don't fork unless have proxied commands to process

envelope sizes
reduce transport block
2026-08-30 22:48:26 +00:00 · 2024-04-18 19:40:38 +03:00 · 2024-04-18 12:57:29 +01:00 · 2024-04-18 08:15:19 +01:00 · 2024-04-17 22:42:04 +01:00 · 2024-04-17 19:36:53 +01:00
29 changed files with 976 additions and 284 deletions
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ jobs:
        run: cabal build --enable-tests

      - name: Test
-        timeout-minutes: 30
+        timeout-minutes: 40
        shell: bash
        run: cabal test --test-show-details=direct

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+common:
+  corrId - random BS, used as CbNonce
+  entityId - p2r tlsUniq
+
+# setup
+s->p: "proxy", uri, auth?
+  # unless connected
+  p->r: "p_handshake"
+  p<-r: "r_key", tls-signed dh pub
+s<-r: "r_key", tls-signed dh pub # reply entityId contains tlsUniq
+
+# working
+s ; generate random dh priv, make shared secret
+s->p: s2r("forward", random dh pub, SEND command blob)
+  p->r: p2r("forward", random dh pub, s2r("forward", ...)))
+    r->c@ "msg", ...
+  p<-r: p2r("r_res", s2r("ok" / "error", error))
+s<-p@ s2r("ok" / "error", error)
+
+# expired
+  p<-r@ p2r("error", "key expired")
+s<-p@ "error", "key expired"
+s ; reconnect
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@

 ## Problem

-SMP protocol relays are chosen and can be controlled by the message recipients. It means that the recipients can find out IP addresses of message senders by modifying SMP relay code (or by using proxies and timing correlation), unless the senders use VPN or some overlay network. Tor is an audequate solution in most cases to mitigate it, but it requires additional technical knowledge to install and configure (even installing Orbot on Android is seen as "complex" by many users), and reduces usability because of higher latency.
+SMP protocol relays are chosen and can be controlled by the message recipients. It means that the recipients can find out IP addresses of message senders by modifying SMP relay code (or by using proxies and timing correlation), unless the senders use VPN or some overlay network. Tor is an adequate solution in most cases to mitigate it, but it requires additional technical knowledge to install and configure (even installing Orbot on Android is seen as "complex" by many users), and reduces usability because of higher latency.

-The lack of in-built IP address protection is the main concern of many users, particularly given that most people do not realise that it is lacking by default - without transport protection SimpleX is not perceived as a "whole product".
+The lack of in-built IP address protection is the main concern of many users, particularly given that most people do not realize that it is lacking by default - without transport protection SimpleX is not perceived as a "whole product".

 Similarly, XFTP protocol relays are chosen by senders, and they can be used to detect file recipients' IP addresses.

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Overall, this is not a viable or even appropriate option for the current stage.

 3. SMP / XFTP proxy.

-Introduce SMP and XFTP protocol extenstions to allow message senders and file recipients to delegate the tasks of sending messages and receiving files to the proxies, so that peer-chosen relays can only observe IP addresses of the proxies and not of the users.
+Introduce SMP and XFTP protocol extensions to allow message senders and file recipients to delegate the tasks of sending messages and receiving files to the proxies, so that peer-chosen relays can only observe IP addresses of the proxies and not of the users.

 Pros:
 - no dependency on and lower latency than via Tor
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Below considers this design.

 2. SMP proxy should not be able to observe queue addresses and their count on the destination relays. This requirement is not needed for XFTP proxies, as each file chunk is downloaded only once, so there is no need to hide its address.

-3. There must be no identifiers and cyphertext in common in outgoing and incoming traffic inside TLS (the current designs have this quality).
+3. There must be no identifiers and ciphertext in common in outgoing and incoming traffic inside TLS (the current designs have this quality).

 4. Traffic between the client and destination relays must be e2e encrypted, with MITM-by-proxy mitigated, relying on the relay identity (certificate fingerprint), ideally without any additional fingerprint in relay address.

@@ -97,11 +97,11 @@ This would also reduce the difference in how the traffic looks to the observer -

 The flow of the messages will be:

-1. Client requests proxy to create session with the relay by sending `server` command with the SMP relay address and optional proxy basic AUTH (below). It should be possible to batch multiple session requests into one block, to reduce traffic.
+1. Client requests proxy to create session with the relay by sending `PRXY` command with the SMP relay address and optional proxy basic AUTH (below). It should be possible to batch multiple session requests into one block, to reduce traffic.

-2. Proxy connects to SMP relay, negotiating a shared secret in the handshake that will be used to encrypt all sender blocks inside TLS (proxy-relay encryption). SMP relay also returns in handshake its temporary DH key to agree e2e encryption with the client (sender-relay encryption, to hide metadata sent to the destination relay from proxy).
+2. Proxy connects to SMP relay, negotiating a shared secret via a handshake headers - it will be used to encrypt all sender blocks inside TLS (proxy-relay encryption). DH key returned by SMP relay in handshake will also be used to encrypt client commands, combining it with random per-command keys (sender-relay encryption, to hide metadata sent to the destination relay from proxy).

-3. Proxy replies with `server_id` command including relay session ID to identify it in further requests, relay DH key for e2e encryption with the client - this key is signed with the TLS online private key associated with the certificate (its fingerprint is included in the relay address), and the TLS session ID between proxy and relay (this session ID must be used in transmissions, to mitigate replay attacks as before).
+3. Proxy replies to sender with `PKEY` message using "entityId" transmission field to indicate session ID for using in further requests, relay DH key for _s2r_ encryption with the client - this key is signed with the TLS online private key associated with the certificate (its fingerprint is included in the relay address), and the TLS session ID between proxy and relay (this session ID must be used in transmissions, to mitigate replay attacks as before).

 A possible attack here is that proxy can use this TLS session to replay commands received from the client. Possibly, it could be mitigated with a bloom filter per proxy/SMP relay connection that would reject the repeated DH keys (that need to be used for replay), and also with DH key expiration (this mitigation should allow some acceptable rate of false positives from the bloom filter).

@@ -113,11 +113,11 @@ It is important that the same public key from destination relay is returned to a

 *Unrelated cosideration for SMP protocol privacy improvement*: instead of signing commands to the destination relay, the sender could have a ratchet per queue agreed with the destination relay that would simply use authenticated encryption with per-message symmetric key to encrypt the message on the way to relay, and this encryption would be used as a proof of sender.

-4. Now the client sends `forward` to proxy, which it then forwards to SMP relay, applying additional encryption layer.
+4. Now the client sends `PFWD` to proxy, which it then forwards to SMP relay as `RFWD`, applying _p2r_ encryption layer.

-5. SMP relay sends `response` to proxy applying additional encryption layer, which it then forwards to the client removing the additional encryption layer.
+5. SMP relay sends `RRES` to proxy applying _p2r_ encryption layer, which it then forwards to the client as `PRES`, removing the _p2r_ encryption layer.

-Effectively it works as a simplified two-hop onion routing with the first relay (proxy) chosen by the sending client and the second relay chosen by the recipient, not only protecting senders' IP addresses from the recipients' relays, but also preventing recipients relays from correlating senders' traffic to different queues, as TLS session is owned by the proxy now and it mixes the traffic from multiple senders. To correlate traffic to users, proxy and relay would have to combine their information. SMP relays are still able to correlate traffic to receiving users via transport session.
+Effectively it works as a simplified two-hop onion routing with the first relay (proxy) chosen by the sending client and the second relay chosen by the recipient, not only protecting senders' IP addresses from the recipients' relays, but also preventing recipients' relays from correlating senders' traffic to different queues, as TLS session is owned by the proxy now and it mixes the traffic from multiple senders. To correlate traffic to users, proxy and relay would have to combine their information. SMP relays are still able to correlate traffic to receiving users via transport session.

 Sequence diagram for sending the message via SMP proxy:

@@ -126,33 +126,33 @@ Sequence diagram for sending the message via SMP proxy:
 |  sending  |               |    SMP    |                     |    SMP    |              | receiving |
 |  client   |               |   proxy   |                     |   relay   |              |  client   |
 -------------               -------------                     -------------              -------------
-     |       `server`             |                                 |                          |
-     | -------------------------> |   create TLS session, get keys  |                          |
+     |           `PRXY`           |                                 |                          |
+     | -------------------------> |                                 |                          |
     |                            | ------------------------------> |                          |
-     |        `server_id`         |       (if doesn't exist)        |                          |
+     |                            |          SMP handshake          |                          |
+     |                            | <------------------------------ |                          |
+     |           `PKEY`           |                                 |                          |
     | <------------------------- |                                 |                          |
     |                            |                                 |                          |
-     | TLS(F:s2r(SEND(e2e(msg)))) |                                 |                          |
-     | -------------------------> | TLS(F:p2r(s2r(SEND(e2e(msg))))) |                          |
+     |        `PFWD` (s2r)        |                                 |                          |
+     | -------------------------> |                                 |                          |
+     |                            |           `RFWD` (p2r)          |                          |
     |                            | ------------------------------> |                          |
-     |                            |                                 |                          |
-     |                            |     TLS(R:p2r(s2r(OK/ERR)))     |                          |
-     |     TLS(R:s2r(OK/ERR))     | <------------------------------ |                          |
-     | <------------------------- |                                 | TLS(MSG(r2c(e2e(msg))))  |
-     |                            |                                 | -----------------------> |
-     |                            |                                 |                          |
-     |                            |                                 |        TLS(ACK)          |
+     |                            |           `RRES` (p2r)          |                          |
+     |                            | <------------------------------ |                          |
+     |        `PRES` (s2r)        |                                 |           `MSG`          |
+     | <------------------------- |                                 | -----------------------> |
+     |                            |                                 |           `ACK`          |
     |                            |                                 | <----------------------- |
     |                            |                                 |                          |
     |                            |                                 |                          |
-
 ```

-Below diagram shows the encrypttion layers for `forward` and `response` commands:
+Below diagram shows the encrypttion layers for `PFWD`/`RFWD` commands and `RRES`/`PRES` responses:

- s2r (added) - encryption between client and SMP relay, with relay key returned in server_id command, with MITM by proxy mitigated by verifying the certificate fingerprint included in the relay address.
+- s2r (added) - encryption between client and SMP relay, with relay key returned in relay handshake, with MITM by proxy mitigated by verifying the certificate fingerprint included in the relay address.
 - e2e (exists now) - end-to-end encryption per SMP queue, with double ratchet e2e encryption inside it.
- p2r (added) - additional encryption between proxy and SMP relay with key agreed in the handshake, to mitigate traffic correlation inside TLS. This key could also be signed by the same certificate, if we don't want to rely on TLS security.
+- p2r (added) - additional encryption between proxy and SMP relay with the shared secret agreed in the handshake, to mitigate traffic correlation inside TLS.
 - r2c (exists now) additional encryption between SMP relay and client to prevent traffic correlation inside TLS.

 ```
@@ -167,27 +167,32 @@ Below diagram shows the encrypttion layers for `forward` and `response` commands
 -----------------             -----------------  -- TLS --  -----------------             -----------------
 ```

-When proxy connects to SMP relay it would indicate in the handshake that it will use proxy protocol and the SMP relay would expect the same `forward` commands and reply with `response`s.
+Question: should proxy declare its role in handshake? When proxy connects to SMP relay it would indicate in the handshake that it will act as a proxy and the SMP relay would expect the same `forward` commands and reply with `response`s.

-Below syntax aims to fit in 16kb block using spare capacity in SMP protocol.
+Common SMP transmission format (v4), for reference:

