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87 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Evgeny Poberezkin 091fbdd0e9 rename simplexmq-legacy into simplexmq-v0 (#270)
* rename simplexmq-legacy into simplexmq-v0

* split UnliftIO instance of ExceptT
2022-01-11 07:27:30 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 8e4c9634e9 update to use legacy name 2022-01-08 10:13:21 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin e237c97d6e legacy package name: simplexmq-legacy 2022-01-08 10:03:27 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin dd4ccce1ba 0.5.2 2022-01-06 13:52:54 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 584f230c4d update versions for 0.5.2, changelog (#261) 2022-01-06 13:50:50 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 10c62e7fa2 fix message delivery when quota exceeded - making it concurrent per queue, not per server (#260)
* test: HELLO blocking message delivery on the same server

* test: quota exceeded in one queue should not block delivery in other queues

* fix test to work in stable branch

* simplify pending message delivery (#202)

* simplify pending message delivery (WIP)

* refactor

* fix concurrent message delivery

* remove type synonym
2022-01-06 08:56:19 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin bd2e251cae server update script 2021-12-17 13:23:37 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 6b5cc3d2d5 0.5.1 2021-12-17 12:33:01 +00:00
Evgeny PoberezkinandEfim Poberezkin 5f7fe8b0dc remove client from servers subscribers map after client disconnection (#228)
Co-authored-by: Efim Poberezkin <8711996+efim-poberezkin@users.noreply.github.com>
2021-12-17 16:28:48 +04:00
Evgeny Poberezkin f15067cf68 0.5.0 2021-12-08 15:11:27 +00:00
Evgeny PoberezkinandEfim Poberezkin ff2b975cd8 prepare v0.5.0 - update versions, changelog (#219)
* prepare v0.5.0 - update versions, changelog

* Update CHANGELOG.md

Co-authored-by: Efim Poberezkin <8711996+efim-poberezkin@users.noreply.github.com>
2021-12-08 15:02:28 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin fe2d6607de delete contact connection with DEL command (#218) 2021-12-07 19:05:19 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 218a7756f8 RJCT / rejectContact to reject contact requests (#214) 2021-12-06 13:12:10 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin d5310c1c6f SimpleX protocols and network overview (#215) 2021-12-06 12:28:11 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 57c9ccfc08 use base64url encoding for public key in connection requests; only allow accepting invitations that were not accepted (#213)
* use base64url encoding for public key in connection requests; only allow accepting invitations that were not accepted

* subscribe ContactConnection, fix test to use base64url encoding in key example
2021-12-06 09:05:13 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 3e226fc3f2 add CONF/LET for invitations, use REQ/ACPT only with contact connections (#212) 2021-12-04 21:08:02 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 04c65d98da support permanent connection link ("contact") in SMP agent protocols (#143)
* open/public queue extension for SMP and SMP agent protocols

* add connection mode - invitation or contact

* use ConnectionMode with REQ and ACPT agent notification/command

* parameterize ConnectionRequest with ConnectionMode

* implement Contact connection mode for permanent connection links

* tests for contact connections
2021-12-04 18:42:08 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 316dc7b320 merge protocol changes from v5 (#211) 2021-12-02 18:42:13 +00:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 606bbf5062 URI syntax for SMP queues and connection requests (#210)
* URI syntax for SMP queues and connection requests

* fix connection request parsing/serializing

* add ConnectionRequest sqlite instances
2021-12-02 17:43:05 +00:00
Efim Poberezkin bfcbe4bcd8 remove build matrix and create release in the end of build to avoid downtime in binary availability (#196) 2021-10-02 18:49:24 +10:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 6b5427b826 update DigitalOcean image manifest and init script to install the latest server release, add docs (#195) 2021-09-12 14:21:09 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 35e6593581 0.4.1 2021-09-11 18:55:31 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 33de5f6fec include migrations in the package, update docs, versions (#194)
* include migrations in the package, update versions

* update DigitalOcean version
2021-09-11 18:36:12 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin d1d7d51fe0 0.4.0 2021-09-11 12:03:51 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 0f9226ba2a update version (0.4.0) and changelog (#193)
* update version (0.4.0) and changelog

* changelog corrections

* make tests more stable
2021-09-11 10:26:51 +01:00
Efim Poberezkin 862f25500d v4 (#192) 2021-09-09 01:30:39 +10:00
Efim Poberezkin da071a0abf Merge pull request #160 from simplex-chat/v4
v4
2021-09-09 01:19:01 +10:00
Efim Poberezkin 51491d9cd5 Merge branch 'master' into v4 2021-09-09 01:10:41 +10:00
Evgeny PoberezkinandEfim Poberezkin d973c834a5 update protocols (#190)
Co-authored-by: Efim Poberezkin <8711996+efim-poberezkin@users.noreply.github.com>
2021-09-08 00:25:04 +10:00
Evgeny Poberezkin e07bedac0e move tryError to Simplex.Messaging.Util (#191) 2021-09-04 19:01:54 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 2ac903a2dd do not allow "," and ";" separators in smp-server hostname (#189) 2021-09-03 20:35:48 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin d23254f44a SMP block size via config, the client can override size set by the server (#188) 2021-09-03 20:16:10 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 9a3afda290 ACK command, ackMessage, do not send ACK to SMP server on MSG (after the initial handshake) (#187) 2021-09-01 08:29:12 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 68f24f90d1 export withAgentLock and do not acquire agent lock in functional API (#186) 2021-08-30 18:29:13 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 75259d70cf set block size to 4096 bytes (#185) 2021-08-30 10:47:22 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 96c6339306 fix error handling of sending pending messages; set block size to 8192 (#184)
* fix error handling of sending pending messages

* s/tryAction/tryError/
2021-08-29 13:10:59 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 7b5ebf7bd2 change type of agent sendMessage result to AgentMsgId (#183) 2021-08-26 23:25:49 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin cb950ae2e4 add SMP queue quota to server config (and use TBQueue for messages) (#182) 2021-08-26 22:54:51 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 26b0edabfc refactor with RecordWildCards (#181) 2021-08-22 13:19:38 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin cda02a3b30 support 3072 bits RSA key size (#180) 2021-08-22 10:04:49 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin dd5137c336 asynchronous message sending to allow accepting messages when agent (or server) is offline (#179)
* asynchronous message sending to allow accepting messages when agent (or server) is offline

* send pending messages after agent restart; test for pending messages delivery when server restarted

* test pending message delivery after agent restart

* message delivery process per server

* test layout
2021-08-12 22:15:55 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin e045774caa reconnect server and resubscribe connections after disconnection (#178) 2021-08-09 08:49:49 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin dd6a53b0d2 funding.yml (#177) 2021-08-05 19:47:22 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin d9084522af agent lock to avoid running subscriber and client processing in parallel; remove check that the connection is active when delivering a message (#176)
* agent lock to avoid running subscriber and client processing in parallel; remove check that the connection is active when delivering a message

* use agent lock in agent functions
2021-08-05 08:33:48 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 3829479a21 Remove introductions, rename CONF/LET to REQ/ACPT (#175)
* remove intros and functions in Reader monad

* rename CONF/LET to REQ/ACPT, allowConnection to acceptConnection
2021-08-05 08:27:44 +01:00
Efim PoberezkinandEvgeny Poberezkin 8a4bced569 decrease initial delay for HELLO retries on online activation (#174)
* decrease initial delay for HELLO retries on online activation

* move retry interval to config

Co-authored-by: Evgeny Poberezkin <2769109+epoberezkin@users.noreply.github.com>
2021-08-01 13:51:40 +01:00
Nikita Poberezkin 8ac4b77777 create cfg dir before server initialization (#173) 2021-07-25 20:29:47 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 30c36b488a commit simplexmq.cabal to remove stack DEPRECATED warning (#172) 2021-07-25 20:27:09 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 10fcb9771a use explicit immediate transactions in all functions that change db (#170) 2021-07-20 21:21:30 +01:00
Nikita Poberezkin 65782d7ef6 add digital ocean deployment instruction (#168)
* add digital ocean deployment instruction

* fix instruction

* fix image link and remove ssh instruction link
2021-07-12 17:22:35 +01:00
Efim Poberezkin 5e380e1d47 add tests for establishing connection asynchronously; retrieve correct key for activation on restart (#169) 2021-07-10 20:02:48 +10:00
Efim Poberezkin 9f945492dd fix markdown error in crypto rfc (#167) 2021-07-09 04:27:07 +10:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 8ba3e3e45a remove connection ID parameter from agent functions (#166)
* remove connection ID parameter from agent functions

* remove unused extension
2021-07-03 20:18:37 +01:00
Efim PoberezkinandEvgeny Poberezkin 3d9ceff691 ask client for confirmation of sender; make establishment of connection asynchronous (#163)
Co-authored-by: Evgeny Poberezkin <2769109+epoberezkin@users.noreply.github.com>
2021-07-04 04:48:24 +10:00
Evgeny Poberezkin daad3315eb upgrade stack resolver to lts-18.0 (#165)
* upgrade stack resolver to lts-18.0

* fix random package version
2021-06-30 10:35:50 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin e4d9b481ec refactor message meta to MsgMeta type (#164) 2021-06-30 10:29:45 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 7af7272635 SQLiteStore connection pool (#162)
* SQLiteStore connection pool

* move SQLiteStore to agent env - single store instance is used for all clients
2021-06-25 18:17:11 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 09c6adeabc pass migration as parameter (to use in simplex-chat) (#161)
* pass migration as parameter (to use in simplex-chat)

* add connId parameter to create/joinConnection
2021-06-24 18:39:59 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin d5f324cb5c SMP agent: functional API (#159)
* SMP agent: functional API (WIP)

* functional API for SMP agent, tests

* fix ICON message parameter

* use stateTVar
2021-06-13 11:11:44 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin bf5561c89c remove entities, remove broadcasts (#158) 2021-06-12 20:01:36 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin ab89963f45 introduction protocol (#156)
* commands to support introduction

* agent messages / envelopes to support introductions

* introductions and invitations table; insert record with random unique ID

* store class methods and types for introductions

* process INTRO and ACPT commands for connection introductions

* fix tests: add MonadFail constraint, remove OK response to JOIN

* process agent messages for introductions

* ICON notification when introduction is completed

* replace multiway if with case

* correction

* support random connection IDs

* save additional connection fields, refactor create connection funcs

* refactor

* refactor

* test duplex connection with random IDs

* store methods for introductions

* test introduction

* fix parsing of CON agent message

* test introduction with random connection IDs

* broadcast with random connection and broadcast IDs

* clean up sql
2021-06-11 21:33:13 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 5ebb546d58 remove digitalocean deployment until ready (#157) 2021-06-06 11:20:06 +01:00
Nikita Poberezkin 46c3589604 add DigitalOcean SMP server Droplet recipe, extend readme (#150) 2021-06-01 23:10:58 +03:00
Evgeny Poberezkin dffa7a6100 groups agent protocol (#142)
* groups agent protocol

* groups to chat protocol

* update groups doc / diagram

* group protocol commands

* update group protocol

* count messages for different group operations

* broadcast and introduction as components for group protocol

* list connections in the broadcast

* protocol commands overview - using polymorphic commands

* another version of group protocol based on "broadcast" and "introduction" concepts

* update number of messages needed to establish connection

* corrections to broadcast and introduction protocols

* corrections in groups protocol

* corrections
2021-06-01 18:20:12 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin bc780343df broadcast commands (#154)
* broadcast commands (WIP)

* broadcasts: store and commands implementation

* test broadcast

* broadcast test

* rename migration, handle SEBadConnType errors

* query semicolons
2021-06-01 18:11:16 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 84ce001598 database migrations (#153)
* database migrations

* fix: reverse order of down migrations

* use positional parameters in queries

* simplify migrations

* typo

* rename SchemaMigration to Migration

* move store initialization to IO monad
2021-05-31 16:38:35 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 92bd8ef335 agent entity types (#148)
* agent entity types (WIP - fails)

* agent entities (tests pass, TODO - reduce boilerplate)

* simplify test patters

* simplify test patterns 2

* refactor testEquality for ACommand

* stricter entity parsing and correct serialization, updated tests

* fix check of entity ID

* remove unused instance Eq (Entity t)
2021-05-29 13:01:17 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 85535de7d8 update script link (#152)
* update script link

* linode logo

* update logo image
2021-05-28 19:28:36 +01:00
Nikita Poberezkin 7bbc4e4109 add linode deployment recipe, modify smp-server-linode script (#151) 2021-05-28 21:00:24 +03:00
Nikita Poberezkin 248aa234d1 turn off smp server websockets support in linode script (#149) 2021-05-27 11:48:30 +03:00
Nikita Poberezkin 26a0665d81 SMP server linode StackScript (#147) 2021-05-24 22:28:10 +03:00
Nikita Poberezkin dea1845908 0.3.2 (#146) 2021-05-23 14:19:19 +03:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 8ed3eb4581 upgrade ghc to 8.10.4, stack resolver to 17.12 (#145) 2021-05-23 12:00:18 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 5962c1bb3e SMP server CLI commands (#144)
SMP server CLI commands
2021-05-23 13:10:00 +03:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 5b39f51203 websockets transport (#139)
* example websockets server

* example of ws client

* type class TConnection for  generic TCP/WebSockets implementation

* support WebSockets transport

* rename TConnection methods

* revert runClient to not need transport arg

* pass the list of ports and transports via SMP server config

* remove TypeApplications

* s/Transport/TProxy/, s/TConnection/Transport/

* fix server with multiple transports, make SMP client use WS transport with port 80 (TODO fallback to WS)
2021-05-17 22:33:12 +01:00
Nikita Poberezkin 63532c8b45 simplex-messaging.md reformulation of key pairs handling part (#141) 2021-05-15 16:04:51 +01:00
Evgeny PoberezkinandEfim Poberezkin 44bec887fe 0.3.1 (#135)
Co-authored-by: Efim Poberezkin <8711996+efim-poberezkin@users.noreply.github.com>
2021-05-10 15:14:06 +04:00
Efim Poberezkin 8bd42035aa reorganize sqlite store test suite (#138) 2021-05-10 15:10:32 +04:00
Efim Poberezkin f7f419224f reduce transaction retry back-off factor to 1.125 (#137) 2021-05-10 14:24:08 +04:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 8ac47b9bbf reduce transaction retry back-off factor to 1.25 (31 retries) (#136) 2021-05-09 12:49:52 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 305bc5cb0a update package categories (#134) 2021-05-09 11:24:40 +01:00
Efim PoberezkinandEvgeny Poberezkin fa5a8cb5cd agent: change sqlite busy retry handling; set journal_mode = WAL (#132)
* agent: change sqlite busy retry handling; set journal_mode = WAL

* fix accumulation

* add exponential back-off (*1.5) to transaction retries

Co-authored-by: Evgeny Poberezkin <2769109+epoberezkin@users.noreply.github.com>
2021-05-09 10:24:02 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 5d59e4b2bd package and module docs, remove Simplex.Markdown (moved to simplex-chat), rename Agent.Transmission to Agent.Protocol (#133)
* package and module docs, remove Simplex.Markdown (moved to simplex-chat), rename Agent.Transmission to Agent.Protocol

* move errors.md to haddock comments, Transport docs

* add CHANGELOG.md, add missing package versions

* changelog, copyright

* docs for Simplex.Messaging.Crypto

* consistent punctuation

* use absolute URLs in readme

* correction
2021-05-09 09:36:08 +01:00
Efim PoberezkinandEvgeny Poberezkin ad87442811 sqlite busy stress test (#131)
* sqlite busy stress test

* refactor withStore2

* refactor withStore2

* pragmas

* swith to IMMEDIATE sqlite transactions and add retry on ErrorBusy

* refactor

* increase timeout, print errors and results

* remove logging errors/results

Co-authored-by: Evgeny Poberezkin <2769109+epoberezkin@users.noreply.github.com>
2021-05-08 16:30:40 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 7aacee405e agent: send CON to user when the 1st party responds HELLO; fix REPLY vulnerability (#130)
* agent: send CON to user when the 1st party responds HELLO; fix REPLY vulnerability

* test for getRcvConn

* add commented OK response to JOIN command

* store: use Only newtype to select one field
2021-05-07 06:57:53 +01:00
Evgeny Poberezkin 4b9ebbbab2 move SMP server from agent commands NEW/JOIN to agent config (#129)
* move SMP server from agent commands NEW/JOIN to agent config

* fix SMPServer parser

* update agent protocol - server management

* enable agent test

* agent test with 2 servers

* create reply queue on the configured server

* choose random server

* swap bind
2021-05-06 18:53:34 +01:00
Efim Poberezkin f09c77cd31 docs: correct agent protocol abnf (#128) 2021-05-04 21:48:54 +04:00
77 changed files with 7595 additions and 2694 deletions
+1
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
open_collective: simplex-chat
+31 -50
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@@ -4,52 +4,14 @@ on:
push:
branches:
- master
- stable
tags:
- "v*"
pull_request:
jobs:
prepare-release:
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Clone project
uses: actions/checkout@v2
- name: Build changelog
id: build_changelog
uses: mikepenz/release-changelog-builder-action@v1
with:
configuration: .github/changelog_conf.json
failOnError: true
ignorePreReleases: true
commitMode: true
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Create release
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1
with:
body: ${{ steps.build_changelog.outputs.changelog }}
files: |
LICENSE
fail_on_unmatched_files: true
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
build:
name: build-${{ matrix.os }}
if: always()
needs: prepare-release
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- os: ubuntu-20.04
asset_name: smp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64
- os: ubuntu-18.04
asset_name: smp-server-ubuntu-18_04-x86-64
runs-on: ubuntu-20.04
steps:
- name: Clone project
uses: actions/checkout@v2
@@ -65,19 +27,38 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/cache@v2
with:
path: ~/.stack
key: ${{ matrix.os }}-${{ hashFiles('stack.yaml') }}
key: ${{ hashFiles('stack.yaml') }}
- name: Build & test
id: build_test
run: |
stack build --test
echo "::set-output name=LOCAL_INSTALL_ROOT::$(stack path --local-install-root)"
- name: Upload binaries to release
stack build --test --force-dirty
install_root=$(stack path --local-install-root)
mv ${install_root}/bin/smp-server smp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64
- name: Build changelog
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
uses: svenstaro/upload-release-action@v2
id: build_changelog
uses: mikepenz/release-changelog-builder-action@v1
with:
repo_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
file: ${{ steps.build_test.outputs.LOCAL_INSTALL_ROOT }}/bin/smp-server
asset_name: ${{ matrix.asset_name }}
tag: ${{ github.ref }}
configuration: .github/changelog_conf.json
failOnError: true
ignorePreReleases: true
commitMode: true
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Create release
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v1
with:
body: |
See full changelog [here](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md).
Commits, chronological:
${{ steps.build_changelog.outputs.changelog }}
files: |
LICENSE
smp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64
fail_on_unmatched_files: true
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+1 -1
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
*.lock
*.cabal
*.db
*.db.bak
*.session.sql
+77
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@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
# 0.5.2
- Fix message delivery logic that blocked delivery of all server messages when server per-queue quota exceeded, making it concurrent per SMP queue, not per server.
# 0.5.1
- Fix server subscription logic bug that was leading to memory leak / resource exhaustion in some edge cases.
# 0.5.0
- No changes in SMP server implementation - it is backwards compatible with v0.4.1
- SMP agent changes:
- URI syntax for SMP queues and connection requests.
- long-term connections links ("contacts") in SMP agent protocol.
- agent command changes:
- `REQ` notification and `ACPT` command are used only with long-term connection links.
- `CONF` notification and `LET` commands are used for normal duplex connections.
# 0.4.1
- Include migrations in the package
# 0.4.0
- SMP server implementation and [SMP protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md) changes:
- support 3072 bit RSA key size
- add SMP queue quotas
- set default transport block size to 4096 bits
- allow SMP client to change transport block size during transport connection handshake
- SMP agent implementation and protocol changes:
- additional connection confirmation step for initiating party
- automatically resume subscribed duplex connections once transport connection is resumed
- passing an arbitrary binary information between parties during the duplex connection handshake - can be used to identify parties
- asynchronous duplex connection handshake - the parties do not have to be online at the same time
- asynchronous message delivery - the agent does not need transport connection to accept client messages for delivery
- additional confirmation of message reception from the client to prevent message loss in case of process termination
- set transport block size to 8192 bits (in the future the agent protocol can allow to have different block sizes for different duplex connections)
- added client commands and notifications (see [agent protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/agent-protocol.md)):
- `REQ` - the notification about joining party establishing connection
- `ACPT` - the command to accept connection with the joining party
- `INFO` - the notification with the information from the initiating party
- `DOWN`/`UP` - the notifications about losing/resuming the connection
- `ACK` - the command to confirm that the message reception/processing is complete
- `MID` - the response to `SEND` confirming that the message is accepted by the agent
- `MERR` - the notification about permanent message delivery error (e.g., `ERR AUTH` indicating that the queue was removed)
# 0.3.2
- Support websockets
- SMP server CLI commands
# 0.3.1
- Released to hackage.org
- SMP agent protocol changes:
- move SMP server from agent commands NEW/JOIN to agent config
- send CON to user only when the 1st party responds HELLO
- Fix REPLY vulnerability
- Fix transaction busy error
# 0.3.0
- SMP encrypted transport over TCP
- Standard X509/PKCS8 encoding for RSA keys
- Sign and verify agent messages
- Verify message integrity based on previous message hash and ID
- Prevent timing attack allowing to determine if queue exists
- Only allow correct RSA keys and signature sizes
# 0.2.0
- SMP client library
- SMP agent with E2E encryption
# 0.1.0
- SMP protocol server implementation without encryption
+60 -16
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@@ -3,9 +3,17 @@
[![GitHub build](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/workflows/build/badge.svg)](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/actions?query=workflow%3Abuild)
[![GitHub release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/simplex-chat/simplexmq)](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/releases)
📢 **v0.5.1 brings a hotfix to the server's subscription management logic, to apply it log in to your server via SSH and run the following command. If you have store log enabled for your server, information about already established queues will be preserved.** If you're doing a custom installation instead of Linode or DigitalOcean you may have to change the path for binary download.
```sh
systemctl stop smp-server
curl -L -o /opt/simplex/bin/smp-server https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/releases/download/v0.5.1/smp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64
systemctl start smp-server
```
## Message broker for unidirectional (simplex) queues
SimpleXMQ is a message broker for managing message queues and sending messages over public network. It consists of SMP server, SMP client library and SMP agent that implement [SMP protocol](./protocol/simplex-messaging.md) for client-server communication and [SMP agent protocol](./protocol/agent-protocol.md) to manage duplex connections via simplex queues on multiple SMP servers.
SimpleXMQ is a message broker for managing message queues and sending messages over public network. It consists of SMP server, SMP client library and SMP agent that implement [SMP protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md) for client-server communication and [SMP agent protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/agent-protocol.md) to manage duplex connections via simplex queues on multiple SMP servers.
SMP protocol is inspired by [Redis serialization protocol](https://redis.io/topics/protocol), but it is much simpler - it currently has only 8 client commands and 6 server responses.
@@ -13,57 +21,93 @@ SimpleXMQ is implemented in Haskell - it benefits from robust software transacti
## SimpleXMQ roadmap
- Streams - high performance message queues. See [Streams RFC](./rfcs/2021-02-28-streams.md) for details.
- "Small" connection groups, when each message will be sent by the SMP agent to multiple connections with a single client command. See [Groups RFC](./rfcs/2021-03-18-groups.md) for details.
- SMP agents cluster to share connections and message management by multiple agents (for example, it would enable multi-device use for [simplex-chat](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat)).
- SMP queue redundancy and rotation in SMP agent duplex connections.
- "Large" groups design and implementation.
- SMP agents synchronization to share connections and messages between multiple agents (it would allow using multiple devices for [simplex-chat](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat)).
- Streams - high performance message queues. See [Streams RFC](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/rfcs/2021-02-28-streams.md) for details.
## Components
### SMP server
[SMP server](./apps/smp-server/Main.hs) can be run on any Linux distribution without any dependencies. It uses in-memory persistence with an optional append-only log of created queues that allows to re-start the server without losing the connections. This log is compacted on every server restart, permanently removing suspended and removed queues.
[SMP server](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/apps/smp-server/Main.hs) can be run on any Linux distribution without any dependencies. It uses in-memory persistence with an optional append-only log of created queues that allows to re-start the server without losing the connections. This log is compacted on every server restart, permanently removing suspended and removed queues.
To enable the queue logging, uncomment `enable: on` option in `smp-server.ini` configuration file that is created the first time the server is started.
On the first start the server generates an RSA key pair for encrypted transport handshake and outputs hash of the public key every time it runs - this hash should be used as part of the server address: `<hostname>:5223#<key hash>`.
SMP server implements [SMP protocol](./protocol/simplex-messaging.md).
SMP server implements [SMP protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md).
### SMP client library
[SMP client](./src/Simplex/Messaging/Client.hs) is a Haskell library to connect to SMP servers that allows to:
[SMP client](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/src/Simplex/Messaging/Client.hs) is a Haskell library to connect to SMP servers that allows to:
- execute commands with a functional API.
- receive messages and other notifications via STM queue.
- automatically send keep-alive commands.
### SMP agent
[SMP agent library](./src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent.hs) can be used to run SMP agent as part of another application and to communicate with the agent via STM queues, without serializing and parsing commands and responses.
[SMP agent library](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent.hs) can be used to run SMP agent as part of another application and to communicate with the agent via STM queues, without serializing and parsing commands and responses.
Haskell type [ACommand](./src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Transmission.hs) represents SMP agent protocol to communicate via STM queues.
Haskell type [ACommand](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Protocol.hs) represents SMP agent protocol to communicate via STM queues.
See [simplex-chat](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat) terminal UI for the example of integrating SMP agent into another application.
[SMP agent executable](./apps/smp-agent/Main.hs) can be used to run a standalone SMP agent process that implements plaintext [SMP agent protocol](./protocol/agent-protocol.md) via TCP port 5224, so it can be used via telnet. It can be deployed in private networks to share access to the connections between multiple applications and services.
[SMP agent executable](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/apps/smp-agent/Main.hs) can be used to run a standalone SMP agent process that implements plaintext [SMP agent protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/agent-protocol.md) via TCP port 5224, so it can be used via telnet. It can be deployed in private networks to share access to the connections between multiple applications and services.
## Using SMP server and SMP agent
You can either run SMP server locally or try local SMP agent with the deployed demo server:
You can either run your own SMP server locally or deploy using [Linode StackScript](#deploy-smp-server-on-linode), or try local SMP agent with the deployed servers:
`smp1.simplex.im:5223#pLdiGvm0jD1CMblnov6Edd/391OrYsShw+RgdfR0ChA=`
`smp2.simplex.im#z5W2QLQ1Br3Yd6CoWg7bIq1bHdwK7Y8bEiEXBs/WfAg=` (London, UK)
`smp3.simplex.im#nxc7HnrnM8dOKgkMp008ub/9o9LXJlxlMrMpR+mfMQw=` (Fremont, CA)
It's the easiest to try SMP agent via a prototype [simplex-chat](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat) terminal UI.
[<img alt="Linode" src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/master/img/linode.svg" align="right" width="200">](https://cloud.linode.com/stackscripts/748014)
## Deploy SMP server on Linode
You can get Linode [free credits](https://www.linode.com/lp/affiliate-referral/?irclickid=02-QkdTEpxyLW0W0EOSREQreUkB2DtzGE2lGTE0&irgwc=1&utm_source=impact) to deploy SMP server.
Deployment on [Linode](https://www.linode.com/) is performed via StackScripts, which serve as recipes for Linode instances, also called Linodes. To deploy SMP server on Linode:
- Create a Linode account or login with an already existing one.
- Open [SMP server StackScript](https://cloud.linode.com/stackscripts/748014) and click "Deploy New Linode".
- You can optionally configure the following parameters:
- [SMP Server store log](#SMP-server) flag for queue persistence on server restart (recommended).
- [Linode API token](https://www.linode.com/docs/guides/getting-started-with-the-linode-api#get-an-access-token) for attaching server info as tags to Linode (server address, public key hash, version) and adding A record to your 2nd level domain (Note: 2nd level e.g. `example.com` domain should be [created](https://cloud.linode.com/domains/create) in your account prior to deployment). The API token access scope should be read/write access to "linodes" (to update linode tags - you need them), and "domains" (to add A record for the 3rd level domain, e.g. `smp`).
- Domain name to use instead of Linode ip address, e.g. `smp.example.com`.
- Choose the region and plan according to your requirements (for regular use Shared CPU Nanode should be sufficient).
- Provide ssh key to be able to connect to your Linode via ssh. This step is required if you haven't provided a Linode API token, because you will need to login to your Linode and get a public key hash either from the welcome message or from the file `/etc/opt/simplex/pub_key_hash` on your Linode after SMP server starts.
- Deploy your Linode. After it starts wait for SMP server to start and for tags to appear (if a Linode API token was provided). It may take up to 5 minutes depending on the connection speed on the Linode. Connecting Linode IP address to provided domain name may take some additional time.
- Get `hostname` and `hash` either from Linode tags (click on a tag and copy it's value from the browser search panel) or via ssh. Linode has a good [guide](https://www.linode.com/docs/guides/use-public-key-authentication-with-ssh/) about ssh.
- Great, your own SMP server is ready! Use `address#hash` as SMP server address in the client.
Please submit an [issue](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/issues) if any problems occur.
[<img alt="DigitalOcean" src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/master/img/digitalocean.png" align="right" width="300">](https://marketplace.digitalocean.com/apps/simplex-server)
## Deploy SMP server on DigitalOcean
You can deploy SMP server using [SimpleX Server 1-click app](https://marketplace.digitalocean.com/apps/simplex-server) from DigitalOcean marketplace:
- Create a DigitalOcean account or login with an already existing one.
- Click 'Create SimpleX server Droplet' button.
- Choose the region and plan according to your requirements (cheapest Regular plan should be sufficient).
- Provide ssh key and confirm Droplet creation.
- SSH to created Droplet (`ssh root@<droplet_ip_address>`) to get SMP server public key hash - either from the welcome message or from `/etc/opt/simplex/pub_key_hash`. DigitalOcean has a good guide on [how to login to Droplet via ssh](https://docs.digitalocean.com/products/droplets/how-to/connect-with-ssh/).
- Great, your own SMP server is ready! Use `ip_address#hash` as SMP server address in the client.
Please submit an [issue](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/issues) if any problems occur.
## SMP server design
![SMP server design](./design/server.svg)
![SMP server design](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/master/design/server.svg)
## SMP agent design
![SMP agent design](./design/agent2.svg)
![SMP agent design](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/master/design/agent2.svg)
## License
[AGPL v3](./LICENSE)
[AGPL v3](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/LICENSE)
+6 -11
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@@ -1,22 +1,17 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
module Main where
import Control.Logger.Simple
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent (runSMPAgent)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (smpDefaultConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (TCP, Transport (..))
cfg :: AgentConfig
cfg =
AgentConfig
{ tcpPort = "5224",
rsaKeySize = 2048 `div` 8,
connIdBytes = 12,
tbqSize = 16,
dbFile = "smp-agent.db",
smpCfg = smpDefaultConfig
}
cfg = defaultAgentConfig {smpServers = L.fromList ["localhost:5223#bU0K+bRg24xWW//lS0umO1Zdw/SXqpJNtm1/RrPLViE="]}
logCfg :: LogConfig
logCfg = LogConfig {lc_file = Nothing, lc_stderr = True}
@@ -25,4 +20,4 @@ main :: IO ()
main = do
putStrLn $ "SMP agent listening on port " ++ tcpPort (cfg :: AgentConfig)
setLogLevel LogInfo -- LogError
withGlobalLogging logCfg $ runSMPAgent cfg
withGlobalLogging logCfg $ runSMPAgent (transport @TCP) cfg
+198 -88
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@@ -3,37 +3,52 @@
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
module Main where
import Control.Monad (unless, when)
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
import qualified Crypto.Store.PKCS8 as S
import Data.ByteString.Base64 (encode)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Char (toLower)
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.Ini (lookupValue, readIniFile)
import Data.Ini (Ini, lookupValue, readIniFile)
import Data.Text (Text)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Data.X509 (PrivKey (PrivKeyRSA))
import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
import Options.Applicative
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Server (runSMPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog (StoreLog, openReadStoreLog)
import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing, doesFileExist)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog (StoreLog, openReadStoreLog, storeLogFilePath)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport (..), TCP, Transport (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets (WS)
import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing, doesFileExist, removeFile)
import System.Exit (exitFailure)
import System.FilePath (combine)
import System.IO (IOMode (..), hFlush, stdout)
import Text.Read (readEither)
cfg :: ServerConfig
cfg =
defaultServerPort :: ServiceName
defaultServerPort = "5223"
defaultBlockSize :: Int
defaultBlockSize = 4096
serverConfig :: ServerConfig
serverConfig =
ServerConfig
{ tcpPort = "5223",
tbqSize = 16,
{ tbqSize = 16,
serverTbqSize = 128,
msgQueueQuota = 256,
queueIdBytes = 12,
msgIdBytes = 6,
storeLog = Nothing,
-- key is loaded from the file server_key in /etc/opt/simplex directory
-- below parameters are set based on ini file /etc/opt/simplex/smp-server.ini
transports = undefined,
storeLog = undefined,
blockSize = undefined,
serverPrivateKey = undefined
}
@@ -49,76 +64,168 @@ logDir = "/var/opt/simplex"
defaultStoreLogFile :: FilePath
defaultStoreLogFile = combine logDir "smp-server-store.log"
iniFile :: FilePath
iniFile = combine cfgDir "smp-server.ini"
defaultKeyFile :: FilePath
defaultKeyFile = combine cfgDir "server_key"
main :: IO ()
main = do
opts <- getServerOpts
putStrLn "SMP Server (-h for help)"
ini <- readCreateIni opts
storeLog <- openStoreLog ini
pk <- readCreateKey
B.putStrLn $ "transport key hash: " <> serverKeyHash pk
putStrLn $ "listening on port " <> tcpPort cfg
runSMPServer cfg {serverPrivateKey = pk, storeLog}
case serverCommand opts of
ServerInit ->
runExceptT (getConfig opts) >>= \case
Right cfg -> do
putStrLn "Error: server is already initialized. Start it with `smp-server start` command"
printConfig cfg
exitFailure
Left _ -> do
cfg <- initializeServer opts
putStrLn "Server was initialized. Start it with `smp-server start` command"
printConfig cfg
ServerStart ->
runExceptT (getConfig opts) >>= \case
Right cfg -> runServer cfg
Left e -> do
putStrLn $ "Server is not initialized: " <> e
putStrLn "Initialize server with `smp-server init` command"
exitFailure
ServerDelete -> do
deleteServer
putStrLn "Server key, config file and store log deleted"
getConfig :: ServerOpts -> ExceptT String IO ServerConfig
getConfig opts = do
ini <- readIni
pk <- readKey ini
storeLog <- liftIO $ openStoreLog opts ini
pure $ makeConfig ini pk storeLog
makeConfig :: IniOpts -> C.FullPrivateKey -> Maybe (StoreLog 'ReadMode) -> ServerConfig
makeConfig IniOpts {serverPort, blockSize, enableWebsockets} pk storeLog =
let transports = (serverPort, transport @TCP) : [("80", transport @WS) | enableWebsockets]
in serverConfig {serverPrivateKey = pk, storeLog, blockSize, transports}
printConfig :: ServerConfig -> IO ()
printConfig ServerConfig {serverPrivateKey, storeLog} = do
B.putStrLn $ "transport key hash: " <> serverKeyHash serverPrivateKey
putStrLn $ case storeLog of
Just s -> "store log: " <> storeLogFilePath s
Nothing -> "store log disabled"
initializeServer :: ServerOpts -> IO ServerConfig
initializeServer opts = do
createDirectoryIfMissing False cfgDir
ini <- createIni opts
pk <- createKey ini
storeLog <- openStoreLog opts ini
pure $ makeConfig ini pk storeLog
runServer :: ServerConfig -> IO ()
runServer cfg = do
printConfig cfg
forM_ (transports cfg) $ \(port, ATransport t) ->
putStrLn $ "listening on port " <> port <> " (" <> transportName t <> ")"
runSMPServer cfg
deleteServer :: IO ()
deleteServer = do
ini <- runExceptT readIni
deleteIfExists iniFile
case ini of
Right IniOpts {storeLogFile, serverKeyFile} -> do
deleteIfExists storeLogFile
deleteIfExists serverKeyFile
Left _ -> do
deleteIfExists defaultKeyFile
deleteIfExists defaultStoreLogFile
data IniOpts = IniOpts
{ enableStoreLog :: Bool,
storeLogFile :: FilePath
storeLogFile :: FilePath,
serverKeyFile :: FilePath,
serverPort :: ServiceName,
blockSize :: Int,
enableWebsockets :: Bool
}
readCreateIni :: ServerOpts -> IO IniOpts
readCreateIni ServerOpts {configFile} = do
createDirectoryIfMissing True cfgDir
doesFileExist configFile >>= (`unless` createIni)
readIni
readIni :: ExceptT String IO IniOpts
readIni = do
fileExists iniFile
ini <- ExceptT $ readIniFile iniFile
let enableStoreLog = (== Right "on") $ lookupValue "STORE_LOG" "enable" ini
storeLogFile = opt defaultStoreLogFile "STORE_LOG" "file" ini
serverKeyFile = opt defaultKeyFile "TRANSPORT" "key_file" ini
serverPort = opt defaultServerPort "TRANSPORT" "port" ini
enableWebsockets = (== Right "on") $ lookupValue "TRANSPORT" "websockets" ini
blockSize <- liftEither . readEither $ opt (show defaultBlockSize) "TRANSPORT" "block_size" ini
pure IniOpts {enableStoreLog, storeLogFile, serverKeyFile, serverPort, blockSize, enableWebsockets}
where
readIni :: IO IniOpts
readIni = do
ini <- either exitError pure =<< readIniFile configFile
let enableStoreLog = (== Right "on") $ lookupValue "STORE_LOG" "enable" ini
storeLogFile = either (const defaultStoreLogFile) T.unpack $ lookupValue "STORE_LOG" "file" ini
pure IniOpts {enableStoreLog, storeLogFile}
exitError e = do
putStrLn $ "error reading config file " <> configFile <> ": " <> e
exitFailure
createIni :: IO ()
createIni = do
confirm $ "Save default ini file to " <> configFile
writeFile
configFile
"[STORE_LOG]\n\
\# The server uses STM memory to store SMP queues and messages,\n\
\# that will be lost on restart (e.g., as with redis).\n\
\# This option enables saving SMP queues to append only log,\n\
\# and restoring them when the server is started.\n\
\# Log is compacted on start (deleted queues are removed).\n\
\# The messages in the queues are not logged.\n\
\\n\
\# enable: on\n\
\# file: /var/opt/simplex/smp-server-store.log\n"
opt :: String -> Text -> Text -> Ini -> String
opt def section key ini = either (const def) T.unpack $ lookupValue section key ini
readCreateKey :: IO C.FullPrivateKey
readCreateKey = do
createDirectoryIfMissing True cfgDir
let path = combine cfgDir "server_key"
hasKey <- doesFileExist path
(if hasKey then readKey else createKey) path
createIni :: ServerOpts -> IO IniOpts
createIni ServerOpts {enableStoreLog} = do
writeFile iniFile $
"[STORE_LOG]\n\
\# The server uses STM memory to store SMP queues and messages,\n\
\# that will be lost on restart (e.g., as with redis).\n\
\# This option enables saving SMP queues to append only log,\n\
\# and restoring them when the server is started.\n\
\# Log is compacted on start (deleted queues are removed).\n\
\# The messages in the queues are not logged.\n\n"
<> (if enableStoreLog then "" else "# ")
<> "enable: on\n\
\# file: "
<> defaultStoreLogFile
<> "\n\n\
\[TRANSPORT]\n\n\
\# key_file: "
<> defaultKeyFile
<> "\n\
\# port: "
<> defaultServerPort
<> "\n\
\# block_size: "
<> show defaultBlockSize
<> "\n\
\websockets: on\n"
pure
IniOpts
{ enableStoreLog,
storeLogFile = defaultStoreLogFile,
serverKeyFile = defaultKeyFile,
serverPort = defaultServerPort,
blockSize = defaultBlockSize,
enableWebsockets = True
}
readKey :: IniOpts -> ExceptT String IO C.FullPrivateKey
readKey IniOpts {serverKeyFile} = do
fileExists serverKeyFile
liftIO (S.readKeyFile serverKeyFile) >>= \case
[S.Unprotected (PrivKeyRSA pk)] -> pure $ C.FullPrivateKey pk
[_] -> err "not RSA key"
[] -> err "invalid key file format"
_ -> err "more than one key"
where
createKey :: FilePath -> IO C.FullPrivateKey
createKey path = do
confirm "Generate new server key pair"
(_, pk) <- C.generateKeyPair newKeySize
S.writeKeyFile S.TraditionalFormat path [PrivKeyRSA $ C.rsaPrivateKey pk]
pure pk
readKey :: FilePath -> IO C.FullPrivateKey
readKey path = do
S.readKeyFile path >>= \case
[S.Unprotected (PrivKeyRSA pk)] -> pure $ C.FullPrivateKey pk
[_] -> errorExit "not RSA key"
[] -> errorExit "invalid key file format"
_ -> errorExit "more than one key"
where
errorExit :: String -> IO b
errorExit e = putStrLn (e <> ": " <> path) >> exitFailure
err :: String -> ExceptT String IO b
err e = throwE $ e <> ": " <> serverKeyFile
createKey :: IniOpts -> IO C.FullPrivateKey
createKey IniOpts {serverKeyFile} = do
(_, pk) <- C.generateKeyPair newKeySize
S.writeKeyFile S.TraditionalFormat serverKeyFile [PrivKeyRSA $ C.rsaPrivateKey pk]
pure pk
fileExists :: FilePath -> ExceptT String IO ()
fileExists path = do
exists <- liftIO $ doesFileExist path
unless exists . throwE $ "file " <> path <> " not found"
deleteIfExists :: FilePath -> IO ()
deleteIfExists path = doesFileExist path >>= (`when` removeFile path)
confirm :: String -> IO ()
confirm msg = do
@@ -128,40 +235,43 @@ confirm msg = do
when (map toLower ok /= "y") exitFailure
serverKeyHash :: C.FullPrivateKey -> B.ByteString
serverKeyHash = encode . C.unKeyHash . C.publicKeyHash . C.publicKey
serverKeyHash = encode . C.unKeyHash . C.publicKeyHash . C.publicKey'
openStoreLog :: IniOpts -> IO (Maybe (StoreLog 'ReadMode))
openStoreLog IniOpts {enableStoreLog, storeLogFile = f}
| enableStoreLog = do
openStoreLog :: ServerOpts -> IniOpts -> IO (Maybe (StoreLog 'ReadMode))
openStoreLog ServerOpts {enableStoreLog = l} IniOpts {enableStoreLog = l', storeLogFile = f}
| l || l' = do
createDirectoryIfMissing True logDir
putStrLn ("store log: " <> f)
Just <$> openReadStoreLog f
| otherwise = putStrLn "store log disabled" $> Nothing
| otherwise = pure Nothing
newtype ServerOpts = ServerOpts
{ configFile :: FilePath
data ServerOpts = ServerOpts
{ serverCommand :: ServerCommand,
enableStoreLog :: Bool
}
data ServerCommand = ServerInit | ServerStart | ServerDelete
serverOpts :: Parser ServerOpts
serverOpts =
ServerOpts
<$> strOption
( long "config"
<> short 'c'
<> metavar "INI_FILE"
<> help ("config file (" <> defaultIniFile <> ")")
<> value defaultIniFile
<$> subparser
( command "init" (info (pure ServerInit) (progDesc "Initialize server: generate server key and ini file"))
<> command "start" (info (pure ServerStart) (progDesc "Start server (ini: /etc/opt/simplex/smp-server.ini)"))
<> command "delete" (info (pure ServerDelete) (progDesc "Delete server key, ini file and store log"))
)
<*> switch
( long "store-log"
<> short 'l'
<> help "enable store log for SMP queues persistence"
)
where
defaultIniFile = combine cfgDir "smp-server.ini"
getServerOpts :: IO ServerOpts
getServerOpts = execParser opts
getServerOpts = customExecParser p opts
where
p = prefs showHelpOnEmpty
opts =
info
(serverOpts <**> helper)
( fullDesc
<> header "Simplex Messaging Protocol (SMP) Server"
<> progDesc "Start server with INI_FILE (created on first run)"
)
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After

