (..),
|
||||
CryptoPrivateKey (..),
|
||||
AAuthKeyPair,
|
||||
KeyPair,
|
||||
KeyPairX25519,
|
||||
ASignatureKeyPair,
|
||||
DhSecret (..),
|
||||
DhSecretX25519,
|
||||
ADhSecret (..),
|
||||
KeyHash (..),
|
||||
newRandom,
|
||||
newRandomDRG,
|
||||
generateAKeyPair,
|
||||
generateKeyPair,
|
||||
generateKeyPair',
|
||||
generateSignatureKeyPair,
|
||||
generateAuthKeyPair,
|
||||
generateDhKeyPair,
|
||||
privateToX509,
|
||||
x509ToPublic,
|
||||
x509ToPrivate,
|
||||
publicKey,
|
||||
signatureKeyPair,
|
||||
publicToX509,
|
||||
encodeASNObj,
|
||||
|
||||
-- * key encoding/decoding
|
||||
encodePubKey,
|
||||
@@ -78,12 +94,20 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
|
||||
CryptoSignature (..),
|
||||
SignatureSize (..),
|
||||
SignatureAlgorithm,
|
||||
AuthAlgorithm,
|
||||
AlgorithmI (..),
|
||||
sign,
|
||||
sign',
|
||||
verify,
|
||||
verify',
|
||||
validSignatureSize,
|
||||
|
||||
-- * crypto_box authenticator, as discussed in https://groups.google.com/g/sci.crypt/c/73yb5a9pz2Y/m/LNgRO7IYXOwJ
|
||||
CbAuthenticator (..),
|
||||
cbAuthenticatorSize,
|
||||
cbAuthenticate,
|
||||
cbVerify,
|
||||
|
||||
-- * DH derivation
|
||||
dh',
|
||||
dhBytes',
|
||||
@@ -99,7 +123,6 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
|
||||
decryptAESNoPad,
|
||||
authTagSize,
|
||||
randomAesKey,
|
||||
randomIV,
|
||||
randomGCMIV,
|
||||
ivSize,
|
||||
gcmIVSize,
|
||||
@@ -109,11 +132,14 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
|
||||
CbNonce (unCbNonce),
|
||||
pattern CbNonce,
|
||||
cbEncrypt,
|
||||
cbEncryptNoPad,
|
||||
cbEncryptMaxLenBS,
|
||||
cbDecrypt,
|
||||
cbDecryptNoPad,
|
||||
sbDecrypt_,
|
||||
sbEncrypt_,
|
||||
cbNonce,
|
||||
randomCbNonce,
|
||||
pseudoRandomCbNonce,
|
||||
|
||||
-- * NaCl crypto_secretbox
|
||||
SbKey (unSbKey),
|
||||
@@ -125,7 +151,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
|
||||
randomSbKey,
|
||||
|
||||
-- * pseudo-random bytes
|
||||
pseudoRandomBytes,
|
||||
randomBytes,
|
||||
|
||||
-- * digests
|
||||
sha256Hash,
|
||||
@@ -135,6 +161,19 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
|
||||
pad,
|
||||
unPad,
|
||||
|
||||
-- * X509 Certificates
|
||||
SignedCertificate,
|
||||
Certificate,
|
||||
signCertificate,
|
||||
signX509,
|
||||
verifyX509,
|
||||
certificateFingerprint,
|
||||
signedFingerprint,
|
||||
SignatureAlgorithmX509 (..),
|
||||
SignedObject (..),
|
||||
encodeCertChain,
|
||||
certChainP,
|
||||
|
||||
-- * Cryptography error type
|
||||
CryptoError (..),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -149,19 +188,20 @@ where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent.STM
|
||||
import Control.Exception (Exception)
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
|
||||
import Crypto.Cipher.AES (AES256)
|
||||
import qualified Crypto.Cipher.Types as AES
|
||||
import qualified Crypto.Cipher.XSalsa as XSalsa
|
||||
import qualified Crypto.Error as CE
|
||||
import Crypto.Hash (Digest, SHA256, SHA512, hash)
|
||||
import Crypto.Hash (Digest, SHA256 (..), SHA512 (..), hash, hashDigestSize)
|
||||
import qualified Crypto.MAC.Poly1305 as Poly1305
|
||||
import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Curve25519 as X25519
|
||||
import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Curve448 as X448
|
||||
import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519 as Ed25519
|
||||
import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed448 as Ed448
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG, getRandomBytes, randomBytesGenerate)
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG, MonadPseudoRandom, drgNew, randomBytesGenerate, withDRG)
|
||||
import Data.ASN1.BinaryEncoding
|
||||
import Data.ASN1.Encoding
|
||||
import Data.ASN1.Types
|
||||
@@ -177,11 +217,13 @@ import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Lazy (fromStrict, toStrict)
|
||||
import Data.Constraint (Dict (..))
|
||||
import Data.Kind (Constraint, Type)
|
||||
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
|
||||
import Data.String
|
||||
import Data.Type.Equality
|
||||
import Data.Typeable (Proxy (Proxy), Typeable)
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word32)
|
||||
import Data.X509
|
||||
import Data.X509.Validation (Fingerprint (..), getFingerprint)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.FromField (FromField (..))
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.ToField (ToField (..))
|
||||
import GHC.TypeLits (ErrorMessage (..), KnownNat, Nat, TypeError, natVal, type (+))
|
||||
@@ -207,10 +249,10 @@ deriving instance Show (SAlgorithm a)
|
||||
|
||||
data Alg = forall a. AlgorithmI a => Alg (SAlgorithm a)
|
||||
|
||||
data SignAlg
|
||||
data AuthAlg
|
||||
= forall a.
|
||||
(AlgorithmI a, SignatureAlgorithm a) =>
|
||||
SignAlg (SAlgorithm a)
|
||||
(AlgorithmI a, AuthAlgorithm a) =>
|
||||
AuthAlg (SAlgorithm a)
|
||||
|
||||
data DhAlg
|
||||
= forall a.
|
||||
@@ -260,8 +302,16 @@ instance Eq APublicKey where
|
||||
Just Refl -> k == k'
|
||||
Nothing -> False
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding APublicKey where
|
||||
smpEncode = smpEncode . encodePubKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpEncode #-}
|
||||
smpDecode = decodePubKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpDecode #-}
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show APublicKey
|
||||
|
||||
type PublicKeyEd25519 = PublicKey Ed25519
|
||||
|
||||
type PublicKeyX25519 = PublicKey X25519
|
||||
|
||||
type PublicKeyX448 = PublicKey X448
|
||||
@@ -277,6 +327,10 @@ deriving instance Eq (PrivateKey a)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (PrivateKey a)
|
||||
|
||||
-- Do not enable, to avoid leaking key data
|
||||
-- instance StrEncoding (PrivateKey Ed25519) where
|
||||
|
||||
-- Used in notification store log
|
||||
instance StrEncoding (PrivateKey X25519) where
|
||||
strEncode = strEncode . encodePrivKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE strEncode #-}
|
||||
@@ -295,6 +349,8 @@ instance Eq APrivateKey where
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show APrivateKey
|
||||
|
||||
type PrivateKeyEd25519 = PrivateKey Ed25519
|
||||
|
||||
type PrivateKeyX25519 = PrivateKey X25519
|
||||
|
||||
type PrivateKeyX448 = PrivateKey X448
|
||||
@@ -398,6 +454,57 @@ dhAlgorithm = \case
|
||||
SX448 -> Just Dict
|
||||
_ -> Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
data APrivateAuthKey
|
||||
= forall a.
|
||||
(AlgorithmI a, AuthAlgorithm a) =>
|
||||
APrivateAuthKey (SAlgorithm a) (PrivateKey a)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq APrivateAuthKey where
|
||||
APrivateAuthKey a k == APrivateAuthKey a' k' = case testEquality a a' of
|
||||
Just Refl -> k == k'
|
||||
Nothing -> False
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show APrivateAuthKey
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding APrivateAuthKey where
|
||||
smpEncode = smpEncode . encodePrivKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpEncode #-}
|
||||
smpDecode = decodePrivKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpDecode #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding APrivateAuthKey where
|
||||
strEncode = strEncode . encodePrivKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE strEncode #-}
|
||||
strDecode = decodePrivKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE strDecode #-}
|
||||
|
||||
data APublicAuthKey
|
||||
= forall a.
|
||||
(AlgorithmI a, AuthAlgorithm a) =>
|
||||
APublicAuthKey (SAlgorithm a) (PublicKey a)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq APublicAuthKey where
|
||||
APublicAuthKey a k == APublicAuthKey a' k' = case testEquality a a' of
|
||||
Just Refl -> k == k'
|
||||
Nothing -> False
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show APublicAuthKey
|
||||
|
||||
-- either X25519 or Ed algorithm that can be used to authorize commands to SMP server
|
||||
type family AuthAlgorithm (a :: Algorithm) :: Constraint where
|
||||
AuthAlgorithm Ed25519 = ()
|
||||
AuthAlgorithm Ed448 = ()
|
||||
AuthAlgorithm X25519 = ()
|
||||
AuthAlgorithm a =
|
||||
(Int ~ Bool, TypeError (Text "Algorithm " :<>: ShowType a :<>: Text " cannot be used for authorization"))
|
||||
|
||||
authAlgorithm :: SAlgorithm a -> Maybe (Dict (AuthAlgorithm a))
|
||||
authAlgorithm = \case
|
||||
SEd25519 -> Just Dict
|
||||
SEd448 -> Just Dict
|
||||
SX25519 -> Just Dict
|
||||
_ -> Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
dhBytes' :: DhSecret a -> ByteString
|
||||
dhBytes' = \case
|
||||
DhSecretX25519 s -> BA.convert s
|
||||
@@ -437,6 +544,12 @@ instance CryptoPublicKey APublicVerifyKey where
|
||||
Just Dict -> Right $ APublicVerifyKey a k
|
||||
_ -> Left "key does not support signature algorithms"
|
||||
|
||||
instance CryptoPublicKey APublicAuthKey where
|
||||
toPubKey f (APublicAuthKey _ k) = f k
|
||||
pubKey (APublicKey a k) = case authAlgorithm a of
|
||||
Just Dict -> Right $ APublicAuthKey a k
|
||||
_ -> Left "key does not support auth algorithms"
|
||||
|
||||
instance CryptoPublicKey APublicDhKey where
|
||||
toPubKey f (APublicDhKey _ k) = f k
|
||||
pubKey (APublicKey a k) = case dhAlgorithm a of
|
||||
@@ -453,6 +566,12 @@ instance Encoding APublicVerifyKey where
|
||||
smpDecode = decodePubKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpDecode #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding APublicAuthKey where
|
||||
smpEncode = smpEncode . encodePubKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpEncode #-}
|
||||
smpDecode = decodePubKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpDecode #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding APublicDhKey where
|
||||
smpEncode = smpEncode . encodePubKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpEncode #-}
|
||||
@@ -471,6 +590,12 @@ instance StrEncoding APublicVerifyKey where
|
||||
strDecode = decodePubKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE strDecode #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding APublicAuthKey where
|
||||
strEncode = strEncode . encodePubKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE strEncode #-}
|
||||
strDecode = decodePubKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE strDecode #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding APublicDhKey where
|
||||
strEncode = strEncode . encodePubKey
|
||||
{-# INLINE strEncode #-}
|
||||
@@ -518,6 +643,13 @@ instance CryptoPrivateKey APrivateSignKey where
|
||||
Just Dict -> Right $ APrivateSignKey a k
|
||||
_ -> Left "key does not support signature algorithms"
|
||||
|
||||
instance CryptoPrivateKey APrivateAuthKey where
|
||||
type PublicKeyType APrivateAuthKey = APublicAuthKey
|
||||
toPrivKey f (APrivateAuthKey _ k) = f k
|
||||
privKey (APrivateKey a k) = case authAlgorithm a of
|
||||
Just Dict -> Right $ APrivateAuthKey a k
|
||||
_ -> Left "key does not support auth algorithms"
|
||||
|
||||
instance CryptoPrivateKey APrivateDhKey where
|
||||
type PublicKeyType APrivateDhKey = APublicDhKey
|
||||
toPrivKey f (APrivateDhKey _ k) = f k
|
||||
@@ -537,6 +669,10 @@ publicKey = \case
|
||||
PrivateKeyX25519 _ k -> PublicKeyX25519 k
|
||||
PrivateKeyX448 _ k -> PublicKeyX448 k
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Expand signature private key to a key pair.
|
||||
signatureKeyPair :: APrivateSignKey -> ASignatureKeyPair
|
||||
signatureKeyPair ak@(APrivateSignKey a k) = (APublicVerifyKey a (publicKey k), ak)
|
||||
|
||||
encodePrivKey :: CryptoPrivateKey pk => pk -> ByteString
|
||||
encodePrivKey = toPrivKey $ encodeASNObj . privateToX509
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -557,23 +693,40 @@ type KeyPairType pk = (PublicKeyType pk, pk)
|
||||
|
||||
type KeyPair a = KeyPairType (PrivateKey a)
|
||||
|
||||
type KeyPairX25519 = KeyPair X25519
|
||||
|
||||
-- TODO narrow key pair types to have the same algorithm in both keys
|
||||
type AKeyPair = KeyPairType APrivateKey
|
||||
|
||||
type ASignatureKeyPair = KeyPairType APrivateSignKey
|
||||
|
||||
type ADhKeyPair = KeyPairType APrivateDhKey
|
||||
|
||||
generateKeyPair :: AlgorithmI a => SAlgorithm a -> IO AKeyPair
|
||||
generateKeyPair a = bimap (APublicKey a) (APrivateKey a) <$> generateKeyPair'
|
||||
type AAuthKeyPair = KeyPairType APrivateAuthKey
|
||||
|
||||
generateSignatureKeyPair :: (AlgorithmI a, SignatureAlgorithm a) => SAlgorithm a -> IO ASignatureKeyPair
|
||||
generateSignatureKeyPair a = bimap (APublicVerifyKey a) (APrivateSignKey a) <$> generateKeyPair'
|
||||
newRandom :: IO (TVar ChaChaDRG)
|
||||
newRandom = newTVarIO =<< drgNew
|
||||
|
||||
generateDhKeyPair :: (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => SAlgorithm a -> IO ADhKeyPair
|
||||
generateDhKeyPair a = bimap (APublicDhKey a) (APrivateDhKey a) <$> generateKeyPair'
|
||||
newRandomDRG :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM (TVar ChaChaDRG)
|
||||
newRandomDRG g = newTVar =<< stateTVar g (`withDRG` drgNew)
|
||||
|
||||
generateKeyPair' :: forall a. AlgorithmI a => IO (KeyPair a)
|
||||
generateKeyPair' = case sAlgorithm @a of
|
||||
generateAKeyPair :: AlgorithmI a => SAlgorithm a -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM AKeyPair
|
||||
generateAKeyPair a g = bimap (APublicKey a) (APrivateKey a) <$> generateKeyPair g
|
||||
|
||||
generateSignatureKeyPair :: (AlgorithmI a, SignatureAlgorithm a) => SAlgorithm a -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ASignatureKeyPair
|
||||
generateSignatureKeyPair a g = bimap (APublicVerifyKey a) (APrivateSignKey a) <$> generateKeyPair g
|
||||
|
||||
generateAuthKeyPair :: (AlgorithmI a, AuthAlgorithm a) => SAlgorithm a -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM AAuthKeyPair
|
||||
generateAuthKeyPair a g = bimap (APublicAuthKey a) (APrivateAuthKey a) <$> generateKeyPair g
|
||||
|
||||
generateDhKeyPair :: (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => SAlgorithm a -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ADhKeyPair
|
||||
generateDhKeyPair a g = bimap (APublicDhKey a) (APrivateDhKey a) <$> generateKeyPair g
|
||||
|
||||
generateKeyPair :: forall a. AlgorithmI a => TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM (KeyPair a)
|
||||
generateKeyPair g = stateTVar g (`withDRG` generateKeyPair_)
|
||||
|
||||
generateKeyPair_ :: forall a. AlgorithmI a => MonadPseudoRandom ChaChaDRG (KeyPair a)
|
||||
generateKeyPair_ = case sAlgorithm @a of
|
||||
SEd25519 ->
|
||||
Ed25519.generateSecretKey >>= \pk ->
|
||||
let k = Ed25519.toPublic pk
|
||||
@@ -595,6 +748,10 @@ instance ToField APrivateSignKey where toField = toField . encodePrivKey
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToField APublicVerifyKey where toField = toField . encodePubKey
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToField APrivateAuthKey where toField = toField . encodePrivKey
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToField APublicAuthKey where toField = toField . encodePubKey
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToField APrivateDhKey where toField = toField . encodePrivKey
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToField APublicDhKey where toField = toField . encodePubKey
|
||||
@@ -609,6 +766,10 @@ instance FromField APrivateSignKey where fromField = blobFieldDecoder decodePriv
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromField APublicVerifyKey where fromField = blobFieldDecoder decodePubKey
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromField APrivateAuthKey where fromField = blobFieldDecoder decodePrivKey
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromField APublicAuthKey where fromField = blobFieldDecoder decodePubKey
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromField APrivateDhKey where fromField = blobFieldDecoder decodePrivKey
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromField APublicDhKey where fromField = blobFieldDecoder decodePubKey
|
||||
@@ -619,7 +780,7 @@ instance (Typeable a, AlgorithmI a) => FromField (PublicKey a) where fromField =
|
||||
|
||||
instance (Typeable a, AlgorithmI a) => FromField (DhSecret a) where fromField = blobFieldDecoder strDecode
|
||||
|
||||
instance IsString (Maybe ASignature) where
|
||||
instance IsString ASignature where
|
||||
fromString = parseString $ decode >=> decodeSignature
|
||||
|
||||
data Signature (a :: Algorithm) where
|
||||
@@ -648,13 +809,17 @@ class CryptoSignature s where
|
||||
signatureBytes :: s -> ByteString
|
||||
decodeSignature :: ByteString -> Either String s
|
||||
|
||||
instance CryptoSignature (Signature s) => StrEncoding (Signature s) where
|
||||
strEncode = serializeSignature
|
||||
strDecode = decodeSignature
|
||||
|
||||
instance CryptoSignature ASignature where
|
||||
signatureBytes (ASignature _ sig) = signatureBytes sig
|
||||
decodeSignature s
|
||||
| B.length s == Ed25519.signatureSize =
|
||||
ASignature SEd25519 . SignatureEd25519 <$> ed Ed25519.signature s
|
||||
ASignature SEd25519 . SignatureEd25519 <$> ed Ed25519.signature s
|
||||
| B.length s == Ed448.signatureSize =
|
||||
ASignature SEd448 . SignatureEd448 <$> ed Ed448.signature s
|
||||
ASignature SEd448 . SignatureEd448 <$> ed Ed448.signature s
|
||||
| otherwise = Left "bad signature size"
|
||||
where
|
||||
ed alg = first show . CE.eitherCryptoError . alg
|
||||
@@ -803,6 +968,13 @@ instance StrEncoding KeyHash where
|
||||
strEncode = strEncode . unKeyHash
|
||||
strP = KeyHash <$> strP
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON KeyHash where
|
||||
toEncoding = strToJEncoding
|
||||
toJSON = strToJSON
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON KeyHash where
|
||||
parseJSON = strParseJSON "KeyHash"
|
||||
|
||||
instance IsString KeyHash where
|
||||
fromString = parseString $ parseAll strP
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -931,15 +1103,11 @@ initAEADGCM (Key aesKey) (GCMIV ivBytes) = cryptoFailable $ do
|
||||
AES.aeadInit AES.AEAD_GCM cipher ivBytes
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Random AES256 key.
|
||||
randomAesKey :: IO Key
|
||||
randomAesKey = Key <$> getRandomBytes aesKeySize
|
||||
randomAesKey :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM Key
|
||||
randomAesKey = fmap Key . randomBytes aesKeySize
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Random IV bytes for AES256 encryption.
|
||||
randomIV :: IO IV
|
||||
randomIV = IV <$> getRandomBytes (ivSize @AES256)
|
||||
|
||||
randomGCMIV :: IO GCMIV
|
||||
randomGCMIV = GCMIV <$> getRandomBytes gcmIVSize
|
||||
randomGCMIV :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM GCMIV
|
||||
randomGCMIV = fmap GCMIV . randomBytes gcmIVSize
|
||||
|
||||
ivSize :: forall c. AES.BlockCipher c => Int
|
||||
ivSize = AES.blockSize (undefined :: c)
|
||||
@@ -966,6 +1134,79 @@ sign' (PrivateKeyEd448 pk k) msg = SignatureEd448 $ Ed448.sign pk k msg
|
||||
sign :: APrivateSignKey -> ByteString -> ASignature
|
||||
sign (APrivateSignKey a k) = ASignature a . sign' k
|
||||
|
||||
signCertificate :: APrivateSignKey -> Certificate -> SignedCertificate
|
||||
signCertificate = signX509
|
||||
|
||||
signX509 :: (ASN1Object o, Eq o, Show o) => APrivateSignKey -> o -> SignedExact o
|
||||
signX509 key = fst . objectToSignedExact f
|
||||
where
|
||||
f bytes =
|
||||
( signatureBytes $ sign key bytes,
|
||||
signatureAlgorithmX509 key,
|
||||
()
|
||||
)
|
||||
{-# INLINE signX509 #-}
|
||||
|
||||
verifyX509 :: (ASN1Object o, Eq o, Show o) => APublicVerifyKey -> SignedExact o -> Either String o
|
||||
verifyX509 key exact = do
|
||||
signature <- case signedAlg of
|
||||
SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_Ed25519 -> ASignature SEd25519 <$> decodeSignature signedSignature
|
||||
SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_Ed448 -> ASignature SEd448 <$> decodeSignature signedSignature
|
||||
_ -> Left "unknown x509 signature algorithm"
|
||||
if verify key signature $ getSignedData exact then Right signedObject else Left "bad signature"
|
||||
where
|
||||
Signed {signedObject, signedAlg, signedSignature} = getSigned exact
|
||||
{-# INLINE verifyX509 #-}
|
||||
|
||||
certificateFingerprint :: SignedCertificate -> KeyHash
|
||||
certificateFingerprint = signedFingerprint
|
||||
|
||||
signedFingerprint :: (ASN1Object o, Eq o, Show o) => SignedExact o -> KeyHash
|
||||
signedFingerprint o = KeyHash fp
|
||||
where
|
||||
Fingerprint fp = getFingerprint o HashSHA256
|
||||
|
||||
class SignatureAlgorithmX509 a where
|
||||
signatureAlgorithmX509 :: a -> SignatureALG
|
||||
|
||||
instance SignatureAlgorithm a => SignatureAlgorithmX509 (SAlgorithm a) where
|
||||
signatureAlgorithmX509 = \case
|
||||
SEd25519 -> SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_Ed25519
|
||||
SEd448 -> SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_Ed448
|
||||
|
||||
instance SignatureAlgorithmX509 APrivateSignKey where
|
||||
signatureAlgorithmX509 (APrivateSignKey a _) = signatureAlgorithmX509 a
|
||||
|
||||
instance SignatureAlgorithmX509 APublicVerifyKey where
|
||||
signatureAlgorithmX509 (APublicVerifyKey a _) = signatureAlgorithmX509 a
|
||||
|
||||
-- | An instance for 'ASignatureKeyPair' / ('PublicKeyType' pk, pk), without touching its type family.
|
||||
instance SignatureAlgorithmX509 pk => SignatureAlgorithmX509 (a, pk) where
|
||||
signatureAlgorithmX509 = signatureAlgorithmX509 . snd
|
||||
|
||||
-- | A wrapper to marshall signed ASN1 objects, like certificates.
|
||||
newtype SignedObject a = SignedObject {getSignedExact :: SignedExact a}
|
||||
|
||||
instance (Typeable a, Eq a, Show a, ASN1Object a) => FromField (SignedObject a) where
|
||||
fromField = fmap SignedObject . blobFieldDecoder decodeSignedObject
|
||||
|
||||
instance (Eq a, Show a, ASN1Object a) => ToField (SignedObject a) where
|
||||
toField (SignedObject s) = toField $ encodeSignedObject s
|
||||
|
||||
instance (Eq a, Show a, ASN1Object a) => Encoding (SignedObject a) where
|
||||
smpEncode (SignedObject exact) = smpEncode . Large $ encodeSignedObject exact
|
||||
smpP = fmap SignedObject . decodeSignedObject . unLarge <$?> smpP
|
||||
|
||||
encodeCertChain :: CertificateChain -> L.NonEmpty Large
|
||||
encodeCertChain cc = L.fromList $ map Large blobs
|
||||
where
|
||||
CertificateChainRaw blobs = encodeCertificateChain cc
|
||||
|
||||
certChainP :: A.Parser CertificateChain
|
||||
certChainP = do
|
||||
rawChain <- CertificateChainRaw . map unLarge . L.toList <$> smpP
|
||||
either (fail . show) pure $ decodeCertificateChain rawChain
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Signature verification.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Used by SMP servers to authorize SMP commands and by SMP agents to verify messages.
|
||||
@@ -982,10 +1223,14 @@ dh' :: DhAlgorithm a => PublicKey a -> PrivateKey a -> DhSecret a
|
||||
dh' (PublicKeyX25519 k) (PrivateKeyX25519 pk _) = DhSecretX25519 $ X25519.dh k pk
|
||||
dh' (PublicKeyX448 k) (PrivateKeyX448 pk _) = DhSecretX448 $ X448.dh k pk
|
||||
|
||||
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ encrypt with a shared DH secret and 192-bit nonce.
|
||||
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ encrypt with padding with a shared DH secret and 192-bit nonce.
|
||||
cbEncrypt :: DhSecret X25519 -> CbNonce -> ByteString -> Int -> Either CryptoError ByteString
|
||||
cbEncrypt (DhSecretX25519 secret) = sbEncrypt_ secret
|
||||
|
||||
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ encrypt with a shared DH secret and 192-bit nonce (without padding).
|
||||
cbEncryptNoPad :: DhSecret X25519 -> CbNonce -> ByteString -> ByteString
|
||||
cbEncryptNoPad (DhSecretX25519 secret) (CbNonce nonce) = cryptoBox secret nonce
|
||||
|
||||
-- | NaCl @secret_box@ encrypt with a symmetric 256-bit key and 192-bit nonce.
|
||||
sbEncrypt :: SbKey -> CbNonce -> ByteString -> Int -> Either CryptoError ByteString
|
||||
sbEncrypt (SbKey key) = sbEncrypt_ key
|
||||
@@ -1007,21 +1252,43 @@ cryptoBox secret nonce s = BA.convert tag <> c
|
||||
cbDecrypt :: DhSecret X25519 -> CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either CryptoError ByteString
|
||||
cbDecrypt (DhSecretX25519 secret) = sbDecrypt_ secret
|
||||
|
||||
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ decrypt with a shared DH secret and 192-bit nonce (without unpadding).
|
||||
cbDecryptNoPad :: DhSecret X25519 -> CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either CryptoError ByteString
|
||||
cbDecryptNoPad (DhSecretX25519 secret) = sbDecryptNoPad_ secret
|
||||
|
||||
-- | NaCl @secret_box@ decrypt with a symmetric 256-bit key and 192-bit nonce.
|
||||
sbDecrypt :: SbKey -> CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either CryptoError ByteString
|
||||
sbDecrypt (SbKey key) = sbDecrypt_ key
|
||||
|
||||
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ decrypt with a shared DH secret and 192-bit nonce.
|
||||
sbDecrypt_ :: ByteArrayAccess key => key -> CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either CryptoError ByteString
|
||||
sbDecrypt_ secret (CbNonce nonce) packet
|
||||
sbDecrypt_ secret nonce = unPad <=< sbDecryptNoPad_ secret nonce
|
||||
|
||||
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ decrypt with a shared DH secret and 192-bit nonce (without unpadding).
|
||||
sbDecryptNoPad_ :: ByteArrayAccess key => key -> CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either CryptoError ByteString
|
||||
sbDecryptNoPad_ secret (CbNonce nonce) packet
|
||||
| B.length packet < 16 = Left CBDecryptError
|
||||
| BA.constEq tag' tag = unPad msg
|
||||
| BA.constEq tag' tag = Right msg
|
||||
| otherwise = Left CBDecryptError
|
||||
where
|
||||
(tag', c) = B.splitAt 16 packet
|
||||
(rs, msg) = xSalsa20 secret nonce c
|
||||
tag = Poly1305.auth rs c
|
||||
|
||||
-- type for authentication scheme using NaCl @crypto_box@ over the sha512 digest of the message.
|
||||
newtype CbAuthenticator = CbAuthenticator ByteString deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
cbAuthenticatorSize :: Int
|
||||
cbAuthenticatorSize = hashDigestSize SHA512 + authTagSize -- 64 + 16 = 80 bytes
|
||||
|
||||
-- create crypto_box authenticator for a message.
|
||||
cbAuthenticate :: PublicKeyX25519 -> PrivateKeyX25519 -> CbNonce -> ByteString -> CbAuthenticator
|
||||
cbAuthenticate k pk nonce msg = CbAuthenticator $ cbEncryptNoPad (dh' k pk) nonce (sha512Hash msg)
|
||||
|
||||
-- verify crypto_box authenticator for a message.