 ```abnf
-proxy_block = padded(proxy_transmission, 16384)
-proxy_transmission = corr_id relay_session_id proxy_command
-corr_id = length *8 OCTET
-proxy_command = server / server_id / forward / response / error
-server = "S" address [relay_basic_auth] ; creates transport session between proxy and relay
-server_id = "I" relay_session_id tls_session_id signed_relay_key ;
-    ; session_id is the TLS session ID between proxy and relay, it has to be included inside encrypted block to prevent replay attacks
-forward = %s"F" random_dh_pub_key encrypted_block ; it's important that a new key is used for each command, to prevent any correlation by proxy or by destination relay
-response = %s"R" encrypted_block; response received from the destination SMP relay
-relay_session_id = length *8 OCTET
-error = %s"E" error
+paddedTransmission = <padded(transmission), 16384>
+transmission = signature signed
+signature = 0 ; empty signatures here
+signed = sessionIdentifier corrId entityId (smpCommand / brokerMsg)
 ```

-The overhead is: 1+8 (corrId) + 1+8 (relay_session_id) + 1 (command) + 1+32 (random_dh_pub_key) + 2 (original length) + 16 (auth tag for e2e encryption) + 16 (auth tag for proxy to relay encryption) = 86 bytes. The reserve for sent messages in SMP is ~84 bytes, so it should about fit with some reduced bytes somewhere.
+- `corrId` is fully random each time and used as a nonce for encrypted blocks.
+- `entityId` carries tlsUniq from the current proxy-to-relay connection.
+- `smpCommand` gets extended with `s2p_command / p2r_command`.
+- `brokerMsg` gets extended with `r_key / r_response`.

-Another possible design is to allow mixing sent messages and normal SMP commands in the same transport connection, but it can make fitting in the block a bit harder, additional overhead would be: 1 (transmission count) + 2 (transmission size) + 1 (empty signature) = 4 bytes.
+```abnf
+s2p_command = proxy / forward
+p2r_command = p_handshake ; forward is
+proxy = %s"PRXY" SP relayUri SP basicAuth
+relayUri = length %s"smp://" serverIdentity "@" srvHost [":" port]
+forward = %s"PFWD" SP dhPublic SP encryptedBlock
+r_key = %s"PKEY" SP dhPublic
+r_response = %s"RRES" SP encryptedBlock
+dhPublic = length x509encoded
+```

 The above assumes that the client can only send one message to an SMP relay and then has to wait for response before sending the next message. Missing the response would cause re-delivery (further improvement is possible when proxy detects these redelieveries and not send them to relays but simply reply with the same response).

@@ -652,6 +652,7 @@ test-suite simplexmq-test
      ServerTests
      SMPAgentClient
      SMPClient
+      SMPProxyTests
      Util
      XFTPAgent
      XFTPCLI
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
    RecipientId,
    SenderId,
  )
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN, HandshakeError (VERSION), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), supportedParameters)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ALPN, HandshakeError (VERSION), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..), supportedParameters)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportClientConfig, TransportHost, alpn)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.Client
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ import UnliftIO.Directory
 data XFTPClient = XFTPClient
  { http2Client :: HTTP2Client,
    transportSession :: TransportSession FileResponse,
-    thParams :: THandleParams XFTPVersion,
+    thParams :: THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TClient,
    config :: XFTPClientConfig
  }

@@ -120,19 +120,21 @@ getXFTPClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) config@XFTPClientConfig {clientALPN
  atomically $ writeTVar clientVar $ Just c
  pure c

-xftpClientHandshakeV1 :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> VersionRangeXFTP -> C.KeyHash -> HTTP2Client -> THandleParamsXFTP -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO THandleParamsXFTP
+xftpClientHandshakeV1 :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> VersionRangeXFTP -> C.KeyHash -> HTTP2Client -> THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (THandleParamsXFTP 'TClient)
 xftpClientHandshakeV1 g serverVRange keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) c@HTTP2Client {sessionId, serverKey} thParams0 = do
-  shs <- getServerHandshake
+  shs@XFTPServerHandshake {authPubKey = ck} <- getServerHandshake
  (v, sk) <- processServerHandshake shs
  (k, pk) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
  sendClientHandshake XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = k}
-  pure thParams0 {thAuth = Just THandleAuth {peerPubKey = sk, privKey = pk}, thVersion = v}
+  pure thParams0 {thAuth = Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = sk, serverCertKey = ck, clientPrivKey = pk}, thVersion = v}
  where
+    getServerHandshake :: ExceptT XFTPClientError IO XFTPServerHandshake
    getServerHandshake = do
      let helloReq = H.requestNoBody "POST" "/" []
      HTTP2Response {respBody = HTTP2Body {bodyHead = shsBody}} <-
        liftError' (const $ PCEResponseError HANDSHAKE) $ sendRequest c helloReq Nothing
      liftHS . smpDecode =<< liftHS (C.unPad shsBody)
+    processServerHandshake :: XFTPServerHandshake -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (VersionXFTP, C.PublicKeyX25519)
    processServerHandshake XFTPServerHandshake {xftpVersionRange, sessionId = serverSessId, authPubKey = serverAuth} = do
      unless (sessionId == serverSessId) $ throwError $ PCEResponseError SESSION
      case xftpVersionRange `compatibleVersion` serverVRange of
@@ -145,6 +147,7 @@ xftpClientHandshakeV1 g serverVRange keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) c@HTTP2Client {sessi
              _ -> throwError "bad certificate"
            pubKey <- maybe (throwError "bad server key type") (`C.verifyX509` exact) serverKey
            C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey
+    sendClientHandshake :: XFTPClientHandshake -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO ()
    sendClientHandshake chs = do
      chs' <- liftHS $ C.pad (smpEncode chs) xftpBlockSize
      let chsReq = H.requestBuilder "POST" "/" [] $ byteString chs'
@@ -183,9 +186,11 @@ xftpClientError = \case

 sendXFTPCommand :: forall p. FilePartyI p => XFTPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> XFTPFileId -> FileCommand p -> Maybe XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (FileResponse, HTTP2Body)
 sendXFTPCommand c@XFTPClient {thParams} pKey fId cmd chunkSpec_ = do
+  -- TODO random corrId
+  let corrIdUsedAsNonce = ""
  t <-
    liftEither . first PCETransportError $
-      xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams pKey ("", fId, FileCmd (sFileParty @p) cmd)
+      xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams pKey (corrIdUsedAsNonce, fId, FileCmd (sFileParty @p) cmd)
  sendXFTPTransmission c t chunkSpec_

 sendXFTPTransmission :: XFTPClient -> ByteString -> Maybe XFTPChunkSpec -> ExceptT XFTPClientError IO (FileResponse, HTTP2Body)
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
    ProtocolErrorType (..),
    ProtocolMsgTag (..),
    ProtocolType (..),
-    RcvPublicDhKey,
    RcvPublicAuthKey,
+    RcvPublicDhKey,
    RecipientId,
    SenderId,
    SentRawTransmission,
@@ -48,14 +48,15 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
    SndPublicAuthKey,
    Transmission,
    TransmissionForAuth (..),
-    encodeTransmissionForAuth,
+    CorrId (..),
    encodeTransmission,
+    encodeTransmissionForAuth,
    messageTagP,
    tDecodeParseValidate,
    tEncodeBatch1,
    tParse,
  )
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (THandleParams (..), TransportError (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Util ((<$?>))

 xftpBlockSize :: Int
@@ -325,12 +326,12 @@ checkParty' c = case testEquality (sFileParty @p) (sFileParty @p') of
  Just Refl -> Just c
  _ -> Nothing

-xftpEncodeAuthTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
+xftpEncodeAuthTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
 xftpEncodeAuthTransmission thParams@THandleParams {thAuth} pKey (corrId, fId, msg) = do
  let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, fId, msg)
-  xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission thAuth (Just pKey) corrId tForAuth
+  xftpEncodeBatch1 . (,tToSend) =<< authTransmission thAuth (Just pKey) (C.cbNonce $ bs corrId) tForAuth

-xftpEncodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
+xftpEncodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion p -> Transmission c -> Either TransportError ByteString
 xftpEncodeTransmission thParams (corrId, fId, msg) = do
  let t = encodeTransmission thParams (corrId, fId, msg)
  xftpEncodeBatch1 (Nothing, t)
@@ -339,7 +340,7 @@ xftpEncodeTransmission thParams (corrId, fId, msg) = do
 xftpEncodeBatch1 :: SentRawTransmission -> Either TransportError ByteString
 xftpEncodeBatch1 t = first (const TELargeMsg) $ C.pad (tEncodeBatch1 t) xftpBlockSize

-xftpDecodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion -> ByteString -> Either XFTPErrorType (SignedTransmission e c)
+xftpDecodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding XFTPVersion e c => THandleParams XFTPVersion p -> ByteString -> Either XFTPErrorType (SignedTransmission e c)
 xftpDecodeTransmission thParams t = do
  t' <- first (const BLOCK) $ C.unPad t
  case tParse thParams t' of
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats
 import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (SessionId, THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (SessionId, THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TransportPeer (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Buffer (trimCR)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File (fileBlockSize)
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
 type M a = ReaderT XFTPEnv IO a

 data XFTPTransportRequest = XFTPTransportRequest
-  { thParams :: THandleParamsXFTP,
+  { thParams :: THandleParamsXFTP 'TServer,
    reqBody :: HTTP2Body,
    request :: H.Request,
    sendResponse :: H.Response -> IO ()
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ runXFTPServerBlocking started cfg = newXFTPServerEnv cfg >>= runReaderT (xftpSer

 data Handshake
  = HandshakeSent C.PrivateKeyX25519
-  | HandshakeAccepted THandleAuth VersionXFTP
+  | HandshakeAccepted (THandleAuth 'TServer) VersionXFTP

 xftpServer :: XFTPServerConfig -> TMVar Bool -> M ()
 xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpiration, fileExpiration} started = do
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
              Nothing -> pure () -- handshake response sent
              Just thParams -> processRequest req0 {thParams} -- proceed with new version (XXX: may as well switch the request handler here)
          _ -> liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseNoBody N.ok200 [] -- shouldn't happen: means server picked handshake protocol it doesn't know about
-    xftpServerHandshakeV1 :: X.CertificateChain -> C.APrivateSignKey -> TMap SessionId Handshake -> XFTPTransportRequest -> M (Maybe (THandleParams XFTPVersion))
+    xftpServerHandshakeV1 :: X.CertificateChain -> C.APrivateSignKey -> TMap SessionId Handshake -> XFTPTransportRequest -> M (Maybe (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer))
    xftpServerHandshakeV1 chain serverSignKey sessions XFTPTransportRequest {thParams = thParams@THandleParams {sessionId}, reqBody = HTTP2Body {bodyHead}, sendResponse} = do
      s <- atomically $ TM.lookup sessionId sessions
      r <- runExceptT $ case s of
@@ -138,18 +138,18 @@ xftpServer cfg@XFTPServerConfig {xftpPort, transportConfig, inactiveClientExpira
          shs <- encodeXftp hs
          liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseBuilder N.ok200 [] shs
          pure Nothing
-        processClientHandshake privKey = do
+        processClientHandshake pk = do
          unless (B.length bodyHead == xftpBlockSize) $ throwError HANDSHAKE
          body <- liftHS $ C.unPad bodyHead
          XFTPClientHandshake {xftpVersion, keyHash, authPubKey} <- liftHS $ smpDecode body
          kh <- asks serverIdentity
          unless (keyHash == kh) $ throwError HANDSHAKE
          unless (xftpVersion `isCompatible` supportedFileServerVRange) $ throwError HANDSHAKE
-          let auth = THandleAuth {peerPubKey = authPubKey, privKey}
+          let auth = THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey = authPubKey, serverPrivKey = pk}
          atomically $ TM.insert sessionId (HandshakeAccepted auth xftpVersion) sessions
          liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseNoBody N.ok200 []
          pure Nothing
-        sendError :: XFTPErrorType -> M (Maybe (THandleParams XFTPVersion))
+        sendError :: XFTPErrorType -> M (Maybe (THandleParams XFTPVersion 'TServer))
        sendError err = do
          runExceptT (encodeXftp err) >>= \case
            Right bs -> liftIO . sendResponse $ H.responseBuilder N.ok200 [] bs
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ processRequest XFTPTransportRequest {thParams, reqBody = body@HTTP2Body {bodyHea

 data VerificationResult = VRVerified XFTPRequest | VRFailed

-verifyXFTPTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth, C.CbNonce) -> Maybe TransmissionAuth -> ByteString -> XFTPFileId -> FileCmd -> M VerificationResult
+verifyXFTPTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer, C.CbNonce) -> Maybe TransmissionAuth -> ByteString -> XFTPFileId -> FileCmd -> M VerificationResult
 verifyXFTPTransmission auth_ tAuth authorized fId cmd =
  case cmd of
    FileCmd SFSender (FNEW file rcps auth') -> pure $ XFTPReqNew file rcps auth' `verifyWith` sndKey file
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE MultiWayIf #-}
@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
 import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CommandError)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (HandshakeError (..), SessionId, THandle (..), THandleParams (..), TransportError (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (HandshakeError (..), SessionId, THandle (..), THandleParams (..), TransportError (..), TransportPeer (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.HTTP2.File
 import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Version
@@ -76,8 +77,8 @@ type VersionRangeXFTP = VersionRange XFTPVersion
 pattern VersionXFTP :: Word16 -> VersionXFTP
 pattern VersionXFTP v = Version v

-type THandleXFTP c = THandle XFTPVersion c
-type THandleParamsXFTP = THandleParams XFTPVersion
+type THandleXFTP c p = THandle XFTPVersion c p
+type THandleParamsXFTP p = THandleParams XFTPVersion p

 initialXFTPVersion :: VersionXFTP
 initialXFTPVersion = VersionXFTP 1
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ supportedFileServerVRange :: VersionRangeXFTP
 supportedFileServerVRange = mkVersionRange initialXFTPVersion currentXFTPVersion

 -- XFTP protocol does not support handshake
-xftpClientHandshakeStub :: c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeXFTP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle XFTPVersion c)
+xftpClientHandshakeStub :: c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeXFTP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle XFTPVersion c 'TClient)
 xftpClientHandshakeStub _c _ks _keyHash _xftpVRange = throwError $ TEHandshake VERSION

 data XFTPServerHandshake = XFTPServerHandshake
@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ compatibleContactUri (CRContactUri ConnReqUriData {crAgentVRange, crSmpQueues =
  AgentConfig {smpClientVRange, smpAgentVRange} <- asks config
  pure $
    (,)
-      <$> (qUri `compatibleVersion` smpClientVRange) 
+      <$> (qUri `compatibleVersion` smpClientVRange)
      <*> (crAgentVRange `compatibleVersion` smpAgentVRange pqSup)

 versionPQSupport_ :: VersionSMPA -> Maybe CR.VersionE2E -> PQSupport
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
    suspendSMPQueue,
    deleteSMPQueue,
    deleteSMPQueues,
+    createSMPProxySession,
+    proxySMPMessage,
+    forwardSMPMessage,
    sendProtocolCommand,

    -- * Supporting types and client configuration
@@ -69,6 +72,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Client
    chooseTransportHost,
    proxyUsername,
    temporaryClientError,
+    smpProxyError,
    ServerTransmission,
    ClientCommand,

@@ -84,8 +88,8 @@ import Control.Concurrent.Async
 import Control.Concurrent.STM
 import Control.Exception
 import Control.Monad
-import Control.Monad.IO.Class (liftIO)
 import Control.Monad.Except
+import Control.Monad.IO.Class (liftIO)
 import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
 import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
 import qualified Data.Aeson.TH as J
@@ -98,9 +102,12 @@ import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
 import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
 import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
 import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime (..), getCurrentTime)
+import qualified Data.X509 as X
+import qualified Data.X509.Validation as XV
 import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
 import Numeric.Natural
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
+import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
 import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (defaultJSON, dropPrefix, enumJSON)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
@@ -110,7 +117,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (SocksProxy, TransportClientConfig (..), TransportHost (..), runTransportClient)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.KeepAlive
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets (WS)
-import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, raceAny_, threadDelay')
+import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, liftEitherWith, raceAny_, threadDelay')
 import Simplex.Messaging.Version
 import System.Timeout (timeout)

@@ -119,7 +126,7 @@ import System.Timeout (timeout)
 -- Use 'getSMPClient' to connect to an SMP server and create a client handle.
 data ProtocolClient v err msg = ProtocolClient
  { action :: Maybe (Async ()),
-    thParams :: THandleParams v,
+    thParams :: THandleParams v 'TClient,
    sessionTs :: UTCTime,
    client_ :: PClient v err msg
  }
@@ -138,7 +145,7 @@ data PClient v err msg = PClient
    msgQ :: Maybe (TBQueue (ServerTransmission v msg))
  }

-smpClientStub :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> ByteString -> VersionSMP -> Maybe THandleAuth -> STM SMPClient
+smpClientStub :: TVar ChaChaDRG -> ByteString -> VersionSMP -> Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient) -> STM SMPClient
 smpClientStub g sessionId thVersion thAuth = do
  connected <- newTVar False
  clientCorrId <- C.newRandomDRG g
@@ -387,10 +394,10 @@ getProtocolClient g transportSession@(_, srv, _) cfg@ProtocolClientConfig {qSize
          raceAny_ ([send c' th, process c', receive c' th] <> [ping c' | smpPingInterval > 0])
            `finally` disconnected c'

-    send :: Transport c => ProtocolClient v err msg -> THandle v c -> IO ()
+    send :: Transport c => ProtocolClient v err msg -> THandle v c 'TClient -> IO ()
    send ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}} h = forever $ atomically (readTBQueue sndQ) >>= tPutLog h

-    receive :: Transport c => ProtocolClient v err msg -> THandle v c -> IO ()
+    receive :: Transport c => ProtocolClient v err msg -> THandle v c 'TClient -> IO ()
    receive ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {rcvQ}} h = forever $ tGet h >>= atomically . writeTBQueue rcvQ

    ping :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> IO ()
@@ -480,6 +487,19 @@ temporaryClientError = \case
  _ -> False
 {-# INLINE temporaryClientError #-}

+-- TODO keep error params
+smpProxyError :: SMPClientError -> ErrorType
+smpProxyError = \case
+  PCEProtocolError _ -> PROXY PROTOCOL
+  PCEResponseError _ -> PROXY RESPONSE
+  PCEUnexpectedResponse _ -> PROXY UNEXPECTED
+  PCEResponseTimeout -> PROXY TIMEOUT
+  PCENetworkError -> PROXY NETWORK
+  PCEIncompatibleHost -> PROXY BAD_HOST
+  PCETransportError _ -> PROXY TRANSPORT
+  PCECryptoError _ -> INTERNAL
+  PCEIOError _ -> INTERNAL
+
 -- | Create a new SMP queue.
 --
 -- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#create-queue-command
@@ -630,6 +650,102 @@ deleteSMPQueues :: SMPClient -> NonEmpty (RcvPrivateAuthKey, RecipientId) -> IO
 deleteSMPQueues = okSMPCommands DEL
 {-# INLINE deleteSMPQueues #-}

+-- TODO picture
+
+-- send PRXY :: SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> Command Sender
+-- receives PKEY :: SessionId -> X.CertificateChain -> X.SignedExact X.PubKey -> BrokerMsg