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@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS servers(
host TEXT NOT NULL,
port TEXT NOT NULL,
key_hash BLOB,
PRIMARY KEY (host, port)
) WITHOUT ROWID;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS rcv_queues(
host TEXT NOT NULL,
port TEXT NOT NULL,
rcv_id BLOB NOT NULL,
conn_alias BLOB NOT NULL,
rcv_private_key BLOB NOT NULL,
snd_id BLOB,
snd_key BLOB,
decrypt_key BLOB NOT NULL,
verify_key BLOB,
status TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (host, port, rcv_id),
FOREIGN KEY (host, port) REFERENCES servers (host, port),
FOREIGN KEY (conn_alias)
REFERENCES connections (conn_alias)
ON DELETE CASCADE
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
UNIQUE (host, port, snd_id)
) WITHOUT ROWID;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS snd_queues(
host TEXT NOT NULL,
port TEXT NOT NULL,
snd_id BLOB NOT NULL,
conn_alias BLOB NOT NULL,
snd_private_key BLOB NOT NULL,
encrypt_key BLOB NOT NULL,
sign_key BLOB NOT NULL,
status TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (host, port, snd_id),
FOREIGN KEY (host, port) REFERENCES servers (host, port),
FOREIGN KEY (conn_alias)
REFERENCES connections (conn_alias)
ON DELETE CASCADE
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
) WITHOUT ROWID;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS connections(
conn_alias BLOB NOT NULL,
rcv_host TEXT,
rcv_port TEXT,
rcv_id BLOB,
snd_host TEXT,
snd_port TEXT,
snd_id BLOB,
last_internal_msg_id INTEGER NOT NULL, -- TODO add defauls here and below in the new schema
last_internal_rcv_msg_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
last_internal_snd_msg_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
last_external_snd_msg_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
last_rcv_msg_hash BLOB NOT NULL,
last_snd_msg_hash BLOB NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (conn_alias),
FOREIGN KEY (rcv_host, rcv_port, rcv_id) REFERENCES rcv_queues (host, port, rcv_id),
FOREIGN KEY (snd_host, snd_port, snd_id) REFERENCES snd_queues (host, port, snd_id)
) WITHOUT ROWID;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS messages(
conn_alias BLOB NOT NULL,
internal_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
internal_ts TEXT NOT NULL,
internal_rcv_id INTEGER,
internal_snd_id INTEGER,
body TEXT NOT NULL, -- deprecated
PRIMARY KEY (conn_alias, internal_id),
FOREIGN KEY (conn_alias)
REFERENCES connections (conn_alias)
ON DELETE CASCADE,
FOREIGN KEY (conn_alias, internal_rcv_id)
REFERENCES rcv_messages (conn_alias, internal_rcv_id)
ON DELETE CASCADE
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
FOREIGN KEY (conn_alias, internal_snd_id)
REFERENCES snd_messages (conn_alias, internal_snd_id)
ON DELETE CASCADE
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
) WITHOUT ROWID;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS rcv_messages(
conn_alias BLOB NOT NULL,
internal_rcv_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
internal_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
external_snd_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
external_snd_ts TEXT NOT NULL,
broker_id BLOB NOT NULL,
broker_ts TEXT NOT NULL,
rcv_status TEXT NOT NULL,
ack_brocker_ts TEXT,
ack_sender_ts TEXT,
internal_hash BLOB NOT NULL,
external_prev_snd_hash BLOB NOT NULL,
integrity BLOB NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (conn_alias, internal_rcv_id),
FOREIGN KEY (conn_alias, internal_id)
REFERENCES messages (conn_alias, internal_id)
ON DELETE CASCADE
) WITHOUT ROWID;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS snd_messages(
conn_alias BLOB NOT NULL,
internal_snd_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
internal_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
snd_status TEXT NOT NULL,
sent_ts TEXT,
delivered_ts TEXT,
internal_hash BLOB NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (conn_alias, internal_snd_id),
FOREIGN KEY (conn_alias, internal_id)
REFERENCES messages (conn_alias, internal_id)
ON DELETE CASCADE
) WITHOUT ROWID;
+9
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@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
CREATE TABLE conn_confirmations (
confirmation_id BLOB NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
conn_alias BLOB NOT NULL REFERENCES connections ON DELETE CASCADE,
sender_key BLOB NOT NULL,
sender_conn_info BLOB NOT NULL,
accepted INTEGER NOT NULL,
own_conn_info BLOB,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
) WITHOUT ROWID;
+3
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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
ALTER TABLE messages ADD msg_body BLOB NOT NULL DEFAULT x''; -- this field replaces body TEXT
-- TODO possibly migrate the data from body if it is possible in migration
ALTER TABLE snd_messages ADD previous_msg_hash BLOB NOT NULL DEFAULT x'';
+11
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@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
ALTER TABLE connections ADD conn_mode TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'INV';
CREATE TABLE conn_invitations (
invitation_id BLOB NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
contact_conn_id BLOB NOT NULL REFERENCES connections ON DELETE CASCADE,
cr_invitation BLOB NOT NULL,
recipient_conn_info BLOB NOT NULL,
accepted INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
own_conn_info BLOB,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
) WITHOUT ROWID;
+9
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@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
# SQLite database migrations
These migrations are [embedded](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Store/SQLite/Migrations.hs) into the executable and run when SMP agent starts (as a separate executable or as a part of [simplex-chat](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat) app).
Migration file names must have a format `YYYYMMDD-name.sql` - they will be executed in the order or lexicographic sorting of the names, the files with any other extension than `.sql` are ignored.
The proposed approach is to minimize the number of migrations and merge them together when possible, to align with the agent releases.
**Please note**: Adding or editing migrations will NOT update the migrations embedded into the executable, unless the [Migrations](../src/Simplex/Messaging/Agent/Store/SQLite/Migrations.hs) module is rebuilt - use `stack build --force-dirty` (in addition to edited files it seems to rebuild the files with TH splices and their dependencies, not all files as with `stack clean`).
+40 -23
View File
@@ -1,18 +1,29 @@
name: simplexmq
version: 0.3.0
#synopsis:
#description:
name: simplexmq-v0
version: 0.5.3
synopsis: SimpleXMQ message broker
description: |
This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,
<./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Client.html client> and
<./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Agent.html agent> for SMP protocols:
.
* <https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md SMP protocol>
* <https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/agent-protocol.md SMP agent protocol>
.
See <https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat terminal chat prototype> built with SimpleXMQ broker.
homepage: https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq#readme
license: AGPL-3
author: Evgeny Poberezkin
maintainer: evgeny@poberezkin.com
copyright: 2020 Evgeny Poberezkin
category: Web, System, Services, Cryptography
author: simplex.chat
maintainer: chat@simplex.chat
copyright: 2020 simplex.chat
category: Chat, Network, Web, System, Cryptography
extra-source-files:
- README.md
- CHANGELOG.md
- migrations/*.*
dependencies:
- ansi-terminal == 0.10.*
- ansi-terminal >= 0.10 && < 0.12
- asn1-encoding == 0.9.*
- asn1-types == 0.3.*
- async == 2.2.*
@@ -20,26 +31,33 @@ dependencies:
- base >= 4.7 && < 5
- base64-bytestring >= 1.0 && < 1.3
- bytestring == 0.10.*
- containers
- cryptonite == 0.26.*
- composition == 1.0.*
- constraints >= 0.12 && < 0.14
- containers == 0.6.*
- cryptonite >= 0.27 && < 0.30
- direct-sqlite == 2.3.*
- directory == 1.3.*
- file-embed >= 0.0.14.0 && <= 0.0.15.0
- filepath == 1.4.*
- generic-random == 1.3.*
- http-types == 0.12.*
- generic-random >= 1.3 && < 1.5
- iso8601-time == 0.1.*
- memory == 0.15.*
- mtl
- mtl == 2.2.*
- network == 3.1.*
- network-transport == 0.5.*
- QuickCheck == 2.13.*
- QuickCheck == 2.14.*
- random >= 1.1 && < 1.3
- simple-logger == 0.1.*
- sqlite-simple == 0.4.*
- stm
- template-haskell == 2.15.*
- stm == 2.5.*
- template-haskell == 2.16.*
- text == 1.2.*
- time == 1.9.*
- transformers == 0.5.*
- unliftio == 0.2.*
- unliftio-core == 0.1.*
- unliftio-core == 0.2.*
- websockets == 0.12.*
- x509 == 1.7.*
library:
@@ -52,8 +70,8 @@ executables:
dependencies:
- cryptostore == 0.2.*
- ini == 0.4.*
- optparse-applicative == 0.15.*
- simplexmq
- optparse-applicative >= 0.15 && < 0.17
- simplexmq-v0
ghc-options:
- -threaded
@@ -61,7 +79,7 @@ executables:
source-dirs: apps/smp-agent
main: Main.hs
dependencies:
- simplexmq
- simplexmq-v0
ghc-options:
- -threaded
@@ -70,12 +88,11 @@ tests:
source-dirs: tests
main: Test.hs
dependencies:
- simplexmq
- simplexmq-v0
- hspec == 2.7.*
- hspec-core == 2.7.*
- HUnit == 1.6.*
- random == 1.1.*
- QuickCheck == 2.13.*
- QuickCheck == 2.14.*
- timeit == 2.0.*
ghc-options:
+226 -114
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
- [Abstract](#abstract)
- [SMP agent](#smp-agent)
- [SMP servers management](#smp-servers-management)
- [SMP agent protocol components](#smp-agent-protocol-components)
- [Duplex connection procedure](#duplex-connection-procedure)
- [Communication between SMP agents](#communication-between-smp-agents)
@@ -11,73 +12,86 @@
- [HELLO message](#hello-message)
- [REPLY message](#reply-message)
- [MSG message](#msg-message)
- [INV message](#inv-message)
- [ACK message](#ack-message)
- [NEW message](#new-message)
- [DEL message](#del-message)
- [SMP agent commands](#smp-agent-commands)
- [Client commands and server responses](#client-commands-and-server-responses)
- [NEW command and INV response](#new-command-and-inv-response)
- [JOIN command](#join-command)
- [CON notification](#con-notification)
- [CONF notification and LET command](#conf-notification-and-let-command)
- [REQ notification and ACPT command](#req-notification-and-acpt-command)
- [INFO and CON notifications](#info-and-con-notifications)
- [SUB command](#sub-command)
- [SEND command and SENT response](#send-command-and-sent-response)
- [SEND command and MID, SENT and MERR responses](#send-command-and-mid-sent-and-merr-responses)
- [MSG notification](#msg-notification)
- [END notification](#end-notification)
- [OFF command](#off-command)
- [DEL command](#del-command)
- [Connection invitation](#connection-invitation)
- [Connection request](#connection-request)
## Abstract
The purpose of SMP agent protocol is to define the syntax and the semantics of communications between the client and the agent that connects to [SMP](./simplex-messaging.md) servers.
It provides:
- convenient protocol to create and manage a bi-directional (duplex) connection to the users of SMP agents consisting of two separate unidirectional (simplex) SMP queues, abstracting away multiple steps required to establish bi-directional connections.
- management of E2E encryption between SMP agents, generating ephemeral RSA keys for each connection.
- SMP command authentication on SMP servers, generating ephemeral RSA keys for each SMP queue.
- TCP transport handshake and encryption with SMP servers.
- protocol to create and manage bi-directional (duplex) connections between the users of SMP agents consisting of two (or more) separate unidirectional (simplex) SMP queues, abstracting away multiple steps required to establish bi-directional connections and any information about the servers location from the users of the agent protocol.
- management of E2E encryption between SMP agents, generating ephemeral asymmetric keys for each connection.
- SMP command authentication on SMP servers, generating ephemeral keys for each SMP queue.
- TCP/TLS transport handshake with SMP servers.
- validation of message integrity.
SMP agent protocols provides no encryption or any security on the client side - it is assumed that the agent is executed in the trusted and secure environment.
The future versions of this protocol could provide:
- managing redundant SMP queues with more than 1 queue in each direction.
- managing simple symmetric groups as a foundation for chat groups and device synchronization.
- agent cluster - synchronizing states of multiple agents.
- secure "synchronous" streams with symmetric message encryption and connection-level authentication (requires extending [SMP protocol](./simplex-messaging.md)) - it can be used, e.g., for file transfers.
SMP agent protocol provides no encryption or security on the client side - it is assumed that the agent is executed in the trusted and secure environment, in one of three ways:
- via TCP network using secure connection.
- via local port (when the agent runs on the same device as a separate process).
- via agent library, when the agent logic is included directly into the client application - [SimpleX Chat for terminal](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat) uses this approach.
## SMP agent
SMP agent is a client-side process or library that communicates via SMP servers using [simplex messaging protocol (SMP)](./simplex-messaging.md) with other SMP agents according to the commands received from its users. This protocol is a middle layer in SMP protocols stack (above SMP protocol but below any application level protocol) - it is intended to be used by client-side applications that need secure asynchronous bi-directional communication channels ("connections").
SMP agents communicate with each other via SMP servers using [simplex messaging protocol (SMP)](./simplex-messaging.md) according to the commands received from its users. This protocol is a middle layer in SimpleX protocols (above SMP protocol but below any application level protocol) - it is intended to be used by client-side applications that need secure asynchronous bi-directional communication channels ("connections").
The agent must have a persistent storage to manage the states of known connections and of the client-side information of two SMP queues that each connection consists of, and also the buffer of the most recent messages. The number of the messages that should be stored is implementation specific, depending on the error management approach that the agent implements; at the very least the agent must store the hash and id of the last received message.
The agent must have a persistent storage to manage the states of known connections and of the client-side information of SMP queues that each connection consists of, and also the buffer of the most recent sent and received messages. The number of the messages that should be stored is implementation specific, depending on the error management approach that the agent implements; at the very least the agent must store the hashes and IDs of the last received and sent messages.
## SMP servers management
SMP agent protocol commands do not contain the addresses of the SMP servers that the agent will use to create and use the connections (excluding the server address in queue URIs used in JOIN command). The list of the servers is a part of the agent configuration and can be dynamically changed by the agent implementation:
- by the client applications via any API that is outside of scope of this protocol.
- by the agents themselves based on availability and latency of the configured servers.
## SMP agent protocol components
SMP agent protocol has 3 main parts:
- the syntax and semantics of messages that SMP agents exchange between each other in order to:
- negotiate establishing unidirectional (simplex) encrypted queues on SMP server(s)
- the syntax and semantics of the messages that SMP agents exchange with each other in order to:
- negotiate establishing unidirectional (simplex) encrypted queues on SMP servers.
- exchange client messages and delivery notifications, providing sequential message IDs and message integrity (by including the hash of the previous message).
- the syntax and semantics of the commands (a higher level interface than SMP protocol) that are sent over TCP or other sequential protocol by agent clients to the agents. This protocol allows to create and manage multiple connections, each consisting of two simplex SMP queues.
- the syntax and semantics of the message that the clients of SMP agents should send out-of-band (as pre-shared "invitation" including SMP server, queue ID and encryption key) to ensure [E2E encryption][1] the integrity of SMP queues and protection against active attacks ([MITM attacks][2]).
- the syntax and semantics of the commands that are sent by the agent clients to the agents. This protocol allows to create and manage multiple connections, each consisting of two or more SMP queues.
- the syntax and semantics of the message that the clients of SMP agents should send out-of-band (as pre-shared "invitation" including queue URIs) to protect [E2E encryption][1] from active attacks ([MITM attacks][2]).
## Duplex connection procedure
![Duplex connection procedure](./diagrams/duplex-messaging/duplex-creating.svg)
The procedure of establishing a duplex connection is explained on the example of Alice and Bob creating a bi-directional connection comprised of two unidirectional (simplex) queues, using SMP agents (A and B) to facilitate it, and two different SMP servers (which could be the same server). It is shown on the diagram above and has these steps:
The procedure of establishing a duplex connection is explained on the example of Alice and Bob creating a bi-directional connection consisting of two unidirectional (simplex) queues, using SMP agents (A and B) to facilitate it, and two different SMP servers (which could be the same server). It is shown on the diagram above and has these steps:
1. Alice requests the new connection from the SMP agent A using `NEW` command.
2. Agent A creates an SMP queue on the server (using [SMP protocol](./simplex-messaging.md)) and responds to Alice with the invitation that contains queue information and the encryption key Bob's agent B should use. The invitation format is described in [Connection invitation](#connection-invitation).
3. Alice sends the invitation to Bob via any secure channel they have (out-of-band message).
4. Bob sends `JOIN` command with the invitation as a parameter to agent B to accept the connection.
1. Alice requests the new connection from the SMP agent A using SMP NEW command.
2. Agent A creates an SMP connection on the server (using [SMP protocol](./simplex-messaging.md)) and responds to Alice with the invitation that contains queue information and the encryption key Bob's agent B should use. The invitation format is described in [Connection request](#connection-request).
3. Alice sends the [connection request](#connection-request) to Bob via any secure channel (out-of-band message).
4. Bob sends `JOIN` command with the connection request as a parameter to agent B to accept the connection.
5. Establishing Alice's SMP queue (with SMP protocol commands):
- Agent B sends unauthenticated message to SMP queue with ephemeral key that will be used to authenticate commands to the queue, as described in SMP protocol.
- Agent A receives the KEY and secures the queue.
- Agent B sends an "SMP confirmation" with SMP SEND command to the SMP queue specified in the connection request - SMP confirmation is an unauthenticated message with an ephemeral key that will be used to authenticate Bob's commands to the queue, as described in SMP protocol, and Bob's info (profile, public key for E2E encryption, etc.). This message is encrypted using key passed in the connection request (or with the derived key, in which case public key for key derivation should be sent in clear text).
- Agent A receives the SMP confirmation containing Bob's key and info as SMP MSG.
- Agent A notifies Alice sending REQ notification with Bob's info.
- Alice accepts connection request with ACPT command.
- Agent A secures the queue with SMP KEY command.
- Agent B tries sending authenticated SMP SEND command with agent `HELLO` message until it succeeds. Once it succeeds, Bob's agent "knows" the queue is secured.
6. Agent B creates a new SMP queue on the server.
7. Establish Bob's SMP queue:
- Agent B sends `REPLY` message with the invitation to this 2nd queue to Alice's agent (via the 1st queue).
- Agent A having received this `REPLY` message sends unauthenticated message to SMP queue with Alice agent's ephemeral key that will be used to authenticate commands to the queue, as described in SMP protocol.
- Bob's agent receives the key and secures the queue.
- Agent B sends `REPLY` message (SMP SEND command) with the connection request to this 2nd queue to Alice's agent (via the 1st queue) - this connection request SHOULD use "simplex" URI scheme.
- Agent A, having received `REPLY` message, sends unauthenticated message (SMP SEND) to SMP queue with Alice agent's ephemeral key that will be used to authenticate Alice's commands to the queue, as described in SMP protocol, and Alice's info.
- Bob's agent receives the key and Alice's information and secures the queue (SMP KEY).
- Bob's agent sends the notification `INFO` with Alice's information to Bob.
- Alice's agent keeps sending `HELLO` message until it succeeds.
8. Agents A and B notify Alice and Bob that connection is established.
- Once sending `HELLO` succeeds, Alice's agent sends to Alice `CON` notification that confirms that now both parties can communicate.
@@ -85,17 +99,21 @@ The procedure of establishing a duplex connection is explained on the example of
At this point the duplex connection between Alice and Bob is established, they can use `SEND` command to send messages. The diagram also shows how the connection status changes for both parties, where the first part is the status of the SMP queue to receive messages, and the second part - the status of the queue to send messages.
The most communication happens between the agents and servers, from the point of view of Alice and Bob they have only 3 steps to do:
The most communication happens between the agents and servers, from the point of view of Alice and Bob there are 4 steps (not including notifications):
1. Alice requests a new connection with `NEW` command and receives the invitation.
2. Alice passes invitation out-of-band to Bob.
3. Bob accepts the connection by sending `JOIN` command with the invitation to his agent.
2. Alice passes connection request out-of-band to Bob.
3. Bob accepts the connection with `JOIN` command with the connection request to his agent.
4. Alice accepts the connection with `ACPT` command.
5. Both parties receive `CON` notification once duplex connection is established.
Clients SHOULD support establishing duplex connection asynchronously (when parties are intermittently offline) by persisting intermediate states and resuming SMP queue subscriptions.
## Communication between SMP agents
SMP agents communicate via SMP servers managing creation, deletion and operations of SMP queues.
To establish duplex connections and to send messages on behalf of their clients, SMP agents communicate via SMP servers.
Agents can use SMP message client body (the part of the SMP message after header - see [SMP protocol](./simplex-messaging.md)) to transmit agent client messages and exchange messages between each other.
Agents use SMP message client body (the part of the SMP message after header - see [SMP protocol](./simplex-messaging.md)) to transmit agent client messages and exchange messages between each other.
Each SMP message client body, once decrypted, contains 3 parts (one of them may include binary message body), as defined by `decryptedSmpMessageBody` syntax:
@@ -103,8 +121,9 @@ Each SMP message client body, once decrypted, contains 3 parts (one of them may
- `agentMessage` - a command/message to the other SMP agent:
- to establish the connection with two SMP queues (`helloMsg`, `replyQueueMsg`)
- to send and to acknowledge user messages (`clientMsg`, `acknowledgeMsg`)
- to notify another agent about queue deletion (`deleteQueueMsg`)
- `msgPadding` - an optional message padding to make all SMP messages have consistent size as an additional privacy protection measure.
- to manage SMP queue rotation (`newQueueMessage`, `deleteQueueMsg`)
- to manage encryption key rotation (TODO)
- `msgPadding` - an optional message padding to make all SMP messages have constant size, to prevent servers from observing the actual message size.
### Messages between SMP agents
@@ -112,31 +131,37 @@ Message syntax below uses [ABNF][3] with [case-sensitive strings extension][4].
```abnf
decryptedSmpMessageBody = agentMsgHeader CRLF agentMessage CRLF msgPadding
agentMsgHeader = agentMsgId SP agentTimestamp SP previousMsgHash
agentMsgId = 1*DIGIT ; sequential agent message ID set by the sending agent
agentMsgHeader = agentMsgId SP agentTimestamp SP previousMsgHash ; here `agentMsgId` is sequential ID set by the sending agent
agentMsgId = 1*DIGIT
agentTimestamp = <date-time> ; RFC3339
previousMsgHash = encoded
encoded = <base64 encoded>
agentMessage = helloMsg / replyQueueMsg / deleteQueueMsg
/ clientMsg / acknowledgeMsg
agentMessage = helloMsg / replyQueueMsg /
clientMsg / invitationMsg/ acknowledgeMsg /
newQueueMessage / deleteQueueMsg
msgPadding = *OCTET ; optional random bytes to get messages to the same size (as defined in SMP message size)
helloMsg = %s"HELLO" SP signatureVerificationKey [SP %s"NO_ACK"]
; NO_ACK means that acknowledgements to client messages will NOT be sent in this connection by the agent that sent `HELLO` message.
signatureVerificationKey = encoded ; base64 encoded
signatureVerificationKey = encoded
replyQueueMsg = %s"REPLY" SP qInfo ; `qInfo` is the same as in out-of-band message
replyQueueMsg = %s"REPLY" SP connectionRequest ; `connectionRequest` is defined below
; this message can only be sent by the second connection party
deleteQueueMsg = %s"DEL" ; notification that recipient queue will be deleted
; no need to notify the other party about suspending queue separately, as suspended and deleted queues are the same to the sender
; NOT SUPPORTED with the current implementation
clientMsg = %s"MSG" SP size CRLF clientMsgBody CRLF ; CRLF is in addition to CRLF in decryptedSmpMessageBody
size = 1*DIGIT
clientMsgBody = *OCTET
acknowledgeMsg = %s"ACK" SP agentMsgId SP ackStatus
; NOT SUPPORTED with the current implementation
invitationMsg = %s"INV" SP connReqInvitation SP connInfo
; `connReqInvitation` and `connInfo` are defined below
acknowledgeMsg = %s"ACK" SP agentMsgId SP msgHash SP ackStatus
; NOT SUPPORTED in the current implementation
msgHash = encoded
; base64 encoded hash of the received message
ackStatus = %s"OK" / ackError
@@ -146,26 +171,51 @@ ackErrorType = ackUnknownMsg / ackProhibitedMsg / ackSyntaxErr
ackUnknownMsg = %s"UNKNOWN"
ackProhibitedMsg = %"PROHIBITED" ; e.g. "HELLO" or "REPLY"
ackProhibitedMsg = %s"PROHIBITED" ; unexpected message e.g. "HELLO" or "REPLY"
ackSyntaxErr = %"SYNTAX" SP syntaxErrCode
ackSyntaxErr = %s"SYNTAX" SP syntaxErrCode
syntaxErrCode = 1*DIGIT ; TODO
newQueueMsg = %s"NEW" SP queueURI
; this message can be sent by any party to add SMP queue to the connection.
; NOT SUPPORTED in the current implementation
deleteQueueMsg = %s"DEL" SP queueURI
; notification that the queue with passed URI will be deleted
; no need to notify the other party about suspending queue separately, as suspended and deleted queues are indistinguishable to the sender
; NOT SUPPORTED in the current implementation
```
#### HELLO message
This is the first message that both agents send after the respective SMP queue is secured by the receiving agent (see diagram). It contains the verification key that the sender will use to cryptographically sign the messages.
This is the first message that both agents send after the respective SMP queue is secured by the receiving agent (see diagram). It MAY contain the public key that the recipient would use to verify messages signed by the sender.
Sending agent might need to retry sending HELLO message, as it would not have any other confirmation that the queue is secured other than the success of sending this message with the signed SEND command of SMP protocol.
Sending agent might need to retry sending HELLO message, as it would not have any other confirmation that the queue is secured other than the success of sending this message with the signed SMP SEND command.
#### REPLY message
This is the message that is sent by the agent that received an out-of-band invitation to pass the invitation to the reply SMP queue to the agent that originated the connection (see diagram).
This is the message that is sent by the agent that received an out-of-band connection request to pass the connection request for the reply SMP queues to the agent that originated the connection (see diagram).
#### MSG message
This is the agent envelope used to send client messages once the connection is established. Do not confuse it with the MSG response from SMP server to the agent and MSG response from SMP agent to the client that are sent in different contexts.
#### INV message
This message is sent to the SMP queue(s) in `connReqContact`, to establish a new connection via existing unsecured queue, that acts as a permanent connection link of a user.
#### ACK message
This message is sent to confirm the client message reception. It includes received message number, message hash and the reception status.
#### NEW message
This message is sent to add an additional SMP queue to the connection. Unlike REPLY message it can be sent at any time.
#### DEL message
This message is sent to notify that the queue with passed URI will be deleted - having received this message, the receiving agent should no longer send messages to this queue. In case it was the only queue in the connection to which the agent could send the messages, it MAY also delete the reply queue(s) in the connection.
## SMP agent commands
This part describes the transmissions between users and client-side SMP agents: commands that the users send to create and operate duplex connections and SMP agent responses and messages they deliver.
@@ -184,24 +234,34 @@ cId = encoded
cName = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "_" / "-")
agentCommand = (userCmd / agentMsg) CRLF
userCmd = newCmd / joinCmd
/ acceptCmd / subscribeCmd
/ sendCmd / acknowledgeCmd
/ suspendCmd / deleteCmd
userCmd = newCmd / joinCmd / letCmd / acceptCmd / subscribeCmd / sendCmd / acknowledgeCmd / suspendCmd / deleteCmd
agentMsg = invitation / confMsg / connReqMsg / connInfo / connected / unsubscribed / connDown / connUp / messageId / sent / messageError / message / received / ok / error
agentMsg = invitation / confirmation
/ connected / unsubscribed
/ message / sent / received
/ ok / error
newCmd = %s"NEW" SP connectionMode [SP %s"NO_ACK"] ; response is `invitation` or `error`
; NO_ACK parameter currently not supported
newCmd = %s"NEW" SP smpServer [SP %s"NO_ACK"]
; response is `invitation` or `error`
smpServer = srvHost [":" port] ["#" keyFingerprint]
srvHost = hostname ; RFC1123, RFC5891
port = 1*DIGIT
keyFingerprint = encoded
connectionMode = %s"INV" / %s"CON"
invitation = %s"INV" SP qInfo
invitation = %s"INV" SP connectionRequest ; `connectionRequest` is defined below
confMsg = %s"CONF" SP confirmationId SP msgBody
; msgBody here is any binary information identifying connection request
letCmd = %s"LET" SP confirmationId SP msgBody
; msgBody here is any binary information identifying connecting party
confirmationId = 1*DIGIT
connReqMsg = %s"REQ" SP invitationId SP msgBody
; msgBody here is any binary information identifying connection request
acceptCmd = %s"ACPT" SP invitationId SP msgBody
; msgBody here is any binary information identifying connecting party
invitationId = 1*DIGIT
connInfo = %s"INFO" SP msgBody
; msgBody here is any binary information identifying connecting party
connected = %s"CON"
@@ -211,17 +271,16 @@ unsubscribed = %s"END"
; when another agent (or another client of the same agent)
; subscribes to the same SMP queue on the server
joinCmd = %s"JOIN" SP qInfo
[SP (smpServer / %s"NO_REPLY")] ; reply queue SMP server
; server from qInfo is used by default
[SP %s"NO_ACK"]
connDown = %s"DOWN"
; lost connection (e.g. because of Internet connectivity or server is down)
connUp = %s"UP"
; restored connection
joinCmd = %s"JOIN" SP connectionRequest SP connInfo [SP %s"NO_REPLY"] [SP %s"NO_ACK"]
; `connectionRequest` and `connInfo` are defined below
; response is `connected` or `error`
confirmation = %s"CONF" SP partyId SP partyInfo
; currently not implemented
acceptCmd = %s"LET" SP partyId ; response is `ok` or `error`
; currently not implemented
; parameters NO_REPLY and NO_ACK are currently not supported
suspendCmd = %s"OFF" ; can be sent by either party, response `ok` or `error`
@@ -236,63 +295,91 @@ binaryMsg = size CRLF msgBody CRLF ; the last CRLF is in addition to CRLF in the
size = 1*DIGIT ; size in bytes
msgBody = *OCTET ; any content of specified size - safe for binary
messageId = %s"MID" SP agentMsgId
sent = %s"SENT" SP agentMsgId
message = %s"MSG" SP msgIntegrity
SP %s"R=" agentMsgId "," agentTimestamp ; receiving agent
SP %s"B=" brokerMsgId "," srvTimestamp ; broker (server)
SP %s"S=" agentMsgId "," agentTimestamp ; sending agent
SP binaryMsg
agentMsgId = 1*DIGIT
srvTimestamp = date-time ; RFC3339
agentTimestamp = date-time
msgIntegrity = ok / messageError
messageError = %s"MERR" SP agentMsgId SP <errorType>
messageError = %s"ERR" SP messageErrorType
messageErrorType = skippedMsgErr / badMsgIdErr / badHashErr
message = %s"MSG" SP msgIntegrity SP recipientMeta SP brokerMeta SP senderMeta SP binaryMsg
recipientMeta = %s"R=" agentMsgId "," agentTimestamp ; receiving agent message metadata
brokerMeta = %s"B=" brokerMsgId "," brokerTimestamp ; broker (server) message metadata
senderMeta = %s"S=" agentMsgId "," agentTimestamp ; sending agent message metadata
brokerMsgId = encoded
brokerTimestamp = <date-time>
msgIntegrity = ok / msgIntegrityError
skippedMsgErr = %"IDS" SP missingFromMsgId SP missingToMsgId
badMsgIdErr = %"ID" SP previousMsgId ; ID is lower than the previous
badHashErr = %"HASH"
msgIntegrityError = %s"ERR" SP msgIntegrityErrorType
msgIntegrityErrorType = skippedMsgErr / badMsgIdErr / badHashErr
acknowledge = %s"ACK" SP agentMsgId ; ID assigned by receiving agent (in MSG "R")
skippedMsgErr = %s"NO_ID" SP missingFromMsgId SP missingToMsgId
badMsgIdErr = %s"ID" SP previousMsgId ; ID is lower than the previous
badHashErr = %s"HASH"
missingFromMsgId = agentMsgId
missingToMsgId = agentMsgId
previousMsgId = agentMsgId
acknowledgeCmd = %s"ACK" SP agentMsgId ; ID assigned by receiving agent (in MSG "R")
received = %s"RCVD" SP agentMsgId SP msgIntegrity
; ID assigned by sending agent (in SENT response)
; currently not implemented
received = %s"RCVD" SP agentMsgId ; ID assigned by sending agent (in SENT response)
; currently not implemented
msgStatus = ok | error
ok = %s"OK"
error = %s"ERR" SP errorType
encoded = base64
error = %s"ERR" SP <errorType>
```
### Client commands and server responses
#### NEW command and INV response
`NEW` command is used to create a connection and an invitation to be sent out-of-band to another protocol user. It should be used by the client of the agent that initiates creating a duplex connection.
`NEW` command is used to create a connection and a connection request to be sent out-of-band to another protocol user (the joining party). It should be used by the client of the agent that initiates creating a duplex connection (the initiating party).
`INV` response is sent by the agent to the client.
`INV` response is sent by the agent to the client of the initiating party.
`NEW` command has `connectionMode` parameter to define the connection mode - to be used to communicate with a single contact (invitation mode, `connectionMode` is `INV`) or to accept connection requests from anybody (contact mode, `connectionMode` is `CON`). The type of connection request is determined by `connectionMode` parameter.
#### JOIN command
It is used to create a connection and accept the invitation received out-of-band. It should be used by the client of the agent that accepts the connection.
It is used to create a connection and accept the connection request received out-of-band. It should be used by the client of the agent that accepts the connection (the joining party).
#### CON notification
#### CONF notification and LET command
It is sent by both agents managing duplex connection to their clients once the connection is established and ready to accept client messages.
When the joining party uses `JOIN` command to accept connection invitation created with `NEW INV` command, the initiating party will receive `CONF` notification with some numeric identifier and an additional binary information, that can be used to identify the joining party or for any other purpose.
To continue with the connection the initiating party should use `LET` command.
#### REQ notification and ACPT command
When the joining party uses `JOIN` command to connect to the contact created with `NEW CON` command, the initiating party will receive `REQ` notification with some numeric identifier and an additional binary information, that can be used to identify the joining party or for any other purpose.
To continue with the connection the party that created the contact should use `ACPT` command.
#### INFO and CON notifications
After the initiating party proceeds with the connection using `ACPT` command, the joining party will receive `INFO` notification that can be used to identify the initiating party or for any other purpose.
Once the connection is established and ready to accept client messages, both agents will send `CON` notification to their clients.
#### SUB command
This command can be used by the client to resume receiving messages from the connection that was created in another TCP/client session. Agent response to this command can be `OK` or `ERR` in case connection does not exist (or can only be used to send connections - e.g. when the reply queue was not created).
#### SEND command and SENT response
#### SEND command and MID, SENT, RCVD and MERR responses
`SEND` command is used to the client to send messages
`SEND` command is used by the client to send messages.
`SENT` response is sent by the agent to confirm that the message was delivered to the SMP server. Message ID in this response is the sequential message number that includes both sent and received messages in the connection.
`MID` response with the message ID (the sequential message number that includes both sent and received messages in the connection) is sent to the client to confirm that the message is accepted by the agent, before it is sent to the SMP server.
`SENT` notification is sent by the agent to confirm that the message was delivered to at least one of SMP servers. This notification contains the same message ID as `MID` notification. `SENT` notification, depending on network availability, can be sent at any time later, potentially in the next client session.
`RCVD` notification is sent by the agent when it receives `ACK` message from the receiving agent. This notification contains reception status, only one successful notification will be sent, and multiple error notifications will be sent in case `ACK` had error status.
In case of the failure to send the message for any other reason than network connection or message queue quota - e.g. authentication error (`ERR AUTH`) or syntax error (`ERR CMD error`), the agent will send to the client `MERR` notification with the message ID, and this message delivery will no longer be attempted to this SMP queue.
#### MSG notification
@@ -305,6 +392,12 @@ It is sent by the agent to the client when agent receives the message from the S
It is sent by the agent to the client when agent receives SMP protocol `END` notification from SMP server. It indicates that another agent has subscribed to the same SMP queue on the server and the server terminated the subscription of the current agent.
#### DOWN and UP notifications
These notifications are sent when server or network connection is, respectively, `DOWN` or back `UP`.
All the subscriptions made in the current client session will be automatically resumed when `UP` notification is received.
#### OFF command
It is used to suspend the receiving SMP queue - sender will no longer be able to send the messages to the connection, but the recipient can retrieve the remaining messages. Agent response to this command can be `OK` or `ERR`. This command is irreversible.
@@ -313,19 +406,38 @@ It is used to suspend the receiving SMP queue - sender will no longer be able to
It is used to delete the connection and all messages in it, as well as the receiving SMP queue and all messages in it that were remaining on the server. Agent response to this command can be `OK` or `ERR`. This command is irreversible.
## Connection invitation
## Connection request
Connection invitation `qInfo` is generated by SMP agent in response to `newCmd` command (`"NEW"`), used by another party user with `joinCmd` command (`"JOIN"`), and then another invitation is sent by the agent in `replyQueueMsg` and used by the first party agent to connect to the reply queue (the second part of the process is invisible to the users).