|
||||
cbVerify :: PublicKeyX25519 -> PrivateKeyX25519 -> CbNonce -> CbAuthenticator -> ByteString -> Bool
|
||||
cbVerify k pk nonce (CbAuthenticator s) authorized = cbDecryptNoPad (dh' k pk) nonce s == Right (sha512Hash authorized)
|
||||
|
||||
newtype CbNonce = CryptoBoxNonce {unCbNonce :: ByteString}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1053,14 +1320,11 @@ cbNonce s
|
||||
where
|
||||
len = B.length s
|
||||
|
||||
randomCbNonce :: IO CbNonce
|
||||
randomCbNonce = CryptoBoxNonce <$> getRandomBytes 24
|
||||
randomCbNonce :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM CbNonce
|
||||
randomCbNonce = fmap CryptoBoxNonce . randomBytes 24
|
||||
|
||||
pseudoRandomCbNonce :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM CbNonce
|
||||
pseudoRandomCbNonce gVar = CryptoBoxNonce <$> pseudoRandomBytes 24 gVar
|
||||
|
||||
pseudoRandomBytes :: Int -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ByteString
|
||||
pseudoRandomBytes n gVar = stateTVar gVar $ randomBytesGenerate n
|
||||
randomBytes :: Int -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ByteString
|
||||
randomBytes n gVar = stateTVar gVar $ randomBytesGenerate n
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding CbNonce where
|
||||
smpEncode = unCbNonce
|
||||
@@ -1097,8 +1361,8 @@ sbKey s
|
||||
unsafeSbKey :: ByteString -> SbKey
|
||||
unsafeSbKey s = either error id $ sbKey s
|
||||
|
||||
randomSbKey :: IO SbKey
|
||||
randomSbKey = SecretBoxKey <$> getRandomBytes 32
|
||||
randomSbKey :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM SbKey
|
||||
randomSbKey gVar = SecretBoxKey <$> randomBytes 32 gVar
|
||||
|
||||
xSalsa20 :: ByteArrayAccess key => key -> ByteString -> ByteString -> (ByteString, ByteString)
|
||||
xSalsa20 secret nonce msg = (rs, msg')
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File
|
||||
( CryptoFile (..),
|
||||
CryptoFileArgs (..),
|
||||
CryptoFileHandle (..),
|
||||
FTCryptoError (..),
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File.readFile,
|
||||
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.File.writeFile,
|
||||
withFile,
|
||||
hPut,
|
||||
hPutTag,
|
||||
hGet,
|
||||
hGetTag,
|
||||
plain,
|
||||
randomArgs,
|
||||
getFileContentsSize,
|
||||
)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Exception
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as LB
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (isJust)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent ()
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy (LazyByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy as LC
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (liftEitherWith)
|
||||
import System.Directory (getFileSize)
|
||||
import UnliftIO (Handle, IOMode (..), liftIO)
|
||||
import qualified UnliftIO as IO
|
||||
import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
|
||||
-- Possibly encrypted local file
|
||||
data CryptoFile = CryptoFile {filePath :: FilePath, cryptoArgs :: Maybe CryptoFileArgs}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data CryptoFileArgs = CFArgs {fileKey :: C.SbKey, fileNonce :: C.CbNonce}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data CryptoFileHandle = CFHandle Handle (Maybe (TVar LC.SbState))
|
||||
|
||||
readFile :: CryptoFile -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO LazyByteString
|
||||
readFile (CryptoFile path cfArgs) = do
|
||||
s <- liftIO $ LB.readFile path
|
||||
case cfArgs of
|
||||
Just (CFArgs (C.SbKey key) (C.CbNonce nonce)) -> do
|
||||
let len = LB.length s - fromIntegral C.authTagSize
|
||||
when (len < 0) $ throwError FTCEInvalidFileSize
|
||||
let (s', tag') = LB.splitAt len s
|
||||
(tag :| cs) <- liftEitherWith FTCECryptoError $ LC.secretBox LC.sbDecryptChunk key nonce s'
|
||||
unless (BA.constEq (LB.toStrict tag') tag) $ throwError FTCEInvalidAuthTag
|
||||
pure $ LB.fromChunks cs
|
||||
Nothing -> pure s
|
||||
|
||||
writeFile :: CryptoFile -> LazyByteString -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO ()
|
||||
writeFile (CryptoFile path cfArgs) s = do
|
||||
s' <- case cfArgs of
|
||||
Just (CFArgs (C.SbKey key) (C.CbNonce nonce)) ->
|
||||
liftEitherWith FTCECryptoError $ LB.fromChunks <$> LC.secretBoxTailTag LC.sbEncryptChunk key nonce s
|
||||
Nothing -> pure s
|
||||
liftIO $ LB.writeFile path s'
|
||||
|
||||
withFile :: CryptoFile -> IOMode -> (CryptoFileHandle -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO a) -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO a
|
||||
withFile (CryptoFile path cfArgs) mode action = do
|
||||
sb <- forM cfArgs $ \(CFArgs key nonce) ->
|
||||
liftEitherWith FTCECryptoError (LC.sbInit key nonce) >>= newTVarIO
|
||||
IO.withFile path mode $ \h -> action $ CFHandle h sb
|
||||
|
||||
hPut :: CryptoFileHandle -> LazyByteString -> IO ()
|
||||
hPut (CFHandle h sb_) s = LB.hPut h =<< maybe (pure s) encrypt sb_
|
||||
where
|
||||
encrypt sb = atomically $ stateTVar sb (`LC.sbEncryptChunkLazy` s)
|
||||
|
||||
hPutTag :: CryptoFileHandle -> IO ()
|
||||
hPutTag (CFHandle h sb_) = forM_ sb_ $ B.hPut h . BA.convert . LC.sbAuth <=< readTVarIO
|
||||
|
||||
hGet :: CryptoFileHandle -> Int -> IO ByteString
|
||||
hGet (CFHandle h sb_) n = B.hGet h n >>= maybe pure decrypt sb_
|
||||
where
|
||||
decrypt sb s = atomically $ stateTVar sb (`LC.sbDecryptChunk` s)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Read and validate the auth tag.
|
||||
-- This function should be called after reading the whole file, it assumes you know the file size and read only the needed bytes.
|
||||
hGetTag :: CryptoFileHandle -> ExceptT FTCryptoError IO ()
|
||||
hGetTag (CFHandle h sb_) = forM_ sb_ $ \sb -> do
|
||||
tag <- liftIO $ B.hGet h C.authTagSize
|
||||
tag' <- LC.sbAuth <$> readTVarIO sb
|
||||
unless (BA.constEq tag tag') $ throwError FTCEInvalidAuthTag
|
||||
|
||||
data FTCryptoError
|
||||
= FTCECryptoError C.CryptoError
|
||||
| FTCEInvalidHeader String
|
||||
| FTCEInvalidFileSize
|
||||
| FTCEInvalidAuthTag
|
||||
| FTCEFileIOError String
|
||||
deriving (Show, Eq, Exception)
|
||||
|
||||
plain :: FilePath -> CryptoFile
|
||||
plain = (`CryptoFile` Nothing)
|
||||
|
||||
randomArgs :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM CryptoFileArgs
|
||||
randomArgs g = CFArgs <$> C.randomSbKey g <*> C.randomCbNonce g
|
||||
|
||||
getFileContentsSize :: CryptoFile -> IO Integer
|
||||
getFileContentsSize (CryptoFile path cfArgs) = do
|
||||
size <- getFileSize path
|
||||
pure $ if isJust cfArgs then size - fromIntegral C.authTagSize else size
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''CryptoFileArgs)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''CryptoFile)
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
|
||||
@@ -15,11 +14,16 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Lazy
|
||||
sbEncrypt,
|
||||
sbDecrypt,
|
||||
sbEncryptTailTag,
|
||||
kcbEncryptTailTag,
|
||||
sbDecryptTailTag,
|
||||
kcbDecryptTailTag,
|
||||
fastReplicate,
|
||||
secretBox,
|
||||
secretBoxTailTag,
|
||||
SbState,
|
||||
cbInit,
|
||||
sbInit,
|
||||
kcbInit,
|
||||
sbEncryptChunk,
|
||||
sbDecryptChunk,
|
||||
sbEncryptChunkLazy,
|
||||
@@ -37,7 +41,6 @@ import qualified Crypto.MAC.Poly1305 as Poly1305
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
|
||||
import Data.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString as S
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
|
||||
@@ -47,6 +50,7 @@ import Data.Int (Int64)
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
|
||||
import Foreign (sizeOf)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto (CbNonce, CryptoError (..), DhSecret (..), DhSecretX25519, SbKey, pattern CbNonce, pattern SbKey)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761 (KEMHybridSecret (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
|
||||
type LazyByteString = LB.ByteString
|
||||
@@ -88,10 +92,10 @@ unPad = fmap snd . splitLen
|
||||
splitLen :: LazyByteString -> Either CryptoError (Int64, LazyByteString)
|
||||
splitLen padded
|
||||
| LB.length lenStr == 8 = case smpDecode $ LB.toStrict lenStr of
|
||||
Right len
|
||||
| len < 0 -> Left CryptoInvalidMsgError
|
||||
| otherwise -> Right (len, LB.take len rest)
|
||||
Left _ -> Left CryptoInvalidMsgError
|
||||
Right len
|
||||
| len < 0 -> Left CryptoInvalidMsgError
|
||||
| otherwise -> Right (len, LB.take len rest)
|
||||
Left _ -> Left CryptoInvalidMsgError
|
||||
| otherwise = Left CryptoInvalidMsgError
|
||||
where
|
||||
(lenStr, rest) = LB.splitAt 8 padded
|
||||
@@ -110,10 +114,10 @@ sbDecrypt :: SbKey -> CbNonce -> LazyByteString -> Either CryptoError LazyByteSt
|
||||
sbDecrypt (SbKey key) (CbNonce nonce) packet
|
||||
| LB.length tag' < 16 = Left CBDecryptError
|
||||
| otherwise = case secretBox sbDecryptChunk key nonce c of
|
||||
Right (tag :| cs)
|
||||
| BA.constEq (LB.toStrict tag') tag -> unPad $ LB.fromChunks cs
|
||||
| otherwise -> Left CBDecryptError
|
||||
Left e -> Left e
|
||||
Right (tag :| cs)
|
||||
| BA.constEq (LB.toStrict tag') tag -> unPad $ LB.fromChunks cs
|
||||
| otherwise -> Left CBDecryptError
|
||||
Left e -> Left e
|
||||
where
|
||||
(tag', c) = LB.splitAt 16 packet
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -126,13 +130,33 @@ secretBox sbProcess secret nonce msg = run <$> sbInit_ secret nonce
|
||||
|
||||
-- | NaCl @secret_box@ lazy encrypt with a symmetric 256-bit key and 192-bit nonce with appended auth tag (more efficient with large files).
|
||||
sbEncryptTailTag :: SbKey -> CbNonce -> LazyByteString -> Int64 -> Int64 -> Either CryptoError LazyByteString
|
||||
sbEncryptTailTag (SbKey key) (CbNonce nonce) msg len paddedLen =
|
||||
sbEncryptTailTag (SbKey key) = sbEncryptTailTag_ key
|
||||
{-# INLINE sbEncryptTailTag #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ lazy encrypt with with a shared hybrid KEM+DH 256-bit secret and 192-bit nonce with appended auth tag (more efficient with large strings/files).
|
||||
kcbEncryptTailTag :: KEMHybridSecret -> CbNonce -> LazyByteString -> Int64 -> Int64 -> Either CryptoError LazyByteString
|
||||
kcbEncryptTailTag (KEMHybridSecret key) = sbEncryptTailTag_ key
|
||||
{-# INLINE kcbEncryptTailTag #-}
|
||||
|
||||
sbEncryptTailTag_ :: ByteArrayAccess key => key -> CbNonce -> LazyByteString -> Int64 -> Int64 -> Either CryptoError LazyByteString
|
||||
sbEncryptTailTag_ key (CbNonce nonce) msg len paddedLen =
|
||||
LB.fromChunks <$> (secretBoxTailTag sbEncryptChunk key nonce =<< pad msg len paddedLen)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | NaCl @secret_box@ decrypt with a symmetric 256-bit key and 192-bit nonce with appended auth tag (more efficient with large files).
|
||||
-- paddedLen should NOT include the tag length, it should be the same number that is passed to sbEncrypt / sbEncryptTailTag.
|
||||
sbDecryptTailTag :: SbKey -> CbNonce -> Int64 -> LazyByteString -> Either CryptoError (Bool, LazyByteString)
|
||||
sbDecryptTailTag (SbKey key) (CbNonce nonce) paddedLen packet =
|
||||
sbDecryptTailTag (SbKey key) = sbDecryptTailTag_ key
|
||||
{-# INLINE sbDecryptTailTag #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ lazy decrypt with a shared hybrid KEM+DH 256-bit secret and 192-bit nonce with appended auth tag (more efficient with large strings/files).
|
||||
-- paddedLen should NOT include the tag length, it should be the same number that is passed to sbEncrypt / sbEncryptTailTag.
|
||||
kcbDecryptTailTag :: KEMHybridSecret -> CbNonce -> Int64 -> LazyByteString -> Either CryptoError (Bool, LazyByteString)
|
||||
kcbDecryptTailTag (KEMHybridSecret key) = sbDecryptTailTag_ key
|
||||
{-# INLINE kcbDecryptTailTag #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- paddedLen should NOT include the tag length, it should be the same number that is passed to sbEncrypt / sbEncryptTailTag.
|
||||
sbDecryptTailTag_ :: ByteArrayAccess key => key -> CbNonce -> Int64 -> LazyByteString -> Either CryptoError (Bool, LazyByteString)
|
||||
sbDecryptTailTag_ key (CbNonce nonce) paddedLen packet =
|
||||
case secretBox sbDecryptChunk key nonce c of
|
||||
Right (tag :| cs) ->
|
||||
let valid = LB.length tag' == 16 && BA.constEq (LB.toStrict tag') tag
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +174,7 @@ secretBoxTailTag sbProcess secret nonce msg = run <$> sbInit_ secret nonce
|
||||
|
||||
-- passes lazy bytestring via initialized secret box returning the reversed list of chunks
|
||||
secretBoxLazy_ :: (SbState -> ByteString -> (ByteString, SbState)) -> SbState -> LazyByteString -> ([ByteString], SbState)
|
||||
secretBoxLazy_ sbProcess state = foldlChunks update ([], state)
|
||||
secretBoxLazy_ sbProcess state = LB.foldlChunks update ([], state)
|
||||
where
|
||||
update (cs, st) chunk = let (!c, !st') = sbProcess st chunk in (c : cs, st')
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -164,6 +188,10 @@ sbInit :: SbKey -> CbNonce -> Either CryptoError SbState
|
||||
sbInit (SbKey secret) (CbNonce nonce) = sbInit_ secret nonce
|
||||
{-# INLINE sbInit #-}
|
||||
|
||||
kcbInit :: KEMHybridSecret -> CbNonce -> Either CryptoError SbState
|
||||
kcbInit (KEMHybridSecret k) (CbNonce nonce) = sbInit_ k nonce
|
||||
{-# INLINE kcbInit #-}
|
||||
|
||||
sbInit_ :: ByteArrayAccess key => key -> ByteString -> Either CryptoError SbState
|
||||
sbInit_ secret nonce = (state2,) <$> cryptoPassed (Poly1305.initialize rs)
|
||||
where
|
||||
@@ -202,10 +230,3 @@ cryptoPassed :: CE.CryptoFailable b -> Either CryptoError b
|
||||
cryptoPassed = \case
|
||||
CE.CryptoPassed a -> Right a
|
||||
CE.CryptoFailed e -> Left $ CryptoPoly1305Error e
|
||||
|
||||
foldlChunks :: (a -> S.ByteString -> a) -> a -> LazyByteString -> a
|
||||
foldlChunks f = go
|
||||
where
|
||||
go !a LB.Empty = a
|
||||
go !a (LB.Chunk c cs) = go (f a c) cs
|
||||
{-# INLINE foldlChunks #-}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE MagicHash #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE UnboxedTuples #-}
|
||||
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -Wno-unrecognised-pragmas #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- |
|
||||
-- Module : Data.ByteArray.ScrubbedBytes
|
||||
-- License : BSD-style
|
||||
-- Author : Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org>
|
||||
-- Stability : Stable
|
||||
-- Portability : GHC
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Memory where
|
||||
|
||||
import GHC.Ptr
|
||||
import GHC.Word
|
||||
#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,15,0)
|
||||
import GHC.Exts (unsafeCoerce#)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
import Data.ByteArray (ByteArray (..), ByteArrayAccess (..))
|
||||
import Data.Foldable (toList)
|
||||
import Data.Memory.PtrMethods
|
||||
import Data.Semigroup
|
||||
import Data.String (IsString (..))
|
||||
import Data.Typeable
|
||||
import Foreign.Storable
|
||||
import GHC.Base
|
||||
import GHC.IO (unsafeDupablePerformIO)
|
||||
|
||||
foreign import ccall "sodium_mlock"
|
||||
c_sodium_mlock :: Ptr () -> Int -> IO ()
|
||||
|
||||
foreign import ccall "sodium_munlock"
|
||||
c_sodium_munlock :: Ptr () -> Int -> IO ()
|
||||
|
||||
-- | LockedBytes is a memory chunk which have the properties of:
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- * Locked from going into swap on allocation.
|
||||
-- * Unlocked and scrubbed scrubbed after its goes out of scope.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- * A Show instance that doesn't actually show any content
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- * A Eq instance that is constant time
|
||||
data LockedBytes = LockedBytes (MutableByteArray# RealWorld)
|
||||
deriving (Typeable)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Show LockedBytes where
|
||||
show _ = "<locked-bytes>"
|
||||
|
||||
instance Eq LockedBytes where
|
||||
(==) = scrubbedBytesEq
|
||||
instance Ord LockedBytes where
|
||||
compare = scrubbedBytesCompare
|
||||
#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,9,0)
|
||||
instance Semigroup LockedBytes where
|
||||
b1 <> b2 = unsafeDupablePerformIO $ scrubbedBytesAppend b1 b2
|
||||
sconcat = unsafeDupablePerformIO . scrubbedBytesConcat . toList
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
instance Monoid LockedBytes where
|
||||
mempty = unsafeDupablePerformIO (newLockedBytes 0)
|
||||
#if !(MIN_VERSION_base(4,11,0))
|
||||
mappend b1 b2 = unsafeDupablePerformIO $ scrubbedBytesAppend b1 b2
|
||||
mconcat = unsafeDupablePerformIO . scrubbedBytesConcat
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
-- instance NFData LockedBytes where
|
||||
-- rnf b = b `seq` ()
|
||||
|
||||
instance IsString LockedBytes where
|
||||
fromString = scrubbedFromChar8
|
||||
|
||||
instance ByteArrayAccess LockedBytes where
|
||||
length = sizeofScrubbedBytes
|
||||
withByteArray = withPtr
|
||||
|
||||
instance ByteArray LockedBytes where
|
||||
allocRet = scrubbedBytesAllocRet
|
||||
|
||||
newLockedBytes :: Int -> IO LockedBytes
|
||||
newLockedBytes (I# sz)
|
||||
| booleanPrim (sz <# 0#) = error "LockedBytes: size must be >= 0"
|
||||
| booleanPrim (sz ==# 0#) = IO $ \s ->
|
||||
case newAlignedPinnedByteArray# 0# 8# s of
|
||||
(# s2, mba #) -> (# s2, LockedBytes mba #)
|
||||
| otherwise = IO $ \s ->
|
||||
case newAlignedPinnedByteArray# sz 8# s of
|
||||
(# s1, mbarr #) ->
|
||||
let !locker = getLocker (byteArrayContents# (unsafeCoerce# mbarr))
|
||||
!scrubber = getScrubber (byteArrayContents# (unsafeCoerce# mbarr))
|
||||
!mba = LockedBytes mbarr
|
||||
in case mkWeak# mbarr () (finalize scrubber mba) (locker s1) of
|
||||
(# s2, _weak #) ->
|
||||
(# s2, mba #)
|
||||
where
|
||||
getLocker :: Addr# -> State# RealWorld -> State# RealWorld
|
||||
getLocker addr s =
|
||||
let IO lockBytes = c_sodium_mlock (Ptr addr) (I# sz)
|
||||
in case lockBytes s of
|
||||
(# s', _ #) -> s'
|
||||
|
||||
getScrubber :: Addr# -> State# RealWorld -> State# RealWorld
|
||||
getScrubber addr s =
|
||||
let IO scrubBytes = c_sodium_munlock (Ptr addr) (I# sz)
|
||||
in case scrubBytes s of
|
||||
(# s', _ #) -> s'
|
||||
|
||||
finalize :: (State# RealWorld -> State# RealWorld) -> LockedBytes -> State# RealWorld -> (# State# RealWorld, () #)
|
||||
finalize scrubber mba@(LockedBytes _) = \s1 ->
|
||||
case scrubber s1 of
|
||||
s2 -> case touch# mba s2 of
|
||||
s3 -> (# s3, () #)
|
||||
|
||||
scrubbedBytesAllocRet :: Int -> (Ptr p -> IO a) -> IO (a, LockedBytes)
|
||||
scrubbedBytesAllocRet sz f = do
|
||||
ba <- newLockedBytes sz
|
||||
r <- withPtr ba f
|
||||
return (r, ba)
|
||||
|
||||
scrubbedBytesAlloc :: Int -> (Ptr p -> IO ()) -> IO LockedBytes
|
||||
scrubbedBytesAlloc sz f = do
|
||||
ba <- newLockedBytes sz
|
||||
withPtr ba f
|
||||
return ba
|
||||
|
||||
scrubbedBytesConcat :: [LockedBytes] -> IO LockedBytes
|
||||
scrubbedBytesConcat l = scrubbedBytesAlloc retLen (copy l)
|
||||
where
|
||||
retLen = sum $ map sizeofScrubbedBytes l
|
||||
|
||||
copy [] _ = return ()
|
||||
copy (x : xs) dst = do
|
||||
withPtr x $ \src -> memCopy dst src chunkLen
|
||||
copy xs (dst `plusPtr` chunkLen)
|
||||
where
|
||||
chunkLen = sizeofScrubbedBytes x
|
||||
|
||||
scrubbedBytesAppend :: LockedBytes -> LockedBytes -> IO LockedBytes
|
||||
scrubbedBytesAppend b1 b2 = scrubbedBytesAlloc retLen $ \dst -> do
|
||||
withPtr b1 $ \s1 -> memCopy dst s1 len1
|
||||
withPtr b2 $ \s2 -> memCopy (dst `plusPtr` len1) s2 len2
|
||||
where
|
||||
len1 = sizeofScrubbedBytes b1
|
||||
len2 = sizeofScrubbedBytes b2
|
||||
retLen = len1 + len2
|
||||
|
||||
sizeofScrubbedBytes :: LockedBytes -> Int
|
||||
sizeofScrubbedBytes (LockedBytes mba) = I# (sizeofMutableByteArray# mba)
|
||||
|
||||
withPtr :: LockedBytes -> (Ptr p -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
withPtr b@(LockedBytes mba) f = do
|
||||
a <- f (Ptr (byteArrayContents# (unsafeCoerce# mba)))
|
||||
touchScrubbedBytes b
|
||||
return a
|
||||
|
||||
touchScrubbedBytes :: LockedBytes -> IO ()
|
||||
touchScrubbedBytes (LockedBytes mba) = IO $ \s -> case touch# mba s of s' -> (# s', () #)
|
||||
|
||||
scrubbedBytesEq :: LockedBytes -> LockedBytes -> Bool
|
||||
scrubbedBytesEq a b
|
||||
| l1 /= l2 = False
|
||||
| otherwise = unsafeDupablePerformIO $ withPtr a $ \p1 -> withPtr b $ \p2 -> memConstEqual p1 p2 l1
|
||||
where
|
||||
l1 = sizeofScrubbedBytes a
|
||||
l2 = sizeofScrubbedBytes b
|
||||
|
||||
scrubbedBytesCompare :: LockedBytes -> LockedBytes -> Ordering
|
||||
scrubbedBytesCompare b1@(LockedBytes m1) b2@(LockedBytes m2) = unsafeDupablePerformIO $ loop 0
|
||||
where
|
||||
!l1 = sizeofScrubbedBytes b1
|
||||
!l2 = sizeofScrubbedBytes b2
|
||||
!len = min l1 l2
|
||||
|
||||
loop !i
|
||||
| i == len =
|
||||
if l1 == l2
|
||||
then pure EQ
|
||||
else
|
||||
if l1 > l2
|
||||
then pure GT
|
||||
else pure LT
|
||||
| otherwise = do
|
||||
e1 <- read8 m1 i
|
||||
e2 <- read8 m2 i
|
||||
if e1 == e2
|
||||
then loop (i + 1)
|
||||
else
|
||||
if e1 < e2
|
||||
then pure LT
|
||||
else pure GT
|
||||
|
||||
read8 m (I# i) = IO $ \s -> case readWord8Array# m i s of
|
||||
(# s2, e #) -> (# s2, W8# e #)
|
||||
|
||||
scrubbedFromChar8 :: [Char] -> LockedBytes
|
||||
scrubbedFromChar8 l = unsafeDupablePerformIO $ scrubbedBytesAlloc len (fill l)
|
||||
where
|
||||
len = Prelude.length l
|
||||
fill :: [Char] -> Ptr Word8 -> IO ()
|
||||
fill [] _ = return ()
|
||||
fill (x : xs) !p = poke p (fromIntegral $ fromEnum x) >> fill xs (p `plusPtr` 1)
|
||||
|
||||
booleanPrim :: Int# -> Bool
|
||||
booleanPrim v = tagToEnum# v
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveGeneric #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
|
||||
@@ -19,8 +19,10 @@ import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
|
||||
import Crypto.Cipher.AES (AES256)
|
||||
import Crypto.Hash (SHA512)
|
||||
import qualified Crypto.KDF.HKDF as H
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON, ToJSON)
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as JQ
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as LB
|
||||
@@ -32,20 +34,26 @@ import Data.Typeable (Typeable)
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word32)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.FromField (FromField (..))
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.ToField (ToField (..))
|
||||
import GHC.Generics
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.QueryString
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (blobFieldDecoder, parseE, parseE')
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (tryE)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (blobFieldDecoder, defaultJSON, parseE, parseE')
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
|
||||
import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
|
||||
-- e2e encryption headers version history:
|
||||
-- 1 - binary protocol encoding (1/1/2022)
|
||||
-- 2 - use KDF in x3dh (10/20/2022)
|
||||
|
||||
kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion :: Version
|
||||
kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion = 2
|
||||
|
||||
currentE2EEncryptVersion :: Version
|
||||
currentE2EEncryptVersion = 2
|
||||
|
||||
supportedE2EEncryptVRange :: VersionRange
|
||||
supportedE2EEncryptVRange = mkVersionRange 1 currentE2EEncryptVersion
|
||||
supportedE2EEncryptVRange = mkVersionRange kdfX3DHE2EEncryptVersion currentE2EEncryptVersion
|
||||
|
||||
data E2ERatchetParams (a :: Algorithm)
|
||||
= E2ERatchetParams Version (PublicKey a) (PublicKey a)
|
||||
@@ -81,10 +89,10 @@ instance AlgorithmI a => StrEncoding (E2ERatchetParamsUri a) where
|
||||
[key1, key2] -> pure $ E2ERatchetParamsUri vs key1 key2
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad e2e params"
|
||||
|
||||
generateE2EParams :: (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => Version -> IO (PrivateKey a, PrivateKey a, E2ERatchetParams a)
|
||||
generateE2EParams v = do
|
||||
(k1, pk1) <- generateKeyPair'
|
||||
(k2, pk2) <- generateKeyPair'
|
||||
generateE2EParams :: (AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) => TVar ChaChaDRG -> Version -> STM (PrivateKey a, PrivateKey a, E2ERatchetParams a)
|
||||
generateE2EParams g v = do
|
||||
(k1, pk1) <- generateKeyPair g
|
||||
(k2, pk2) <- generateKeyPair g
|
||||
pure (pk1, pk2, E2ERatchetParams v k1 k2)
|
||||
|
||||
data RatchetInitParams = RatchetInitParams
|
||||
@@ -96,27 +104,22 @@ data RatchetInitParams = RatchetInitParams
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
x3dhSnd :: DhAlgorithm a => PrivateKey a -> PrivateKey a -> E2ERatchetParams a -> RatchetInitParams
|
||||
x3dhSnd spk1 spk2 (E2ERatchetParams v rk1 rk2) =
|
||||
x3dh v (publicKey spk1, rk1) (dh' rk1 spk2) (dh' rk2 spk1) (dh' rk2 spk2)
|
||||
x3dhSnd spk1 spk2 (E2ERatchetParams _ rk1 rk2) =
|
||||
x3dh (publicKey spk1, rk1) (dh' rk1 spk2) (dh' rk2 spk1) (dh' rk2 spk2)
|
||||
|
||||
x3dhRcv :: DhAlgorithm a => PrivateKey a -> PrivateKey a -> E2ERatchetParams a -> RatchetInitParams
|
||||
x3dhRcv rpk1 rpk2 (E2ERatchetParams v sk1 sk2) =
|
||||
x3dh v (sk1, publicKey rpk1) (dh' sk2 rpk1) (dh' sk1 rpk2) (dh' sk2 rpk2)
|
||||
x3dhRcv rpk1 rpk2 (E2ERatchetParams _ sk1 sk2) =
|
||||
x3dh (sk1, publicKey rpk1) (dh' sk2 rpk1) (dh' sk1 rpk2) (dh' sk2 rpk2)
|
||||
|
||||
x3dh :: DhAlgorithm a => Version -> (PublicKey a, PublicKey a) -> DhSecret a -> DhSecret a -> DhSecret a -> RatchetInitParams
|
||||
x3dh v (sk1, rk1) dh1 dh2 dh3 =
|
||||
x3dh :: DhAlgorithm a => (PublicKey a, PublicKey a) -> DhSecret a -> DhSecret a -> DhSecret a -> RatchetInitParams
|
||||
x3dh (sk1, rk1) dh1 dh2 dh3 =
|
||||
RatchetInitParams {assocData, ratchetKey = RatchetKey sk, sndHK = Key hk, rcvNextHK = Key nhk}
|
||||
where
|
||||
assocData = Str $ pubKeyBytes sk1 <> pubKeyBytes rk1
|
||||
dhs = dhBytes' dh1 <> dhBytes' dh2 <> dhBytes' dh3
|
||||
(hk, nhk, sk)
|
||||
-- for backwards compatibility with clients using agent version before 3.4.0
|
||||
| v == 1 =
|
||||
let (hk', rest) = B.splitAt 32 dhs
|
||||
in uncurry (hk',,) $ B.splitAt 32 rest
|
||||
| otherwise =
|
||||
let salt = B.replicate 64 '\0'
|
||||
in hkdf3 salt dhs "SimpleXX3DH"
|
||||
(hk, nhk, sk) =
|
||||
let salt = B.replicate 64 '\0'
|
||||
in hkdf3 salt dhs "SimpleXX3DH"
|
||||
|
||||
type RatchetX448 = Ratchet 'X448
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -135,29 +138,20 @@ data Ratchet a = Ratchet
|
||||
rcNHKs :: HeaderKey,
|
||||
rcNHKr :: HeaderKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic, FromJSON)
|
||||
|
||||
instance AlgorithmI a => ToJSON (Ratchet a) where
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding J.defaultOptions
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data SndRatchet a = SndRatchet
|
||||
{ rcDHRr :: PublicKey a,
|
||||
rcCKs :: RatchetKey,
|
||||
rcHKs :: HeaderKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic, FromJSON)
|
||||
|
||||
instance AlgorithmI a => ToJSON (SndRatchet a) where
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding J.defaultOptions
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data RcvRatchet = RcvRatchet
|
||||
{ rcCKr :: RatchetKey,
|
||||
rcHKr :: HeaderKey
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic, FromJSON)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON RcvRatchet where
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding J.defaultOptions
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
type SkippedMsgKeys = Map HeaderKey SkippedHdrMsgKeys
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -204,10 +198,6 @@ instance ToJSON RatchetKey where
|
||||
instance FromJSON RatchetKey where
|
||||
parseJSON = fmap RatchetKey . strParseJSON "Key"
|
||||
|
||||
instance AlgorithmI a => ToField (Ratchet a) where toField = toField . LB.toStrict . J.encode
|
||||
|
||||
instance (AlgorithmI a, Typeable a) => FromField (Ratchet a) where fromField = blobFieldDecoder J.eitherDecodeStrict'
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToField MessageKey where toField = toField . smpEncode
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromField MessageKey where fromField = blobFieldDecoder smpDecode
|
||||
@@ -358,11 +348,12 @@ maxSkip = 512
|
||||
rcDecrypt ::
|
||||
forall a.