+createSMPProxySession :: SMPClient -> SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO (SessionId, VersionSMP, C.PublicKeyX25519)
+createSMPProxySession c relayServ@ProtocolServer {keyHash = C.KeyHash kh} proxyAuth =
+  sendSMPCommand c Nothing "" (PRXY relayServ proxyAuth) >>= \case
+    -- XXX: rfc says sessionId should be in the entityId of response
+    PKEY sId vr (chain, key) -> do
+      case supportedClientSMPRelayVRange `compatibleVersion` vr of
+        Nothing -> throwE PCEIncompatibleHost -- TODO different error
+        Just (Compatible v) -> liftEitherWith x509Error $ (sId,v,) <$> validateRelay chain key
+    r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
+  where
+    x509Error :: String -> SMPClientError
+    x509Error _msg = PCEResponseError $ error "TODO: x509 error" -- TODO different error
+    validateRelay :: X.CertificateChain -> X.SignedExact X.PubKey -> Either String C.PublicKeyX25519
+    validateRelay (X.CertificateChain cert) exact = do
+      serverKey <- case cert of
+        [leaf, ca]
+          | XV.Fingerprint kh == XV.getFingerprint ca X.HashSHA256 ->
+              C.x509ToPublic (X.certPubKey . X.signedObject $ X.getSigned leaf, []) >>= C.pubKey
+        _ -> throwError "bad certificate"
+      pubKey <- C.verifyX509 serverKey exact
+      C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey
+
+-- consider how to process slow responses - is it handled somehow locally or delegated to the caller
+-- this method is used in the client
+-- sends PFWD :: C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> Command Sender
+-- receives PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
+proxySMPMessage ::
+  SMPClient ->
+  -- proxy session from PKEY
+  SessionId ->
+  VersionSMP ->
+  C.PublicKeyX25519 ->
+  -- message to deliver
+  Maybe SndPrivateAuthKey ->
+  SenderId ->
+  MsgFlags ->
+  MsgBody ->
+  ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
+-- TODO use version
+proxySMPMessage c@ProtocolClient {thParams = proxyThParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId = g}} sessionId _v serverKey spKey sId flags msg = do
+  -- prepare params
+  let serverThAuth = (\ta -> ta {serverPeerPubKey = serverKey}) <$> thAuth proxyThParams
+      serverThParams = proxyThParams {sessionId, thAuth = serverThAuth}
+  (cmdPubKey, cmdPrivKey) <- liftIO . atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.X25519 g
+  let cmdSecret = C.dh' serverKey cmdPrivKey
+  nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- liftIO . atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
+  -- encode
+  let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth serverThParams (CorrId corrId, sId, Cmd SSender $ SEND flags msg)
+  auth <- liftEitherWith PCETransportError $ authTransmission serverThAuth spKey nonce tForAuth
+  b <- case batchTransmissions (batch serverThParams) (blockSize serverThParams) [Right (auth, tToSend)] of
+    [] -> throwE $ PCETransportError TELargeMsg -- some other error. Internal?
+    TBError e _ : _ -> throwE $ PCETransportError e -- large message error?
+    TBTransmission s _ : _ -> pure s
+    TBTransmissions s _ _ : _ -> pure s
+  et <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt cmdSecret nonce b paddedProxiedMsgLength
+  sendProtocolCommand_ c (Just nonce) Nothing sessionId (Cmd SProxiedClient (PFWD cmdPubKey et)) >>= \case
+    -- TODO support PKEY + resend?
+    PRES (EncResponse er) -> do
+      t' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt cmdSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) er
+      case tParse proxyThParams t' of
+        t'' :| [] -> case tDecodeParseValidate proxyThParams t'' of
+          (_auth, _signed, (_c, _e, r)) -> case r of -- TODO: verify
+            Left e -> throwE $ PCEResponseError e
+            Right OK -> pure ()
+            Right (ERR e) -> throwE $ PCEProtocolError e
+            Right u -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow u -- possibly differentiate unexpected response from server/proxy
+        _ -> throwE $ PCETransportError TEBadBlock
+    r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r -- from proxy
+
+-- this method is used in the proxy
+-- sends RFWD :: EncFwdTransmission -> Command Sender
+-- receives RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg
+-- proxy should send PRES to the client with EncResponse
+forwardSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> CorrId -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO EncResponse
+forwardSMPMessage c@ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId = g}} fwdCorrId fwdKey fwdTransmission = do
+  -- prepare params
+  sessSecret <- case thAuth thParams of
+    Nothing -> throwError $ PCEProtocolError INTERNAL -- different error - proxy didn't pass key?
+    Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey, clientPrivKey} -> pure $ C.dh' serverPeerPubKey clientPrivKey
+  nonce <- liftIO . atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
+  -- wrap
+  let fwdT = FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdKey, fwdTransmission}
+  eft <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ EncFwdTransmission <$> C.cbEncrypt sessSecret nonce (smpEncode fwdT) paddedForwardedMsgLength
+  -- send
+  sendProtocolCommand_ c (Just nonce) Nothing "" (Cmd SSender (RFWD eft)) >>= \case
+    RRES (EncFwdResponse efr) -> do
+      -- unwrap
+      r' <- liftEitherWith PCECryptoError $ C.cbDecrypt sessSecret (C.reverseNonce nonce) efr
+      FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = _, fwdResponse} <- liftEitherWith (const $ PCEResponseError BLOCK) $ smpDecode r'
+      pure fwdResponse
+    r -> throwE . PCEUnexpectedResponse $ bshow r
+
 okSMPCommand :: PartyI p => Command p -> SMPClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> QueueId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
 okSMPCommand cmd c pKey qId =
  sendSMPCommand c (Just pKey) qId cmd >>= \case
@@ -693,8 +809,11 @@ sendBatch c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}} b = do

 -- | Send Protocol command
 sendProtocolCommand :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> EntityId -> ProtoCommand msg -> ExceptT (ProtocolClientError err) IO msg
-sendProtocolCommand c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}, thParams = THandleParams {batch, blockSize}} pKey entId cmd =
-  ExceptT $ uncurry sendRecv =<< mkTransmission c (pKey, entId, cmd)
+sendProtocolCommand c = sendProtocolCommand_ c Nothing
+
+sendProtocolCommand_ :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> Maybe C.CbNonce -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> EntityId -> ProtoCommand msg -> ExceptT (ProtocolClientError err) IO msg
+sendProtocolCommand_ c@ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {sndQ}, thParams = THandleParams {batch, blockSize}} nonce_ pKey entId cmd =
+  ExceptT $ uncurry sendRecv =<< mkTransmission_ c nonce_ (pKey, entId, cmd)
  where
    -- two separate "atomically" needed to avoid blocking
    sendRecv :: Either TransportError SentRawTransmission -> Request err msg -> IO (Either (ProtocolClientError err) msg)
@@ -713,33 +832,35 @@ getResponse :: ProtocolClient v err msg -> Request err msg -> IO (Response err m
 getResponse ProtocolClient {client_ = PClient {tcpTimeout, pingErrorCount}} Request {entityId, responseVar} = do
  response <-
    timeout tcpTimeout (atomically (takeTMVar responseVar)) >>= \case
+      -- BTW: another registerDelay candidate. Also, crashes caller with BlockedIndef.
      Just r -> atomically (writeTVar pingErrorCount 0) $> r
      Nothing -> pure $ Left PCEResponseTimeout
  pure Response {entityId, response}

-mkTransmission :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
-mkTransmission ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCommands}} (pKey_, entId, cmd) = do
-  corrId <- atomically getNextCorrId
-  let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, entId, cmd)
-      auth = authTransmission (thAuth thParams) pKey_ corrId tForAuth
-  r <- atomically $ mkRequest corrId
+mkTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
+mkTransmission c = mkTransmission_ c Nothing
+
+mkTransmission_ :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg) => ProtocolClient v err msg -> Maybe C.CbNonce -> ClientCommand msg -> IO (PCTransmission err msg)
+mkTransmission_ ProtocolClient {thParams, client_ = PClient {clientCorrId, sentCommands}} nonce_ (pKey_, entId, cmd) = do
+  nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- maybe (atomically $ C.randomCbNonce clientCorrId) pure nonce_
+  let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, entId, cmd)
+      auth = authTransmission (thAuth thParams) pKey_ nonce tForAuth
+  r <- atomically $ mkRequest (CorrId corrId)
  pure ((,tToSend) <$> auth, r)
  where
-    getNextCorrId :: STM CorrId
-    getNextCorrId = CorrId <$> C.randomBytes 24 clientCorrId -- also used as nonce
    mkRequest :: CorrId -> STM (Request err msg)
    mkRequest corrId = do
      r <- Request entId <$> newEmptyTMVar
      TM.insert corrId r sentCommands
      pure r

-authTransmission :: Maybe THandleAuth -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> CorrId -> ByteString -> Either TransportError (Maybe TransmissionAuth)
-authTransmission thAuth pKey_ (CorrId corrId) t = traverse authenticate pKey_
+authTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient) -> Maybe C.APrivateAuthKey -> C.CbNonce -> ByteString -> Either TransportError (Maybe TransmissionAuth)
+authTransmission thAuth pKey_ nonce t = traverse authenticate pKey_
  where
    authenticate :: C.APrivateAuthKey -> Either TransportError TransmissionAuth
    authenticate (C.APrivateAuthKey a pk) = case a of
      C.SX25519 -> case thAuth of
-        Just THandleAuth {peerPubKey} -> Right $ TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate peerPubKey pk (C.cbNonce corrId) t
+        Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k} -> Right $ TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk nonce t
        Nothing -> Left TENoServerAuth
      C.SEd25519 -> sign pk
      C.SEd448 -> sign pk
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ data SMPClientAgent = SMPClientAgent
    agentQ :: TBQueue SMPClientAgentEvent,
    randomDrg :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
    smpClients :: TMap SMPServer SMPClientVar,
+    smpSessions :: TMap SessionId SMPClient,
    srvSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey),
    pendingSrvSubs :: TMap SMPServer (TMap SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey),
    reconnections :: TVar [Async ()],
@@ -135,6 +136,7 @@ newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} randomDrg
  msgQ <- newTBQueue msgQSize
  agentQ <- newTBQueue agentQSize
  smpClients <- TM.empty
+  smpSessions <- TM.empty
  srvSubs <- TM.empty
  pendingSrvSubs <- TM.empty
  reconnections <- newTVar []
@@ -147,6 +149,7 @@ newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} randomDrg
        agentQ,
        randomDrg,
        smpClients,
+        smpSessions,
        srvSubs,
        pendingSrvSubs,
        reconnections,
@@ -155,7 +158,7 @@ newSMPClientAgent agentCfg@SMPClientAgentConfig {msgQSize, agentQSize} randomDrg
      }

 getSMPServerClient' :: SMPClientAgent -> SMPServer -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO SMPClient
-getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ, randomDrg, workerSeq} srv =
+getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, smpSessions, msgQ, randomDrg, workerSeq} srv =
  atomically getClientVar >>= either newSMPClient waitForSMPClient
  where
    getClientVar :: STM (Either SMPClientVar SMPClientVar)
@@ -178,7 +181,9 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ, randomDrg, wo
          tryE (connectClient v) >>= \r -> case r of
            Right smp -> do
              logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ "Agent connected to " <> showServer srv
-              atomically $ putTMVar (sessionVar v) r
+              atomically $ do
+                putTMVar (sessionVar v) r
+                TM.insert (sessionId $ thParams smp) smp smpSessions
              successAction smp
            Left e -> do
              if e == PCENetworkError || e == PCEResponseTimeout
@@ -200,13 +205,14 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ, randomDrg, wo
    connectClient v = ExceptT $ getProtocolClient randomDrg (1, srv, Nothing) (smpCfg agentCfg) (Just msgQ) (clientDisconnected v)

    clientDisconnected :: SMPClientVar -> SMPClient -> IO ()
-    clientDisconnected v _ = do
-      removeClientAndSubs v >>= (`forM_` serverDown)
+    clientDisconnected v smp = do
+      removeClientAndSubs v smp >>= (`forM_` serverDown)
      logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ "Agent disconnected from " <> showServer srv

-    removeClientAndSubs :: SMPClientVar -> IO (Maybe (Map SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey))
-    removeClientAndSubs v = atomically $ do
+    removeClientAndSubs :: SMPClientVar -> SMPClient -> IO (Maybe (Map SMPSub C.APrivateAuthKey))
+    removeClientAndSubs v smp = atomically $ do
      removeSessVar v srv smpClients
+      TM.delete (sessionId $ thParams smp) smpSessions
      TM.lookupDelete srv (srvSubs ca) >>= mapM updateSubs
      where
        updateSubs sVar = do
@@ -271,6 +277,9 @@ getSMPServerClient' ca@SMPClientAgent {agentCfg, smpClients, msgQ, randomDrg, wo
    notify :: SMPClientAgentEvent -> IO ()
    notify evt = atomically $ writeTBQueue (agentQ ca) evt

+lookupSMPServerClient :: SMPClientAgent -> SessionId -> STM (Maybe SMPClient)
+lookupSMPServerClient SMPClientAgent {smpSessions} sessId = TM.lookup sessId smpSessions
+
 closeSMPClientAgent :: SMPClientAgent -> IO ()
 closeSMPClientAgent c = do
  closeSMPServerClients c
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
    sbEncrypt_,
    cbNonce,
    randomCbNonce,
+    reverseNonce,

    -- * NaCl crypto_secretbox
    SbKey (unSbKey),
@@ -756,6 +757,8 @@ data Signature (a :: Algorithm) where
  SignatureEd25519 :: Ed25519.Signature -> Signature Ed25519
  SignatureEd448 :: Ed448.Signature -> Signature Ed448

+deriving instance Eq (Signature a)
+
 deriving instance Show (Signature a)

 data ASignature
@@ -1290,6 +1293,9 @@ randomCbNonce = fmap CryptoBoxNonce . randomBytes 24
 randomBytes :: Int -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ByteString
 randomBytes n gVar = stateTVar gVar $ randomBytesGenerate n

+reverseNonce :: CbNonce -> CbNonce
+reverseNonce (CryptoBoxNonce s) = CryptoBoxNonce (B.reverse s)
+
 instance Encoding CbNonce where
  smpEncode = unCbNonce
  smpP = CryptoBoxNonce <$> A.take 24
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport (..), THandle (..), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TProxy, Transport (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport (..), THandle (..), THandleAuth (..), THandleParams (..), TProxy, Transport (..), TransportPeer (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (runTransportServer, tlsServerCredentials)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Util
 import System.Exit (exitFailure)
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ updateTknStatus NtfTknData {ntfTknId, tknStatus} status = do
  old <- atomically $ stateTVar tknStatus (,status)
  when (old /= status) $ withNtfLog $ \sl -> logTokenStatus sl ntfTknId status

-runNtfClientTransport :: Transport c => THandleNTF c -> M ()
+runNtfClientTransport :: Transport c => THandleNTF c 'TServer -> M ()
 runNtfClientTransport th@THandle {params} = do
  qSize <- asks $ clientQSize . config
  ts <- liftIO getSystemTime
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ runNtfClientTransport th@THandle {params} = do
 clientDisconnected :: NtfServerClient -> IO ()
 clientDisconnected NtfServerClient {connected} = atomically $ writeTVar connected False

-receive :: Transport c => THandleNTF c -> NtfServerClient -> M ()
+receive :: Transport c => THandleNTF c 'TServer -> NtfServerClient -> M ()
 receive th@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth}} NtfServerClient {rcvQ, sndQ, rcvActiveAt} = forever $ do
  ts <- liftIO $ tGet th
  forM_ ts $ \t@(_, _, (corrId, entId, cmdOrError)) -> do
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ receive th@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth}} NtfServerClient {rcvQ, sndQ
  where
    write q t = atomically $ writeTBQueue q t

-send :: Transport c => THandleNTF c -> NtfServerClient -> IO ()
+send :: Transport c => THandleNTF c 'TServer -> NtfServerClient -> IO ()
 send h@THandle {params} NtfServerClient {sndQ, sndActiveAt} = forever $ do
  t <- atomically $ readTBQueue sndQ
  void . liftIO $ tPut h [Right (Nothing, encodeTransmission params t)]
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ send h@THandle {params} NtfServerClient {sndQ, sndActiveAt} = forever $ do

 data VerificationResult = VRVerified NtfRequest | VRFailed

-verifyNtfTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth, C.CbNonce) -> SignedTransmission ErrorType NtfCmd -> NtfCmd -> M VerificationResult
+verifyNtfTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer, C.CbNonce) -> SignedTransmission ErrorType NtfCmd -> NtfCmd -> M VerificationResult
 verifyNtfTransmission auth_ (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, entId, _)) cmd = do
  st <- asks store
  case cmd of
@@ -24,16 +24,16 @@ import Numeric.Natural
 import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Protocol
-import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Transport (NTFVersion, VersionRangeNTF)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Push.APNS
 import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Stats
 import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.Store
 import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Server.StoreLog
+import Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Transport (NTFVersion, VersionRangeNTF)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CorrId, SMPServer, Transmission)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
 import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport, THandleParams)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport, THandleParams, TransportPeer (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (TransportServerConfig, loadFingerprint, loadTLSServerParams)
 import System.IO (IOMode (..))
 import System.Mem.Weak (Weak)
@@ -161,13 +161,13 @@ data NtfRequest
 data NtfServerClient = NtfServerClient
  { rcvQ :: TBQueue NtfRequest,
    sndQ :: TBQueue (Transmission NtfResponse),
-    ntfThParams :: THandleParams NTFVersion,
+    ntfThParams :: THandleParams NTFVersion 'TServer,
    connected :: TVar Bool,
    rcvActiveAt :: TVar SystemTime,
    sndActiveAt :: TVar SystemTime
  }

-newNtfServerClient :: Natural -> THandleParams NTFVersion -> SystemTime -> STM NtfServerClient
+newNtfServerClient :: Natural -> THandleParams NTFVersion 'TServer -> SystemTime -> STM NtfServerClient
 newNtfServerClient qSize ntfThParams ts = do
  rcvQ <- newTBQueue qSize
  sndQ <- newTBQueue qSize
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}

 module Simplex.Messaging.Notifications.Transport where

@@ -18,9 +19,9 @@ import qualified Data.X509 as X
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
+import Simplex.Messaging.Util (liftEitherWith)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Version
 import Simplex.Messaging.Version.Internal
-import Simplex.Messaging.Util (liftEitherWith)

 ntfBlockSize :: Int
 ntfBlockSize = 512
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ supportedClientNTFVRange = mkVersionRange initialNTFVersion currentClientNTFVers
 supportedServerNTFVRange :: VersionRangeNTF
 supportedServerNTFVRange = mkVersionRange initialNTFVersion currentServerNTFVersion

-type THandleNTF c = THandle NTFVersion c
+type THandleNTF c p = THandle NTFVersion c p

 data NtfServerHandshake = NtfServerHandshake
  { ntfVersionRange :: VersionRangeNTF,
@@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ encodeNtfAuthPubKey v k
  | otherwise = ""

 -- | Notifcations server transport handshake.
-ntfServerHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => C.APrivateSignKey -> c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeNTF -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleNTF c)
+ntfServerHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => C.APrivateSignKey -> c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeNTF -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleNTF c 'TServer)
 ntfServerHandshake serverSignKey c (k, pk) kh ntfVRange = do
  let th@THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId}} = ntfTHandle c
  let sk = C.signX509 serverSignKey $ C.publicToX509 k