Connection request `connectionRequest` is generated by SMP agent in response to `newCmd` command (`"NEW"`), used by another party user with `joinCmd` command (`"JOIN"`), and then another connection request is sent by the agent in `replyQueueMsg` and used by the first party agent to connect to the reply queue (the second part of the process is invisible to the users).
Connection invitation is a text with the following syntax:
Connection request syntax:
```
qInfo = %s"smp::" smpServer "::" queueId "::" ephemeralPublicKey
queueId = encoded
ephemeralPublicKey = %s"rsa:" encoded ; RSA key for sender to encrypt messages X509 base64 encoded
connectionRequest = connectionScheme "/" connReqType "#/?smp=" smpQueues "&e2e=" e2eEncryption
connReqType = %s"invitation" / %s"contact"
; this parameter has the same meaning as connectionMode in agent commands
; `NEW INV` creates `invitation` connection request, `NEW CON` - `contact`
connectionScheme = (%s"https://" clientAppServer) | %s"simplex:"
clientAppServer = hostname [ ":" port ]
; client app server, e.g. simplex.chat
e2eEncryption = encryptionScheme ":" publicKey
encryptionScheme = %s"rsa" ; end-to-end encryption and key exchange protocols,
; the current hybrid encryption scheme (RSA-OAEP/AES-256-GCM-SHA256)
; will be replaced with double ratchet protocol and DH key exchange.
publicKey = <base64url X509 SPKI key encoding>
smpQueues = smpQueue [ "," 1*smpQueue ] ; SMP queues for the connection
smpQueue = <URL-encoded queueURI defined in SMP protocol>
```
All parameters are passed via URI hash to avoid sending them to the server (in case "https" scheme is used) - they can be used by the client-side code and processed by the client application. Parameters `smp` and `e2e` can be present in any order, any unknown additional parameters SHOULD be ignored.
`clientAppServer` is not an SMP server - it is a server that shows the instruction on how to download the client app that will connect using this connection request. This server can also host a mobile or desktop app manifest so that this link is opened directly in the app if it is installed on the device.
"simplex" URI scheme in `connectionProtocol` can be used instead of client app server, to connect without creating any web traffic. Client apps MUST support this URI scheme.
See SMP protocol [out-of-band messages](./simplex-messaging.md#out-of-band-messages) for syntax of `queueURI`.
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_encryption
[2]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack
[3]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234
[4]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7405
[4]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7405
@@ -27,11 +27,14 @@ sequenceDiagram
note over BA: status: NONE/NEW
note over BA, AA: 5. establish Alice's SMP queue
BA ->> AS: SEND: KEY: sender's server key
BA ->> AS: SEND: Bob's info and sender server key (SMP confirmation)
note over BA: status: NONE/CONFIRMED
activate BA
AS ->> AA: MSG: KEY: sender's server key
AS ->> AA: MSG: Bob's info and<br>sender server key
note over AA: status: CONFIRMED/NONE
AA ->> AS: ACK: confirm message
AA ->> A: REQ: connection request ID<br>and Bob's info
A ->> AA: ACPT: accept connection request,<br>send Alice's info
AA ->> AS: KEY: secure queue
note over AA: status: SECURED/NONE
@@ -40,6 +43,7 @@ sequenceDiagram
note over BA: status: NONE/ACTIVE
AS ->> AA: MSG: HELLO: Alice's agent<br>knows Bob can send
note over AA: status: ACTIVE/NONE
AA ->> AS: ACK: confirm message
note over BA, BS: 6. create Bob's SMP queue
BA ->> BS: NEW: create SMP queue
@@ -51,12 +55,15 @@ sequenceDiagram
note over BA: status: PENDING/ACTIVE
AS ->> AA: MSG: REPLY: invitation<br>to connect
note over AA: status: ACTIVE/NEW
AA ->> AS: ACK: confirm message
AA ->> BS: SEND: KEY: sender's server key
AA ->> BS: SEND: Alice's info and sender's server key
note over AA: status: ACTIVE/CONFIRMED
activate AA
BS ->> BA: MSG: KEY: sender's server key
BS ->> BA: MSG: Alice's info and<br>sender's server key
note over BA: status: CONFIRMED/ACTIVE
BA ->> B: INFO: Alice's info
BA ->> BS: ACK: confirm message
BA ->> BS: KEY: secure queue
note over BA: status: SECURED/ACTIVE
@@ -65,6 +72,7 @@ sequenceDiagram
note over AA: status: ACTIVE/ACTIVE
BS ->> BA: MSG: HELLO: Bob's agent<br>knows Alice can send
note over BA: status: ACTIVE/ACTIVE
BA ->> BS: ACK: confirm message
note over A, B: 8. notify users about connection success
AA ->> A: CON: connected
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# SimpleX: messaging and application network
## Table of contents
- [SimpleX objectives](#simplex-objectives)
- [SimpleX network](#simplex-network)
- [Threat model](#threat-model)
## SimpleX objectives
1. Provide messaging infrastructure for distributed applications. This infrastructure needs to have the following qualities:
- Security against passive and active (man-in-the-middle) attacks: the parties should have reliable end-to-end encryption and be able to identify and to some extent compensate for the presence of the active attacker who may modify, delete or add messages.
- Privacy: network server operators should have no ability to read or modify messages without detection, and it should be impossible or hard to infer the contacts the users communicate with. Non-malicious network operators should retain no record of participants communications.
- Reliability: the messages should be delivered even if some participating network servers or receiving clients fail, with “at least once” delivery guarantee.
- Integrity: the messages should be delivered without alteration, in the same order, and any unauthorized message change should be detected by the recipient.
- Asynchronous delivery: it should not be required that both communicating parties (client devices, services or applications) are online for reliable message delivery.
- Low latency: the delay introduced by the network should not be higher than 100ms-1s in addition to the underlying TCP network latency.
2. Provide better communication privacy, in particular meta-data privacy (who talks to whom and when), and security, in particular security against active attacks, than the alternative instant messaging solutions.
3. Balance user experience with privacy requirements, prioritizing experience of mobile device users.
## SimpleX network
### Overview
SimpleX network provides asynchronous messaging infrastructure that aims to deliver on the above objectives and to avoid the disadvantages of the alternative solutions.
The key differences of SimpleX network are:
- participants do not need to have globally unique addresses to communicate, instead they use redundant unidirectional (simplex) messaging queues, with a separate set of queues for each contact.
- connection requests are passed out-of-band, non-optionally protecting key exchange against man-in-the-middle attack.
- message queues provided by network servers are used by the clients to create more complex communication scenarios, such as duplex one-to-one communication, transmitting files, group communication without central servers and content/communication channels (requiring a separate type of server to host them, which is out of scope of this document).
- servers do not store any user information (no user profiles, contacts or messages, once they are delivered), and can use in-memory persistence only.
- users can change server provider(s) without losing their communication contacts, simply by changing the configuration on which servers the new queues are created.
SimpleX network has design similar to P2P networks, but unlike most P2P networks it consists of clients and servers, without dependency on any centralized component. Servers provide anonymous unidirectional message queues in order to:
- continuously accept messages for the recipients, even when they are offline.
- provide recipient anonymity, as the messaging queues do not identify the users, and different addresses of the same queue are used for senders and recipients to provide additional protection against server traffic correlation, in case transport connections are compromised.
Coincidentally, SimpleX network reminds [Pond messenger](https://github.com/agl/pond) design, the main differences are:
- Clients can receive messages via multiple servers (in Pond users use one home server and it serves as a user permanent address),
- Clients do not need to poll servers to receive messages, the messages from subscribed queues are delivered via an open transport connection as they are received by the servers, resulting in low latency of message delivery.
### SimpleX servers
Clients communicate with servers (but not with other clients) using SimpleX Messaging Protocol (SMP) running over some transport protocol that provides server authentication, confidentiality with forward secrecy, integrity and transport channel binding (to prevent SMP commands replay).
Users can use multiple servers. They choose the servers they use to receive the messages through, and they communicate with the servers chosen by the recipients to send messages.
It is assumed that users have some degree of trust to the servers, for one of the following reasons:
- They deploy and control the servers themselves from the available open-source code. The advantage of self-deployed servers is that users have full control of server information and activity, but the downside is that it is easier to correlate incoming and outgoing messages by observing server traffic, assuming small number of messages sent via user-hosted servers and irregular communication time. It can be mitigated by:
- sending noise traffic.
- future protocol versions can add configurable per queue message delivery delays (compromising on one of the design objectives of low latency).
- using SMP servers via an onion routing or mix network.
- They use servers from the trusted commercial providers. The more clients the provider has, the less meta-data about the communication times is leaked to the network observers, and even if transport confidentiality is compromised it is not possible to correlate sent and received traffic without compromising the server, because the clients use different queue IDs to send and receive messages, and the message delivered to the recipient is additionally encrypted by the server.
- To some extent, users trust their contacts and the servers they chose that the users send messages to. The client applications could further improve user trust to the servers chosen by their contacts by supporting either the list of servers that are “allowed to send to” or “prohibited to send to” (e.g., known trusted or compromised servers, certain IP ranges, server geographical locations etc.).
If users use the free servers deployed by the volunteers, there is a risk that the server code can maliciously record all queues and messages (even though encrypted) sent via the same transport connection and to gain a partial knowledge of the users communications graph and other meta-data. User clients can mitigate it by using some overlay network that protects the privacy of TCP connections, e.g., Tor, and by sending noise traffic between the end users.
The servers authorize users to access (send/receive/etc.) their message queues via a digital signature of transmissions using a unique key pair different for each queue sender and recipient, so no information that is required for the server to authorize users allows to aggregate user communications across multiple queues.
### Transport
SimpleX network does not rely on transport or overlay network for server or client authentication. SMP protocol itself must provide integrity, forward secure confidentiality of communicating parties and mutual authentication even if transport protocol (but not the server) is compromised by the active attacker.
To protect against MITM attack on the transport, the clients should verify server self-signed certificate during TLS handshake by validating its pre-shared hash of the certificate in the server address (either as part of client configuration or passed in SMP connection request).
Clients use TLS1.3 protocol to connect to the server, restricting supported cryptographic protocols as defined in SimpleX Messaging Protocol.
After TCP transport connection is established, and the server is authenticated, the client sends blocks of a fixed size 16Kb, and the server replies with the blocks of the same size. When the actual message is smaller, it should be padded before encryption, and if it is larger, it can be split to chunks by the client application. The first blocks from the client and the server should include protocol version so that the party with the higher version can confirm compatibility and the transport channel identifier as described in SMP protocol.
Client can terminate the server transport connection without losing any messages removal of the message from the server and the delivery of the next message happens when the client acknowledges the message reception (normally, after it is persisted in the clients database).
Depending on the privacy requirements of the clients, the client can use a separate transport connection per queue, or receive messages from multiple queues via a single transport connection, for efficiency. In our implementations this configuration will be available to the end users.
### Server implementation
- does not store user access logs.
- does not store messages after the client has received them.
- permanently removes queues after they are deleted by the users
- only stores messages in transit in server operating memory; as clients are expected to use multiple servers to deliver each message, the message loss in one of the servers is acceptable.
### SimpleX clients and agents
Clients are assumed to be running on the trusted devices and can use the locally encrypted storage for messages, contacts, groups and other resources.
SimpleX clients implementing application-level protocols communicate with SimpleX servers via agents. SimpleX agents can be accessed in one of the following ways:
- via TCP network using trusted network connection or an overlay transport network.
- via local port (when the agent runs on the same device as a separate process).
- via agent library, when the agent logic is included directly into the client application.
The last option is the most secure, as it reduces the number of attack vectors in comparison with other options. The current implementation of SimpleX Chat uses this approach.
SimpleX agents provide the following operations:
- Creating and managing bi-directional (duplex) client connections and delivering messages via redundant groups of SimpleX queues.
- Exchanging keys and providing end-to-end encryption. The current prototype uses RSA cryptography with ad-hoc hybrid encryption scheme, we are currently switching it to X3DH for key exchange and double ratchet protocol for E2E encryption.
Communication between the client and the agent and the communication between the agents (via end-to-end encrypted messages delivered via SMP protocol) is described by SimpleX Agent Protocol.
Bi-directional client connections consist of multiple “send” and multiple “receive” queues (for redundancy) that agents use to send and receive messages; each queue should be used for limited amount of time, the rotation of queues is negotiated using SimpleX Agent Protocol.
There are two ways that SimpleX network users can establish the connection:
- Users communicate the initial connection invitation out-of-band, via link or via QR code. This out-of-band communication is assumed secure against active attacks and insecure against passive attacks. Once the connection is established that users are assumed to have confirmed out-of-band, the connection can no longer be compromised even if out-of-band invitation was obtained by the attacker. This out-of-band invitation does not contain any personal information, only the address of the queue and public key for the key exchange for end-to-end encryption.
- Users can create a “contact queue(s)” on SMP servers that would be used to receive connection requests. The important distinction with commonly used addressing systems is that this queue is only used to pass the connection request and not for subsequent messages. So, while it is possible to spam users who created such contact queues with connection requests, they can be removed without disrupting the communication with the existing contacts.
The reply queue addresses and the key exchange for the reply queues is negotiated via the direct queue.
### Message encryption
Messages are encrypted end-to-end using double ratchet protocol. Once the sending client deletes messages it wont be able to decrypt them again. While messages are numbered within the queue, this only reveals to the servers how messages have been exchanged in a given queue that has a limited lifetime, so the total number of messages exchanged between contacts is not revealed.
The next queue to use is negotiated between agents in encrypted messages, and in most cases, it will be on another server (unless the client is configured to use one server, which is not recommended).
### Client storage
It is assumed that the client device and the storage is trusted, but clients can implement storage encryption using a user-provided passphrase.
## Threat model
### Assumptions
User protects their information and keys.
SimpleX Chat software is authentic.
User device is not compromised, excluding the scenarios below where it is explicitly stated it is compromised.
Used cryptographic primitives are not compromised.
### SimpleX Messaging Protocol server
**can:**
- learn when a queue recipient or sender is online via transmission times.
- correlate multiple queues to a single user in case they are accessed via the same transport connection or from the same IP address.
- correlate multiple queues to a single user based on the time they are accessed. Clients that use message notification servers can mitigate it by only subscribing to the queues after they receive the notifications and disconnecting after some time of inactivity.
- know how many messages is sent via the queue, clients can mitigate it with noise traffic.
- add, drop, duplicate or corrupt messages, but it will be detected by the client on SimpleX Agent Protocol level. Using multiple servers to deliver each message mitigates the loss of messages.
**cannot:**
- decrypt messages
- compromise e2e encryption with MITM attack (as server is only used to pass one of two keys in DH exchange, the first key is passed out-of-band)
### A global passive adversary monitoring all Internet traffic
**can:**
- learn who is using SimpleX Chat.
- learn when messages are sent and received.
- learn which SimpleX Messaging Protocol servers are used.
- in case of low traffic on the servers, correlate senders and recipients by the time messages sent and received.
- observe the approximate size of the files transmitted to O(log log M) of file size precision.
**cannot, even in case of compromised transport protocol:**
- correlate senders and recipients by the content of messages (as different queue IDs are used for senders and recipients, with additional encryption layer in the delivered messages).
### A local network attacker
**can:**
- observe when a user is using SimpleX Chat.
- block SimpleX Chat traffic.
- determine which servers the user communicates with.
- observe the approximate size of files transmissions and receptions.
**cannot:**
- see who sends messages to the user and who the user sends the messages to
### An attacker who obtained users decrypted chat database
**can:**
- see the history of all messages
- see shared profiles of contacts and groups
- receive new user messages, but the user will detect it as the number and the hash of the previous message wont match. Also, they will be instantly alerted that an unknown device is connected to their message queues, as long as they are online at the same time, as message queues only allow one active subscription.
- delete users message queues, so the contacts wont be able to send messages.
- send messages from the user to their contacts, but the recipients will detect it as soon as the user sends the next message, because the previous message hash wont match (and potentially wont be able to decrypt them in case they dont keep the previous ratchet keys).
**cannot:**
- impersonate a sender and send messages to the user whose database was stolen without also compromising the server (to place the message in the queue) or the user's device at a subsequent time (to place the message in the database).
### A users contact
**can:**
- spam the user with messages.
- forever retain messages from the user.
**cannot:**
- prove to a third-party that a message came from a user (assuming a users device is not seized)
- prove that two contacts they have is the same user.
- two contacts cannot confirm if they are communicating with the same user.
### An attacker with Internet access
**can:**
- DoS SimpleX messaging servers.
- spam the user who created a “contact queue” (queue for accepting connection requests) by sending multiple connection requests.
**cannot:**
- send messages to the user who they are not connected with.
+204 -92
View File
@@ -7,11 +7,13 @@
- [SMP Model](#smp-model)
- [Out-of-band messages](#out-of-band-messages)
- [Simplex queue](#simplex-queue)
- [SMP queue URI](#smp-queue-uri)
- [SMP procedure](#smp-procedure)
- [SMP qualities and features](#smp-qualities-and-features)
- [Cryptographic algorithms](#cryptographic-algorithms)
- [Simplex queue IDs](#simplex-queue-ids)
- [Server privacy requirements](#server-privacy-requirements)
- [Server security requirements](#server-security-requirements)
- [Message delivery notifications](#message-delivery-notifications)
- [SMP commands](#smp-commands)
- [Correlating responses with commands](#correlating-responses-with-commands)
- [Command authentication](#command-authentication)
@@ -20,14 +22,19 @@
- [Create queue command](#create-queue-command)
- [Subscribe to queue](#subscribe-to-queue)
- [Secure queue command](#secure-queue-command)
- [Enable notifications command](#enable-notifications-command)
- [Acknowledge message delivery](#acknowledge-message-delivery)
- [Suspend queue](#suspend-queue)
- [Delete queue](#delete-queue)
- [Sender commands](#sender-commands)
- [Send message](#send-message)
- [Notifier commands](#notifier-commands)
- [Subscribe to queue notifications](#subscribe-to-queue-notifications)
- [Server messages](#server-messages)
- [Queue IDs response](#queue-ids-response)
- [Deliver queue message](#deliver-queue-message)
- [Notifier queue ID response](#notifier-queue-id-response)
- [Deliver message notification](#deliver-message-notification)
- [Subscription END notification](#subscription-end-notification)
- [Error responses](#error-responses)
- [OK response](#ok-response)
@@ -66,36 +73,15 @@ The SMP model has three communication participants: the recipient, the message b
SMP server manages multiple "simplex queues" - data records on the server that identify communication channels from the senders to the recipients. The same communicating party that is the sender in one queue, can be the recipient in another - without exposing this fact to the server.
The queue record consists of 2 unique random IDs generated by the server, one for the recipient and another for the sender, and 2 keys to authenticate the recipient and the sender respectively, provided by the client. The users of SMP protocol must use a unique key for each queue, to avoid the possibility of aggregating and analysing their queues in case SMP server is compromised.
The queue record consists of 2 unique random IDs generated by the server, one for the recipient and another for the sender, and 2 keys to authenticate the recipient and the sender respectively, provided by the client. The users of SMP protocol must use a unique key for each queue, to avoid the possibility of aggregating and analyzing their queues in case SMP server is compromised.
Creating and using the queue requires sending commands to the SMP server from the recipient and the sender - they are described in detail in [SMP commands](#smp-commands) section.
## Out-of-band messages
The out-of-band message with the queue information is sent via some trusted alternative channel from the recipient to the sender. This message is used to share the encryption (a.k.a. "public") key that the sender will use to encrypt the messages (to be decrypted by the recipient), sender queue ID, server hostname and any other information necessary to establish secure encrypted connection with SMP server (see [Appendix A](#appendix-a) for SMP transport protocol).
The out-of-band message with the queue information is sent via some trusted alternative channel from the recipient to the sender. This message is used to share one or several [queue URIs](#smp-queue-uri) that parties can use to establish the initial connection, the encryption scheme and, it can include the public key(s) for end-to-end encryption.
The [ABNF][8] syntax of the message is:
```abnf
outOfBandMsg = "smp::" server "::" queueId "::" encryptionKey
server = <hostname> [":" port] ["#" serverKeyHash]
port = 1*DIGIT
serverKeyHash = encoded
queueId = encoded
encryptionKey = %s"rsa:" x509encoded ; the recipient's RSA public key for sender to encrypt messages
x509encoded = <base64 X509 key encoding>
encoded = <base64 encoded binary>
```
`hostname` can be IP address or domain name, as defined in RFC 1123, section 2.1.
`port` is optional, the default TCP port for SMP protocol is 5223.
`serverKeyHash` is an optional hash of the server transport key used during transport handshake (see [Appendix A](#appendix-a)).
Encryption keys are encoded using [X509][11] specification.
Defining the approach to out-of-band message passing is out of scope of this protocol.
The approach to out-of-band message passing and their syntax should be defined in application-level protocols.
## Simplex queue
@@ -123,6 +109,29 @@ Queue is defined by recipient ID `RID` and sender ID `SID`, unique for the serve
The protocol uses different IDs for sender and recipient in order to provide an additional privacy by preventing the correlation of senders and recipients commands sent over the network - in case the encrypted transport is compromised, it would still be difficult to correlate senders and recipients without access to the queue records on the server.
## SMP queue URI
The SMP queue URIs MUST include server identity, queue hostname, an optional port, sender queue ID and the public key that the clients must use to verify responses. Server identity is used to establish secure connection protected from MITM attack with SMP server (see [Appendix A](#appendix-a) for SMP transport protocol).
The [ABNF][8] syntax of the queue URI is:
```abnf
queueURI = %s"smp://" smpServer "/" queueId "#" serverSignaturePublicKey
; serverSignaturePublicKey syntax is defined below
smpServer = serverIdentity "@" srvHost [":" port]
srvHost = <hostname> ; RFC1123, RFC5891
port = 1*DIGIT
serverIdentity = base64url
queueId = base64url
base64url = <base64url encoded binary> ; RFC4648, section 5
```
`hostname` can be IP address or domain name, as defined in RFC 1123, section 2.1.
`port` is optional, the default TCP port for SMP protocol is 5223.
`serverIdentity` is a required hash of the server certificate SPKI block (without line breaks, header and footer) used by the client to validate server certificate during transport handshake (see [Appendix A](#appendix-a))
## SMP procedure
The SMP procedure of creating a simplex queue on SMP server is explained using participants Alice (the recipient) who wants to receive messages from Bob (the sender).
@@ -137,7 +146,7 @@ To create and start using a simplex queue Alice and Bob follow these steps:
3. Generates another new random public/private key pair (recipient key - `RK`) that she did not use before for her to sign commands and to decrypt the transmissions received from the server.
4. Sends `"NEW"` command to the server to create a simplex queue (see `create` in [Create queue command](#create-queue-command)). This command contains previously generated unique "public" key `RK` that will be used to sign the following commands related to the same queue, for example to subscribe to the messages received to this queue or to update the queue, e.g. by setting the key required to send the messages (initially Alice creates the queue that accepts unsigned messages, so anybody could send the message via this queue if they knew the queue sender's ID and server address).
4. Sends `"NEW"` command to the server to create a simplex queue (see `create` in [Create queue command](#create-queue-command)). This command contains previously generated unique "public" key `RK` that will be used to verify the following commands related to the same queue signed by its private counterpart, for example to subscribe to the messages received to this queue or to update the queue, e.g. by setting the key required to send the messages (initially Alice creates the queue that accepts unsigned messages, so anybody could send the message via this queue if they knew the queue sender's ID and server address).
5. The server sends `"IDS"` response with queue IDs (`queueIds`):
@@ -175,7 +184,7 @@ To create and start using a simplex queue Alice and Bob follow these steps:
5. Alice secures the queue `RID` with `"KEY"` command so only Bob can send messages to it (see [Secure queue command](#secure-queue-command)):
1. She sends the `KEY` command with `RID` signed with "private" key `RK` to update the queue to only accept requests signed by "private" key `SK` provided by Bob.
1. She sends the `KEY` command with `RID` signed with "private" key `RK` to update the queue to only accept requests signed by "private" key `SK` provided by Bob. This command contains unique "public" key `SK` previously generated by Bob.
2. From this moment the server will accept only signed commands to `SID`, so only Bob will be able to send messages to the queue `SID` (corresponding to `RID` that Alice has).
@@ -265,7 +274,7 @@ Simplex Messaging Protocol:
- One unique "public" key is used by the servers to authenticate requests to send the messages into the queue, and another unique "public" key - to retrieve the messages from the queue. "Unique" here means that each "public" key is used only for one queue and is not used for any other context - effectively, this key is not public and does not represent any participant identity.
- Both "public" keys are provided to the server by the queue recipient when the queue is created.
- Both recipient and sender "public" keys are provided to the server by the queue recipient. "Public" key `RK` is provided when the queue is created, public key `SK` is provided when the queue is secured.
- The "public" keys known to the server and used to authenticate commands from the participants are unrelated to the keys used to encrypt and decrypt the messages - the latter keys are also unique per each queue but they are only known to participants, not to the servers.
@@ -273,29 +282,36 @@ Simplex Messaging Protocol:
## Cryptographic algorithms
Simplex messaging clients need to cryptographically sign commands for the following operations:
Simplex messaging clients and servers must cryptographically sign commands, responses and messages for the following operations:
- With the recipient's key `RK` (server to verify):
- create the queue (`NEW`)
- subscribe to queue (`SUB`)
- secure the queue (`KEY`)
- enable queue notifications (`NKEY`)
- acknowledge received messages (`ACK`)
- suspend the queue (`OFF`)
- delete the queue (`DEL`)
- With the sender's key `SK` (server to verify):
- send messages (`SEND`)
- With the optional notifier's key:
- subscribe to message notifications (`NSUB`)
- With the server's key (for recipient and sender to verify)
- queue IDs response (`IDS`)
- notifier queue ID response (`NID`)
- delivered messages (`MSG`)
- `OK` and `ERR` responses (excluding error responses not related to a queue)
To sign and verify commands, clients and servers MUST use RSA-PSS algorithm defined in [RFC3447][2].
To sign/verify transmissions clients and servers MUST use Ed25519 or Ed448 algorithm defined in [RFC8709][15].
To optionally sign and verify messages, clients SHOULD use RSA-PSS algorithm.
To encrypt/decrypt message bodies delivered to the recipients, servers/clients MUST use x25519 or x448 algorithm defined in [RFC8709][15] to derive the shared secret (TODO encryption scheme).
To encrypt and decrypt messages, clients and servers SHOULD use RSA-OAEP algorithm defined in [RFC3447][2].
Clients MUST encrypt message bodies sent via SMP servers - the protocol for this end-to-end encryption should be chosen by the clients using SMP protocol.
The reasons to use these algorithms:
- They are supported by WebCrypto API.
- They are more widely supported than ECC algorithms.
- They are newer versions than RSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encryption and signature schemes.
- Faster operation than RSA algorithms.
- DH key exchange provides forward secrecy.
Future versions of the protocol may allow different cryptographic algorithms.
@@ -318,6 +334,18 @@ Simplex messaging server implementations MUST NOT create, store or send to any o
- Any other information that may compromise privacy or [forward secrecy][4] of communication between clients using simplex messaging servers.
## Message delivery notifications
Supporting message delivery while the client mobile app is not running requires sending push notifications with the device token. All alternative mechanisms for background message delivery are unreliable, particularly on iOS platform. Obviously, supporting push notification delivery by simply subscribing to messages would reduce meta-data privacy as it allows to see all queues that a given device uses.
To protect the privacy of the recipients, there are several commands in SMP protocol that allow enabling and subscribing to message notifications from SMP queues, using separate set of "notifier keys" and via separate queue IDs - as long as SMP server is not compromised, these notifier queue IDs cannot be correlated with recipient or sender queue IDs.
The clients can optionally instruct a dedicated push notification server to subscribe to notifications and deliver push notifications to the device, which can then retrieve the messages in the background and send local notifications to the user - this is out of scope of SMP protocol. The commands that SMP protocol provides to allow it:
- `enableNotifications` (`"NKEY"`) with `notifierId` (`"NID"`) response - see [Enable notifications command](#enable-notifications-command).
- `subscribeNotifications` (`"NSUB"`) - see [Subscribe to queue notifications](#subscribe-to-queue-notifications).
- `messageNotification` (`"NMSG"`) - see [Deliver message notification](#deliver-message-notification).
## SMP commands
Commands syntax below is provided using [ABNF][8] with [case-sensitive strings extension][8a].
@@ -326,14 +354,18 @@ Each transmission between the client and the server must have this format/syntax
```abnf
transmission = [signature] SP signed SP pad ; pad to the fixed block size
signed = [corrId] SP [queueId] SP cmd
cmd = ping / recipientCmd / send / serverMsg
recipientCmd = create / subscribe / secure / acknowledge / suspend / delete
serverMsg = pong / queueIds / message / unsubscribed / ok / error
signed = sessionIdentifier SP [corrId] SP [queueId] SP cmd ; corrId is required in client commands and server responses,
; corrId is empty in server notifications.
cmd = ping / recipientCmd / send / subscribeNotifications / serverMsg
recipientCmd = create / subscribe / secure / enableNotifications /
acknowledge / suspend / delete
serverMsg = queueIds / message / notifierId / messageNotification /
unsubscribed / ok / error
corrId = 1*(%x21-7F) ; any characters other than control/whitespace
queueId = encoded ; empty queue ID is used with "create" command
signature = encoded
; empty signature can be used with "create", "send" and "ping" commands and server messages
; empty signature can be used with "send" before the queue is secured with secure command
; signature is always empty with "ping" and "serverMsg"
encoded = <base64 encoded binary>
```
@@ -343,23 +375,24 @@ The syntax of specific commands and responses is defined below.
### Correlating responses with commands
The server should send `queueIds`, `error` and `ok` responses in the same order within each queue ID as the commands received in the transport connection, so that they can be correlated by the clients. To simplify correlation of commands and responses, the server should use the same `corrId` in the response as in the command sent by the client.
The server should send `queueIds`, `error` and `ok` responses in the same order within each queue ID as the commands received in the transport connection, so that they can be correlated by the clients. To simplify correlation of commands and responses, the server must use the same `corrId` in the response as in the command sent by the client.
If the transport connection is closed before some responses are sent, these responses should be discarded.
### Command authentication
SMP servers must authenticate all transmissions (excluding `ping` and `send` commands) by verifying the provided signatures. Command signature should be generated by applying RSA-PSS algorithm to the `signed` block of the transmission using the key associated with the queue ID (sender's or recipient's, depending on which queue ID is used).
SMP servers must authenticate all transmissions (excluding `ping` and initial `send` commands) by verifying the client signatures. Command signature should be generated by applying the algorithm specified for the queue to the `signed` block of the transmission, using the key associated with the queue ID (recipient's, sender's or notifier's, depending on which queue ID is used).
### Keep-alive command
To keep the transport connection alive and to generate noise traffic the clients should use `ping` command to which the server responds with `pong` response. This command should be sent unsigned and without queue ID.
To keep the transport connection alive and to generate noise traffic the clients should use `ping` command to which the server responds with `ok` response. This command should be sent unsigned and without queue ID.
```abnf
ping = %s"PING"
pong = %s"PONG"
```
This command is always send unsigned.
### Recipient commands
Sending any of the commands in this section (other than `create`, that is sent without queue ID) is only allowed with recipient's ID (`RID`). If sender's ID is used the server must respond with `"ERR AUTH"` response (see [Error responses](#error-responses)).
@@ -369,24 +402,45 @@ Sending any of the commands in this section (other than `create`, that is sent w
This command is sent by the recipient to the SMP server to create a new queue. The syntax is:
```abnf
create = %s"NEW" SP recipientKey
recipientKey = %s"rsa:" x509encoded ; the recipient's RSA public key for this queue
create = %s"NEW" SP recipientSignaturePublicKey SP recipientDhPublicKey
recipientSignaturePublicKey = signaturePublicKey
; the recipient's public key to verify commands for this queue
signaturePublicKey = signatureScheme ":" x509encoded
signatureScheme = %s"rsa" | %s"ed25519" | %s"ed448"
; "rsa" means deprecated RSA-PSS signature scheme,
; it must not be used for the new queues.
recipientDhPublicKey = dhPublicKey
dhPublicKey = encryptionScheme ":" x509encoded
; the recipient's key for DH exchange to derive the secret
; that the server will use to encrypt delivered message bodies
encryptionScheme = %s"x25519" | %s"x448"
; TODO change to define the encryption scheme, e.g. "crypto_box"
x509encoded = <base64 X509 key encoding>
```
If the queue is created successfully, the server must send `queueIds` response with the recipient's and sender's queue IDs:
If the queue is created successfully, the server must send `queueIds` response with the recipient's and sender's queue IDs and public keys to sign all responses and messages and to encrypt delivered message bodies:
```abnf
queueIds = %s"IDS" SP recipientId SP senderId
SP serverSignaturePublicKey SP serverDhPublicKey
serverSignaturePublicKey = signatureKey
; the server's public key to verify responses and messages for this queue
serverDhPublicKey = dhPublicKey
; the server's key for DH exchange to derive the secret
; that the server will use to encrypt delivered message bodies to the recipient
recipientId = encoded
senderId = encoded
```
This response should be sent with empty queue ID (the second part of the transmission).
Once the queue is created, the recipient gets automatically subscribed to receive the messages from that queue, until the transport connection is closed. The `subscribe` command is needed only to start receiving the messages from the existing queue when the new transport connection is opened.
NEW `transmission` must be signed using the `recipientKey` that was passed in the transmission.
`NEW` transmission MUST be signed using the private part of the `recipientSignaturePublicKey` this verifies that the client has the private key that will be used to sign subsequent commands for this queue.