|
||||
(AlgorithmI a, DhAlgorithm a) =>
|
||||
TVar ChaChaDRG ->
|
||||
Ratchet a ->
|
||||
SkippedMsgKeys ->
|
||||
ByteString ->
|
||||
ExceptT CryptoError IO (DecryptResult a)
|
||||
rcDecrypt rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
|
||||
rcDecrypt g rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
|
||||
encMsg@EncRatchetMessage {emHeader} <- parseE CryptoHeaderError smpP msg'
|
||||
encHdr <- parseE CryptoHeaderError smpP emHeader
|
||||
-- plaintext = TrySkippedMessageKeysHE(state, enc_header, cipher-text, AD)
|
||||
@@ -402,7 +393,7 @@ rcDecrypt rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
|
||||
Left e -> throwE e
|
||||
Right (rc'@Ratchet {rcDHRs, rcRK, rcNHKs, rcNHKr}, hmks) -> do
|
||||
-- DHRatchetHE(state, header)
|
||||
(_, rcDHRs') <- liftIO $ generateKeyPair' @a
|
||||
(_, rcDHRs') <- atomically $ generateKeyPair @a g
|
||||
-- state.RK, state.CKr, state.NHKr = KDF_RK_HE(state.RK, DH(state.DHRs, state.DHRr))
|
||||
let (rcRK', rcCKr', rcNHKr') = rootKdf rcRK msgDHRs rcDHRs
|
||||
-- state.RK, state.CKs, state.NHKs = KDF_RK_HE(state.RK, DH(state.DHRs, state.DHRr))
|
||||
@@ -428,9 +419,9 @@ rcDecrypt rc@Ratchet {rcRcv, rcAD = Str rcAD} rcMKSkipped msg' = do
|
||||
| rcNr + maxSkip < untilN = Left $ CERatchetTooManySkipped (untilN + 1 - rcNr)
|
||||
| rcNr == untilN = Right (r, M.empty)
|
||||
| otherwise =
|
||||
let (rcCKr', rcNr', mks) = advanceRcvRatchet (untilN - rcNr) rcCKr rcNr M.empty
|
||||
r' = r {rcRcv = Just rr {rcCKr = rcCKr'}, rcNr = rcNr'}
|
||||
in Right (r', M.singleton rcHKr mks)
|
||||
let (rcCKr', rcNr', mks) = advanceRcvRatchet (untilN - rcNr) rcCKr rcNr M.empty
|
||||
r' = r {rcRcv = Just rr {rcCKr = rcCKr'}, rcNr = rcNr'}
|
||||
in Right (r', M.singleton rcHKr mks)
|
||||
advanceRcvRatchet :: Word32 -> RatchetKey -> Word32 -> SkippedHdrMsgKeys -> (RatchetKey, Word32, SkippedHdrMsgKeys)
|
||||
advanceRcvRatchet 0 ck msgNs mks = (ck, msgNs, mks)
|
||||
advanceRcvRatchet n ck msgNs mks =
|
||||
@@ -493,3 +484,23 @@ hkdf3 salt ikm info = (s1, s2, s3)
|
||||
out = H.expand prk info 96
|
||||
(s1, rest) = B.splitAt 32 out
|
||||
(s2, s3) = B.splitAt 32 rest
|
||||
|
||||
$(JQ.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''RcvRatchet)
|
||||
|
||||
instance AlgorithmI a => ToJSON (SndRatchet a) where
|
||||
toEncoding = $(JQ.mkToEncoding defaultJSON ''SndRatchet)
|
||||
toJSON = $(JQ.mkToJSON defaultJSON ''SndRatchet)
|
||||
|
||||
instance AlgorithmI a => FromJSON (SndRatchet a) where
|
||||
parseJSON = $(JQ.mkParseJSON defaultJSON ''SndRatchet)
|
||||
|
||||
instance AlgorithmI a => ToJSON (Ratchet a) where
|
||||
toEncoding = $(JQ.mkToEncoding defaultJSON ''Ratchet)
|
||||
toJSON = $(JQ.mkToJSON defaultJSON ''Ratchet)
|
||||
|
||||
instance AlgorithmI a => FromJSON (Ratchet a) where
|
||||
parseJSON = $(JQ.mkParseJSON defaultJSON ''Ratchet)
|
||||
|
||||
instance AlgorithmI a => ToField (Ratchet a) where toField = toField . LB.toStrict . J.encode
|
||||
|
||||
instance (AlgorithmI a, Typeable a) => FromField (Ratchet a) where fromField = blobFieldDecoder J.eitherDecodeStrict'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761 where
|
||||
|
||||
import Crypto.Hash (Digest, SHA256, hash)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
|
||||
import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Memory (LockedBytes)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings
|
||||
|
||||
-- Hybrid shared secret for crypto_box is defined as SHA256(DHSecret || KEMSharedKey),
|
||||
-- similar to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-josefsson-ntruprime-hybrid/
|
||||
|
||||
newtype KEMHybridSecret = KEMHybridSecret LockedBytes
|
||||
|
||||
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ decrypt with a shared hybrid DH + KEM secret and 192-bit nonce.
|
||||
kcbDecrypt :: KEMHybridSecret -> CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either CryptoError ByteString
|
||||
kcbDecrypt (KEMHybridSecret k) = sbDecrypt_ k
|
||||
|
||||
-- | NaCl @crypto_box@ encrypt with a shared hybrid DH + KEM secret and 192-bit nonce.
|
||||
kcbEncrypt :: KEMHybridSecret -> CbNonce -> ByteString -> Int -> Either CryptoError ByteString
|
||||
kcbEncrypt (KEMHybridSecret k) = sbEncrypt_ k
|
||||
|
||||
kemHybridSecret :: PublicKeyX25519 -> PrivateKeyX25519 -> KEMSharedKey -> KEMHybridSecret
|
||||
kemHybridSecret k pk (KEMSharedKey kem) =
|
||||
let DhSecretX25519 dh = C.dh' k pk
|
||||
in KEMHybridSecret $ BA.convert (hash $ BA.convert dh <> kem :: Digest SHA256)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent.STM
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (bimap)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
|
||||
import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.FromField
|
||||
import Database.SQLite.Simple.ToField
|
||||
import Foreign (nullPtr)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.Memory (LockedBytes)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.Defines
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.FFI
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.RNG (withDRG)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
|
||||
newtype KEMPublicKey = KEMPublicKey ByteString
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
newtype KEMSecretKey = KEMSecretKey LockedBytes
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
newtype KEMCiphertext = KEMCiphertext ByteString
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
newtype KEMSharedKey = KEMSharedKey LockedBytes
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
type KEMKeyPair = (KEMPublicKey, KEMSecretKey)
|
||||
|
||||
sntrup761Keypair :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> IO KEMKeyPair
|
||||
sntrup761Keypair drg =
|
||||
bimap KEMPublicKey KEMSecretKey
|
||||
<$> BA.allocRet
|
||||
c_SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE
|
||||
( \skPtr ->
|
||||
BA.alloc c_SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE $ \pkPtr ->
|
||||
withDRG drg $ c_sntrup761_keypair pkPtr skPtr nullPtr
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
sntrup761Enc :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> KEMPublicKey -> IO (KEMCiphertext, KEMSharedKey)
|
||||
sntrup761Enc drg (KEMPublicKey pk) =
|
||||
BA.withByteArray pk $ \pkPtr ->
|
||||
bimap KEMCiphertext KEMSharedKey
|
||||
<$> BA.allocRet
|
||||
c_SNTRUP761_SIZE
|
||||
( \kPtr ->
|
||||
BA.alloc c_SNTRUP761_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE $ \cPtr ->
|
||||
withDRG drg $ c_sntrup761_enc cPtr kPtr pkPtr nullPtr
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
sntrup761Dec :: KEMCiphertext -> KEMSecretKey -> IO KEMSharedKey
|
||||
sntrup761Dec (KEMCiphertext c) (KEMSecretKey sk) =
|
||||
BA.withByteArray sk $ \skPtr ->
|
||||
BA.withByteArray c $ \cPtr ->
|
||||
KEMSharedKey
|
||||
<$> BA.alloc c_SNTRUP761_SIZE (\kPtr -> c_sntrup761_dec kPtr cPtr skPtr)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding KEMPublicKey where
|
||||
strEncode (KEMPublicKey pk) = strEncode (BA.convert pk :: ByteString)
|
||||
strP = KEMPublicKey . BA.convert <$> strP @ByteString
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding KEMCiphertext where
|
||||
smpEncode (KEMCiphertext c) = smpEncode . Large $ BA.convert c
|
||||
smpP = KEMCiphertext . BA.convert . unLarge <$> smpP
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON KEMPublicKey where
|
||||
toJSON = strToJSON
|
||||
toEncoding = strToJEncoding
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON KEMPublicKey where
|
||||
parseJSON = strParseJSON "KEMPublicKey"
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToField KEMSharedKey where
|
||||
toField (KEMSharedKey k) = toField (BA.convert k :: ByteString)
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromField KEMSharedKey where
|
||||
fromField f = KEMSharedKey . BA.convert @ByteString <$> fromField f
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.Defines where
|
||||
|
||||
#include "sntrup761.h"
|
||||
|
||||
c_SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE :: Int
|
||||
c_SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE = #{const SNTRUP761_SECRETKEY_SIZE}
|
||||
|
||||
c_SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE :: Int
|
||||
c_SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE = #{const SNTRUP761_PUBLICKEY_SIZE}
|
||||
|
||||
c_SNTRUP761_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE :: Int
|
||||
c_SNTRUP761_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE = #{const SNTRUP761_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE}
|
||||
|
||||
c_SNTRUP761_SIZE :: Int
|
||||
c_SNTRUP761_SIZE = #{const SNTRUP761_SIZE}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.FFI
|
||||
( c_sntrup761_keypair,
|
||||
c_sntrup761_enc,
|
||||
c_sntrup761_dec,
|
||||
) where
|
||||
|
||||
import Foreign
|
||||
import Foreign.C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.RNG (RNGContext, RNGFunc)
|
||||
|
||||
-- void sntrup761_keypair (uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
|
||||
foreign import ccall "sntrup761_keypair"
|
||||
c_sntrup761_keypair :: Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> Ptr RNGContext -> FunPtr RNGFunc -> IO ()
|
||||
|
||||
-- void sntrup761_enc (uint8_t *c, uint8_t *k, const uint8_t *pk, void *random_ctx, sntrup761_random_func *random);
|
||||
foreign import ccall "sntrup761_enc"
|
||||
c_sntrup761_enc :: Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> Ptr RNGContext -> FunPtr RNGFunc -> IO ()
|
||||
|
||||
-- void sntrup761_dec (uint8_t *k, const uint8_t *c, const uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
foreign import ccall "sntrup761_dec"
|
||||
c_sntrup761_dec :: Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> IO ()
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto.SNTRUP761.Bindings.RNG
|
||||
( withDRG,
|
||||
RNGContext,
|
||||
RNGFunc,
|
||||
) where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent.STM
|
||||
import Control.Exception (bracket)
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
|
||||
import Data.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess (copyByteArrayToPtr))
|
||||
import Foreign
|
||||
import Foreign.C
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
|
||||
withDRG :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> (FunPtr RNGFunc -> IO a) -> IO a
|
||||
withDRG drg = bracket (createRNGFunc drg) freeHaskellFunPtr
|
||||
|
||||
createRNGFunc :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> IO (FunPtr RNGFunc)
|
||||
createRNGFunc drg =
|
||||
mkRNGFunc $ \_ctx sz buf -> do
|
||||
bs <- atomically $ C.randomBytes (fromIntegral sz) drg
|
||||
copyByteArrayToPtr bs buf
|
||||
|
||||
type RNGContext = ()
|
||||
|
||||
-- typedef void random_func (void *ctx, size_t length, uint8_t *dst);
|
||||
type RNGFunc = Ptr RNGContext -> CSize -> Ptr Word8 -> IO ()
|
||||
|
||||
foreign import ccall "wrapper"
|
||||
mkRNGFunc :: RNGFunc -> IO (FunPtr RNGFunc)
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
( Encoding (..),
|
||||
Tail (..),
|
||||
Large (..),
|
||||
_smpP,
|
||||
smpEncodeList,
|
||||
smpListP,
|
||||
lenEncode,
|
||||
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ lenP = fromIntegral . c2w <$> A.anyChar
|
||||
{-# INLINE lenP #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding a => Encoding (Maybe a) where
|
||||
smpEncode s = maybe "0" (("1" <>) . smpEncode) s
|
||||
smpEncode = maybe "0" (('1' `B.cons`) . smpEncode)
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpEncode #-}
|
||||
smpP =
|
||||
smpP >>= \case
|
||||
@@ -143,6 +144,9 @@ instance Encoding SystemTime where
|
||||
smpP = MkSystemTime <$> smpP <*> pure 0
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpP #-}
|
||||
|
||||
_smpP :: Encoding a => Parser a
|
||||
_smpP = A.space *> smpP
|
||||
|
||||
-- lists encode/parse as a sequence of items prefixed with list length (as 1 byte)
|
||||
smpEncodeList :: Encoding a => [a] -> ByteString
|
||||
smpEncodeList xs = B.cons (lenEncode $ length xs) . B.concat $ map smpEncode xs
|
||||
@@ -170,37 +174,37 @@ instance (Encoding a, Encoding b) => Encoding (a, b) where
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpP #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance (Encoding a, Encoding b, Encoding c) => Encoding (a, b, c) where
|
||||
smpEncode (a, b, c) = smpEncode a <> smpEncode b <> smpEncode c
|
||||
smpEncode (a, b, c) = B.concat [smpEncode a, smpEncode b, smpEncode c]
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpEncode #-}
|
||||
smpP = (,,) <$> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpP #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance (Encoding a, Encoding b, Encoding c, Encoding d) => Encoding (a, b, c, d) where
|
||||
smpEncode (a, b, c, d) = smpEncode a <> smpEncode b <> smpEncode c <> smpEncode d
|
||||
smpEncode (a, b, c, d) = B.concat [smpEncode a, smpEncode b, smpEncode c, smpEncode d]
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpEncode #-}
|
||||
smpP = (,,,) <$> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpP #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance (Encoding a, Encoding b, Encoding c, Encoding d, Encoding e) => Encoding (a, b, c, d, e) where
|
||||
smpEncode (a, b, c, d, e) = smpEncode a <> smpEncode b <> smpEncode c <> smpEncode d <> smpEncode e
|
||||
smpEncode (a, b, c, d, e) = B.concat [smpEncode a, smpEncode b, smpEncode c, smpEncode d, smpEncode e]
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpEncode #-}
|
||||
smpP = (,,,,) <$> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpP #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance (Encoding a, Encoding b, Encoding c, Encoding d, Encoding e, Encoding f) => Encoding (a, b, c, d, e, f) where
|
||||
smpEncode (a, b, c, d, e, f) = smpEncode a <> smpEncode b <> smpEncode c <> smpEncode d <> smpEncode e <> smpEncode f
|
||||
smpEncode (a, b, c, d, e, f) = B.concat [smpEncode a, smpEncode b, smpEncode c, smpEncode d, smpEncode e, smpEncode f]
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpEncode #-}
|
||||
smpP = (,,,,,) <$> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpP #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance (Encoding a, Encoding b, Encoding c, Encoding d, Encoding e, Encoding f, Encoding g) => Encoding (a, b, c, d, e, f, g) where
|
||||
smpEncode (a, b, c, d, e, f, g) = smpEncode a <> smpEncode b <> smpEncode c <> smpEncode d <> smpEncode e <> smpEncode f <> smpEncode g
|
||||
smpEncode (a, b, c, d, e, f, g) = B.concat [smpEncode a, smpEncode b, smpEncode c, smpEncode d, smpEncode e, smpEncode f, smpEncode g]
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpEncode #-}
|
||||
smpP = (,,,,,,) <$> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpP #-}
|
||||
|
||||
instance (Encoding a, Encoding b, Encoding c, Encoding d, Encoding e, Encoding f, Encoding g, Encoding h) => Encoding (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) where
|
||||
smpEncode (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) = smpEncode a <> smpEncode b <> smpEncode c <> smpEncode d <> smpEncode e <> smpEncode f <> smpEncode g <> smpEncode h
|
||||
smpEncode (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) = B.concat [smpEncode a, smpEncode b, smpEncode c, smpEncode d, smpEncode e, smpEncode f, smpEncode g, smpEncode h]
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpEncode #-}
|
||||
smpP = (,,,,,,,) <$> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
{-# INLINE smpP #-}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import Data.Word (Word16)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Protocol
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Transport (supportedClientNTFVRange)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ErrorType)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,50 +18,53 @@ type NtfClient = ProtocolClient ErrorType NtfResponse
|
||||
|
||||
type NtfClientError = ProtocolClientError ErrorType
|
||||
|
||||
ntfRegisterToken :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> NewNtfEntity 'Token -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO (NtfTokenId, C.PublicKeyX25519)
|
||||
defaultNTFClientConfig :: ProtocolClientConfig
|
||||
defaultNTFClientConfig = defaultClientConfig supportedClientNTFVRange
|
||||
|
||||
ntfRegisterToken :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> NewNtfEntity 'Token -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO (NtfTokenId, C.PublicKeyX25519)
|
||||
ntfRegisterToken c pKey newTkn =
|
||||
sendNtfCommand c (Just pKey) "" (TNEW newTkn) >>= \case
|
||||
NRTknId tknId dhKey -> pure (tknId, dhKey)
|
||||
r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
|
||||
ntfVerifyToken :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> NtfTokenId -> NtfRegCode -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO ()
|
||||
ntfVerifyToken :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> NtfTokenId -> NtfRegCode -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO ()
|
||||
ntfVerifyToken c pKey tknId code = okNtfCommand (TVFY code) c pKey tknId
|
||||
|
||||
ntfCheckToken :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> NtfTokenId -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO NtfTknStatus
|
||||
ntfCheckToken :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> NtfTokenId -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO NtfTknStatus
|
||||
ntfCheckToken c pKey tknId =
|
||||
sendNtfCommand c (Just pKey) tknId TCHK >>= \case
|
||||
NRTkn stat -> pure stat
|
||||
r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
|
||||
ntfReplaceToken :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> NtfTokenId -> DeviceToken -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO ()
|
||||
ntfReplaceToken :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> NtfTokenId -> DeviceToken -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO ()
|
||||
ntfReplaceToken c pKey tknId token = okNtfCommand (TRPL token) c pKey tknId
|
||||
|
||||
ntfDeleteToken :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> NtfTokenId -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO ()
|
||||
ntfDeleteToken :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> NtfTokenId -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO ()
|
||||
ntfDeleteToken = okNtfCommand TDEL
|
||||
|
||||
ntfEnableCron :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> NtfTokenId -> Word16 -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO ()
|
||||
ntfEnableCron :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> NtfTokenId -> Word16 -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO ()
|
||||
ntfEnableCron c pKey tknId int = okNtfCommand (TCRN int) c pKey tknId
|
||||
|
||||
ntfCreateSubscription :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> NewNtfEntity 'Subscription -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO NtfSubscriptionId
|
||||
ntfCreateSubscription :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> NewNtfEntity 'Subscription -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO NtfSubscriptionId
|
||||
ntfCreateSubscription c pKey newSub =
|
||||
sendNtfCommand c (Just pKey) "" (SNEW newSub) >>= \case
|
||||
NRSubId subId -> pure subId
|
||||
r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
|
||||
ntfCheckSubscription :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> NtfSubscriptionId -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO NtfSubStatus
|
||||
ntfCheckSubscription :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> NtfSubscriptionId -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO NtfSubStatus
|
||||
ntfCheckSubscription c pKey subId =
|
||||
sendNtfCommand c (Just pKey) subId SCHK >>= \case
|
||||
NRSub stat -> pure stat
|
||||
r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
|
||||
|
||||
ntfDeleteSubscription :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> NtfSubscriptionId -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO ()
|
||||
ntfDeleteSubscription :: NtfClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> NtfSubscriptionId -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO ()
|
||||
ntfDeleteSubscription = okNtfCommand SDEL
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Send notification server command
|
||||
sendNtfCommand :: NtfEntityI e => NtfClient -> Maybe C.APrivateSignKey -> NtfEntityId -> NtfCommand e -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO NtfResponse
|
||||
sendNtfCommand :: NtfEntityI e => NtfClient -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> NtfEntityId -> NtfCommand e -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO NtfResponse
|
||||
sendNtfCommand c pKey entId cmd = sendProtocolCommand c pKey entId (NtfCmd sNtfEntity cmd)
|
||||
|
||||
okNtfCommand :: NtfEntityI e => NtfCommand e -> NtfClient -> C.APrivateSignKey -> NtfEntityId -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO ()
|
||||
okNtfCommand :: NtfEntityI e => NtfCommand e -> NtfClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> NtfEntityId -> ExceptT NtfClientError IO ()
|
||||
okNtfCommand cmd c pKey entId =
|
||||
sendNtfCommand c (Just pKey) entId cmd >>= \case
|
||||
NROk -> return ()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Protocol where
|
||||
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..), (.=))
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..), (.:), (.=))
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson.Encoding as JE
|
||||
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
|
||||
@@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ instance ToJSON NtfRegCode where
|
||||
toEncoding = strToJEncoding
|
||||
|
||||
data NewNtfEntity (e :: NtfEntity) where
|
||||
NewNtfTkn :: DeviceToken -> C.APublicVerifyKey -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> NewNtfEntity 'Token
|
||||
NewNtfSub :: NtfTokenId -> SMPQueueNtf -> NtfPrivateSignKey -> NewNtfEntity 'Subscription
|
||||
NewNtfTkn :: DeviceToken -> NtfPublicAuthKey -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> NewNtfEntity 'Token
|
||||
NewNtfSub :: NtfTokenId -> SMPQueueNtf -> NtfPrivateAuthKey -> NewNtfEntity 'Subscription
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Show (NewNtfEntity e)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -206,20 +206,20 @@ instance NtfEntityI e => ProtocolEncoding ErrorType (NtfCommand e) where
|
||||
fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @ErrorType @NtfResponse
|
||||
{-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
|
||||
|
||||
checkCredentials (sig, _, entityId, _) cmd = case cmd of
|
||||
checkCredentials (auth, _, entityId, _) cmd = case cmd of
|
||||
-- TNEW and SNEW must have signature but NOT token/subscription IDs
|
||||
TNEW {} -> sigNoEntity
|
||||
SNEW {} -> sigNoEntity
|
||||
PING
|
||||
| isNothing sig && B.null entityId -> Right cmd
|
||||
| isNothing auth && B.null entityId -> Right cmd
|
||||
| otherwise -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
|
||||
-- other client commands must have both signature and entity ID
|
||||
_
|
||||
| isNothing sig || B.null entityId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| isNothing auth || B.null entityId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| otherwise -> Right cmd
|
||||
where
|
||||
sigNoEntity
|
||||
| isNothing sig = Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| isNothing auth = Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| not (B.null entityId) = Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
|
||||
| otherwise = Right cmd
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -358,7 +358,11 @@ instance StrEncoding SMPQueueNtf where
|
||||
notifierId <- A.char '/' *> strP
|
||||
pure SMPQueueNtf {smpServer, notifierId}
|
||||
|
||||
data PushProvider = PPApnsDev | PPApnsProd | PPApnsTest
|
||||
data PushProvider
|
||||
= PPApnsDev -- provider for Apple development environment
|
||||
| PPApnsProd -- production environment, including TestFlight
|
||||
| PPApnsTest -- used for tests, to use APNS mock server
|
||||
| PPApnsNull -- used to test servers from the client - does not communicate with APNS
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Ord, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding PushProvider where
|
||||
@@ -366,11 +370,13 @@ instance Encoding PushProvider where
|
||||
PPApnsDev -> "AD"
|
||||
PPApnsProd -> "AP"
|
||||
PPApnsTest -> "AT"
|
||||
PPApnsNull -> "AN"
|
||||
smpP =
|
||||
A.take 2 >>= \case
|
||||
"AD" -> pure PPApnsDev
|
||||
"AP" -> pure PPApnsProd
|
||||
"AT" -> pure PPApnsTest
|
||||
"AN" -> pure PPApnsNull
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad PushProvider"
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding PushProvider where
|
||||
@@ -378,11 +384,13 @@ instance StrEncoding PushProvider where
|
||||
PPApnsDev -> "apns_dev"
|
||||
PPApnsProd -> "apns_prod"
|
||||
PPApnsTest -> "apns_test"
|
||||
PPApnsNull -> "apns_null"
|
||||
strP =
|
||||
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
|
||||
"apns_dev" -> pure PPApnsDev
|
||||
"apns_prod" -> pure PPApnsProd
|
||||
"apns_test" -> pure PPApnsTest
|
||||
"apns_null" -> pure PPApnsNull
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad PushProvider"
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromField PushProvider where fromField = fromTextField_ $ eitherToMaybe . strDecode . encodeUtf8
|
||||
@@ -408,6 +416,12 @@ instance ToJSON DeviceToken where
|
||||
toEncoding (DeviceToken pp t) = J.pairs $ "pushProvider" .= decodeLatin1 (strEncode pp) <> "token" .= decodeLatin1 t
|
||||
toJSON (DeviceToken pp t) = J.object ["pushProvider" .= decodeLatin1 (strEncode pp), "token" .= decodeLatin1 t]
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON DeviceToken where
|
||||
parseJSON = J.withObject "DeviceToken" $ \o -> do
|
||||
pp <- strDecode . encodeUtf8 <$?> o .: "pushProvider"
|
||||
t <- encodeUtf8 <$> o .: "token"
|
||||
pure $ DeviceToken pp t
|
||||
|
||||
type NtfEntityId = ByteString
|
||||
|
||||
type NtfSubscriptionId = NtfEntityId
|
||||
@@ -510,6 +524,9 @@ instance ToJSON NtfTknStatus where
|
||||
toEncoding = JE.text . decodeLatin1 . smpEncode
|
||||
toJSON = J.String . decodeLatin1 . smpEncode
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON NtfTknStatus where
|
||||
parseJSON = J.withText "NtfTknStatus" $ either fail pure . smpDecode . encodeUtf8
|
||||
|
||||
checkEntity :: forall t e e'. (NtfEntityI e, NtfEntityI e') => t e' -> Either String (t e)
|
||||
checkEntity c = case testEquality (sNtfEntity @e) (sNtfEntity @e') of
|
||||
Just Refl -> Right c
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,17 +12,16 @@
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent.STM (stateTVar)
|
||||
import Control.Logger.Simple
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Reader
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (second)
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import Data.Functor (($>))
|
||||
import Data.Int (Int64)
|
||||
import Data.List (intercalate, sort)
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty(..))
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
|
||||
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
|
||||
import Data.Map.Strict (Map)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
|
||||
@@ -49,8 +48,8 @@ import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport (..), THandle (..), TProxy, Transport (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (runTransportServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport (..), THandle (..), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TProxy, Transport (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (runTransportServer, tlsServerCredentials)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
|
||||
import System.Exit (exitFailure)
|
||||
import System.IO (BufferMode (..), hPutStrLn, hSetBuffering)
|
||||
@@ -83,12 +82,16 @@ ntfServer cfg@NtfServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} started = do
|
||||
runServer :: (ServiceName, ATransport) -> M ()
|
||||
runServer (tcpPort, ATransport t) = do
|
||||
serverParams <- asks tlsServerParams
|
||||
runTransportServer started tcpPort serverParams tCfg (runClient t)
|
||||
serverSignKey <- either fail pure . fromTLSCredentials $ tlsServerCredentials serverParams
|
||||
runTransportServer started tcpPort serverParams tCfg (runClient serverSignKey t)
|
||||
fromTLSCredentials (_, pk) = C.x509ToPrivate (pk, []) >>= C.privKey
|
||||
|
||||
runClient :: Transport c => TProxy c -> c -> M ()
|
||||
runClient _ h = do
|
||||
runClient :: Transport c => C.APrivateSignKey -> TProxy c -> c -> M ()
|
||||
runClient signKey _ h = do
|
||||
kh <- asks serverIdentity
|
||||
liftIO (runExceptT $ ntfServerHandshake h kh supportedNTFServerVRange) >>= \case
|
||||
ks <- atomically . C.generateKeyPair =<< asks random
|
||||
NtfServerConfig {ntfServerVRange} <- asks config
|
||||
liftIO (runExceptT $ ntfServerHandshake signKey h ks kh ntfServerVRange) >>= \case
|
||||
Right th -> runNtfClientTransport th
|
||||
Left _ -> pure ()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -110,9 +113,9 @@ ntfServer cfg@NtfServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} started = do
|
||||
liftIO $ threadDelay' $ 1000000 * (initialDelay + if initialDelay < 0 then 86400 else 0)
|
||||
NtfServerStats {fromTime, tknCreated, tknVerified, tknDeleted, subCreated, subDeleted, ntfReceived, ntfDelivered, activeTokens, activeSubs} <- asks serverStats
|
||||
let interval = 1000000 * logInterval
|
||||
withFile statsFilePath AppendMode $ \h -> liftIO $ do
|
||||
hSetBuffering h LineBuffering
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
withFile statsFilePath AppendMode $ \h -> liftIO $ do
|
||||
hSetBuffering h LineBuffering
|
||||
ts <- getCurrentTime
|
||||
fromTime' <- atomically $ swapTVar fromTime ts
|
||||
tknCreated' <- atomically $ swapTVar tknCreated 0
|
||||
@@ -142,7 +145,7 @@ ntfServer cfg@NtfServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} started = do
|
||||
weekCount sub,
|
||||
monthCount sub
|
||||
]
|
||||
threadDelay' interval
|
||||
liftIO $ threadDelay' interval
|
||||
|
||||
resubscribe :: NtfSubscriber -> Map NtfSubscriptionId NtfSubData -> M ()
|
||||
resubscribe NtfSubscriber {newSubQ} subs = do
|
||||
@@ -205,10 +208,10 @@ ntfSubscriber NtfSubscriber {smpSubscribers, newSubQ, smpAgent = ca@SMPClientAge
|
||||
Just err -> (subs, oks, err : errs) -- permanent error, log and don't retry subscription
|
||||
Nothing -> (sub : subs, oks, errs) -- temporary error, retry subscription
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Subscribe to queues. The list of results can have a different order.
|
||||
-- \| Subscribe to queues. The list of results can have a different order.