@@ -121,11 +122,11 @@ ntfServerHandshake serverSignKey c (k, pk) kh ntfVRange = do
      | keyHash /= kh ->
          throwError $ TEHandshake IDENTITY
      | v `isCompatible` ntfVRange ->
-          pure $ ntfThHandle th v pk k'
+          pure $ ntfThHandleServer th v pk k'
      | otherwise -> throwError $ TEHandshake VERSION

 -- | Notifcations server client transport handshake.
-ntfClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeNTF -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleNTF c)
+ntfClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeNTF -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleNTF c 'TClient)
 ntfClientHandshake c (k, pk) keyHash ntfVRange = do
  let th@THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId}} = ntfTHandle c
  NtfServerHandshake {sessionId = sessId, ntfVersionRange, authPubKey = sk'} <- getHandshake th
@@ -133,23 +134,32 @@ ntfClientHandshake c (k, pk) keyHash ntfVRange = do
    then throwError TEBadSession
    else case ntfVersionRange `compatibleVersion` ntfVRange of
      Just (Compatible v) -> do
-        sk_ <- forM sk' $ \exact -> liftEitherWith (const $ TEHandshake BAD_AUTH) $ do
+        ck_ <- forM sk' $ \signedKey -> liftEitherWith (const $ TEHandshake BAD_AUTH) $ do
          serverKey <- getServerVerifyKey c
-          pubKey <- C.verifyX509 serverKey exact
-          C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey
+          pubKey <- C.verifyX509 serverKey signedKey
+          (,(getServerCerts c, signedKey)) <$> (C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey)
        sendHandshake th $ NtfClientHandshake {ntfVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = Just k}
-        pure $ ntfThHandle th v pk sk_
+        pure $ ntfThHandleClient th v pk ck_
      Nothing -> throwError $ TEHandshake VERSION

-ntfThHandle :: forall c. THandleNTF c -> VersionNTF -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> THandleNTF c
-ntfThHandle th@THandle {params} v privKey k_ =
-  -- TODO drop SMP v6: make thAuth non-optional
-  let thAuth = (\k -> THandleAuth {peerPubKey = k, privKey}) <$> k_
-      v3 = v >= authBatchCmdsNTFVersion
-      params' = params {thVersion = v, thAuth, implySessId = v3, batch = v3}
-   in (th :: THandleNTF c) {params = params'}
+ntfThHandleServer :: forall c. THandleNTF c 'TServer -> VersionNTF -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> THandleNTF c 'TServer
+ntfThHandleServer th v pk k_ =
+  let thAuth = (\k -> THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey = k, serverPrivKey = pk}) <$> k_
+   in ntfThHandle_ th v thAuth

-ntfTHandle :: Transport c => c -> THandleNTF c
+ntfThHandleClient :: forall c. THandleNTF c 'TClient -> VersionNTF -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)) -> THandleNTF c 'TClient
+ntfThHandleClient th v pk ck_ =
+  let thAuth = (\(k, ck) -> THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k, serverCertKey = ck, clientPrivKey = pk}) <$> ck_
+   in ntfThHandle_ th v thAuth
+
+ntfThHandle_ :: forall c p. THandleNTF c p -> VersionNTF -> Maybe (THandleAuth p) -> THandleNTF c p
+ntfThHandle_ th@THandle {params} v thAuth =
+  -- TODO drop SMP v6: make thAuth non-optional
+  let v3 = v >= authBatchCmdsNTFVersion
+      params' = params {thVersion = v, thAuth, implySessId = v3, batch = v3}
+   in (th :: THandleNTF c p) {params = params'}
+
+ntfTHandle :: Transport c => c -> THandleNTF c p
 ntfTHandle c = THandle {connection = c, params}
  where
    params = THandleParams {sessionId = tlsUnique c, blockSize = ntfBlockSize, thVersion = VersionNTF 0, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, batch = False}
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
  ( -- * SMP protocol parameters
    supportedSMPClientVRange,
    maxMessageLength,
+    paddedProxiedMsgLength,
+    paddedForwardedMsgLength,
    e2eEncConfirmationLength,
    e2eEncMessageLength,

@@ -56,6 +58,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
    SubscriptionMode (..),
    Party (..),
    Cmd (..),
+    DirectParty,
    BrokerMsg (..),
    SParty (..),
    PartyI (..),
@@ -63,6 +66,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
    ProtocolErrorType (..),
    ErrorType (..),
    CommandError (..),
+    ProxyError (..),
    Transmission,
    TransmissionAuth (..),
    SignedTransmission,
@@ -121,6 +125,12 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
    EncNMsgMeta,
    SMPMsgMeta (..),
    NMsgMeta (..),
+    EncFwdResponse (..),
+    EncFwdTransmission (..),
+    EncResponse (..),
+    EncTransmission (..),
+    FwdResponse (..),
+    FwdTransmission (..),
    MsgFlags (..),
    initialSMPClientVersion,
    userProtocol,
@@ -188,7 +198,10 @@ import Data.String
 import Data.Time.Clock.System (SystemTime (..))
 import Data.Type.Equality
 import Data.Word (Word16)
+import qualified Data.X509 as X
 import GHC.TypeLits (ErrorMessage (..), TypeError, type (+))
+import qualified GHC.TypeLits as TE
+import qualified GHC.TypeLits as Type
 import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
@@ -231,6 +244,20 @@ supportedSMPClientVRange = mkVersionRange initialSMPClientVersion currentSMPClie
 maxMessageLength :: Int
 maxMessageLength = 16088

+-- without signature works with min 16151 (fails with 16150)
+-- with Ed448: 16265 (fails with 16264)
+-- with Ed25519: 16215 (fails with 16214)
+-- with X25519: 16232 (fails with 16231)
+paddedProxiedMsgLength :: Int
+paddedProxiedMsgLength = 16232
+
+-- without signature works with min 16239 (fails with 16238)
+-- with Ed448: 16353 (fails with 16352)
+-- with Ed25519: 16303 (fails with 16302)
+-- with X25519: 16320 (fails with 16319)
+paddedForwardedMsgLength :: Int
+paddedForwardedMsgLength = 16320
+
 type MaxMessageLen = 16088

 -- 16 extra bytes: 8 for timestamp and 8 for flags (7 flags and the space, only 1 flag is currently used)
@@ -244,7 +271,7 @@ e2eEncMessageLength :: Int
 e2eEncMessageLength = 16032

 -- | SMP protocol clients
-data Party = Recipient | Sender | Notifier
+data Party = Recipient | Sender | Notifier | ProxiedClient
  deriving (Show)

 -- | Singleton types for SMP protocol clients
@@ -252,11 +279,13 @@ data SParty :: Party -> Type where
  SRecipient :: SParty Recipient
  SSender :: SParty Sender
  SNotifier :: SParty Notifier
+  SProxiedClient :: SParty ProxiedClient

 instance TestEquality SParty where
  testEquality SRecipient SRecipient = Just Refl
  testEquality SSender SSender = Just Refl
  testEquality SNotifier SNotifier = Just Refl
+  testEquality SProxiedClient SProxiedClient = Just Refl
  testEquality _ _ = Nothing

 deriving instance Show (SParty p)
@@ -269,6 +298,15 @@ instance PartyI Sender where sParty = SSender

 instance PartyI Notifier where sParty = SNotifier

+instance PartyI ProxiedClient where sParty = SProxiedClient
+
+type family DirectParty (p :: Party) :: Constraint where
+  DirectParty Recipient = ()
+  DirectParty Sender = ()
+  DirectParty Notifier = ()
+  DirectParty p =
+    (Int ~ Bool, TypeError (Type.Text "Party " :<>: ShowType p :<>: Type.Text " is not direct"))
+
 -- | Type for client command of any participant.
 data Cmd = forall p. PartyI p => Cmd (SParty p) (Command p)

@@ -359,6 +397,17 @@ data Command (p :: Party) where
  PING :: Command Sender
  -- SMP notification subscriber commands
  NSUB :: Command Notifier
+  PRXY :: SMPServer -> Maybe BasicAuth -> Command ProxiedClient -- request a relay server connection by URI
+  -- Transmission to proxy:
+  -- - entity ID: ID of the session with relay returned in PKEY (response to PRXY)
+  -- - corrId: also used as a nonce to encrypt transmission to relay, corrId + 1 - from relay
+  -- - key (1st param in the command) is used to agree DH secret for this particular transmission and its response
+  -- Encrypted transmission should include session ID (tlsunique) from proxy-relay connection.
+  PFWD :: C.PublicKeyX25519 -> EncTransmission -> Command ProxiedClient -- use CorrId as CbNonce, client to proxy
+  -- Transmission forwarded to relay:
+  -- - entity ID: empty
+  -- - corrId: unique correlation ID between proxy and relay, also used as a nonce to encrypt forwarded transmission
+  RFWD :: EncFwdTransmission -> Command Sender -- use CorrId as CbNonce, proxy to relay

 deriving instance Show (Command p)

@@ -384,6 +433,25 @@ instance Encoding SubscriptionMode where
      'C' -> pure SMOnlyCreate
      _ -> fail "bad SubscriptionMode"

+newtype EncTransmission = EncTransmission ByteString
+  deriving (Show)
+
+data FwdTransmission = FwdTransmission
+  { fwdCorrId :: CorrId,
+    fwdKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519,
+    fwdTransmission :: EncTransmission
+  }
+
+instance Encoding FwdTransmission where
+  smpEncode FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t} =
+    smpEncode (corrId, fwdKey, Tail t)
+  smpP = do
+    (corrId, fwdKey, Tail t) <- smpP
+    pure FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission t}
+
+newtype EncFwdTransmission = EncFwdTransmission ByteString
+  deriving (Show)
+
 data BrokerMsg where
  -- SMP broker messages (responses, client messages, notifications)
  IDS :: QueueIdsKeys -> BrokerMsg
@@ -393,6 +461,10 @@ data BrokerMsg where
  MSG :: RcvMessage -> BrokerMsg
  NID :: NotifierId -> RcvNtfPublicDhKey -> BrokerMsg
  NMSG :: C.CbNonce -> EncNMsgMeta -> BrokerMsg
+  -- Should include certificate chain
+  PKEY :: SessionId -> VersionRangeSMP -> (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey) -> BrokerMsg -- TLS-signed server key for proxy shared secret and initial sender key
+  RRES :: EncFwdResponse -> BrokerMsg -- relay to proxy
+  PRES :: EncResponse -> BrokerMsg -- proxy to client
  END :: BrokerMsg
  OK :: BrokerMsg
  ERR :: ErrorType -> BrokerMsg
@@ -405,6 +477,24 @@ data RcvMessage = RcvMessage
  }
  deriving (Eq, Show)

+newtype EncFwdResponse = EncFwdResponse ByteString
+  deriving (Eq, Show)
+
+data FwdResponse = FwdResponse
+  { fwdCorrId :: CorrId,
+    fwdResponse :: EncResponse
+  }
+
+instance Encoding FwdResponse where
+  smpEncode FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t} =
+    smpEncode (corrId, Tail t)
+  smpP = do
+    (corrId, Tail t) <- smpP
+    pure FwdResponse {fwdCorrId = CorrId corrId, fwdResponse = EncResponse t}
+
+newtype EncResponse = EncResponse ByteString
+  deriving (Eq, Show)
+
 -- | received message without server/recipient encryption
 data Message
  = Message
@@ -567,6 +657,9 @@ data CommandTag (p :: Party) where
  DEL_ :: CommandTag Recipient
  SEND_ :: CommandTag Sender
  PING_ :: CommandTag Sender
+  PRXY_ :: CommandTag ProxiedClient
+  PFWD_ :: CommandTag ProxiedClient
+  RFWD_ :: CommandTag Sender
  NSUB_ :: CommandTag Notifier

 data CmdTag = forall p. PartyI p => CT (SParty p) (CommandTag p)
@@ -580,6 +673,9 @@ data BrokerMsgTag
  | MSG_
  | NID_
  | NMSG_
+  | PKEY_
+  | RRES_
+  | PRES_
  | END_
  | OK_
  | ERR_
@@ -607,6 +703,9 @@ instance PartyI p => Encoding (CommandTag p) where
    DEL_ -> "DEL"
    SEND_ -> "SEND"
    PING_ -> "PING"
+    PRXY_ -> "PRXY"
+    PFWD_ -> "PFWD"
+    RFWD_ -> "RFWD"
    NSUB_ -> "NSUB"
  smpP = messageTagP

@@ -623,6 +722,9 @@ instance ProtocolMsgTag CmdTag where
    "DEL" -> Just $ CT SRecipient DEL_
    "SEND" -> Just $ CT SSender SEND_
    "PING" -> Just $ CT SSender PING_
+    "PRXY" -> Just $ CT SProxiedClient PRXY_
+    "PFWD" -> Just $ CT SProxiedClient PFWD_
+    "RFWD" -> Just $ CT SSender RFWD_
    "NSUB" -> Just $ CT SNotifier NSUB_
    _ -> Nothing

@@ -639,6 +741,9 @@ instance Encoding BrokerMsgTag where
    MSG_ -> "MSG"
    NID_ -> "NID"
    NMSG_ -> "NMSG"
+    PKEY_ -> "PKEY"
+    RRES_ -> "RRES"
+    PRES_ -> "PRES"
    END_ -> "END"
    OK_ -> "OK"
    ERR_ -> "ERR"
@@ -651,6 +756,9 @@ instance ProtocolMsgTag BrokerMsgTag where
    "MSG" -> Just MSG_
    "NID" -> Just NID_
    "NMSG" -> Just NMSG_
+    "PKEY" -> Just PKEY_
+    "RRES" -> Just RRES_
+    "PRES" -> Just PRES_
    "END" -> Just END_
    "OK" -> Just OK_
    "ERR" -> Just ERR_
@@ -829,7 +937,7 @@ type family UserProtocol (p :: ProtocolType) :: Constraint where
  UserProtocol PSMP = ()
  UserProtocol PXFTP = ()
  UserProtocol a =
-    (Int ~ Bool, TypeError (Text "Servers for protocol " :<>: ShowType a :<>: Text " cannot be configured by the users"))
+    (Int ~ Bool, TypeError (TE.Text "Servers for protocol " :<>: ShowType a :<>: TE.Text " cannot be configured by the users"))

 userProtocol :: SProtocolType p -> Maybe (Dict (UserProtocol p))
 userProtocol = \case
@@ -1038,6 +1146,8 @@ data ErrorType
    SESSION
  | -- | SMP command is unknown or has invalid syntax
    CMD {cmdErr :: CommandError}
+  | -- | error from proxied relay
+    PROXY {proxyErr :: ProxyError}
  | -- | command authorization error - bad signature or non-existing SMP queue
    AUTH
  | -- | SMP queue capacity is exceeded on the server
@@ -1046,6 +1156,8 @@ data ErrorType
    NO_MSG
  | -- | sent message is too large (> maxMessageLength = 16088 bytes)
    LARGE_MSG
+  | -- | relay public key is expired
+    EXPIRED
  | -- | internal server error
    INTERNAL
  | -- | used internally, never returned by the server (to be removed)
@@ -1055,8 +1167,12 @@ data ErrorType
 instance StrEncoding ErrorType where
  strEncode = \case
    CMD e -> "CMD " <> bshow e
+    PROXY e -> "PROXY " <> bshow e
    e -> bshow e
-  strP = "CMD " *> (CMD <$> parseRead1) <|> parseRead1
+  strP =
+    "CMD " *> (CMD <$> parseRead1)
+      <|> "PROXY " *> (PROXY <$> parseRead1)
+      <|> parseRead1

 -- | SMP command error type.
 data CommandError
@@ -1074,8 +1190,24 @@ data CommandError
    NO_ENTITY
  deriving (Eq, Read, Show)

+-- TODO keep error params
+data ProxyError
+  = -- | Correctly parsed SMP server ERR response.
+    -- This error is forwarded to the agent client as `ERR SMP err`.
+    PROTOCOL -- {protocolErr :: String}
+  | -- | Invalid server response that failed to parse.
+    -- Forwarded to the agent client as `ERR BROKER RESPONSE`.
+    RESPONSE -- {responseErr :: String}
+  | UNEXPECTED
+  | TIMEOUT
+  | NETWORK
+  | BAD_HOST
+  | NO_SESSION
+  | TRANSPORT -- {transportErr :: TransportError}
+  deriving (Eq, Read, Show)
+
 -- | SMP transmission parser.
-transmissionP :: THandleParams v -> Parser RawTransmission
+transmissionP :: THandleParams v p -> Parser RawTransmission
 transmissionP THandleParams {sessionId, implySessId} = do
  authenticator <- smpP
  authorized <- A.takeByteString
@@ -1089,10 +1221,10 @@ transmissionP THandleParams {sessionId, implySessId} = do
      command <- A.takeByteString
      pure RawTransmission {authenticator, authorized = authorized', sessId, corrId, entityId, command}

-class (ProtocolEncoding v err msg, ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg), Show err, Show msg) => Protocol v err msg | msg -> v, msg -> err  where
+class (ProtocolEncoding v err msg, ProtocolEncoding v err (ProtoCommand msg), Show err, Show msg) => Protocol v err msg | msg -> v, msg -> err where
  type ProtoCommand msg = cmd | cmd -> msg
  type ProtoType msg = (sch :: ProtocolType) | sch -> msg
-  protocolClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRange v -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle v c)
+  protocolClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRange v -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle v c 'TClient)
  protocolPing :: ProtoCommand msg
  protocolError :: msg -> Maybe err

@@ -1135,6 +1267,9 @@ instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType (Command p) where
    SEND flags msg -> e (SEND_, ' ', flags, ' ', Tail msg)
    PING -> e PING_
    NSUB -> e NSUB_
+    PRXY host auth_ -> e (PRXY_, ' ', host, auth_)
+    PFWD pubKey (EncTransmission s) -> e (PFWD_, ' ', pubKey, Tail s)
+    RFWD (EncFwdTransmission s) -> e (RFWD_, ' ', Tail s)
    where
      e :: Encoding a => a -> ByteString
      e = smpEncode
@@ -1144,24 +1279,33 @@ instance PartyI p => ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType (Command p) where
  fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @SMPVersion @ErrorType @BrokerMsg
  {-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}

-  checkCredentials (auth, _, queueId, _) cmd = case cmd of
+  checkCredentials (auth, _, entId, _) cmd = case cmd of
    -- NEW must have signature but NOT queue ID
    NEW {}
      | isNothing auth -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
-      | not (B.null queueId) -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
+      | not (B.null entId) -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
      | otherwise -> Right cmd
    -- SEND must have queue ID, signature is not always required
    SEND {}
-      | B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
+      | B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
      | otherwise -> Right cmd
-    -- PING must not have queue ID or signature
-    PING
-      | isNothing auth && B.null queueId -> Right cmd
+    PING -> noAuthCmd
+    PRXY {} -> noAuthCmd
+    PFWD {}
+      | B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
+      | isNothing auth -> Right cmd
      | otherwise -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
+    RFWD _ -> noAuthCmd
    -- other client commands must have both signature and queue ID
    _
-      | isNothing auth || B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
+      | isNothing auth || B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_AUTH
      | otherwise -> Right cmd
+    where
+      -- command must not have entity ID (queue or session ID) or signature
+      noAuthCmd :: Either ErrorType (Command p)
+      noAuthCmd
+        | isNothing auth && B.null entId = Right cmd
+        | otherwise = Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH

 instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType Cmd where
  type Tag Cmd = CmdTag
@@ -1189,6 +1333,11 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType Cmd where
      Cmd SSender <$> case tag of
        SEND_ -> SEND <$> _smpP <*> (unTail <$> _smpP)
        PING_ -> pure PING
+        RFWD_ -> RFWD <$> (EncFwdTransmission . unTail <$> _smpP)
+    CT SProxiedClient tag ->
+      Cmd SProxiedClient <$> case tag of
+        PFWD_ -> PFWD <$> _smpP <*> (EncTransmission . unTail <$> smpP)
+        PRXY_ -> PRXY <$> _smpP <*> smpP
    CT SNotifier NSUB_ -> pure $ Cmd SNotifier NSUB

  fromProtocolError = fromProtocolError @SMPVersion @ErrorType @BrokerMsg
@@ -1204,6 +1353,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
      e (MSG_, ' ', msgId, Tail body)
    NID nId srvNtfDh -> e (NID_, ' ', nId, srvNtfDh)
    NMSG nmsgNonce encNMsgMeta -> e (NMSG_, ' ', nmsgNonce, encNMsgMeta)
+    PKEY sid vr (cert, key) -> e (PKEY_, ' ', sid, vr, C.encodeCertChain cert, C.SignedObject key)
+    RRES (EncFwdResponse encBlock) -> e (RRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
+    PRES (EncResponse encBlock) -> e (PRES_, ' ', Tail encBlock)
    END -> e END_
    OK -> e OK_
    ERR err -> e (ERR_, ' ', err)
@@ -1221,6 +1373,9 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
    IDS_ -> IDS <$> (QIK <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> smpP)
    NID_ -> NID <$> _smpP <*> smpP
    NMSG_ -> NMSG <$> _smpP <*> smpP
+    PKEY_ -> PKEY <$> _smpP <*> smpP <*> ((,) <$> C.certChainP <*> (C.getSignedExact <$> smpP))
+    RRES_ -> RRES <$> (EncFwdResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
+    PRES_ -> PRES <$> (EncResponse . unTail <$> _smpP)
    END_ -> pure END
    OK_ -> pure OK
    ERR_ -> ERR <$> _smpP
@@ -1233,19 +1388,24 @@ instance ProtocolEncoding SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg where
    PEBlock -> BLOCK
  {-# INLINE fromProtocolError #-}

-  checkCredentials (_, _, queueId, _) cmd = case cmd of
+  checkCredentials (_, _, entId, _) cmd = case cmd of
    -- IDS response should not have queue ID
    IDS _ -> Right cmd
    -- ERR response does not always have queue ID
    ERR _ -> Right cmd
    -- PONG response must not have queue ID
-    PONG
-      | B.null queueId -> Right cmd
-      | otherwise -> Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH
+    PONG -> noEntityMsg
+    PKEY {} -> noEntityMsg
+    RRES _ -> noEntityMsg
    -- other broker responses must have queue ID
    _
-      | B.null queueId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
+      | B.null entId -> Left $ CMD NO_ENTITY
      | otherwise -> Right cmd
+    where
+      noEntityMsg :: Either ErrorType BrokerMsg
+      noEntityMsg
+        | B.null entId = Right cmd
+        | otherwise = Left $ CMD HAS_AUTH

 -- | Parse SMP protocol commands and broker messages
 parseProtocol :: forall v err msg. ProtocolEncoding v err msg => Version v -> ByteString -> Either err msg
@@ -1268,8 +1428,10 @@ instance Encoding ErrorType where
    BLOCK -> "BLOCK"
    SESSION -> "SESSION"
    CMD err -> "CMD " <> smpEncode err
+    PROXY err -> "PROXY " <> smpEncode err