`IDS` response transmission MUST be sent signed with `serverSignaturePublicKey` this verifies that the server has the private key that will be used to sign subsequent responses and messages for this queue. This response should be sent with empty queue ID (the third part of the transmission).
#### Subscribe to queue
@@ -400,19 +454,42 @@ If subscription is successful the server must respond with the first available m
The first message will be delivered either immediately or as soon as it is available; to receive the following message the recipient must acknowledge the reception of the message (see [Acknowledge message delivery](#acknowledge-message-delivery)).
This transmission and its response MUST be signed.
#### Secure queue command
This command is sent by the recipient to the server to add sender's key to the queue:
```
secure = %s"KEY" SP senderKey
senderKey = %s"rsa:" x509encoded ; the sender's RSA public key for this queue
```abnf
secure = %s"KEY" SP senderSignaturePublicKey
senderSignaturePublicKey = signaturePublicKey
; the sender's key to verify SEND commands for this queue
```
`senderKey` is received from the sender as part of the first message - see [Send Message Command](#send-message-command).
`senderKey` is received from the sender as part of the first message - see [Send Message](#send-message) command.
Once the queue is secured only signed messages can be sent to it.
#### Enable notifications command
This command is sent by the recipient to the server to add notifier's key to the queue, to allow push notifications server to receive notifications when the message arrives, via a separate queue ID, without receiving message content.
```abnf
enableNotifications = %s"NKEY" SP notifierKey
notifierKey = signatureScheme ":" x509encoded ; the notifier's public key public key to verify NSUB command for this queue
```
The server will respond with `notifierId` response if notifications were enabled and the notifier's key was successfully added to the queue:
```abnf
notifierId = %s"NID" SP notifierId
recipientId = encoded
```
This response is sent with the recipient's queue ID (the third part of the transmission).
To receive the message notifications, `subscribeNotifications` command ("NSUB") must be sent signed with the notifier's key.
#### Acknowledge message delivery
The recipient should send the acknowledgement of message delivery once the message was stored in the client, to notify the server that the message should be deleted:
@@ -484,12 +561,26 @@ The body should be encrypted with the recipient's "public" key (`EK`); once decr
decryptedBody = [clientHeader] CRLF clientBody CRLF
clientHeader = senderKeyMsg
senderKeyMsg = %s"KEY" SP senderKey
senderKey = %s"rsa:" x509encoded ; the sender's RSA public key for this queue
senderKey = signatureScheme ":" x509encoded ; the sender's public key to sign SEND commands for this queue
clientBody = *OCTET
```
`clientHeader` in the initial unsigned message is used to transmit sender's server key and can be used in the future revisions of SMP protocol for other purposes.
### Notifier commands
#### Subscribe to queue notifications
The push notifications server (notifier) must use this command to start receiving message notifications from the queue:
```abnf
subscribeNotifications = %s"NSUB"
```
If subscription is successful the server must respond with `ok` response if no messages are available. The notifier will be receiving the message notifications from this queue until the transport connection is closed or until another transport connection subscribes to notifications from the same simplex queue - in this case the first subscription should be cancelled and [subscription END notification](#subscription-end-notification) delivered.
The first message notification will be delivered either immediately or as soon as the message is available.
### Server messages
#### Queue IDs response
@@ -503,7 +594,9 @@ See its syntax in [Create queue command](#create-queue-command)
The server must deliver messages to all subscribed simplex queues on the currently open transport connection. The syntax for the message delivery is:
```abnf
message = %s"MSG" SP msgId SP timestamp SP size SP msgBody SP
message = %s"MSG" SP encryptedMessage
encryptedMessage = <encrypt sentMessage>
sentMessage = msgId SP timestamp SP size SP msgBody SP
msgId = encoded
timestamp = <date-time defined in RFC3339>
```
@@ -512,7 +605,27 @@ timestamp = <date-time defined in RFC3339>
`timestamp` - the UTC time when the server received the message from the sender, must be in date-time format defined by [RFC 3339][10]
`binaryMsg` - see syntax in [Send message](#send-message)
`msgBody` - see syntax in [Send message](#send-message)
When server delivers the messages to the recipient, message body should be encrypted with the secret derived from DH exchange using the keys passed during the queue creation and returned with `queueIds` response.
This is done to prevent the possibility of correlation of incoming and outgoing traffic of SMP server inside transport protocol.
#### Notifier queue ID response
Server must respond with this message when queue notifications are enabled.
See its syntax in [Enable notifications command](#enable-notifications-command)
#### Deliver message notification
The server must deliver message notifications to all simplex queues that were subscribed with `subscribeNotifications` command ("NSUB") on the currently open transport connection. The syntax for the message notification delivery is:
```abnf
messageNotification = %s"NMSG"
```
Message notification does not contain any message data or meta-data, it only notifies that the message is available.
#### Subscription END notification
@@ -534,7 +647,8 @@ No further messages should be delivered to unsubscribed transport connection.
- transmission has no required signature or queue ID (`NO_AUTH`)
- transmission has unexpected credentials (`HAS_AUTH`)
- transmission has no required queue ID (`NO_QUEUE`)
- authentication error (`AUTH`) - incorrect signature, unknown (or suspended) queue, sender's ID is used in place of recipient's and vice versa, and some other cases (see [Send message command](#send-message-command)).
- authentication error (`AUTH`) - incorrect signature, unknown (or suspended) queue, sender's ID is used in place of recipient's and vice versa, and some other cases (see [Send message](#send-message) command).
- message queue quota exceeded error (`QUOTA`) - too many messages were sent to the message queue. Further messages can only be sent after the recipient retrieves the messages.
- incorrect message body size (`SIZE`).
- internal server error (`INTERNAL`).
@@ -564,52 +678,47 @@ ok = %s"OK"
Both the recipient and the sender can use TCP or some other, possibly higher level, transport protocol to communicate with the server. The default TCP port for SMP server is 5223.
By default, the client and server should use the protocol presented below, that does not depend on a centralized certificate authority.
For scenarios when meta-data privacy is critical, it is recommended that clients:
- communicating over Tor network,
- establish a separate connection for each SMP queue,
- send noise traffic (using PING command).
Transport is encrypted with [AEAD-GCM][12] protocol with two random symmetric AES 256-bit keys and two random base IVs that will be agreed during the handshake. Both client and the server should maintain two 32-bit word counters, one for the sent and one for the received messages. The IV for each message should be computed by xor-ing the sequential message counter, starting from 0, with the first 32 bits of agreed base IV (the number is encoded in network byte order).
In addition to that, the servers can be deployed as Tor onion services.
To establish the session keys and base IVs, the server should have an asymmetric key pair generated during server deployment and unknown to the clients. The users should know the key hash (256 bits) in advance in order to be able to validate the server public key during transport connection handshake.
The transport protocol should provide the following:
- server authentication (by matching server certificate hash with `serverIdentity`),
- forward secrecy (by encrypting the traffic using ephemeral keys agreed during transport handshake),
- integrity (preventing data modification by the attacker without detection),
- unique channel binding (`sessionIdentifier`) to include in the signed part of SMP transmissions.
The handshake sequence is the following:
By default, the client and server communicate using [TLS 1.3 protocol][13] restricted to:
- TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 cypher suite,
- ed25519 and ed448 EdDSA algorithms for signatures,
- x25519 and x448 ECDHE groups for key exchange.
- servers must send only one self-signed certificate in the handshake, clients must abort the connection in case more than one certificate is sent.
- server and client TLS configuration should not allow resuming the sessions.
1. Once the connection is established, the server sends the `server_header` followed by its public RSA key encoded in X509 binary (not base-64 encoded) format to the client.
2. The client compares the SHA256 hash of the received key with the hash it already has (e.g. received as part of connection invitation or as SMP server configuration). If the hash does not match, the client must terminate the connection.
3. If the hash is the same, the client should generate two random symmetric 256-bit AES keys and two base IVs that will be used as session keys/IVs by the client and the server.
4. The client then should create the `client_handshake` block and send it to the server, encrypted using [RSA-OAEP][2] scheme with the server public key: `rsa-encrypt(client_handshake)`. `snd_aes_key` and `snd_base_iv` will be used by the client to encrypt **sent** messages and by the server to decrypt them, `rcv_aes_key` and `rcv_base_iv` will be used by the client to decrypt **received** messages and by the server to encrypt them. `client_handshake` also contains `block_size` and reserved `protocol` blocks (see syntax).
5. The server should decrypt the received AES keys and base IVs with its private RSA key.
6. In case of successful decryption, the server should send encrypted welcome block (`encrypted_welcome_block`) that contains SMP protocol version supported by the server.
During TLS handshake the client must validate that the hash of the server certificate SPKI block is equal to the `serverIdentity` the client received as part of SMP server address; if the server identity does not match the client must abort the connection.
All the subsequent data, both from the client and from the server, should be sent padded to the fixed agreed block size, encrypted with symmetric AES keys and base IVs (incremented by counters on both sides), that were sent by the client during the handshake. If the application needs to transmit a larger message, it should be broken down into fragments.
Once TLS handshake is complete, client and server will exchange blocks of fixed size (16384 bytes).
Handshake blocks sent by the client and the server have this syntax:
The first block sent by the client should be `clientHello` and the server should respond with `serverHello`:
```abnf
server_header = block_size protocol key_size
block_size = 4*4(OCTET) ; 4-byte block size sent by the server
protocol = 2*2(%x00) ; 0, reserved
key_size = 2*2(OCTET) ; the size of the encoded key in bytes (binary encoded in X509 standard)
clientHello = SP smpVersion SP reserved pad
serverHello = sessionIdentifier SP smpVersion SP reserved pad
sessionIdentifier = <base64 encoded> ; unique session identifier derived from transport connection handshake
; it should be included in all SMP transmissions sent in this transport connection.
client_handshake = client_block_size protocol snd_aes_key snd_base_iv rcv_aes_key rcv_base_iv
client_block_size = 4*4(OCTET) ; 4-byte block size sent by the client,
; to confirm or override the block size sent by the server
client_protocol = 2*2(%x00) ; 0, reserved
snd_aes_key = 32*32(OCTET)
snd_base_iv = 16*16(OCTET)
rcv_aes_key = 32*32(OCTET)
rcv_base_iv = 16*16(OCTET)
transport_block = aes_body_auth_tag aes_encrypted_body
; size is sent by server during handshake, usually 4096 bytes
aes_body_auth_tag = 16*16(OCTET)
aes_encrypted_body = 1*OCTET
encrypted_welcome_block = transport_block
welcome_block = smp_version SP pad ; decrypt(encrypted_welcome_block)
smp_version = %s"v" 1*DIGIT "." 1*DIGIT "." 1*DIGIT ["-" 1*ALPHA "." 1*DIGIT] ; in semver format
; for example: v123.456.789-alpha.7
smpVersion = %s"SMP v" 1*DIGIT "." 1*DIGIT "." 1*DIGIT ; semver format, the version in this document is v0.5.0
reserved = <reserved for additional information>
pad = 1*OCTET
```
For TLS 1.3 transport client should assert that `sessionIdentifier` is equal to `tls-unique` channel binding defined in [RFC 5929][14] (TLS Finished message struct); we pass it in `serverHello` block to allow communication over some other transport protocol.
The communication party (client or server) that has the lower protocol version should assume that this version will be supported by another party, the party with the higher protocol version should abort the connection in case they cannot support the lower version.
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack
[2]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_encryption
[3]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code
@@ -622,3 +731,6 @@ pad = 1*OCTET
[10]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3339
[11]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280
[12]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7714
[13]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446
[14]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5929#section-3
[15]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8709.html
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@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
# SMP agent groups
## Problems
- device/user profile synchronisation
- chat group communication
Both problems would require message broadcast between a group of SMP agents.
## Solution: basic symmetric groups via SMP agent protocol
Additional commands and message envelopes to SMP agent protocol to provide an abstraction layer for device synchronisation and chat groups.
The groups are fully symmetric, all agent who are members of the group have equal rights and can join and leave group at any time.
All the information about the groups is stored only in agents, the commands are used to synchronise the group state between the agents.
```abnf
group_command = create_group / add_to_group / remove_from_group / leave_group
group_response = group_created / added_to_group / removed_from_group
group_notification = added_to_group_by / removed_from_group_by / left_group
create_group = %s"GNEW " group_name ; cAlias must be empty
add_to_group = %s"GADD " group_name ; cAlias is the connection to add to the group
added_to_group = %s"GADDED " name ; cAlias is the connection added to the group
```
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@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
# Open connections
## Problem
This proposal describes how to create invitations that can be used multiple times.
It can be used for:
- an open invitation to join a group.
- an open invitation to connect to a person - e.g. QR code/invitation link on a person's website, or passed from one person to another.
- part of the solution for public DNS-based addresses (when a directory server would map address in some domain name#example.tld to an open invitation).
## Solution
No changes to SMP protocol - a dedicated unsecured SMP queue is used to receive invitations to connect that are sent in encrypted agent message. An unsecured SMP queue is used as an out-of-band channel for establishing another SMP queue.
Additional parameters in commands in SMP agent protocol:
- `NEW` command will have a parameter `INV` or `CON` to create an invitation or a permanent contact connection.
`conn_alias? OPEN` (or `PUB`, `NEWPUB`, tbc) - to create an "open"/"public" queue, the response is an invitation in a different format (TBC):
- should allow multiple servers (probably the original invitation should be extended to support it)
- should have a marker to indicate it's an open/public queue (probably the original invitation should be extended to include an invitation type).
e.g. `smp:<queue_type>::<server1>/<queue_id1>,<server2>/<queue_id2>::<key1>`
`queue_type`:
- `prv` - original invitation, should be accepted with KEY SMP message
- `pub` - open invitation, should be accepted with INV SMP message (to be added to SMP protocol)
```mmd
A ->> AA: oidA? OPEN
AA ->> A: oidA INV pub_inv
...
B ->> BA: cidBA? JOIN pub_inv len CRLF meta_binary CRLF ; change command to require meta, len can be 0 for the current usage ; meta is used to send user profile
BA ->> B: cidBA OK
BA ->> SA ->> AA: INV prv_inv CRLF meta_binary
AA ->> A: oidA CONF invID len meta_binary
A ->> AA cidAB? LET invID
establish connection as usual
BA ->> B: cidBA CON
AA ->> A: cidAB CON
```
That protocol requires addressing the current problem when an invitation cannot be accepted when the party that generated the invitation is not online.
Questions.
1. Do we need to differentiate the semantics of the invitation on the syntax level, or should we allow to just manage it outside of protocol when the receiving agent decides which SMP messages to accept and which to ignore (KEY / INV).
@@ -145,9 +145,9 @@ For each message, the agent performs the following actions to encrypt it:
3. Encrypt the message using this AES256 key with [AES-GCM-SIV](https://hackage.haskell.org/package/cryptonite-0.28/docs/Crypto-Cipher-AESGCMSIV.html) (AEAD scheme) using the function `encrypt` with a random nonce.
4. Encrypt the AES256 key with public encryption key for the queue using RSA-OAEP [encrypt](https://hackage.haskell.org/package/cryptonite-0.28/docs/Crypto-PubKey-RSA-OAEP.html#v:encrypt) function parameterized with [SHA256](https://hackage.haskell.org/package/cryptonite-0.28/docs/Crypto-Hash-Algorithms.html#t:SHA256) algorithm.
5. The message to send is concatenation of:
1. encrypted AES256 key,
2. AuthTag from encryption in step 3,
3. encrypted message (in this order)
1. encrypted AES256 key,
2. AuthTag from encryption in step 3,
3. encrypted message (in this order).
As there is no additional data that is sent e2e in clear text, we potentially need some simpler algorithm, possibly the one implemented in the tutorial, that implements authenticated encryption without additional (unencrypted) data.
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ Or we could use this algorithm to allow some data that is sent e2e in clear text
### Message decryption
Agent decrypt the message following the same steps in the opposite order
Agent decrypts the message following the same steps in the opposite order:
1. Split encrypted message to AES256 key, AuthTag and encrypted message - tag and key have fixed size (?).
2. Decrypt AES256 key using the decryption key (the private key that recipient has).
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sequenceDiagram
participant M as Existing<br>member (M)
participant MA as Existing<br>member<br>agent (MA)
participant A as Alice (A)
participant AA as Alice's<br>agent (AA)
participant BA as Bob's<br>agent (BA)
participant B as Bob (B)
note over A, AA: 1. create new group (no members)
A ->> AA: G:gidA? NEW<br>(gidA - group ID of this group for A,<br>can be generated by the agent)
note over AA: create "internal" broadcast associated with the group<br>(B: NEW)
AA ->> A: G:gidA OK
note over A, BA: 2. add Bob to group
A ->> AA: C:idAB INTRO G:gidA gInfo<br>(idAB - conn alias A has for B)
note over AA: generate new random ID for member B (midB, unique per group)<br>initiate "internal" connection gidAB for B in group<br>(internal means that it is not visible to the clients<br>and cannot be used with client commands)
AA ->> BA: via idAB: GROUP C:midB g:gInvAB gInfo
BA ->> B: C:idBA REQ G:invID gInfo<br>(invID - to refer to it in ACPT)
B ->> BA: G:gidB? ACPT G:invID<br>(RJCT G:invID could be added)
note over BA: create group and "internal" broadcast associated with the group<br>(B: NEW)
BA ->> B: G:gidB OK
BA ->> AA: establish internal connection gidBA (using g:gInvAB) for A in group
note over BA, AA: add connections gidBA and gidAB to broadcasts<br>(B: ADD)
AA ->> A: G:gidA CON C:idAB
BA ->> B: G:gidA CON C:idBA
note over M, B: For each existing member M:<br>create and accept internal introduction between connections, related to the group, via gidAB/BA/AM/MA, connections created are gidBM and gidMB<br>The fact that the introduction arrives via connection allocated for the group, allows agents identify it as a new group member, ID used in introductions is group-scoped member ID.
note over A, BA: once all members were sent to B
AA ->> BA: via gidAB: MEM C:midB
note over BA, B: once all members are connected
BA ->> B: G:gidB MEM
note over A, AA: once all members reported connection
AA ->> A: G:gidA MEM C:idAB
note over M, AA: for each member M
AA ->> MA: via gidAM: MEM C:midB
MA ->> M: G:gidM MEM C:idMB
note over M, B: 3. B sends message to the group
B ->> BA: G:gidB SEND msg
note over BA: send message via associated broadcast and respond to client with SENT notifications
BA ->> B: G:gidB SENT C:idBA intMsgID
BA ->> B: G:gidB SENT C:idBM intMsgID
note over BA, B: once sent to all
BA ->> B: G:gidB SENT intMsgID
AA ->> A: G:gidA MSG C:idAB intMsgID msgdata
A ->> AA: G:gidA ACK intMsgID
AA ->> BA: via gidAB: RCVD extMsgID hash sig
BA ->> B: G:gidA RCVD C:idBA intMsgID status<br>(status - message integrity check)
MA ->> M: G:gidM MSG C:idMB intMsgID msgdata
M ->> MA: G:gidM ACK intMsgID
MA ->> BA: via gidMB: RCVD extMsgID hash sig
BA ->> B: G:gidM RCVD C:idBM intMsgID status
note over BA, B: once received by all
BA ->> B: G:gidM RCVD intMsgID status
note over M, B: 4a. A leaves group
A ->> AA: G:gidA LEAVE
AA ->> A: G:gidA OK
AA ->> BA: via gidAB: LEFT
note over AA: remove gidAB, remove from broadcast
note over BA: remove gidBA, remove from broadcast
BA ->> B: G:gidB LEFT C:idBA
AA ->> MA: via gidAM: LEFT
note over AA: remove gidAM, remove from broadcast
note over MA: remove gidMA, remove from broadcast
MA ->> M: G:gidM LEFT C:idMA
AA ->> A: G:gidA LEFT
note over B, BA: if all members left
BA ->> B: G:gidB: EMPTY
note over M, B: 4b. A removes B from group
A ->> AA: G:gidA REM C:idAB
AA ->> A: G:gidA OK
AA ->> BA: via gidAB: OUT
note over BA: remove gidBA, all gidBM
BA ->> B: G:gidB OUT C:idBA
note over AA: remove gidAB
AA ->> A: G:gidA OK
note over M, B: below steps happen for each existing member M
AA ->> MA: via gidAM: REM C:midB
note over MA: remove gidMB
MA ->> AA: via gidMA: REMD C:midB
MA ->> M: G:gidM REMD C:idMB C:idMA<br>(B removed by A)
note over A, AA: once all members removed B
AA ->> A: G:gidA REMD C:idAB<br>(B removed by this agent)
note over M, B: 4c. A deletes group
A ->> AA: G:gidA DEL
AA ->> A: G:gidA OK
AA ->> BA: via gidAB: DEL
note over BA: remove all group connections and messages
BA ->> B: G:gidB DELD C:idBA<br>(group deleted by A)
BA ->> AA: via gidBA: DELD
AA ->> A: G:gidA DELD C:idAB
AA ->> MA: via gidAM: DEL
note over MA: remove all group connections and messages
MA ->> M: G:gidM DELD C:idMA<br>(group deleted by A)
MA ->> AA: via gidMA: DELD
AA ->> A: G:gidA DELD C:idAM
AA ->> A: G:gidA DELD<br>(group deleted by this agent - all confirmed)
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sequenceDiagram
participant A as Alice (A) - the introducer
participant AA as Alice's<br>agent (AA)
participant B as Bob (B) - introduced
participant BA as Bob's<br>agent (BA)
participant M as Mark (M) - introduced to
participant MA as Mark's<br>agent (MA)
note over A, AA: 1. create introduction
A ->> AA: C:idAB INTRO C:idAM infoM<br>(idAB - conn alias A has for B,<br>idAM - for M)
AA ->> A: C:idAB OK
note over A, BA: 2. send intro to Bob
AA ->> BA: via idAB: INTRO C:extIntroIdM infoM
BA ->> B: C:idBA REQ C:intIntroIdM infoM
B ->> BA: C:idBM? ACPT C:intIntroIdM
BA ->> B: C:idBM OK
note over BA: 3. create connection for M idBM
BA ->> AA: via idBA: INV C:extIntroIdM invBM infoB
note over AA, M: 4. send intro to Mark
AA ->> MA: via idAM: REQ C:extIntroIdB invBM infoB
note over MA, B: 5. Mark connects to Bob
MA ->> M: C:idMA REQ C:intIntroIdB infoB
M ->> MA: C:idMB? ACPT C:intIntroIdB
MA ->> M: C:idMB OK
MA ->> BA: establish connection idBM -> idMB
note over A, MA: 6. notify all clients
MA ->> M: C:idMB CON
MA ->> AA: via idMA: CON C:extIntroIdB
BA ->> B: C:idBM CON
BA ->> AA: via idBA: CON C:extIntroIdB
AA ->> A: C:idAB CON C:idAM
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# Overview of SMP agent protocol commands
## Connections
### Commands and messages
A initiates connection, B accepts
- command `C:idB? NEW` - create connection
- message `C:idB INV cInv`
- command `C:idA? JOIN cInv replyMode` - join connection (response `OK`, followed by `CON`)
- *message* `C:idB REQ prv:invId infoB` - request from B joining sent to A (not implemented)
- *command* `C:idB ACPT prv:invId` - A confirms B joining (not implemented)
- message `C:id CON` - connection is established
- command `C:id SUB` - subscribe to connection
- message `C:id END` - unsubscribed from connection
- command `C:idB SEND msg` - send message
- message `C:idA SENT msgId` - confirmation that the message is sent
- message `C:id MSG msgId msgMeta msgIntegrity msgBody` - received message
- *command* `C:idB ACK msgId` - acknowledge message reception (not implemented)
- *message* `C:idA RCVD msgId msgIntegrity` - confirmation of message reception and integrity (not implemented)
- command `C:id OFF` - suspend connection
- command `C:id DEL` - delete connection
- message `C:id? OK` - command confirmation
- message `C:id? ERR e` - error
### Envelopes
- `MSG `
- `HELLO verificationKey ackMode`
- `REPLY replyInv`
## Broadcasts
### Commands & messages
- command `B:id? NEW` - create broadcast (response is `B:id OK`)
- command `B:id SEND msg` - broadcast message (response is multiple `C:id SENT msgId` or ERR, separately for each connection, followed by `B:id SENT msgId` once sent to all)
- message `B:id SENT msgId` - notification that the message is sent and its internal ID, same as SENT
- command `B:id ADD cId` - add existing connection to a broadcast (response is `B:id OK` or `ERR`, e.g. if bId is used)
- command `B:id REM cId` - remove connection from the broadcast (response is `REMD`)
- message `B:id REMD cId` - connection removed from the broadcast
- message `B:id EMPTY` - all connections were removed from the broadcast
- command `B:id DEL` - delete broadcast (response is `B:id OK`)
- command `B:id LS` - list connections in broadcast, response is `B:id MEM space_separated_connections`
- message `B:id MEM space_separated_connections`
## Open/public connection
### Commands
- command `O:id? NEW` - create open connection
- message `O:id INV oInv` - open invitation
- command `C:id? JOIN oInv replyMode` - join connection (response `OK`, followed by `CON`)
- message `O:id REQ open:invId infoB` - confirmation from B joining sent to A
- command `C:idC? ACPT open:invId` - note, that it creates new connection, keeping OPEN connection
- command `O:id SUB` - subscribe to open connection
- message `O:id END` - unsubscribed from open connection
- command `O:id OFF` - suspend open connection
- command `O:id DEL` - delete open connection
- message `O:id? OK` - command confirmation
- message `O:id? ERR e` - error
## Introductions
### Commands
- command `C:idAB INTRO C:idAM infoM` - introduce connection cIdB to connection cIdM (response is `OK`)
- message `C:idBA REQ C:invId infoM` - notification to confirm introduction
- command `C:idBM? ACPT C:invId` - accept offer to be introduced (response is `cIdBM OK`, followed by `ICON`)
- message `C:idBM CON` - confirmation that connection is established to both introduced parties
- message `C:idAB CON C:idAM` - confirmation that connection is established to the introducer
### Envelopes
- `INTRO C:extIntroIdM infoM` - new introduction offered by introducer
- `INV C:extIntroIdB prv:invBM infoB` - invitation to join connection from B to M sent via A (can be pub:)
- `REQ C:extIntroIdB prv:invBM infoB` - new introduction forwarded by introducer
- `CON C:extIntroIdM` - confirmation that the connection is established sent by both introduced parties to the introducer
## Groups
## Agent commands and messages syntax
- command `G:gId? NEW` - create group (response is `G:gId OK`)
- command `C:cId INTRO G:gId gInfo` - add existing connection to a group
- message `C:cId REQ g:invID gInfo` - invitation to join the group
- command `G:gId? ACPT g:invId` - accept invitation (response is `G gId OK`)
- message `G:gId CON C:cId` - 2 connections created with some group member (both for group and direct messages)
- message `G:gId MEM [C:cId]` - connection created with all group members for a given member or current client
- command `G:gId SEND msg` - send message to group
- message `G:gId SENT msgId` - notification that the message is sent and its internal ID, same as SENT
- message `G:gId MSG C:cId msgId msgdata` - received group message from cId, msgdata is the same set of parameters as in `MSG`
- command `G:gId ACK msgId` - acknowledge message reception by the client
- message `G:gId RCVD t:cId msgId status` - message delivery notification
- command `G:gId LEAVE` - leave the group
- message `G:gId LEFT [C:cId]` - connection cId left the group
- command `G:gId REM C:cId` - remove group member (response is `gId OK`, followed by `GREMD` notification)
- message `G:gId REMD C:cId [C:cId]` - member removed
- message `G:gId OUT C:cId` - you are removed (see question below - should it be just a sequence of GLEFT?)
- message `G:gId EMPTY` - all members left the group and it is now empty
- command `G:gId DEL` - delete the group (response is `gId OK`)
- message `G:gId DELD [C:cId]` - group deleted
## Agent message envelopes syntax
- `GROUP C:mid G:inv gInfo` - invitation to join the group
- `MEM C:mid` - confirmation that member connected to all members
- `LEFT` - notification that member left the group
- `OUT` - you are removed from the group
- `REM C:mid` - remove member mid from the group
- `REMD C:mid` - confirmation that member is removed
- `DEL` - group is deleted
- `DELD` - confirmation that group is deleted
## Commands and objects
| Dir | Command / message | (C)onnection | (O)pen connection | (B)roadcast | (G)roup |
|:---------:|:--------------------:|:------------:|:-----------------:|:-----------:|:-------:|
| command | `t:id? NEW` | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| command | `C:id INTRO t:id info` | ✓ | - | - | ✓ |
| message | `t:id INV inv` | ✓ | ✓ | - | - |
| command | `C:id? JOIN inv replyMode info` | ✓ | - | - | - |
| message | `t:id REQ invId info` | ✓ | ✓ | - | ✓ |
| command | `t:id? ACPT invId` | ✓ | - | - | ✓ |
| message | `t:id CON [C:id]` | ✓ | - | - | ✓ |
| message | `t:id MEM [C:id]` | - | - | - | ✓ |
| command | `t:id SUB` | ✓ | ✓ | - | ✓ |
| message | `t:id END` | ✓ | ✓ | - | ✓ |
| command | `t:id OFF` | ✓ | ✓ | - | - |
| command | `t:id DEL` | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| message | `t:id DELD [C:Id]` | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| command | `t:id SEND msg` | ✓ | - | ✓ | ✓ |
| message | `t:id SENT [t':id] msgId` | ✓ | - | ✓ | ✓ |
| message | `t:id MSG [C:id] msgId msgdata` | ✓ | - | - | ✓ |
| command | `t:id ACK msgId` | ✓ | - | - | ✓ |
| message | `t:id RCVD [t':id] msgId status` | ✓ | - | - | ✓ |
| command | `t:id ADD C:id` | - | - | - | ✓ |
| command | `t:id REM C:id` | - | - | ✓ | ✓ |
| command | `t:id REMD C:id` | - | - | ✓ | ✓ |
| message | `t:id EMPTY` | - | - | ✓ | ✓ |
| message | `G:id OUT C:id` | - | - | - | ✓ |
| command | `t:id LS` | - | - | ✓ | ✓ |
| message | `t:id MS cIds` | - | - | ✓ | ✓ |
| command | `G:id LEAVE` | - | - | - | ✓ |
| message | `G:id LEFT [C:id]` | - | - | - | ✓ |
+50
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@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
# SMP agent broadcast
## Problem
Support agent message broadcast to multiple connections.
It is done in ad-hoc way as part of the previous [groups proposal](./2021-05-23-groups2.md) - this proposal defines broadcast as a separate agent primitive to simplify group management.
It can also be used for other purposes when the same message needs to be sent to multiple recipients without creating groups.
## Solution
A minimal protocol of additional client commands to create, manage and use broadcasts.
From the point of view of the recipient this will look like a normal message, as if the sending agent executed multiple send commands (in fact, broadcast can be implemented by agent sending itself multiple SEND commands)
### Commands and messages
- command `B:bId? NEW` - create broadcast (response is `B:bId OK`, or `ERR` if broadcast already exists)
- command `B:bId ADD C:cId` - add existing connection to a broadcast (response is `B:bId OK` or `ERR`, e.g. if connection already added or does not exist)
- command `B:bId SEND msg` - broadcast message (response is multiple `B:cId SENT [C:bId] msgId` or ERR, separately for each connection and then for the broadcast)
- message `B:bId SENT [C:bId] msgId` - notification that the message is sent to a specific or all recipients
- command `B:bId REM C:cId` - remove connection from broadcast (response is `B:bId OK` or `ERR`)
- message `B:bId EMPTY` - all connections were removed from the broadcast
- command `B:bId DEL` - delete broadcast (response is `B:bId OK` and when the last connection is removed an additional `B:bId EMPTY` is sent)
- command `B:bId LS` - list connections in broadcast, response is `B:Id MS space_separated_connections`
- message `B:bId MS space_separated_connections`
## Questions
1. Should broadcast IDs use the same namespace as connection IDs (and as group IDs)? Having the same namespace for all abstractions that the agent can operate on can be helpful, as it can also allow implementing some queries to determine which type a given ID has, but it also increases implementation complexity.
2. Given that this abstraction would be used as internal abstraction for groups (same as connections internal to the group), it might be better to implement "agent users", each with its own connection namespace. In this case agent would use itself as one of the users.
3. There is a similarity of commands for connections, groups and broadcasts, they only differ on the single-letter prefix. We could do one of the following:
- use the same command for different object types. This feels incorrect and error prone on its own.
- extend transmission structure with the field defining the object type (connection, group, broadcast, etc.).
In this case, the transmission would look like:
```
agentTransmission = [corrId] CRLF objectType:[objectID] CRLF agentCommand
objectType = C | B | G ; this is the additional field
```
This approach would allow reusing the existing command avoiding the unnecessary repetition.
In this case, the command type could be parameterized with the list of supported agent object types, so we can ensure on the type level that only allowed commands can be constructed.
EDIT: This approach is already implemented
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+41
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@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
# SMP agent introduction
## Problem
Allow an agent client to connect two connections it has directly, with the agent acting as an out-of-band channel.
It can be used both separately as part of some client functionality, and as part of group protocol.
## Solution
A protocol with commands and message envelopes to exchange the information between parties to establish connection.
### Commands and messages
Below commands are for the scenario when A introduces B to M.
- command `C:idAB INTRO C:idAM infoM` - initiate introduction of the connection cIdB to connection cIdM (response is `C:idAB OK`)
- message `C:idBA REQ C:invId infoM` - notification to confirm introduction
- command `C:idBM? ACPT C:invId` - accept offer to be introduced (response is `C:idBM OK`, followed by `C:idBM CON`)
- message `C:idBM CON` - confirmation that connection is established to both introduced parties
- message `C:idAB CON C:idAM` - confirmation that connection is established to the introducer
### Agent envelopes
- `INTRO C:extIntroIdM infoM` - new introduction offered by introducer
- `INV C:extIntroIdB prv:invBM infoB` - invitation to join connection from B to M sent via A
- `REQ C:extIntroIdB prv:invBM infoB` - new introduction forwarded by the introducer
- `CON C:extIntroId` - confirmation that the connection is established sent by both introduced parties to the introducer
## Namespace
Given that the introduction objects are short lived, they should not reuse the same commands or share the same namespace as connections, broadcasts and groups, but they probably should share the namespace with group and connection invitations.
## Introduction protocol costs
5 messages + cost to establish a connection
The [sequence digram for introduction](https://mermaid.ink/img/eyJjb2RlIjoic2VxdWVuY2VEaWFncmFtXG4gIHBhcnRpY2lwYW50IEEgYXMgQWxpY2UgKEEpIC0gdGhlIGludHJvZHVjZXJcbiAgcGFydGljaXBhbnQgQUEgYXMgQWxpY2Unczxicj5hZ2VudCAoQUEpXG4gIHBhcnRpY2lwYW50IEIgYXMgQm9iIChCKSAtIGludHJvZHVjZWRcbiAgcGFydGljaXBhbnQgQkEgYXMgQm9iJ3M8YnI-YWdlbnQgKEJBKVxuICBwYXJ0aWNpcGFudCBNIGFzIE1hcmsgKE0pIC0gaW50cm9kdWNlZCB0b1xuICBwYXJ0aWNpcGFudCBNQSBhcyBNYXJrJ3M8YnI-YWdlbnQgKE1BKVxuXG4gIG5vdGUgb3ZlciBBLCBBQTogMS4gY3JlYXRlIGludHJvZHVjdGlvblxuICBBIC0-PiBBQTogQzppZEFCIElOVFJPIEM6aWRBTSBpbmZvTTxicj4oaWRBQiAtIGNvbm4gYWxpYXMgQSBoYXMgZm9yIEIsPGJyPmlkQU0gLSBmb3IgTSlcbiAgQUEgLT4-IEE6IEM6aWRBQiBPS1xuXG4gIG5vdGUgb3ZlciBBLCBCQTogMi4gc2VuZCBpbnRybyB0byBCb2JcblxuICBBQSAtPj4gQkE6IHZpYSBpZEFCOiBJTlRSTyBDOmV4dEludHJvSWRNIGluZm9NXG4gIEJBIC0-PiBCOiBDOmlkQkEgUkVRIEM6aW50SW50cm9JZE0gaW5mb01cbiAgQiAtPj4gQkE6IEM6aWRCTT8gQUNQVCBDOmludEludHJvSWRNXG4gIEJBIC0-PiBCOiBDOmlkQk0gT0tcblxuICBub3RlIG92ZXIgQkE6IDMuIGNyZWF0ZSBjb25uZWN0aW9uIGZvciAgTSBpZEJNXG5cbiAgQkEgLT4-IEFBOiB2aWEgaWRCQTogSU5WIEM6ZXh0SW50cm9JZE0gcHJ2OmludkJNIGluZm9CXG5cbiAgbm90ZSBvdmVyIEFBLCBNOiA0LiBzZW5kIGludHJvIHRvIE1hcmtcblxuICBBQSAtPj4gTUE6IHZpYSBpZEFNOiBSRVEgQzpleHRJbnRyb0lkQiBwcnY6aW52Qk0gaW5mb0JcblxuICBub3RlIG92ZXIgTUEsIEI6IDUuIE1hcmsgY29ubmVjdHMgdG8gQm9iXG5cbiAgTUEgLT4-IE06IEM6aWRNQSBSRVEgQzppbnRJbnRyb0lkQiBpbmZvQlxuICBNIC0-PiBNQTogQzppZE1CPyBBQ1BUIEM6aW50SW50cm9JZEJcbiAgTUEgLT4-IE06IEM6aWRNQiBPS1xuXG4gIE1BIC0-PiBCQTogIGVzdGFibGlzaCBjb25uZWN0aW9uIGlkQk0gLT4gaWRNQlxuXG4gIG5vdGUgb3ZlciBBLCBNQTogNi4gbm90aWZ5IGFsbCBjbGllbnRzXG5cbiAgTUEgLT4-IE06IEM6aWRNQiBDT05cbiAgTUEgLT4-IEFBOiB2aWEgaWRNQTogQ09OIEM6ZXh0SW50cm9JZEJcbiAgQkEgLT4-IEI6IEM6aWRCTSBDT05cbiAgQkEgLT4-IEFBOiB2aWEgaWRCQTogQ09OIEM6ZXh0SW50cm9JZEJcbiAgQUEgLT4-IEE6IEM6aWRBQiBDT04gQzppZEFNXG4iLCJtZXJtYWlkIjp7fSwidXBkYXRlRWRpdG9yIjpmYWxzZX0), the source is [here](./intro.mmd).
![sequence digram for introduction](https://mermaid.ink/svg/eyJjb2RlIjoic2VxdWVuY2VEaWFncmFtXG4gIHBhcnRpY2lwYW50IEEgYXMgQWxpY2UgKEEpIC0gdGhlIGludHJvZHVjZXJcbiAgcGFydGljaXBhbnQgQUEgYXMgQWxpY2Unczxicj5hZ2VudCAoQUEpXG4gIHBhcnRpY2lwYW50IEIgYXMgQm9iIChCKSAtIGludHJvZHVjZWRcbiAgcGFydGljaXBhbnQgQkEgYXMgQm9iJ3M8YnI-YWdlbnQgKEJBKVxuICBwYXJ0aWNpcGFudCBNIGFzIE1hcmsgKE0pIC0gaW50cm9kdWNlZCB0b1xuICBwYXJ0aWNpcGFudCBNQSBhcyBNYXJrJ3M8YnI-YWdlbnQgKE1BKVxuXG4gIG5vdGUgb3ZlciBBLCBBQTogMS4gY3JlYXRlIGludHJvZHVjdGlvblxuICBBIC0-PiBBQTogQzppZEFCIElOVFJPIEM6aWRBTSBpbmZvTTxicj4oaWRBQiAtIGNvbm4gYWxpYXMgQSBoYXMgZm9yIEIsPGJyPmlkQU0gLSBmb3IgTSlcbiAgQUEgLT4-IEE6IEM6aWRBQiBPS1xuXG4gIG5vdGUgb3ZlciBBLCBCQTogMi4gc2VuZCBpbnRybyB0byBCb2JcblxuICBBQSAtPj4gQkE6IHZpYSBpZEFCOiBJTlRSTyBDOmV4dEludHJvSWRNIGluZm9NXG4gIEJBIC0-PiBCOiBDOmlkQkEgUkVRIEM6aW50SW50cm9JZE0gaW5mb01cbiAgQiAtPj4gQkE6IEM6aWRCTT8gQUNQVCBDOmludEludHJvSWRNXG4gIEJBIC0-PiBCOiBDOmlkQk0gT0tcblxuICBub3RlIG92ZXIgQkE6IDMuIGNyZWF0ZSBjb25uZWN0aW9uIGZvciAgTSBpZEJNXG5cbiAgQkEgLT4-IEFBOiB2aWEgaWRCQTogSU5WIEM6ZXh0SW50cm9JZE0gcHJ2OmludkJNIGluZm9CXG5cbiAgbm90ZSBvdmVyIEFBLCBNOiA0LiBzZW5kIGludHJvIHRvIE1hcmtcblxuICBBQSAtPj4gTUE6IHZpYSBpZEFNOiBSRVEgQzpleHRJbnRyb0lkQiBwcnY6aW52Qk0gaW5mb0JcblxuICBub3RlIG92ZXIgTUEsIEI6IDUuIE1hcmsgY29ubmVjdHMgdG8gQm9iXG5cbiAgTUEgLT4-IE06IEM6aWRNQSBSRVEgQzppbnRJbnRyb0lkQiBpbmZvQlxuICBNIC0-PiBNQTogQzppZE1CPyBBQ1BUIEM6aW50SW50cm9JZEJcbiAgTUEgLT4-IE06IEM6aWRNQiBPS1xuXG4gIE1BIC0-PiBCQTogIGVzdGFibGlzaCBjb25uZWN0aW9uIGlkQk0gLT4gaWRNQlxuXG4gIG5vdGUgb3ZlciBBLCBNQTogNi4gbm90aWZ5IGFsbCBjbGllbnRzXG5cbiAgTUEgLT4-IE06IEM6aWRNQiBDT05cbiAgTUEgLT4-IEFBOiB2aWEgaWRNQTogQ09OIEM6ZXh0SW50cm9JZEJcbiAgQkEgLT4-IEI6IEM6aWRCTSBDT05cbiAgQkEgLT4-IEFBOiB2aWEgaWRCQTogQ09OIEM6ZXh0SW50cm9JZEJcbiAgQUEgLT4-IEE6IEM6aWRBQiBDT04gQzppZEFNXG4iLCJtZXJtYWlkIjp7fSwidXBkYXRlRWRpdG9yIjpmYWxzZX0)
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
# Server image for DigitalOcean
The current image used for 1-click deployment on DigitalOcean does not contain the source or binary of SMP Server - it downloads the compiled binary of the latest release (rather than a particular release) from GitHub.
The upside is that the new image does not have to be created and approved by DigitalOcean every time when the new release is created.
The downside is that while the release is being prepared in CI, when the release object is already created in GitHub but the server binary is not attached yet, the attempt to install the server would fail - it can last anything from several to 20 minutes, depending on whether the cached dependencies were used or everything was recompiled. Currently, when there is a small number of users, it is not a big problem, but we should consider some possible solutions in the future. Linode StackScript has the same issue.