|
||||
subscribeQueues :: SMPServer -> NonEmpty NtfSubData -> IO (NonEmpty (NtfSubData, Either SMPClientError ()))
|
||||
subscribeQueues srv subs =
|
||||
L.map (second snd) . L.zip subs <$> subscribeQueuesNtfs ca srv (L.map sub subs)
|
||||
L.zipWith (\s r -> (s, snd r)) subs <$> subscribeQueuesNtfs ca srv (L.map sub subs)
|
||||
where
|
||||
sub NtfSubData {smpQueue = SMPQueueNtf {notifierId}, notifierKey} = (notifierId, notifierKey)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -248,10 +251,11 @@ ntfSubscriber NtfSubscriber {smpSubscribers, newSubQ, smpAgent = ca@SMPClientAge
|
||||
forM errs (\((_, ntfId), err) -> handleSubError (SMPQueueNtf srv ntfId) err)
|
||||
>>= logSubErrors srv . catMaybes . L.toList
|
||||
|
||||
logSubStatus srv event n = when (n > 0) $
|
||||
logInfo $ "SMP server " <> event <> " " <> showServer' srv <> " (" <> tshow n <> " subscriptions)"
|
||||
logSubStatus srv event n =
|
||||
when (n > 0) . logInfo $
|
||||
"SMP server " <> event <> " " <> showServer' srv <> " (" <> tshow n <> " subscriptions)"
|
||||
|
||||
logSubErrors :: SMPServer -> [NtfSubStatus] -> M ()
|
||||
logSubErrors :: SMPServer -> [NtfSubStatus] -> M ()
|
||||
logSubErrors srv errs = forM_ (L.group $ sort errs) $ \errs' -> do
|
||||
logError $ "SMP subscription errors on server " <> showServer' srv <> ": " <> tshow (L.head errs') <> " (" <> tshow (length errs') <> " errors)"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -275,12 +279,11 @@ ntfSubscriber NtfSubscriber {smpSubscribers, newSubQ, smpAgent = ca@SMPClientAge
|
||||
|
||||
updateSubStatus smpQueue status = do
|
||||
st <- asks store
|
||||
atomically (findNtfSubscription st smpQueue)
|
||||
>>= mapM_
|
||||
( \NtfSubData {ntfSubId, subStatus} -> do
|
||||
atomically $ writeTVar subStatus status
|
||||
withNtfLog $ \sl -> logSubscriptionStatus sl ntfSubId status
|
||||
)
|
||||
atomically (findNtfSubscription st smpQueue) >>= mapM_ update
|
||||
where
|
||||
update NtfSubData {ntfSubId, subStatus} = do
|
||||
old <- atomically $ stateTVar subStatus (,status)
|
||||
when (old /= status) $ withNtfLog $ \sl -> logSubscriptionStatus sl ntfSubId status
|
||||
|
||||
ntfPush :: NtfPushServer -> M ()
|
||||
ntfPush s@NtfPushServer {pushQ} = forever $ do
|
||||
@@ -290,11 +293,14 @@ ntfPush s@NtfPushServer {pushQ} = forever $ do
|
||||
case ntf of
|
||||
PNVerification _
|
||||
| status /= NTInvalid && status /= NTExpired ->
|
||||
deliverNotification pp tkn ntf >>= \case
|
||||
Right _ -> do
|
||||
status_ <- atomically $ stateTVar tknStatus $ \status' -> if status' == NTActive then (Nothing, NTActive) else (Just NTConfirmed, NTConfirmed)
|
||||
forM_ status_ $ \status' -> withNtfLog $ \sl -> logTokenStatus sl ntfTknId status'
|
||||
_ -> pure ()
|
||||
deliverNotification pp tkn ntf >>= \case
|
||||
Right _ -> do
|
||||
status_ <- atomically $ stateTVar tknStatus $ \case
|
||||
NTActive -> (Nothing, NTActive)
|
||||
NTConfirmed -> (Nothing, NTConfirmed)
|
||||
_ -> (Just NTConfirmed, NTConfirmed)
|
||||
forM_ status_ $ \status' -> withNtfLog $ \sl -> logTokenStatus sl ntfTknId status'
|
||||
_ -> pure ()
|
||||
| otherwise -> logError "bad notification token status"
|
||||
PNCheckMessages -> checkActiveTkn status $ do
|
||||
void $ deliverNotification pp tkn ntf
|
||||
@@ -309,7 +315,7 @@ ntfPush s@NtfPushServer {pushQ} = forever $ do
|
||||
| status == NTActive = action
|
||||
| otherwise = liftIO $ logError "bad notification token status"
|
||||
deliverNotification :: PushProvider -> NtfTknData -> PushNotification -> M (Either PushProviderError ())
|
||||
deliverNotification pp tkn@NtfTknData {ntfTknId, tknStatus} ntf = do
|
||||
deliverNotification pp tkn ntf = do
|
||||
deliver <- liftIO $ getPushClient s pp
|
||||
liftIO (runExceptT $ deliver tkn ntf) >>= \case
|
||||
Right _ -> pure $ Right ()
|
||||
@@ -318,69 +324,71 @@ ntfPush s@NtfPushServer {pushQ} = forever $ do
|
||||
PPRetryLater -> retryDeliver
|
||||
PPCryptoError _ -> err e
|
||||
PPResponseError _ _ -> err e
|
||||
PPTokenInvalid -> updateTknStatus NTInvalid >> err e
|
||||
PPTokenInvalid -> updateTknStatus tkn NTInvalid >> err e
|
||||
PPPermanentError -> err e
|
||||
where
|
||||
retryDeliver :: M (Either PushProviderError ())
|
||||
retryDeliver = do
|
||||
deliver <- liftIO $ newPushClient s pp
|
||||
liftIO (runExceptT $ deliver tkn ntf) >>= either err (pure . Right)
|
||||
updateTknStatus :: NtfTknStatus -> M ()
|
||||
updateTknStatus status = do
|
||||
atomically $ writeTVar tknStatus status
|
||||
withNtfLog $ \sl -> logTokenStatus sl ntfTknId status
|
||||
err e = logError (T.pack $ "Push provider error (" <> show pp <> "): " <> show e) $> Left e
|
||||
|
||||
updateTknStatus :: NtfTknData -> NtfTknStatus -> M ()
|
||||
updateTknStatus NtfTknData {ntfTknId, tknStatus} status = do
|
||||
old <- atomically $ stateTVar tknStatus (,status)
|
||||
when (old /= status) $ withNtfLog $ \sl -> logTokenStatus sl ntfTknId status
|
||||
|
||||
runNtfClientTransport :: Transport c => THandle c -> M ()
|
||||
runNtfClientTransport th@THandle {sessionId} = do
|
||||
runNtfClientTransport th@THandle {params} = do
|
||||
qSize <- asks $ clientQSize . config
|
||||
ts <- liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
c <- atomically $ newNtfServerClient qSize sessionId ts
|
||||
c <- atomically $ newNtfServerClient qSize params ts
|
||||
s <- asks subscriber
|
||||
ps <- asks pushServer
|
||||
expCfg <- asks $ inactiveClientExpiration . config
|
||||
raceAny_ ([liftIO $ send th c, client c s ps, receive th c] <> disconnectThread_ c expCfg)
|
||||
`finally` liftIO (clientDisconnected c)
|
||||
where
|
||||
disconnectThread_ c expCfg = maybe [] ((: []) . liftIO . disconnectTransport th c activeAt) expCfg
|
||||
disconnectThread_ c (Just expCfg) = [liftIO $ disconnectTransport th (rcvActiveAt c) (sndActiveAt c) expCfg (pure True)]
|
||||
disconnectThread_ _ _ = []
|
||||
|
||||
clientDisconnected :: NtfServerClient -> IO ()
|
||||
clientDisconnected NtfServerClient {connected} = atomically $ writeTVar connected False
|
||||
|
||||
receive :: Transport c => THandle c -> NtfServerClient -> M ()
|
||||
receive th NtfServerClient {rcvQ, sndQ, activeAt} = forever $ do
|
||||
receive th@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth}} NtfServerClient {rcvQ, sndQ, rcvActiveAt} = forever $ do
|
||||
ts <- liftIO $ tGet th
|
||||
forM_ ts $ \t@(_, _, (corrId, entId, cmdOrError)) -> do
|
||||
atomically . writeTVar activeAt =<< liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
atomically . writeTVar rcvActiveAt =<< liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
logDebug "received transmission"
|
||||
case cmdOrError of
|
||||
Left e -> write sndQ (corrId, entId, NRErr e)
|
||||
Right cmd ->
|
||||
verifyNtfTransmission t cmd >>= \case
|
||||
verifyNtfTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (SMP.bs corrId)) <$> thAuth) t cmd >>= \case
|
||||
VRVerified req -> write rcvQ req
|
||||
VRFailed -> write sndQ (corrId, entId, NRErr AUTH)
|
||||
where
|
||||
write q t = atomically $ writeTBQueue q t
|
||||
|
||||
send :: Transport c => THandle c -> NtfServerClient -> IO ()
|
||||
send h@THandle {thVersion = v} NtfServerClient {sndQ, sessionId, activeAt} = forever $ do
|
||||
send h@THandle {params} NtfServerClient {sndQ, sndActiveAt} = forever $ do
|
||||
t <- atomically $ readTBQueue sndQ
|
||||
void . liftIO $ tPut h Nothing [(Nothing, encodeTransmission v sessionId t)]
|
||||
atomically . writeTVar activeAt =<< liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
void . liftIO $ tPut h [Right (Nothing, encodeTransmission params t)]
|
||||
atomically . writeTVar sndActiveAt =<< liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
|
||||
-- instance Show a => Show (TVar a) where
|
||||
-- show x = unsafePerformIO $ show <$> readTVarIO x
|
||||
|
||||
data VerificationResult = VRVerified NtfRequest | VRFailed
|
||||
|
||||
verifyNtfTransmission :: SignedTransmission ErrorType NtfCmd -> NtfCmd -> M VerificationResult
|
||||
verifyNtfTransmission (sig_, signed, (corrId, entId, _)) cmd = do
|
||||
verifyNtfTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth, C.CbNonce) -> SignedTransmission ErrorType NtfCmd -> NtfCmd -> M VerificationResult
|
||||
verifyNtfTransmission auth_ (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, entId, _)) cmd = do
|
||||
st <- asks store
|
||||
case cmd of
|
||||
NtfCmd SToken c@(TNEW tkn@(NewNtfTkn _ k _)) -> do
|
||||
r_ <- atomically $ getNtfTokenRegistration st tkn
|
||||
pure $
|
||||
if verifyCmdSignature sig_ signed k
|
||||
if verifyCmdAuthorization auth_ tAuth authorized k
|
||||
then case r_ of
|
||||
Just t@NtfTknData {tknVerifyKey}
|
||||
| k == tknVerifyKey -> verifiedTknCmd t c
|
||||
@@ -401,7 +409,7 @@ verifyNtfTransmission (sig_, signed, (corrId, entId, _)) cmd = do
|
||||
then do
|
||||
t_ <- atomically $ getActiveNtfToken st subTknId
|
||||
verifyToken' t_ $ verifiedSubCmd s c
|
||||
else pure $ maybe False (dummyVerifyCmd signed) sig_ `seq` VRFailed
|
||||
else pure $ maybe False (dummyVerifyCmd auth_ authorized) tAuth `seq` VRFailed
|
||||
NtfCmd SSubscription PING -> pure $ VRVerified $ NtfReqPing corrId entId
|
||||
NtfCmd SSubscription c -> do
|
||||
s_ <- atomically $ getNtfSubscription st entId
|
||||
@@ -409,7 +417,7 @@ verifyNtfTransmission (sig_, signed, (corrId, entId, _)) cmd = do
|
||||
Just s@NtfSubData {tokenId = subTknId} -> do
|
||||
t_ <- atomically $ getActiveNtfToken st subTknId
|
||||
verifyToken' t_ $ verifiedSubCmd s c
|
||||
_ -> pure $ maybe False (dummyVerifyCmd signed) sig_ `seq` VRFailed
|
||||
_ -> pure $ maybe False (dummyVerifyCmd auth_ authorized) tAuth `seq` VRFailed
|
||||
where
|
||||
verifiedTknCmd t c = VRVerified (NtfReqCmd SToken (NtfTkn t) (corrId, entId, c))
|
||||
verifiedSubCmd s c = VRVerified (NtfReqCmd SSubscription (NtfSub s) (corrId, entId, c))
|
||||
@@ -417,10 +425,10 @@ verifyNtfTransmission (sig_, signed, (corrId, entId, _)) cmd = do
|
||||
verifyToken t_ positiveVerificationResult =
|
||||
pure $ case t_ of
|
||||
Just t@NtfTknData {tknVerifyKey} ->
|
||||
if verifyCmdSignature sig_ signed tknVerifyKey
|
||||
if verifyCmdAuthorization auth_ tAuth authorized tknVerifyKey
|
||||
then positiveVerificationResult t
|
||||
else VRFailed
|
||||
_ -> maybe False (dummyVerifyCmd signed) sig_ `seq` VRFailed
|
||||
_ -> maybe False (dummyVerifyCmd auth_ authorized) tAuth `seq` VRFailed
|
||||
verifyToken' :: Maybe NtfTknData -> VerificationResult -> M VerificationResult
|
||||
verifyToken' t_ = verifyToken t_ . const
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -436,7 +444,7 @@ client NtfServerClient {rcvQ, sndQ} NtfSubscriber {newSubQ, smpAgent = ca} NtfPu
|
||||
NtfReqNew corrId (ANE SToken newTkn@(NewNtfTkn _ _ dhPubKey)) -> do
|
||||
logDebug "TNEW - new token"
|
||||
st <- asks store
|
||||
ks@(srvDhPubKey, srvDhPrivKey) <- liftIO C.generateKeyPair'
|
||||
ks@(srvDhPubKey, srvDhPrivKey) <- atomically . C.generateKeyPair =<< asks random
|
||||
let dhSecret = C.dh' dhPubKey srvDhPrivKey
|
||||
tknId <- getId
|
||||
regCode <- getRegCode
|
||||
@@ -460,17 +468,16 @@ client NtfServerClient {rcvQ, sndQ} NtfSubscriber {newSubQ, smpAgent = ca} NtfPu
|
||||
else pure $ NRErr AUTH
|
||||
TVFY code -- this allows repeated verification for cases when client connection dropped before server response
|
||||
| (status == NTRegistered || status == NTConfirmed || status == NTActive) && tknRegCode == code -> do
|
||||
logDebug "TVFY - token verified"
|
||||
st <- asks store
|
||||
atomically $ writeTVar tknStatus NTActive
|
||||
tIds <- atomically $ removeInactiveTokenRegistrations st tkn
|
||||
forM_ tIds cancelInvervalNotifications
|
||||
withNtfLog $ \s -> logTokenStatus s tknId NTActive
|
||||
incNtfStat tknVerified
|
||||
pure NROk
|
||||
logDebug "TVFY - token verified"
|
||||
st <- asks store
|
||||
updateTknStatus tkn NTActive
|
||||
tIds <- atomically $ removeInactiveTokenRegistrations st tkn
|
||||
forM_ tIds cancelInvervalNotifications
|
||||
incNtfStat tknVerified
|
||||
pure NROk
|
||||
| otherwise -> do
|
||||
logDebug "TVFY - incorrect code or token status"
|
||||
pure $ NRErr AUTH
|
||||
logDebug "TVFY - incorrect code or token status"
|
||||
pure $ NRErr AUTH
|
||||
TCHK -> do
|
||||
logDebug "TCHK"
|
||||
pure $ NRTkn status
|
||||
@@ -507,16 +514,16 @@ client NtfServerClient {rcvQ, sndQ} NtfSubscriber {newSubQ, smpAgent = ca} NtfPu
|
||||
TCRN int
|
||||
| int < 20 -> pure $ NRErr QUOTA
|
||||
| otherwise -> do
|
||||
logDebug "TCRN"
|
||||
atomically $ writeTVar tknCronInterval int
|
||||
atomically (TM.lookup tknId intervalNotifiers) >>= \case
|
||||
Nothing -> runIntervalNotifier int
|
||||
Just IntervalNotifier {interval, action} ->
|
||||
unless (interval == int) $ do
|
||||
uninterruptibleCancel action
|
||||
runIntervalNotifier int
|
||||
withNtfLog $ \s -> logTokenCron s tknId int
|
||||
pure NROk
|
||||
logDebug "TCRN"
|
||||
atomically $ writeTVar tknCronInterval int
|
||||
atomically (TM.lookup tknId intervalNotifiers) >>= \case
|
||||
Nothing -> runIntervalNotifier int
|
||||
Just IntervalNotifier {interval, action} ->
|
||||
unless (interval == int) $ do
|
||||
uninterruptibleCancel action
|
||||
runIntervalNotifier int
|
||||
withNtfLog $ \s -> logTokenCron s tknId int
|
||||
pure NROk
|
||||
where
|
||||
runIntervalNotifier interval = do
|
||||
action <- async . intervalNotifier $ fromIntegral interval * 1000000 * 60
|
||||
@@ -562,13 +569,11 @@ client NtfServerClient {rcvQ, sndQ} NtfSubscriber {newSubQ, smpAgent = ca} NtfPu
|
||||
PING -> pure NRPong
|
||||
NtfReqPing corrId entId -> pure (corrId, entId, NRPong)
|
||||
getId :: M NtfEntityId
|
||||
getId = getRandomBytes =<< asks (subIdBytes . config)
|
||||
getId = randomBytes =<< asks (subIdBytes . config)
|
||||
getRegCode :: M NtfRegCode
|
||||
getRegCode = NtfRegCode <$> (getRandomBytes =<< asks (regCodeBytes . config))
|
||||
getRandomBytes :: Int -> M ByteString
|
||||
getRandomBytes n = do
|
||||
gVar <- asks idsDrg
|
||||
atomically (C.pseudoRandomBytes n gVar)
|
||||
getRegCode = NtfRegCode <$> (randomBytes =<< asks (regCodeBytes . config))
|
||||
randomBytes :: Int -> M ByteString
|
||||
randomBytes n = atomically . C.randomBytes n =<< asks random
|
||||
cancelInvervalNotifications :: NtfTokenId -> M ()
|
||||
cancelInvervalNotifications tknId =
|
||||
atomically (TM.lookupDelete tknId intervalNotifiers)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,14 +3,15 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Env where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent (ThreadId)
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent.Async (Async)
|
||||
import Control.Logger.Simple
|
||||
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
|
||||
import Crypto.Random
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import Data.Int (Int64)
|
||||
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock (getCurrentTime)
|
||||
@@ -31,8 +32,9 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CorrId, SMPServer, Transmission)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (loadFingerprint, loadTLSServerParams, TransportServerConfig)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport, THandleParams)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (TransportServerConfig, loadFingerprint, loadTLSServerParams)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version (VersionRange)
|
||||
import System.IO (IOMode (..))
|
||||
import System.Mem.Weak (Weak)
|
||||
import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
@@ -58,14 +60,15 @@ data NtfServerConfig = NtfServerConfig
|
||||
logStatsStartTime :: Int64,
|
||||
serverStatsLogFile :: FilePath,
|
||||
serverStatsBackupFile :: Maybe FilePath,
|
||||
ntfServerVRange :: VersionRange,
|
||||
transportConfig :: TransportServerConfig
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
defaultInactiveClientExpiration :: ExpirationConfig
|
||||
defaultInactiveClientExpiration =
|
||||
ExpirationConfig
|
||||
{ ttl = 7200, -- 2 hours
|
||||
checkInterval = 3600 -- seconds, 1 hour
|
||||
{ ttl = 43200, -- seconds, 12 hours
|
||||
checkInterval = 3600 -- seconds, 1 hours
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
data NtfEnv = NtfEnv
|
||||
@@ -74,7 +77,7 @@ data NtfEnv = NtfEnv
|
||||
pushServer :: NtfPushServer,
|
||||
store :: NtfStore,
|
||||
storeLog :: Maybe (StoreLog 'WriteMode),
|
||||
idsDrg :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
|
||||
random :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
|
||||
tlsServerParams :: T.ServerParams,
|
||||
serverIdentity :: C.KeyHash,
|
||||
serverStats :: NtfServerStats
|
||||
@@ -82,15 +85,17 @@ data NtfEnv = NtfEnv
|
||||
|
||||
newNtfServerEnv :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => NtfServerConfig -> m NtfEnv
|
||||
newNtfServerEnv config@NtfServerConfig {subQSize, pushQSize, smpAgentCfg, apnsConfig, storeLogFile, caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile} = do
|
||||
idsDrg <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
|
||||
random <- liftIO C.newRandom
|
||||
store <- atomically newNtfStore
|
||||
logInfo "restoring subscriptions..."
|
||||
storeLog <- liftIO $ mapM (`readWriteNtfStore` store) storeLogFile
|
||||
subscriber <- atomically $ newNtfSubscriber subQSize smpAgentCfg
|
||||
logInfo "restored subscriptions"
|
||||
subscriber <- atomically $ newNtfSubscriber subQSize smpAgentCfg random
|
||||
pushServer <- atomically $ newNtfPushServer pushQSize apnsConfig
|
||||
tlsServerParams <- liftIO $ loadTLSServerParams caCertificateFile certificateFile privateKeyFile
|
||||
Fingerprint fp <- liftIO $ loadFingerprint caCertificateFile
|
||||
serverStats <- atomically . newNtfServerStats =<< liftIO getCurrentTime
|
||||
pure NtfEnv {config, subscriber, pushServer, store, storeLog, idsDrg, tlsServerParams, serverIdentity = C.KeyHash fp, serverStats}
|
||||
pure NtfEnv {config, subscriber, pushServer, store, storeLog, random, tlsServerParams, serverIdentity = C.KeyHash fp, serverStats}
|
||||
|
||||
data NtfSubscriber = NtfSubscriber
|
||||
{ smpSubscribers :: TMap SMPServer SMPSubscriber,
|
||||
@@ -98,11 +103,11 @@ data NtfSubscriber = NtfSubscriber
|
||||
smpAgent :: SMPClientAgent
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
newNtfSubscriber :: Natural -> SMPClientAgentConfig -> STM NtfSubscriber
|
||||
newNtfSubscriber qSize smpAgentCfg = do
|
||||
newNtfSubscriber :: Natural -> SMPClientAgentConfig -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM NtfSubscriber
|
||||
newNtfSubscriber qSize smpAgentCfg random = do
|
||||
smpSubscribers <- TM.empty
|
||||
newSubQ <- newTBQueue qSize
|
||||
smpAgent <- newSMPClientAgent smpAgentCfg
|
||||
smpAgent <- newSMPClientAgent smpAgentCfg random
|
||||
pure NtfSubscriber {smpSubscribers, newSubQ, smpAgent}
|
||||
|
||||
data SMPSubscriber = SMPSubscriber
|
||||
@@ -138,7 +143,9 @@ newNtfPushServer qSize apnsConfig = do
|
||||
|
||||
newPushClient :: NtfPushServer -> PushProvider -> IO PushProviderClient
|
||||
newPushClient NtfPushServer {apnsConfig, pushClients} pp = do
|
||||
c <- apnsPushProviderClient <$> createAPNSPushClient (apnsProviderHost pp) apnsConfig
|
||||
c <- case apnsProviderHost pp of
|
||||
Nothing -> pure $ \_ _ -> pure ()
|
||||
Just host -> apnsPushProviderClient <$> createAPNSPushClient host apnsConfig
|
||||
atomically $ TM.insert pp c pushClients
|
||||
pure c
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -154,15 +161,17 @@ data NtfRequest
|
||||
data NtfServerClient = NtfServerClient
|
||||
{ rcvQ :: TBQueue NtfRequest,
|
||||
sndQ :: TBQueue (Transmission NtfResponse),
|
||||
sessionId :: ByteString,
|
||||
ntfThParams :: THandleParams,
|
||||
connected :: TVar Bool,
|
||||
activeAt :: TVar SystemTime
|
||||
rcvActiveAt :: TVar SystemTime,
|
||||
sndActiveAt :: TVar SystemTime
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
newNtfServerClient :: Natural -> ByteString -> SystemTime -> STM NtfServerClient
|
||||
newNtfServerClient qSize sessionId ts = do
|
||||
newNtfServerClient :: Natural -> THandleParams -> SystemTime -> STM NtfServerClient
|
||||
newNtfServerClient qSize ntfThParams ts = do
|
||||
rcvQ <- newTBQueue qSize
|
||||
sndQ <- newTBQueue qSize
|
||||
connected <- newTVar True
|
||||
activeAt <- newTVar ts
|
||||
return NtfServerClient {rcvQ, sndQ, sessionId, connected, activeAt}
|
||||
rcvActiveAt <- newTVar ts
|
||||
sndActiveAt <- newTVar ts
|
||||
return NtfServerClient {rcvQ, sndQ, ntfThParams, connected, rcvActiveAt, sndActiveAt}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Main where
|
||||
|
||||
import Data.Either (fromRight)
|
||||
import Data.Functor (($>))
|
||||
import Data.Ini (lookupValue, readIniFile)
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
|
||||
@@ -18,10 +17,13 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgentConfig (..), defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server (runNtfServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Env (NtfServerConfig (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Env (NtfServerConfig (..), defaultInactiveClientExpiration)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Push.APNS (defaultAPNSPushClientConfig)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Transport (supportedServerNTFVRange)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ProtoServerWithAuth (..), pattern NtfServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (simplexMQVersion)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (TransportServerConfig (..), defaultTransportServerConfig)
|
||||
import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing, doesFileExist)
|
||||
@@ -29,9 +31,6 @@ import System.FilePath (combine)
|
||||
import System.IO (BufferMode (..), hSetBuffering, stderr, stdout)
|
||||
import Text.Read (readMaybe)
|
||||
|
||||
ntfServerVersion :: String
|
||||
ntfServerVersion = "1.5.1"
|
||||
|
||||
defaultSMPBatchDelay :: Int
|
||||
defaultSMPBatchDelay = 10000
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -42,6 +41,10 @@ ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
|
||||
doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
|
||||
True -> exitError $ "Error: server is already initialized (" <> iniFile <> " exists).\nRun `" <> executableName <> " start`."
|
||||
_ -> initializeServer opts
|
||||
OnlineCert certOpts ->
|
||||
doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
|
||||
True -> genOnline cfgPath certOpts
|
||||
_ -> exitError $ "Error: server is not initialized (" <> iniFile <> " does not exist).\nRun `" <> executableName <> " init`."
|
||||
Start ->
|
||||
doesFileExist iniFile >>= \case
|
||||
True -> readIniFile iniFile >>= either exitError runServer
|
||||
@@ -53,7 +56,7 @@ ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
|
||||
putStrLn "Deleted configuration and log files"
|
||||
where
|
||||
iniFile = combine cfgPath "ntf-server.ini"
|
||||
serverVersion = "SMP notifications server v" <> ntfServerVersion
|
||||
serverVersion = "SMP notifications server v" <> simplexMQVersion
|
||||
defaultServerPort = "443"
|
||||
executableName = "ntf-server"
|
||||
storeLogFilePath = combine logPath "ntf-server-store.log"
|
||||
@@ -87,12 +90,17 @@ ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
|
||||
<> "log_tls_errors: off\n\
|
||||
\# delay between command batches sent to SMP relays (microseconds), 0 to disable\n"
|
||||
<> ("smp_batch_delay: " <> show defaultSMPBatchDelay <> "\n")
|
||||
<> "websockets: off\n"
|
||||
<> "websockets: off\n\n\
|
||||
\[INACTIVE_CLIENTS]\n\
|
||||
\# TTL and interval to check inactive clients\n\
|
||||
\disconnect: off\n"
|
||||
<> ("# ttl: " <> show (ttl defaultInactiveClientExpiration) <> "\n")
|
||||
<> ("# check_interval: " <> show (checkInterval defaultInactiveClientExpiration) <> "\n")
|
||||
runServer ini = do
|
||||
hSetBuffering stdout LineBuffering
|
||||
hSetBuffering stderr LineBuffering
|
||||
fp <- checkSavedFingerprint cfgPath defaultX509Config
|
||||
let host = fromRight "<hostnames>" $ T.unpack <$> lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "host" ini
|
||||
let host = either (const "<hostnames>") T.unpack $ lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "host" ini
|
||||
port = T.unpack $ strictIni "TRANSPORT" "port" ini
|
||||
cfg@NtfServerConfig {transports, storeLogFile} = serverConfig
|
||||
srv = ProtoServerWithAuth (NtfServer [THDomainName host] (if port == "443" then "" else port) (C.KeyHash fp)) Nothing
|
||||
@@ -116,7 +124,12 @@ ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
|
||||
smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig {smpCfg = (smpCfg defaultSMPClientAgentConfig) {batchDelay}},
|
||||
apnsConfig = defaultAPNSPushClientConfig,
|
||||
subsBatchSize = 900,
|
||||
inactiveClientExpiration = Nothing,
|
||||
inactiveClientExpiration =
|
||||
settingIsOn "INACTIVE_CLIENTS" "disconnect" ini
|
||||
$> ExpirationConfig
|
||||
{ ttl = readStrictIni "INACTIVE_CLIENTS" "ttl" ini,
|
||||
checkInterval = readStrictIni "INACTIVE_CLIENTS" "check_interval" ini
|
||||
},
|
||||
storeLogFile = enableStoreLog $> storeLogFilePath,
|
||||
caCertificateFile = c caCrtFile,
|
||||
privateKeyFile = c serverKeyFile,
|
||||
@@ -125,6 +138,7 @@ ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
|
||||
logStatsStartTime = 0, -- seconds from 00:00 UTC
|
||||
serverStatsLogFile = combine logPath "ntf-server-stats.daily.log",
|
||||
serverStatsBackupFile = logStats $> combine logPath "ntf-server-stats.log",
|
||||
ntfServerVRange = supportedServerNTFVRange,
|
||||
transportConfig =
|
||||
defaultTransportServerConfig
|
||||
{ logTLSErrors = fromMaybe False $ iniOnOff "TRANSPORT" "log_tls_errors" ini
|
||||
@@ -133,6 +147,7 @@ ntfServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
|
||||
|
||||
data CliCommand
|
||||
= Init InitOptions
|
||||
| OnlineCert CertOptions
|
||||
| Start
|
||||
| Delete
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -148,6 +163,7 @@ cliCommandP :: FilePath -> FilePath -> FilePath -> Parser CliCommand
|
||||
cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile =
|
||||
hsubparser
|
||||
( command "init" (info (Init <$> initP) (progDesc $ "Initialize server - creates " <> cfgPath <> " and " <> logPath <> " directories and configuration files"))
|
||||
<> command "cert" (info (OnlineCert <$> certOptionsP) (progDesc $ "Generate new online TLS server credentials (configuration: " <> iniFile <> ")"))
|
||||
<> command "start" (info (pure Start) (progDesc $ "Start server (configuration: " <> iniFile <> ")"))
|
||||
<> command "delete" (info (pure Delete) (progDesc "Delete configuration and log files"))
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveGeneric #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
|
||||
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -Wno-unrecognised-pragmas #-}
|
||||
|
||||
{-# HLINT ignore "Use newtype instead of data" #-}
|
||||
@@ -12,24 +12,26 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Push.APNS where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Exception (Exception)
|
||||
import Control.Logger.Simple
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Control.Monad.IO.Class
|
||||
import Crypto.Hash.Algorithms (SHA256 (..))
|
||||
import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.ECDSA as EC
|
||||
import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types as ECT
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG, drgNew)
|
||||
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
|
||||
import qualified Crypto.Store.PKCS8 as PK
|
||||
import Data.ASN1.BinaryEncoding (DER (..))