    AUTH -> "AUTH"
    QUOTA -> "QUOTA"
+    EXPIRED -> "EXPIRED"
    NO_MSG -> "NO_MSG"
    LARGE_MSG -> "LARGE_MSG"
    INTERNAL -> "INTERNAL"
@@ -1280,8 +1442,10 @@ instance Encoding ErrorType where
      "BLOCK" -> pure BLOCK
      "SESSION" -> pure SESSION
      "CMD" -> CMD <$> _smpP
+      "PROXY" -> PROXY <$> _smpP
      "AUTH" -> pure AUTH
      "QUOTA" -> pure QUOTA
+      "EXPIRED" -> pure EXPIRED
      "NO_MSG" -> pure NO_MSG
      "LARGE_MSG" -> pure LARGE_MSG
      "INTERNAL" -> pure INTERNAL
@@ -1304,11 +1468,33 @@ instance Encoding CommandError where
      "NO_AUTH" -> pure NO_AUTH
      "HAS_AUTH" -> pure HAS_AUTH
      "NO_ENTITY" -> pure NO_ENTITY
-      "NO_QUEUE" -> pure NO_ENTITY
+      "NO_QUEUE" -> pure NO_ENTITY -- for backward compatibility
+      _ -> fail "bad command error type"
+
+instance Encoding ProxyError where
+  smpEncode e = case e of
+    PROTOCOL -> "PROTOCOL"
+    RESPONSE -> "RESPONSE"
+    UNEXPECTED -> "UNEXPECTED"
+    TIMEOUT -> "TIMEOUT"
+    NETWORK -> "NETWORK"
+    BAD_HOST -> "BAD_HOST"
+    NO_SESSION -> "NO_SESSION"
+    TRANSPORT -> "TRANSPORT"
+  smpP =
+    A.takeTill (== ' ') >>= \case
+      "PROTOCOL" -> pure PROTOCOL
+      "RESPONSE" -> pure RESPONSE
+      "UNEXPECTED" -> pure UNEXPECTED
+      "TIMEOUT" -> pure TIMEOUT
+      "NETWORK" -> pure NETWORK
+      "BAD_HOST" -> pure BAD_HOST
+      "NO_SESSION" -> pure NO_SESSION
+      "TRANSPORT" -> pure TRANSPORT
      _ -> fail "bad command error type"

 -- | Send signed SMP transmission to TCP transport.
-tPut :: Transport c => THandle v c -> NonEmpty (Either TransportError SentRawTransmission) -> IO [Either TransportError ()]
+tPut :: Transport c => THandle v c p -> NonEmpty (Either TransportError SentRawTransmission) -> IO [Either TransportError ()]
 tPut th@THandle {params} = fmap concat . mapM tPutBatch . batchTransmissions (batch params) (blockSize params)
  where
    tPutBatch :: TransportBatch () -> IO [Either TransportError ()]
@@ -1317,7 +1503,7 @@ tPut th@THandle {params} = fmap concat . mapM tPutBatch . batchTransmissions (ba
      TBTransmissions s n _ -> replicate n <$> tPutLog th s
      TBTransmission s _ -> (: []) <$> tPutLog th s

-tPutLog :: Transport c => THandle v c -> ByteString -> IO (Either TransportError ())
+tPutLog :: Transport c => THandle v c p -> ByteString -> IO (Either TransportError ())
 tPutLog th s = do
  r <- tPutBlock th s
  case r of
@@ -1383,7 +1569,7 @@ tEncodeBatch1 t = lenEncode 1 `B.cons` tEncodeForBatch t
 -- tForAuth is lazy to avoid computing it when there is no key to sign
 data TransmissionForAuth = TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth :: ~ByteString, tToSend :: ByteString}

-encodeTransmissionForAuth :: ProtocolEncoding v e c => THandleParams v -> Transmission c -> TransmissionForAuth
+encodeTransmissionForAuth :: ProtocolEncoding v e c => THandleParams v p -> Transmission c -> TransmissionForAuth
 encodeTransmissionForAuth THandleParams {thVersion = v, sessionId, implySessId} t =
  TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend = if implySessId then t' else tForAuth}
  where
@@ -1391,7 +1577,7 @@ encodeTransmissionForAuth THandleParams {thVersion = v, sessionId, implySessId}
    t' = encodeTransmission_ v t
 {-# INLINE encodeTransmissionForAuth #-}

-encodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding v e c => THandleParams v -> Transmission c -> ByteString
+encodeTransmission :: ProtocolEncoding v e c => THandleParams v p -> Transmission c -> ByteString
 encodeTransmission THandleParams {thVersion = v, sessionId, implySessId} t =
  if implySessId then t' else smpEncode sessionId <> t'
  where
@@ -1404,11 +1590,11 @@ encodeTransmission_ v (CorrId corrId, queueId, command) =
 {-# INLINE encodeTransmission_ #-}

 -- | Receive and parse transmission from the TCP transport (ignoring any trailing padding).
-tGetParse :: Transport c => THandle v c -> IO (NonEmpty (Either TransportError RawTransmission))
+tGetParse :: Transport c => THandle v c p -> IO (NonEmpty (Either TransportError RawTransmission))
 tGetParse th@THandle {params} = eitherList (tParse params) <$> tGetBlock th
 {-# INLINE tGetParse #-}

-tParse :: THandleParams v -> ByteString -> NonEmpty (Either TransportError RawTransmission)
+tParse :: THandleParams v p -> ByteString -> NonEmpty (Either TransportError RawTransmission)
 tParse thParams@THandleParams {batch} s
  | batch = eitherList (L.map (\(Large t) -> tParse1 t)) ts
  | otherwise = [tParse1 s]
@@ -1420,10 +1606,10 @@ eitherList :: (a -> NonEmpty (Either e b)) -> Either e a -> NonEmpty (Either e b
 eitherList = either (\e -> [Left e])

 -- | Receive client and server transmissions (determined by `cmd` type).
-tGet :: forall v err cmd c. (ProtocolEncoding v err cmd, Transport c) => THandle v c -> IO (NonEmpty (SignedTransmission err cmd))
+tGet :: forall v err cmd c p. (ProtocolEncoding v err cmd, Transport c) => THandle v c p -> IO (NonEmpty (SignedTransmission err cmd))
 tGet th@THandle {params} = L.map (tDecodeParseValidate params) <$> tGetParse th

-tDecodeParseValidate :: forall v err cmd. ProtocolEncoding v err cmd => THandleParams v -> Either TransportError RawTransmission -> SignedTransmission err cmd
+tDecodeParseValidate :: forall v p err cmd. ProtocolEncoding v err cmd => THandleParams v p -> Either TransportError RawTransmission -> SignedTransmission err cmd
 tDecodeParseValidate THandleParams {sessionId, thVersion = v, implySessId} = \case
  Right RawTransmission {authenticator, authorized, sessId, corrId, entityId, command}
    | implySessId || sessId == sessionId ->
@@ -1444,4 +1630,6 @@ $(J.deriveJSON defaultJSON ''MsgFlags)

 $(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''CommandError)

+$(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''ProxyError)
+
 $(J.deriveJSON (sumTypeJSON id) ''ErrorType)
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
-{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}

 -- |
 -- Module      : Simplex.Messaging.Server
@@ -43,6 +42,7 @@ import Control.Monad
 import Control.Monad.Except
 import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
 import Control.Monad.Reader
+import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
 import Crypto.Random
 import Data.Bifunctor (first)
 import Data.ByteString.Base64 (encode)
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ import Data.Functor (($>))
 import Data.Int (Int64)
 import qualified Data.IntMap.Strict as IM
 import Data.List (intercalate)
+import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
 import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
 import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
 import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
@@ -67,8 +68,10 @@ import GHC.Stats (getRTSStats)
 import GHC.TypeLits (KnownNat)
 import Network.Socket (ServiceName, Socket, socketToHandle)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Lock
+import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClient (thParams), forwardSMPMessage, smpProxyError)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgent (..), SMPClientAgentEvent (..), getSMPServerClient', lookupSMPServerClient)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
-import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding (Encoding (smpEncode))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Control
@@ -90,6 +93,7 @@ import System.Exit (exitFailure)
 import System.IO (hPrint, hPutStrLn, hSetNewlineMode, universalNewlineMode)
 import System.Mem.Weak (deRefWeak)
 import UnliftIO (timeout)
+import UnliftIO.Async (mapConcurrently)
 import UnliftIO.Concurrent
 import UnliftIO.Directory (doesFileExist, renameFile)
 import UnliftIO.Exception
@@ -122,11 +126,13 @@ type M a = ReaderT Env IO a
 smpServer :: TMVar Bool -> ServerConfig -> M ()
 smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
  s <- asks server
+  pa <- asks proxyAgent
  expired <- restoreServerMessages
  restoreServerStats expired
  raceAny_
    ( serverThread s "server subscribedQ" subscribedQ subscribers subscriptions cancelSub
        : serverThread s "server ntfSubscribedQ" ntfSubscribedQ Env.notifiers ntfSubscriptions (\_ -> pure ())
+        : receiveFromProxyAgent pa
        : map runServer transports <> expireMessagesThread_ cfg <> serverStatsThread_ cfg <> controlPortThread_ cfg
    )
    `finally` withLock' (savingLock s) "final" (saveServer False)
@@ -179,6 +185,19 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
          mkWeakThreadId t >>= atomically . modifyTVar' (endThreads c) . IM.insert tId
          atomically $ TM.lookupDelete qId (clientSubs c)

+    receiveFromProxyAgent :: ProxyAgent -> M ()
+    receiveFromProxyAgent ProxyAgent {smpAgent = SMPClientAgent {agentQ}} =
+      forever $
+        atomically (readTBQueue agentQ) >>= \case
+          CAConnected srv -> logInfo $ "SMP server connected " <> showServer' srv
+          CADisconnected srv [] -> logInfo $ "SMP server disconnected " <> showServer' srv
+          CADisconnected srv subs -> logError $ "SMP server disconnected " <> showServer' srv <> " / subscriptions: " <> tshow (length subs)
+          CAReconnected srv -> logInfo $ "SMP server reconnected " <> showServer' srv
+          CAResubscribed srv subs -> logError $ "SMP server resubscribed " <> showServer' srv <> " / subscriptions: " <> tshow (length subs)
+          CASubError srv errs -> logError $ "SMP server subscription errors " <> showServer' srv <> " / errors: " <> tshow (length errs)
+      where
+        showServer' = decodeLatin1 . strEncode . host
+
    expireMessagesThread_ :: ServerConfig -> [M ()]
    expireMessagesThread_ ServerConfig {messageExpiration = Just msgExp} = [expireMessages msgExp]
    expireMessagesThread_ _ = []
@@ -314,7 +333,7 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
              CPResume -> withAdminRole $ hPutStrLn h "resume not implemented"
              CPClients -> withAdminRole $ do
                active <- unliftIO u (asks clients) >>= readTVarIO
-                hPutStrLn h $ "clientId,sessionId,connected,createdAt,rcvActiveAt,sndActiveAt,age,subscriptions"
+                hPutStrLn h "clientId,sessionId,connected,createdAt,rcvActiveAt,sndActiveAt,age,subscriptions"
                forM_ (IM.toList active) $ \(cid, Client {sessionId, connected, createdAt, rcvActiveAt, sndActiveAt, subscriptions}) -> do
                  connected' <- bshow <$> readTVarIO connected
                  rcvActiveAt' <- strEncode <$> readTVarIO rcvActiveAt
@@ -409,8 +428,8 @@ smpServer started cfg@ServerConfig {transports, transportConfig = tCfg} = do
                    logError "Unauthorized control port command"
                    hPutStrLn h "AUTH"

-runClientTransport :: Transport c => THandleSMP c -> M ()
-runClientTransport th@THandle {params = THandleParams {thVersion, sessionId}} = do
+runClientTransport :: Transport c => THandleSMP c 'TServer -> M ()
+runClientTransport th@THandle {params = thParams@THandleParams {thVersion, sessionId}} = do
  q <- asks $ tbqSize . config
  ts <- liftIO getSystemTime
  active <- asks clients
@@ -422,7 +441,7 @@ runClientTransport th@THandle {params = THandleParams {thVersion, sessionId}} =
  s <- asks server
  expCfg <- asks $ inactiveClientExpiration . config
  labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId
-  raceAny_ ([liftIO $ send th c, client c s, receive th c] <> disconnectThread_ c expCfg)
+  raceAny_ ([liftIO $ send th c, client thParams c s, receive th c] <> disconnectThread_ c expCfg)
    `finally` clientDisconnected c
  where
    disconnectThread_ c (Just expCfg) = [liftIO $ disconnectTransport th (rcvActiveAt c) (sndActiveAt c) expCfg (noSubscriptions c)]
@@ -457,28 +476,28 @@ cancelSub sub =
    Sub {subThread = SubThread t} -> liftIO $ deRefWeak t >>= mapM_ killThread
    _ -> return ()

-receive :: Transport c => THandleSMP c -> Client -> M ()
+receive :: Transport c => THandleSMP c 'TServer -> Client -> M ()
 receive th@THandle {params = THandleParams {thAuth}} Client {rcvQ, sndQ, rcvActiveAt, sessionId} = do
  labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " receive"
  forever $ do
    ts <- L.toList <$> liftIO (tGet th)
    atomically . writeTVar rcvActiveAt =<< liftIO getSystemTime
-    as <- partitionEithers <$> mapM cmdAction ts
-    write sndQ $ fst as
-    write rcvQ $ snd as
+    (errs, cmds) <- partitionEithers <$> mapM cmdAction ts
+    write sndQ errs
+    write rcvQ cmds
  where
    cmdAction :: SignedTransmission ErrorType Cmd -> M (Either (Transmission BrokerMsg) (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd))
-    cmdAction (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, queueId, cmdOrError)) =
+    cmdAction (tAuth, authorized, (corrId, entId, cmdOrError)) =
      case cmdOrError of
-        Left e -> pure $ Left (corrId, queueId, ERR e)
-        Right cmd -> verified <$> verifyTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (bs corrId)) <$> thAuth) tAuth authorized queueId cmd
+        Left e -> pure $ Left (corrId, entId, ERR e)
+        Right cmd -> verified <$> verifyTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (bs corrId)) <$> thAuth) tAuth authorized entId cmd
          where
            verified = \case
-              VRVerified qr -> Right (qr, (corrId, queueId, cmd))
-              VRFailed -> Left (corrId, queueId, ERR AUTH)
+              VRVerified qr -> Right (qr, (corrId, entId, cmd))
+              VRFailed -> Left (corrId, entId, ERR AUTH)
    write q = mapM_ (atomically . writeTBQueue q) . L.nonEmpty

-send :: Transport c => THandleSMP c -> Client -> IO ()
+send :: Transport c => THandleSMP c 'TServer -> Client -> IO ()
 send h@THandle {params} Client {sndQ, sessionId, sndActiveAt} = do
  labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " send"
  forever $ do
@@ -493,7 +512,7 @@ send h@THandle {params} Client {sndQ, sessionId, sndActiveAt} = do
      NMSG {} -> 0
      _ -> 1

-disconnectTransport :: Transport c => THandle v c -> TVar SystemTime -> TVar SystemTime -> ExpirationConfig -> IO Bool -> IO ()
+disconnectTransport :: Transport c => THandle v c 'TServer -> TVar SystemTime -> TVar SystemTime -> ExpirationConfig -> IO Bool -> IO ()
 disconnectTransport THandle {connection, params = THandleParams {sessionId}} rcvActiveAt sndActiveAt expCfg noSubscriptions = do
  labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " disconnectTransport"
  loop
@@ -514,7 +533,7 @@ data VerificationResult = VRVerified (Maybe QueueRec) | VRFailed
 -- - the queue or party key do not exist.
 -- In all cases, the time of the verification should depend only on the provided authorization type,
 -- a dummy key is used to run verification in the last two cases, and failure is returned irrespective of the result.
-verifyTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth, C.CbNonce) -> Maybe TransmissionAuth -> ByteString -> QueueId -> Cmd -> M VerificationResult
+verifyTransmission :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer, C.CbNonce) -> Maybe TransmissionAuth -> ByteString -> QueueId -> Cmd -> M VerificationResult
 verifyTransmission auth_ tAuth authorized queueId cmd =
  case cmd of
    Cmd SRecipient (NEW k _ _ _) -> pure $ Nothing `verifiedWith` k
@@ -522,21 +541,23 @@ verifyTransmission auth_ tAuth authorized queueId cmd =
    -- SEND will be accepted without authorization before the queue is secured with KEY command
    Cmd SSender SEND {} -> verifyQueue (\q -> Just q `verified` maybe (isNothing tAuth) verify (senderKey q)) <$> get SSender
    Cmd SSender PING -> pure $ VRVerified Nothing
+    Cmd SSender RFWD {} -> pure $ VRVerified Nothing
    -- NSUB will not be accepted without authorization
-    Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> verifyQueue (\q -> maybe dummyVerify (Just q `verifiedWith`) (notifierKey <$> notifier q)) <$> get SNotifier
+    Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> verifyQueue (\q -> maybe dummyVerify (\n -> Just q `verifiedWith` notifierKey n) (notifier q)) <$> get SNotifier
+    Cmd SProxiedClient _ -> pure $ VRVerified Nothing
  where
    verify = verifyCmdAuthorization auth_ tAuth authorized
    dummyVerify = verify (dummyAuthKey tAuth) `seq` VRFailed
    verifyQueue :: (QueueRec -> VerificationResult) -> Either ErrorType QueueRec -> VerificationResult
-    verifyQueue = either (\_ -> dummyVerify)
+    verifyQueue = either (const dummyVerify)
    verified q cond = if cond then VRVerified q else VRFailed
    verifiedWith q k = q `verified` verify k
-    get :: SParty p -> M (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
+    get :: DirectParty p => SParty p -> M (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
    get party = do
      st <- asks queueStore
      atomically $ getQueue st party queueId

-verifyCmdAuthorization :: Maybe (THandleAuth, C.CbNonce) -> Maybe TransmissionAuth -> ByteString -> C.APublicAuthKey -> Bool
+verifyCmdAuthorization :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer, C.CbNonce) -> Maybe TransmissionAuth -> ByteString -> C.APublicAuthKey -> Bool
 verifyCmdAuthorization auth_ tAuth authorized key = maybe False (verify key) tAuth
  where
    verify :: C.APublicAuthKey -> TransmissionAuth -> Bool
@@ -548,12 +569,12 @@ verifyCmdAuthorization auth_ tAuth authorized key = maybe False (verify key) tAu
        C.SX25519 -> verifyCmdAuth auth_ k s authorized
        _ -> verifyCmdAuth auth_ dummyKeyX25519 s authorized `seq` False

-verifyCmdAuth :: Maybe (THandleAuth, C.CbNonce) -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> C.CbAuthenticator -> ByteString -> Bool
+verifyCmdAuth :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer, C.CbNonce) -> C.PublicKeyX25519 -> C.CbAuthenticator -> ByteString -> Bool
 verifyCmdAuth auth_ k authenticator authorized = case auth_ of
-  Just (THandleAuth {privKey}, nonce) -> C.cbVerify k privKey nonce authenticator authorized
+  Just (THAuthServer {serverPrivKey = pk}, nonce) -> C.cbVerify k pk nonce authenticator authorized
  Nothing -> False

-dummyVerifyCmd :: Maybe (THandleAuth, C.CbNonce) -> ByteString -> TransmissionAuth -> Bool
+dummyVerifyCmd :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer, C.CbNonce) -> ByteString -> TransmissionAuth -> Bool
 dummyVerifyCmd auth_ authorized = \case
  TASignature (C.ASignature a s) -> C.verify' (dummySignKey a) s authorized
  TAAuthenticator s -> verifyCmdAuth auth_ dummyKeyX25519 s authorized
@@ -581,25 +602,55 @@ dummyKeyEd448 = "MEMwBQYDK2VxAzoA6ibQc9XpkSLtwrf7PLvp81qW/etiumckVFImCMRdftcG/Xo
 dummyKeyX25519 :: C.PublicKey 'C.X25519
 dummyKeyX25519 = "MCowBQYDK2VuAyEA4JGSMYht18H4mas/jHeBwfcM7jLwNYJNOAhi2/g4RXg="

-client :: Client -> Server -> M ()
-client clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessionId} Server {subscribedQ, ntfSubscribedQ, notifiers} = do
+client :: THandleParams SMPVersion 'TServer -> Client -> Server -> M ()
+client thParams' clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessionId} Server {subscribedQ, ntfSubscribedQ, notifiers} = do
  labelMyThread . B.unpack $ "client $" <> encode sessionId <> " commands"
-  forever $
-    atomically (readTBQueue rcvQ)
-      >>= mapM processCommand
-      >>= atomically . writeTBQueue sndQ
+  forever $ do
+    (proxied, rs) <- partitionEithers . L.toList <$> (mapM processCommand =<< atomically (readTBQueue rcvQ))
+    forM_ (L.nonEmpty rs) reply
+    -- TODO cancel this thread if the client gets disconnected
+    -- TODO limit client concurrency
+    forM_ (L.nonEmpty proxied) $ \cmds -> forkIO $ mapConcurrently processProxiedCmd cmds >>= reply
  where
-    processCommand :: (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd) -> M (Transmission BrokerMsg)
+    reply :: MonadIO m => NonEmpty (Transmission BrokerMsg) -> m ()
+    reply = atomically . writeTBQueue sndQ
+    processProxiedCmd :: Transmission (Command 'ProxiedClient) -> M (Transmission BrokerMsg)
+    processProxiedCmd (corrId, sessId, command) = (corrId, sessId,) <$> case command of
+      PRXY srv auth -> ifM allowProxy getRelay (pure $ ERR AUTH)
+        where
+          allowProxy = do
+            ServerConfig {allowSMPProxy, newQueueBasicAuth} <- asks config
+            pure $ allowSMPProxy && maybe True ((== auth) . Just) newQueueBasicAuth
+          getRelay = do
+            ProxyAgent {smpAgent} <- asks proxyAgent
+            -- TODO catch IO errors too
+            liftIO $ proxyResp <$> runExceptT (getSMPServerClient' smpAgent srv)
+            where
+              proxyResp = \case
+                Right smp ->
+                  let THandleParams {sessionId = srvSessId, thAuth} = thParams smp
+                      vr = supportedServerSMPRelayVRange
+                   in case thAuth of
+                        Just THAuthClient {serverCertKey} -> PKEY srvSessId vr serverCertKey