## How to build an image
1. [Create an API token](https://cloud.digitalocean.com/account/api/tokens) in vendor account in DigitalOcean.
2. Install [packer](https://www.packer.io/downloads) downloading binary or with brew (on Mac):
```shell
brew tap hashicorp/tap
brew install hashicorp/tap/packer
```
3. Run `packer build` in the `smp-server-digitalocean-droplet` repository:
```shell
cd ./scripts/smp-server-digitalocean-droplet
DIGITALOCEAN_TOKEN=$YOUR_TOKEN packer build -on-error=ask -color=false ./marketplace-image.json
```
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
#!/bin/bash
# receives pubkey_hash file location as the first parameter
ip_address=$(hostname -I | awk '{print$1}')
hash=$(cat $1)
cat <<EOF
********************************************************************************
SMP server address: $ip_address#$hash
Check SMP server status with: systemctl status smp-server
To keep this server secure, the UFW firewall is enabled.
All ports are BLOCKED except 22 (SSH), 80 (HTTP), 5223 (SMP server).
********************************************************************************
To stop seeing this message delete line - bash /opt/simplex/on_login.sh - from /root/.bashrc
EOF
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
{
"variables": {
"token": "{{env `DIGITALOCEAN_TOKEN`}}",
"image_name": "smp-server-snapshot",
"application_name": "SMP server"
},
"sensitive-variables": ["token"],
"builders": [
{
"type": "digitalocean",
"api_token": "{{user `token`}}",
"image": "ubuntu-20-04-x64",
"region": "fra1",
"size": "s-1vcpu-1gb",
"ssh_username": "root",
"snapshot_name": "{{user `image_name`}}"
}
],
"provisioners": [
{
"type": "shell",
"inline": [
"cloud-init status --wait",
"mkdir -p /opt/simplex"
]
},
{
"type": "file",
"source": "files/opt/",
"destination": "/opt/"
},
{
"type": "shell",
"environment_vars": [
"application_name={{user `application_name`}}",
"DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive"
],
"scripts": [
"scripts/01-packages.sh",
"scripts/02-firewall.sh",
"scripts/03-init-start.sh",
"scripts/90-cleanup.sh",
"scripts/99-img-check.sh"
]
}
]
}
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
#!/bin/sh
# update apt
apt-get -y update
apt-get -y upgrade
# packages needed for smp-server init-start.sh
apt-get install -y jq
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
#!/bin/sh
# add firewall
echo "y" | ufw enable
# open ports
ufw allow ssh
ufw allow http
ufw allow 5223
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
#!/bin/bash
bin_dir="/opt/simplex/bin"
conf_dir="/etc/opt/simplex"
var_dir="/var/opt/simplex"
mkdir -p $bin_dir
mkdir -p $conf_dir
mkdir -p $var_dir
echo "downloading the latest SMP server release"
curl -s https://api.github.com/repos/simplex-chat/simplexmq/releases/latest > release.json
jq '.assets[].browser_download_url | select(test("smp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64"))' release.json \
| tr -d \" \
| wget -qi -
release_version=$(jq '.tag_name' release.json | tr -d \")
echo "downloaded SMP server $release_version"
rm release.json
echo "preparing for SMP server initiaization"
mv smp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64 $bin_dir/smp-server
chmod +x $bin_dir/smp-server
cat <<EOT >> /etc/profile.d/simplex.sh
#!/bin/bash
export PATH="$PATH:$bin_dir"
EOT
source /etc/profile.d/simplex.sh
# prepare SMP server systemd service
cat <<EOT >> /etc/systemd/system/smp-server.service
[Unit]
Description=SMP server systemd service
[Service]
Type=simple
ExecStart=/bin/sh -c "$bin_dir/smp-server start"
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
EOT
chmod 644 /etc/systemd/system/smp-server.service
echo "initializing SMP server"
hash_file="$conf_dir/pubkey_hash"
smp-server init -l | grep "transport key hash:" | cut -f2 -d":" | xargs > $hash_file
# turn off websockets support
sed -e '/websockets/s/^/# /g' -i $conf_dir/smp-server.ini
# add welcome script to .bashrc
echo "bash /opt/simplex/on_login.sh $hash_file" >> /root/.bashrc
echo "starting SMP server"
sudo systemctl enable smp-server
sudo systemctl start smp-server
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
#!/bin/bash
# DigitalOcean Marketplace Image Validation Tool
# © 2021 DigitalOcean LLC.
# This code is licensed under Apache 2.0 license (see LICENSE.md for details)
set -o errexit
# Ensure /tmp exists and has the proper permissions before
# checking for security updates
# https://github.com/digitalocean/marketplace-partners/issues/94
if [[ ! -d /tmp ]]; then
mkdir /tmp
fi
chmod 1777 /tmp
if [ -n "$(command -v yum)" ]; then
yum update -y
yum clean all
elif [ -n "$(command -v apt-get)" ]; then
apt-get -y update
apt-get -y upgrade
apt-get -y autoremove
apt-get -y autoclean
fi
rm -rf /tmp/* /var/tmp/*
history -c
cat /dev/null > /root/.bash_history
unset HISTFILE
find /var/log -mtime -1 -type f -exec truncate -s 0 {} \;
rm -rf /var/log/*.gz /var/log/*.[0-9] /var/log/*-????????
rm -rf /var/lib/cloud/instances/*
rm -f /root/.ssh/authorized_keys /etc/ssh/*key*
touch /etc/ssh/revoked_keys
chmod 600 /etc/ssh/revoked_keys
# Securely erase the unused portion of the filesystem
GREEN='\033[0;32m'
NC='\033[0m'
printf "\n${GREEN}Writing zeros to the remaining disk space to securely
erase the unused portion of the file system.
Depending on your disk size this may take several minutes.
The secure erase will complete successfully when you see:${NC}
dd: writing to '/zerofile': No space left on device\n
Beginning secure erase now\n"
dd if=/dev/zero of=/zerofile &
PID=$!
while [ -d /proc/$PID ]
do
printf "."
sleep 5
done
sync; rm /zerofile; sync
cat /dev/null > /var/log/lastlog; cat /dev/null > /var/log/wtmp
rm /var/log/auth.log
rm /var/log/kern.log
rm /var/log/ufw.log
@@ -0,0 +1,682 @@
#!/bin/bash
# DigitalOcean Marketplace Image Validation Tool
# © 2021 DigitalOcean LLC.
# This code is licensed under Apache 2.0 license (see LICENSE.md for details)
VERSION="v. 1.6"
RUNDATE=$( date )
# Script should be run with SUDO
if [ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]
then echo "[Error] - This script must be run with sudo or as the root user."
exit 1
fi
STATUS=0
PASS=0
WARN=0
FAIL=0
# $1 == command to check for
# returns: 0 == true, 1 == false
cmdExists() {
if command -v "$1" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
return 0
else
return 1
fi
}
function getDistro {
if [ -f /etc/os-release ]; then
# freedesktop.org and systemd
. /etc/os-release
OS=$NAME
VER=$VERSION_ID
elif type lsb_release >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# linuxbase.org
OS=$(lsb_release -si)
VER=$(lsb_release -sr)
elif [ -f /etc/lsb-release ]; then
# For some versions of Debian/Ubuntu without lsb_release command
. /etc/lsb-release
OS=$DISTRIB_ID
VER=$DISTRIB_RELEASE
elif [ -f /etc/debian_version ]; then
# Older Debian/Ubuntu/etc.
OS=Debian
VER=$(cat /etc/debian_version)
elif [ -f /etc/SuSe-release ]; then
# Older SuSE/etc.
:
elif [ -f /etc/redhat-release ]; then
# Older Red Hat, CentOS, etc.
VER=$( cat /etc/redhat-release | cut -d" " -f3 | cut -d "." -f1)
d=$( cat /etc/redhat-release | cut -d" " -f1 | cut -d "." -f1)
if [[ $d == "CentOS" ]]; then
OS="CentOS Linux"
fi
else
# Fall back to uname, e.g. "Linux <version>", also works for BSD, etc.
OS=$(uname -s)
VER=$(uname -r)
fi
}
function loadPasswords {
SHADOW=$(cat /etc/shadow)
}
function checkAgent {
# Check for the presence of the do-agent in the filesystem
if [ -d /var/opt/digitalocean/do-agent ];then
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m DigitalOcean Monitoring Agent detected.\n"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
if [[ $OS == "CentOS Linux" ]]; then
echo "The agent can be removed with 'sudo yum remove do-agent' "
elif [[ $OS == "Ubuntu" ]]; then
echo "The agent can be removed with 'sudo apt-get purge do-agent' "
fi
else
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m DigitalOcean Monitoring agent was not found\n"
((PASS++))
fi
}
function checkLogs {
cp_ignore="/var/log/cpanel-install.log"
echo -en "\nChecking for log files in /var/log\n\n"
# Check if there are log archives or log files that have not been recently cleared.
for f in /var/log/*-????????; do
[[ -e $f ]] || break
if [ $f != $cp_ignore ]; then
echo -en "\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m Log archive ${f} found\n"
((WARN++))
if [[ $STATUS != 2 ]]; then
STATUS=1
fi
fi
done
for f in /var/log/*.[0-9];do
[[ -e $f ]] || break
echo -en "\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m Log archive ${f} found\n"
((WARN++))
if [[ $STATUS != 2 ]]; then
STATUS=1
fi
done
for f in /var/log/*.log; do
[[ -e $f ]] || break
if [[ "${f}" = '/var/log/lfd.log' && "$( cat "${f}" | egrep -v '/var/log/messages has been reset| Watching /var/log/messages' | wc -c)" -gt 50 ]]; then
if [ $f != $cp_ignore ]; then
echo -en "\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m un-cleared log file, ${f} found\n"
((WARN++))
if [[ $STATUS != 2 ]]; then
STATUS=1
fi
fi
elif [[ "${f}" != '/var/log/lfd.log' && "$( cat "${f}" | wc -c)" -gt 50 ]]; then
if [ $f != $cp_ignore ]; then
echo -en "\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m un-cleared log file, ${f} found\n"
((WARN++))
if [[ $STATUS != 2 ]]; then
STATUS=1
fi
fi
fi
done
}
function checkTMP {
# Check the /tmp directory to ensure it is empty. Warn on any files found.
return 1
}
function checkRoot {
user="root"
uhome="/root"
for usr in $SHADOW
do
IFS=':' read -r -a u <<< "$usr"
if [[ "${u[0]}" == "${user}" ]]; then
if [[ ${u[1]} == "!" ]] || [[ ${u[1]} == "!!" ]] || [[ ${u[1]} == "*" ]]; then
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m User ${user} has no password set.\n"
((PASS++))
else
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m User ${user} has a password set on their account.\n"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
fi
fi
done
if [ -d ${uhome}/ ]; then
if [ -d ${uhome}/.ssh/ ]; then
if ls ${uhome}/.ssh/*> /dev/null 2>&1; then
for key in ${uhome}/.ssh/*
do
if [ "${key}" == "${uhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" ]; then
if [ "$( cat "${key}" | wc -c)" -gt 50 ]; then
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m has a populated authorized_keys file in \e[93m${key}\e[0m\n"
akey=$(cat ${key})
echo "File Contents:"
echo $akey
echo "--------------"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
fi
elif [ "${key}" == "${uhome}/.ssh/id_rsa" ]; then
if [ "$( cat "${key}" | wc -c)" -gt 0 ]; then
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m has a private key file in \e[93m${key}\e[0m\n"
akey=$(cat ${key})
echo "File Contents:"
echo $akey
echo "--------------"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
else
echo -en "\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m has empty private key file in \e[93m${key}\e[0m\n"
((WARN++))
if [[ $STATUS != 2 ]]; then
STATUS=1
fi
fi
elif [ "${key}" != "${uhome}/.ssh/known_hosts" ]; then
echo -en "\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m has a file in their .ssh directory at \e[93m${key}\e[0m\n"
((WARN++))
if [[ $STATUS != 2 ]]; then
STATUS=1
fi
else
if [ "$( cat "${key}" | wc -c)" -gt 50 ]; then
echo -en "\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m has a populated known_hosts file in \e[93m${key}\e[0m\n"
((WARN++))
if [[ $STATUS != 2 ]]; then
STATUS=1
fi
fi
fi
done
else
echo -en "\e[32m[ OK ]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m has no SSH keys present\n"
fi
else
echo -en "\e[32m[ OK ]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m does not have an .ssh directory\n"
fi
if [ -f /root/.bash_history ];then
BH_S=$( cat /root/.bash_history | wc -c)
if [[ $BH_S -lt 200 ]]; then
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m ${user}'s Bash History appears to have been cleared\n"
((PASS++))
else
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m ${user}'s Bash History should be cleared to prevent sensitive information from leaking\n"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
fi
return 1;
else
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m The Root User's Bash History is not present\n"
((PASS++))
fi
else
echo -en "\e[32m[ OK ]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m does not have a directory in /home\n"
fi
echo -en "\n\n"
return 1
}
function checkUsers {
# Check each user-created account
for user in $(awk -F: '$3 >= 1000 && $1 != "nobody" {print $1}' /etc/passwd;)
do
# Skip some other non-user system accounts
if [[ $user == "centos" ]]; then
:
elif [[ $user == "nfsnobody" ]]; then
:
else
echo -en "\nChecking user: ${user}...\n"
for usr in $SHADOW
do
IFS=':' read -r -a u <<< "$usr"
if [[ "${u[0]}" == "${user}" ]]; then
if [[ ${u[1]} == "!" ]] || [[ ${u[1]} == "!!" ]] || [[ ${u[1]} == "*" ]]; then
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m User ${user} has no password set.\n"
((PASS++))
else
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m User ${user} has a password set on their account. Only system users are allowed on the image.\n"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
fi
fi
done
#echo "User Found: ${user}"
uhome="/home/${user}"
if [ -d "${uhome}/" ]; then
if [ -d "${uhome}/.ssh/" ]; then
if ls "${uhome}/.ssh/*"> /dev/null 2>&1; then
for key in ${uhome}/.ssh/*
do
if [ "${key}" == "${uhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" ]; then
if [ "$( cat "${key}" | wc -c)" -gt 50 ]; then
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m has a populated authorized_keys file in \e[93m${key}\e[0m\n"
akey=$(cat ${key})
echo "File Contents:"
echo $akey
echo "--------------"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
fi
elif [ "${key}" == "${uhome}/.ssh/id_rsa" ]; then
if [ "$( cat "${key}" | wc -c)" -gt 0 ]; then
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m has a private key file in \e[93m${key}\e[0m\n"
akey=$(cat ${key})
echo "File Contents:"
echo $akey
echo "--------------"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
else
echo -en "\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m has empty private key file in \e[93m${key}\e[0m\n"
((WARN++))
if [[ $STATUS != 2 ]]; then
STATUS=1
fi
fi
elif [ "${key}" != "${uhome}/.ssh/known_hosts" ]; then
echo -en "\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m has a file in their .ssh directory named \e[93m${key}\e[0m\n"
((WARN++))
if [[ $STATUS != 2 ]]; then
STATUS=1
fi
else
if [ "$( cat "${key}" | wc -c)" -gt 50 ]; then
echo -en "\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m has a known_hosts file in \e[93m${key}\e[0m\n"
((WARN++))
if [[ $STATUS != 2 ]]; then
STATUS=1
fi
fi
fi
done
else
echo -en "\e[32m[ OK ]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m has no SSH keys present\n"
fi
else
echo -en "\e[32m[ OK ]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m does not have an .ssh directory\n"
fi
else
echo -en "\e[32m[ OK ]\e[0m User \e[1m${user}\e[0m does not have a directory in /home\n"
fi
# Check for an uncleared .bash_history for this user
if [ -f "${uhome}/.bash_history" ]; then
BH_S=$( cat "${uhome}/.bash_history" | wc -c )
if [[ $BH_S -lt 200 ]]; then
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m ${user}'s Bash History appears to have been cleared\n"
((PASS++))
else
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m ${user}'s Bash History should be cleared to prevent sensitive information from leaking\n"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
fi
echo -en "\n\n"
fi
fi
done
}
function checkFirewall {
if [[ $OS == "Ubuntu" ]]; then
fw="ufw"
ufwa=$(ufw status |head -1| sed -e "s/^Status:\ //")
if [[ $ufwa == "active" ]]; then
FW_VER="\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m Firewall service (${fw}) is active\n"
((PASS++))
else
FW_VER="\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m No firewall is configured. Ensure ${fw} is installed and configured\n"
((WARN++))
fi
elif [[ $OS == "CentOS Linux" ]]; then
if [ -f /usr/lib/systemd/system/csf.service ]; then
fw="csf"
if [[ $(systemctl status $fw >/dev/null 2>&1) ]]; then
FW_VER="\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m Firewall service (${fw}) is active\n"
((PASS++))
elif cmdExists "firewall-cmd"; then
if [[ $(systemctl is-active firewalld >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo 1 || echo 0) ]]; then
FW_VER="\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m Firewall service (${fw}) is active\n"
((PASS++))
else
FW_VER="\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m No firewall is configured. Ensure ${fw} is installed and configured\n"
((WARN++))
fi
else
FW_VER="\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m No firewall is configured. Ensure ${fw} is installed and configured\n"
((WARN++))
fi
else
fw="firewalld"
if [[ $(systemctl is-active firewalld >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo 1 || echo 0) ]]; then
FW_VER="\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m Firewall service (${fw}) is active\n"
((PASS++))
else
FW_VER="\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m No firewall is configured. Ensure ${fw} is installed and configured\n"
((WARN++))
fi
fi
elif [[ "$OS" =~ Debian.* ]]; then
# user could be using a number of different services for managing their firewall
# we will check some of the most common
if cmdExists 'ufw'; then
fw="ufw"
ufwa=$(ufw status |head -1| sed -e "s/^Status:\ //")
if [[ $ufwa == "active" ]]; then
FW_VER="\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m Firewall service (${fw}) is active\n"
((PASS++))
else
FW_VER="\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m No firewall is configured. Ensure ${fw} is installed and configured\n"
((WARN++))
fi
elif cmdExists "firewall-cmd"; then
fw="firewalld"
if [[ $(systemctl is-active --quiet $fw) ]]; then
FW_VER="\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m Firewall service (${fw}) is active\n"
((PASS++))
else
FW_VER="\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m No firewall is configured. Ensure ${fw} is installed and configured\n"
((WARN++))
fi
else
# user could be using vanilla iptables, check if kernel module is loaded
fw="iptables"
if [[ $(lsmod | grep -q '^ip_tables' 2>/dev/null) ]]; then
FW_VER="\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m Firewall service (${fw}) is active\n"
((PASS++))
else
FW_VER="\e[93m[WARN]\e[0m No firewall is configured. Ensure ${fw} is installed and configured\n"
((WARN++))
fi
fi
fi
}
function checkUpdates {
if [[ $OS == "Ubuntu" ]] || [[ "$OS" =~ Debian.* ]]; then
# Ensure /tmp exists and has the proper permissions before
# checking for security updates
# https://github.com/digitalocean/marketplace-partners/issues/94
if [[ ! -d /tmp ]]; then
mkdir /tmp
fi
chmod 1777 /tmp
echo -en "\nUpdating apt package database to check for security updates, this may take a minute...\n\n"
apt-get -y update > /dev/null
uc=$(apt-get --just-print upgrade | grep -i "security" | wc -l)
if [[ $uc -gt 0 ]]; then
update_count=$(( ${uc} / 2 ))
else
update_count=0
fi
if [[ $update_count -gt 0 ]]; then
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m There are ${update_count} security updates available for this image that have not been installed.\n"
echo -en
echo -en "Here is a list of the security updates that are not installed:\n"
sleep 2
apt-get --just-print upgrade | grep -i security | awk '{print $2}' | awk '!seen[$0]++'
echo -en
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
else
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m There are no pending security updates for this image.\n\n"
fi
elif [[ $OS == "CentOS Linux" ]]; then
echo -en "\nChecking for available security updates, this may take a minute...\n\n"
update_count=$(yum check-update --security --quiet | wc -l)
if [[ $update_count -gt 0 ]]; then
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m There are ${update_count} security updates available for this image that have not been installed.\n"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
else
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m There are no pending security updates for this image.\n"
((PASS++))
fi
else
echo "Error encountered"
exit 1
fi
return 1;
}
function checkCloudInit {
if hash cloud-init 2>/dev/null; then
CI="\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m Cloud-init is installed.\n"
((PASS++))
else
CI="\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m No valid verison of cloud-init was found.\n"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
fi
return 1
}
function checkMongoDB {
# Check if MongoDB is installed
# If it is, verify the version is allowed (non-SSPL)
if [[ $OS == "Ubuntu" ]] || [[ "$OS" =~ Debian.* ]]; then
if [[ -f "/usr/bin/mongod" ]]; then
version=$(/usr/bin/mongod --version --quiet | grep "db version" | sed -e "s/^db\ version\ v//")
if version_gt $version 4.0.0; then
if version_gt $version 4.0.3; then
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m An SSPL version of MongoDB is present, ${version}"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
else
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m The version of MongoDB installed, ${version} is not under the SSPL"
((PASS++))
fi
else
if version_gt $version 3.6.8; then
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m An SSPL version of MongoDB is present, ${version}"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
else
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m The version of MongoDB installed, ${version} is not under the SSPL"
((PASS++))
fi
fi
else
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m MongoDB is not installed"
((PASS++))
fi
elif [[ $OS == "CentOS Linux" ]]; then
if [[ -f "/usr/bin/mongod" ]]; then
version=$(/usr/bin/mongod --version --quiet | grep "db version" | sed -e "s/^db\ version\ v//")
if version_gt $version 4.0.0; then
if version_gt $version 4.0.3; then
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m An SSPL version of MongoDB is present"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
else
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m The version of MongoDB installed is not under the SSPL"
((PASS++))
fi
else
if version_gt $version 3.6.8; then
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m An SSPL version of MongoDB is present"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
else
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m The version of MongoDB installed is not under the SSPL"
((PASS++))
fi
fi
else
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m MongoDB is not installed"
((PASS++))
fi
else
echo "ERROR: Unable to identify distribution"
((FAIL++))
STATUS 2
return 1
fi
}
function version_gt() { test "$(printf '%s\n' "$@" | sort -V | head -n 1)" != "$1"; }
clear
echo "DigitalOcean Marketplace Image Validation Tool ${VERSION}"
echo "Executed on: ${RUNDATE}"
echo "Checking local system for Marketplace compatibility..."
getDistro
echo -en "\n\e[1mDistribution:\e[0m ${OS}\n"
echo -en "\e[1mVersion:\e[0m ${VER}\n\n"
ost=0
osv=0
if [[ $OS == "Ubuntu" ]]; then
ost=1
if [[ $VER == "20.04" ]]; then
osv=1
elif [[ $VER == "18.04" ]]; then
osv=1
elif [[ $VER == "16.04" ]]; then
osv=1
else
osv=0
fi
elif [[ "$OS" =~ Debian.* ]]; then
ost=1
case "$VER" in
9)
osv=1
;;
10)
osv=1
;;
*)
osv=2
;;
esac
elif [[ $OS == "CentOS Linux" ]]; then
ost=1
if [[ $VER == "8" ]]; then
osv=1
elif [[ $VER == "7" ]]; then
osv=1
elif [[ $VER == "6" ]]; then
osv=1
else
osv=2
fi
else
ost=0
fi
if [[ $ost == 1 ]]; then
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m Supported Operating System Detected: ${OS}\n"
((PASS++))
else
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m ${OS} is not a supported Operating System\n"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
fi
if [[ $osv == 1 ]]; then
echo -en "\e[32m[PASS]\e[0m Supported Release Detected: ${VER}\n"
((PASS++))
elif [[ $ost == 1 ]]; then
echo -en "\e[41m[FAIL]\e[0m ${OS} ${VER} is not a supported Operating System Version\n"
((FAIL++))
STATUS=2
else
echo "Exiting..."
exit 1
fi
checkCloudInit
echo -en "${CI}"
checkFirewall
echo -en "${FW_VER}"
checkUpdates
loadPasswords
checkLogs
echo -en "\n\nChecking all user-created accounts...\n"
checkUsers
echo -en "\n\nChecking the root account...\n"
checkRoot
checkAgent
checkMongoDB
# Summary
echo -en "\n\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n"
if [[ $STATUS == 0 ]]; then
echo -en "Scan Complete.\n\e[32mAll Tests Passed!\e[0m\n"
elif [[ $STATUS == 1 ]]; then
echo -en "Scan Complete. \n\e[93mSome non-critical tests failed. Please review these items.\e[0m\e[0m\n"
else
echo -en "Scan Complete. \n\e[41mOne or more tests failed. Please review these items and re-test.\e[0m\n"
fi
echo "---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------"
echo -en "\e[1m${PASS} Tests PASSED\e[0m\n"
echo -en "\e[1m${WARN} WARNINGS\e[0m\n"
echo -en "\e[1m${FAIL} Tests FAILED\e[0m\n"
echo -en "---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n"
if [[ $STATUS == 0 ]]; then
echo -en "We did not detect any issues with this image. Please be sure to manually ensure that all software installed on the base system is functional, secure and properly configured (or facilities for configuration on first-boot have been created).\n\n"
exit 0
elif [[ $STATUS == 1 ]]; then
echo -en "Please review all [WARN] items above and ensure they are intended or resolved. If you do not have a specific requirement, we recommend resolving these items before image submission\n\n"
exit 0
else
echo -en "Some critical tests failed. These items must be resolved and this scan re-run before you submit your image to the DigitalOcean Marketplace.\n\n"
exit 1
fi
+125
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
#!/bin/bash
# <UDF name="enable_store_log" label="Store log - persists SMP queues to append only log and restores them upon server restart." default="on" oneof="on, off" />
# <UDF name="api_token" label="Linode API token - enables StackScript to create tags containing SMP server domain/ip address, transport key hash and server version. Use `domain#hash` or `ip#hash` as SMP server address in the client. Note: minimal permissions token should have are - read/write access to `linodes` (to update linode tags - you need them) and `domains` (to add A record for the chosen 3rd level domain)" default="" />
# <UDF name="fqdn" label="FQDN (Fully qualified domain name) - provide third level domain name (ex: smp.example.com). If provided can be used instead of ip address." default="" />
# log all stdout output to stackscript.log
exec &> >(tee -i /var/log/stackscript.log)
# uncomment next line to enable debugging features
# set -xeo pipefail
cd $HOME
sudo apt-get -y update
sudo apt-get -y upgrade
sudo apt-get install -y jq
# add firewall
echo "y" | ufw enable
# open ports
ufw allow ssh
ufw allow http
ufw allow 5223
bin_dir="/opt/simplex/bin"
conf_dir="/etc/opt/simplex"
var_dir="/var/opt/simplex"
mkdir -p $bin_dir
mkdir -p $conf_dir
mkdir -p $var_dir
# retrieve latest release info and download smp-server executable
curl -s https://api.github.com/repos/simplex-chat/simplexmq/releases/latest > release.json
jq '.assets[].browser_download_url | select(test("smp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64"))' release.json \
| tr -d \" \
| wget -qi -
mv smp-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64 $bin_dir/smp-server
chmod +x $bin_dir/smp-server
cat <<EOT >> /etc/profile.d/simplex.sh
#!/bin/bash
export PATH="$PATH:$bin_dir"
EOT
source /etc/profile.d/simplex.sh
# initialize SMP server
init_opts=()
[[ $ENABLE_STORE_LOG == "on" ]] && init_opts+=(-l)
hash_file="$conf_dir/pubkey_hash"
smp-server init "${init_opts[@]}" | grep "transport key hash:" | cut -f2 -d":" | xargs > $hash_file
# turn off websockets support
sed -e '/websockets/s/^/# /g' -i $conf_dir/smp-server.ini
# create script that will run on login
on_login_script="/opt/simplex/on_login.sh"
cat <<EOT >> $on_login_script
#!/bin/bash
# receives pubkey_hash file location as the first parameter
ip_address=\$(hostname -I | awk '{print\$1}')
hash=\$(cat \$1)
cat <<EOF
********************************************************************************
SMP server address: \$ip_address#\$hash
Check SMP server status with: systemctl status smp-server
To keep this server secure, the UFW firewall is enabled.
All ports are BLOCKED except 22 (SSH), 80 (HTTP), 5223 (SMP server).
********************************************************************************
To stop seeing this message delete line - bash /opt/simplex/on_login.sh - from /root/.bashrc
EOF
EOT
chmod +x $on_login_script
echo "bash $on_login_script $hash_file" >> /root/.bashrc
# create A record and update linode's tags
if [ ! -z "$API_TOKEN" ]; then
ip_address=$(curl ifconfig.me)
address=$ip_address
if [ ! -z "$FQDN" ]; then
domain_address=$(echo $FQDN | rev | cut -d "." -f 1,2 | rev)
domain_id=$(curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" https://api.linode.com/v4/domains \
| jq --arg da "$domain_address" '.data[] | select( .domain == $da ) | .id')
if [[ ! -z $domain_id ]]; then
curl -s -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" \
-X POST -d "{\"type\":\"A\",\"name\":\"$FQDN\",\"target\":\"$ip_address\"}" \
https://api.linode.com/v4/domains/${domain_id}/records
address=$FQDN
fi
fi
hash=$(cat $hash_file)
release_version=$(jq '.tag_name' release.json | tr -d \")
curl -s -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" \
-X PUT -d "{\"tags\":[\"$address\",\"#$hash\",\"$release_version\"]}" \
https://api.linode.com/v4/linode/instances/$LINODE_ID
fi
# create, enable and start SMP server systemd service
cat <<EOT >> /etc/systemd/system/smp-server.service
[Unit]
Description=SMP server systemd service
[Service]
Type=simple
ExecStart=/bin/sh -c "$bin_dir/smp-server start"
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
EOT
chmod 644 /etc/systemd/system/smp-server.service
sudo systemctl enable smp-server
sudo systemctl start smp-server
# cleanup
rm release.json
+259
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
cabal-version: 1.12
-- This file has been generated from package.yaml by hpack version 0.34.4.
--
-- see: https://github.com/sol/hpack
name: simplexmq-v0
version: 0.5.3
synopsis: SimpleXMQ message broker
description: This package includes <./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Server.html server>,
<./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Client.html client> and
<./docs/Simplex-Messaging-Agent.html agent> for SMP protocols:
.
* <https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md SMP protocol>
* <https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/agent-protocol.md SMP agent protocol>
.
See <https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat terminal chat prototype> built with SimpleXMQ broker.
category: Chat, Network, Web, System, Cryptography
homepage: https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq#readme
author: simplex.chat
maintainer: chat@simplex.chat
copyright: 2020 simplex.chat
license: AGPL-3
license-file: LICENSE
build-type: Simple
extra-source-files:
README.md
CHANGELOG.md
migrations/20210101_initial.sql
migrations/20210624_confirmations.sql
migrations/20210809_snd_messages.sql
migrations/20211202_connection_mode.sql
migrations/README.md
library
exposed-modules:
Simplex.Messaging.Agent
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.ExceptT
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite
Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations
Simplex.Messaging.Client
Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
Simplex.Messaging.Server
Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM
Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore
Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.STM
Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore
Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.STM
Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
Simplex.Messaging.Transport
Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets
Simplex.Messaging.Util
other-modules:
Paths_simplexmq_v0
hs-source-dirs:
src
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns
build-depends:
QuickCheck ==2.14.*
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
, async ==2.2.*
, attoparsec ==0.13.*
, base >=4.7 && <5
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
, bytestring ==0.10.*
, composition ==1.0.*
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
, containers ==0.6.*
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
, direct-sqlite ==2.3.*
, directory ==1.3.*
, file-embed >=0.0.14.0 && <=0.0.15.0
, filepath ==1.4.*
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
, http-types ==0.12.*
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
, memory ==0.15.*
, mtl ==2.2.*
, network ==3.1.*
, network-transport ==0.5.*
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
, simple-logger ==0.1.*
, sqlite-simple ==0.4.*
, stm ==2.5.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text ==1.2.*
, time ==1.9.*
, transformers ==0.5.*
, unliftio ==0.2.*
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
, websockets ==0.12.*
, x509 ==1.7.*
default-language: Haskell2010
executable smp-agent
main-is: Main.hs
other-modules:
Paths_simplexmq_v0
hs-source-dirs:
apps/smp-agent
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded
build-depends:
QuickCheck ==2.14.*
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
, async ==2.2.*
, attoparsec ==0.13.*
, base >=4.7 && <5
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
, bytestring ==0.10.*
, composition ==1.0.*
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
, containers ==0.6.*
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
, direct-sqlite ==2.3.*
, directory ==1.3.*
, file-embed >=0.0.14.0 && <=0.0.15.0
, filepath ==1.4.*
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
, http-types ==0.12.*
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
, memory ==0.15.*
, mtl ==2.2.*
, network ==3.1.*
, network-transport ==0.5.*
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
, simple-logger ==0.1.*
, simplexmq-v0
, sqlite-simple ==0.4.*
, stm ==2.5.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text ==1.2.*
, time ==1.9.*
, transformers ==0.5.*
, unliftio ==0.2.*
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
, websockets ==0.12.*
, x509 ==1.7.*
default-language: Haskell2010
executable smp-server
main-is: Main.hs
other-modules:
Paths_simplexmq_v0
hs-source-dirs:
apps/smp-server
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns -threaded
build-depends:
QuickCheck ==2.14.*
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
, async ==2.2.*
, attoparsec ==0.13.*
, base >=4.7 && <5
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
, bytestring ==0.10.*
, composition ==1.0.*
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
, containers ==0.6.*
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
, cryptostore ==0.2.*
, direct-sqlite ==2.3.*
, directory ==1.3.*
, file-embed >=0.0.14.0 && <=0.0.15.0
, filepath ==1.4.*
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
, http-types ==0.12.*
, ini ==0.4.*
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
, memory ==0.15.*
, mtl ==2.2.*
, network ==3.1.*
, network-transport ==0.5.*
, optparse-applicative >=0.15 && <0.17
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
, simple-logger ==0.1.*
, simplexmq-v0
, sqlite-simple ==0.4.*
, stm ==2.5.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text ==1.2.*
, time ==1.9.*
, transformers ==0.5.*
, unliftio ==0.2.*
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
, websockets ==0.12.*
, x509 ==1.7.*
default-language: Haskell2010
test-suite smp-server-test
type: exitcode-stdio-1.0
main-is: Test.hs
other-modules:
AgentTests
AgentTests.ConnectionRequestTests
AgentTests.FunctionalAPITests
AgentTests.SQLiteTests
ProtocolErrorTests
ServerTests
SMPAgentClient
SMPClient
Paths_simplexmq_v0
hs-source-dirs:
tests
ghc-options: -Wall -Wcompat -Werror=incomplete-patterns -Wredundant-constraints -Wincomplete-record-updates -Wincomplete-uni-patterns -Wunused-type-patterns
build-depends:
HUnit ==1.6.*
, QuickCheck ==2.14.*
, ansi-terminal >=0.10 && <0.12
, asn1-encoding ==0.9.*
, asn1-types ==0.3.*
, async ==2.2.*
, attoparsec ==0.13.*
, base >=4.7 && <5
, base64-bytestring >=1.0 && <1.3
, bytestring ==0.10.*
, composition ==1.0.*
, constraints >=0.12 && <0.14
, containers ==0.6.*
, cryptonite >=0.27 && <0.30
, direct-sqlite ==2.3.*
, directory ==1.3.*
, file-embed >=0.0.14.0 && <=0.0.15.0
, filepath ==1.4.*
, generic-random >=1.3 && <1.5
, hspec ==2.7.*
, hspec-core ==2.7.*
, http-types ==0.12.*
, iso8601-time ==0.1.*
, memory ==0.15.*
, mtl ==2.2.*
, network ==3.1.*
, network-transport ==0.5.*
, random >=1.1 && <1.3
, simple-logger ==0.1.*
, simplexmq-v0
, sqlite-simple ==0.4.*
, stm ==2.5.*
, template-haskell ==2.16.*
, text ==1.2.*
, time ==1.9.*
, timeit ==2.0.*
, transformers ==0.5.*
, unliftio ==0.2.*
, unliftio-core ==0.2.*
, websockets ==0.12.*
, x509 ==1.7.*
default-language: Haskell2010
-138
View File
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
module Simplex.Markdown where
import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
import Data.Attoparsec.Text (Parser)
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.Text as A
import Data.Either (fromRight)
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.Map.Strict (Map)
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Data.String
import Data.Text (Text)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import System.Console.ANSI.Types
data Markdown = Markdown Format Text | Markdown :|: Markdown
deriving (Eq, Show)
data Format
= Bold
| Italic
| Underline
| StrikeThrough
| Snippet
| Secret
| Colored Color
| NoFormat
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance Semigroup Markdown where (<>) = (:|:)
instance Monoid Markdown where mempty = unmarked ""
instance IsString Markdown where fromString = unmarked . T.pack
unmarked :: Text -> Markdown
unmarked = Markdown NoFormat
colorMD :: Char
colorMD = '!'
secretMD :: Char
secretMD = '#'
formats :: Map Char Format
formats =
M.fromList
[ ('*', Bold),
('_', Italic),
('+', Underline),
('~', StrikeThrough),
('`', Snippet),
(secretMD, Secret),
(colorMD, Colored White)
]
colors :: Map Text Color
colors =
M.fromList
[ ("red", Red),
("green", Green),
("blue", Blue),
("yellow", Yellow),
("cyan", Cyan),
("magenta", Magenta),
("r", Red),
("g", Green),
("b", Blue),
("y", Yellow),
("c", Cyan),
("m", Magenta),
("1", Red),
("2", Green),
("3", Blue),
("4", Yellow),
("5", Cyan),
("6", Magenta)
]
parseMarkdown :: Text -> Markdown
parseMarkdown s = fromRight (unmarked s) $ A.parseOnly (markdownP <* A.endOfInput) s
markdownP :: Parser Markdown
markdownP = merge <$> A.many' fragmentP
where
merge :: [Markdown] -> Markdown
merge [] = ""
merge fs = foldr1 (:|:) fs
fragmentP :: Parser Markdown
fragmentP =
A.anyChar >>= \case
' ' -> unmarked . T.cons ' ' <$> A.takeWhile (== ' ')
c -> case M.lookup c formats of
Just Secret -> secretP
Just (Colored White) -> coloredP
Just f -> formattedP c "" f
Nothing -> unformattedP c
formattedP :: Char -> Text -> Format -> Parser Markdown
formattedP c p f = do
s <- A.takeTill (== c)
(A.char c $> markdown c p f s) <|> noFormat (c `T.cons` p <> s)
markdown :: Char -> Text -> Format -> Text -> Markdown
markdown c p f s
| T.null s || T.head s == ' ' || T.last s == ' ' =
unmarked $ c `T.cons` p <> s `T.snoc` c
| otherwise = Markdown f s
secretP :: Parser Markdown
secretP = secret <$> A.takeWhile (== secretMD) <*> A.takeTill (== secretMD) <*> A.takeWhile (== secretMD)
secret :: Text -> Text -> Text -> Markdown
secret b s a
| T.null a || T.null s || T.head s == ' ' || T.last s == ' ' =
unmarked $ secretMD `T.cons` ss
| otherwise = Markdown Secret $ T.init ss
where
ss = b <> s <> a
coloredP :: Parser Markdown
coloredP = do
color <- A.takeWhile (\c -> c /= ' ' && c /= colorMD)
case M.lookup color colors of
Just c ->
let f = Colored c
in (A.char ' ' *> formattedP colorMD (color `T.snoc` ' ') f)
<|> noFormat (colorMD `T.cons` color)
_ -> noFormat (colorMD `T.cons` color)
unformattedP :: Char -> Parser Markdown
unformattedP c = unmarked . T.cons c <$> wordsP
wordsP :: Parser Text
wordsP = do
s <- (<>) <$> A.takeTill (== ' ') <*> A.takeWhile (== ' ')
A.peekChar >>= \case
Nothing -> pure s
Just c -> case M.lookup c formats of
Just _ -> pure s
Nothing -> (s <>) <$> wordsP
noFormat :: Text -> Parser Markdown
noFormat = pure . unmarked
+566 -243
View File
@@ -1,69 +1,185 @@
{-# LANGUAGE ConstraintKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NumericUnderscores #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedLists #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
-- |
-- Module : Simplex.Messaging.Agent
-- Copyright : (c) simplex.chat
-- License : AGPL-3
--
-- Maintainer : chat@simplex.chat
-- Stability : experimental
-- Portability : non-portable
--
-- This module defines SMP protocol agent with SQLite persistence.
--
-- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/agent-protocol.md
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent
( runSMPAgent,
( -- * SMP agent over TCP
runSMPAgent,
runSMPAgentBlocking,
-- * queue-based SMP agent
getAgentClient,
runAgentClient,
-- * SMP agent functional API
AgentClient (..),
AgentMonad,
AgentErrorMonad,
getSMPAgentClient,
runSMPAgentClient,
disconnectAgentClient, -- used in tests
withAgentLock,