|
||||
import Data.ASN1.Encoding
|
||||
import Data.ASN1.Types
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON, ToJSON, (.=))
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (ToJSON, (.=))
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson.Encoding as JE
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as JQ
|
||||
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as U
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Builder (lazyByteString)
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as LB
|
||||
import qualified Data.CaseInsensitive as CI
|
||||
import Data.Int (Int64)
|
||||
import Data.Map.Strict (Map)
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
|
||||
@@ -38,8 +40,7 @@ import qualified Data.Text as T
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock.System
|
||||
import qualified Data.X509 as X
|
||||
import qualified Data.X509.CertificateStore as XS
|
||||
import GHC.Generics (Generic)
|
||||
import Network.HTTP.Types (HeaderName, Status)
|
||||
import Network.HTTP.Types (Status)
|
||||
import qualified Network.HTTP.Types as N
|
||||
import Network.HTTP2.Client (Request)
|
||||
import qualified Network.HTTP2.Client as H
|
||||
@@ -47,7 +48,9 @@ import Network.Socket (HostName, ServiceName)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Protocol
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Push.APNS.Internal
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Store (NtfTknData (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (EncNMsgMeta)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2 (HTTP2Body (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Client
|
||||
@@ -59,17 +62,13 @@ data JWTHeader = JWTHeader
|
||||
{ alg :: Text, -- key algorithm, ES256 for APNS
|
||||
kid :: Text -- key ID
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Show, Generic)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON JWTHeader where toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding J.defaultOptions
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data JWTClaims = JWTClaims
|
||||
{ iss :: Text, -- issuer, team ID for APNS
|
||||
iat :: Int64 -- issue time, seconds from epoch
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Show, Generic)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON JWTClaims where toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding J.defaultOptions
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data JWTToken = JWTToken JWTHeader JWTClaims
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
@@ -81,6 +80,10 @@ mkJWTToken hdr iss = do
|
||||
|
||||
type SignedJWTToken = ByteString
|
||||
|
||||
$(JQ.deriveToJSON defaultJSON ''JWTHeader)
|
||||
|
||||
$(JQ.deriveToJSON defaultJSON ''JWTClaims)
|
||||
|
||||
signedJWTToken :: EC.PrivateKey -> JWTToken -> IO SignedJWTToken
|
||||
signedJWTToken pk (JWTToken hdr claims) = do
|
||||
let hc = jwtEncode hdr <> "." <> jwtEncode claims
|
||||
@@ -120,24 +123,13 @@ instance StrEncoding PNMessageData where
|
||||
pure PNMessageData {smpQueue, ntfTs, nmsgNonce, encNMsgMeta}
|
||||
|
||||
data APNSNotification = APNSNotification {aps :: APNSNotificationBody, notificationData :: Maybe J.Value}
|
||||
deriving (Show, Generic)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON APNSNotification where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON J.defaultOptions {J.omitNothingFields = True}
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding J.defaultOptions {J.omitNothingFields = True}
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data APNSNotificationBody
|
||||
= APNSBackground {contentAvailable :: Int}
|
||||
| APNSMutableContent {mutableContent :: Int, alert :: APNSAlertBody, category :: Maybe Text}
|
||||
| APNSAlert {alert :: APNSAlertBody, badge :: Maybe Int, sound :: Maybe Text, category :: Maybe Text}
|
||||
deriving (Show, Generic)
|
||||
|
||||
apnsJSONOptions :: J.Options
|
||||
apnsJSONOptions = J.defaultOptions {J.omitNothingFields = True, J.sumEncoding = J.UntaggedValue, J.fieldLabelModifier = J.camelTo2 '-'}
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON APNSNotificationBody where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON apnsJSONOptions
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding apnsJSONOptions
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
type APNSNotificationData = Map Text Text
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -201,11 +193,12 @@ data APNSPushClientConfig = APNSPushClientConfig
|
||||
caStoreFile :: FilePath
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
apnsProviderHost :: PushProvider -> HostName
|
||||
apnsProviderHost :: PushProvider -> Maybe HostName
|
||||
apnsProviderHost = \case
|
||||
PPApnsTest -> "localhost"
|
||||
PPApnsDev -> "api.sandbox.push.apple.com"
|
||||
PPApnsProd -> "api.push.apple.com"
|
||||
PPApnsNull -> Nothing
|
||||
PPApnsTest -> Just "localhost"
|
||||
PPApnsDev -> Just "api.sandbox.push.apple.com"
|
||||
PPApnsProd -> Just "api.push.apple.com"
|
||||
|
||||
defaultAPNSPushClientConfig :: APNSPushClientConfig
|
||||
defaultAPNSPushClientConfig =
|
||||
@@ -240,7 +233,7 @@ createAPNSPushClient apnsHost apnsCfg@APNSPushClientConfig {authKeyFileEnv, auth
|
||||
authKeyId <- T.pack <$> getEnv authKeyIdEnv
|
||||
let jwtHeader = JWTHeader {alg = authKeyAlg, kid = authKeyId}
|
||||
jwtToken <- newTVarIO =<< mkApnsJWTToken appTeamId jwtHeader privateKey
|
||||
nonceDrg <- drgNew >>= newTVarIO
|
||||
nonceDrg <- C.newRandom
|
||||
pure APNSPushClient {https2Client, privateKey, jwtHeader, jwtToken, nonceDrg, apnsHost, apnsCfg}
|
||||
|
||||
getApnsJWTToken :: APNSPushClient -> IO SignedJWTToken
|
||||
@@ -303,6 +296,10 @@ apnsNotification NtfTknData {tknDhSecret} nonce paddedLen = \case
|
||||
|
||||
-- apnAlert alert = APNSAlert {alert, badge = Nothing, sound = Nothing, category = Nothing}
|
||||
|
||||
$(JQ.deriveToJSON apnsJSONOptions ''APNSNotificationBody)
|
||||
|
||||
$(JQ.deriveToJSON defaultJSON ''APNSNotification)
|
||||
|
||||
apnsRequest :: APNSPushClient -> ByteString -> APNSNotification -> IO Request
|
||||
apnsRequest c tkn ntf@APNSNotification {aps} = do
|
||||
signedJWT <- getApnsJWTToken c
|
||||
@@ -335,12 +332,13 @@ type PushProviderClient = NtfTknData -> PushNotification -> ExceptT PushProvider
|
||||
|
||||
-- this is not a newtype on purpose to have a correct JSON encoding as a record
|
||||
data APNSErrorResponse = APNSErrorResponse {reason :: Text}
|
||||
deriving (Generic, FromJSON)
|
||||
|
||||
$(JQ.deriveFromJSON defaultJSON ''APNSErrorResponse)
|
||||
|
||||
apnsPushProviderClient :: APNSPushClient -> PushProviderClient
|
||||
apnsPushProviderClient c@APNSPushClient {nonceDrg, apnsCfg} tkn@NtfTknData {token = DeviceToken _ tknStr} pn = do
|
||||
http2 <- liftHTTPS2 $ getApnsHTTP2Client c
|
||||
nonce <- atomically $ C.pseudoRandomCbNonce nonceDrg
|
||||
nonce <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce nonceDrg
|
||||
apnsNtf <- liftEither $ first PPCryptoError $ apnsNotification tkn nonce (paddedNtfLength apnsCfg) pn
|
||||
req <- liftIO $ apnsRequest c tknStr apnsNtf
|
||||
-- TODO when HTTP2 client is thread-safe, we can use sendRequestDirect
|
||||
@@ -354,15 +352,15 @@ apnsPushProviderClient c@APNSPushClient {nonceDrg, apnsCfg} tkn@NtfTknData {toke
|
||||
result status reason'
|
||||
| status == Just N.ok200 = pure ()
|
||||
| status == Just N.badRequest400 =
|
||||
case reason' of
|
||||
"BadDeviceToken" -> throwError PPTokenInvalid
|
||||
"DeviceTokenNotForTopic" -> throwError PPTokenInvalid
|
||||
"TopicDisallowed" -> throwError PPPermanentError
|
||||
_ -> err status reason'
|
||||
case reason' of
|
||||
"BadDeviceToken" -> throwError PPTokenInvalid
|
||||
"DeviceTokenNotForTopic" -> throwError PPTokenInvalid
|
||||
"TopicDisallowed" -> throwError PPPermanentError
|
||||
_ -> err status reason'
|
||||
| status == Just N.forbidden403 = case reason' of
|
||||
"ExpiredProviderToken" -> throwError PPPermanentError -- there should be no point retrying it as the token was refreshed
|
||||
"InvalidProviderToken" -> throwError PPPermanentError
|
||||
_ -> err status reason'
|
||||
"ExpiredProviderToken" -> throwError PPPermanentError -- there should be no point retrying it as the token was refreshed
|
||||
"InvalidProviderToken" -> throwError PPPermanentError
|
||||
_ -> err status reason'
|
||||
| status == Just N.gone410 = throwError PPTokenInvalid
|
||||
| status == Just N.serviceUnavailable503 = liftIO (disconnectApnsHTTP2Client c) >> throwError PPRetryLater
|
||||
-- Just tooManyRequests429 -> TooManyRequests - too many requests for the same token
|
||||
@@ -370,12 +368,3 @@ apnsPushProviderClient c@APNSPushClient {nonceDrg, apnsCfg} tkn@NtfTknData {toke
|
||||
err :: Maybe Status -> Text -> ExceptT PushProviderError IO ()
|
||||
err s r = throwError $ PPResponseError s r
|
||||
liftHTTPS2 a = ExceptT $ first PPConnection <$> a
|
||||
|
||||
hApnsTopic :: HeaderName
|
||||
hApnsTopic = CI.mk "apns-topic"
|
||||
|
||||
hApnsPushType :: HeaderName
|
||||
hApnsPushType = CI.mk "apns-push-type"
|
||||
|
||||
hApnsPriority :: HeaderName
|
||||
hApnsPriority = CI.mk "apns-priority"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Push.APNS.Internal where
|
||||
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
|
||||
import qualified Data.CaseInsensitive as CI
|
||||
import Network.HTTP.Types (HeaderName)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON)
|
||||
|
||||
hApnsTopic :: HeaderName
|
||||
hApnsTopic = CI.mk "apns-topic"
|
||||
|
||||
hApnsPushType :: HeaderName
|
||||
hApnsPushType = CI.mk "apns-push-type"
|
||||
|
||||
hApnsPriority :: HeaderName
|
||||
hApnsPriority = CI.mk "apns-priority"
|
||||
|
||||
apnsJSONOptions :: J.Options
|
||||
apnsJSONOptions = defaultJSON {J.sumEncoding = J.UntaggedValue, J.fieldLabelModifier = J.camelTo2 '-'}
|
||||
@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ newNtfServerStats ts = do
|
||||
pure NtfServerStats {fromTime, tknCreated, tknVerified, tknDeleted, subCreated, subDeleted, ntfReceived, ntfDelivered, activeTokens, activeSubs}
|
||||
|
||||
getNtfServerStatsData :: NtfServerStats -> STM NtfServerStatsData
|
||||
getNtfServerStatsData s = do
|
||||
_fromTime <- readTVar $ fromTime (s :: NtfServerStats)
|
||||
getNtfServerStatsData s@NtfServerStats {fromTime} = do
|
||||
_fromTime <- readTVar fromTime
|
||||
_tknCreated <- readTVar $ tknCreated s
|
||||
_tknVerified <- readTVar $ tknVerified s
|
||||
_tknDeleted <- readTVar $ tknDeleted s
|
||||
@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@ getNtfServerStatsData s = do
|
||||
pure NtfServerStatsData {_fromTime, _tknCreated, _tknVerified, _tknDeleted, _subCreated, _subDeleted, _ntfReceived, _ntfDelivered, _activeTokens, _activeSubs}
|
||||
|
||||
setNtfServerStats :: NtfServerStats -> NtfServerStatsData -> STM ()
|
||||
setNtfServerStats s d = do
|
||||
writeTVar (fromTime (s :: NtfServerStats)) $! _fromTime (d :: NtfServerStatsData)
|
||||
setNtfServerStats s@NtfServerStats {fromTime} d@NtfServerStatsData {_fromTime} = do
|
||||
writeTVar fromTime $! _fromTime
|
||||
writeTVar (tknCreated s) $! _tknCreated d
|
||||
writeTVar (tknVerified s) $! _tknVerified d
|
||||
writeTVar (tknDeleted s) $! _tknDeleted d
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Store where
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +19,7 @@ import qualified Data.Set as S
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word16)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Protocol
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (NtfPrivateSignKey, SMPServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (NtfPrivateAuthKey, NtfPublicAuthKey, SMPServer)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (whenM, ($>>=))
|
||||
@@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ data NtfTknData = NtfTknData
|
||||
{ ntfTknId :: NtfTokenId,
|
||||
token :: DeviceToken,
|
||||
tknStatus :: TVar NtfTknStatus,
|
||||
tknVerifyKey :: C.APublicVerifyKey,
|
||||
tknVerifyKey :: NtfPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
tknDhKeys :: C.KeyPair 'C.X25519,
|
||||
tknDhSecret :: C.DhSecretX25519,
|
||||
tknRegCode :: NtfRegCode,
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +62,7 @@ mkNtfTknData ntfTknId (NewNtfTkn token tknVerifyKey _) tknDhKeys tknDhSecret tkn
|
||||
data NtfSubData = NtfSubData
|
||||
{ ntfSubId :: NtfSubscriptionId,
|
||||
smpQueue :: SMPQueueNtf,
|
||||
notifierKey :: NtfPrivateSignKey,
|
||||
notifierKey :: NtfPrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
tokenId :: NtfTokenId,
|
||||
subStatus :: TVar NtfSubStatus
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE StrictData #-}
|
||||
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-ambiguous-fields #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.StoreLog
|
||||
( StoreLog,
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +24,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.StoreLog
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent.STM
|
||||
import Control.Monad (void)
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import Data.Word (Word16)
|
||||
@@ -30,7 +32,7 @@ import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Protocol
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Store
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (NtfPrivateSignKey)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (NtfPrivateAuthKey)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (whenM)
|
||||
import System.Directory (doesFileExist, renameFile)
|
||||
@@ -50,7 +52,7 @@ data NtfTknRec = NtfTknRec
|
||||
{ ntfTknId :: NtfTokenId,
|
||||
token :: DeviceToken,
|
||||
tknStatus :: NtfTknStatus,
|
||||
tknVerifyKey :: C.APublicVerifyKey,
|
||||
tknVerifyKey :: C.APublicAuthKey,
|
||||
tknDhKeys :: C.KeyPair 'C.X25519,
|
||||
tknDhSecret :: C.DhSecretX25519,
|
||||
tknRegCode :: NtfRegCode,
|
||||
@@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ mkTknRec NtfTknData {ntfTknId, token, tknStatus = status, tknVerifyKey, tknDhKey
|
||||
data NtfSubRec = NtfSubRec
|
||||
{ ntfSubId :: NtfSubscriptionId,
|
||||
smpQueue :: SMPQueueNtf,
|
||||
notifierKey :: NtfPrivateSignKey,
|
||||
notifierKey :: NtfPrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
tokenId :: NtfTokenId,
|
||||
subStatus :: NtfSubStatus
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -151,6 +153,7 @@ instance StrEncoding NtfSubRec where
|
||||
|
||||
logNtfStoreRecord :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> NtfStoreLogRecord -> IO ()
|
||||
logNtfStoreRecord = writeStoreLogRecord
|
||||
{-# INLINE logNtfStoreRecord #-}
|
||||
|
||||
logCreateToken :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> NtfTknData -> IO ()
|
||||
logCreateToken s tkn = logNtfStoreRecord s . CreateToken =<< atomically (mkTknRec tkn)
|
||||
@@ -194,9 +197,11 @@ readNtfStore f st = mapM_ addNtfLogRecord . B.lines =<< B.readFile f
|
||||
CreateToken r@NtfTknRec {ntfTknId} -> do
|
||||
tkn <- mkTknData r
|
||||
addNtfToken st ntfTknId tkn
|
||||
TokenStatus tknId status ->
|
||||
getNtfToken st tknId
|
||||
>>= mapM_ (\NtfTknData {tknStatus} -> writeTVar tknStatus status)
|
||||
TokenStatus tknId status -> do
|
||||
tkn_ <- getNtfToken st tknId
|
||||
forM_ tkn_ $ \tkn@NtfTknData {tknStatus} -> do
|
||||
writeTVar tknStatus status
|
||||
when (status == NTActive) $ void $ removeInactiveTokenRegistrations st tkn
|
||||
UpdateToken tknId token' tknRegCode ->
|
||||
getNtfToken st tknId
|
||||
>>= mapM_
|
||||
@@ -221,7 +226,5 @@ readNtfStore f st = mapM_ addNtfLogRecord . B.lines =<< B.readFile f
|
||||
|
||||
writeNtfStore :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> NtfStore -> IO ()
|
||||
writeNtfStore s NtfStore {tokens, subscriptions} = do
|
||||
atomically (readTVar tokens >>= mapM mkTknRec)
|
||||
>>= mapM_ (writeStoreLogRecord s . CreateToken)
|
||||
atomically (readTVar subscriptions >>= mapM mkSubRec)
|
||||
>>= mapM_ (writeStoreLogRecord s . CreateSubscription)
|
||||
mapM_ (logCreateToken s) =<< readTVarIO tokens
|
||||
mapM_ (logCreateSubscription s) =<< readTVarIO subscriptions
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,72 +1,136 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Transport where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Monad (forM)
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 (Parser)
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import qualified Data.X509 as X
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (liftEitherWith)
|
||||
|
||||
ntfBlockSize :: Int
|
||||
ntfBlockSize = 512
|
||||
|
||||
supportedNTFServerVRange :: VersionRange
|
||||
supportedNTFServerVRange = mkVersionRange 1 1
|
||||
authBatchCmdsNTFVersion :: Version
|
||||
authBatchCmdsNTFVersion = 2
|
||||
|
||||
currentClientNTFVersion :: Version
|
||||
currentClientNTFVersion = 1
|
||||
|
||||
currentServerNTFVersion :: Version
|
||||
currentServerNTFVersion = 1
|
||||
|
||||
supportedClientNTFVRange :: VersionRange
|
||||
supportedClientNTFVRange = mkVersionRange 1 currentClientNTFVersion
|
||||
|
||||
supportedServerNTFVRange :: VersionRange
|
||||
supportedServerNTFVRange = mkVersionRange 1 currentServerNTFVersion
|
||||
|
||||
data NtfServerHandshake = NtfServerHandshake
|
||||
{ ntfVersionRange :: VersionRange,
|
||||
sessionId :: SessionId
|
||||
sessionId :: SessionId,
|
||||
-- pub key to agree shared secrets for command authorization and entity ID encryption.
|
||||
authPubKey :: Maybe (X.SignedExact X.PubKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
data NtfClientHandshake = NtfClientHandshake
|
||||
{ -- | agreed SMP notifications server protocol version
|
||||
ntfVersion :: Version,
|
||||
-- | server identity - CA certificate fingerprint
|
||||
keyHash :: C.KeyHash
|
||||
keyHash :: C.KeyHash,
|
||||
-- pub key to agree shared secret for entity ID encryption, shared secret for command authorization is agreed using per-queue keys.
|
||||
authPubKey :: Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding NtfServerHandshake where
|
||||
smpEncode NtfServerHandshake {ntfVersionRange, sessionId} =
|
||||
smpEncode (ntfVersionRange, sessionId)
|
||||
smpEncode NtfServerHandshake {ntfVersionRange, sessionId, authPubKey} =
|
||||
B.concat
|
||||
[ smpEncode (ntfVersionRange, sessionId),
|
||||
encodeAuthEncryptCmds (maxVersion ntfVersionRange) $ C.SignedObject <$> authPubKey
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
smpP = do
|
||||
(ntfVersionRange, sessionId) <- smpP
|
||||
pure NtfServerHandshake {ntfVersionRange, sessionId}
|
||||
-- TODO drop SMP v6: remove special parser and make key non-optional
|
||||
authPubKey <- authEncryptCmdsP (maxVersion ntfVersionRange) $ C.getSignedExact <$> smpP
|
||||
pure NtfServerHandshake {ntfVersionRange, sessionId, authPubKey}
|
||||
|
||||
encodeAuthEncryptCmds :: Encoding a => Version -> Maybe a -> ByteString
|
||||
encodeAuthEncryptCmds v k
|
||||
| v >= authBatchCmdsNTFVersion = maybe "" smpEncode k
|
||||
| otherwise = ""
|
||||
|
||||
authEncryptCmdsP :: Version -> Parser a -> Parser (Maybe a)
|
||||
authEncryptCmdsP v p = if v >= authBatchCmdsNTFVersion then Just <$> p else pure Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding NtfClientHandshake where
|
||||
smpEncode NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion, keyHash} = smpEncode (ntfVersion, keyHash)
|
||||
smpEncode NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion, keyHash, authPubKey} =
|
||||
smpEncode (ntfVersion, keyHash) <> encodeNtfAuthPubKey ntfVersion authPubKey
|
||||
smpP = do
|
||||
(ntfVersion, keyHash) <- smpP
|
||||
pure NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion, keyHash}
|
||||
-- TODO drop SMP v6: remove special parser and make key non-optional
|
||||
authPubKey <- ntfAuthPubKeyP ntfVersion
|
||||
pure NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion, keyHash, authPubKey}
|
||||
|
||||
ntfAuthPubKeyP :: Version -> Parser (Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519)
|
||||
ntfAuthPubKeyP v = if v >= authBatchCmdsNTFVersion then Just <$> smpP else pure Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
encodeNtfAuthPubKey :: Version -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> ByteString
|
||||
encodeNtfAuthPubKey v k
|
||||
| v >= authBatchCmdsNTFVersion = maybe "" smpEncode k
|
||||
| otherwise = ""
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Notifcations server transport handshake.
|
||||
ntfServerHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRange -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle c)
|
||||
ntfServerHandshake c kh ntfVRange = do
|
||||
let th@THandle {sessionId} = ntfTHandle c
|
||||
sendHandshake th $ NtfServerHandshake {sessionId, ntfVersionRange = ntfVRange}
|
||||
ntfServerHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => C.APrivateSignKey -> c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRange -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle c)
|
||||
ntfServerHandshake serverSignKey c (k, pk) kh ntfVRange = do
|
||||
let th@THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId}} = ntfTHandle c
|
||||
let sk = C.signX509 serverSignKey $ C.publicToX509 k
|
||||
sendHandshake th $ NtfServerHandshake {sessionId, ntfVersionRange = ntfVRange, authPubKey = Just sk}
|
||||
getHandshake th >>= \case
|
||||
NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion, keyHash}
|
||||
NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = k'}
|
||||
| keyHash /= kh ->
|
||||
throwError $ TEHandshake IDENTITY
|
||||
| ntfVersion `isCompatible` ntfVRange -> do
|
||||
pure (th :: THandle c) {thVersion = ntfVersion}
|
||||
throwError $ TEHandshake IDENTITY
|
||||
| v `isCompatible` ntfVRange ->
|
||||
pure $ ntfThHandle th v pk k'
|
||||
| otherwise -> throwError $ TEHandshake VERSION
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Notifcations server client transport handshake.
|
||||
ntfClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRange -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle c)
|
||||
ntfClientHandshake c keyHash ntfVRange = do
|
||||
let th@THandle {sessionId} = ntfTHandle c
|
||||
NtfServerHandshake {sessionId = sessId, ntfVersionRange} <- getHandshake th
|
||||
ntfClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRange -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle c)
|
||||
ntfClientHandshake c (k, pk) keyHash ntfVRange = do
|
||||
let th@THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId}} = ntfTHandle c
|
||||
NtfServerHandshake {sessionId = sessId, ntfVersionRange, authPubKey = sk'} <- getHandshake th
|
||||
if sessionId /= sessId
|
||||
then throwError TEBadSession
|
||||
else case ntfVersionRange `compatibleVersion` ntfVRange of
|
||||
Just (Compatible ntfVersion) -> do
|
||||
sendHandshake th $ NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion, keyHash}
|
||||
pure (th :: THandle c) {thVersion = ntfVersion}
|
||||
Just (Compatible v) -> do
|
||||
sk_ <- forM sk' $ \exact -> liftEitherWith (const $ TEHandshake BAD_AUTH) $ do
|
||||
serverKey <- getServerVerifyKey c
|
||||
pubKey <- C.verifyX509 serverKey exact
|
||||
C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey
|
||||
sendHandshake th $ NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = Just k}
|
||||
pure $ ntfThHandle th v pk sk_
|
||||
Nothing -> throwError $ TEHandshake VERSION
|
||||
|
||||
ntfThHandle :: forall c. THandle c -> Version -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> THandle c
|
||||
ntfThHandle th@THandle {params} v privKey k_ =
|
||||
-- TODO drop SMP v6: make thAuth non-optional
|
||||
let thAuth = (\k -> THandleAuth {peerPubKey = k, privKey}) <$> k_
|
||||
v3 = v >= authBatchCmdsNTFVersion
|
||||
params' = params {thVersion = v, thAuth, implySessId = v3, batch = v3}
|
||||
in (th :: THandle c) {params = params'}
|
||||
|
||||
ntfTHandle :: Transport c => c -> THandle c
|
||||
ntfTHandle c = THandle {connection = c, sessionId = tlsUnique c, blockSize = ntfBlockSize, thVersion = 0, batch = False}
|
||||
ntfTHandle c = THandle {connection = c, params}
|
||||
where
|
||||
params = THandleParams {sessionId = tlsUnique c, blockSize = ntfBlockSize, thVersion = 0, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, batch = False}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -47,10 +47,11 @@ data NtfToken = NtfToken
|
||||
{ deviceToken :: DeviceToken,
|
||||
ntfServer :: NtfServer,
|
||||
ntfTokenId :: Maybe NtfTokenId,
|
||||
-- TODO combine keys to key pair as the types should match
|
||||
-- | key used by the ntf server to verify transmissions
|
||||
ntfPubKey :: C.APublicVerifyKey,
|
||||
ntfPubKey :: C.APublicAuthKey,
|
||||
-- | key used by the ntf client to sign transmissions
|
||||
ntfPrivKey :: C.APrivateSignKey,
|
||||
ntfPrivKey :: C.APrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
-- | client's DH keys (to repeat registration if necessary)
|
||||
ntfDhKeys :: C.KeyPair 'C.X25519,
|
||||
-- | shared DH secret used to encrypt/decrypt notifications e2e
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ data NtfToken = NtfToken
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
newNtfToken :: DeviceToken -> NtfServer -> C.ASignatureKeyPair -> C.KeyPair 'C.X25519 -> NotificationsMode -> NtfToken
|
||||
newNtfToken :: DeviceToken -> NtfServer -> C.AAuthKeyPair -> C.KeyPair 'C.X25519 -> NotificationsMode -> NtfToken
|
||||
newNtfToken deviceToken ntfServer (ntfPubKey, ntfPrivKey) ntfDhKeys ntfMode =
|
||||
NtfToken
|
||||
{ deviceToken,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
|
||||
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Parsers where
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,6 +14,7 @@ import Data.ByteString.Base64
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import Data.Char (isAlphaNum, toLower)
|
||||
import Data.String
|
||||
import Data.Text (Text)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Text as T
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime)
|
||||
@@ -83,7 +85,7 @@ blobFieldDecoder dec = \case
|
||||
Left e -> returnError ConversionFailed f ("couldn't parse field: " ++ e)
|
||||
f -> returnError ConversionFailed f "expecting SQLBlob column type"
|
||||
|
||||
fromTextField_ :: (Typeable a) => (Text -> Maybe a) -> Field -> Ok a
|
||||
fromTextField_ :: Typeable a => (Text -> Maybe a) -> Field -> Ok a
|
||||
fromTextField_ fromText = \case
|
||||
f@(Field (SQLText t) _) ->
|
||||
case fromText t of
|
||||
@@ -107,17 +109,21 @@ enumJSON tagModifier =
|
||||
J.allNullaryToStringTag = True
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-- used in platform-specific encoding, includes tag for single-field encoding of sum types to allow conversion to tagged objects
|
||||
sumTypeJSON :: (String -> String) -> J.Options
|
||||
#if defined(darwin_HOST_OS) && defined(swiftJSON)
|
||||
sumTypeJSON = singleFieldJSON
|
||||
sumTypeJSON = singleFieldJSON_ $ Just SingleFieldJSONTag
|
||||
#else
|
||||
sumTypeJSON = taggedObjectJSON
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
pattern SingleFieldJSONTag :: (Eq a, IsString a) => a
|
||||
pattern SingleFieldJSONTag = "_owsf"
|
||||
|
||||
taggedObjectJSON :: (String -> String) -> J.Options
|
||||
taggedObjectJSON tagModifier =
|
||||
J.defaultOptions
|
||||
{ J.sumEncoding = J.TaggedObject "type" "data",
|
||||
{ J.sumEncoding = J.TaggedObject TaggedObjectJSONTag TaggedObjectJSONData,
|
||||
J.tagSingleConstructors = True,
|
||||
J.constructorTagModifier = tagModifier,
|
||||
J.allNullaryToStringTag = False,
|
||||
@@ -125,13 +131,26 @@ taggedObjectJSON tagModifier =
|
||||
J.omitNothingFields = True
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pattern TaggedObjectJSONTag :: (Eq a, IsString a) => a
|
||||
pattern TaggedObjectJSONTag = "type"
|
||||
|
||||
pattern TaggedObjectJSONData :: (Eq a, IsString a) => a
|
||||
pattern TaggedObjectJSONData = "data"
|
||||
|
||||
-- used in platform independent encoding, doesn't include tag for single-field encoding of sum types
|
||||
singleFieldJSON :: (String -> String) -> J.Options
|
||||
singleFieldJSON tagModifier =
|
||||
singleFieldJSON = singleFieldJSON_ Nothing
|
||||
|
||||
singleFieldJSON_ :: Maybe String -> (String -> String) -> J.Options
|
||||
singleFieldJSON_ objectTag tagModifier =
|
||||
J.defaultOptions
|
||||
{ J.sumEncoding = J.ObjectWithSingleField,
|
||||
{ J.sumEncoding = J.ObjectWithSingleField objectTag,
|
||||
J.tagSingleConstructors = True,
|
||||
J.constructorTagModifier = tagModifier,
|
||||
J.allNullaryToStringTag = False,
|
||||
J.nullaryToObject = True,
|
||||
J.omitNothingFields = True
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
defaultJSON :: J.Options
|
||||
defaultJSON = J.defaultOptions {J.omitNothingFields = True}
|
||||
|
||||
+267
-170
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE AllowAmbiguousTypes #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveGeneric #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-}
|
||||
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE StrictData #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilyDependencies #-}
|
||||
@@ -46,6 +48,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
-- * SMP protocol types
|
||||
ProtocolEncoding (..),
|
||||
Command (..),
|
||||
SubscriptionMode (..),
|
||||
Party (..),
|
||||
Cmd (..),
|
||||
BrokerMsg (..),
|
||||
@@ -56,6 +59,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
ErrorType (..),
|
||||
CommandError (..),
|
||||
Transmission,
|
||||
TransmissionAuth (..),
|
||||
SignedTransmission,
|
||||
SentRawTransmission,
|
||||
SignedRawTransmission,
|
||||
@@ -76,6 +80,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
SMPServerWithAuth,
|
||||
NtfServer,
|
||||
pattern NtfServer,
|
||||
NtfServerWithAuth,
|
||||
XFTPServer,
|
||||
pattern XFTPServer,
|
||||
XFTPServerWithAuth,
|
||||
@@ -89,14 +94,14 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
RecipientId,
|
||||
SenderId,
|
||||
NotifierId,
|
||||
RcvPrivateSignKey,
|
||||
RcvPublicVerifyKey,
|
||||
RcvPrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
RcvPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
RcvPublicDhKey,
|
||||
RcvDhSecret,
|
||||
SndPrivateSignKey,
|
||||
SndPublicVerifyKey,
|
||||
NtfPrivateSignKey,
|
||||
NtfPublicVerifyKey,
|
||||
SndPrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
SndPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
NtfPrivateAuthKey,
|
||||
NtfPublicAuthKey,
|
||||
RcvNtfPublicDhKey,
|
||||
RcvNtfDhSecret,
|
||||
Message (..),
|
||||
@@ -115,10 +120,14 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
userProtocol,
|
||||
rcvMessageMeta,
|
||||
noMsgFlags,
|
||||
messageId,
|
||||
messageTs,
|
||||
|
||||
-- * Parse and serialize
|
||||
ProtocolMsgTag (..),
|
||||
messageTagP,
|
||||
TransmissionForAuth (..),
|
||||
encodeTransmissionForAuth,
|
||||
encodeTransmission,
|
||||
transmissionP,
|
||||
_smpP,
|
||||
@@ -127,17 +136,22 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
legacyEncodeServer,
|
||||
legacyServerP,
|
||||
legacyStrEncodeServer,
|
||||
srvHostnamesSMPClientVersion,
|
||||
sameSrvAddr,
|
||||
sameSrvAddr',
|
||||
noAuthSrv,
|
||||
|
||||
-- * TCP transport functions
|
||||
TransportBatch (..),
|
||||
tPut,
|
||||
tPutLog,
|
||||
tGet,
|
||||
tParse,
|
||||
tDecodeParseValidate,
|
||||
tEncode,
|
||||
tEncodeBatch,
|
||||
tEncodeBatch1,
|
||||
batchTransmissions,
|
||||
batchTransmissions',
|
||||
|
||||
-- * exports for tests
|
||||
CommandTag (..),
|
||||
@@ -146,12 +160,13 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
|
||||
import Control.Concurrent (threadDelay)
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Control.Monad.Except
|
||||
import Data.Aeson (FromJSON (..), ToJSON (..))