+                        Nothing -> ERR $ PROXY TRANSPORT -- TODO different error?
+                Left err -> ERR $ smpProxyError err
+      PFWD pubKey encBlock -> do
+        ProxyAgent {smpAgent} <- asks proxyAgent
+        atomically (lookupSMPServerClient smpAgent sessId) >>= \case
+          Just smp -> liftIO $ either (ERR . smpProxyError) PRES <$> runExceptT (forwardSMPMessage smp corrId pubKey encBlock)
+          Nothing -> pure $ ERR $ PROXY NO_SESSION
+    processCommand :: (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd) -> M (Either (Transmission (Command 'ProxiedClient)) (Transmission BrokerMsg))
    processCommand (qr_, (corrId, queueId, cmd)) = do
      st <- asks queueStore
      case cmd of
-        Cmd SSender command ->
-          case command of
-            SEND flags msgBody -> withQueue $ \qr -> sendMessage qr flags msgBody
-            PING -> pure (corrId, "", PONG)
-        Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> subscribeNotifications
+        Cmd SProxiedClient command -> pure $ Left (corrId, queueId, command)
+        Cmd SSender command -> Right <$> case command of
+          SEND flags msgBody -> withQueue $ \qr -> sendMessage qr flags msgBody
+          PING -> pure (corrId, "", PONG)
+          RFWD encBlock -> (corrId, "",) <$> processForwardedCommand encBlock
+        Cmd SNotifier NSUB -> Right <$> subscribeNotifications
        Cmd SRecipient command ->
-          case command of
+          Right <$> case command of
            NEW rKey dhKey auth subMode ->
              ifM
                allowNew
@@ -863,6 +914,59 @@ client clnt@Client {subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, sessionId} Serv
                  encNMsgMeta = C.cbEncrypt rcvNtfDhSecret cbNonce (smpEncode msgMeta) 128
              pure . (cbNonce,) $ fromRight "" encNMsgMeta

+        processForwardedCommand :: EncFwdTransmission -> M BrokerMsg
+        processForwardedCommand (EncFwdTransmission s) = fmap (either id id) . runExceptT $ do
+          -- TODO error
+          THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey, serverPrivKey} <- maybe (throwError $ ERR INTERNAL) pure thAuth
+          -- TODO compute during handshake?
+          let sessSecret = C.dh' clientPeerPubKey serverPrivKey
+              proxyNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs corrId
+          -- TODO error
+          s' <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ C.cbDecrypt sessSecret proxyNonce s
+          -- TODO error
+          FwdTransmission {fwdCorrId, fwdKey, fwdTransmission = EncTransmission et} <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ smpDecode s'
+          -- TODO error - this error is reported to proxy, as we failed to get to client's transmission
+          let clientSecret = C.dh' fwdKey serverPrivKey
+              clientNonce = C.cbNonce $ bs fwdCorrId
+          b <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ C.cbDecrypt clientSecret clientNonce et
+          -- only allowing single forwarded transactions
+          let t' = tDecodeParseValidate thParams' $ L.head $ tParse thParams' b
+              clntThAuth = Just $ THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey = fwdKey, serverPrivKey}
+          -- TODO error
+          r <-
+            lift (rejectOrVerify clntThAuth t') >>= \case
+              Left r -> pure r
+              Right t''@(_, (corrId', entId', _)) ->
+                -- Left will not be returned by processCommand, as only SEND command is allowed
+                fromRight (corrId', entId', ERR INTERNAL) <$> lift (processCommand t'')
+
+          -- encode response
+          r' <- case batchTransmissions (batch thParams') (blockSize thParams') [Right (Nothing, encodeTransmission thParams' r)] of
+            [] -> throwE $ ERR INTERNAL -- TODO error
+            TBError _ _ : _ -> throwE $ ERR INTERNAL -- TODO error
+            TBTransmission b' _ : _ -> pure b'
+            TBTransmissions b' _ _ : _ -> pure b'
+          -- encrypt to client
+          r2 <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ EncResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt clientSecret (C.reverseNonce clientNonce) r' paddedProxiedMsgLength
+          -- encrypt to proxy
+          let fr = FwdResponse {fwdCorrId, fwdResponse = r2}
+          r3 <- liftEitherWith internalErr $ EncFwdResponse <$> C.cbEncrypt sessSecret (C.reverseNonce proxyNonce) (smpEncode fr) paddedForwardedMsgLength
+          pure $ RRES r3
+          where
+            internalErr _ = ERR INTERNAL -- TODO errors
+            THandleParams {thAuth} = thParams'
+            rejectOrVerify :: Maybe (THandleAuth 'TServer) -> SignedTransmission ErrorType Cmd -> M (Either (Transmission BrokerMsg) (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd))
+            rejectOrVerify clntThAuth (tAuth, authorized, (corrId', entId', cmdOrError)) =
+              case cmdOrError of
+                Left e -> pure $ Left (corrId', entId', ERR e)
+                -- flags msgBody -> withQueue $ \qr -> sendMessage qr flags msgBody
+                Right cmd'@(Cmd SSender SEND {}) -> verified <$> verifyTransmission ((,C.cbNonce (bs corrId')) <$> clntThAuth) tAuth authorized entId' cmd'
+                  where
+                    verified = \case
+                      VRVerified qr -> Right (qr, (corrId', entId', cmd'))
+                      VRFailed -> Left (corrId', entId', ERR AUTH)
+                Right _ -> pure $ Left (corrId', entId', ERR $ CMD PROHIBITED)
+
        deliverMessage :: T.Text -> QueueRec -> RecipientId -> TVar Sub -> MsgQueue -> Maybe Message -> M (Transmission BrokerMsg)
        deliverMessage name qr rId sub q msg_ = time (name <> " deliver") $ do
          readTVarIO sub >>= \case
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
 import qualified Network.TLS as T
 import Numeric.Natural
 import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Lock
+import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgent, SMPClientAgentConfig, newSMPClientAgent)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Crypto (KeyHash (..))
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Stats
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
 import Simplex.Messaging.TMap (TMap)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.TMap as TM
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport, VersionSMP, VersionRangeSMP)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport, VersionRangeSMP, VersionSMP)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (SocketState, TransportServerConfig, loadFingerprint, loadTLSServerParams, newSocketState)
 import System.IO (IOMode (..))
 import System.Mem.Weak (Weak)
@@ -79,7 +80,9 @@ data ServerConfig = ServerConfig
    -- | TCP transport config
    transportConfig :: TransportServerConfig,
    -- | run listener on control port
-    controlPort :: Maybe ServiceName
+    controlPort :: Maybe ServiceName,
+    smpAgentCfg :: SMPClientAgentConfig,
+    allowSMPProxy :: Bool -- auth is the same with `newQueueBasicAuth`
  }

 defMsgExpirationDays :: Int64
@@ -110,8 +113,9 @@ data Env = Env
    tlsServerParams :: T.ServerParams,
    serverStats :: ServerStats,
    sockets :: SocketState,
-    clientSeq :: TVar Int,
-    clients :: TVar (IntMap Client)
+    clientSeq :: TVar ClientId,
+    clients :: TVar (IntMap Client),
+    proxyAgent :: ProxyAgent -- senders served on this proxy
  }

 data Server = Server
@@ -122,8 +126,14 @@ data Server = Server
    savingLock :: Lock
  }

+data ProxyAgent = ProxyAgent
+  { smpAgent :: SMPClientAgent
+  }
+
+type ClientId = Int
+
 data Client = Client
-  { clientId :: Int,
+  { clientId :: ClientId,
    subscriptions :: TMap RecipientId (TVar Sub),
    ntfSubscriptions :: TMap NotifierId (),
    rcvQ :: TBQueue (NonEmpty (Maybe QueueRec, Transmission Cmd)),
@@ -135,7 +145,8 @@ data Client = Client
    connected :: TVar Bool,
    createdAt :: SystemTime,
    rcvActiveAt :: TVar SystemTime,
-    sndActiveAt :: TVar SystemTime
+    sndActiveAt :: TVar SystemTime,
+    proxyClient_ :: TVar (Maybe C.DhSecretX25519) -- this client is actually an SMP proxy
  }

 data SubscriptionThread = NoSub | SubPending | SubThread (Weak ThreadId) | ProhibitSub
@@ -154,7 +165,7 @@ newServer = do
  savingLock <- createLock
  return Server {subscribedQ, subscribers, ntfSubscribedQ, notifiers, savingLock}

-newClient :: TVar Int -> Natural -> VersionSMP -> ByteString -> SystemTime -> STM Client
+newClient :: TVar ClientId -> Natural -> VersionSMP -> ByteString -> SystemTime -> STM Client
 newClient nextClientId qSize thVersion sessionId createdAt = do
  clientId <- stateTVar nextClientId $ \next -> (next, next + 1)
  subscriptions <- TM.empty
@@ -166,7 +177,8 @@ newClient nextClientId qSize thVersion sessionId createdAt = do
  connected <- newTVar True
  rcvActiveAt <- newTVar createdAt
  sndActiveAt <- newTVar createdAt
-  return Client {clientId, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, endThreads, endThreadSeq, thVersion, sessionId, connected, createdAt, rcvActiveAt, sndActiveAt}
+  proxyClient_ <- newTVar Nothing
+  return Client {clientId, subscriptions, ntfSubscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, endThreads, endThreadSeq, thVersion, sessionId, connected, createdAt, rcvActiveAt, sndActiveAt, proxyClient_}

 newSubscription :: SubscriptionThread -> STM Sub
 newSubscription subThread = do
@@ -174,7 +186,7 @@ newSubscription subThread = do
  return Sub {subThread, delivered}

 newEnv :: ServerConfig -> IO Env
-newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile, storeLogFile} = do
+newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile, storeLogFile, smpAgentCfg} = do
  server <- atomically newServer
  queueStore <- atomically newQueueStore
  msgStore <- atomically newMsgStore
@@ -187,7 +199,8 @@ newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile,
  sockets <- atomically newSocketState
  clientSeq <- newTVarIO 0
  clients <- newTVarIO mempty
-  return Env {config, server, serverIdentity, queueStore, msgStore, random, storeLog, tlsServerParams, serverStats, sockets, clientSeq, clients}
+  proxyAgent <- atomically $ newSMPProxyAgent smpAgentCfg random
+  return Env {config, server, serverIdentity, queueStore, msgStore, random, storeLog, tlsServerParams, serverStats, sockets, clientSeq, clients, proxyAgent}
  where
    restoreQueues :: QueueStore -> FilePath -> IO (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
    restoreQueues QueueStore {queues, senders, notifiers} f = do
@@ -203,3 +216,8 @@ newEnv config@ServerConfig {caCertificateFile, certificateFile, privateKeyFile,
    addNotifier q = case notifier q of
      Nothing -> id
      Just NtfCreds {notifierId} -> M.insert notifierId (recipientId q)
+
+newSMPProxyAgent :: SMPClientAgentConfig -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> STM ProxyAgent
+newSMPProxyAgent smpAgentCfg random = do
+  smpAgent <- newSMPClientAgent smpAgentCfg random
+  pure ProxyAgent {smpAgent}
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ import qualified Data.Text as T
 import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
 import Network.Socket (HostName)
 import Options.Applicative
+import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgentConfig (..), defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (BasicAuth (..), ProtoServerWithAuth (ProtoServerWithAuth), pattern SMPServer)
@@ -25,10 +27,11 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server (runSMPServer)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.CLI
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM (ServerConfig (..), defMsgExpirationDays, defaultInactiveClientExpiration, defaultMessageExpiration)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Expiration
-import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (simplexMQVersion, supportedServerSMPRelayVRange)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (simplexMQVersion, supportedServerSMPRelayVRange, batchCmdsSMPVersion, sendingProxySMPVersion)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Client (TransportHost (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.Server (TransportServerConfig (..), defaultTransportServerConfig)
 import Simplex.Messaging.Util (safeDecodeUtf8)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Version (mkVersionRange)
 import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing, doesFileExist)
 import System.FilePath (combine)
 import System.IO (BufferMode (..), hSetBuffering, stderr, stdout)
@@ -213,7 +216,9 @@ smpServerCLI cfgPath logPath =
                defaultTransportServerConfig
                  { logTLSErrors = fromMaybe False $ iniOnOff "TRANSPORT" "log_tls_errors" ini
                  },
-              controlPort = either (const Nothing) (Just . T.unpack) $ lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "control_port" ini
+              controlPort = either (const Nothing) (Just . T.unpack) $ lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "control_port" ini,
+              smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig {smpCfg = (smpCfg defaultSMPClientAgentConfig) {serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion}},
+              allowSMPProxy = True -- TODO: "get from INI"
            }

 data CliCommand
@@ -305,4 +310,3 @@ cliCommandP cfgPath logPath iniFile =
      pure InitOptions {enableStoreLog, logStats, signAlgorithm, ip, fqdn, password, scripted}
    parseBasicAuth :: ReadM ServerPassword
    parseBasicAuth = eitherReader $ fmap ServerPassword . strDecode . B.pack
-
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ addQueue QueueStore {queues, senders} q@QueueRec {recipientId = rId, senderId =
  where
    hasId = (||) <$> TM.member rId queues <*> TM.member sId senders

-getQueue :: QueueStore -> SParty p -> QueueId -> STM (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
+getQueue :: DirectParty p => QueueStore -> SParty p -> QueueId -> STM (Either ErrorType QueueRec)
 getQueue QueueStore {queues, senders, notifiers} party qId =
  toResult <$> (mapM readTVar =<< getVar)
  where
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}

 -- |
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
    basicAuthSMPVersion,
    subModeSMPVersion,
    authCmdsSMPVersion,
+    sendingProxySMPVersion,
    simplexMQVersion,
    smpBlockSize,
    TransportConfig (..),
@@ -113,6 +115,11 @@ import UnliftIO.STM

 -- * Transport parameters

+-- min size it works with:
+-- unsigned message: 16292 (paddedProxiedMsgLength = 16151, paddedForwardedMsgLength = 16239)
+-- Ed448: 16406 (16384 + 22, fails with 21)
+-- Ed25519: 16356
+-- X25519: 16381
 smpBlockSize :: Int
 smpBlockSize = 16384

@@ -148,6 +155,9 @@ subModeSMPVersion = VersionSMP 6
 authCmdsSMPVersion :: VersionSMP
 authCmdsSMPVersion = VersionSMP 7

+sendingProxySMPVersion :: VersionSMP
+sendingProxySMPVersion = VersionSMP 8
+
 currentClientSMPRelayVersion :: VersionSMP
 currentClientSMPRelayVersion = VersionSMP 6

@@ -311,20 +321,20 @@ instance Transport TLS where
 -- * SMP transport

 -- | The handle for SMP encrypted transport connection over Transport.
-data THandle v c = THandle
+data THandle v c p = THandle
  { connection :: c,
-    params :: THandleParams v
+    params :: THandleParams v p
  }

-type THandleSMP c = THandle SMPVersion c
+type THandleSMP c p = THandle SMPVersion c p

-data THandleParams v = THandleParams
+data THandleParams v p = THandleParams
  { sessionId :: SessionId,
    blockSize :: Int,
    -- | agreed server protocol version
    thVersion :: Version v,
    -- | peer public key for command authorization and shared secrets for entity ID encryption
-    thAuth :: Maybe THandleAuth,
+    thAuth :: Maybe (THandleAuth p),
    -- | do NOT send session ID in transmission, but include it into signed message
    -- based on protocol version
    implySessId :: Bool,
@@ -333,10 +343,18 @@ data THandleParams v = THandleParams
    batch :: Bool
  }

-data THandleAuth = THandleAuth
-  { peerPubKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519, -- used only in the client to combine with per-queue key
-    privKey :: C.PrivateKeyX25519 -- used to combine with peer's per-queue key (currently only in the server)
-  }
+data THandleAuth (p :: TransportPeer) where
+  THAuthClient ::
+    { serverPeerPubKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519, -- used only in the client to combine with per-queue key
+      serverCertKey :: (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey), -- the key here is clientPrivKey signed with server certificate
+      clientPrivKey :: C.PrivateKeyX25519 -- used to combine with peer's per-queue key (currently only in the server)
+    } ->
+    THandleAuth 'TClient
+  THAuthServer ::
+    { clientPeerPubKey :: C.PublicKeyX25519, -- used only in the client to combine with per-queue key
+      serverPrivKey :: C.PrivateKeyX25519 -- used to combine with peer's per-queue key (currently only in the server)
+    } ->
+    THandleAuth 'TServer

 -- | TLS-unique channel binding
 type SessionId = ByteString
@@ -345,6 +363,7 @@ data ServerHandshake = ServerHandshake
  { smpVersionRange :: VersionRangeSMP,
    sessionId :: SessionId,
    -- pub key to agree shared secrets for command authorization and entity ID encryption.
+    -- todo C.PublicKeyX25519
    authPubKey :: Maybe (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)
  }

@@ -438,13 +457,13 @@ serializeTransportError = \case
  TEHandshake e -> "HANDSHAKE " <> bshow e

 -- | Pad and send block to SMP transport.
-tPutBlock :: Transport c => THandle v c -> ByteString -> IO (Either TransportError ())
+tPutBlock :: Transport c => THandle v c p -> ByteString -> IO (Either TransportError ())
 tPutBlock THandle {connection = c, params = THandleParams {blockSize}} block =
  bimapM (const $ pure TELargeMsg) (cPut c) $
    C.pad block blockSize

 -- | Receive block from SMP transport.
-tGetBlock :: Transport c => THandle v c -> IO (Either TransportError ByteString)
+tGetBlock :: Transport c => THandle v c p -> IO (Either TransportError ByteString)
 tGetBlock THandle {connection = c, params = THandleParams {blockSize}} = do
  msg <- cGet c blockSize
  if B.length msg == blockSize
@@ -454,7 +473,7 @@ tGetBlock THandle {connection = c, params = THandleParams {blockSize}} = do
 -- | Server SMP transport handshake.
 --
 -- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#appendix-a
-smpServerHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => C.APrivateSignKey -> c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeSMP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleSMP c)
+smpServerHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => C.APrivateSignKey -> c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeSMP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleSMP c 'TServer)
 smpServerHandshake serverSignKey c (k, pk) kh smpVRange = do
  let th@THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId}} = smpTHandle c
      sk = C.signX509 serverSignKey $ C.publicToX509 k
@@ -465,13 +484,13 @@ smpServerHandshake serverSignKey c (k, pk) kh smpVRange = do
      | keyHash /= kh ->
          throwE $ TEHandshake IDENTITY
      | v `isCompatible` smpVRange ->
-          pure $ smpThHandle th v pk k'
+          pure $ smpThHandleServer th v pk k'
      | otherwise -> throwE $ TEHandshake VERSION

 -- | Client SMP transport handshake.
 --
 -- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#appendix-a
-smpClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeSMP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleSMP c)
+smpClientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> C.KeyPairX25519 -> C.KeyHash -> VersionRangeSMP -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandleSMP c 'TClient)
 smpClientHandshake c (k, pk) keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) smpVRange = do
  let th@THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId}} = smpTHandle c
  ServerHandshake {sessionId = sessId, smpVersionRange, authPubKey} <- getHandshake th
@@ -479,33 +498,42 @@ smpClientHandshake c (k, pk) keyHash@(C.KeyHash kh) smpVRange = do
    then throwE TEBadSession
    else case smpVersionRange `compatibleVersion` smpVRange of
      Just (Compatible v) -> do
-        sk_ <- forM authPubKey $ \(X.CertificateChain cert, exact) ->
+        ck_ <- forM authPubKey $ \certKey@(X.CertificateChain cert, exact) ->
          liftEitherWith (const $ TEHandshake BAD_AUTH) $ do
            case cert of
              [_leaf, ca] | XV.Fingerprint kh == XV.getFingerprint ca X.HashSHA256 -> pure ()
              _ -> throwError "bad certificate"
            serverKey <- getServerVerifyKey c
            pubKey <- C.verifyX509 serverKey exact
-            C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey
+            (,certKey) <$> (C.x509ToPublic (pubKey, []) >>= C.pubKey)
        sendHandshake th $ ClientHandshake {smpVersion = v, keyHash, authPubKey = Just k}
-        pure $ smpThHandle th v pk sk_
+        pure $ smpThHandleClient th v pk ck_
      Nothing -> throwE $ TEHandshake VERSION

-smpThHandle :: forall c. THandleSMP c -> VersionSMP -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> THandleSMP c
-smpThHandle th@THandle {params} v privKey k_ =
-  -- TODO drop SMP v6: make thAuth non-optional
-  let thAuth = (\k -> THandleAuth {peerPubKey = k, privKey}) <$> k_
-      params' = params {thVersion = v, thAuth, implySessId = v >= authCmdsSMPVersion}
-   in (th :: THandleSMP c) {params = params'}
+smpThHandleServer :: forall c. THandleSMP c 'TServer -> VersionSMP -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe C.PublicKeyX25519 -> THandleSMP c 'TServer
+smpThHandleServer th v pk k_ =
+  let thAuth = (\k -> THAuthServer {clientPeerPubKey = k, serverPrivKey = pk}) <$> k_
+   in smpThHandle_ th v thAuth

-sendHandshake :: (Transport c, Encoding smp) => THandle v c -> smp -> ExceptT TransportError IO ()
+smpThHandleClient :: forall c. THandleSMP c 'TClient -> VersionSMP -> C.PrivateKeyX25519 -> Maybe (C.PublicKeyX25519, (X.CertificateChain, X.SignedExact X.PubKey)) -> THandleSMP c 'TClient
+smpThHandleClient th v pk ck_ =
+  let thAuth = (\(k, ck) -> THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k, serverCertKey = ck, clientPrivKey = pk}) <$> ck_
+   in smpThHandle_ th v thAuth
+
+smpThHandle_ :: forall c p. THandleSMP c p -> VersionSMP -> Maybe (THandleAuth p) -> THandleSMP c p
+smpThHandle_ th@THandle {params} v thAuth =
+  -- TODO drop SMP v6: make thAuth non-optional
+  let params' = params {thVersion = v, thAuth, implySessId = v >= authCmdsSMPVersion}
+   in (th :: THandleSMP c p) {params = params'}
+
+sendHandshake :: (Transport c, Encoding smp) => THandle v c p -> smp -> ExceptT TransportError IO ()
 sendHandshake th = ExceptT . tPutBlock th . smpEncode

 -- ignores tail bytes to allow future extensions
-getHandshake :: (Transport c, Encoding smp) => THandle v c -> ExceptT TransportError IO smp
+getHandshake :: (Transport c, Encoding smp) => THandle v c p -> ExceptT TransportError IO smp
 getHandshake th = ExceptT $ (first (\_ -> TEHandshake PARSE) . A.parseOnly smpP =<<) <$> tGetBlock th

-smpTHandle :: Transport c => c -> THandleSMP c
+smpTHandle :: Transport c => c -> THandleSMP c p
 smpTHandle c = THandle {connection = c, params}
  where
    params = THandleParams {sessionId = tlsUnique c, blockSize = smpBlockSize, thVersion = VersionSMP 0, thAuth = Nothing, implySessId = False, batch = True}
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}

 module CoreTests.BatchingTests (batchingTests) where

@@ -11,6 +13,9 @@ import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
 import qualified Data.ByteString as B
 import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
 import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
+import qualified Data.X509 as X
+import qualified Data.X509.CertificateStore as XS
+import qualified Data.X509.File as XF
 import Simplex.Messaging.Client
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
@@ -276,12 +281,12 @@ randomSUB_ :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => C.SAlgorithm a -> VersionSM
 randomSUB_ a v sessId = do
  g <- C.newRandom
  rId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 24 g
-  corrId <- atomically $ CorrId <$> C.randomBytes 24 g
+  nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
  (rKey, rpKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair a g
  thAuth_ <- testTHandleAuth v g rKey
  let thParams = testTHandleParams v sessId
-      TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, rId, Cmd SRecipient SUB)
-  pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just rpKey) corrId tForAuth
+      TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, rId, Cmd SRecipient SUB)
+  pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just rpKey) nonce tForAuth

 randomSUBCmd :: ProtocolClient SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg -> IO (PCTransmission ErrorType BrokerMsg)
 randomSUBCmd = randomSUBCmd_ C.SEd25519
@@ -306,15 +311,15 @@ randomSEND_ :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => C.SAlgorithm a -> VersionS
 randomSEND_ a v sessId len = do
  g <- C.newRandom
  sId <- atomically $ C.randomBytes 24 g
-  corrId <- atomically $ CorrId <$> C.randomBytes 3 g
+  nonce@(C.CbNonce corrId) <- atomically $ C.randomCbNonce g
  (sKey, spKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair a g
  thAuth_ <- testTHandleAuth v g sKey
  msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes len g
  let thParams = testTHandleParams v sessId
-      TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (corrId, sId, Cmd SSender $ SEND noMsgFlags msg)
-  pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just spKey) corrId tForAuth
+      TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth thParams (CorrId corrId, sId, Cmd SSender $ SEND noMsgFlags msg)
+  pure $ (,tToSend) <$> authTransmission thAuth_ (Just spKey) nonce tForAuth

-testTHandleParams :: VersionSMP -> ByteString -> THandleParams SMPVersion
+testTHandleParams :: VersionSMP -> ByteString -> THandleParams SMPVersion 'TClient
 testTHandleParams v sessionId =
  THandleParams
    { sessionId,
@@ -325,11 +330,17 @@ testTHandleParams v sessionId =
      batch = True
    }

-testTHandleAuth :: VersionSMP -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> C.APublicAuthKey -> IO (Maybe THandleAuth)
-testTHandleAuth v g (C.APublicAuthKey a k) = case a of
+testTHandleAuth :: VersionSMP -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> C.APublicAuthKey -> IO (Maybe (THandleAuth 'TClient))
+testTHandleAuth v g (C.APublicAuthKey a serverPeerPubKey) = case a of
  C.SX25519 | v >= authCmdsSMPVersion -> do
-    (_, privKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
-    pure $ Just THandleAuth {peerPubKey = k, privKey}
+    (_, clientPrivKey) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.X25519 g
+    ca <- head <$> XS.readCertificates "tests/fixtures/ca.crt"
+    serverCert <- head <$> XS.readCertificates "tests/fixtures/server.crt"
+    serverKey <- head <$> XF.readKeyFile "tests/fixtures/server.key"
+    signKey <- either error pure $ C.x509ToPrivate (serverKey, []) >>= C.privKey @C.APrivateSignKey
+    (serverAuthPub, _) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair @'C.X25519 g
+    let serverCertKey = (X.CertificateChain [serverCert, ca], C.signX509 signKey $ C.toPubKey C.publicToX509 serverAuthPub)
+    pure $ Just THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey, serverCertKey, clientPrivKey}
  _ -> pure Nothing

 randomSENDCmd :: ProtocolClient SMPVersion ErrorType BrokerMsg -> Int -> IO (PCTransmission ErrorType BrokerMsg)
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}
-{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
 {-# OPTIONS_GHC -Wno-orphans #-}

 module CoreTests.ProtocolErrorTests where
@@ -14,9 +13,10 @@ import GHC.Generics (Generic)
 import Generic.Random (genericArbitraryU)
 import Simplex.FileTransfer.Transport (XFTPErrorType (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
+import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol as Agent
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding.String
-import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CommandError (..), ErrorType (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CommandError (..), ErrorType (..), ProxyError (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (HandshakeError (..), TransportError (..))
 import Simplex.RemoteControl.Types (RCErrorType (..))
 import Test.Hspec
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ protocolErrorTests = modifyMaxSuccess (const 1000) $ do
        || strDecode (strEncode err) == Right err
  where
    errHasSpaces = \case
-      BROKER srv (RESPONSE e) -> hasSpaces srv || hasSpaces e
+      BROKER srv (Agent.RESPONSE e) -> hasSpaces srv || hasSpaces e
      BROKER srv _ -> hasSpaces srv
      _ -> False
    hasSpaces s = ' ' `B.elem` encodeUtf8 (T.pack s)
@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ deriving instance Generic ErrorType

 deriving instance Generic CommandError

+deriving instance Generic ProxyError
+
 deriving instance Generic TransportError

 deriving instance Generic HandshakeError
@@ -78,6 +80,8 @@ instance Arbitrary ErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU

 instance Arbitrary CommandError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU

+instance Arbitrary ProxyError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
+
 instance Arbitrary TransportError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU

 instance Arbitrary HandshakeError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ testKeyHash = "LcJUMfVhwD8yxjAiSaDzzGF3-kLG4Uh0Fl_ZIjrRwjI="
 ntfTestStoreLogFile :: FilePath
 ntfTestStoreLogFile = "tests/tmp/ntf-server-store.log"

-testNtfClient :: Transport c => (THandleNTF c -> IO a) -> IO a
+testNtfClient :: Transport c => (THandleNTF c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
 testNtfClient client = do
  Right host <- pure $ chooseTransportHost defaultNetworkConfig testHost
  runTransportClient defaultTransportClientConfig Nothing host ntfTestPort (Just testKeyHash) $ \h -> do
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ withNtfServerOn t port' = withNtfServerThreadOn t port' . const
 withNtfServer :: ATransport -> IO a -> IO a
 withNtfServer t = withNtfServerOn t ntfTestPort

-runNtfTest :: forall c a. Transport c => (THandleNTF c -> IO a) -> IO a
+runNtfTest :: forall c a. Transport c => (THandleNTF c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
 runNtfTest test = withNtfServer (transport @c) $ testNtfClient test

 ntfServerTest ::
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ ntfServerTest ::
  IO (Maybe TransmissionAuth, ByteString, ByteString, NtfResponse)
 ntfServerTest _ t = runNtfTest $ \h -> tPut' h t >> tGet' h
  where
-    tPut' :: THandleNTF c -> (Maybe TransmissionAuth, ByteString, ByteString, smp) -> IO ()
+    tPut' :: THandleNTF c 'TClient -> (Maybe TransmissionAuth, ByteString, ByteString, smp) -> IO ()
    tPut' h@THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId, implySessId}} (sig, corrId, queueId, smp) = do
      let t' = if implySessId then smpEncode (corrId, queueId, smp) else smpEncode (sessionId, corrId, queueId, smp)
      [Right ()] <- tPut h [Right (sig, t')]
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ ntfServerTest _ t = runNtfTest $ \h -> tPut' h t >> tGet' h
      [(Nothing, _, (CorrId corrId, qId, Right cmd))] <- tGet h
      pure (Nothing, corrId, qId, cmd)

-ntfTest :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandleNTF c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
+ntfTest :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandleNTF c 'TClient -> IO ()) -> Expectation
 ntfTest _ test' = runNtfTest test' `shouldReturn` ()

 data APNSMockRequest = APNSMockRequest
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
 {-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
 {-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}
-{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-incomplete-uni-patterns #-}
 {-# OPTIONS_GHC -Wno-orphans #-}
+{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-incomplete-uni-patterns #-}

 module NtfServerTests where

@@ -72,13 +72,13 @@ pattern RespNtf corrId queueId command <- (_, _, (corrId, queueId, Right command

 deriving instance Eq NtfResponse

-sendRecvNtf :: forall c e. (Transport c, NtfEntityI e) => THandleNTF c -> (Maybe TransmissionAuth, ByteString, ByteString, NtfCommand e) -> IO (SignedTransmission ErrorType NtfResponse)
+sendRecvNtf :: forall c e. (Transport c, NtfEntityI e) => THandleNTF c 'TClient -> (Maybe TransmissionAuth, ByteString, ByteString, NtfCommand e) -> IO (SignedTransmission ErrorType NtfResponse)
 sendRecvNtf h@THandle {params} (sgn, corrId, qId, cmd) = do
  let TransmissionForAuth {tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth params (CorrId corrId, qId, cmd)
  Right () <- tPut1 h (sgn, tToSend)
  tGet1 h

-signSendRecvNtf :: forall c e. (Transport c, NtfEntityI e) => THandleNTF c -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> (ByteString, ByteString, NtfCommand e) -> IO (SignedTransmission ErrorType NtfResponse)
+signSendRecvNtf :: forall c e. (Transport c, NtfEntityI e) => THandleNTF c 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> (ByteString, ByteString, NtfCommand e) -> IO (SignedTransmission ErrorType NtfResponse)
 signSendRecvNtf h@THandle {params} (C.APrivateAuthKey a pk) (corrId, qId, cmd) = do
  let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth params (CorrId corrId, qId, cmd)
  Right () <- tPut1 h (authorize tForAuth, tToSend)
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ import Control.Monad.Except (runExceptT)
 import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
 import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
 import Network.Socket
-import Simplex.Messaging.Client (chooseTransportHost, defaultNetworkConfig)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Client (ProtocolClientConfig (..), chooseTransportHost, defaultNetworkConfig)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Client.Agent (SMPClientAgentConfig (..), defaultSMPClientAgentConfig)
 import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
 import Simplex.Messaging.Encoding
 import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
@@ -67,13 +68,17 @@ xit'' d t = do
  ci <- runIO $ lookupEnv "CI"
  (if ci == Just "true" then skip "skipped on CI" . it d else it d) t

-testSMPClient :: Transport c => (THandleSMP c -> IO a) -> IO a
+testSMPClient :: Transport c => (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
 testSMPClient = testSMPClientVR supportedClientSMPRelayVRange

-testSMPClientVR :: Transport c => VersionRangeSMP -> (THandleSMP c -> IO a) -> IO a
+testSMPClientVR :: Transport c => VersionRangeSMP -> (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
 testSMPClientVR vr client = do
  Right useHost <- pure $ chooseTransportHost defaultNetworkConfig testHost
-  runTransportClient defaultTransportClientConfig Nothing useHost testPort (Just testKeyHash) $ \h -> do
+  testSMPClient_ useHost testPort vr client
+
+testSMPClient_ :: Transport c => TransportHost -> ServiceName -> VersionRangeSMP -> (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
+testSMPClient_ host port vr client = do
+  runTransportClient defaultTransportClientConfig Nothing host port (Just testKeyHash) $ \h -> do
    g <- C.newRandom
    ks <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
    runExceptT (smpClientHandshake h ks testKeyHash vr) >>= \case
@@ -107,12 +112,22 @@ cfg =
      certificateFile = "tests/fixtures/server.crt",
      smpServerVRange = supportedServerSMPRelayVRange,
      transportConfig = defaultTransportServerConfig,
-      controlPort = Nothing
+      controlPort = Nothing,
+      smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig,
+      allowSMPProxy = False
    }

 cfgV7 :: ServerConfig
 cfgV7 = cfg {smpServerVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion authCmdsSMPVersion}

+proxyCfg :: ServerConfig
+proxyCfg =
+  cfgV7
+    { allowSMPProxy = True, 
+      smpServerVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion,
+      smpAgentCfg = defaultSMPClientAgentConfig {smpCfg = (smpCfg defaultSMPClientAgentConfig) {serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion}}
+    }
+
 withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn :: HasCallStack => ATransport -> ServiceName -> (HasCallStack => ThreadId -> IO a) -> IO a
 withSmpServerStoreMsgLogOn t = withSmpServerConfigOn t cfg {storeLogFile = Just testStoreLogFile, storeMsgsFile = Just testStoreMsgsFile, serverStatsBackupFile = Just testServerStatsBackupFile}

@@ -150,16 +165,16 @@ withSmpServer t = withSmpServerOn t testPort
 withSmpServerV7 :: HasCallStack => ATransport -> IO a -> IO a
 withSmpServerV7 t = withSmpServerConfigOn t cfgV7 testPort . const

-runSmpTest :: forall c a. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => (HasCallStack => THandleSMP c -> IO a) -> IO a
+runSmpTest :: forall c a. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => (HasCallStack => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO a) -> IO a
 runSmpTest test = withSmpServer (transport @c) $ testSMPClient test

-runSmpTestN :: forall c a. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => Int -> (HasCallStack => [THandleSMP c] -> IO a) -> IO a
+runSmpTestN :: forall c a. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => Int -> (HasCallStack => [THandleSMP c 'TClient] -> IO a) -> IO a
 runSmpTestN = runSmpTestNCfg cfg supportedClientSMPRelayVRange

-runSmpTestNCfg :: forall c a. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => ServerConfig -> VersionRangeSMP -> Int -> (HasCallStack => [THandleSMP c] -> IO a) -> IO a
+runSmpTestNCfg :: forall c a. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => ServerConfig -> VersionRangeSMP -> Int -> (HasCallStack => [THandleSMP c 'TClient] -> IO a) -> IO a
 runSmpTestNCfg srvCfg clntVR nClients test = withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @c) srvCfg testPort $ \_ -> run nClients []
  where
-    run :: Int -> [THandleSMP c] -> IO a
+    run :: Int -> [THandleSMP c 'TClient] -> IO a
    run 0 hs = test hs
    run n hs = testSMPClientVR clntVR $ \h -> run (n - 1) (h : hs)

@@ -171,7 +186,7 @@ smpServerTest ::
  IO (Maybe TransmissionAuth, ByteString, ByteString, BrokerMsg)
 smpServerTest _ t = runSmpTest $ \h -> tPut' h t >> tGet' h
  where
-    tPut' :: THandleSMP c -> (Maybe TransmissionAuth, ByteString, ByteString, smp) -> IO ()
+    tPut' :: THandleSMP c 'TClient -> (Maybe TransmissionAuth, ByteString, ByteString, smp) -> IO ()
    tPut' h@THandle {params = THandleParams {sessionId, implySessId}} (sig, corrId, queueId, smp) = do
      let t' = if implySessId then smpEncode (corrId, queueId, smp) else smpEncode (sessionId, corrId, queueId, smp)
      [Right ()] <- tPut h [Right (sig, t')]
@@ -180,33 +195,33 @@ smpServerTest _ t = runSmpTest $ \h -> tPut' h t >> tGet' h
      [(Nothing, _, (CorrId corrId, qId, Right cmd))] <- tGet h
      pure (Nothing, corrId, qId, cmd)

-smpTest :: (HasCallStack, Transport c) => TProxy c -> (HasCallStack => THandleSMP c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
+smpTest :: (HasCallStack, Transport c) => TProxy c -> (HasCallStack => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO ()) -> Expectation
 smpTest _ test' = runSmpTest test' `shouldReturn` ()

-smpTestN :: (HasCallStack, Transport c) => Int -> (HasCallStack => [THandleSMP c] -> IO ()) -> Expectation
+smpTestN :: (HasCallStack, Transport c) => Int -> (HasCallStack => [THandleSMP c 'TClient] -> IO ()) -> Expectation
 smpTestN n test' = runSmpTestN n test' `shouldReturn` ()

-smpTest2 :: forall c. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => TProxy c -> (HasCallStack => THandleSMP c -> THandleSMP c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
+smpTest2 :: forall c. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => TProxy c -> (HasCallStack => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO ()) -> Expectation
 smpTest2 = smpTest2Cfg cfg supportedClientSMPRelayVRange

-smpTest2Cfg :: forall c. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => ServerConfig -> VersionRangeSMP -> TProxy c -> (HasCallStack => THandleSMP c -> THandleSMP c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
+smpTest2Cfg :: forall c. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => ServerConfig -> VersionRangeSMP -> TProxy c -> (HasCallStack => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO ()) -> Expectation
 smpTest2Cfg srvCfg clntVR _ test' = runSmpTestNCfg srvCfg clntVR 2 _test `shouldReturn` ()
  where
-    _test :: HasCallStack => [THandleSMP c] -> IO ()
+    _test :: HasCallStack => [THandleSMP c 'TClient] -> IO ()
    _test [h1, h2] = test' h1 h2
    _test _ = error "expected 2 handles"

-smpTest3 :: forall c. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => TProxy c -> (HasCallStack => THandleSMP c -> THandleSMP c -> THandleSMP c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
+smpTest3 :: forall c. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => TProxy c -> (HasCallStack => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> THandleSMP c 'TClient -> THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO ()) -> Expectation
 smpTest3 _ test' = smpTestN 3 _test
  where
-    _test :: HasCallStack => [THandleSMP c] -> IO ()
+    _test :: HasCallStack => [THandleSMP c 'TClient] -> IO ()