createConnection,
joinConnection,
allowConnection,
acceptContact,
rejectContact,
subscribeConnection,
sendMessage,
ackMessage,
suspendConnection,
deleteConnection,
)
where
import Control.Concurrent.STM (stateTVar)
import Control.Logger.Simple (logInfo, showText)
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift (MonadUnliftIO)
import Control.Monad.Reader
import Crypto.Random (MonadRandom)
import Data.Bifunctor (second)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Composition ((.:), (.:.))
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty (..))
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Data.Maybe (isJust)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Data.Text.Encoding (decodeUtf8)
import Data.Time.Clock
import Database.SQLite.Simple (SQLError)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite (SQLiteStore, connectSQLiteStore)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Transmission
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite (SQLiteStore)
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (SMPServerTransmission)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (CorrId (..), MsgBody, SenderPublicKey)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (MsgBody, SenderPublicKey)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (putLn, runTCPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow)
import System.IO (Handle)
import UnliftIO.Async (race_)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport (..), TProxy, Transport (..), currentSMPVersionStr, runTransportServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, tryError, unlessM)
import System.Random (randomR)
import UnliftIO.Async (async, race_)
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
import UnliftIO.STM
runSMPAgent :: (MonadRandom m, MonadUnliftIO m) => AgentConfig -> m ()
runSMPAgent cfg = newEmptyTMVarIO >>= (`runSMPAgentBlocking` cfg)
-- | Runs an SMP agent as a TCP service using passed configuration.
--
-- See a full agent executable here: https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/apps/smp-agent/Main.hs
runSMPAgent :: (MonadRandom m, MonadUnliftIO m) => ATransport -> AgentConfig -> m ()
runSMPAgent t cfg = do
started <- newEmptyTMVarIO
runSMPAgentBlocking t started cfg
runSMPAgentBlocking :: (MonadRandom m, MonadUnliftIO m) => TMVar Bool -> AgentConfig -> m ()
runSMPAgentBlocking started cfg@AgentConfig {tcpPort} = runReaderT smpAgent =<< newSMPAgentEnv cfg
-- | Runs an SMP agent as a TCP service using passed configuration with signalling.
--
-- This function uses passed TMVar to signal when the server is ready to accept TCP requests (True)
-- and when it is disconnected from the TCP socket once the server thread is killed (False).
runSMPAgentBlocking :: (MonadRandom m, MonadUnliftIO m) => ATransport -> TMVar Bool -> AgentConfig -> m ()
runSMPAgentBlocking (ATransport t) started cfg@AgentConfig {tcpPort} = runReaderT (smpAgent t) =<< newSMPAgentEnv cfg
where
smpAgent :: (MonadUnliftIO m', MonadReader Env m') => m' ()
smpAgent = runTCPServer started tcpPort $ \h -> do
liftIO $ putLn h "Welcome to SMP v0.2.0 agent"
c <- getSMPAgentClient
smpAgent :: forall c m'. (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m', MonadReader Env m') => TProxy c -> m' ()
smpAgent _ = runTransportServer started tcpPort $ \(h :: c) -> do
liftIO . putLn h $ "Welcome to SMP agent v" <> currentSMPVersionStr
c <- getAgentClient
logConnection c True
race_ (connectClient h c) (runSMPAgentClient c)
`E.finally` (closeSMPServerClients c >> logConnection c False)
race_ (connectClient h c) (runAgentClient c)
`E.finally` disconnectAgentClient c
getSMPAgentClient :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => m AgentClient
getSMPAgentClient = do
n <- asks clientCounter
cfg <- asks config
atomically $ newAgentClient n cfg
-- | Creates an SMP agent client instance
getSMPAgentClient :: (MonadRandom m, MonadUnliftIO m) => AgentConfig -> m AgentClient
getSMPAgentClient cfg = newSMPAgentEnv cfg >>= runReaderT runAgent
where
runAgent = do
c <- getAgentClient
action <- async $ subscriber c `E.finally` disconnectAgentClient c
pure c {smpSubscriber = action}
connectClient :: MonadUnliftIO m => Handle -> AgentClient -> m ()
disconnectAgentClient :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> m ()
disconnectAgentClient c = closeAgentClient c >> logConnection c False
-- |
type AgentErrorMonad m = (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadError AgentErrorType m)
-- | Create SMP agent connection (NEW command)
createConnection :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> SConnectionMode c -> m (ConnId, ConnectionRequest c)
createConnection c cMode = withAgentEnv c $ newConn c "" cMode
-- | Join SMP agent connection (JOIN command)
joinConnection :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnectionRequest c -> ConnInfo -> m ConnId
joinConnection c = withAgentEnv c .: joinConn c ""
-- | Allow connection to continue after CONF notification (LET command)
allowConnection :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> m ()
allowConnection c = withAgentEnv c .:. allowConnection' c
-- | Accept contact after REQ notification (ACPT command)
acceptContact :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> m ConnId
acceptContact c = withAgentEnv c .: acceptContact' c ""
-- | Reject contact (RJCT command)
rejectContact :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> ConfirmationId -> m ()
rejectContact c = withAgentEnv c .: rejectContact' c
-- | Subscribe to receive connection messages (SUB command)
subscribeConnection :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> m ()
subscribeConnection c = withAgentEnv c . subscribeConnection' c
-- | Send message to the connection (SEND command)
sendMessage :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> MsgBody -> m AgentMsgId
sendMessage c = withAgentEnv c .: sendMessage' c
ackMessage :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> AgentMsgId -> m ()
ackMessage c = withAgentEnv c .: ackMessage' c
-- | Suspend SMP agent connection (OFF command)
suspendConnection :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> m ()
suspendConnection c = withAgentEnv c . suspendConnection' c
-- | Delete SMP agent connection (DEL command)
deleteConnection :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> m ()
deleteConnection c = withAgentEnv c . deleteConnection' c
withAgentEnv :: AgentClient -> ReaderT Env m a -> m a
withAgentEnv c = (`runReaderT` agentEnv c)
-- withAgentClient :: AgentErrorMonad m => AgentClient -> ReaderT Env m a -> m a
-- withAgentClient c = withAgentLock c . withAgentEnv c
-- | Creates an SMP agent client instance that receives commands and sends responses via 'TBQueue's.
getAgentClient :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => m AgentClient
getAgentClient = ask >>= atomically . newAgentClient
connectClient :: Transport c => MonadUnliftIO m => c -> AgentClient -> m ()
connectClient h c = race_ (send h c) (receive h c)
logConnection :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> Bool -> m ()
@@ -71,260 +187,445 @@ logConnection c connected =
let event = if connected then "connected to" else "disconnected from"
in logInfo $ T.unwords ["client", showText (clientId c), event, "Agent"]
runSMPAgentClient :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => AgentClient -> m ()
runSMPAgentClient c = do
db <- asks $ dbFile . config
s1 <- connectSQLiteStore db
s2 <- connectSQLiteStore db
race_ (subscriber c s1) (client c s2)
-- | Runs an SMP agent instance that receives commands and sends responses via 'TBQueue's.
runAgentClient :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => AgentClient -> m ()
runAgentClient c = race_ (subscriber c) (client c)
receive :: forall m. MonadUnliftIO m => Handle -> AgentClient -> m ()
receive h c@AgentClient {rcvQ, sndQ} = forever $ do
(corrId, cAlias, cmdOrErr) <- tGet SClient h
receive :: forall c m. (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m) => c -> AgentClient -> m ()
receive h c@AgentClient {rcvQ, subQ} = forever $ do
(corrId, connId, cmdOrErr) <- tGet SClient h
case cmdOrErr of
Right cmd -> write rcvQ (corrId, cAlias, cmd)
Left e -> write sndQ (corrId, cAlias, ERR e)
Right cmd -> write rcvQ (corrId, connId, cmd)
Left e -> write subQ (corrId, connId, ERR e)
where
write :: TBQueue (ATransmission p) -> ATransmission p -> m ()
write q t = do
logClient c "-->" t
atomically $ writeTBQueue q t
send :: MonadUnliftIO m => Handle -> AgentClient -> m ()
send h c@AgentClient {sndQ} = forever $ do
t <- atomically $ readTBQueue sndQ
send :: (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m) => c -> AgentClient -> m ()
send h c@AgentClient {subQ} = forever $ do
t <- atomically $ readTBQueue subQ
tPut h t
logClient c "<--" t
logClient :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> ByteString -> ATransmission a -> m ()
logClient AgentClient {clientId} dir (CorrId corrId, cAlias, cmd) = do
logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ B.unwords [bshow clientId, dir, "A :", corrId, cAlias, B.takeWhile (/= ' ') $ serializeCommand cmd]
logClient AgentClient {clientId} dir (corrId, connId, cmd) = do
logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ B.unwords [bshow clientId, dir, "A :", corrId, connId, B.takeWhile (/= ' ') $ serializeCommand cmd]
client :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => AgentClient -> SQLiteStore -> m ()
client c@AgentClient {rcvQ, sndQ} st = forever $ do
t@(corrId, cAlias, _) <- atomically $ readTBQueue rcvQ
runExceptT (processCommand c st t) >>= \case
Left e -> atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ (corrId, cAlias, ERR e)
Right _ -> return ()
client :: forall m. (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => AgentClient -> m ()
client c@AgentClient {rcvQ, subQ} = forever $ do
(corrId, connId, cmd) <- atomically $ readTBQueue rcvQ
withAgentLock c (runExceptT $ processCommand c (connId, cmd))
>>= atomically . writeTBQueue subQ . \case
Left e -> (corrId, connId, ERR e)
Right (connId', resp) -> (corrId, connId', resp)
withStore ::
AgentMonad m =>
(forall m'. (MonadUnliftIO m', MonadError StoreError m') => m' a) ->
(forall m'. (MonadUnliftIO m', MonadError StoreError m') => SQLiteStore -> m' a) ->
m a
withStore action = do
runExceptT (action `E.catch` handleInternal) >>= \case
st <- asks store
runExceptT (action st `E.catch` handleInternal) >>= \case
Right c -> return c
Left e -> throwError $ storeError e
where
-- TODO when parsing exception happens in store, the agent hangs;
-- changing SQLError to SomeException does not help
handleInternal :: (MonadError StoreError m') => SQLError -> m' a
handleInternal e = throwError . SEInternal $ bshow e
storeError :: StoreError -> AgentErrorType
storeError = \case
SEConnNotFound -> CONN UNKNOWN
SEConnNotFound -> CONN NOT_FOUND
SEConnDuplicate -> CONN DUPLICATE
SEBadConnType CRcv -> CONN SIMPLEX
SEBadConnType CSnd -> CONN SIMPLEX
SEInvitationNotFound -> CMD PROHIBITED
e -> INTERNAL $ show e
processCommand :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SQLiteStore -> ATransmission 'Client -> m ()
processCommand c@AgentClient {sndQ} st (corrId, connAlias, cmd) =
case cmd of
NEW smpServer -> createNewConnection smpServer
JOIN smpQueueInfo replyMode -> joinConnection smpQueueInfo replyMode
SUB -> subscribeConnection connAlias
SUBALL -> subscribeAll
SEND msgBody -> sendMessage msgBody
OFF -> suspendConnection
DEL -> deleteConnection
-- | execute any SMP agent command
processCommand :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> (ConnId, ACommand 'Client) -> m (ConnId, ACommand 'Agent)
processCommand c (connId, cmd) = case cmd of
NEW (ACM cMode) -> second (INV . ACR cMode) <$> newConn c connId cMode
JOIN (ACR _ cReq) connInfo -> (,OK) <$> joinConn c connId cReq connInfo
LET confId ownCInfo -> allowConnection' c connId confId ownCInfo $> (connId, OK)
ACPT invId ownCInfo -> (,OK) <$> acceptContact' c connId invId ownCInfo
RJCT invId -> rejectContact' c connId invId $> (connId, OK)
SUB -> subscribeConnection' c connId $> (connId, OK)
SEND msgBody -> (connId,) . MID <$> sendMessage' c connId msgBody
ACK msgId -> ackMessage' c connId msgId $> (connId, OK)
OFF -> suspendConnection' c connId $> (connId, OK)
DEL -> deleteConnection' c connId $> (connId, OK)
newConn :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> SConnectionMode c -> m (ConnId, ConnectionRequest c)
newConn c connId cMode = do
srv <- getSMPServer
(rq, qUri, encryptKey) <- newRcvQueue c srv
g <- asks idsDrg
let cData = ConnData {connId}
connId' <- withStore $ \st -> createRcvConn st g cData rq cMode
addSubscription c rq connId'
let crData = ConnReqData simplexChat [qUri] encryptKey
pure . (connId',) $ case cMode of
SCMInvitation -> CRInvitation crData
SCMContact -> CRContact crData
joinConn :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> ConnectionRequest c -> ConnInfo -> m ConnId
joinConn c connId (CRInvitation (ConnReqData _ (qUri :| _) encryptKey)) cInfo = do
(sq, senderKey, verifyKey) <- newSndQueue qUri encryptKey
g <- asks idsDrg
cfg <- asks config
let cData = ConnData {connId}
connId' <- withStore $ \st -> createSndConn st g cData sq
confirmQueue c sq senderKey cInfo
activateQueueJoining c connId' sq verifyKey $ retryInterval cfg
pure connId'
joinConn c connId (CRContact (ConnReqData _ (qUri :| _) encryptKey)) cInfo = do
(connId', cReq) <- newConn c connId SCMInvitation
sendInvitation c qUri encryptKey cReq cInfo
pure connId'
activateQueueJoining :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> SndQueue -> VerificationKey -> RetryInterval -> m ()
activateQueueJoining c connId sq verifyKey retryInterval =
activateQueue c connId sq verifyKey retryInterval createReplyQueue
where
createNewConnection :: SMPServer -> m ()
createNewConnection server = do
-- TODO create connection alias if not passed
-- make connAlias Maybe?
(rq, qInfo) <- newReceiveQueue c server connAlias
withStore $ createRcvConn st rq
respond $ INV qInfo
createReplyQueue :: m ()
createReplyQueue = do
srv <- getSMPServer
(rq, qUri', encryptKey) <- newRcvQueue c srv
addSubscription c rq connId
withStore $ \st -> upgradeSndConnToDuplex st connId rq
sendControlMessage c sq . REPLY $ CRInvitation $ ConnReqData CRSSimplex [qUri'] encryptKey
joinConnection :: SMPQueueInfo -> ReplyMode -> m ()
joinConnection qInfo@(SMPQueueInfo srv _ _) replyMode = do
-- TODO create connection alias if not passed
-- make connAlias Maybe?
(sq, senderKey, verifyKey) <- newSendQueue qInfo connAlias
withStore $ createSndConn st sq
connectToSendQueue c st sq senderKey verifyKey
case replyMode of
ReplyOn -> sendReplyQInfo srv sq
ReplyVia srv' -> sendReplyQInfo srv' sq
ReplyOff -> return ()
respond CON
-- | Approve confirmation (LET command) in Reader monad
allowConnection' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> m ()
allowConnection' c connId confId ownConnInfo = do
withStore (`getConn` connId) >>= \case
SomeConn _ (RcvConnection _ rq) -> do
AcceptedConfirmation {senderKey} <- withStore $ \st -> acceptConfirmation st confId ownConnInfo
processConfirmation c rq senderKey
_ -> throwError $ CMD PROHIBITED
subscribeConnection :: ConnAlias -> m ()
subscribeConnection cAlias =
withStore (getConn st cAlias) >>= \case
SomeConn _ (DuplexConnection _ rq _) -> subscribe rq
SomeConn _ (RcvConnection _ rq) -> subscribe rq
_ -> throwError $ CONN SIMPLEX
-- | Accept contact (ACPT command) in Reader monad
acceptContact' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> InvitationId -> ConnInfo -> m ConnId
acceptContact' c connId invId ownConnInfo = do
Invitation {contactConnId, connReq} <- withStore (`getInvitation` invId)
withStore (`getConn` contactConnId) >>= \case
SomeConn _ ContactConnection {} -> do
withStore $ \st -> acceptInvitation st invId ownConnInfo
joinConn c connId connReq ownConnInfo
_ -> throwError $ CMD PROHIBITED
-- | Reject contact (RJCT command) in Reader monad
rejectContact' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> InvitationId -> m ()
rejectContact' _ contactConnId invId =
withStore $ \st -> deleteInvitation st contactConnId invId
processConfirmation :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> RcvQueue -> SenderPublicKey -> m ()
processConfirmation c rq sndKey = do
withStore $ \st -> setRcvQueueStatus st rq Confirmed
secureQueue c rq sndKey
withStore $ \st -> setRcvQueueStatus st rq Secured
-- | Subscribe to receive connection messages (SUB command) in Reader monad
subscribeConnection' :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> m ()
subscribeConnection' c connId =
withStore (`getConn` connId) >>= \case
SomeConn _ (DuplexConnection _ rq sq) -> do
resumeMsgDelivery c connId sq
case status (sq :: SndQueue) of
Confirmed -> withVerifyKey sq $ \verifyKey -> do
conf <- withStore (`getAcceptedConfirmation` connId)
secureQueue c rq $ senderKey (conf :: AcceptedConfirmation)
withStore $ \st -> setRcvQueueStatus st rq Secured
activateSecuredQueue rq sq verifyKey
Secured -> withVerifyKey sq $ activateSecuredQueue rq sq
Active -> subscribeQueue c rq connId
_ -> throwError $ INTERNAL "unexpected queue status"
SomeConn _ (SndConnection _ sq) -> do
resumeMsgDelivery c connId sq
case status (sq :: SndQueue) of
Confirmed -> withVerifyKey sq $ \verifyKey ->
activateQueueJoining c connId sq verifyKey =<< resumeInterval
Active -> throwError $ CONN SIMPLEX
_ -> throwError $ INTERNAL "unexpected queue status"
SomeConn _ (RcvConnection _ rq) -> subscribeQueue c rq connId
SomeConn _ (ContactConnection _ rq) -> subscribeQueue c rq connId
where
withVerifyKey :: SndQueue -> (C.PublicKey -> m ()) -> m ()
withVerifyKey sq action =
let err = throwError $ INTERNAL "missing signing key public counterpart"
in maybe err action . C.publicKey $ signKey sq
activateSecuredQueue :: RcvQueue -> SndQueue -> C.PublicKey -> m ()
activateSecuredQueue rq sq verifyKey = do
activateQueueInitiating c connId sq verifyKey =<< resumeInterval
subscribeQueue c rq connId
resumeInterval :: m RetryInterval
resumeInterval = do
r <- asks $ retryInterval . config
pure r {initialInterval = 5_000_000}
-- | Send message to the connection (SEND command) in Reader monad
sendMessage' :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> MsgBody -> m AgentMsgId
sendMessage' c connId msg =
withStore (`getConn` connId) >>= \case
SomeConn _ (DuplexConnection _ _ sq) -> enqueueMessage sq
SomeConn _ (SndConnection _ sq) -> enqueueMessage sq
_ -> throwError $ CONN SIMPLEX
where
enqueueMessage :: SndQueue -> m AgentMsgId
enqueueMessage sq = do
resumeMsgDelivery c connId sq
msgId <- storeSentMsg
queuePendingMsgs c connId sq [msgId]
pure $ unId msgId
where
subscribe rq = subscribeQueue c rq cAlias >> respond' cAlias OK
-- TODO remove - hack for subscribing to all; respond' and parameterization of subscribeConnection are byproduct
subscribeAll :: m ()
subscribeAll = withStore (getAllConnAliases st) >>= mapM_ subscribeConnection
sendMessage :: MsgBody -> m ()
sendMessage msgBody =
withStore (getConn st connAlias) >>= \case
SomeConn _ (DuplexConnection _ _ sq) -> sendMsg sq
SomeConn _ (SndConnection _ sq) -> sendMsg sq
_ -> throwError $ CONN SIMPLEX
where
sendMsg sq = do
storeSentMsg :: m InternalId
storeSentMsg = do
internalTs <- liftIO getCurrentTime
(internalId, internalSndId, previousMsgHash) <- withStore $ updateSndIds st sq
let msgStr =
serializeSMPMessage
SMPMessage
{ senderMsgId = unSndId internalSndId,
senderTimestamp = internalTs,
previousMsgHash,
agentMessage = A_MSG msgBody
}
msgHash = C.sha256Hash msgStr
withStore $
createSndMsg st sq $
SndMsgData {internalId, internalSndId, internalTs, msgBody, internalHash = msgHash}
sendAgentMessage c sq msgStr
respond $ SENT (unId internalId)
withStore $ \st -> do
(internalId, internalSndId, previousMsgHash) <- updateSndIds st connId
let msgBody =
serializeSMPMessage
SMPMessage
{ senderMsgId = unSndId internalSndId,
senderTimestamp = internalTs,
previousMsgHash,
agentMessage = A_MSG msg
}
internalHash = C.sha256Hash msgBody
msgData = SndMsgData {..}
createSndMsg st connId msgData
pure internalId
suspendConnection :: m ()
suspendConnection =
withStore (getConn st connAlias) >>= \case
SomeConn _ (DuplexConnection _ rq _) -> suspend rq
SomeConn _ (RcvConnection _ rq) -> suspend rq
_ -> throwError $ CONN SIMPLEX
where
suspend rq = suspendQueue c rq >> respond OK
resumeMsgDelivery :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> SndQueue -> m ()
resumeMsgDelivery c connId sq@SndQueue {server, sndId} = do
let qKey = (connId, server, sndId)
unlessM (queueDelivering qKey) $
async (runSmpQueueMsgDelivery c connId sq)
>>= atomically . modifyTVar (smpQueueMsgDeliveries c) . M.insert qKey
unlessM connQueued $
withStore (`getPendingMsgs` connId)
>>= queuePendingMsgs c connId sq
where
queueDelivering qKey = isJust . M.lookup qKey <$> readTVarIO (smpQueueMsgDeliveries c)
connQueued =
atomically $
isJust
<$> stateTVar
(connMsgsQueued c)
(\m -> (M.lookup connId m, M.insert connId True m))
deleteConnection :: m ()
deleteConnection =
withStore (getConn st connAlias) >>= \case
SomeConn _ (DuplexConnection _ rq _) -> delete rq
SomeConn _ (RcvConnection _ rq) -> delete rq
_ -> delConn
where
delConn = withStore (deleteConn st connAlias) >> respond OK
delete rq = do
deleteQueue c rq
removeSubscription c connAlias
delConn
queuePendingMsgs :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> SndQueue -> [InternalId] -> m ()
queuePendingMsgs c connId sq msgIds = atomically $ do
q <- getPendingMsgQ c connId sq
mapM_ (writeTQueue q) msgIds
sendReplyQInfo :: SMPServer -> SndQueue -> m ()
sendReplyQInfo srv sq = do
(rq, qInfo) <- newReceiveQueue c srv connAlias
withStore $ upgradeSndConnToDuplex st connAlias rq
senderTimestamp <- liftIO getCurrentTime
sendAgentMessage c sq . serializeSMPMessage $
SMPMessage
{ senderMsgId = 0,
senderTimestamp,
previousMsgHash = "",
agentMessage = REPLY qInfo
}
getPendingMsgQ :: AgentClient -> ConnId -> SndQueue -> STM (TQueue InternalId)
getPendingMsgQ c connId SndQueue {server, sndId} = do
let qKey = (connId, server, sndId)
maybe (newMsgQueue qKey) pure . M.lookup qKey =<< readTVar (smpQueueMsgQueues c)
where
newMsgQueue qKey = do
mq <- newTQueue
modifyTVar (smpQueueMsgQueues c) $ M.insert qKey mq
pure mq
respond :: ACommand 'Agent -> m ()
respond = respond' connAlias
runSmpQueueMsgDelivery :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> SndQueue -> m ()
runSmpQueueMsgDelivery c@AgentClient {subQ} connId sq = do
mq <- atomically $ getPendingMsgQ c connId sq
ri <- asks $ reconnectInterval . config
forever $ do
msgId <- atomically $ readTQueue mq
let mId = unId msgId
withStore (\st -> E.try $ getPendingMsgData st connId msgId) >>= \case
Left (e :: E.SomeException) ->
notify $ MERR mId (INTERNAL $ show e)
Right msgBody -> do
withRetryInterval ri $ \loop -> do
tryError (sendAgentMessage c sq msgBody) >>= \case
Left e -> case e of
SMP SMP.QUOTA -> loop
SMP {} -> notify $ MERR mId e
CMD {} -> notify $ MERR mId e
_ -> loop
Right () -> do
notify $ SENT mId
withStore $ \st -> updateSndMsgStatus st connId msgId SndMsgSent
where
notify :: ACommand 'Agent -> m ()
notify cmd = atomically $ writeTBQueue subQ ("", connId, cmd)
respond' :: ConnAlias -> ACommand 'Agent -> m ()
respond' cAlias resp = atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ (corrId, cAlias, resp)
ackMessage' :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> AgentMsgId -> m ()
ackMessage' c connId msgId = do
withStore (`getConn` connId) >>= \case
SomeConn _ (DuplexConnection _ rq _) -> ack rq
SomeConn _ (RcvConnection _ rq) -> ack rq
_ -> throwError $ CONN SIMPLEX
where
ack :: RcvQueue -> m ()
ack rq = do
let mId = InternalId msgId
withStore $ \st -> checkRcvMsg st connId mId
sendAck c rq
withStore $ \st -> updateRcvMsgAck st connId mId
subscriber :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => AgentClient -> SQLiteStore -> m ()
subscriber c@AgentClient {msgQ} st = forever $ do
-- TODO this will only process messages and notifications
-- | Suspend SMP agent connection (OFF command) in Reader monad
suspendConnection' :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> m ()
suspendConnection' c connId =
withStore (`getConn` connId) >>= \case
SomeConn _ (DuplexConnection _ rq _) -> suspendQueue c rq
SomeConn _ (RcvConnection _ rq) -> suspendQueue c rq
_ -> throwError $ CONN SIMPLEX
-- | Delete SMP agent connection (DEL command) in Reader monad
deleteConnection' :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> m ()
deleteConnection' c connId =
withStore (`getConn` connId) >>= \case
SomeConn _ (DuplexConnection _ rq _) -> delete rq
SomeConn _ (RcvConnection _ rq) -> delete rq
SomeConn _ (ContactConnection _ rq) -> delete rq
SomeConn _ (SndConnection _ _) -> withStore (`deleteConn` connId)
where
delete :: RcvQueue -> m ()
delete rq = do
deleteQueue c rq
removeSubscription c connId
withStore (`deleteConn` connId)
getSMPServer :: AgentMonad m => m SMPServer
getSMPServer =
asks (smpServers . config) >>= \case
srv :| [] -> pure srv
servers -> do
gen <- asks randomServer
i <- atomically . stateTVar gen $ randomR (0, L.length servers - 1)
pure $ servers L.!! i
sendControlMessage :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SndQueue -> AMessage -> m ()
sendControlMessage c sq agentMessage = do
senderTimestamp <- liftIO getCurrentTime
sendAgentMessage c sq . serializeSMPMessage $
SMPMessage
{ senderMsgId = 0,
senderTimestamp,
previousMsgHash = "",
agentMessage
}
subscriber :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => AgentClient -> m ()
subscriber c@AgentClient {msgQ} = forever $ do
t <- atomically $ readTBQueue msgQ
runExceptT (processSMPTransmission c st t) >>= \case
withAgentLock c (runExceptT $ processSMPTransmission c t) >>= \case
Left e -> liftIO $ print e
Right _ -> return ()
processSMPTransmission :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SQLiteStore -> SMPServerTransmission -> m ()
processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {sndQ} st (srv, rId, cmd) = do
rq@RcvQueue {connAlias, status} <- withStore $ getRcvQueue st srv rId
case cmd of
SMP.MSG srvMsgId srvTs msgBody -> do
-- TODO deduplicate with previously received
msg <- decryptAndVerify rq msgBody
let msgHash = C.sha256Hash msg
agentMsg <- liftEither $ parseSMPMessage msg
case agentMsg of
SMPConfirmation senderKey -> do
processSMPTransmission :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SMPServerTransmission -> m ()
processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {subQ} (srv, rId, cmd) = do
withStore (\st -> getRcvConn st srv rId) >>= \case
SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection cData rq _) -> processSMP SCDuplex cData rq
SomeConn SCRcv (RcvConnection cData rq) -> processSMP SCRcv cData rq
SomeConn SCContact (ContactConnection cData rq) -> processSMP SCContact cData rq
_ -> atomically $ writeTBQueue subQ ("", "", ERR $ CONN NOT_FOUND)
where
processSMP :: SConnType c -> ConnData -> RcvQueue -> m ()
processSMP cType ConnData {connId} rq@RcvQueue {status} =
case cmd of
SMP.MSG srvMsgId srvTs msgBody -> do
-- TODO deduplicate with previously received
msg <- decryptAndVerify rq msgBody
let msgHash = C.sha256Hash msg
case parseSMPMessage msg of
Left e -> notify (ERR e) >> sendAck c rq
Right (SMPConfirmation senderKey cInfo) -> smpConfirmation senderKey cInfo >> sendAck c rq
Right SMPMessage {agentMessage, senderMsgId, senderTimestamp, previousMsgHash} ->
case agentMessage of
HELLO verifyKey _ -> helloMsg verifyKey msgBody >> sendAck c rq
REPLY cReq -> replyMsg cReq >> sendAck c rq
A_MSG body -> agentClientMsg previousMsgHash (senderMsgId, senderTimestamp) (srvMsgId, srvTs) body msgHash
A_INV cReq cInfo -> smpInvitation cReq cInfo >> sendAck c rq
SMP.END -> do
removeSubscription c connId
logServer "<--" c srv rId "END"
notify END
_ -> do
logServer "<--" c srv rId $ "unexpected: " <> bshow cmd
notify . ERR $ BROKER UNEXPECTED
where
notify :: ACommand 'Agent -> m ()
notify msg = atomically $ writeTBQueue subQ ("", connId, msg)
prohibited :: m ()
prohibited = notify . ERR $ AGENT A_PROHIBITED
smpConfirmation :: SenderPublicKey -> ConnInfo -> m ()
smpConfirmation senderKey cInfo = do
logServer "<--" c srv rId "MSG <KEY>"
case status of
New -> do
-- TODO currently it automatically allows whoever sends the confirmation
-- Commands CONF and LET are not supported in v0.2
withStore $ setRcvQueueStatus st rq Confirmed
-- TODO update sender key in the store?
secureQueue c rq senderKey
withStore $ setRcvQueueStatus st rq Secured
_ -> notify connAlias . ERR $ AGENT A_PROHIBITED
SMPMessage {agentMessage, senderMsgId, senderTimestamp, previousMsgHash} ->
case agentMessage of
HELLO verifyKey _ -> do
logServer "<--" c srv rId "MSG <HELLO>"
case status of
Active -> notify connAlias . ERR $ AGENT A_PROHIBITED
_ -> do
void $ verifyMessage (Just verifyKey) msgBody
withStore $ setRcvQueueActive st rq verifyKey
REPLY qInfo -> do
logServer "<--" c srv rId "MSG <REPLY>"
(sq, senderKey, verifyKey) <- newSendQueue qInfo connAlias
withStore $ upgradeRcvConnToDuplex st connAlias sq
connectToSendQueue c st sq senderKey verifyKey
notify connAlias CON
A_MSG body -> agentClientMsg rq previousMsgHash (senderMsgId, senderTimestamp) (srvMsgId, srvTs) body msgHash
sendAck c rq
return ()
SMP.END -> do
removeSubscription c connAlias
logServer "<--" c srv rId "END"
notify connAlias END
_ -> do
logServer "<--" c srv rId $ "unexpected: " <> bshow cmd
notify connAlias . ERR $ BROKER UNEXPECTED
where
notify :: ConnAlias -> ACommand 'Agent -> m ()
notify connAlias msg = atomically $ writeTBQueue sndQ ("", connAlias, msg)
agentClientMsg :: RcvQueue -> PrevRcvMsgHash -> (ExternalSndId, ExternalSndTs) -> (BrokerId, BrokerTs) -> MsgBody -> MsgHash -> m ()
agentClientMsg rq@RcvQueue {connAlias, status} receivedPrevMsgHash senderMeta brokerMeta msgBody msgHash = do
logServer "<--" c srv rId "MSG <MSG>"
case status of
Active -> do
New -> case cType of
SCRcv -> do
g <- asks idsDrg
let newConfirmation = NewConfirmation {connId, senderKey, senderConnInfo = cInfo}
confId <- withStore $ \st -> createConfirmation st g newConfirmation
notify $ CONF confId cInfo
SCDuplex -> do
notify $ INFO cInfo
processConfirmation c rq senderKey
_ -> prohibited
_ -> prohibited
helloMsg :: SenderPublicKey -> ByteString -> m ()
helloMsg verifyKey msgBody = do
logServer "<--" c srv rId "MSG <HELLO>"
case status of
Active -> prohibited
_ -> do
void $ verifyMessage (Just verifyKey) msgBody
withStore $ \st -> setRcvQueueActive st rq verifyKey
case cType of
SCDuplex -> notifyConnected c connId
_ -> pure ()
replyMsg :: ConnectionRequest 'CMInvitation -> m ()
replyMsg (CRInvitation (ConnReqData _ (qUri :| _) encryptKey)) = do
logServer "<--" c srv rId "MSG <REPLY>"
case cType of
SCRcv -> do
AcceptedConfirmation {ownConnInfo} <- withStore (`getAcceptedConfirmation` connId)
(sq, senderKey, verifyKey) <- newSndQueue qUri encryptKey
withStore $ \st -> upgradeRcvConnToDuplex st connId sq
confirmQueue c sq senderKey ownConnInfo
withStore (`removeConfirmations` connId)
cfg <- asks config
activateQueueInitiating c connId sq verifyKey $ retryInterval cfg
_ -> prohibited
agentClientMsg :: PrevRcvMsgHash -> (ExternalSndId, ExternalSndTs) -> (BrokerId, BrokerTs) -> MsgBody -> MsgHash -> m ()
agentClientMsg externalPrevSndHash sender broker msgBody internalHash = do
logServer "<--" c srv rId "MSG <MSG>"
internalTs <- liftIO getCurrentTime
(internalId, internalRcvId, prevExtSndId, prevRcvMsgHash) <- withStore $ updateRcvIds st rq
let msgIntegrity = checkMsgIntegrity prevExtSndId (fst senderMeta) prevRcvMsgHash
withStore $
createRcvMsg st rq $
RcvMsgData
{ internalId,
internalRcvId,
internalTs,
senderMeta,
brokerMeta,
msgBody,
internalHash = msgHash,
externalPrevSndHash = receivedPrevMsgHash,
msgIntegrity
}
notify connAlias $
MSG
{ recipientMeta = (unId internalId, internalTs),
senderMeta,
brokerMeta,
msgBody,
msgIntegrity
}
_ -> notify connAlias . ERR $ AGENT A_PROHIBITED
where
checkMsgIntegrity :: PrevExternalSndId -> ExternalSndId -> PrevRcvMsgHash -> MsgIntegrity
checkMsgIntegrity prevExtSndId extSndId internalPrevMsgHash
(internalId, internalRcvId, prevExtSndId, prevRcvMsgHash) <- withStore (`updateRcvIds` connId)
let integrity = checkMsgIntegrity prevExtSndId (fst sender) prevRcvMsgHash externalPrevSndHash
recipient = (unId internalId, internalTs)
msgMeta = MsgMeta {integrity, recipient, sender, broker}
rcvMsg = RcvMsgData {..}
withStore $ \st -> createRcvMsg st connId rcvMsg
notify $ MSG msgMeta msgBody
smpInvitation :: ConnectionRequest 'CMInvitation -> ConnInfo -> m ()
smpInvitation connReq cInfo = do
logServer "<--" c srv rId "MSG <KEY>"
case cType of
SCContact -> do
g <- asks idsDrg
let newInv = NewInvitation {contactConnId = connId, connReq, recipientConnInfo = cInfo}
invId <- withStore $ \st -> createInvitation st g newInv
notify $ REQ invId cInfo
_ -> prohibited
checkMsgIntegrity :: PrevExternalSndId -> ExternalSndId -> PrevRcvMsgHash -> ByteString -> MsgIntegrity
checkMsgIntegrity prevExtSndId extSndId internalPrevMsgHash receivedPrevMsgHash
| extSndId == prevExtSndId + 1 && internalPrevMsgHash == receivedPrevMsgHash = MsgOk
| extSndId < prevExtSndId = MsgError $ MsgBadId extSndId
| extSndId == prevExtSndId = MsgError MsgDuplicate -- ? deduplicate
@@ -332,16 +633,39 @@ processSMPTransmission c@AgentClient {sndQ} st (srv, rId, cmd) = do
| internalPrevMsgHash /= receivedPrevMsgHash = MsgError MsgBadHash
| otherwise = MsgError MsgDuplicate -- this case is not possible
connectToSendQueue :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SQLiteStore -> SndQueue -> SenderPublicKey -> VerificationKey -> m ()
connectToSendQueue c st sq senderKey verifyKey = do
sendConfirmation c sq senderKey
withStore $ setSndQueueStatus st sq Confirmed
sendHello c sq verifyKey
withStore $ setSndQueueStatus st sq Active
confirmQueue :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SndQueue -> SenderPublicKey -> ConnInfo -> m ()
confirmQueue c sq senderKey cInfo = do
sendConfirmation c sq senderKey cInfo
withStore $ \st -> setSndQueueStatus st sq Confirmed
newSendQueue ::
(MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => SMPQueueInfo -> ConnAlias -> m (SndQueue, SenderPublicKey, VerificationKey)
newSendQueue (SMPQueueInfo smpServer senderId encryptKey) connAlias = do
activateQueueInitiating :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> SndQueue -> VerificationKey -> RetryInterval -> m ()
activateQueueInitiating c connId sq verifyKey retryInterval =
activateQueue c connId sq verifyKey retryInterval $ notifyConnected c connId
activateQueue :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> SndQueue -> VerificationKey -> RetryInterval -> m () -> m ()
activateQueue c connId sq verifyKey retryInterval afterActivation =
getActivation c connId >>= \case
Nothing -> async runActivation >>= addActivation c connId
Just _ -> pure ()
where
runActivation :: m ()
runActivation = do
sendHello c sq verifyKey retryInterval
withStore $ \st -> setSndQueueStatus st sq Active
removeActivation c connId
removeVerificationKey
afterActivation
removeVerificationKey :: m ()
removeVerificationKey =
let safeSignKey = C.removePublicKey $ signKey sq
in withStore $ \st -> updateSignKey st sq safeSignKey
notifyConnected :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> m ()
notifyConnected c connId = atomically $ writeTBQueue (subQ c) ("", connId, CON)
newSndQueue ::
(MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => SMPQueueUri -> EncryptionKey -> m (SndQueue, SenderPublicKey, VerificationKey)
newSndQueue (SMPQueueUri smpServer senderId _) encryptKey = do
size <- asks $ rsaKeySize . config
(senderKey, sndPrivateKey) <- liftIO $ C.generateKeyPair size
(verifyKey, signKey) <- liftIO $ C.generateKeyPair size
@@ -349,7 +673,6 @@ newSendQueue (SMPQueueInfo smpServer senderId encryptKey) connAlias = do
SndQueue
{ server = smpServer,
sndId = senderId,
connAlias,
sndPrivateKey,
encryptKey,
signKey,
+158 -64
View File
@@ -11,11 +11,14 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client
( AgentClient (..),
newAgentClient,
AgentMonad,
getSMPServerClient,
closeSMPServerClients,
newReceiveQueue,
withAgentLock,
closeAgentClient,
newRcvQueue,
subscribeQueue,
addSubscription,
sendConfirmation,
sendInvitation,
RetryInterval (..),
sendHello,
secureQueue,
sendAgentMessage,
@@ -27,9 +30,14 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Client
logServer,
removeSubscription,
cryptoError,
addActivation,
getActivation,
removeActivation,
)
where
import Control.Concurrent.Async (Async, async, uninterruptibleCancel)
import Control.Concurrent.STM (stateTVar)
import Control.Logger.Simple
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
@@ -40,44 +48,62 @@ import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Map.Strict (Map)
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Data.Maybe (isNothing)
import Data.Set (Set)
import qualified Data.Set as S
import Data.Text.Encoding
import Data.Time.Clock
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.ExceptT ()
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Transmission
import Simplex.Messaging.Client
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ErrorType (AUTH), MsgBody, QueueId, SenderPublicKey)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, liftEitherError, liftError)
import UnliftIO.Concurrent
import UnliftIO.Exception (IOException)
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
import UnliftIO.STM
data AgentClient = AgentClient
{ rcvQ :: TBQueue (ATransmission 'Client),
sndQ :: TBQueue (ATransmission 'Agent),
subQ :: TBQueue (ATransmission 'Agent),
msgQ :: TBQueue SMPServerTransmission,
smpClients :: TVar (Map SMPServer SMPClient),
subscrSrvrs :: TVar (Map SMPServer (Set ConnAlias)),
subscrConns :: TVar (Map ConnAlias SMPServer),
clientId :: Int
subscrSrvrs :: TVar (Map SMPServer (Map ConnId RcvQueue)),
subscrConns :: TVar (Map ConnId SMPServer),
activations :: TVar (Map ConnId (Async ())), -- activations of send queues in progress
connMsgsQueued :: TVar (Map ConnId Bool),
smpQueueMsgQueues :: TVar (Map (ConnId, SMPServer, SMP.SenderId) (TQueue InternalId)),
smpQueueMsgDeliveries :: TVar (Map (ConnId, SMPServer, SMP.SenderId) (Async ())),
reconnections :: TVar [Async ()],
clientId :: Int,
agentEnv :: Env,
smpSubscriber :: Async (),
lock :: TMVar ()
}
newAgentClient :: TVar Int -> AgentConfig -> STM AgentClient
newAgentClient cc AgentConfig {tbqSize} = do
rcvQ <- newTBQueue tbqSize
sndQ <- newTBQueue tbqSize
msgQ <- newTBQueue tbqSize
newAgentClient :: Env -> STM AgentClient
newAgentClient agentEnv = do
let qSize = tbqSize $ config agentEnv
rcvQ <- newTBQueue qSize
subQ <- newTBQueue qSize
msgQ <- newTBQueue qSize
smpClients <- newTVar M.empty
subscrSrvrs <- newTVar M.empty
subscrConns <- newTVar M.empty
clientId <- (+ 1) <$> readTVar cc
writeTVar cc clientId
return AgentClient {rcvQ, sndQ, msgQ, smpClients, subscrSrvrs, subscrConns, clientId}
activations <- newTVar M.empty
connMsgsQueued <- newTVar M.empty
smpQueueMsgQueues <- newTVar M.empty
smpQueueMsgDeliveries <- newTVar M.empty
reconnections <- newTVar []
clientId <- stateTVar (clientCounter agentEnv) $ \i -> (i + 1, i + 1)
lock <- newTMVar ()
return AgentClient {rcvQ, subQ, msgQ, smpClients, subscrSrvrs, subscrConns, activations, connMsgsQueued, smpQueueMsgQueues, smpQueueMsgDeliveries, reconnections, clientId, agentEnv, smpSubscriber = undefined, lock}
-- | Agent monad with MonadReader Env and MonadError AgentErrorType
type AgentMonad m = (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m, MonadError AgentErrorType m)
getSMPServerClient :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SMPServer -> m SMPClient
@@ -95,33 +121,75 @@ getSMPServerClient c@AgentClient {smpClients, msgQ} srv =
connectClient :: m SMPClient
connectClient = do
cfg <- asks $ smpCfg . config
liftEitherError smpClientError (getSMPClient srv cfg msgQ clientDisconnected)
u <- askUnliftIO
liftEitherError smpClientError (getSMPClient srv cfg msgQ $ clientDisconnected u)
`E.catch` internalError
where
internalError :: IOException -> m SMPClient
internalError = throwError . INTERNAL . show
clientDisconnected :: IO ()
clientDisconnected = do
removeSubs >>= mapM_ (mapM_ notifySub)
clientDisconnected :: UnliftIO m -> IO ()
clientDisconnected u = do
removeClientSubs >>= (`forM_` serverDown u)
logInfo . decodeUtf8 $ "Agent disconnected from " <> showServer srv
removeSubs :: IO (Maybe (Set ConnAlias))
removeSubs = atomically $ do
removeClientSubs :: IO (Maybe (Map ConnId RcvQueue))
removeClientSubs = atomically $ do
modifyTVar smpClients $ M.delete srv
cs <- M.lookup srv <$> readTVar (subscrSrvrs c)
modifyTVar (subscrSrvrs c) $ M.delete srv
modifyTVar (subscrConns c) $ maybe id deleteKeys cs
modifyTVar (subscrConns c) $ maybe id (deleteKeys . M.keysSet) cs
return cs
where
deleteKeys :: Ord k => Set k -> Map k a -> Map k a
deleteKeys ks m = S.foldr' M.delete m ks
notifySub :: ConnAlias -> IO ()
notifySub connAlias = atomically $ writeTBQueue (sndQ c) ("", connAlias, END)
serverDown :: UnliftIO m -> Map ConnId RcvQueue -> IO ()
serverDown u cs = unless (M.null cs) $ do
mapM_ (notifySub DOWN) $ M.keysSet cs
a <- async . unliftIO u $ tryReconnectClient cs
atomically $ modifyTVar (reconnections c) (a :)
closeSMPServerClients :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> m ()
closeSMPServerClients c = liftIO $ readTVarIO (smpClients c) >>= mapM_ closeSMPClient
tryReconnectClient :: Map ConnId RcvQueue -> m ()
tryReconnectClient cs = do
ri <- asks $ reconnectInterval . config
withRetryInterval ri $ \loop ->
reconnectClient cs `catchError` const loop