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson as J
|
||||
import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 (Parser)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
|
||||
import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 (Parser, (<?>))
|
||||
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64 as B64
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import Data.Char (isPrint, isSpace)
|
||||
@@ -164,19 +179,24 @@ import Data.Maybe (isJust, isNothing)
|
||||
import Data.String
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..))
|
||||
import Data.Type.Equality
|
||||
import GHC.Generics (Generic)
|
||||
import GHC.TypeLits (ErrorMessage (..), TypeError, type (+))
|
||||
import Generic.Random (genericArbitraryU)
|
||||
import Network.Socket (HostName, ServiceName)
|
||||
import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
|
||||
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.ServiceScheme
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost, TransportHosts (..))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, eitherToMaybe, (<$?>))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Version
|
||||
import Test.QuickCheck (Arbitrary (..))
|
||||
|
||||
-- SMP client protocol version history:
|
||||
-- 1 - binary protocol encoding (1/1/2022)
|
||||
-- 2 - multiple server hostnames and versioned queue addresses (8/12/2022)
|
||||
|
||||
srvHostnamesSMPClientVersion :: Version
|
||||
srvHostnamesSMPClientVersion = 2
|
||||
|
||||
currentSMPClientVersion :: Version
|
||||
currentSMPClientVersion = 2
|
||||
@@ -234,14 +254,14 @@ deriving instance Show Cmd
|
||||
type Transmission c = (CorrId, EntityId, c)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | signed parsed transmission, with original raw bytes and parsing error.
|
||||
type SignedTransmission e c = (Maybe C.ASignature, Signed, Transmission (Either e c))
|
||||
type SignedTransmission e c = (Maybe TransmissionAuth, Signed, Transmission (Either e c))
|
||||
|
||||
type Signed = ByteString
|
||||
|
||||
-- | unparsed SMP transmission with signature.
|
||||
data RawTransmission = RawTransmission
|
||||
{ signature :: ByteString,
|
||||
signed :: ByteString,
|
||||
{ authenticator :: ByteString, -- signature or encrypted transmission hash
|
||||
authorized :: ByteString, -- authorized transmission
|
||||
sessId :: SessionId,
|
||||
corrId :: ByteString,
|
||||
entityId :: ByteString,
|
||||
@@ -249,11 +269,32 @@ data RawTransmission = RawTransmission
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
data TransmissionAuth
|
||||
= TASignature C.ASignature
|
||||
| TAAuthenticator C.CbAuthenticator
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
-- this encoding is backwards compatible with v6 that used Maybe C.ASignature instead of TAuthorization
|
||||
tAuthBytes :: Maybe TransmissionAuth -> ByteString
|
||||
tAuthBytes = \case
|
||||
Nothing -> ""
|
||||
Just (TASignature s) -> C.signatureBytes s
|
||||
Just (TAAuthenticator (C.CbAuthenticator s)) -> s
|
||||
|
||||
decodeTAuthBytes :: ByteString -> Either String (Maybe TransmissionAuth)
|
||||
decodeTAuthBytes s
|
||||
| B.null s = Right Nothing
|
||||
| B.length s == C.cbAuthenticatorSize = Right . Just . TAAuthenticator $ C.CbAuthenticator s
|
||||
| otherwise = Just . TASignature <$> C.decodeSignature s
|
||||
|
||||
instance IsString (Maybe TransmissionAuth) where
|
||||
fromString = parseString $ B64.decode >=> C.decodeSignature >=> pure . fmap TASignature
|
||||
|
||||
-- | unparsed sent SMP transmission with signature, without session ID.
|
||||
type SignedRawTransmission = (Maybe C.ASignature, SessionId, ByteString, ByteString)
|
||||
type SignedRawTransmission = (Maybe TransmissionAuth, SessionId, ByteString, ByteString)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | unparsed sent SMP transmission with signature.
|
||||
type SentRawTransmission = (Maybe C.ASignature, ByteString)
|
||||
type SentRawTransmission = (Maybe TransmissionAuth, ByteString)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | SMP queue ID for the recipient.
|
||||
type RecipientId = QueueId
|
||||
@@ -272,10 +313,14 @@ type EntityId = ByteString
|
||||
-- | Parameterized type for SMP protocol commands from all clients.
|
||||
data Command (p :: Party) where
|
||||
-- SMP recipient commands
|
||||
NEW :: RcvPublicVerifyKey -> RcvPublicDhKey -> Maybe BasicAuth -> Command Recipient
|
||||
-- RcvPublicAuthKey is the key used for command authorization:
|
||||
-- v6 of SMP servers only support signature algorithm for command authorization.
|
||||
-- v7 of SMP servers additionally support additional layer of authenticated encryption.
|
||||
-- RcvPublicAuthKey is defined as C.APublicKey - it can be either signature or DH public keys.
|
||||
NEW :: RcvPublicAuthKey -> RcvPublicDhKey -> Maybe BasicAuth -> SubscriptionMode -> Command Recipient
|
||||
SUB :: Command Recipient
|
||||
KEY :: SndPublicVerifyKey -> Command Recipient
|
||||
NKEY :: NtfPublicVerifyKey -> RcvNtfPublicDhKey -> Command Recipient
|
||||
KEY :: SndPublicAuthKey -> Command Recipient
|
||||
NKEY :: NtfPublicAuthKey -> RcvNtfPublicDhKey -> Command Recipient
|
||||
NDEL :: Command Recipient
|
||||
GET :: Command Recipient
|
||||
-- ACK v1 has to be supported for encoding/decoding
|
||||
@@ -295,6 +340,28 @@ deriving instance Show (Command p)
|
||||
|
||||
deriving instance Eq (Command p)
|
||||
|
||||
data SubscriptionMode = SMSubscribe | SMOnlyCreate
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding SubscriptionMode where
|
||||
strEncode = \case
|
||||
SMSubscribe -> "subscribe"
|
||||
SMOnlyCreate -> "only-create"
|
||||
strP =
|
||||
(A.string "subscribe" $> SMSubscribe)
|
||||
<|> (A.string "only-create" $> SMOnlyCreate)
|
||||
<?> "SubscriptionMode"
|
||||
|
||||
instance Encoding SubscriptionMode where
|
||||
smpEncode = \case
|
||||
SMSubscribe -> "S"
|
||||
SMOnlyCreate -> "C"
|
||||
smpP =
|
||||
A.anyChar >>= \case
|
||||
'S' -> pure SMSubscribe
|
||||
'C' -> pure SMOnlyCreate
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad SubscriptionMode"
|
||||
|
||||
data BrokerMsg where
|
||||
-- SMP broker messages (responses, client messages, notifications)
|
||||
IDS :: QueueIdsKeys -> BrokerMsg
|
||||
@@ -312,8 +379,6 @@ data BrokerMsg where
|
||||
|
||||
data RcvMessage = RcvMessage
|
||||
{ msgId :: MsgId,
|
||||
msgTs :: SystemTime,
|
||||
msgFlags :: MsgFlags,
|
||||
msgBody :: EncRcvMsgBody -- e2e encrypted, with extra encryption for recipient
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
@@ -331,20 +396,15 @@ data Message
|
||||
msgTs :: SystemTime
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding RcvMessage where
|
||||
strEncode RcvMessage {msgId, msgTs, msgFlags, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody body} =
|
||||
B.unwords
|
||||
[ strEncode msgId,
|
||||
strEncode msgTs,
|
||||
"flags=" <> strEncode msgFlags,
|
||||
strEncode body
|
||||
]
|
||||
strP = do
|
||||
msgId <- strP_
|
||||
msgTs <- strP_
|
||||
msgFlags <- ("flags=" *> strP_) <|> pure noMsgFlags
|
||||
msgBody <- EncRcvMsgBody <$> strP
|
||||
pure RcvMessage {msgId, msgTs, msgFlags, msgBody}
|
||||
messageId :: Message -> MsgId
|
||||
messageId = \case
|
||||
Message {msgId} -> msgId
|
||||
MessageQuota {msgId} -> msgId
|
||||
|
||||
messageTs :: Message -> SystemTime
|
||||
messageTs = \case
|
||||
Message {msgTs} -> msgTs
|
||||
MessageQuota {msgTs} -> msgTs
|
||||
|
||||
newtype EncRcvMsgBody = EncRcvMsgBody ByteString
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
@@ -423,7 +483,14 @@ data SMPMsgMeta = SMPMsgMeta
|
||||
msgTs :: SystemTime,
|
||||
msgFlags :: MsgFlags
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding SMPMsgMeta where
|
||||
strEncode SMPMsgMeta {msgId, msgTs, msgFlags} =
|
||||
strEncode (msgId, msgTs, msgFlags)
|
||||
strP = do
|
||||
(msgId, msgTs, msgFlags) <- strP
|
||||
pure SMPMsgMeta {msgId, msgTs, msgFlags}
|
||||
|
||||
rcvMessageMeta :: MsgId -> ClientRcvMsgBody -> SMPMsgMeta
|
||||
rcvMessageMeta msgId = \case
|
||||
@@ -446,9 +513,7 @@ instance Encoding NMsgMeta where
|
||||
|
||||
-- it must be data for correct JSON encoding
|
||||
data MsgFlags = MsgFlags {notification :: Bool}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show, Generic)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON MsgFlags where toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding J.defaultOptions
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
-- this encoding should not become bigger than 7 bytes (currently it is 1 byte)
|
||||
instance Encoding MsgFlags where
|
||||
@@ -598,7 +663,7 @@ instance Encoding ClientMsgEnvelope where
|
||||
data ClientMessage = ClientMessage PrivHeader ByteString
|
||||
|
||||
data PrivHeader
|
||||
= PHConfirmation C.APublicVerifyKey
|
||||
= PHConfirmation C.APublicAuthKey
|
||||
| PHEmpty
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -632,6 +697,8 @@ pattern NtfServer host port keyHash = ProtocolServer SPNTF host port keyHash
|
||||
|
||||
{-# COMPLETE NtfServer #-}
|
||||
|
||||
type NtfServerWithAuth = ProtoServerWithAuth 'PNTF
|
||||
|
||||
type XFTPServer = ProtocolServer 'PXFTP
|
||||
|
||||
pattern XFTPServer :: NonEmpty TransportHost -> ServiceName -> C.KeyHash -> ProtocolServer 'PXFTP
|
||||
@@ -712,10 +779,16 @@ instance ProtocolTypeI p => ToJSON (SProtocolType p) where
|
||||
toEncoding = strToJEncoding
|
||||
toJSON = strToJSON
|
||||
|
||||
instance ProtocolTypeI p => FromJSON (SProtocolType p) where
|
||||
parseJSON = strParseJSON "SProtocolType"
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON AProtocolType where
|
||||
toEncoding = strToJEncoding
|
||||
toJSON = strToJSON
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON AProtocolType where
|
||||
parseJSON = strParseJSON "AProtocolType"
|
||||
|
||||
checkProtocolType :: forall t p p'. (ProtocolTypeI p, ProtocolTypeI p') => t p' -> Either String (t p)
|
||||
checkProtocolType p = case testEquality (protocolTypeI @p) (protocolTypeI @p') of
|
||||
Just Refl -> Right p
|
||||
@@ -867,16 +940,6 @@ serverStrP = do
|
||||
where
|
||||
portP = show <$> (A.char ':' *> (A.decimal :: Parser Int))
|
||||
|
||||
data SrvLoc = SrvLoc HostName ServiceName
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Ord, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding SrvLoc where
|
||||
strEncode (SrvLoc host port) = B.pack $ host <> if null port then "" else ':' : port
|
||||
strP = SrvLoc <$> host <*> (port <|> pure "")
|
||||
where
|
||||
host = B.unpack <$> A.takeWhile1 (A.notInClass ":#,;/ ")
|
||||
port = show <$> (A.char ':' *> (A.decimal :: Parser Int))
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Transmission correlation ID.
|
||||
newtype CorrId = CorrId {bs :: ByteString} deriving (Eq, Ord, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -892,6 +955,9 @@ instance ToJSON CorrId where
|
||||
toJSON = strToJSON
|
||||
toEncoding = strToJEncoding
|
||||
|
||||
instance FromJSON CorrId where
|
||||
parseJSON = strParseJSON "CorrId"
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Queue IDs and keys
|
||||
data QueueIdsKeys = QIK
|
||||
{ rcvId :: RecipientId,
|
||||
@@ -900,13 +966,13 @@ data QueueIdsKeys = QIK
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Recipient's private key used by the recipient to authorize (sign) SMP commands.
|
||||
-- | Recipient's private key used by the recipient to authorize (v6: sign, v7: encrypt hash) SMP commands.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Only used by SMP agent, kept here so its definition is close to respective public key.
|
||||
type RcvPrivateSignKey = C.APrivateSignKey
|
||||
type RcvPrivateAuthKey = C.APrivateAuthKey
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Recipient's public key used by SMP server to verify authorization of SMP commands.
|
||||
type RcvPublicVerifyKey = C.APublicVerifyKey
|
||||
type RcvPublicAuthKey = C.APublicAuthKey
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Public key used for DH exchange to encrypt message bodies from server to recipient
|
||||
type RcvPublicDhKey = C.PublicKeyX25519
|
||||
@@ -914,19 +980,19 @@ type RcvPublicDhKey = C.PublicKeyX25519
|
||||
-- | DH Secret used to encrypt message bodies from server to recipient
|
||||
type RcvDhSecret = C.DhSecretX25519
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Sender's private key used by the recipient to authorize (sign) SMP commands.
|
||||
-- | Sender's private key used by the recipient to authorize (v6: sign, v7: encrypt hash) SMP commands.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Only used by SMP agent, kept here so its definition is close to respective public key.
|
||||
type SndPrivateSignKey = C.APrivateSignKey
|
||||
type SndPrivateAuthKey = C.APrivateAuthKey
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Sender's public key used by SMP server to verify authorization of SMP commands.
|
||||
type SndPublicVerifyKey = C.APublicVerifyKey
|
||||
type SndPublicAuthKey = C.APublicAuthKey
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Private key used by push notifications server to authorize (sign) NSUB command.
|
||||
type NtfPrivateSignKey = C.APrivateSignKey
|
||||
-- | Private key used by push notifications server to authorize (sign or encrypt hash) NSUB command.
|
||||
type NtfPrivateAuthKey = C.APrivateAuthKey
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Public key used by SMP server to verify authorization of NSUB command sent by push notifications server.
|
||||
type NtfPublicVerifyKey = C.APublicVerifyKey
|
||||
type NtfPublicAuthKey = C.APublicAuthKey
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Public key used for DH exchange to encrypt notification metadata from server to recipient
|
||||
type RcvNtfPublicDhKey = C.PublicKeyX25519
|
||||
@@ -962,11 +1028,7 @@ data ErrorType
|
||||
INTERNAL
|
||||
| -- | used internally, never returned by the server (to be removed)
|
||||
DUPLICATE_ -- not part of SMP protocol, used internally
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON ErrorType where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Read, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding ErrorType where
|
||||
strEncode = \case
|
||||
@@ -988,34 +1050,27 @@ data CommandError
|
||||
HAS_AUTH
|
||||
| -- | transmission has no required entity ID (e.g. SMP queue)
|
||||
NO_ENTITY
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
instance ToJSON CommandError where
|
||||
toJSON = J.genericToJSON $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
toEncoding = J.genericToEncoding $ sumTypeJSON id
|
||||
|
||||
instance Arbitrary ErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
|
||||
|
||||
instance Arbitrary CommandError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
|
||||
deriving (Eq, Read, Show)
|
||||
|
||||
-- | SMP transmission parser.
|
||||
transmissionP :: Parser RawTransmission
|
||||
transmissionP = do
|
||||
signature <- smpP
|
||||
signed <- A.takeByteString
|
||||
either fail pure $ parseAll (trn signature signed) signed
|
||||
transmissionP :: THandleParams -> Parser RawTransmission
|
||||
transmissionP THandleParams {sessionId, implySessId} = do
|
||||
authenticator <- smpP
|
||||
authorized <- A.takeByteString
|
||||
either fail pure $ parseAll (trn authenticator authorized) authorized
|
||||
where
|
||||
trn signature signed = do
|
||||
sessId <- smpP
|
||||
trn authenticator authorized = do
|
||||
sessId <- if implySessId then pure "" else smpP
|
||||
let authorized' = if implySessId then smpEncode sessionId <> authorized else authorized
|
||||
corrId <- smpP
|
||||
entityId <- smpP
|
||||
command <- A.takeByteString
|
||||
pure RawTransmission {signature, signed, sessId, corrId, entityId, command}
|
||||
pure RawTransmission {authenticator, authorized = authorized', sessId, corrId, entityId, command}
|
||||
|
||||
class (ProtocolEncoding err msg, ProtocolEncoding err (ProtoCommand msg), Show err, Show msg) => Protocol err msg | msg -> err where
|
||||
type ProtoCommand msg = cmd | cmd -> msg
|
||||
type ProtoType msg = (sch :: ProtocolType) | sch -> msg
|
||||
protocolClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRange -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle c)
|
||||
protocolClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRange -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle c)
|
||||
protocolPing :: ProtoCommand msg
|
||||
protocolError :: msg -> Maybe err
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1040,26 +1095,22 @@ class ProtocolMsgTag (Tag msg) => ProtocolEncoding err msg | msg -> err where
|
||||
instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding ErrorType (Command p) where
|
||||
type Tag (Command p) = CommandTag p
|
||||
encodeProtocol v = \case
|
||||
NEW rKey dhKey auth_ -> case auth_ of
|
||||
Just auth
|
||||
| v >= 5 -> new <> e ('A', auth)
|
||||
| otherwise -> new
|
||||
_ -> new
|
||||
NEW rKey dhKey auth_ subMode
|
||||
| v >= subModeSMPVersion -> new <> auth <> e subMode
|
||||
| v == basicAuthSMPVersion -> new <> auth
|
||||
| otherwise -> new
|
||||
where
|
||||
new = e (NEW_, ' ', rKey, dhKey)
|
||||
auth = maybe "" (e . ('A',)) auth_
|
||||
SUB -> e SUB_
|
||||
KEY k -> e (KEY_, ' ', k)
|
||||
NKEY k dhKey -> e (NKEY_, ' ', k, dhKey)
|
||||
NDEL -> e NDEL_
|
||||
GET -> e GET_
|
||||
ACK msgId
|
||||
| v == 1 -> e ACK_
|
||||
| otherwise -> e (ACK_, ' ', msgId)
|
||||
ACK msgId -> e (ACK_, ' ', msgId)
|
||||
OFF -> e OFF_
|
||||
DEL -> e DEL_
|
||||
SEND flags msg
|
||||
| v == 1 -> e (SEND_, ' ', Tail msg)
|
||||
| otherwise -> e (SEND_, ' ', flags, ' ', Tail msg)
|
||||
SEND flags msg -> e (SEND_, ' ', flags, ' ', Tail msg)
|
||||
PING -> e PING_
|
||||
NSUB -> e NSUB_
|
||||
where
|
||||
@@ -1071,10 +1122,10 @@ instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding ErrorType (Command p) where
|
||||
fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @ErrorType @BrokerMsg
|
||||
{-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}
|
||||
|
||||
checkCredentials (sig, _, queueId, _) cmd = case cmd of
|
||||
checkCredentials (auth, _, queueId, _) cmd = case cmd of
|
||||
-- NEW must have signature but NOT queue ID
|
||||
NEW {}
|
||||
| isNothing sig -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| isNothing auth -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| not (B.null queueId) -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
|
||||
| otherwise -> Right cmd
|
||||
-- SEND must have queue ID, signature is not always required
|
||||
@@ -1083,11 +1134,11 @@ instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding ErrorType (Command p) where
|
||||
| otherwise -> Right cmd
|
||||
-- PING must not have queue ID or signature
|
||||
PING
|
||||
| isNothing sig && B.null queueId -> Right cmd
|
||||
| isNothing auth && B.null queueId -> Right cmd
|
||||
| otherwise -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
|
||||
-- other client commands must have both signature and queue ID
|
||||
_
|
||||
| isNothing sig || B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| isNothing auth || B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
|
||||
| otherwise -> Right cmd
|
||||
|
||||
instance ProtocolEncoding ErrorType Cmd where
|
||||
@@ -1098,25 +1149,23 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding ErrorType Cmd where
|
||||
CT SRecipient tag ->
|
||||
Cmd SRecipient <$> case tag of
|
||||
NEW_
|
||||
| v >= 5 -> new <*> optional (A.char 'A' *> smpP)
|
||||
| otherwise -> new <*> pure Nothing
|
||||
| v >= subModeSMPVersion -> new <*> auth <*> smpP
|
||||
| v == basicAuthSMPVersion -> new <*> auth <*> pure SMSubscribe
|
||||
| otherwise -> new <*> pure Nothing <*> pure SMSubscribe
|
||||
where
|
||||
new = NEW <$> _smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
auth = optional (A.char 'A' *> smpP)
|
||||
SUB_ -> pure SUB
|
||||
KEY_ -> KEY <$> _smpP
|
||||
NKEY_ -> NKEY <$> _smpP <*> smpP
|
||||
NDEL_ -> pure NDEL
|
||||
GET_ -> pure GET
|
||||
ACK_
|
||||
| v == 1 -> pure $ ACK ""
|
||||
| otherwise -> ACK <$> _smpP
|
||||
ACK_ -> ACK <$> _smpP
|
||||
OFF_ -> pure OFF
|
||||
DEL_ -> pure DEL
|
||||
CT SSender tag ->
|
||||
Cmd SSender <$> case tag of
|
||||
SEND_
|
||||
| v == 1 -> SEND noMsgFlags <$> (unTail <$> _smpP)
|
||||
| otherwise -> SEND <$> _smpP <*> (unTail <$> _smpP)
|
||||
SEND_ -> SEND <$> _smpP <*> (unTail <$> _smpP)
|
||||
PING_ -> pure PING
|
||||
CT SNotifier NSUB_ -> pure $ Cmd SNotifier NSUB
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1127,12 +1176,10 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding ErrorType Cmd where
|
||||
|
||||
instance ProtocolEncoding ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
type Tag BrokerMsg = BrokerMsgTag
|
||||
encodeProtocol v = \case
|
||||
encodeProtocol _v = \case
|
||||
IDS (QIK rcvId sndId srvDh) -> e (IDS_, ' ', rcvId, sndId, srvDh)
|
||||
MSG RcvMessage {msgId, msgTs, msgFlags, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody body}
|
||||
| v == 1 -> e (MSG_, ' ', msgId, msgTs, Tail body)
|
||||
| v == 2 -> e (MSG_, ' ', msgId, msgTs, msgFlags, ' ', Tail body)
|
||||
| otherwise -> e (MSG_, ' ', msgId, Tail body)
|
||||
MSG RcvMessage {msgId, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody body} ->
|
||||
e (MSG_, ' ', msgId, Tail body)
|
||||
NID nId srvNtfDh -> e (NID_, ' ', nId, srvNtfDh)
|
||||
NMSG nmsgNonce encNMsgMeta -> e (NMSG_, ' ', nmsgNonce, encNMsgMeta)
|
||||
END -> e END_
|
||||
@@ -1143,13 +1190,10 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
e :: Encoding a => a -> ByteString
|
||||
e = smpEncode
|
||||
|
||||
protocolP v = \case
|
||||
protocolP _v = \case
|
||||
MSG_ -> do
|
||||
msgId <- _smpP
|
||||
MSG <$> case v of
|
||||
1 -> RcvMessage msgId <$> smpP <*> pure noMsgFlags <*> bodyP
|
||||
2 -> RcvMessage msgId <$> smpP <*> smpP <*> (A.space *> bodyP)
|
||||
_ -> RcvMessage msgId (MkSystemTime 0 0) noMsgFlags <$> bodyP
|
||||
MSG . RcvMessage msgId <$> bodyP
|
||||
where
|
||||
bodyP = EncRcvMsgBody . unTail <$> smpP
|
||||
IDS_ -> IDS <$> (QIK <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP)
|
||||
@@ -1181,9 +1225,6 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding ErrorType BrokerMsg where
|
||||
| B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
|
||||
| otherwise -> Right cmd
|
||||
|
||||
_smpP :: Encoding a => Parser a
|
||||
_smpP = A.space *> smpP
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Parse SMP protocol commands and broker messages
|
||||
parseProtocol :: forall err msg. ProtocolEncoding err msg => Version -> ByteString -> Either err msg
|
||||
parseProtocol v s =
|
||||
@@ -1245,58 +1286,108 @@ instance Encoding CommandError where
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad command error type"
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Send signed SMP transmission to TCP transport.
|
||||
tPut :: Transport c => THandle c -> Maybe Int -> NonEmpty SentRawTransmission -> IO [Either TransportError ()]
|
||||
tPut th delay_ trs
|
||||
| batch th = tPutBatch [] $ L.map tEncode trs
|
||||
| otherwise = forM (L.toList trs) $ tPutLog . tEncode
|
||||
tPut :: Transport c => THandle c -> NonEmpty (Either TransportError SentRawTransmission) -> IO [Either TransportError ()]
|
||||
tPut th@THandle {params} = fmap concat . mapM tPutBatch . batchTransmissions (batch params) (blockSize params)
|
||||
where
|
||||
tPutBatch :: [Either TransportError ()] -> NonEmpty ByteString -> IO [Either TransportError ()]
|
||||
tPutBatch rs ts = do
|
||||
let (n, s, ts_) = encodeBatch 0 "" ts
|
||||
r <- if n == 0 then largeMsg else replicate n <$> tPutLog (tEncodeBatch n s)
|
||||
let rs' = rs <> r
|
||||
case ts_ of
|
||||
Just ts' -> mapM_ threadDelay delay_ >> tPutBatch rs' ts'
|
||||
_ -> pure rs'
|
||||
largeMsg = putStrLn "tPut error: large message" >> pure [Left TELargeMsg]
|
||||
tPutLog s = do
|
||||
r <- tPutBlock th s
|
||||
case r of
|
||||
Left e -> putStrLn ("tPut error: " <> show e)
|
||||
_ -> pure ()
|
||||
pure r
|
||||
encodeBatch :: Int -> ByteString -> NonEmpty ByteString -> (Int, ByteString, Maybe (NonEmpty ByteString))
|
||||
encodeBatch n s ts@(t :| ts_)
|
||||
| n == 255 = (n, s, Just ts)
|
||||
| otherwise =
|
||||
let s' = s <> smpEncode (Large t)
|
||||
n' = n + 1
|
||||
in if B.length s' > blockSize th - 1 -- one byte is reserved for the number of messages in the batch
|
||||
then (n,s,) $ if n == 0 then L.nonEmpty ts_ else Just ts
|
||||
else case L.nonEmpty ts_ of
|
||||
Just ts' -> encodeBatch n' s' ts'
|
||||
_ -> (n', s', Nothing)
|
||||
tPutBatch :: TransportBatch () -> IO [Either TransportError ()]
|
||||
tPutBatch = \case
|
||||
TBError e _ -> [Left e] <$ putStrLn "tPut error: large message"
|
||||
TBTransmissions s n _ -> replicate n <$> tPutLog th s
|
||||
TBTransmission s _ -> (: []) <$> tPutLog th s
|
||||
|
||||
tEncode :: (Maybe C.ASignature, ByteString) -> ByteString
|
||||
tEncode (sig, t) = smpEncode (C.signatureBytes sig) <> t
|
||||
tPutLog :: Transport c => THandle c -> ByteString -> IO (Either TransportError ())
|
||||
tPutLog th s = do
|
||||
r <- tPutBlock th s
|
||||
case r of
|
||||
Left e -> putStrLn ("tPut error: " <> show e)
|
||||
_ -> pure ()
|
||||
pure r
|
||||
|
||||
tEncodeBatch :: Int -> ByteString -> ByteString
|
||||
tEncodeBatch n s = lenEncode n `B.cons` s
|
||||
-- ByteString in TBTransmissions includes byte with transmissions count
|
||||
data TransportBatch r = TBTransmissions ByteString Int [r] | TBTransmission ByteString r | TBError TransportError r
|
||||
|
||||
encodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding e c => Version -> ByteString -> Transmission c -> ByteString
|
||||
encodeTransmission v sessionId (CorrId corrId, queueId, command) =
|
||||
smpEncode (sessionId, corrId, queueId) <> encodeProtocol v command
|
||||
batchTransmissions :: Bool -> Int -> NonEmpty (Either TransportError SentRawTransmission) -> [TransportBatch ()]
|
||||
batchTransmissions batch bSize = batchTransmissions' batch bSize . L.map (,())
|
||||
|
||||
-- | encodes and batches transmissions into blocks,
|
||||
batchTransmissions' :: forall r. Bool -> Int -> NonEmpty (Either TransportError SentRawTransmission, r) -> [TransportBatch r]
|
||||
batchTransmissions' batch bSize
|
||||
| batch = addBatch . foldr addTransmission ([], 0, 0, [], [])
|
||||
| otherwise = map mkBatch1 . L.toList
|
||||
where
|
||||
mkBatch1 :: (Either TransportError SentRawTransmission, r) -> TransportBatch r
|
||||
mkBatch1 (t_, r) = case t_ of
|
||||
Left e -> TBError e r
|
||||
Right t
|
||||
-- 2 bytes are reserved for pad size
|
||||
| B.length s <= bSize - 2 -> TBTransmission s r
|
||||
| otherwise -> TBError TELargeMsg r
|
||||
where
|
||||
s = tEncode t
|
||||
-- 3 = 2 bytes reserved for pad size + 1 for transmission count
|
||||
bSize' = bSize - 3
|
||||
addTransmission :: (Either TransportError SentRawTransmission, r) -> ([TransportBatch r], Int, Int, [ByteString], [r]) -> ([TransportBatch r], Int, Int, [ByteString], [r])
|
||||
addTransmission (t_, r) acc@(bs, len, n, ss, rs) = case t_ of
|
||||
Left e -> (TBError e r : addBatch acc, 0, 0, [], [])
|
||||
Right t
|
||||
| len' <= bSize' && n < 255 -> (bs, len', 1 + n, s : ss, r : rs)
|
||||
| sLen <= bSize' -> (addBatch acc, sLen, 1, [s], [r])
|
||||
| otherwise -> (TBError TELargeMsg r : addBatch acc, 0, 0, [], [])
|
||||
where
|
||||
s = tEncodeForBatch t
|
||||
sLen = B.length s
|
||||
len' = len + sLen
|
||||
addBatch :: ([TransportBatch r], Int, Int, [ByteString], [r]) -> [TransportBatch r]
|
||||
addBatch (bs, _len, n, ss, rs) = if n == 0 then bs else TBTransmissions b n rs : bs
|
||||
where
|
||||
b = B.concat $ B.singleton (lenEncode n) : ss
|
||||
|
||||
tEncode :: SentRawTransmission -> ByteString
|
||||
tEncode (auth, t) = smpEncode (tAuthBytes auth) <> t
|
||||
{-# INLINE tEncode #-}
|
||||
|
||||
tEncodeForBatch :: SentRawTransmission -> ByteString
|
||||
tEncodeForBatch = smpEncode . Large . tEncode
|
||||
{-# INLINE tEncodeForBatch #-}
|
||||
|
||||
tEncodeBatch1 :: SentRawTransmission -> ByteString
|
||||
tEncodeBatch1 t = lenEncode 1 `B.cons` tEncodeForBatch t
|
||||
{-# INLINE tEncodeBatch1 #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- tForAuth is lazy to avoid computing it when there is no key to sign
|
||||
data TransmissionForAuth = TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth :: ~ByteString, tToSend :: ByteString}
|
||||
|
||||
encodeTransmissionForAuth :: ProtocolEncoding e c => THandleParams -> Transmission c -> TransmissionForAuth
|
||||
encodeTransmissionForAuth THandleParams {thVersion = v, sessionId, implySessId} t =
|
||||
TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend = if implySessId then t' else tForAuth}
|
||||
where
|
||||
tForAuth = smpEncode sessionId <> t'
|
||||
t' = encodeTransmission_ v t
|
||||
{-# INLINE encodeTransmissionForAuth #-}
|
||||
|
||||
encodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding e c => THandleParams -> Transmission c -> ByteString
|
||||
encodeTransmission THandleParams {thVersion = v, sessionId, implySessId} t =
|
||||
if implySessId then t' else smpEncode sessionId <> t'
|
||||
where
|
||||
t' = encodeTransmission_ v t
|
||||
{-# INLINE encodeTransmission #-}
|
||||
|
||||
encodeTransmission_ :: ProtocolEncoding e c => Version -> Transmission c -> ByteString
|
||||
encodeTransmission_ v (CorrId corrId, queueId, command) =
|
||||
smpEncode (corrId, queueId) <> encodeProtocol v command
|
||||
{-# INLINE encodeTransmission_ #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Receive and parse transmission from the TCP transport (ignoring any trailing padding).
|
||||
tGetParse :: Transport c => THandle c -> IO (NonEmpty (Either TransportError RawTransmission))
|
||||
tGetParse th = eitherList (tParse $ batch th) <$> tGetBlock th
|
||||
tGetParse th@THandle {params} = eitherList (tParse params) <$> tGetBlock th
|
||||
{-# INLINE tGetParse #-}
|
||||
|
||||
tParse :: Bool -> ByteString -> NonEmpty (Either TransportError RawTransmission)
|
||||
tParse batch s
|
||||
tParse :: THandleParams -> ByteString -> NonEmpty (Either TransportError RawTransmission)
|
||||
tParse thParams@THandleParams {batch} s
|
||||
| batch = eitherList (L.map (\(Large t) -> tParse1 t)) ts
|
||||
| otherwise = [tParse1 s]
|
||||
where
|
||||
tParse1 = parse transmissionP TEBadBlock
|
||||
tParse1 = parse (transmissionP thParams) TEBadBlock
|
||||
ts = parse smpP TEBadBlock s
|
||||
|
||||
eitherList :: (a -> NonEmpty (Either e b)) -> Either e a -> NonEmpty (Either e b)
|
||||
@@ -1304,14 +1395,14 @@ eitherList = either (\e -> [Left e])
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Receive client and server transmissions (determined by `cmd` type).