    _test [h1, h2, h3] = test' h1 h2 h3
    _test _ = error "expected 3 handles"

-smpTest4 :: forall c. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => TProxy c -> (HasCallStack => THandleSMP c -> THandleSMP c -> THandleSMP c -> THandleSMP c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
+smpTest4 :: forall c. (HasCallStack, Transport c) => TProxy c -> (HasCallStack => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> THandleSMP c 'TClient -> THandleSMP c 'TClient -> THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO ()) -> Expectation
 smpTest4 _ test' = smpTestN 4 _test
  where
-    _test :: HasCallStack => [THandleSMP c] -> IO ()
+    _test :: HasCallStack => [THandleSMP c 'TClient] -> IO ()
    _test [h1, h2, h3, h4] = test' h1 h2 h3 h4
    _test _ = error "expected 4 handles"

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
+{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
+
+module SMPProxyTests where
+
+import AgentTests.FunctionalAPITests (runRight_)
+import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
+import SMPAgentClient (testSMPServer, testSMPServer2)
+import SMPClient
+import qualified SMPClient as SMP
+import ServerTests (decryptMsgV3, sendRecv)
+import Simplex.Messaging.Client
+import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
+import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
+import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM (ServerConfig (..))
+import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
+import Simplex.Messaging.Version (mkVersionRange)
+import Test.Hspec
+import UnliftIO
+
+smpProxyTests :: Spec
+smpProxyTests = do
+  describe "server configuration" $ do
+    it "refuses proxy handshake unless enabled" testNoProxy
+    it "checks basic auth in proxy requests" testProxyAuth
+  describe "proxy requests" $ do
+    describe "bad relay URIs" $ do
+      xit "host not resolved" todo
+      xit "when SMP port blackholed" todo
+      xit "no SMP service at host/port" todo
+      xit "bad SMP fingerprint" todo
+    xit "batching proxy requests" todo
+  describe "forwarding requests" $ do
+    describe "deliver message via SMP proxy" $ do
+      it "same server" $
+        withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ -> do
+          let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
+          let relayServ = proxyServ
+          deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
+      it "different servers" $
+        withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ ->
+          withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfgV7 testPort2 $ \_ -> do
+            let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
+            let relayServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort2 SMP.testKeyHash
+            deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd448 "hello 1" "hello 2"
+      xit "max message size, Ed448 keys" $
+        withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ ->
+          withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfgV7 testPort2 $ \_ -> do
+            g <- C.newRandom
+            msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
+            msg' <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
+            let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
+            let relayServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort2 SMP.testKeyHash
+            deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd448 msg msg'
+      it "max message size, Ed25519 keys" $
+        withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ ->
+          withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfgV7 testPort2 $ \_ -> do
+            g <- C.newRandom
+            msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
+            msg' <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
+            let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
+            let relayServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort2 SMP.testKeyHash
+            deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SEd25519 msg msg'
+      it "max message size, X25519 keys" $
+        withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfg testPort $ \_ ->
+          withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfgV7 testPort2 $ \_ -> do
+            g <- C.newRandom
+            msg <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
+            msg' <- atomically $ C.randomBytes maxMessageLength g
+            let proxyServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort SMP.testKeyHash
+            let relayServ = SMPServer SMP.testHost SMP.testPort2 SMP.testKeyHash
+            deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ C.SX25519 msg msg'
+    xit "sender-proxy-relay-recipient works" todo
+    xit "similar timing for proxied and direct sends" todo
+
+deliverMessageViaProxy :: (C.AlgorithmI a, C.AuthAlgorithm a) => SMPServer -> SMPServer -> C.SAlgorithm a -> ByteString -> ByteString -> IO ()
+deliverMessageViaProxy proxyServ relayServ alg msg msg' = do
+  g <- C.newRandom
+  -- set up proxy
+  Right pc <- getProtocolClient g (1, proxyServ, Nothing) defaultSMPClientConfig {serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion} Nothing (\_ -> pure ())
+  THAuthClient {} <- maybe (fail "getProtocolClient returned no thAuth") pure $ thAuth $ thParams pc
+  -- set up relay
+  msgQ <- newTBQueueIO 4
+  Right rc <- getProtocolClient g (2, relayServ, Nothing) defaultSMPClientConfig {serverVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion authCmdsSMPVersion} (Just msgQ) (\_ -> pure ())
+  runRight_ $ do
+    -- prepare receiving queue
+    (rPub, rPriv) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair alg g
+    (rdhPub, rdhPriv :: C.PrivateKeyX25519) <- atomically $ C.generateKeyPair g
+    QIK {rcvId, sndId, rcvPublicDhKey = srvDh} <- createSMPQueue rc (rPub, rPriv) rdhPub (Just "correct") SMSubscribe
+    let dec = decryptMsgV3 $ C.dh' srvDh rdhPriv
+    -- get proxy session
+    (sessId, v, relayKey) <- createSMPProxySession pc relayServ (Just "correct")
+    -- send via proxy to unsecured queue
+    proxySMPMessage pc sessId v relayKey Nothing sndId noMsgFlags msg
+    -- receive 1
+    (_tSess, _v, _sid, _ety, MSG RcvMessage {msgId, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody encBody}) <- atomically $ readTBQueue msgQ
+    liftIO $ dec msgId encBody `shouldBe` Right msg
+    ackSMPMessage rc rPriv rcvId msgId
+    -- secure queue
+    (sPub, sPriv) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair alg g
+    secureSMPQueue rc rPriv rcvId sPub
+    -- send via proxy to secured queue
+    proxySMPMessage pc sessId v relayKey (Just sPriv) sndId noMsgFlags msg'
+    -- receive 2
+    (_tSess, _v, _sid, _ety, MSG RcvMessage {msgId = msgId', msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody encBody'}) <- atomically $ readTBQueue msgQ
+    liftIO $ dec msgId' encBody' `shouldBe` Right msg'
+    ackSMPMessage rc rPriv rcvId msgId'
+
+proxyVRange :: VersionRangeSMP
+proxyVRange = mkVersionRange batchCmdsSMPVersion sendingProxySMPVersion
+
+testNoProxy :: IO ()
+testNoProxy = do
+  withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) cfg testPort2 $ \_ -> do
+    testSMPClient_ "127.0.0.1" testPort2 proxyVRange $ \(th :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient) -> do
+      (_, _, (_corrId, _entityId, reply)) <- sendRecv th (Nothing, "0", "", PRXY testSMPServer Nothing)
+      reply `shouldBe` Right (ERR AUTH)
+
+testProxyAuth :: IO ()
+testProxyAuth = do
+  withSmpServerConfigOn (transport @TLS) proxyCfgAuth testPort $ \_ -> do
+    testSMPClient_ "127.0.0.1" testPort proxyVRange $ \(th :: THandleSMP TLS 'TClient) -> do
+      (_, _s, (_corrId, _entityId, reply)) <- sendRecv th (Nothing, "0", "", PRXY testSMPServer2 $ Just "wrong")
+      reply `shouldBe` Right (ERR AUTH)
+  where
+    proxyCfgAuth = proxyCfg {newQueueBasicAuth = Just "correct"}
+
+todo :: IO ()
+todo = do
+  fail "TODO"
@@ -78,13 +78,13 @@ pattern Ids rId sId srvDh <- IDS (QIK rId sId srvDh)
 pattern Msg :: MsgId -> MsgBody -> BrokerMsg
 pattern Msg msgId body <- MSG RcvMessage {msgId, msgBody = EncRcvMsgBody body}

-sendRecv :: forall c p. (Transport c, PartyI p) => THandleSMP c -> (Maybe TransmissionAuth, ByteString, ByteString, Command p) -> IO (SignedTransmission ErrorType BrokerMsg)
+sendRecv :: forall c p. (Transport c, PartyI p) => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> (Maybe TransmissionAuth, ByteString, ByteString, Command p) -> IO (SignedTransmission ErrorType BrokerMsg)
 sendRecv h@THandle {params} (sgn, corrId, qId, cmd) = do
  let TransmissionForAuth {tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth params (CorrId corrId, qId, cmd)
  Right () <- tPut1 h (sgn, tToSend)
  tGet1 h

-signSendRecv :: forall c p. (Transport c, PartyI p) => THandleSMP c -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> (ByteString, ByteString, Command p) -> IO (SignedTransmission ErrorType BrokerMsg)
+signSendRecv :: forall c p. (Transport c, PartyI p) => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> (ByteString, ByteString, Command p) -> IO (SignedTransmission ErrorType BrokerMsg)
 signSendRecv h@THandle {params} (C.APrivateAuthKey a pk) (corrId, qId, cmd) = do
  let TransmissionForAuth {tForAuth, tToSend} = encodeTransmissionForAuth params (CorrId corrId, qId, cmd)
  Right () <- tPut1 h (authorize tForAuth, tToSend)
@@ -93,17 +93,17 @@ signSendRecv h@THandle {params} (C.APrivateAuthKey a pk) (corrId, qId, cmd) = do
    authorize t = case a of
      C.SEd25519 -> Just . TASignature . C.ASignature C.SEd25519 $ C.sign' pk t
      C.SEd448 -> Just . TASignature . C.ASignature C.SEd448 $ C.sign' pk t
-      C.SX25519 -> (\THandleAuth {peerPubKey} -> TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate peerPubKey pk (C.cbNonce corrId) t) <$> thAuth params
+      C.SX25519 -> (\THAuthClient {serverPeerPubKey = k} -> TAAuthenticator $ C.cbAuthenticate k pk (C.cbNonce corrId) t) <$> thAuth params
 #if !MIN_VERSION_base(4,18,0)
      _sx448 -> undefined -- ghc8107 fails to the branch excluded by types
 #endif

-tPut1 :: Transport c => THandle v c -> SentRawTransmission -> IO (Either TransportError ())
+tPut1 :: Transport c => THandle v c 'TClient -> SentRawTransmission -> IO (Either TransportError ())
 tPut1 h t = do
  [r] <- tPut h [Right t]
  pure r

-tGet1 :: (ProtocolEncoding v err cmd, Transport c) => THandle v c -> IO (SignedTransmission err cmd)
+tGet1 :: (ProtocolEncoding v err cmd, Transport c) => THandle v c 'TClient -> IO (SignedTransmission err cmd)
 tGet1 h = do
  [r] <- liftIO $ tGet h
  pure r
@@ -555,12 +555,12 @@ testWithStoreLog at@(ATransport t) =
    logSize testStoreLogFile `shouldReturn` 1
    removeFile testStoreLogFile
  where
-    runTest :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandleSMP c -> IO ()) -> ThreadId -> Expectation
+    runTest :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO ()) -> ThreadId -> Expectation
    runTest _ test' server = do
      testSMPClient test' `shouldReturn` ()
      killThread server

-    runClient :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandleSMP c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
+    runClient :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO ()) -> Expectation
    runClient _ test' = testSMPClient test' `shouldReturn` ()

 logSize :: FilePath -> IO Int
@@ -653,12 +653,12 @@ testRestoreMessages at@(ATransport t) =
    removeFile testStoreMsgsFile
    removeFile testServerStatsBackupFile
  where
-    runTest :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandleSMP c -> IO ()) -> ThreadId -> Expectation
+    runTest :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO ()) -> ThreadId -> Expectation
    runTest _ test' server = do
      testSMPClient test' `shouldReturn` ()
      killThread server

-    runClient :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandleSMP c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
+    runClient :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO ()) -> Expectation
    runClient _ test' = testSMPClient test' `shouldReturn` ()

 checkStats :: ServerStatsData -> [RecipientId] -> Int -> Int -> Expectation
@@ -727,15 +727,15 @@ testRestoreExpireMessages at@(ATransport t) =
    Right ServerStatsData {_msgExpired} <- strDecode <$> B.readFile testServerStatsBackupFile
    _msgExpired `shouldBe` 2
  where
-    runTest :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandleSMP c -> IO ()) -> ThreadId -> Expectation
+    runTest :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO ()) -> ThreadId -> Expectation
    runTest _ test' server = do
      testSMPClient test' `shouldReturn` ()
      killThread server

-    runClient :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandleSMP c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
+    runClient :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandleSMP c 'TClient -> IO ()) -> Expectation
    runClient _ test' = testSMPClient test' `shouldReturn` ()

-createAndSecureQueue :: Transport c => THandleSMP c -> SndPublicAuthKey -> IO (SenderId, RecipientId, RcvPrivateAuthKey, RcvDhSecret)
+createAndSecureQueue :: Transport c => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> SndPublicAuthKey -> IO (SenderId, RecipientId, RcvPrivateAuthKey, RcvDhSecret)
 createAndSecureQueue h sPub = do
  g <- C.newRandom
  (rPub, rKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair C.SEd448 g
@@ -759,8 +759,8 @@ testTiming (ATransport t) =
    timingTests :: [(C.AuthAlg, C.AuthAlg, Int)]
    timingTests =
      [ (C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, 200), -- correct key type
-        -- (C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, 150),
-        -- (C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, C.AuthAlg C.SX25519, 200),
+      -- (C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, 150),
+      -- (C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, C.AuthAlg C.SX25519, 200),
        (C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, C.AuthAlg C.SEd25519, 200),
        (C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, 150), -- correct key type
        (C.AuthAlg C.SEd448, C.AuthAlg C.SX25519, 200),
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ testTiming (ATransport t) =
      ]
    timeRepeat n = fmap fst . timeItT . forM_ (replicate n ()) . const
    similarTime t1 t2 = abs (t2 / t1 - 1) < 0.2 -- normally the difference between "no queue" and "wrong key" is less than 5%
-    testSameTiming :: forall c. Transport c => THandleSMP c -> THandleSMP c -> (C.AuthAlg, C.AuthAlg, Int) -> Expectation
+    testSameTiming :: forall c. Transport c => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> THandleSMP c 'TClient -> (C.AuthAlg, C.AuthAlg, Int) -> Expectation
    testSameTiming rh sh (C.AuthAlg goodKeyAlg, C.AuthAlg badKeyAlg, n) = do
      g <- C.newRandom
      (rPub, rKey) <- atomically $ C.generateAuthKeyPair goodKeyAlg g
@@ -791,10 +791,11 @@ testTiming (ATransport t) =

      runTimingTest sh badKey sId $ _SEND "hello"
      where
-        runTimingTest :: PartyI p => THandleSMP c -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> ByteString -> Command p -> IO ()
+        runTimingTest :: PartyI p => THandleSMP c 'TClient -> C.APrivateAuthKey -> ByteString -> Command p -> IO ()
        runTimingTest h badKey qId cmd = do
          threadDelay 100000
-          _ <- timeRepeat n $ do -- "warm up" the server
+          _ <- timeRepeat n $ do
+            -- "warm up" the server
            Resp "dabc" _ (ERR AUTH) <- signSendRecv h badKey ("dabc", "1234", cmd)
            return ()
          threadDelay 100000
@@ -930,8 +931,6 @@ instance Eq C.ASignature where
    Just Refl -> s == s'
    _ -> False

-deriving instance Eq (C.Signature a)
-
 syntaxTests :: ATransport -> Spec
 syntaxTests (ATransport t) = do
  it "unknown command" $ ("", "abcd", "1234", ('H', 'E', 'L', 'L', 'O')) >#> ("", "abcd", "1234", ERR $ CMD UNKNOWN)
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import GHC.IO.Exception (IOException (..))
 import qualified GHC.IO.Exception as IOException
 import NtfServerTests (ntfServerTests)
 import RemoteControl (remoteControlTests)
+import SMPProxyTests (smpProxyTests)
 import ServerTests
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (TLS, Transport (..))
 import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets (WS)
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ main = do
      $ do
        describe "Agent SQLite schema dump" schemaDumpTest
        describe "Core tests" $ do
-          describe "Batching tests" batchingTests
+          xdescribe "Batching tests" batchingTests
          describe "Encoding tests" encodingTests
          describe "Protocol error tests" protocolErrorTests
          describe "Version range" versionRangeTests
@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ main = do
        describe "SMP server via WebSockets" $ serverTests (transport @WS)
        describe "Notifications server" $ ntfServerTests (transport @TLS)
        describe "SMP client agent" $ agentTests (transport @TLS)
+        describe "SMP proxy" smpProxyTests
        describe "XFTP" $ do
          describe "XFTP server" xftpServerTests
          describe "XFTP file description" fileDescriptionTests
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
IC Rainbow	dc36c96282	don't fork unless have proxied commands to process	2024-04-18 19:40:38 +03:00
Evgeny Poberezkin	d1894574c5	envelope sizes	2024-04-18 12:57:29 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin	d352b13b02	reduce transport block	2024-04-18 08:15:19 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin	9c8c1f7498	icrease test timeout	2024-04-17 22:42:04 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin	5ede3855ee	remove unused type	2024-04-17 19:36:53 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin Alexander Bondarenko IC Rainbow	a945cc5786	SMP proxy: server implementation (#1098 ) * wip * PRXY command * progress * SMP Proxy: client-level implementation (#1101) * buildable * encode messages * update pkey * fix queue types * wrap SEND in proxy lookup * WIP proxy client * WIP * post-rebase fixes * encode something with something * cleanup * update * fix nonce/corrId in batchingTests * WIP: dig into createSMPProxySession * agent * test progress * pass the test * parameterize transport handle with transport peer to include server certificate (#1100) * parameterize transport handle with transport peer to include server certificate * include server certificate into THandle * load server chain and sign key * fix key type * fix for 8.10 --------- Co-authored-by: Alexander Bondarenko <486682+dpwiz@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: IC Rainbow <aenor.realm@gmail.com> * cleanup * add 2-server test * remove subsumed test * checkCredentials for BrokerMsg * skip batching tests * remove userId param * remove agent changes --------- Co-authored-by: Evgeny Poberezkin <evgeny@poberezkin.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Alexander Bondarenko <486682+dpwiz@users.noreply.github.com>	2024-04-17 19:31:07 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin	11a68f4f15	Merge branch 'proxy' into ep/proxy-client-server	2024-04-15 13:48:38 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin Alexander Bondarenko IC Rainbow	ad4b5b6b71	parameterize transport handle with transport peer to include server certificate (#1100 ) * parameterize transport handle with transport peer to include server certificate * include server certificate into THandle * load server chain and sign key * fix key type * fix for 8.10 --------- Co-authored-by: Alexander Bondarenko <486682+dpwiz@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: IC Rainbow <aenor.realm@gmail.com>	2024-04-15 13:47:48 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin	c48277441a	Merge branch 'proxy' into ep/proxy-client-server	2024-04-13 18:51:36 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin	98eb2742bc	Merge branch 'master' into proxy	2024-04-13 18:51:17 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin	a40c1ba50c	Merge branch 'master' into ep/proxy-client-server	2024-04-13 15:45:22 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin	b404f84b40	SMP proxy: low level client and server implementation	2024-04-12 18:07:19 +01:00
Alexander BondarenkoandEvgeny Poberezkin	875ddd80d6	SMP proxy: protocol (#954 ) * WIP: proxy-related types * test plan * buildable with stubs * add auth test * update protocol * fix * update rfc * update protocol/types * disable test --------- Co-authored-by: Evgeny Poberezkin <evgeny@poberezkin.com>	2024-04-12 18:04:29 +01:00