reconnectClient :: Map ConnId RcvQueue -> m ()
reconnectClient cs = do
withAgentLock c . withSMP c srv $ \smp -> do
subs <- readTVarIO $ subscrConns c
forM_ (M.toList cs) $ \(connId, rq@RcvQueue {rcvPrivateKey, rcvId}) ->
when (isNothing $ M.lookup connId subs) $ do
subscribeSMPQueue smp rcvPrivateKey rcvId
`catchError` \case
SMPServerError e -> liftIO $ notifySub (ERR $ SMP e) connId
e -> throwError e
addSubscription c rq connId
liftIO $ notifySub UP connId
notifySub :: ACommand 'Agent -> ConnId -> IO ()
notifySub cmd connId = atomically $ writeTBQueue (subQ c) ("", connId, cmd)
closeAgentClient :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> m ()
closeAgentClient c = liftIO $ do
closeSMPServerClients c
cancelActions $ activations c
cancelActions $ reconnections c
cancelActions $ smpQueueMsgDeliveries c
closeSMPServerClients :: AgentClient -> IO ()
closeSMPServerClients c = readTVarIO (smpClients c) >>= mapM_ closeSMPClient
cancelActions :: Foldable f => TVar (f (Async ())) -> IO ()
cancelActions as = readTVarIO as >>= mapM_ uninterruptibleCancel
withAgentLock :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> m a -> m a
withAgentLock AgentClient {lock} =
E.bracket_
(void . atomically $ takeTMVar lock)
(atomically $ putTMVar lock ())
withSMP_ :: forall a m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SMPServer -> (SMPClient -> m a) -> m a
withSMP_ c srv action =
@@ -158,8 +226,8 @@ smpClientError = \case
SMPTransportError e -> BROKER $ TRANSPORT e
e -> INTERNAL $ show e
newReceiveQueue :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SMPServer -> ConnAlias -> m (RcvQueue, SMPQueueInfo)
newReceiveQueue c srv connAlias = do
newRcvQueue :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SMPServer -> m (RcvQueue, SMPQueueUri, EncryptionKey)
newRcvQueue c srv = do
size <- asks $ rsaKeySize . config
(recipientKey, rcvPrivateKey) <- liftIO $ C.generateKeyPair size
logServer "-->" c srv "" "NEW"
@@ -170,44 +238,50 @@ newReceiveQueue c srv connAlias = do
RcvQueue
{ server = srv,
rcvId,
connAlias,
rcvPrivateKey,
sndId = Just sId,
sndKey = Nothing,
decryptKey,
verifyKey = Nothing,
status = New
}
addSubscription c rq connAlias
return (rq, SMPQueueInfo srv sId encryptKey)
pure (rq, SMPQueueUri srv sId reservedServerKey, encryptKey)
subscribeQueue :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> RcvQueue -> ConnAlias -> m ()
subscribeQueue c rq@RcvQueue {server, rcvPrivateKey, rcvId} connAlias = do
subscribeQueue :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> RcvQueue -> ConnId -> m ()
subscribeQueue c rq@RcvQueue {server, rcvPrivateKey, rcvId} connId = do
withLogSMP c server rcvId "SUB" $ \smp ->
subscribeSMPQueue smp rcvPrivateKey rcvId
addSubscription c rq connAlias
addSubscription c rq connId
addSubscription :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> RcvQueue -> ConnAlias -> m ()
addSubscription c RcvQueue {server} connAlias = atomically $ do
modifyTVar (subscrConns c) $ M.insert connAlias server
addSubscription :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> RcvQueue -> ConnId -> m ()
addSubscription c rq@RcvQueue {server} connId = atomically $ do
modifyTVar (subscrConns c) $ M.insert connId server
modifyTVar (subscrSrvrs c) $ M.alter (Just . addSub) server
where
addSub :: Maybe (Set ConnAlias) -> Set ConnAlias
addSub (Just cs) = S.insert connAlias cs
addSub _ = S.singleton connAlias
addSub :: Maybe (Map ConnId RcvQueue) -> Map ConnId RcvQueue
addSub (Just cs) = M.insert connId rq cs
addSub _ = M.singleton connId rq
removeSubscription :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnAlias -> m ()
removeSubscription AgentClient {subscrConns, subscrSrvrs} connAlias = atomically $ do
removeSubscription :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> m ()
removeSubscription AgentClient {subscrConns, subscrSrvrs} connId = atomically $ do
cs <- readTVar subscrConns
writeTVar subscrConns $ M.delete connAlias cs
writeTVar subscrConns $ M.delete connId cs
mapM_
(modifyTVar subscrSrvrs . M.alter (>>= delSub))
(M.lookup connAlias cs)
(M.lookup connId cs)
where
delSub :: Set ConnAlias -> Maybe (Set ConnAlias)
delSub :: Map ConnId RcvQueue -> Maybe (Map ConnId RcvQueue)
delSub cs =
let cs' = S.delete connAlias cs
in if S.null cs' then Nothing else Just cs'
let cs' = M.delete connId cs
in if M.null cs' then Nothing else Just cs'
addActivation :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> Async () -> m ()
addActivation c connId a = atomically . modifyTVar (activations c) $ M.insert connId a
getActivation :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> m (Maybe (Async ()))
getActivation c connId = M.lookup connId <$> readTVarIO (activations c)
removeActivation :: MonadUnliftIO m => AgentClient -> ConnId -> m ()
removeActivation c connId = atomically . modifyTVar (activations c) $ M.delete connId
logServer :: AgentMonad m => ByteString -> AgentClient -> SMPServer -> QueueId -> ByteString -> m ()
logServer dir AgentClient {clientId} srv qId cmdStr =
@@ -219,20 +293,23 @@ showServer srv = B.pack $ host srv <> maybe "" (":" <>) (port srv)
logSecret :: ByteString -> ByteString
logSecret bs = encode $ B.take 3 bs
sendConfirmation :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SndQueue -> SenderPublicKey -> m ()
sendConfirmation c sq@SndQueue {server, sndId} senderKey =
sendConfirmation :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SndQueue -> SenderPublicKey -> ConnInfo -> m ()
sendConfirmation c sq@SndQueue {server, sndId} senderKey cInfo =
withLogSMP_ c server sndId "SEND <KEY>" $ \smp -> do
msg <- mkConfirmation smp
liftSMP $ sendSMPMessage smp Nothing sndId msg
where
mkConfirmation :: SMPClient -> m MsgBody
mkConfirmation smp = encryptAndSign smp sq . serializeSMPMessage $ SMPConfirmation senderKey
mkConfirmation smp = encryptAndSign smp sq . serializeSMPMessage $ SMPConfirmation senderKey cInfo
sendHello :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SndQueue -> VerificationKey -> m ()
sendHello c sq@SndQueue {server, sndId, sndPrivateKey} verifyKey =
sendHello :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SndQueue -> VerificationKey -> RetryInterval -> m ()
sendHello c sq@SndQueue {server, sndId, sndPrivateKey} verifyKey ri =
withLogSMP_ c server sndId "SEND <HELLO> (retrying)" $ \smp -> do
msg <- mkHello smp $ AckMode On
liftSMP $ send 8 100000 msg smp
liftSMP . withRetryInterval ri $ \loop ->
sendSMPMessage smp (Just sndPrivateKey) sndId msg `catchE` \case
SMPServerError AUTH -> loop
e -> throwE e
where
mkHello :: SMPClient -> AckMode -> m ByteString
mkHello smp ackMode = do
@@ -245,14 +322,22 @@ sendHello c sq@SndQueue {server, sndId, sndPrivateKey} verifyKey =
agentMessage = HELLO verifyKey ackMode
}
send :: Int -> Int -> ByteString -> SMPClient -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
send 0 _ _ _ = throwE $ SMPServerError AUTH
send retry delay msg smp =
sendSMPMessage smp (Just sndPrivateKey) sndId msg `catchE` \case
SMPServerError AUTH -> do
threadDelay delay
send (retry - 1) (delay * 3 `div` 2) msg smp
e -> throwE e
sendInvitation :: forall m. AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> SMPQueueUri -> EncryptionKey -> ConnectionRequest 'CMInvitation -> ConnInfo -> m ()
sendInvitation c SMPQueueUri {smpServer, senderId} encryptKey cReq connInfo = do
withLogSMP_ c smpServer senderId "SEND <INV>" $ \smp -> do
msg <- mkInvitation smp
liftSMP $ sendSMPMessage smp Nothing senderId msg
where
mkInvitation :: SMPClient -> m ByteString
mkInvitation smp = do
senderTimestamp <- liftIO getCurrentTime
encryptUnsigned smp encryptKey . serializeSMPMessage $
SMPMessage
{ senderMsgId = 0,
senderTimestamp,
previousMsgHash = "",
agentMessage = A_INV cReq connInfo
}
secureQueue :: AgentMonad m => AgentClient -> RcvQueue -> SenderPublicKey -> m ()
secureQueue c RcvQueue {server, rcvId, rcvPrivateKey} senderKey =
@@ -293,6 +378,15 @@ decryptAndVerify RcvQueue {decryptKey, verifyKey} msg =
verifyMessage verifyKey msg
>>= liftError cryptoError . C.decrypt decryptKey
encryptUnsigned :: AgentMonad m => SMPClient -> EncryptionKey -> ByteString -> m ByteString
encryptUnsigned smp encryptKey msg = do
paddedSize <- asks $ (blockSize smp -) . reservedMsgSize
size <- asks $ rsaKeySize . config
liftError cryptoError $ do
enc <- C.encrypt encryptKey paddedSize msg
let sig = B.replicate size ' '
pure $ sig <> enc
verifyMessage :: AgentMonad m => Maybe VerificationKey -> ByteString -> m ByteString
verifyMessage verifyKey msg = do
size <- asks $ rsaKeySize . config
+48 -7
View File
@@ -1,43 +1,84 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NumericUnderscores #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-unticked-promoted-constructors #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite where
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
import Crypto.Random
import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty)
import Network.Socket
import Numeric.Natural
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol (SMPServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations as Migrations
import Simplex.Messaging.Client
import System.Random (StdGen, newStdGen)
import UnliftIO.STM
data AgentConfig = AgentConfig
{ tcpPort :: ServiceName,
smpServers :: NonEmpty SMPServer,
rsaKeySize :: Int,
connIdBytes :: Int,
tbqSize :: Natural,
dbFile :: FilePath,
smpCfg :: SMPClientConfig
dbPoolSize :: Int,
smpCfg :: SMPClientConfig,
retryInterval :: RetryInterval,
reconnectInterval :: RetryInterval
}
minute :: Int
minute = 60_000_000
defaultAgentConfig :: AgentConfig
defaultAgentConfig =
AgentConfig
{ tcpPort = "5224",
smpServers = undefined,
rsaKeySize = 2048 `div` 8,
connIdBytes = 12,
tbqSize = 16,
dbFile = "smp-agent.db",
dbPoolSize = 4,
smpCfg = smpDefaultConfig,
retryInterval =
RetryInterval
{ initialInterval = 1_000_000,
increaseAfter = minute,
maxInterval = 10 * minute
},
reconnectInterval =
RetryInterval
{ initialInterval = 1_000_000,
increaseAfter = 10_000_000,
maxInterval = 10_000_000
}
}
data Env = Env
{ config :: AgentConfig,
store :: SQLiteStore,
idsDrg :: TVar ChaChaDRG,
clientCounter :: TVar Int,
reservedMsgSize :: Int
reservedMsgSize :: Int,
randomServer :: TVar StdGen
}
newSMPAgentEnv :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => AgentConfig -> m Env
newSMPAgentEnv config = do
idsDrg <- drgNew >>= newTVarIO
_ <- createSQLiteStore $ dbFile config
newSMPAgentEnv cfg = do
idsDrg <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
store <- liftIO $ createSQLiteStore (dbFile cfg) (dbPoolSize cfg) Migrations.app
clientCounter <- newTVarIO 0
return Env {config, idsDrg, clientCounter, reservedMsgSize}
randomServer <- newTVarIO =<< liftIO newStdGen
return Env {config = cfg, store, idsDrg, clientCounter, reservedMsgSize, randomServer}
where
-- 1st rsaKeySize is used by the RSA signature in each command,
-- 2nd - by encrypted message body header
-- 3rd - by message signature
-- smpCommandSize - is the estimated max size for SMP command, queueId, corrId
reservedMsgSize = 3 * rsaKeySize config + smpCommandSize (smpCfg config)
reservedMsgSize = 3 * rsaKeySize cfg + smpCommandSize (smpCfg cfg)
+22
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
{-# LANGUAGE InstanceSigs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-orphans #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.ExceptT where
import Control.Monad.Except
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
import UnliftIO.Exception (Exception)
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
newtype InternalException e = InternalException {unInternalException :: e}
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance Exception e => Exception (InternalException e)
instance (MonadUnliftIO m, Exception e) => MonadUnliftIO (ExceptT e m) where
withRunInIO :: ((forall a. ExceptT e m a -> IO a) -> IO b) -> ExceptT e m b
withRunInIO exceptToIO =
withExceptT unInternalException . ExceptT . E.try $
withRunInIO $ \run ->
exceptToIO $ run . (either (E.throwIO . InternalException) return <=< runExceptT)
+862
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,862 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveGeneric #-}
{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE PolyKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
{-# LANGUAGE UndecidableInstances #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-unticked-promoted-constructors #-}
-- |
-- Module : Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
-- Copyright : (c) simplex.chat
-- License : AGPL-3
--
-- Maintainer : chat@simplex.chat
-- Stability : experimental
-- Portability : non-portable
--
-- Types, parsers, serializers and functions to send and receive SMP agent protocol commands and responses.
--
-- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/agent-protocol.md
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
( -- * SMP agent protocol types
ConnInfo,
ACommand (..),
AParty (..),
SAParty (..),
MsgHash,
MsgMeta (..),
SMPMessage (..),
AMessage (..),
SMPServer (..),
SMPQueueUri (..),
ConnectionMode (..),
SConnectionMode (..),
AConnectionMode (..),
cmInvitation,
cmContact,
ConnectionModeI (..),
ConnectionRequest (..),
AConnectionRequest (..),
ConnReqData (..),
ConnReqScheme (..),
simplexChat,
AgentErrorType (..),
CommandErrorType (..),
ConnectionErrorType (..),
BrokerErrorType (..),
SMPAgentError (..),
ATransmission,
ATransmissionOrError,
ARawTransmission,
ConnId,
ConfirmationId,
InvitationId,
AckMode (..),
OnOff (..),
MsgIntegrity (..),
MsgErrorType (..),
QueueStatus (..),
SignatureKey,
VerificationKey,
EncryptionKey,
DecryptionKey,
ACorrId,
AgentMsgId,
-- * Parse and serialize
serializeCommand,
serializeSMPMessage,
serializeMsgIntegrity,
serializeServer,
serializeSMPQueueUri,
reservedServerKey, -- TODO remove
serializeConnMode,
serializeConnMode',
connMode,
connMode',
serializeConnReq,
serializeConnReq',
serializeAgentError,
commandP,
parseSMPMessage,
smpServerP,
smpQueueUriP,
connModeT,
connReqP,
connReqP',
msgIntegrityP,
agentErrorTypeP,
agentMessageP,
-- * TCP transport functions
tPut,
tGet,
tPutRaw,
tGetRaw,
)
where
import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
import Control.Monad.IO.Class
import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA as R
import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 (Parser)
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.ByteString.Base64
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as U
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.Kind (Type)
import Data.List (find)
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Data.Maybe (isJust)
import Data.String (IsString (..))
import Data.Text (Text)
import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime)
import Data.Time.ISO8601
import Data.Type.Equality
import Data.Typeable ()
import GHC.Generics (Generic)
import Generic.Random (genericArbitraryU)
import Network.HTTP.Types (parseSimpleQuery, renderSimpleQuery)
import Network.Socket (HostName, ServiceName)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
( ErrorType,
MsgBody,
MsgId,
SenderPublicKey,
)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (Transport (..), TransportError, serializeTransportError, transportErrorP)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
import Test.QuickCheck (Arbitrary (..))
import Text.Read
import UnliftIO.Exception (Exception)
-- | Raw (unparsed) SMP agent protocol transmission.
type ARawTransmission = (ByteString, ByteString, ByteString)
-- | Parsed SMP agent protocol transmission.
type ATransmission p = (ACorrId, ConnId, ACommand p)
-- | SMP agent protocol transmission or transmission error.
type ATransmissionOrError p = (ACorrId, ConnId, Either AgentErrorType (ACommand p))
type ACorrId = ByteString
-- | SMP agent protocol participants.
data AParty = Agent | Client
deriving (Eq, Show)
-- | Singleton types for SMP agent protocol participants.
data SAParty :: AParty -> Type where
SAgent :: SAParty Agent
SClient :: SAParty Client
deriving instance Show (SAParty p)
deriving instance Eq (SAParty p)
instance TestEquality SAParty where
testEquality SAgent SAgent = Just Refl
testEquality SClient SClient = Just Refl
testEquality _ _ = Nothing
data ACmd = forall p. ACmd (SAParty p) (ACommand p)
deriving instance Show ACmd
type ConnInfo = ByteString
-- | Parameterized type for SMP agent protocol commands and responses from all participants.
data ACommand (p :: AParty) where
NEW :: AConnectionMode -> ACommand Client -- response INV
INV :: AConnectionRequest -> ACommand Agent
JOIN :: AConnectionRequest -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Client -- response OK
CONF :: ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Agent -- ConnInfo is from sender
LET :: ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Client -- ConnInfo is from client
REQ :: InvitationId -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Agent -- ConnInfo is from sender
ACPT :: InvitationId -> ConnInfo -> ACommand Client -- ConnInfo is from client
RJCT :: InvitationId -> ACommand Client
INFO :: ConnInfo -> ACommand Agent
CON :: ACommand Agent -- notification that connection is established
SUB :: ACommand Client
END :: ACommand Agent
DOWN :: ACommand Agent
UP :: ACommand Agent
-- QST :: QueueDirection -> ACommand Client
-- STAT :: QueueDirection -> Maybe QueueStatus -> Maybe SubMode -> ACommand Agent
SEND :: MsgBody -> ACommand Client
MID :: AgentMsgId -> ACommand Agent
SENT :: AgentMsgId -> ACommand Agent
MERR :: AgentMsgId -> AgentErrorType -> ACommand Agent
MSG :: MsgMeta -> MsgBody -> ACommand Agent
ACK :: AgentMsgId -> ACommand Client
-- RCVD :: AgentMsgId -> ACommand Agent
OFF :: ACommand Client
DEL :: ACommand Client
OK :: ACommand Agent
ERR :: AgentErrorType -> ACommand Agent
deriving instance Eq (ACommand p)
deriving instance Show (ACommand p)
data ConnectionMode = CMInvitation | CMContact
deriving (Eq, Show)
data SConnectionMode (m :: ConnectionMode) where
SCMInvitation :: SConnectionMode CMInvitation
SCMContact :: SConnectionMode CMContact
deriving instance Eq (SConnectionMode m)
deriving instance Show (SConnectionMode m)
instance TestEquality SConnectionMode where
testEquality SCMInvitation SCMInvitation = Just Refl
testEquality SCMContact SCMContact = Just Refl
testEquality _ _ = Nothing
data AConnectionMode = forall m. ACM (SConnectionMode m)
instance Eq AConnectionMode where
ACM m == ACM m' = isJust $ testEquality m m'
cmInvitation :: AConnectionMode
cmInvitation = ACM SCMInvitation
cmContact :: AConnectionMode
cmContact = ACM SCMContact
deriving instance Show AConnectionMode
connMode :: SConnectionMode m -> ConnectionMode
connMode SCMInvitation = CMInvitation
connMode SCMContact = CMContact
connMode' :: ConnectionMode -> AConnectionMode
connMode' CMInvitation = cmInvitation
connMode' CMContact = cmContact
class ConnectionModeI (m :: ConnectionMode) where sConnectionMode :: SConnectionMode m
instance ConnectionModeI CMInvitation where sConnectionMode = SCMInvitation
instance ConnectionModeI CMContact where sConnectionMode = SCMContact
type MsgHash = ByteString
-- | Agent message metadata sent to the client
data MsgMeta = MsgMeta
{ integrity :: MsgIntegrity,
recipient :: (AgentMsgId, UTCTime),
broker :: (MsgId, UTCTime),
sender :: (AgentMsgId, UTCTime)
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
-- | SMP message formats.
data SMPMessage
= -- | SMP confirmation
-- (see <https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#send-message SMP protocol>)
SMPConfirmation
{ -- | sender's public key to use for authentication of sender's commands at the recepient's server
senderKey :: SenderPublicKey,
-- | sender's information to be associated with the connection, e.g. sender's profile information
connInfo :: ConnInfo
}
| -- | Agent message header and envelope for client messages
-- (see <https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/agent-protocol.md#messages-between-smp-agents SMP agent protocol>)
SMPMessage
{ -- | sequential ID assigned by the sending agent
senderMsgId :: AgentMsgId,
-- | timestamp from the sending agent
senderTimestamp :: SenderTimestamp,
-- | digest of the previous message
previousMsgHash :: MsgHash,
-- | messages sent between agents once queue is secured
agentMessage :: AMessage
}
deriving (Show)
-- | Messages sent between SMP agents once SMP queue is secured.
--
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/agent-protocol.md#messages-between-smp-agents
data AMessage where
-- | the first message in the queue to validate it is secured
HELLO :: VerificationKey -> AckMode -> AMessage
-- | reply queue information
REPLY :: ConnectionRequest CMInvitation -> AMessage
-- | agent envelope for the client message
A_MSG :: MsgBody -> AMessage
-- | connection request with the invitation to connect
A_INV :: ConnectionRequest CMInvitation -> ConnInfo -> AMessage
deriving (Show)
-- | Parse SMP message.
parseSMPMessage :: ByteString -> Either AgentErrorType SMPMessage
parseSMPMessage = parse (smpMessageP <* A.endOfLine) $ AGENT A_MESSAGE
where
smpMessageP :: Parser SMPMessage
smpMessageP = A.endOfLine *> smpClientMessageP <|> smpConfirmationP
smpConfirmationP :: Parser SMPMessage
smpConfirmationP = "KEY " *> (SMPConfirmation <$> C.pubKeyP <* A.endOfLine <* A.endOfLine <*> binaryBodyP <* A.endOfLine)
smpClientMessageP :: Parser SMPMessage
smpClientMessageP =
SMPMessage
<$> A.decimal <* A.space
<*> tsISO8601P <* A.space
-- TODO previous message hash should become mandatory when we support HELLO and REPLY
-- (for HELLO it would be the hash of SMPConfirmation)
<*> (base64P <|> pure "") <* A.endOfLine
<*> agentMessageP
-- | Serialize SMP message.
serializeSMPMessage :: SMPMessage -> ByteString
serializeSMPMessage = \case
SMPConfirmation sKey cInfo -> smpMessage ("KEY " <> C.serializePubKey sKey) "" (serializeBinary cInfo) <> "\n"
SMPMessage {senderMsgId, senderTimestamp, previousMsgHash, agentMessage} ->
let header = messageHeader senderMsgId senderTimestamp previousMsgHash
body = serializeAgentMessage agentMessage
in smpMessage "" header body
where
messageHeader msgId ts prevMsgHash =
B.unwords [bshow msgId, B.pack $ formatISO8601Millis ts, encode prevMsgHash]
smpMessage smpHeader aHeader aBody = B.intercalate "\n" [smpHeader, aHeader, aBody, ""]
agentMessageP :: Parser AMessage
agentMessageP =
"HELLO " *> hello
<|> "REPLY " *> reply
<|> "MSG " *> a_msg
<|> "INV " *> a_inv
where
hello = HELLO <$> C.pubKeyP <*> ackMode
reply = REPLY <$> connReqP'
a_msg = A_MSG <$> binaryBodyP <* A.endOfLine
a_inv = A_INV <$> connReqP' <* A.space <*> binaryBodyP <* A.endOfLine
ackMode = AckMode <$> (" NO_ACK" $> Off <|> pure On)
-- | SMP server location parser.
smpServerP :: Parser SMPServer
smpServerP = SMPServer <$> server <*> optional port <*> optional kHash
where
server = B.unpack <$> A.takeWhile1 (A.notInClass ":#,; ")
port = A.char ':' *> (B.unpack <$> A.takeWhile1 A.isDigit)
kHash = C.KeyHash <$> (A.char '#' *> base64P)
serializeAgentMessage :: AMessage -> ByteString
serializeAgentMessage = \case
HELLO verifyKey ackMode -> "HELLO " <> C.serializePubKey verifyKey <> if ackMode == AckMode Off then " NO_ACK" else ""
REPLY cReq -> "REPLY " <> serializeConnReq' cReq
A_MSG body -> "MSG " <> serializeBinary body <> "\n"
A_INV cReq cInfo -> B.unwords ["INV", serializeConnReq' cReq, serializeBinary cInfo] <> "\n"
-- | Serialize SMP queue information that is sent out-of-band.
serializeSMPQueueUri :: SMPQueueUri -> ByteString
serializeSMPQueueUri (SMPQueueUri srv qId _) =
serializeServerUri srv <> "/" <> U.encode qId <> "#"
-- | SMP queue information parser.
smpQueueUriP :: Parser SMPQueueUri
smpQueueUriP =
SMPQueueUri <$> smpServerUriP <* "/" <*> base64UriP <* "#" <*> pure reservedServerKey
reservedServerKey :: C.PublicKey
reservedServerKey = C.PublicKey $ R.PublicKey 1 0 0
serializeConnReq :: AConnectionRequest -> ByteString
serializeConnReq (ACR _ cr) = serializeConnReq' cr
serializeConnReq' :: ConnectionRequest m -> ByteString
serializeConnReq' = \case
CRInvitation crData -> serialize CMInvitation crData
CRContact crData -> serialize CMContact crData
where
serialize crMode ConnReqData {crScheme, crSmpQueues, crEncryptKey} =
sch <> "/" <> m <> "#/" <> queryStr
where
sch = case crScheme of
CRSSimplex -> "simplex:"
CRSAppServer host port -> B.pack $ "https://" <> host <> maybe "" (':' :) port
m = case crMode of
CMInvitation -> "invitation"
CMContact -> "contact"
queryStr = renderSimpleQuery True [("smp", queues), ("e2e", key)]
queues = B.intercalate "," . map serializeSMPQueueUri $ L.toList crSmpQueues
key = C.serializePubKeyUri crEncryptKey
connReqP' :: forall m. ConnectionModeI m => Parser (ConnectionRequest m)
connReqP' = do
ACR m cr <- connReqP
case testEquality m $ sConnectionMode @m of
Just Refl -> pure cr
_ -> fail "bad connection request mode"
connReqP :: Parser AConnectionRequest
connReqP = do
crScheme <- "simplex:" $> CRSSimplex <|> "https://" *> appServer
crMode <- "/" *> mode <* "#/?"
query <- parseSimpleQuery <$> A.takeTill (\c -> c == ' ' || c == '\n')
crSmpQueues <- paramP "smp" smpQueues query
crEncryptKey <- paramP "e2e" C.pubKeyUriP query
let cReq = ConnReqData {crScheme, crSmpQueues, crEncryptKey}
pure $ case crMode of
CMInvitation -> ACR SCMInvitation $ CRInvitation cReq
CMContact -> ACR SCMContact $ CRContact cReq
where
appServer = CRSAppServer <$> host <*> optional port
host = B.unpack <$> A.takeTill (\c -> c == ':' || c == '/')
port = B.unpack <$> (A.char ':' *> A.takeTill (== '/'))
mode = "invitation" $> CMInvitation <|> "contact" $> CMContact
paramP param parser query =
let p = maybe (fail "") (pure . snd) $ find ((== param) . fst) query
in parseAll parser <$?> p
smpQueues =
maybe (fail "no SMP queues") pure . L.nonEmpty
=<< (smpQueue `A.sepBy1'` A.char ',')
smpQueue = parseAll smpQueueUriP <$?> A.takeTill (== ',')
-- | Serialize SMP server location.
serializeServer :: SMPServer -> ByteString
serializeServer SMPServer {host, port, keyHash} =
B.pack $ host <> maybe "" (':' :) port <> maybe "" (('#' :) . B.unpack . encode . C.unKeyHash) keyHash
serializeServerUri :: SMPServer -> ByteString
serializeServerUri SMPServer {host, port, keyHash} = "smp://" <> kh <> B.pack host <> p
where
kh = maybe "" ((<> "@") . U.encode . C.unKeyHash) keyHash
p = B.pack $ maybe "" (':' :) port
smpServerUriP :: Parser SMPServer
smpServerUriP = do
_ <- "smp://"
keyHash <- optional $ C.KeyHash <$> (U.decode <$?> A.takeTill (== '@') <* A.char '@')
host <- B.unpack <$> A.takeWhile1 (A.notInClass ":#,;/ ")
port <- optional $ B.unpack <$> (A.char ':' *> A.takeWhile1 A.isDigit)
pure SMPServer {host, port, keyHash}
serializeConnMode :: AConnectionMode -> ByteString
serializeConnMode (ACM cMode) = serializeConnMode' $ connMode cMode
serializeConnMode' :: ConnectionMode -> ByteString
serializeConnMode' = \case
CMInvitation -> "INV"
CMContact -> "CON"
connModeP' :: Parser ConnectionMode
connModeP' = "INV" $> CMInvitation <|> "CON" $> CMContact
connModeP :: Parser AConnectionMode
connModeP = connMode' <$> connModeP'
connModeT :: Text -> Maybe ConnectionMode
connModeT = \case
"INV" -> Just CMInvitation
"CON" -> Just CMContact
_ -> Nothing
-- | SMP server location and transport key digest (hash).
data SMPServer = SMPServer
{ host :: HostName,
port :: Maybe ServiceName,
keyHash :: Maybe C.KeyHash
}
deriving (Eq, Ord, Show)
instance IsString SMPServer where
fromString = parseString $ parseAll smpServerP
-- | SMP agent connection alias.
type ConnId = ByteString
type ConfirmationId = ByteString
type InvitationId = ByteString
-- | Connection modes.
data OnOff = On | Off deriving (Eq, Show, Read)
-- | Message acknowledgement mode of the connection.
newtype AckMode = AckMode OnOff deriving (Eq, Show)
-- | SMP queue information sent out-of-band.
--
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#out-of-band-messages
data SMPQueueUri = SMPQueueUri
{ smpServer :: SMPServer,
senderId :: SMP.SenderId,
serverVerifyKey :: VerificationKey
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data ConnectionRequest (m :: ConnectionMode) where
CRInvitation :: ConnReqData -> ConnectionRequest CMInvitation
CRContact :: ConnReqData -> ConnectionRequest CMContact
deriving instance Eq (ConnectionRequest m)
deriving instance Show (ConnectionRequest m)
data AConnectionRequest = forall m. ACR (SConnectionMode m) (ConnectionRequest m)
instance Eq AConnectionRequest where
ACR m cr == ACR m' cr' = case testEquality m m' of
Just Refl -> cr == cr'
_ -> False
deriving instance Show AConnectionRequest
data ConnReqData = ConnReqData
{ crScheme :: ConnReqScheme,
crSmpQueues :: L.NonEmpty SMPQueueUri,
crEncryptKey :: EncryptionKey
}
deriving (Eq, Show)
data ConnReqScheme = CRSSimplex | CRSAppServer HostName (Maybe ServiceName)
deriving (Eq, Show)
simplexChat :: ConnReqScheme
simplexChat = CRSAppServer "simplex.chat" Nothing
-- | Public key used to E2E encrypt SMP messages.
type EncryptionKey = C.PublicKey
-- | Private key used to E2E decrypt SMP messages.
type DecryptionKey = C.SafePrivateKey
-- | Private key used to sign SMP commands
type SignatureKey = C.APrivateKey
-- | Public key used by SMP server to authorize (verify) SMP commands.
type VerificationKey = C.PublicKey
data QueueDirection = SND | RCV deriving (Show)
-- | SMP queue status.
data QueueStatus
= -- | queue is created
New
| -- | queue is confirmed by the sender
Confirmed
| -- | queue is secured with sender key (only used by the queue recipient)
Secured
| -- | queue is active
Active
| -- | queue is disabled (only used by the queue recipient)
Disabled
deriving (Eq, Show, Read)
type AgentMsgId = Int64
type SenderTimestamp = UTCTime
-- | Result of received message integrity validation.
data MsgIntegrity = MsgOk | MsgError MsgErrorType
deriving (Eq, Show)
-- | Error of message integrity validation.
data MsgErrorType = MsgSkipped AgentMsgId AgentMsgId | MsgBadId AgentMsgId | MsgBadHash | MsgDuplicate
deriving (Eq, Show)
-- | Error type used in errors sent to agent clients.
data AgentErrorType
= -- | command or response error
CMD CommandErrorType
| -- | connection errors
CONN ConnectionErrorType
| -- | SMP protocol errors forwarded to agent clients
SMP ErrorType
| -- | SMP server errors
BROKER BrokerErrorType
| -- | errors of other agents
AGENT SMPAgentError
| -- | agent implementation or dependency errors
INTERNAL String
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
-- | SMP agent protocol command or response error.
data CommandErrorType
= -- | command is prohibited in this context
PROHIBITED
| -- | command syntax is invalid
SYNTAX
| -- | entity ID is required with this command
NO_CONN
| -- | message size is not correct (no terminating space)
SIZE
| -- | message does not fit in SMP block
LARGE
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
-- | Connection error.
data ConnectionErrorType
= -- | connection alias is not in the database
NOT_FOUND
| -- | connection alias already exists
DUPLICATE
| -- | connection is simplex, but operation requires another queue
SIMPLEX
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
-- | SMP server errors.
data BrokerErrorType
= -- | invalid server response (failed to parse)
RESPONSE ErrorType
| -- | unexpected response
UNEXPECTED
| -- | network error
NETWORK
| -- | handshake or other transport error
TRANSPORT TransportError
| -- | command response timeout
TIMEOUT
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
-- | Errors of another SMP agent.
data SMPAgentError
= -- | possibly should include bytestring that failed to parse
A_MESSAGE
| -- | possibly should include the prohibited SMP/agent message
A_PROHIBITED
| -- | cannot RSA/AES-decrypt or parse decrypted header
A_ENCRYPTION
| -- | invalid RSA signature
A_SIGNATURE
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
instance Arbitrary AgentErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary CommandErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary ConnectionErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary BrokerErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary SMPAgentError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
-- | SMP agent command and response parser
commandP :: Parser ACmd
commandP =
"NEW " *> newCmd
<|> "INV " *> invResp
<|> "JOIN " *> joinCmd
<|> "CONF " *> confMsg
<|> "LET " *> letCmd
<|> "REQ " *> reqMsg
<|> "ACPT " *> acptCmd
<|> "RJCT " *> rjctCmd
<|> "INFO " *> infoCmd
<|> "SUB" $> ACmd SClient SUB
<|> "END" $> ACmd SAgent END
<|> "DOWN" $> ACmd SAgent DOWN
<|> "UP" $> ACmd SAgent UP
<|> "SEND " *> sendCmd
<|> "MID " *> msgIdResp
<|> "SENT " *> sentResp
<|> "MERR " *> msgErrResp
<|> "MSG " *> message
<|> "ACK " *> ackCmd
<|> "OFF" $> ACmd SClient OFF
<|> "DEL" $> ACmd SClient DEL
<|> "ERR " *> agentError
<|> "CON" $> ACmd SAgent CON
<|> "OK" $> ACmd SAgent OK
where
newCmd = ACmd SClient . NEW <$> connModeP
invResp = ACmd SAgent . INV <$> connReqP
joinCmd = ACmd SClient <$> (JOIN <$> connReqP <* A.space <*> A.takeByteString)
confMsg = ACmd SAgent <$> (CONF <$> A.takeTill (== ' ') <* A.space <*> A.takeByteString)
letCmd = ACmd SClient <$> (LET <$> A.takeTill (== ' ') <* A.space <*> A.takeByteString)
reqMsg = ACmd SAgent <$> (REQ <$> A.takeTill (== ' ') <* A.space <*> A.takeByteString)
acptCmd = ACmd SClient <$> (ACPT <$> A.takeTill (== ' ') <* A.space <*> A.takeByteString)
rjctCmd = ACmd SClient . RJCT <$> A.takeByteString
infoCmd = ACmd SAgent . INFO <$> A.takeByteString
sendCmd = ACmd SClient . SEND <$> A.takeByteString
msgIdResp = ACmd SAgent . MID <$> A.decimal
sentResp = ACmd SAgent . SENT <$> A.decimal
msgErrResp = ACmd SAgent <$> (MERR <$> A.decimal <* A.space <*> agentErrorTypeP)
message = ACmd SAgent <$> (MSG <$> msgMetaP <* A.space <*> A.takeByteString)
ackCmd = ACmd SClient . ACK <$> A.decimal
msgMetaP = do
integrity <- msgIntegrityP
recipient <- " R=" *> partyMeta A.decimal
broker <- " B=" *> partyMeta base64P
sender <- " S=" *> partyMeta A.decimal
pure MsgMeta {integrity, recipient, broker, sender}
partyMeta idParser = (,) <$> idParser <* "," <*> tsISO8601P
agentError = ACmd SAgent . ERR <$> agentErrorTypeP
-- | Message integrity validation result parser.
msgIntegrityP :: Parser MsgIntegrity
msgIntegrityP = "OK" $> MsgOk <|> "ERR " *> (MsgError <$> msgErrorType)
where
msgErrorType =
"ID " *> (MsgBadId <$> A.decimal)
<|> "IDS " *> (MsgSkipped <$> A.decimal <* A.space <*> A.decimal)
<|> "HASH" $> MsgBadHash
<|> "DUPLICATE" $> MsgDuplicate
parseCommand :: ByteString -> Either AgentErrorType ACmd
parseCommand = parse commandP $ CMD SYNTAX
-- | Serialize SMP agent command.
serializeCommand :: ACommand p -> ByteString
serializeCommand = \case
NEW cMode -> "NEW " <> serializeConnMode cMode
INV cReq -> "INV " <> serializeConnReq cReq
JOIN cReq cInfo -> B.unwords ["JOIN", serializeConnReq cReq, serializeBinary cInfo]
CONF confId cInfo -> B.unwords ["CONF", confId, serializeBinary cInfo]
LET confId cInfo -> B.unwords ["LET", confId, serializeBinary cInfo]
REQ invId cInfo -> B.unwords ["REQ", invId, serializeBinary cInfo]
ACPT invId cInfo -> B.unwords ["ACPT", invId, serializeBinary cInfo]
RJCT invId -> "RJCT " <> invId
INFO cInfo -> "INFO " <> serializeBinary cInfo
SUB -> "SUB"
END -> "END"
DOWN -> "DOWN"
UP -> "UP"
SEND msgBody -> "SEND " <> serializeBinary msgBody
MID mId -> "MID " <> bshow mId
SENT mId -> "SENT " <> bshow mId
MERR mId e -> B.unwords ["MERR", bshow mId, serializeAgentError e]
MSG msgMeta msgBody -> B.unwords ["MSG", serializeMsgMeta msgMeta, serializeBinary msgBody]
ACK mId -> "ACK " <> bshow mId
OFF -> "OFF"
DEL -> "DEL"
CON -> "CON"
ERR e -> "ERR " <> serializeAgentError e
OK -> "OK"
where
showTs :: UTCTime -> ByteString
showTs = B.pack . formatISO8601Millis
serializeMsgMeta :: MsgMeta -> ByteString
serializeMsgMeta MsgMeta {integrity, recipient = (rmId, rTs), broker = (bmId, bTs), sender = (smId, sTs)} =
B.unwords
[ serializeMsgIntegrity integrity,
"R=" <> bshow rmId <> "," <> showTs rTs,
"B=" <> encode bmId <> "," <> showTs bTs,
"S=" <> bshow smId <> "," <> showTs sTs
]
-- | Serialize message integrity validation result.
serializeMsgIntegrity :: MsgIntegrity -> ByteString
serializeMsgIntegrity = \case
MsgOk -> "OK"
MsgError e ->
"ERR " <> case e of
MsgSkipped fromMsgId toMsgId ->
B.unwords ["NO_ID", bshow fromMsgId, bshow toMsgId]
MsgBadId aMsgId -> "ID " <> bshow aMsgId
MsgBadHash -> "HASH"
MsgDuplicate -> "DUPLICATE"
-- | SMP agent protocol error parser.
agentErrorTypeP :: Parser AgentErrorType
agentErrorTypeP =
"SMP " *> (SMP <$> SMP.errorTypeP)
<|> "BROKER RESPONSE " *> (BROKER . RESPONSE <$> SMP.errorTypeP)
<|> "BROKER TRANSPORT " *> (BROKER . TRANSPORT <$> transportErrorP)
<|> "INTERNAL " *> (INTERNAL <$> parseRead A.takeByteString)
<|> parseRead2
-- | Serialize SMP agent protocol error.
serializeAgentError :: AgentErrorType -> ByteString
serializeAgentError = \case
SMP e -> "SMP " <> SMP.serializeErrorType e
BROKER (RESPONSE e) -> "BROKER RESPONSE " <> SMP.serializeErrorType e
BROKER (TRANSPORT e) -> "BROKER TRANSPORT " <> serializeTransportError e
e -> bshow e
binaryBodyP :: Parser ByteString
binaryBodyP = do
size :: Int <- A.decimal <* A.endOfLine
A.take size
serializeBinary :: ByteString -> ByteString
serializeBinary body = bshow (B.length body) <> "\n" <> body
-- | Send raw (unparsed) SMP agent protocol transmission to TCP connection.
tPutRaw :: Transport c => c -> ARawTransmission -> IO ()
tPutRaw h (corrId, entity, command) = do
putLn h corrId
putLn h entity
putLn h command
-- | Receive raw (unparsed) SMP agent protocol transmission from TCP connection.
tGetRaw :: Transport c => c -> IO ARawTransmission
tGetRaw h = (,,) <$> getLn h <*> getLn h <*> getLn h
-- | Send SMP agent protocol command (or response) to TCP connection.
tPut :: (Transport c, MonadIO m) => c -> ATransmission p -> m ()
tPut h (corrId, connAlias, command) =
liftIO $ tPutRaw h (corrId, connAlias, serializeCommand command)
-- | Receive client and agent transmissions from TCP connection.
tGet :: forall c m p. (Transport c, MonadIO m) => SAParty p -> c -> m (ATransmissionOrError p)
tGet party h = liftIO (tGetRaw h) >>= tParseLoadBody
where
tParseLoadBody :: ARawTransmission -> m (ATransmissionOrError p)
tParseLoadBody t@(corrId, connId, command) = do
let cmd = parseCommand command >>= fromParty >>= tConnId t
fullCmd <- either (return . Left) cmdWithMsgBody cmd
return (corrId, connId, fullCmd)
fromParty :: ACmd -> Either AgentErrorType (ACommand p)
fromParty (ACmd (p :: p1) cmd) = case testEquality party p of
Just Refl -> Right cmd
_ -> Left $ CMD PROHIBITED
tConnId :: ARawTransmission -> ACommand p -> Either AgentErrorType (ACommand p)
tConnId (_, connId, _) cmd = case cmd of
-- NEW, JOIN and ACPT have optional connId
NEW _ -> Right cmd
JOIN {} -> Right cmd
ACPT {} -> Right cmd
-- ERROR response does not always have connId
ERR _ -> Right cmd
-- other responses must have connId
_
| B.null connId -> Left $ CMD NO_CONN
| otherwise -> Right cmd
cmdWithMsgBody :: ACommand p -> m (Either AgentErrorType (ACommand p))
cmdWithMsgBody = \case
SEND body -> SEND <$$> getBody body
MSG msgMeta body -> MSG msgMeta <$$> getBody body
JOIN qUri cInfo -> JOIN qUri <$$> getBody cInfo
CONF confId cInfo -> CONF confId <$$> getBody cInfo
LET confId cInfo -> LET confId <$$> getBody cInfo
REQ invId cInfo -> REQ invId <$$> getBody cInfo
ACPT invId cInfo -> ACPT invId <$$> getBody cInfo
INFO cInfo -> INFO <$$> getBody cInfo
cmd -> pure $ Right cmd
-- TODO refactor with server
getBody :: ByteString -> m (Either AgentErrorType ByteString)
getBody binary =
case B.unpack binary of
':' : body -> return . Right $ B.pack body
str -> case readMaybe str :: Maybe Int of
Just size -> liftIO $ do
body <- cGet h size
s <- getLn h
return $ if B.null s then Right body else Left $ CMD SIZE
Nothing -> return . Left $ CMD SYNTAX
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval where
import Control.Concurrent (threadDelay)
import Control.Monad.IO.Class (MonadIO, liftIO)
data RetryInterval = RetryInterval
{ initialInterval :: Int,
increaseAfter :: Int,
maxInterval :: Int
}
withRetryInterval :: forall m. MonadIO m => RetryInterval -> (m () -> m ()) -> m ()
withRetryInterval RetryInterval {initialInterval, increaseAfter, maxInterval} action =
callAction 0 initialInterval
where
callAction :: Int -> Int -> m ()
callAction elapsedTime delay = action loop
where
loop = do
let newDelay =
if elapsedTime < increaseAfter || delay == maxInterval
then delay
else min (delay * 3 `div` 2) maxInterval
liftIO $ threadDelay delay
callAction (elapsedTime + delay) newDelay
+122 -43
View File
@@ -9,13 +9,15 @@
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store where
import Control.Concurrent.STM (TVar)
import Control.Exception (Exception)
import Crypto.Random (ChaChaDRG)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.Kind (Type)
import Data.Time (UTCTime)
import Data.Type.Equality
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Transmission
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
( MsgBody,
MsgId,
@@ -30,26 +32,42 @@ import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
-- | Store class type. Defines store access methods for implementations.
class Monad m => MonadAgentStore s m where
-- Queue and Connection management
createRcvConn :: s -> RcvQueue -> m ()
createSndConn :: s -> SndQueue -> m ()
getConn :: s -> ConnAlias -> m SomeConn
getAllConnAliases :: s -> m [ConnAlias] -- TODO remove - hack for subscribing to all
getRcvQueue :: s -> SMPServer -> SMP.RecipientId -> m RcvQueue
deleteConn :: s -> ConnAlias -> m ()
upgradeRcvConnToDuplex :: s -> ConnAlias -> SndQueue -> m ()
upgradeSndConnToDuplex :: s -> ConnAlias -> RcvQueue -> m ()
createRcvConn :: s -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> ConnData -> RcvQueue -> SConnectionMode c -> m ConnId