|
||||
tGet :: forall err cmd c. (ProtocolEncoding err cmd, Transport c) => THandle c -> IO (NonEmpty (SignedTransmission err cmd))
|
||||
tGet th@THandle {sessionId, thVersion = v} = L.map (tDecodeParseValidate sessionId v) <$> tGetParse th
|
||||
tGet th@THandle {params} = L.map (tDecodeParseValidate params) <$> tGetParse th
|
||||
|
||||
tDecodeParseValidate :: forall err cmd. ProtocolEncoding err cmd => SessionId -> Version -> Either TransportError RawTransmission -> SignedTransmission err cmd
|
||||
tDecodeParseValidate sessionId v = \case
|
||||
Right RawTransmission {signature, signed, sessId, corrId, entityId, command}
|
||||
| sessId == sessionId ->
|
||||
let decodedTransmission = (,corrId,entityId,command) <$> C.decodeSignature signature
|
||||
in either (const $ tError corrId) (tParseValidate signed) decodedTransmission
|
||||
tDecodeParseValidate :: forall err cmd. ProtocolEncoding err cmd => THandleParams -> Either TransportError RawTransmission -> SignedTransmission err cmd
|
||||
tDecodeParseValidate THandleParams {sessionId, thVersion = v, implySessId} = \case
|
||||
Right RawTransmission {authenticator, authorized, sessId, corrId, entityId, command}
|
||||
| implySessId || sessId == sessionId ->
|
||||
let decodedTransmission = (,corrId,entityId,command) <$> decodeTAuthBytes authenticator
|
||||
in either (const $ tError corrId) (tParseValidate authorized) decodedTransmission
|
||||
| otherwise -> (Nothing, "", (CorrId corrId, "", Left $ fromProtocolError @err @cmd PESession))
|
||||
Left _ -> tError ""
|
||||
where
|
||||
@@ -1322,3 +1413,9 @@ tDecodeParseValidate sessionId v = \case
|
||||
tParseValidate signed t@(sig, corrId, entityId, command) =
|
||||
let cmd = parseProtocol @err @cmd v command >>= checkCredentials t
|
||||
in (sig, signed, (CorrId corrId, entityId, cmd))
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''MsgFlags)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''CommandError)
|
||||
|
||||
$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''ErrorType)
|
||||
|
||||
+318
-176
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +13,7 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
|
||||
|
||||
-- |
|
||||
-- Module : Simplex.Messaging.Server
|
||||
@@ -29,8 +32,9 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Server
|
||||
( runSMPServer,
|
||||
runSMPServerBlocking,
|
||||
disconnectTransport,
|
||||
verifyCmdSignature,
|
||||
verifyCmdAuthorization,
|
||||
dummyVerifyCmd,
|
||||
randomId,
|
||||
)
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -57,6 +61,7 @@ import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime (..), diffTimeToPicoseconds, getCurrentTime)
|
||||
import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..), getSystemTime)
|
||||
import Data.Time.Format.ISO8601 (iso8601Show)
|
||||
import Data.Type.Equality
|
||||
import GHC.Stats (getRTSStats)
|
||||
import GHC.TypeLits (KnownNat)
|
||||
import Network.Socket (ServiceName, Socket, socketToHandle)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Lock
|
||||
@@ -65,12 +70,12 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding (Encoding (smpEncode))
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Control
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM as Env
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.STM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.STM
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.STM as QS
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
|
||||
@@ -80,13 +85,20 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Buffer (trimCR)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
|
||||
import System.Exit (exitFailure)
|
||||
import System.IO (hPutStrLn, hSetNewlineMode, universalNewlineMode)
|
||||
import System.IO (hPrint, hPutStrLn, hSetNewlineMode, universalNewlineMode)
|
||||
import System.Mem.Weak (deRefWeak)
|
||||
import UnliftIO (timeout)
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Concurrent
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Directory (doesFileExist, renameFile)
|
||||
import UnliftIO.Exception
|
||||
import UnliftIO.IO
|
||||
import UnliftIO.STM
|
||||
#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,18,0)
|
||||
import Data.List (sort)
|
||||
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
|
||||
import GHC.Conc (listThreads, threadStatus)
|
||||
import GHC.Conc.Sync (threadLabel)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
-- | Runs an SMP server using passed configuration.
|
||||
--
|
||||
@@ -108,19 +120,22 @@ type M a = ReaderT Env IO a
|
||||
smpServer :: TMVar Bool -> ServerConfig -> M ()
|
||||
smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
|
||||
s <- asks server
|
||||
restoreServerMessages
|
||||
restoreServerStats
|
||||
expired <- restoreServerMessages
|
||||
restoreServerStats expired
|
||||
raceAny_
|
||||
( serverThread s subscribedQ subscribers subscriptions cancelSub :
|
||||
serverThread s ntfSubscribedQ notifiers ntfSubscriptions (\_ -> pure ()) :
|
||||
map runServer transports <> expireMessagesThread_ cfg <> serverStatsThread_ cfg <> controlPortThread_ cfg
|
||||
( serverThread s "server subscribedQ" subscribedQ subscribers subscriptions cancelSub
|
||||
: serverThread s "server ntfSubscribedQ" ntfSubscribedQ Env.notifiers ntfSubscriptions (\_ -> pure ())
|
||||
: map runServer transports <> expireMessagesThread_ cfg <> serverStatsThread_ cfg <> controlPortThread_ cfg
|
||||
)
|
||||
`finally` withLock (savingLock s) "final" (saveServer False)
|
||||
where
|
||||
runServer :: (ServiceName, ATransport) -> M ()
|
||||
runServer (tcpPort, ATransport t) = do
|
||||
serverParams <- asks tlsServerParams
|
||||
runTransportServer started tcpPort serverParams tCfg (runClient t)
|
||||
ss <- asks sockets
|
||||
serverSignKey <- either fail pure . fromTLSCredentials $ tlsServerCredentials serverParams
|
||||
runTransportServerState ss started tcpPort serverParams tCfg (runClient serverSignKey t)
|
||||
fromTLSCredentials (_, pk) = C.x509ToPrivate (pk, []) >>= C.privKey
|
||||
|
||||
saveServer :: Bool -> M ()
|
||||
saveServer keepMsgs = withLog closeStoreLog >> saveServerMessages keepMsgs >> saveServerStats
|
||||
@@ -128,20 +143,23 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
|
||||
serverThread ::
|
||||
forall s.
|
||||
Server ->
|
||||
String ->
|
||||
(Server -> TQueue (QueueId, Client)) ->
|
||||
(Server -> TMap QueueId Client) ->
|
||||
(Client -> TMap QueueId s) ->
|
||||
(s -> IO ()) ->
|
||||
M ()
|
||||
serverThread s subQ subs clientSubs unsub = forever $ do
|
||||
atomically updateSubscribers
|
||||
$>>= endPreviousSubscriptions
|
||||
>>= liftIO . mapM_ unsub
|
||||
serverThread s label subQ subs clientSubs unsub = do
|
||||
labelMyThread label
|
||||
forever $
|
||||
atomically updateSubscribers
|
||||
$>>= endPreviousSubscriptions
|
||||
>>= liftIO . mapM_ unsub
|
||||
where
|
||||
updateSubscribers :: STM (Maybe (QueueId, Client))
|
||||
updateSubscribers = do
|
||||
(qId, clnt) <- readTQueue $ subQ s
|
||||
let clientToBeNotified = \c' ->
|
||||
let clientToBeNotified c' =
|
||||
if sameClientSession clnt c'
|
||||
then pure Nothing
|
||||
else do
|
||||
@@ -150,8 +168,9 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
|
||||
TM.lookupInsert qId clnt (subs s) $>>= clientToBeNotified
|
||||
endPreviousSubscriptions :: (QueueId, Client) -> M (Maybe s)
|
||||
endPreviousSubscriptions (qId, c) = do
|
||||
void . forkIO . atomically $
|
||||
writeTBQueue (sndQ c) [(CorrId "", qId, END)]
|
||||
void . forkIO $ do
|
||||
labelMyThread $ label <> ".endPreviousSubscriptions"
|
||||
atomically $ writeTBQueue (sndQ c) [(CorrId "", qId, END)]
|
||||
atomically $ TM.lookupDelete qId (clientSubs c)
|
||||
|
||||
expireMessagesThread_ :: ServerConfig -> [M ()]
|
||||
@@ -163,13 +182,16 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
|
||||
ms <- asks msgStore
|
||||
quota <- asks $ msgQueueQuota . config
|
||||
let interval = checkInterval expCfg * 1000000
|
||||
stats <- asks serverStats
|
||||
labelMyThread "expireMessages"
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
liftIO $ threadDelay' interval
|
||||
old <- liftIO $ expireBeforeEpoch expCfg
|
||||
rIds <- M.keysSet <$> readTVarIO ms
|
||||
forM_ rIds $ \rId ->
|
||||
atomically (getMsgQueue ms rId quota)
|
||||
>>= atomically . (`deleteExpiredMsgs` old)
|
||||
forM_ rIds $ \rId -> do
|
||||
q <- atomically (getMsgQueue ms rId quota)
|
||||
deleted <- atomically $ deleteExpiredMsgs q old
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (msgExpired stats) (+ deleted)
|
||||
|
||||
serverStatsThread_ :: ServerConfig -> [M ()]
|
||||
serverStatsThread_ ServerConfig {logStatsInterval = Just interval, logStatsStartTime, serverStatsLogFile} =
|
||||
@@ -178,21 +200,25 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
|
||||
|
||||
logServerStats :: Int64 -> Int64 -> FilePath -> M ()
|
||||
logServerStats startAt logInterval statsFilePath = do
|
||||
labelMyThread "logServerStats"
|
||||
initialDelay <- (startAt -) . fromIntegral . (`div` 1000000_000000) . diffTimeToPicoseconds . utctDayTime <$> liftIO getCurrentTime
|
||||
liftIO $ putStrLn $ "server stats log enabled: " <> statsFilePath
|
||||
liftIO $ threadDelay' $ 1000000 * (initialDelay + if initialDelay < 0 then 86400 else 0)
|
||||
ServerStats {fromTime, qCreated, qSecured, qDeleted, msgSent, msgRecv, activeQueues, msgSentNtf, msgRecvNtf, activeQueuesNtf, qCount, msgCount} <- asks serverStats
|
||||
ServerStats {fromTime, qCreated, qSecured, qDeletedAll, qDeletedNew, qDeletedSecured, msgSent, msgRecv, msgExpired, activeQueues, msgSentNtf, msgRecvNtf, activeQueuesNtf, qCount, msgCount} <- asks serverStats
|
||||
let interval = 1000000 * logInterval
|
||||
withFile statsFilePath AppendMode $ \h -> liftIO $ do
|
||||
hSetBuffering h LineBuffering
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
withFile statsFilePath AppendMode $ \h -> liftIO $ do
|
||||
hSetBuffering h LineBuffering
|
||||
ts <- getCurrentTime
|
||||
fromTime' <- atomically $ swapTVar fromTime ts
|
||||
qCreated' <- atomically $ swapTVar qCreated 0
|
||||
qSecured' <- atomically $ swapTVar qSecured 0
|
||||
qDeleted' <- atomically $ swapTVar qDeleted 0
|
||||
qDeletedAll' <- atomically $ swapTVar qDeletedAll 0
|
||||
qDeletedNew' <- atomically $ swapTVar qDeletedNew 0
|
||||
qDeletedSecured' <- atomically $ swapTVar qDeletedSecured 0
|
||||
msgSent' <- atomically $ swapTVar msgSent 0
|
||||
msgRecv' <- atomically $ swapTVar msgRecv 0
|
||||
msgExpired' <- atomically $ swapTVar msgExpired 0
|
||||
ps <- atomically $ periodStatCounts activeQueues ts
|
||||
msgSentNtf' <- atomically $ swapTVar msgSentNtf 0
|
||||
msgRecvNtf' <- atomically $ swapTVar msgRecvNtf 0
|
||||
@@ -205,7 +231,7 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
|
||||
[ iso8601Show $ utctDay fromTime',
|
||||
show qCreated',
|
||||
show qSecured',
|
||||
show qDeleted',
|
||||
show qDeletedAll',
|
||||
show msgSent',
|
||||
show msgRecv',
|
||||
dayCount ps,
|
||||
@@ -217,17 +243,22 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
|
||||
weekCount psNtf,
|
||||
monthCount psNtf,
|
||||
show qCount',
|
||||
show msgCount'
|
||||
show msgCount',
|
||||
show msgExpired',
|
||||
show qDeletedNew',
|
||||
show qDeletedSecured'
|
||||
]
|
||||
threadDelay' interval
|
||||
liftIO $ threadDelay' interval
|
||||
|
||||
runClient :: Transport c => TProxy c -> c -> M ()
|
||||
runClient _ h = do
|
||||
runClient :: Transport c => C.APrivateSignKey -> TProxy c -> c -> M ()
|
||||
runClient signKey tp h = do
|
||||
kh <- asks serverIdentity
|
||||
smpVRange <- asks $ smpServerVRange . config
|
||||
liftIO (runExceptT $ smpServerHandshake h kh smpVRange) >>= \case
|
||||
Right th -> runClientTransport th
|
||||
Left _ -> pure ()
|
||||
ks <- atomically . C.generateKeyPair =<< asks random
|
||||
ServerConfig {smpServerVRange, smpHandshakeTimeout} <- asks config
|
||||
labelMyThread $ "smp handshake for " <> transportName tp
|
||||
liftIO (timeout smpHandshakeTimeout . runExceptT $ smpServerHandshake signKey h ks kh smpServerVRange) >>= \case
|
||||
Just (Right th) -> runClientTransport th
|
||||
_ -> pure ()
|
||||
|
||||
controlPortThread_ :: ServerConfig -> [M ()]
|
||||
controlPortThread_ ServerConfig {controlPort = Just port} = [runCPServer port]
|
||||
@@ -238,10 +269,13 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
|
||||
srv <- asks server
|
||||
cpStarted <- newEmptyTMVarIO
|
||||
u <- askUnliftIO
|
||||
liftIO $ runTCPServer cpStarted port $ runCPClient u srv
|
||||
liftIO $ do
|
||||
labelMyThread "control port server"
|
||||
runTCPServer cpStarted port $ runCPClient u srv
|
||||
where
|
||||
runCPClient :: UnliftIO (ReaderT Env IO) -> Server -> Socket -> IO ()
|
||||
runCPClient u srv sock = do
|
||||
labelMyThread "control port client"
|
||||
h <- socketToHandle sock ReadWriteMode
|
||||
hSetBuffering h LineBuffering
|
||||
hSetNewlineMode h universalNewlineMode
|
||||
@@ -257,13 +291,25 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
|
||||
processCP h = \case
|
||||
CPSuspend -> hPutStrLn h "suspend not implemented"
|
||||
CPResume -> hPutStrLn h "resume not implemented"
|
||||
CPClients -> hPutStrLn h "clients not implemented"
|
||||
CPClients -> do
|
||||
active <- unliftIO u (asks clients) >>= readTVarIO
|
||||
hPutStrLn h $ "clientId,sessionId,connected,createdAt,rcvActiveAt,sndActiveAt,age,subscriptions"
|
||||
forM_ (M.toList active) $ \(cid, Client {sessionId, connected, createdAt, rcvActiveAt, sndActiveAt, subscriptions}) -> do
|
||||
connected' <- bshow <$> readTVarIO connected
|
||||
rcvActiveAt' <- strEncode <$> readTVarIO rcvActiveAt
|
||||
sndActiveAt' <- strEncode <$> readTVarIO sndActiveAt
|
||||
now <- liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
let age = systemSeconds now - systemSeconds createdAt
|
||||
subscriptions' <- bshow . M.size <$> readTVarIO subscriptions
|
||||
hPutStrLn h . B.unpack $ B.intercalate "," [bshow cid, encode sessionId, connected', strEncode createdAt, rcvActiveAt', sndActiveAt', bshow age, subscriptions']
|
||||
CPStats -> do
|
||||
ServerStats {fromTime, qCreated, qSecured, qDeleted, msgSent, msgRecv, msgSentNtf, msgRecvNtf, qCount, msgCount} <- unliftIO u $ asks serverStats
|
||||
ServerStats {fromTime, qCreated, qSecured, qDeletedAll, qDeletedNew, qDeletedSecured, msgSent, msgRecv, msgSentNtf, msgRecvNtf, qCount, msgCount} <- unliftIO u $ asks serverStats
|
||||
putStat "fromTime" fromTime
|
||||
putStat "qCreated" qCreated
|
||||
putStat "qSecured" qSecured
|
||||
putStat "qDeleted" qDeleted
|
||||
putStat "qDeletedAll" qDeletedAll
|
||||
putStat "qDeletedNew" qDeletedNew
|
||||
putStat "qDeletedSecured" qDeletedSecured
|
||||
putStat "msgSent" msgSent
|
||||
putStat "msgRecv" msgRecv
|
||||
putStat "msgSentNtf" msgSentNtf
|
||||
@@ -273,34 +319,93 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
|
||||
where
|
||||
putStat :: Show a => String -> TVar a -> IO ()
|
||||
putStat label var = readTVarIO var >>= \v -> hPutStrLn h $ label <> ": " <> show v
|
||||
CPStatsRTS -> getRTSStats >>= hPrint h
|
||||
CPThreads -> do
|
||||
#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,18,0)
|
||||
threads <- liftIO listThreads
|
||||
hPutStrLn h $ "Threads: " <> show (length threads)
|
||||
forM_ (sort threads) $ \tid -> do
|
||||
label <- threadLabel tid
|
||||
status <- threadStatus tid
|
||||
hPutStrLn h $ show tid <> " (" <> show status <> ") " <> fromMaybe "" label
|
||||
#else
|
||||
hPutStrLn h "Not available on GHC 8.10"
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
CPSockets -> do
|
||||
(accepted', closed', active') <- unliftIO u $ asks sockets
|
||||
(accepted, closed, active) <- atomically $ (,,) <$> readTVar accepted' <*> readTVar closed' <*> readTVar active'
|
||||
hPutStrLn h "Sockets: "
|
||||
hPutStrLn h $ "accepted: " <> show accepted
|
||||
hPutStrLn h $ "closed: " <> show closed
|
||||
hPutStrLn h $ "active: " <> show (M.size active)
|
||||
hPutStrLn h $ "leaked: " <> show (accepted - closed - M.size active)
|
||||
CPSocketThreads -> do
|
||||
#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,18,0)
|
||||
(_, _, active') <- unliftIO u $ asks sockets
|
||||
active <- readTVarIO active'
|
||||
forM_ (M.toList active) $ \(sid, tid') ->
|
||||
deRefWeak tid' >>= \case
|
||||
Nothing -> hPutStrLn h $ intercalate "," [show sid, "", "gone", ""]
|
||||
Just tid -> do
|
||||
label <- threadLabel tid
|
||||
status <- threadStatus tid
|
||||
hPutStrLn h $ intercalate "," [show sid, show tid, show status, fromMaybe "" label]
|
||||
#else
|
||||
hPutStrLn h "Not available on GHC 8.10"
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
CPDelete queueId' -> unliftIO u $ do
|
||||
st <- asks queueStore
|
||||
ms <- asks msgStore
|
||||
queueId <- atomically (getQueue st SSender queueId') >>= \case
|
||||
Left _ -> pure queueId' -- fallback to using as recipientId directly
|
||||
Right QueueRec {recipientId} -> pure recipientId
|
||||
r <- atomically $
|
||||
deleteQueue st queueId $>>= \q ->
|
||||
Right . (q,) <$> delMsgQueueSize ms queueId
|
||||
case r of
|
||||
Left e -> liftIO . hPutStrLn h $ "error: " <> show e
|
||||
Right (q, numDeleted) -> do
|
||||
withLog (`logDeleteQueue` queueId)
|
||||
updateDeletedStats q
|
||||
liftIO . hPutStrLn h $ "ok, " <> show numDeleted <> " messages deleted"
|
||||
CPSave -> withLock (savingLock srv) "control" $ do
|
||||
hPutStrLn h "saving server state..."
|
||||
unliftIO u $ saveServer True
|
||||
hPutStrLn h "server state saved!"
|
||||
CPHelp -> hPutStrLn h "commands: stats, save, help, quit"
|
||||
CPHelp -> hPutStrLn h "commands: stats, stats-rts, clients, sockets, socket-threads, threads, delete, save, help, quit"
|
||||
CPQuit -> pure ()
|
||||
CPSkip -> pure ()
|
||||
|
||||
runClientTransport :: Transport c => THandle c -> M ()
|
||||
runClientTransport th@THandle {thVersion, sessionId} = do
|
||||
runClientTransport th@THandle {params = THandleParams {thVersion, sessionId}} = do
|
||||
q <- asks $ tbqSize . config
|
||||
ts <- liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
c <- atomically $ newClient q thVersion sessionId ts
|
||||
active <- asks clients
|
||||
nextClientId <- asks clientSeq
|
||||
c <- atomically $ do
|
||||
new@Client {clientId} <- newClient nextClientId q thVersion sessionId ts
|
||||
TM.insert clientId new active
|
||||
pure new
|
||||
s <- asks server
|
||||
expCfg <- asks $ inactiveClientExpiration . config
|
||||
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId
|
||||
raceAny_ ([liftIO $ send th c, client c s, receive th c] <> disconnectThread_ c expCfg)
|
||||
`finally` clientDisconnected c
|
||||
where
|
||||
disconnectThread_ c (Just expCfg) = [liftIO $ disconnectTransport th c activeAt expCfg]
|
||||
disconnectThread_ c (Just expCfg) = [liftIO $ disconnectTransport th (rcvActiveAt c) (sndActiveAt c) expCfg (noSubscriptions c)]
|
||||
disconnectThread_ _ _ = []
|
||||
noSubscriptions c = atomically $ (&&) <$> TM.null (subscriptions c) <*> TM.null (ntfSubscriptions c)
|
||||
|
||||
clientDisconnected :: Client -> M ()
|
||||
clientDisconnected c@Client {subscriptions, connected} = do
|
||||
clientDisconnected c@Client {clientId, subscriptions, connected, sessionId} = do
|
||||
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " disc"
|
||||
atomically $ writeTVar connected False
|
||||
subs <- readTVarIO subscriptions
|
||||
liftIO $ mapM_ cancelSub subs
|
||||
atomically $ writeTVar subscriptions M.empty
|
||||
cs <- asks $ subscribers . server
|
||||
atomically . mapM_ (\rId -> TM.update deleteCurrentClient rId cs) $ M.keys subs
|
||||
asks clients >>= atomically . TM.delete clientId
|
||||
where
|
||||
deleteCurrentClient :: Client -> Maybe Client
|
||||
deleteCurrentClient c'
|
||||
@@ -317,18 +422,20 @@ cancelSub sub =
|
||||
_ -> return ()
|
||||
|
||||
receive :: Transport c => THandle c -> Client -> M ()
|
||||
receive th Client {rcvQ, sndQ, activeAt} = forever $ do
|
||||
ts <- L.toList <$> liftIO (tGet th)
|
||||
atomically . writeTVar activeAt =<< liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
as <- partitionEithers <$> mapM cmdAction ts
|
||||
write sndQ $ fst as
|
||||
write rcvQ $ snd as
|
||||
receive th@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth}} Client {rcvQ, sndQ, rcvActiveAt, sessionId} = do
|
||||
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " receive"
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
ts <- L.toList <$> liftIO (tGet th)
|
||||
atomically . writeTVar rcvActiveAt =<< liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
as <- partitionEithers <$> mapM cmdAction ts
|
||||
write sndQ $ fst as
|
||||
write rcvQ $ snd as
|
||||
where
|
||||
cmdAction :: SignedTransmission ErrorType Cmd -> M (Either (Transmission BrokerMsg) (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd))
|
||||
cmdAction (sig, signed, (corrId, queueId, cmdOrError)) =
|
||||
cmdAction (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, queueId, cmdOrError)) =
|
||||
case cmdOrError of
|
||||
Left e -> pure $ Left (corrId, queueId, ERR e)
|
||||
Right cmd -> verified <$> verifyTransmission sig signed queueId cmd
|
||||
Right cmd -> verified <$> verifyTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (bs corrId)) <$> thAuth) tAuth authorized queueId cmd
|
||||
where
|
||||
verified = \case
|
||||
VRVerified qr -> Right (qr, (corrId, queueId, cmd))
|
||||
@@ -336,10 +443,13 @@ receive th Client {rcvQ, sndQ, activeAt} = forever $ do
|
||||
write q = mapM_ (atomically . writeTBQueue q) . L.nonEmpty
|
||||
|
||||
send :: Transport c => THandle c -> Client -> IO ()
|
||||
send h@THandle {thVersion = v} Client {sndQ, sessionId, activeAt} = forever $ do
|
||||
ts <- atomically $ L.sortWith tOrder <$> readTBQueue sndQ
|
||||
void . liftIO . tPut h Nothing $ L.map ((Nothing,) . encodeTransmission v sessionId) ts
|
||||
atomically . writeTVar activeAt =<< liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
send h@THandle {params} Client {sndQ, sessionId, sndActiveAt} = do
|
||||
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " send"
|
||||
forever $ do
|
||||
ts <- atomically $ L.sortWith tOrder <$> readTBQueue sndQ
|
||||
-- TODO we can authorize responses as well
|
||||
void . liftIO . tPut h $ L.map (\t -> Right (Nothing, encodeTransmission params t)) ts
|
||||
atomically . writeTVar sndActiveAt =<< liftIO getSystemTime
|
||||
where
|
||||
tOrder :: Transmission BrokerMsg -> Int
|
||||
tOrder (_, _, cmd) = case cmd of
|
||||
@@ -347,55 +457,84 @@ send h@THandle {thVersion = v} Client {sndQ, sessionId, activeAt} = forever $ do
|
||||
NMSG {} -> 0
|
||||
_ -> 1
|
||||
|
||||
disconnectTransport :: Transport c => THandle c -> client -> (client -> TVar SystemTime) -> ExpirationConfig -> IO ()
|
||||
disconnectTransport THandle {connection} c activeAt expCfg = do
|
||||
let interval = checkInterval expCfg * 1000000
|
||||
forever . liftIO $ do
|
||||
threadDelay' interval
|
||||
old <- expireBeforeEpoch expCfg
|
||||
ts <- readTVarIO $ activeAt c
|
||||
when (systemSeconds ts < old) $ closeConnection connection
|
||||
disconnectTransport :: Transport c => THandle c -> TVar SystemTime -> TVar SystemTime -> ExpirationConfig -> IO Bool -> IO ()
|
||||
disconnectTransport THandle {connection, params = THandleParams {sessionId}} rcvActiveAt sndActiveAt expCfg noSubscriptions = do
|
||||
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " disconnectTransport"
|
||||
loop
|
||||
where
|
||||
loop = do
|
||||
threadDelay' $ checkInterval expCfg * 1000000
|
||||
ifM noSubscriptions checkExpired loop
|
||||
checkExpired = do
|
||||
old <- expireBeforeEpoch expCfg
|
||||
ts <- max <$> readTVarIO rcvActiveAt <*> readTVarIO sndActiveAt
|
||||
if systemSeconds ts < old then closeConnection connection else loop
|
||||
|
||||
data VerificationResult = VRVerified (Maybe QueueRec) | VRFailed
|
||||
|
||||
verifyTransmission :: Maybe C.ASignature -> ByteString -> QueueId -> Cmd -> M VerificationResult
|
||||
verifyTransmission sig_ signed queueId cmd =
|
||||
-- This function verifies queue command authorization, with the objective to have constant time between the three AUTH error scenarios:
|
||||
-- - the queue and party key exist, and the provided authorization has type matching queue key, but it is made with the different key.
|
||||
-- - the queue and party key exist, but the provided authorization has incorrect type.
|
||||
-- - the queue or party key do not exist.
|
||||
-- In all cases, the time of the verification should depend only on the provided authorization type,
|
||||
-- a dummy key is used to run verification in the last two cases, and failure is returned irrespective of the result.
|
||||
verifyTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth, C.CbNonce) -> Maybe TransmissionAuth -> ByteString -> QueueId -> Cmd -> M VerificationResult
|
||||
verifyTransmission auth_ tAuth authorized queueId cmd =
|
||||
case cmd of
|
||||
Cmd SRecipient (NEW k _ _) -> pure $ Nothing `verified` verifyCmdSignature sig_ signed k
|
||||
Cmd SRecipient _ -> verifyCmd SRecipient $ verifyCmdSignature sig_ signed . recipientKey
|
||||
Cmd SSender SEND {} -> verifyCmd SSender $ verifyMaybe . senderKey
|
||||
Cmd SRecipient (NEW k _ _ _) -> pure $ Nothing `verifiedWith` k
|
||||
Cmd SRecipient _ -> verifyQueue (\q -> Just q `verifiedWith` recipientKey q) <$> get SRecipient
|
||||
-- SEND will be accepted without authorization before the queue is secured with KEY command
|
||||
Cmd SSender SEND {} -> verifyQueue (\q -> Just q `verified` maybe (isNothing tAuth) verify (senderKey q)) <$> get SSender
|
||||
Cmd SSender PING -> pure $ VRVerified Nothing
|
||||
Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> verifyCmd SNotifier $ verifyMaybe . fmap notifierKey . notifier
|
||||
-- NSUB will not be accepted without authorization
|
||||
Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> verifyQueue (\q -> maybe dummyVerify (Just q `verifiedWith`) (notifierKey <$> notifier q)) <$> get SNotifier
|
||||
where
|
||||
verifyCmd :: SParty p -> (QueueRec -> Bool) -> M VerificationResult
|
||||
verifyCmd party f = do
|
||||
st <- asks queueStore
|
||||
q_ <- atomically $ getQueue st party queueId
|
||||
pure $ case q_ of
|
||||
Right q -> Just q `verified` f q
|
||||
_ -> maybe False (dummyVerifyCmd signed) sig_ `seq` VRFailed
|
||||
verifyMaybe :: Maybe C.APublicVerifyKey -> Bool
|
||||
verifyMaybe = maybe (isNothing sig_) $ verifyCmdSignature sig_ signed
|
||||
verify = verifyCmdAuthorization auth_ tAuth authorized
|
||||
dummyVerify = verify (dummyAuthKey tAuth) `seq` VRFailed
|
||||
verifyQueue :: (QueueRec -> VerificationResult) -> Either ErrorType QueueRec -> VerificationResult
|
||||
verifyQueue = either (\_ -> dummyVerify)
|
||||
verified q cond = if cond then VRVerified q else VRFailed
|
||||
verifiedWith q k = q `verified` verify k
|
||||
get :: SParty p -> M (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
|
||||
get party = do
|
||||
st <- asks queueStore
|
||||
atomically $ getQueue st party queueId
|
||||
|
||||
verifyCmdSignature :: Maybe C.ASignature -> ByteString -> C.APublicVerifyKey -> Bool
|
||||
verifyCmdSignature sig_ signed key = maybe False (verify key) sig_
|
||||
verifyCmdAuthorization :: Maybe (THandleAuth, C.CbNonce) -> Maybe TransmissionAuth -> ByteString -> C.APublicAuthKey -> Bool
|
||||
verifyCmdAuthorization auth_ tAuth authorized key = maybe False (verify key) tAuth
|
||||
where
|
||||
verify :: C.APublicVerifyKey -> C.ASignature -> Bool
|
||||
verify (C.APublicVerifyKey a k) sig@(C.ASignature a' s) =
|
||||
case (testEquality a a', C.signatureSize k == C.signatureSize s) of
|
||||
(Just Refl, True) -> C.verify' k s signed
|
||||
_ -> dummyVerifyCmd signed sig `seq` False
|
||||
verify :: C.APublicAuthKey -> TransmissionAuth -> Bool
|
||||
verify (C.APublicAuthKey a k) = \case
|
||||
TASignature (C.ASignature a' s) -> case testEquality a a' of
|
||||
Just Refl -> C.verify' k s authorized
|
||||
_ -> C.verify' (dummySignKey a') s authorized `seq` False
|
||||
TAAuthenticator s -> case a of
|
||||
C.SX25519 -> verifyCmdAuth auth_ k s authorized
|
||||
_ -> verifyCmdAuth auth_ dummyKeyX25519 s authorized `seq` False
|
||||
|
||||
dummyVerifyCmd :: ByteString -> C.ASignature -> Bool
|
||||
dummyVerifyCmd signed (C.ASignature _ s) = C.verify' (dummyPublicKey s) s signed
|
||||
verifyCmdAuth :: Maybe (THandleAuth, C.CbNonce) -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> C.CbAuthenticator -> ByteString -> Bool
|
||||
verifyCmdAuth auth_ k authenticator authorized = case auth_ of
|
||||
Just (THandleAuth {privKey}, nonce) -> C.cbVerify k privKey nonce authenticator authorized
|
||||
Nothing -> False
|
||||
|
||||
dummyVerifyCmd :: Maybe (THandleAuth, C.CbNonce) -> ByteString -> TransmissionAuth -> Bool
|
||||
dummyVerifyCmd auth_ authorized = \case
|
||||
TASignature (C.ASignature a s) -> C.verify' (dummySignKey a) s authorized
|
||||
TAAuthenticator s -> verifyCmdAuth auth_ dummyKeyX25519 s authorized
|
||||
|
||||
-- These dummy keys are used with `dummyVerify` function to mitigate timing attacks
|
||||
-- by having the same time of the response whether a queue exists or nor, for all valid key/signature sizes
|
||||
dummyPublicKey :: C.Signature a -> C.PublicKey a
|
||||
dummyPublicKey = \case
|
||||
C.SignatureEd25519 _ -> dummyKeyEd25519
|
||||
C.SignatureEd448 _ -> dummyKeyEd448
|
||||
dummySignKey :: C.SignatureAlgorithm a => C.SAlgorithm a -> C.PublicKey a
|
||||
dummySignKey = \case
|
||||
C.SEd25519 -> dummyKeyEd25519
|
||||
C.SEd448 -> dummyKeyEd448
|
||||
|
||||
dummyAuthKey :: Maybe TransmissionAuth -> C.APublicAuthKey
|
||||
dummyAuthKey = \case
|
||||
Just (TASignature (C.ASignature a _)) -> case a of
|
||||
C.SEd25519 -> C.APublicAuthKey C.SEd25519 dummyKeyEd25519
|
||||
C.SEd448 -> C.APublicAuthKey C.SEd448 dummyKeyEd448
|
||||
_ -> C.APublicAuthKey C.SX25519 dummyKeyX25519
|
||||
|
||||
dummyKeyEd25519 :: C.PublicKey 'C.Ed25519
|
||||
dummyKeyEd25519 = "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEA139Oqs4QgpqbAmB0o7rZf6T19ryl7E65k4AYe0kE3Qs="
|
||||
@@ -403,8 +542,12 @@ dummyKeyEd25519 = "MCowBQYDK2VwAyEA139Oqs4QgpqbAmB0o7rZf6T19ryl7E65k4AYe0kE3Qs="
|
||||
dummyKeyEd448 :: C.PublicKey 'C.Ed448
|
||||
dummyKeyEd448 = "MEMwBQYDK2VxAzoA6ibQc9XpkSLtwrf7PLvp81qW/etiumckVFImCMRdftcG/XopbOSaq9qyLhrgJWKOLyNrQPNVvpMA"
|
||||
|
||||
dummyKeyX25519 :: C.PublicKey 'C.X25519
|
||||
dummyKeyX25519 = "MCowBQYDK2VuAyEA4JGSMYht18H4mas/jHeBwfcM7jLwNYJNOAhi2/g4RXg="
|
||||
|
||||
client :: forall m. (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => Client -> Server -> m ()
|
||||
client clnt@Client {thVersion, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ} Server {subscribedQ, ntfSubscribedQ, notifiers} =
|
||||
client clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessionId} Server {subscribedQ, ntfSubscribedQ, notifiers} = do
|
||||
labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " commands"
|
||||
forever $
|
||||
atomically (readTBQueue rcvQ)
|
||||
>>= mapM processCommand
|
||||
@@ -421,10 +564,10 @@ client clnt@Client {thVersion, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ} Serv
|
||||
Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> subscribeNotifications
|
||||
Cmd SRecipient command ->
|
||||
case command of
|
||||
NEW rKey dhKey auth ->
|
||||
NEW rKey dhKey auth subMode ->
|
||||
ifM
|
||||
allowNew
|
||||
(createQueue st rKey dhKey)
|
||||
(createQueue st rKey dhKey subMode)
|
||||
(pure (corrId, queueId, ERR AUTH))
|
||||
where
|
||||
allowNew = do
|
||||
@@ -439,9 +582,9 @@ client clnt@Client {thVersion, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ} Serv
|
||||
OFF -> suspendQueue_ st
|
||||
DEL -> delQueueAndMsgs st
|
||||
where
|
||||
createQueue :: QueueStore -> RcvPublicVerifyKey -> RcvPublicDhKey -> m (Transmission BrokerMsg)
|
||||
createQueue st recipientKey dhKey = time "NEW" $ do
|
||||
(rcvPublicDhKey, privDhKey) <- liftIO C.generateKeyPair'
|
||||
createQueue :: QueueStore -> RcvPublicAuthKey -> RcvPublicDhKey -> SubscriptionMode -> m (Transmission BrokerMsg)
|
||||
createQueue st recipientKey dhKey subMode = time "NEW" $ do
|
||||
(rcvPublicDhKey, privDhKey) <- atomically . C.generateKeyPair =<< asks random
|
||||
let rcvDhSecret = C.dh' dhKey privDhKey
|
||||
qik (rcvId, sndId) = QIK {rcvId, sndId, rcvPublicDhKey}
|
||||
qRec (recipientId, senderId) =
|
||||
@@ -471,7 +614,10 @@ client clnt@Client {thVersion, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ} Serv
|
||||
stats <- asks serverStats
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (qCreated stats) (+ 1)
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (qCount stats) (+ 1)
|
||||
subscribeQueue qr rId $> IDS (qik ids)
|
||||
case subMode of
|
||||
SMOnlyCreate -> pure ()
|
||||
SMSubscribe -> void $ subscribeQueue qr rId
|
||||
pure $ IDS (qik ids)
|
||||
|
||||
logCreateById :: StoreLog 'WriteMode -> RecipientId -> IO ()
|
||||
logCreateById s rId =
|
||||
@@ -484,16 +630,16 @@ client clnt@Client {thVersion, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ} Serv
|
||||
n <- asks $ queueIdBytes . config
|
||||
liftM2 (,) (randomId n) (randomId n)
|
||||
|
||||
secureQueue_ :: QueueStore -> SndPublicVerifyKey -> m (Transmission BrokerMsg)
|
||||
secureQueue_ :: QueueStore -> SndPublicAuthKey -> m (Transmission BrokerMsg)
|
||||
secureQueue_ st sKey = time "KEY" $ do
|
||||
withLog $ \s -> logSecureQueue s queueId sKey
|
||||
stats <- asks serverStats
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (qSecured stats) (+ 1)
|
||||
atomically $ (corrId,queueId,) . either ERR (const OK) <$> secureQueue st queueId sKey
|
||||
|
||||
addQueueNotifier_ :: QueueStore -> NtfPublicVerifyKey -> RcvNtfPublicDhKey -> m (Transmission BrokerMsg)
|
||||
addQueueNotifier_ :: QueueStore -> NtfPublicAuthKey -> RcvNtfPublicDhKey -> m (Transmission BrokerMsg)
|
||||
addQueueNotifier_ st notifierKey dhKey = time "NKEY" $ do
|
||||
(rcvPublicDhKey, privDhKey) <- liftIO C.generateKeyPair'
|
||||
(rcvPublicDhKey, privDhKey) <- atomically . C.generateKeyPair =<< asks random
|
||||
let rcvNtfDhSecret = C.dh' dhKey privDhKey
|
||||
(corrId,queueId,) <$> addNotifierRetry 3 rcvPublicDhKey rcvNtfDhSecret
|
||||
where
|
||||
@@ -625,27 +771,27 @@ client clnt@Client {thVersion, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ} Serv
|
||||
sendMessage qr msgFlags msgBody
|
||||
| B.length msgBody > maxMessageLength = pure $ err LARGE_MSG
|
||||
| otherwise = case status qr of
|
||||
QueueOff -> return $ err AUTH
|
||||
QueueActive ->
|
||||
case C.maxLenBS msgBody of
|
||||
Left _ -> pure $ err LARGE_MSG
|
||||
Right body -> do
|
||||
msg_ <- time "SEND" $ do
|
||||
q <- getStoreMsgQueue "SEND" $ recipientId qr
|
||||
expireMessages q
|
||||
atomically . writeMsg q =<< mkMessage body
|
||||
case msg_ of
|
||||
Nothing -> pure $ err QUOTA
|
||||
Just msg -> time "SEND ok" $ do
|
||||
stats <- asks serverStats
|
||||
when (notification msgFlags) $ do
|
||||
atomically . trySendNotification msg =<< asks idsDrg
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (msgSentNtf stats) (+ 1)
|
||||
atomically $ updatePeriodStats (activeQueuesNtf stats) (recipientId qr)
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (msgSent stats) (+ 1)
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (msgCount stats) (subtract 1)
|
||||
atomically $ updatePeriodStats (activeQueues stats) (recipientId qr)
|
||||
pure ok
|
||||
QueueOff -> return $ err AUTH
|
||||
QueueActive ->
|
||||
case C.maxLenBS msgBody of
|
||||
Left _ -> pure $ err LARGE_MSG
|
||||
Right body -> do
|
||||
msg_ <- time "SEND" $ do
|
||||
q <- getStoreMsgQueue "SEND" $ recipientId qr
|
||||
expireMessages q
|
||||
atomically . writeMsg q =<< mkMessage body
|
||||
case msg_ of
|
||||
Nothing -> pure $ err QUOTA
|
||||
Just msg -> time "SEND ok" $ do
|
||||
stats <- asks serverStats
|
||||
when (notification msgFlags) $ do
|
||||
atomically . trySendNotification msg =<< asks random
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (msgSentNtf stats) (+ 1)
|
||||
atomically $ updatePeriodStats (activeQueuesNtf stats) (recipientId qr)
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (msgSent stats) (+ 1)
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (msgCount stats) (subtract 1)
|
||||
atomically $ updatePeriodStats (activeQueues stats) (recipientId qr)
|
||||
pure ok
|
||||
where
|
||||
mkMessage :: C.MaxLenBS MaxMessageLen -> m Message
|
||||
mkMessage body = do
|
||||
@@ -657,7 +803,9 @@ client clnt@Client {thVersion, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ} Serv
|
||||
expireMessages q = do
|
||||
msgExp <- asks $ messageExpiration . config
|
||||
old <- liftIO $ mapM expireBeforeEpoch msgExp
|
||||
atomically $ mapM_ (deleteExpiredMsgs q) old
|
||||
stats <- asks serverStats
|
||||
deleted <- atomically $ sum <$> mapM (deleteExpiredMsgs q) old
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (msgExpired stats) (+ deleted)
|
||||
|
||||
trySendNotification :: Message -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ()
|
||||
trySendNotification msg ntfNonceDrg =
|
||||
@@ -674,7 +822,7 @@ client clnt@Client {thVersion, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ} Serv
|
||||
|
||||
mkMessageNotification :: ByteString -> SystemTime -> RcvNtfDhSecret -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM (C.CbNonce, EncNMsgMeta)
|
||||
mkMessageNotification msgId msgTs rcvNtfDhSecret ntfNonceDrg = do
|
||||
cbNonce <- C.pseudoRandomCbNonce ntfNonceDrg
|
||||
cbNonce <- C.randomCbNonce ntfNonceDrg
|
||||
let msgMeta = NMsgMeta {msgId, msgTs}
|
||||
encNMsgMeta = C.cbEncrypt rcvNtfDhSecret cbNonce (smpEncode msgMeta) 128
|
||||
pure . (cbNonce,) $ fromRight "" encNMsgMeta
|
||||
@@ -699,6 +847,7 @@ client clnt@Client {thVersion, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ} Serv
|
||||
s -> s
|
||||
where
|
||||
subscriber = do
|
||||
labelMyThread $ B.unpack ("client $" <> encode sessionId) <> " subscriber/" <> T.unpack name
|
||||
msg <- atomically $ peekMsg q
|
||||
time "subscriber" . atomically $ do
|
||||
let encMsg = encryptMsg qr msg
|
||||
@@ -711,22 +860,17 @@ client clnt@Client {thVersion, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ} Serv
|
||||
time name = timed name queueId
|
||||
|
||||
encryptMsg :: QueueRec -> Message -> RcvMessage
|
||||
encryptMsg qr msg = case msg of
|
||||
Message {msgFlags, msgBody}
|
||||
| thVersion == 1 || thVersion == 2 -> encrypt msgFlags msgBody
|
||||
| otherwise -> encrypt msgFlags $ encodeRcvMsgBody RcvMsgBody {msgTs = msgTs', msgFlags, msgBody}
|
||||
MessageQuota {} ->
|
||||
encrypt noMsgFlags $ encodeRcvMsgBody (RcvMsgQuota msgTs')
|
||||
encryptMsg qr msg = encrypt . encodeRcvMsgBody $ case msg of
|
||||
Message {msgFlags, msgBody} -> RcvMsgBody {msgTs = msgTs', msgFlags, msgBody}
|
||||
MessageQuota {} -> RcvMsgQuota msgTs'
|
||||
where
|
||||
encrypt :: KnownNat i => MsgFlags -> C.MaxLenBS i -> RcvMessage
|
||||
encrypt msgFlags body =
|
||||
let encBody = EncRcvMsgBody $ C.cbEncryptMaxLenBS (rcvDhSecret qr) (C.cbNonce msgId') body
|
||||
in RcvMessage msgId' msgTs' msgFlags encBody
|
||||
msgId' = msgId (msg :: Message)
|
||||
msgTs' = msgTs (msg :: Message)
|
||||
encrypt :: KnownNat i => C.MaxLenBS i -> RcvMessage
|
||||
encrypt body = RcvMessage msgId' . EncRcvMsgBody $ C.cbEncryptMaxLenBS (rcvDhSecret qr) (C.cbNonce msgId') body
|
||||
msgId' = messageId msg
|
||||
msgTs' = messageTs msg
|
||||
|
||||
setDelivered :: Sub -> Message -> STM Bool
|
||||
setDelivered s msg = tryPutTMVar (delivered s) $ msgId (msg :: Message)
|
||||
setDelivered s msg = tryPutTMVar (delivered s) (messageId msg)
|
||||
|
||||
getStoreMsgQueue :: T.Text -> RecipientId -> m MsgQueue
|
||||
getStoreMsgQueue name rId = time (name <> " getMsgQueue") $ do
|
||||
@@ -738,13 +882,9 @@ client clnt@Client {thVersion, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ} Serv
|
||||
delQueueAndMsgs st = do
|
||||
withLog (`logDeleteQueue` queueId)
|
||||
ms <- asks msgStore
|
||||
stats <- asks serverStats
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (qDeleted stats) (+ 1)
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (qCount stats) (subtract 1)
|
||||
atomically $
|
||||
deleteQueue st queueId >>= \case
|
||||
Left e -> pure $ err e
|
||||
Right _ -> delMsgQueue ms queueId $> ok
|
||||
atomically (deleteQueue st queueId $>>= \q -> delMsgQueue ms queueId $> Right q) >>= \case
|
||||
Right q -> updateDeletedStats q $> ok
|
||||
Left e -> pure $ err e
|
||||
|
||||
ok :: Transmission BrokerMsg
|
||||
ok = (corrId, queueId, OK)
|
||||
@@ -755,6 +895,14 @@ client clnt@Client {thVersion, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ} Serv
|
||||
okResp :: Either ErrorType () -> Transmission BrokerMsg
|
||||
okResp = either err $ const ok
|
||||
|
||||
updateDeletedStats :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => QueueRec -> m ()
|
||||
updateDeletedStats q = do
|
||||
stats <- asks serverStats
|
||||
let delSel = if isNothing (senderKey q) then qDeletedNew else qDeletedSecured
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (delSel stats) (+ 1)
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (qDeletedAll stats) (+ 1)
|
||||
atomically $ modifyTVar' (qCount stats) (subtract 1)
|
||||
|
||||
withLog :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => (StoreLog 'WriteMode -> IO a) -> m ()
|
||||
withLog action = do
|
||||
env <- ask
|
||||
@@ -773,9 +921,7 @@ timed name qId a = do
|
||||
sec = 1000_000000
|
||||
|
||||
randomId :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => Int -> m ByteString
|
||||
randomId n = do
|
||||
gVar <- asks idsDrg
|
||||
atomically (C.pseudoRandomBytes n gVar)
|
||||
randomId n = atomically . C.randomBytes n =<< asks random
|
||||
|
||||
saveServerMessages :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => Bool -> m ()
|
||||
saveServerMessages keepMsgs = asks (storeMsgsFile . config) >>= mapM_ saveMessages
|
||||
@@ -792,45 +938,39 @@ saveServerMessages keepMsgs = asks (storeMsgsFile . config) >>= mapM_ saveMessag
|
||||
atomically (getMessages ms rId)
|
||||
>>= mapM_ (B.hPutStrLn h . strEncode . MLRv3 rId)
|
||||
|
||||
restoreServerMessages :: forall m. (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => m ()
|
||||
restoreServerMessages = asks (storeMsgsFile . config) >>= mapM_ restoreMessages
|
||||
restoreServerMessages :: forall m. (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => m Int
|
||||
restoreServerMessages = asks (storeMsgsFile . config) >>= \case
|
||||
Just f -> ifM (doesFileExist f) (restoreMessages f) (pure 0)
|
||||
Nothing -> pure 0
|
||||
where
|
||||
restoreMessages f = whenM (doesFileExist f) $ do
|
||||
restoreMessages f = do
|
||||
logInfo $ "restoring messages from file " <> T.pack f
|
||||
st <- asks queueStore
|
||||
ms <- asks msgStore
|
||||
quota <- asks $ msgQueueQuota . config
|
||||
old_ <- asks (messageExpiration . config) $>>= (liftIO . fmap Just . expireBeforeEpoch)
|
||||
runExceptT (liftIO (B.readFile f) >>= mapM_ (restoreMsg st ms quota old_) . B.lines) >>= \case
|
||||
runExceptT (liftIO (B.readFile f) >>= foldM (\expired -> restoreMsg expired ms quota old_) 0 . B.lines) >>= \case
|
||||
Left e -> do
|
||||
logError . T.pack $ "error restoring messages: " <> e
|
||||
liftIO exitFailure
|
||||
_ -> do
|
||||
Right expired -> do
|
||||
renameFile f $ f <> ".bak"
|
||||
logInfo "messages restored"
|
||||
pure expired
|
||||
where
|
||||
restoreMsg st ms quota old_ s = do
|
||||
r <- liftEither . first (msgErr "parsing") $ strDecode s
|
||||
case r of
|
||||
MLRv3 rId msg -> addToMsgQueue rId msg
|
||||
MLRv1 rId encMsg -> do
|
||||
qr <- liftEitherError (msgErr "queue unknown") . atomically $ getQueue st SRecipient rId
|
||||
msg' <- updateMsgV1toV3 qr encMsg
|
||||
addToMsgQueue rId msg'
|
||||
restoreMsg !expired ms quota old_ s = do
|
||||
MLRv3 rId msg <- liftEither . first (msgErr "parsing") $ strDecode s
|
||||
addToMsgQueue rId msg
|
||||
where
|
||||
addToMsgQueue rId msg = do
|
||||
logFull <- atomically $ do
|
||||
(isExpired, logFull) <- atomically $ do
|
||||
q <- getMsgQueue ms rId quota
|
||||
case msg of
|
||||
Message {msgTs}
|
||||
| maybe True (systemSeconds msgTs >=) old_ -> isNothing <$> writeMsg q msg
|
||||
| otherwise -> pure False
|
||||
MessageQuota {} -> writeMsg q msg $> False
|
||||
when logFull . logError . decodeLatin1 $ "message queue " <> strEncode rId <> " is full, message not restored: " <> strEncode (msgId (msg :: Message))
|
||||
updateMsgV1toV3 QueueRec {rcvDhSecret} RcvMessage {msgId, msgTs, msgFlags, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody body} = do
|
||||
let nonce = C.cbNonce msgId
|
||||
msgBody <- liftEither . first (msgErr "v1 message decryption") $ C.maxLenBS =<< C.cbDecrypt rcvDhSecret nonce body
|
||||
pure Message {msgId, msgTs, msgFlags, msgBody}
|
||||
| maybe True (systemSeconds msgTs >=) old_ -> (False,) . isNothing <$> writeMsg q msg
|
||||
| otherwise -> pure (True, False)
|
||||
MessageQuota {} -> writeMsg q msg $> (False, False)
|
||||
when logFull . logError . decodeLatin1 $ "message queue " <> strEncode rId <> " is full, message not restored: " <> strEncode (messageId msg)
|
||||
pure $ if isExpired then expired + 1 else expired
|
||||
msgErr :: Show e => String -> e -> String
|
||||
msgErr op e = op <> " error (" <> show e <> "): " <> B.unpack (B.take 100 s)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -844,19 +984,21 @@ saveServerStats =
|
||||
B.writeFile f $ strEncode stats
|
||||
logInfo "server stats saved"
|
||||
|
||||
restoreServerStats :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => m ()
|
||||
restoreServerStats = asks (serverStatsBackupFile . config) >>= mapM_ restoreStats
|
||||
restoreServerStats :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => Int -> m ()
|
||||
restoreServerStats expiredWhileRestoring = asks (serverStatsBackupFile . config) >>= mapM_ restoreStats
|
||||
where
|
||||
restoreStats f = whenM (doesFileExist f) $ do
|
||||
logInfo $ "restoring server stats from file " <> T.pack f
|
||||
liftIO (strDecode <$> B.readFile f) >>= \case
|
||||
Right d -> do
|
||||
Right d@ServerStatsData {_qCount = statsQCount} -> do
|
||||
s <- asks serverStats
|
||||
_qCount <- fmap (length . M.keys) . readTVarIO . queues =<< asks queueStore
|
||||
_msgCount <- foldM (\n q -> (n +) <$> readTVarIO (size q)) 0 =<< readTVarIO =<< asks msgStore
|
||||
atomically $ setServerStats s d {_qCount, _msgCount}
|
||||
_qCount <- fmap M.size . readTVarIO . queues =<< asks queueStore
|
||||
_msgCount <- foldM (\(!n) q -> (n +) <$> readTVarIO (size q)) 0 =<< readTVarIO =<< asks msgStore
|
||||
atomically $ setServerStats s d {_qCount, _msgCount, _msgExpired = _msgExpired d + expiredWhileRestoring}
|
||||
renameFile f $ f <> ".bak"
|
||||
logInfo "server stats restored"
|
||||
when (_qCount /= statsQCount) $ logWarn $ "Queue count differs: stats: " <> tshow statsQCount <> ", store: " <> tshow _qCount
|
||||
logInfo $ "Restored " <> tshow _msgCount <> " messages in " <> tshow _qCount <> " queues"
|
||||
Left e -> do
|
||||
logInfo $ "error restoring server stats: " <> T.pack e
|
||||
liftIO exitFailure
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE ApplicativeDo #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
|
||||
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI where
|
||||
|
||||
import Control.Monad
|
||||
import Data.ASN1.Types (asn1CharacterToString)
|
||||
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
|
||||
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
|
||||
import Data.Either (fromRight)
|
||||
@@ -17,6 +19,8 @@ import Data.Ini (Ini, lookupValue)
|
||||
import Data.Text (Text)
|
||||
import qualified Data.Text as T
|
||||
import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
|
||||
import qualified Data.X509 as X
|
||||
import qualified Data.X509.File as XF
|
||||
import Data.X509.Validation (Fingerprint (..))
|
||||
import Network.Socket (HostName, ServiceName)
|
||||
import Options.Applicative
|
||||
@@ -27,12 +31,14 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (loadFingerprint)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets (WS)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (eitherToMaybe, whenM)
|
||||
import System.Directory (doesDirectoryExist, listDirectory, removeDirectoryRecursive, removePathForcibly)
|
||||
import System.Environment (lookupEnv)
|
||||
import System.Exit (exitFailure)
|
||||
import System.FilePath (combine)
|
||||
import System.IO (IOMode (..), hFlush, hGetLine, stdout, withFile)
|
||||
import System.Process (readCreateProcess, shell)
|
||||
import Text.Read (readMaybe)
|
||||
|
||||
exitError :: String -> IO ()
|
||||
exitError :: String -> IO a
|
||||
exitError msg = putStrLn msg >> exitFailure
|
||||
|
||||
confirmOrExit :: String -> IO ()
|
||||
@@ -84,14 +90,18 @@ getCliCommand' cmdP version =
|
||||
versionOption = infoOption version (long "version" <> short 'v' <> help "Show version")
|
||||
|
||||
createServerX509 :: FilePath -> X509Config -> IO ByteString
|
||||
createServerX509 cfgPath x509cfg = do
|
||||
createOpensslCaConf
|
||||
createOpensslServerConf
|
||||
createServerX509 = createServerX509_ True
|
||||
|
||||
createServerX509_ :: Bool -> FilePath -> X509Config -> IO ByteString
|
||||
createServerX509_ createCA cfgPath x509cfg = do
|
||||
let alg = show $ signAlgorithm (x509cfg :: X509Config)
|
||||
-- CA certificate (identity/offline)
|
||||
run $ "openssl genpkey -algorithm " <> alg <> " -out " <> c caKeyFile
|
||||
run $ "openssl req -new -x509 -days 999999 -config " <> c opensslCaConfFile <> " -extensions v3 -key " <> c caKeyFile <> " -out " <> c caCrtFile
|
||||
when createCA $ do
|
||||
createOpensslCaConf
|
||||
run $ "openssl genpkey -algorithm " <> alg <> " -out " <> c caKeyFile
|
||||
run $ "openssl req -new -x509 -days 999999 -config " <> c opensslCaConfFile <> " -extensions v3 -key " <> c caKeyFile <> " -out " <> c caCrtFile
|
||||
-- server certificate (online)
|
||||
createOpensslServerConf
|
||||
run $ "openssl genpkey -algorithm " <> alg <> " -out " <> c serverKeyFile
|
||||
run $ "openssl req -new -config " <> c opensslServerConfFile <> " -reqexts v3 -key " <> c serverKeyFile <> " -out " <> c serverCsrFile
|
||||
run $ "openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -extfile " <> c opensslServerConfFile <> " -extensions v3 -in " <> c serverCsrFile <> " -CA " <> c caCrtFile <> " -CAkey " <> c caKeyFile <> " -CAcreateserial -out " <> c serverCrtFile
|
||||
@@ -131,6 +141,59 @@ createServerX509 cfgPath x509cfg = do
|
||||
withFile (c fingerprintFile) WriteMode (`B.hPutStrLn` strEncode fp)
|
||||
pure fp
|
||||
|
||||
data CertOptions = CertOptions
|
||||
{ signAlgorithm_ :: Maybe SignAlgorithm,
|
||||
commonName_ :: Maybe HostName
|
||||
}
|
||||
deriving (Show)
|
||||
|
||||
certOptionsP :: Parser CertOptions
|
||||
certOptionsP = do
|
||||
signAlgorithm_ <-
|
||||
optional $
|
||||
option
|
||||
(maybeReader readMaybe)
|
||||
( long "sign-algorithm"
|
||||
<> short 'a'
|
||||
<> help "Set new signature algorithm used for TLS certificates: ED25519, ED448"
|
||||
<> metavar "ALG"
|
||||
)
|
||||
commonName_ <-
|
||||
optional $
|
||||
strOption
|
||||
( long "cn"
|
||||
<> help
|
||||
"Set new Common Name for TLS online certificate"
|
||||
<> metavar "FQDN"
|
||||
)
|
||||
pure CertOptions {signAlgorithm_, commonName_}
|
||||
|
||||
genOnline :: FilePath -> CertOptions -> IO ()
|
||||
genOnline cfgPath CertOptions {signAlgorithm_, commonName_} = do
|
||||
(signAlgorithm, commonName) <-
|
||||
case (signAlgorithm_, commonName_) of
|
||||
(Just alg, Just cn) -> pure (alg, cn)
|
||||
_ ->
|
||||
XF.readSignedObject certPath >>= \case
|
||||
[old] -> either exitError pure . fromX509 . X.signedObject $ X.getSigned old
|
||||
[] -> exitError $ "No certificate found at " <> certPath
|
||||
_ -> exitError $ "Too many certificates at " <> certPath
|
||||
let x509cfg = defaultX509Config {signAlgorithm, commonName}
|
||||
void $ createServerX509_ False cfgPath x509cfg
|
||||
putStrLn "Generated new server credentials"
|
||||
warnCAPrivateKeyFile cfgPath x509cfg
|
||||
where
|
||||
certPath = combine cfgPath $ serverCrtFile defaultX509Config
|
||||
fromX509 X.Certificate {certSignatureAlg, certSubjectDN} = (,) <$> maybe oldAlg Right signAlgorithm_ <*> maybe oldCN Right commonName_
|
||||
where
|
||||
oldAlg = case certSignatureAlg of
|
||||
X.SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash X.PubKeyALG_Ed448 -> Right ED448
|
||||
X.SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash X.PubKeyALG_Ed25519 -> Right ED25519
|
||||
alg -> Left $ "Unexpected signature algorithm " <> show alg
|
||||
oldCN = case X.getDnElement X.DnCommonName certSubjectDN of
|
||||
Nothing -> Left "Certificate subject has no CN element"
|
||||
Just cn -> maybe (Left "Certificate subject CN decoding failed") Right $ asn1CharacterToString cn
|
||||
|
||||
warnCAPrivateKeyFile :: FilePath -> X509Config -> IO ()
|
||||
warnCAPrivateKeyFile cfgPath X509Config {caKeyFile} =
|
||||
putStrLn $
|
||||
@@ -235,3 +298,6 @@ printServiceInfo serverVersion srv@(ProtoServerWithAuth ProtocolServer {keyHash}
|
||||
|
||||
clearDirIfExists :: FilePath -> IO ()
|
||||
clearDirIfExists path = whenM (doesDirectoryExist path) $ listDirectory path >>= mapM_ (removePathForcibly . combine path)
|
||||
|
||||
getEnvPath :: String -> FilePath -> IO FilePath
|
||||
getEnvPath name def = maybe def (\case "" -> def; f -> f) <$> lookupEnv name
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
|
||||
module Simplex.Messaging.Server.Control where
|
||||
|
||||
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
|
||||
import Data.ByteString (ByteString)
|
||||
import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
|
||||
|
||||
data ControlProtocol
|
||||
@@ -11,9 +12,15 @@ data ControlProtocol
|
||||
| CPResume
|
||||
| CPClients
|
||||
| CPStats
|
||||
| CPStatsRTS
|
||||
| CPThreads
|
||||
| CPSockets
|
||||
| CPSocketThreads
|
||||
| CPDelete ByteString
|
||||
| CPSave
|
||||
| CPHelp
|
||||
| CPQuit
|
||||
| CPSkip
|
||||
|
||||
instance StrEncoding ControlProtocol where
|
||||
strEncode = \case
|
||||
@@ -21,16 +28,28 @@ instance StrEncoding ControlProtocol where
|
||||
CPResume -> "resume"
|
||||
CPClients -> "clients"
|
||||
CPStats -> "stats"
|
||||
CPStatsRTS -> "stats-rts"
|
||||
CPThreads -> "threads"
|
||||
CPSockets -> "sockets"
|
||||
CPSocketThreads -> "socket-threads"
|
||||
CPDelete bs -> "delete " <> strEncode bs
|
||||
CPSave -> "save"
|
||||
CPHelp -> "help"
|
||||
CPQuit -> "quit"
|
||||
CPSkip -> ""
|
||||
strP =
|
||||
A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
|
||||
"suspend" -> pure CPSuspend
|
||||
"resume" -> pure CPResume
|
||||
"clients" -> pure CPClients
|
||||
"stats" -> pure CPStats
|
||||
"stats-rts" -> pure CPStatsRTS
|
||||
"threads" -> pure CPThreads
|
||||
"sockets" -> pure CPSockets
|
||||
"socket-threads" -> pure CPSocketThreads
|
||||
"delete" -> CPDelete <$> (A.space *> strP)
|
||||
"save" -> pure CPSave
|
||||
"help" -> pure CPHelp
|
||||
"quit" -> pure CPQuit
|
||||
"" -> pure CPSkip
|
||||
_ -> fail "bad ControlProtocol command"
|
||||
|
||||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Reference in New Issue
Block a user