createSndConn :: s -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> ConnData -> SndQueue -> m ConnId
getConn :: s -> ConnId -> m SomeConn
getAllConnIds :: s -> m [ConnId] -- TODO remove - hack for subscribing to all
getRcvConn :: s -> SMPServer -> SMP.RecipientId -> m SomeConn
deleteConn :: s -> ConnId -> m ()
upgradeRcvConnToDuplex :: s -> ConnId -> SndQueue -> m ()
upgradeSndConnToDuplex :: s -> ConnId -> RcvQueue -> m ()
setRcvQueueStatus :: s -> RcvQueue -> QueueStatus -> m ()
setRcvQueueActive :: s -> RcvQueue -> VerificationKey -> m ()
setSndQueueStatus :: s -> SndQueue -> QueueStatus -> m ()
updateSignKey :: s -> SndQueue -> SignatureKey -> m ()
-- Confirmations
createConfirmation :: s -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> NewConfirmation -> m ConfirmationId
acceptConfirmation :: s -> ConfirmationId -> ConnInfo -> m AcceptedConfirmation
getAcceptedConfirmation :: s -> ConnId -> m AcceptedConfirmation
removeConfirmations :: s -> ConnId -> m ()
-- Invitations - sent via Contact connections
createInvitation :: s -> TVar ChaChaDRG -> NewInvitation -> m InvitationId
getInvitation :: s -> InvitationId -> m Invitation
acceptInvitation :: s -> InvitationId -> ConnInfo -> m ()
deleteInvitation :: s -> ConnId -> InvitationId -> m ()
-- Msg management
updateRcvIds :: s -> RcvQueue -> m (InternalId, InternalRcvId, PrevExternalSndId, PrevRcvMsgHash)
createRcvMsg :: s -> RcvQueue -> RcvMsgData -> m ()
updateSndIds :: s -> SndQueue -> m (InternalId, InternalSndId, PrevSndMsgHash)
createSndMsg :: s -> SndQueue -> SndMsgData -> m ()
getMsg :: s -> ConnAlias -> InternalId -> m Msg
updateRcvIds :: s -> ConnId -> m (InternalId, InternalRcvId, PrevExternalSndId, PrevRcvMsgHash)
createRcvMsg :: s -> ConnId -> RcvMsgData -> m ()
updateSndIds :: s -> ConnId -> m (InternalId, InternalSndId, PrevSndMsgHash)
createSndMsg :: s -> ConnId -> SndMsgData -> m ()
updateSndMsgStatus :: s -> ConnId -> InternalId -> SndMsgStatus -> m ()
getPendingMsgData :: s -> ConnId -> InternalId -> m MsgBody
getPendingMsgs :: s -> ConnId -> m [InternalId]
getMsg :: s -> ConnId -> InternalId -> m Msg
checkRcvMsg :: s -> ConnId -> InternalId -> m ()
updateRcvMsgAck :: s -> ConnId -> InternalId -> m ()
-- * Queue types
@@ -57,10 +75,8 @@ class Monad m => MonadAgentStore s m where
data RcvQueue = RcvQueue
{ server :: SMPServer,
rcvId :: SMP.RecipientId,
connAlias :: ConnAlias,
rcvPrivateKey :: RecipientPrivateKey,
sndId :: Maybe SMP.SenderId,
sndKey :: Maybe SenderPublicKey,
decryptKey :: DecryptionKey,
verifyKey :: Maybe VerificationKey,
status :: QueueStatus
@@ -71,7 +87,6 @@ data RcvQueue = RcvQueue
data SndQueue = SndQueue
{ server :: SMPServer,
sndId :: SMP.SenderId,
connAlias :: ConnAlias,
sndPrivateKey :: SenderPrivateKey,
encryptKey :: EncryptionKey,
signKey :: SignatureKey,
@@ -82,7 +97,7 @@ data SndQueue = SndQueue
-- * Connection types
-- | Type of a connection.
data ConnType = CRcv | CSnd | CDuplex deriving (Eq, Show)
data ConnType = CRcv | CSnd | CDuplex | CContact deriving (Eq, Show)
-- | Connection of a specific type.
--
@@ -95,9 +110,10 @@ data ConnType = CRcv | CSnd | CDuplex deriving (Eq, Show)
-- - DuplexConnection is a connection that has both receive and send queues set up,
-- typically created by upgrading a receive or a send connection with a missing queue.
data Connection (d :: ConnType) where
RcvConnection :: ConnAlias -> RcvQueue -> Connection CRcv
SndConnection :: ConnAlias -> SndQueue -> Connection CSnd
DuplexConnection :: ConnAlias -> RcvQueue -> SndQueue -> Connection CDuplex
RcvConnection :: ConnData -> RcvQueue -> Connection CRcv
SndConnection :: ConnData -> SndQueue -> Connection CSnd
DuplexConnection :: ConnData -> RcvQueue -> SndQueue -> Connection CDuplex
ContactConnection :: ConnData -> RcvQueue -> Connection CContact
deriving instance Eq (Connection d)
@@ -107,11 +123,13 @@ data SConnType :: ConnType -> Type where
SCRcv :: SConnType CRcv
SCSnd :: SConnType CSnd
SCDuplex :: SConnType CDuplex
SCContact :: SConnType CContact
connType :: SConnType c -> ConnType
connType SCRcv = CRcv
connType SCSnd = CSnd
connType SCDuplex = CDuplex
connType SCContact = CContact
deriving instance Eq (SConnType d)
@@ -121,6 +139,7 @@ instance TestEquality SConnType where
testEquality SCRcv SCRcv = Just Refl
testEquality SCSnd SCSnd = Just Refl
testEquality SCDuplex SCDuplex = Just Refl
testEquality SCContact SCContact = Just Refl
testEquality _ _ = Nothing
-- | Connection of an unknown type.
@@ -134,9 +153,43 @@ instance Eq SomeConn where
deriving instance Show SomeConn
-- * Message integrity validation types
newtype ConnData = ConnData {connId :: ConnId}
deriving (Eq, Show)
type MsgHash = ByteString
-- * Confirmation types
data NewConfirmation = NewConfirmation
{ connId :: ConnId,
senderKey :: SenderPublicKey,
senderConnInfo :: ConnInfo
}
data AcceptedConfirmation = AcceptedConfirmation
{ confirmationId :: ConfirmationId,
connId :: ConnId,
senderKey :: SenderPublicKey,
senderConnInfo :: ConnInfo,
ownConnInfo :: ConnInfo
}
-- * Invitations
data NewInvitation = NewInvitation
{ contactConnId :: ConnId,
connReq :: ConnectionRequest 'CMInvitation,
recipientConnInfo :: ConnInfo
}
data Invitation = Invitation
{ invitationId :: InvitationId,
contactConnId :: ConnId,
connReq :: ConnectionRequest 'CMInvitation,
recipientConnInfo :: ConnInfo,
ownConnInfo :: Maybe ConnInfo,
accepted :: Bool
}
-- * Message integrity validation types
-- | Corresponds to `last_external_snd_msg_id` in `connections` table
type PrevExternalSndId = Int64
@@ -148,18 +201,15 @@ type PrevRcvMsgHash = MsgHash
type PrevSndMsgHash = MsgHash
-- ? merge/replace these with RcvMsg and SndMsg
-- * Message data containers - used on Msg creation to reduce number of parameters
data RcvMsgData = RcvMsgData
{ internalId :: InternalId,
internalRcvId :: InternalRcvId,
internalTs :: InternalTs,
senderMeta :: (ExternalSndId, ExternalSndTs),
brokerMeta :: (BrokerId, BrokerTs),
{ msgMeta :: MsgMeta,
msgBody :: MsgBody,
internalRcvId :: InternalRcvId,
internalHash :: MsgHash,
externalPrevSndHash :: MsgHash,
msgIntegrity :: MsgIntegrity
externalPrevSndHash :: MsgHash
}
data SndMsgData = SndMsgData
@@ -167,9 +217,20 @@ data SndMsgData = SndMsgData
internalSndId :: InternalSndId,
internalTs :: InternalTs,
msgBody :: MsgBody,
internalHash :: MsgHash
internalHash :: MsgHash,
previousMsgHash :: MsgHash
}
data PendingMsg = PendingMsg
{ connId :: ConnId,
msgId :: InternalId
}
deriving (Show)
-- * Broadcast types
type BroadcastId = ByteString
-- * Message types
-- | A message in either direction that is stored by the agent.
@@ -240,9 +301,9 @@ data SndMsg = SndMsg
newtype InternalSndId = InternalSndId {unSndId :: Int64} deriving (Eq, Show)
data SndMsgStatus
= Created
| Sent
| Delivered
= SndMsgCreated
| SndMsgSent
| SndMsgDelivered
deriving (Eq, Show)
type SentTs = UTCTime
@@ -251,7 +312,7 @@ type DeliveredTs = UTCTime
-- | Base message data independent of direction.
data MsgBase = MsgBase
{ connAlias :: ConnAlias,
{ connAlias :: ConnId,
-- | Monotonically increasing id of a message per connection, internal to the agent.
-- Internal Id preserves ordering between both received and sent messages, and is needed
-- to track the order of the conversation (which can be different for the sender / receiver)
@@ -271,11 +332,29 @@ type InternalTs = UTCTime
-- * Store errors
-- | Agent store error.
data StoreError
= SEInternal ByteString
| SEConnNotFound
| SEConnDuplicate
| SEBadConnType ConnType
| SEBadQueueStatus -- not used, planned to check strictly
| SENotImplemented -- TODO remove
= -- | IO exceptions in store actions.
SEInternal ByteString
| -- | failed to generate unique random ID
SEUniqueID
| -- | Connection alias not found (or both queues absent).
SEConnNotFound
| -- | Connection alias already used.
SEConnDuplicate
| -- | Wrong connection type, e.g. "send" connection when "receive" or "duplex" is expected, or vice versa.
-- 'upgradeRcvConnToDuplex' and 'upgradeSndConnToDuplex' do not allow duplex connections - they would also return this error.
SEBadConnType ConnType
| -- | Confirmation not found.
SEConfirmationNotFound
| -- | Invitation not found
SEInvitationNotFound
| -- | Message not found
SEMsgNotFound
| -- | Currently not used. The intention was to pass current expected queue status in methods,
-- as we always know what it should be at any stage of the protocol,
-- and in case it does not match use this error.
SEBadQueueStatus
| -- | Used in `getMsg` that is not implemented/used. TODO remove.
SENotImplemented
deriving (Eq, Show, Exception)
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TemplateHaskell #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations
( Migration (..),
app,
initialize,
get,
run,
)
where
import Control.Monad (forM_)
import Data.FileEmbed (embedDir, makeRelativeToProject)
import Data.Function (on)
import Data.List (intercalate, sortBy)
import Data.Text (Text)
import Data.Text.Encoding (decodeUtf8)
import Data.Time.Clock (getCurrentTime)
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Connection, Only (..))
import qualified Database.SQLite.Simple as DB
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
import qualified Database.SQLite3 as SQLite3
import System.FilePath (takeBaseName, takeExtension)
data Migration = Migration {name :: String, up :: Text}
deriving (Show)
-- | The list of migrations in ascending order by date
app :: [Migration]
app =
sortBy (compare `on` name) . map migration . filter sqlFile $
$(makeRelativeToProject "migrations" >>= embedDir)
where
sqlFile (file, _) = takeExtension file == ".sql"
migration (file, qStr) = Migration {name = takeBaseName file, up = decodeUtf8 qStr}
get :: Connection -> [Migration] -> IO (Either String [Migration])
get conn migrations =
migrationsToRun migrations . map fromOnly
<$> DB.query_ conn "SELECT name FROM migrations ORDER BY name ASC;"
run :: Connection -> [Migration] -> IO ()
run conn ms = DB.withImmediateTransaction conn . forM_ ms $
\Migration {name, up} -> insert name >> execSQL up
where
insert name = DB.execute conn "INSERT INTO migrations (name, ts) VALUES (?, ?);" . (name,) =<< getCurrentTime
execSQL = SQLite3.exec $ DB.connectionHandle conn
initialize :: Connection -> IO ()
initialize conn =
DB.execute_
conn
[sql|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS migrations (
name TEXT NOT NULL,
ts TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (name)
);
|]
migrationsToRun :: [Migration] -> [String] -> Either String [Migration]
migrationsToRun appMs [] = Right appMs
migrationsToRun [] dbMs = Left $ "database version is newer than the app: " <> intercalate ", " dbMs
migrationsToRun (a : as) (d : ds)
| name a == d = migrationsToRun as ds
| otherwise = Left $ "different migration in the app/database: " <> name a <> " / " <> d
@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Schema (createSchema) where
import Database.SQLite.Simple (Connection, Query, execute_)
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
createSchema :: Connection -> IO ()
createSchema conn =
mapM_
(execute_ conn)
[ servers,
rcvQueues,
sndQueues,
connections,
messages,
rcvMessages,
sndMessages
]
-- port is either a port number or a service name, see Network.Socket.Info.ServiceName
servers :: Query
servers =
[sql|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS servers(
host TEXT NOT NULL,
port TEXT NOT NULL,
key_hash BLOB,
PRIMARY KEY (host, port)
) WITHOUT ROWID;
|]
rcvQueues :: Query
rcvQueues =
[sql|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS rcv_queues(
host TEXT NOT NULL,
port TEXT NOT NULL,
rcv_id BLOB NOT NULL,
conn_alias BLOB NOT NULL,
rcv_private_key BLOB NOT NULL,
snd_id BLOB,
snd_key BLOB,
decrypt_key BLOB NOT NULL,
verify_key BLOB,
status TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (host, port, rcv_id),
FOREIGN KEY (host, port) REFERENCES servers (host, port),
FOREIGN KEY (conn_alias)
REFERENCES connections (conn_alias)
ON DELETE CASCADE
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
UNIQUE (host, port, snd_id)
) WITHOUT ROWID;
|]
sndQueues :: Query
sndQueues =
[sql|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS snd_queues(
host TEXT NOT NULL,
port TEXT NOT NULL,
snd_id BLOB NOT NULL,
conn_alias BLOB NOT NULL,
snd_private_key BLOB NOT NULL,
encrypt_key BLOB NOT NULL,
sign_key BLOB NOT NULL,
status TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (host, port, snd_id),
FOREIGN KEY (host, port) REFERENCES servers (host, port),
FOREIGN KEY (conn_alias)
REFERENCES connections (conn_alias)
ON DELETE CASCADE
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
) WITHOUT ROWID;
|]
connections :: Query
connections =
[sql|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS connections(
conn_alias BLOB NOT NULL,
rcv_host TEXT,
rcv_port TEXT,
rcv_id BLOB,
snd_host TEXT,
snd_port TEXT,
snd_id BLOB,
last_internal_msg_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
last_internal_rcv_msg_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
last_internal_snd_msg_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
last_external_snd_msg_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
last_rcv_msg_hash BLOB NOT NULL,
last_snd_msg_hash BLOB NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (conn_alias),
FOREIGN KEY (rcv_host, rcv_port, rcv_id) REFERENCES rcv_queues (host, port, rcv_id),
FOREIGN KEY (snd_host, snd_port, snd_id) REFERENCES snd_queues (host, port, snd_id)
) WITHOUT ROWID;
|]
messages :: Query
messages =
[sql|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS messages(
conn_alias BLOB NOT NULL,
internal_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
internal_ts TEXT NOT NULL,
internal_rcv_id INTEGER,
internal_snd_id INTEGER,
body TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (conn_alias, internal_id),
FOREIGN KEY (conn_alias)
REFERENCES connections (conn_alias)
ON DELETE CASCADE,
FOREIGN KEY (conn_alias, internal_rcv_id)
REFERENCES rcv_messages (conn_alias, internal_rcv_id)
ON DELETE CASCADE
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED,
FOREIGN KEY (conn_alias, internal_snd_id)
REFERENCES snd_messages (conn_alias, internal_snd_id)
ON DELETE CASCADE
DEFERRABLE INITIALLY DEFERRED
) WITHOUT ROWID;
|]
rcvMessages :: Query
rcvMessages =
[sql|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS rcv_messages(
conn_alias BLOB NOT NULL,
internal_rcv_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
internal_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
external_snd_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
external_snd_ts TEXT NOT NULL,
broker_id BLOB NOT NULL,
broker_ts TEXT NOT NULL,
rcv_status TEXT NOT NULL,
ack_brocker_ts TEXT,
ack_sender_ts TEXT,
internal_hash BLOB NOT NULL,
external_prev_snd_hash BLOB NOT NULL,
integrity BLOB NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (conn_alias, internal_rcv_id),
FOREIGN KEY (conn_alias, internal_id)
REFERENCES messages (conn_alias, internal_id)
ON DELETE CASCADE
) WITHOUT ROWID;
|]
sndMessages :: Query
sndMessages =
[sql|
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS snd_messages(
conn_alias BLOB NOT NULL,
internal_snd_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
internal_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
snd_status TEXT NOT NULL,
sent_ts TEXT,
delivered_ts TEXT,
internal_hash BLOB NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (conn_alias, internal_snd_id),
FOREIGN KEY (conn_alias, internal_id)
REFERENCES messages (conn_alias, internal_id)
ON DELETE CASCADE
) WITHOUT ROWID;
|]
-461
View File
@@ -1,461 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveAnyClass #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DeriveGeneric #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-unticked-promoted-constructors #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Transmission where
import Control.Applicative (optional, (<|>))
import Control.Monad.IO.Class
import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 (Parser)
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.ByteString.Base64
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.Int (Int64)
import Data.Kind (Type)
import Data.Time.Clock (UTCTime)
import Data.Time.ISO8601
import Data.Type.Equality
import Data.Typeable ()
import GHC.Generics (Generic)
import Generic.Random (genericArbitraryU)
import Network.Socket
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
( CorrId (..),
Encoded,
ErrorType,
MsgBody,
MsgId,
SenderPublicKey,
)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Protocol as SMP
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
import System.IO
import Test.QuickCheck (Arbitrary (..))
import Text.Read
import UnliftIO.Exception
type ARawTransmission = (ByteString, ByteString, ByteString)
type ATransmission p = (CorrId, ConnAlias, ACommand p)
type ATransmissionOrError p = (CorrId, ConnAlias, Either AgentErrorType (ACommand p))
data AParty = Agent | Client
deriving (Eq, Show)
data SAParty :: AParty -> Type where
SAgent :: SAParty Agent
SClient :: SAParty Client
deriving instance Show (SAParty p)
deriving instance Eq (SAParty p)
instance TestEquality SAParty where
testEquality SAgent SAgent = Just Refl
testEquality SClient SClient = Just Refl
testEquality _ _ = Nothing
data ACmd = forall p. ACmd (SAParty p) (ACommand p)
deriving instance Show ACmd
data ACommand (p :: AParty) where
NEW :: SMPServer -> ACommand Client -- response INV
INV :: SMPQueueInfo -> ACommand Agent
JOIN :: SMPQueueInfo -> ReplyMode -> ACommand Client -- response OK
CON :: ACommand Agent -- notification that connection is established
-- TODO currently it automatically allows whoever sends the confirmation
-- CONF :: OtherPartyId -> ACommand Agent
-- LET :: OtherPartyId -> ACommand Client
SUB :: ACommand Client
SUBALL :: ACommand Client -- TODO should be moved to chat protocol - hack for subscribing to all
END :: ACommand Agent
-- QST :: QueueDirection -> ACommand Client
-- STAT :: QueueDirection -> Maybe QueueStatus -> Maybe SubMode -> ACommand Agent
SEND :: MsgBody -> ACommand Client
SENT :: AgentMsgId -> ACommand Agent
MSG ::
{ recipientMeta :: (AgentMsgId, UTCTime),
brokerMeta :: (MsgId, UTCTime),
senderMeta :: (AgentMsgId, UTCTime),
msgIntegrity :: MsgIntegrity,
msgBody :: MsgBody
} ->
ACommand Agent
-- ACK :: AgentMsgId -> ACommand Client
-- RCVD :: AgentMsgId -> ACommand Agent
OFF :: ACommand Client
DEL :: ACommand Client
OK :: ACommand Agent
ERR :: AgentErrorType -> ACommand Agent
deriving instance Eq (ACommand p)
deriving instance Show (ACommand p)
type Message = ByteString
data SMPMessage
= SMPConfirmation SenderPublicKey
| SMPMessage
{ senderMsgId :: AgentMsgId,
senderTimestamp :: SenderTimestamp,
previousMsgHash :: ByteString,
agentMessage :: AMessage
}
deriving (Show)
data AMessage where
HELLO :: VerificationKey -> AckMode -> AMessage
REPLY :: SMPQueueInfo -> AMessage
A_MSG :: MsgBody -> AMessage
deriving (Show)
parseSMPMessage :: ByteString -> Either AgentErrorType SMPMessage
parseSMPMessage = parse (smpMessageP <* A.endOfLine) $ AGENT A_MESSAGE
where
smpMessageP :: Parser SMPMessage
smpMessageP =
smpConfirmationP <* A.endOfLine
<|> A.endOfLine *> smpClientMessageP
smpConfirmationP :: Parser SMPMessage
smpConfirmationP = SMPConfirmation <$> ("KEY " *> C.pubKeyP <* A.endOfLine)
smpClientMessageP :: Parser SMPMessage
smpClientMessageP =
SMPMessage
<$> A.decimal <* A.space
<*> tsISO8601P <* A.space
-- TODO previous message hash should become mandatory when we support HELLO and REPLY
-- (for HELLO it would be the hash of SMPConfirmation)
<*> (base64P <|> pure "") <* A.endOfLine
<*> agentMessageP
serializeSMPMessage :: SMPMessage -> ByteString
serializeSMPMessage = \case
SMPConfirmation sKey -> smpMessage ("KEY " <> C.serializePubKey sKey) "" ""
SMPMessage {senderMsgId, senderTimestamp, previousMsgHash, agentMessage} ->
let header = messageHeader senderMsgId senderTimestamp previousMsgHash
body = serializeAgentMessage agentMessage
in smpMessage "" header body
where
messageHeader msgId ts prevMsgHash =
B.unwords [bshow msgId, B.pack $ formatISO8601Millis ts, encode prevMsgHash]
smpMessage smpHeader aHeader aBody = B.intercalate "\n" [smpHeader, aHeader, aBody, ""]
agentMessageP :: Parser AMessage
agentMessageP =
"HELLO " *> hello
<|> "REPLY " *> reply
<|> "MSG " *> a_msg
where
hello = HELLO <$> C.pubKeyP <*> ackMode
reply = REPLY <$> smpQueueInfoP
a_msg = do
size :: Int <- A.decimal <* A.endOfLine
A_MSG <$> A.take size <* A.endOfLine
ackMode = " NO_ACK" $> AckMode Off <|> pure (AckMode On)
smpQueueInfoP :: Parser SMPQueueInfo
smpQueueInfoP =
"smp::" *> (SMPQueueInfo <$> smpServerP <* "::" <*> base64P <* "::" <*> C.pubKeyP)
smpServerP :: Parser SMPServer
smpServerP = SMPServer <$> server <*> optional port <*> optional kHash
where
server = B.unpack <$> A.takeTill (A.inClass ":# ")
port = A.char ':' *> (B.unpack <$> A.takeWhile1 A.isDigit)
kHash = C.KeyHash <$> (A.char '#' *> base64P)
parseAgentMessage :: ByteString -> Either AgentErrorType AMessage
parseAgentMessage = parse agentMessageP $ AGENT A_MESSAGE
serializeAgentMessage :: AMessage -> ByteString
serializeAgentMessage = \case
HELLO verifyKey ackMode -> "HELLO " <> C.serializePubKey verifyKey <> if ackMode == AckMode Off then " NO_ACK" else ""
REPLY qInfo -> "REPLY " <> serializeSmpQueueInfo qInfo
A_MSG body -> "MSG " <> serializeMsg body <> "\n"
serializeSmpQueueInfo :: SMPQueueInfo -> ByteString
serializeSmpQueueInfo (SMPQueueInfo srv qId ek) =
B.intercalate "::" ["smp", serializeServer srv, encode qId, C.serializePubKey ek]
serializeServer :: SMPServer -> ByteString
serializeServer SMPServer {host, port, keyHash} =
B.pack $ host <> maybe "" (':' :) port <> maybe "" (('#' :) . B.unpack . encode . C.unKeyHash) keyHash
data SMPServer = SMPServer
{ host :: HostName,
port :: Maybe ServiceName,
keyHash :: Maybe C.KeyHash
}
deriving (Eq, Ord, Show)
type ConnAlias = ByteString
type OtherPartyId = Encoded
data Mode = On | Off deriving (Eq, Show, Read)
newtype AckMode = AckMode Mode deriving (Eq, Show)
data SMPQueueInfo = SMPQueueInfo SMPServer SMP.SenderId EncryptionKey
deriving (Eq, Show)
data ReplyMode = ReplyOff | ReplyOn | ReplyVia SMPServer deriving (Eq, Show)
type EncryptionKey = C.PublicKey
type DecryptionKey = C.SafePrivateKey
type SignatureKey = C.SafePrivateKey
type VerificationKey = C.PublicKey
data QueueDirection = SND | RCV deriving (Show)
data QueueStatus = New | Confirmed | Secured | Active | Disabled
deriving (Eq, Show, Read)
type AgentMsgId = Int64
type SenderTimestamp = UTCTime
data MsgIntegrity = MsgOk | MsgError MsgErrorType
deriving (Eq, Show)
data MsgErrorType = MsgSkipped AgentMsgId AgentMsgId | MsgBadId AgentMsgId | MsgBadHash | MsgDuplicate
deriving (Eq, Show)
-- | error type used in errors sent to agent clients
data AgentErrorType
= CMD CommandErrorType -- command errors
| CONN ConnectionErrorType -- connection state errors
| SMP ErrorType -- SMP protocol errors forwarded to agent clients
| BROKER BrokerErrorType -- SMP server errors
| AGENT SMPAgentError -- errors of other agents
| INTERNAL String -- agent implementation errors
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
data CommandErrorType
= PROHIBITED -- command is prohibited
| SYNTAX -- command syntax is invalid
| NO_CONN -- connection alias is required with this command
| SIZE -- message size is not correct (no terminating space)
| LARGE -- message does not fit SMP block
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
data ConnectionErrorType
= UNKNOWN -- connection alias not in database
| DUPLICATE -- connection alias already exists
| SIMPLEX -- connection is simplex, but operation requires another queue
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
data BrokerErrorType
= RESPONSE ErrorType -- invalid server response (failed to parse)
| UNEXPECTED -- unexpected response
| NETWORK -- network error
| TRANSPORT TransportError -- handshake or other transport error
| TIMEOUT -- command response timeout
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
data SMPAgentError
= A_MESSAGE -- possibly should include bytestring that failed to parse
| A_PROHIBITED -- possibly should include the prohibited SMP/agent message
| A_ENCRYPTION -- cannot RSA/AES-decrypt or parse decrypted header
| A_SIGNATURE -- invalid RSA signature
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
instance Arbitrary AgentErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary CommandErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary ConnectionErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary BrokerErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary SMPAgentError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
commandP :: Parser ACmd
commandP =
"NEW " *> newCmd
<|> "INV " *> invResp
<|> "JOIN " *> joinCmd
<|> "SUB" $> ACmd SClient SUB
<|> "SUBALL" $> ACmd SClient SUBALL -- TODO remove - hack for subscribing to all
<|> "END" $> ACmd SAgent END
<|> "SEND " *> sendCmd
<|> "SENT " *> sentResp
<|> "MSG " *> message
<|> "OFF" $> ACmd SClient OFF
<|> "DEL" $> ACmd SClient DEL
<|> "ERR " *> agentError
<|> "CON" $> ACmd SAgent CON
<|> "OK" $> ACmd SAgent OK
where
newCmd = ACmd SClient . NEW <$> smpServerP
invResp = ACmd SAgent . INV <$> smpQueueInfoP
joinCmd = ACmd SClient <$> (JOIN <$> smpQueueInfoP <*> replyMode)
sendCmd = ACmd SClient . SEND <$> A.takeByteString
sentResp = ACmd SAgent . SENT <$> A.decimal
message = do
msgIntegrity <- msgIntegrityP <* A.space
recipientMeta <- "R=" *> partyMeta A.decimal
brokerMeta <- "B=" *> partyMeta base64P
senderMeta <- "S=" *> partyMeta A.decimal
msgBody <- A.takeByteString
return $ ACmd SAgent MSG {recipientMeta, brokerMeta, senderMeta, msgIntegrity, msgBody}
replyMode =
" NO_REPLY" $> ReplyOff
<|> A.space *> (ReplyVia <$> smpServerP)
<|> pure ReplyOn
partyMeta idParser = (,) <$> idParser <* "," <*> tsISO8601P <* A.space
agentError = ACmd SAgent . ERR <$> agentErrorTypeP
msgIntegrityP :: Parser MsgIntegrity
msgIntegrityP = "OK" $> MsgOk <|> "ERR " *> (MsgError <$> msgErrorType)
where
msgErrorType =
"ID " *> (MsgBadId <$> A.decimal)
<|> "IDS " *> (MsgSkipped <$> A.decimal <* A.space <*> A.decimal)
<|> "HASH" $> MsgBadHash
<|> "DUPLICATE" $> MsgDuplicate
parseCommand :: ByteString -> Either AgentErrorType ACmd
parseCommand = parse commandP $ CMD SYNTAX
serializeCommand :: ACommand p -> ByteString
serializeCommand = \case
NEW srv -> "NEW " <> serializeServer srv
INV qInfo -> "INV " <> serializeSmpQueueInfo qInfo
JOIN qInfo rMode -> "JOIN " <> serializeSmpQueueInfo qInfo <> replyMode rMode
SUB -> "SUB"
SUBALL -> "SUBALL" -- TODO remove - hack for subscribing to all
END -> "END"
SEND msgBody -> "SEND " <> serializeMsg msgBody
SENT mId -> "SENT " <> bshow mId
MSG {recipientMeta = (rmId, rTs), brokerMeta = (bmId, bTs), senderMeta = (smId, sTs), msgIntegrity, msgBody} ->
B.unwords
[ "MSG",
serializeMsgIntegrity msgIntegrity,
"R=" <> bshow rmId <> "," <> showTs rTs,
"B=" <> encode bmId <> "," <> showTs bTs,
"S=" <> bshow smId <> "," <> showTs sTs,
serializeMsg msgBody
]
OFF -> "OFF"
DEL -> "DEL"
CON -> "CON"
ERR e -> "ERR " <> serializeAgentError e
OK -> "OK"
where
replyMode :: ReplyMode -> ByteString
replyMode = \case
ReplyOff -> " NO_REPLY"
ReplyVia srv -> " " <> serializeServer srv
ReplyOn -> ""
showTs :: UTCTime -> ByteString
showTs = B.pack . formatISO8601Millis
serializeMsgIntegrity :: MsgIntegrity -> ByteString
serializeMsgIntegrity = \case
MsgOk -> "OK"
MsgError e ->
"ERR " <> case e of
MsgSkipped fromMsgId toMsgId ->
B.unwords ["NO_ID", bshow fromMsgId, bshow toMsgId]
MsgBadId aMsgId -> "ID " <> bshow aMsgId
MsgBadHash -> "HASH"
MsgDuplicate -> "DUPLICATE"
agentErrorTypeP :: Parser AgentErrorType
agentErrorTypeP =
"SMP " *> (SMP <$> SMP.errorTypeP)
<|> "BROKER RESPONSE " *> (BROKER . RESPONSE <$> SMP.errorTypeP)
<|> "BROKER TRANSPORT " *> (BROKER . TRANSPORT <$> transportErrorP)
<|> "INTERNAL " *> (INTERNAL <$> parseRead A.takeByteString)
<|> parseRead2
serializeAgentError :: AgentErrorType -> ByteString
serializeAgentError = \case
SMP e -> "SMP " <> SMP.serializeErrorType e
BROKER (RESPONSE e) -> "BROKER RESPONSE " <> SMP.serializeErrorType e
BROKER (TRANSPORT e) -> "BROKER TRANSPORT " <> serializeTransportError e
e -> bshow e
serializeMsg :: ByteString -> ByteString
serializeMsg body = bshow (B.length body) <> "\n" <> body
tPutRaw :: Handle -> ARawTransmission -> IO ()
tPutRaw h (corrId, connAlias, command) = do
putLn h corrId
putLn h connAlias
putLn h command
tGetRaw :: Handle -> IO ARawTransmission
tGetRaw h = (,,) <$> getLn h <*> getLn h <*> getLn h
tPut :: MonadIO m => Handle -> ATransmission p -> m ()
tPut h (CorrId corrId, connAlias, command) =
liftIO $ tPutRaw h (corrId, connAlias, serializeCommand command)
-- | get client and agent transmissions
tGet :: forall m p. MonadIO m => SAParty p -> Handle -> m (ATransmissionOrError p)
tGet party h = liftIO (tGetRaw h) >>= tParseLoadBody
where
tParseLoadBody :: ARawTransmission -> m (ATransmissionOrError p)
tParseLoadBody t@(corrId, connAlias, command) = do
let cmd = parseCommand command >>= fromParty >>= tConnAlias t
fullCmd <- either (return . Left) cmdWithMsgBody cmd
return (CorrId corrId, connAlias, fullCmd)
fromParty :: ACmd -> Either AgentErrorType (ACommand p)
fromParty (ACmd (p :: p1) cmd) = case testEquality party p of
Just Refl -> Right cmd
_ -> Left $ CMD PROHIBITED
tConnAlias :: ARawTransmission -> ACommand p -> Either AgentErrorType (ACommand p)
tConnAlias (_, connAlias, _) cmd = case cmd of
-- NEW and JOIN have optional connAlias
NEW _ -> Right cmd
JOIN _ _ -> Right cmd
-- ERROR response does not always have connAlias
ERR _ -> Right cmd
-- other responses must have connAlias
_
| B.null connAlias -> Left $ CMD NO_CONN
| otherwise -> Right cmd
cmdWithMsgBody :: ACommand p -> m (Either AgentErrorType (ACommand p))
cmdWithMsgBody = \case
SEND body -> SEND <$$> getMsgBody body
MSG agentMsgId srvTS agentTS integrity body -> MSG agentMsgId srvTS agentTS integrity <$$> getMsgBody body
cmd -> return $ Right cmd
-- TODO refactor with server
getMsgBody :: MsgBody -> m (Either AgentErrorType MsgBody)
getMsgBody msgBody =
case B.unpack msgBody of
':' : body -> return . Right $ B.pack body
str -> case readMaybe str :: Maybe Int of
Just size -> liftIO $ do
body <- B.hGet h size
s <- getLn h
return $ if B.null s then Right body else Left $ CMD SIZE
Nothing -> return . Left $ CMD SYNTAX
+185 -96
View File
@@ -7,19 +7,37 @@
{-# LANGUAGE NumericUnderscores #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
-- |
-- Module : Simplex.Messaging.Client
-- Copyright : (c) simplex.chat
-- License : AGPL-3
--
-- Maintainer : chat@simplex.chat
-- Stability : experimental
-- Portability : non-portable
--
-- This module provides a functional client API for SMP protocol.
--
-- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md
module Simplex.Messaging.Client
( SMPClient (blockSize),
( -- * Connect (disconnect) client to (from) SMP server
SMPClient (blockSize),
getSMPClient,
closeSMPClient,
-- * SMP protocol command functions
createSMPQueue,
subscribeSMPQueue,
secureSMPQueue,
sendSMPMessage,
ackSMPMessage,
sendSMPCommand,
suspendSMPQueue,
deleteSMPQueue,
sendSMPCommand,
-- * Supporting types and client configuration
SMPClientError (..),
SMPClientConfig (..),
smpDefaultConfig,
@@ -35,19 +53,26 @@ import Control.Monad
import Control.Monad.Trans.Class
import Control.Monad.Trans.Except
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Map.Strict (Map)
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Data.Maybe
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
import Numeric.Natural
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Transmission (SMPServer (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol (SMPServer (..))
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport (..), TCP, THandle (..), TProxy, Transport (..), TransportError, clientHandshake, runTransportClient)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets (WS)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, liftError, raceAny_)
import System.IO
import System.Timeout
import System.Timeout (timeout)
-- | 'SMPClient' is a handle used to send commands to a specific SMP server.
--
-- The only exported selector is blockSize that is negotiated
-- with the server during the TCP transport handshake.
--
-- Use 'getSMPClient' to connect to an SMP server and create a client handle.
data SMPClient = SMPClient
{ action :: Async (),
connected :: TVar Bool,
@@ -61,23 +86,36 @@ data SMPClient = SMPClient
blockSize :: Int
}
-- | Type synonym for transmission from some SPM server queue.
type SMPServerTransmission = (SMPServer, RecipientId, Command 'Broker)
-- | SMP client configuration.
data SMPClientConfig = SMPClientConfig
{ qSize :: Natural,
defaultPort :: ServiceName,
{ -- | size of TBQueue to use for server commands and responses
qSize :: Natural,
-- | default SMP server port if port is not specified in SMPServer
defaultTransport :: (ServiceName, ATransport),
-- | timeout of TCP commands (microseconds)
tcpTimeout :: Int,
-- | period for SMP ping commands (microseconds)
smpPing :: Int,
-- | SMP transport block size, Nothing - the block size will be set by the server.
-- Allowed sizes are 4, 8, 16, 32, 64 KiB (* 1024 bytes).
smpBlockSize :: Maybe Int,
-- | estimated maximum size of SMP command excluding message body,
-- determines the maximum allowed message size
smpCommandSize :: Int
}
-- | Default SMP client configuration.
smpDefaultConfig :: SMPClientConfig
smpDefaultConfig =
SMPClientConfig
{ qSize = 16,
defaultPort = "5223",
defaultTransport = ("5223", transport @TCP),
tcpTimeout = 4_000_000,
smpPing = 30_000_000,
smpBlockSize = Just 8192,
smpCommandSize = 256
}
@@ -88,103 +126,135 @@ data Request = Request
type Response = Either SMPClientError Cmd
-- | Connects to 'SMPServer' using passed client configuration
-- and queue for messages and notifications.
--
-- A single queue can be used for multiple 'SMPClient' instances,
-- as 'SMPServerTransmission' includes server information.
getSMPClient :: SMPServer -> SMPClientConfig -> TBQueue SMPServerTransmission -> IO () -> IO (Either SMPClientError SMPClient)
getSMPClient
smpServer@SMPServer {host, port, keyHash}
SMPClientConfig {qSize, defaultPort, tcpTimeout, smpPing}
msgQ
disconnected = do
c <- atomically mkSMPClient
thVar <- newEmptyTMVarIO
action <-
async $
runTCPClient host (fromMaybe defaultPort port) (client c thVar)
`finally` atomically (putTMVar thVar $ Left SMPNetworkError)
tHandle <- tcpTimeout `timeout` atomically (takeTMVar thVar)
pure $ case tHandle of
Just (Right THandle {blockSize}) -> Right c {action, blockSize}
Just (Left e) -> Left e
Nothing -> Left SMPNetworkError
where
mkSMPClient :: STM SMPClient
mkSMPClient = do
connected <- newTVar False
clientCorrId <- newTVar 0
sentCommands <- newTVar M.empty
sndQ <- newTBQueue qSize
rcvQ <- newTBQueue qSize
return
SMPClient
{ action = undefined,
blockSize = undefined,
connected,
smpServer,
tcpTimeout,
clientCorrId,
sentCommands,
sndQ,
rcvQ,
msgQ
}
getSMPClient smpServer cfg@SMPClientConfig {qSize, tcpTimeout, smpPing, smpBlockSize} msgQ disconnected =
atomically mkSMPClient >>= runClient useTransport
where
mkSMPClient :: STM SMPClient
mkSMPClient = do
connected <- newTVar False
clientCorrId <- newTVar 0
sentCommands <- newTVar M.empty
sndQ <- newTBQueue qSize
rcvQ <- newTBQueue qSize
return
SMPClient
{ action = undefined,
blockSize = undefined,
connected,
smpServer,
tcpTimeout,
clientCorrId,
sentCommands,
sndQ,
rcvQ,
msgQ
}
client :: SMPClient -> TMVar (Either SMPClientError THandle) -> Handle -> IO ()
client c thVar h =
runExceptT (clientHandshake h keyHash) >>= \case
Right th -> clientTransport c thVar th
Left e -> atomically . putTMVar thVar . Left $ SMPTransportError e
runClient :: (ServiceName, ATransport) -> SMPClient -> IO (Either SMPClientError SMPClient)
runClient (port', ATransport t) c = do
thVar <- newEmptyTMVarIO
action <-
async $
runTransportClient (host smpServer) port' (client t c thVar)
`finally` atomically (putTMVar thVar $ Left SMPNetworkError)
bSize <- tcpTimeout `timeout` atomically (takeTMVar thVar)
pure $ case bSize of
Just (Right blockSize) -> Right c {action, blockSize}
Just (Left e) -> Left e
Nothing -> Left SMPNetworkError
clientTransport :: SMPClient -> TMVar (Either SMPClientError THandle) -> THandle -> IO ()
clientTransport c thVar th = do
atomically $ do
writeTVar (connected c) True
putTMVar thVar $ Right th
raceAny_ [send c th, process c, receive c th, ping c]
`finally` disconnected
useTransport :: (ServiceName, ATransport)
useTransport = case port smpServer of
Nothing -> defaultTransport cfg
Just "80" -> ("80", transport @WS)
Just p -> (p, transport @TCP)
send :: SMPClient -> THandle -> IO ()
send SMPClient {sndQ} h = forever $ atomically (readTBQueue sndQ) >>= tPut h
client :: forall c. Transport c => TProxy c -> SMPClient -> TMVar (Either SMPClientError Int) -> c -> IO ()
client _ c thVar h =
runExceptT (clientHandshake h smpBlockSize $ keyHash smpServer) >>= \case
Left e -> atomically . putTMVar thVar . Left $ SMPTransportError e
Right th -> do
atomically $ do
writeTVar (connected c) True
putTMVar thVar . Right $ blockSize (th :: THandle c)
raceAny_ [send c th, process c, receive c th, ping c]
`finally` disconnected
receive :: SMPClient -> THandle -> IO ()
receive SMPClient {rcvQ} h = forever $ tGet fromServer h >>= atomically . writeTBQueue rcvQ
send :: Transport c => SMPClient -> THandle c -> IO ()
send SMPClient {sndQ} h = forever $ atomically (readTBQueue sndQ) >>= tPut h
ping :: SMPClient -> IO ()
ping c = forever $ do
threadDelay smpPing
runExceptT $ sendSMPCommand c Nothing "" (Cmd SSender PING)
receive :: Transport c => SMPClient -> THandle c -> IO ()
receive SMPClient {rcvQ} h = forever $ tGet fromServer h >>= atomically . writeTBQueue rcvQ
process :: SMPClient -> IO ()
process SMPClient {rcvQ, sentCommands} = forever $ do
(_, (corrId, qId, respOrErr)) <- atomically $ readTBQueue rcvQ
cs <- readTVarIO sentCommands
case M.lookup corrId cs of
Nothing -> do
case respOrErr of
Right (Cmd SBroker cmd) -> atomically $ writeTBQueue msgQ (smpServer, qId, cmd)
-- TODO send everything else to errQ and log in agent
_ -> return ()
Just Request {queueId, responseVar} -> atomically $ do
modifyTVar sentCommands $ M.delete corrId
putTMVar responseVar $
if queueId == qId
then case respOrErr of
Left e -> Left $ SMPResponseError e
Right (Cmd _ (ERR e)) -> Left $ SMPServerError e
Right r -> Right r
else Left SMPUnexpectedResponse
ping :: SMPClient -> IO ()
ping c = forever $ do
threadDelay smpPing
runExceptT $ sendSMPCommand c Nothing "" (Cmd SSender PING)
process :: SMPClient -> IO ()
process SMPClient {rcvQ, sentCommands} = forever $ do
(_, (corrId, qId, respOrErr)) <- atomically $ readTBQueue rcvQ
if B.null $ bs corrId
then sendMsg qId respOrErr
else do
cs <- readTVarIO sentCommands
case M.lookup corrId cs of
Nothing -> sendMsg qId respOrErr
Just Request {queueId, responseVar} -> atomically $ do
modifyTVar sentCommands $ M.delete corrId
putTMVar responseVar $
if queueId == qId
then case respOrErr of
Left e -> Left $ SMPResponseError e
Right (Cmd _ (ERR e)) -> Left $ SMPServerError e
Right r -> Right r
else Left SMPUnexpectedResponse
sendMsg :: QueueId -> Either ErrorType Cmd -> IO ()
sendMsg qId = \case
Right (Cmd SBroker cmd) -> atomically $ writeTBQueue msgQ (smpServer, qId, cmd)
-- TODO send everything else to errQ and log in agent
_ -> return ()
-- | Disconnects SMP client from the server and terminates client threads.
closeSMPClient :: SMPClient -> IO ()
closeSMPClient = uninterruptibleCancel . action
-- | SMP client error type.
data SMPClientError
= SMPServerError ErrorType
| SMPResponseError ErrorType
| SMPUnexpectedResponse
| SMPResponseTimeout
| SMPNetworkError
| SMPTransportError TransportError
| SMPSignatureError C.CryptoError
= -- | Correctly parsed SMP server ERR response.
-- This error is forwarded to the agent client as `ERR SMP err`.
SMPServerError ErrorType
| -- | Invalid server response that failed to parse.
-- Forwarded to the agent client as `ERR BROKER RESPONSE`.
SMPResponseError ErrorType
| -- | Different response from what is expected to a certain SMP command,
-- e.g. server should respond `IDS` or `ERR` to `NEW` command,
-- other responses would result in this error.
-- Forwarded to the agent client as `ERR BROKER UNEXPECTED`.
SMPUnexpectedResponse
| -- | Used for TCP connection and command response timeouts.
-- Forwarded to the agent client as `ERR BROKER TIMEOUT`.
SMPResponseTimeout
| -- | Failure to establish TCP connection.
-- Forwarded to the agent client as `ERR BROKER NETWORK`.
SMPNetworkError
| -- | TCP transport handshake or some other transport error.
-- Forwarded to the agent client as `ERR BROKER TRANSPORT e`.
SMPTransportError TransportError
| -- | Error when cryptographically "signing" the command.
SMPSignatureError C.CryptoError
deriving (Eq, Show, Exception)
-- | Create a new SMP queue.
--
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#create-queue-command
createSMPQueue ::
SMPClient ->
RecipientPrivateKey ->
@@ -196,6 +266,9 @@ createSMPQueue c rpKey rKey =
Cmd _ (IDS rId sId) -> return (rId, sId)
_ -> throwE SMPUnexpectedResponse
-- | Subscribe to the SMP queue.
--
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#subscribe-to-queue
subscribeSMPQueue :: SMPClient -> RecipientPrivateKey -> RecipientId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
subscribeSMPQueue c@SMPClient {smpServer, msgQ} rpKey rId =
sendSMPCommand c (Just rpKey) rId (Cmd SRecipient SUB) >>= \case
@@ -204,15 +277,24 @@ subscribeSMPQueue c@SMPClient {smpServer, msgQ} rpKey rId =
lift . atomically $ writeTBQueue msgQ (smpServer, rId, cmd)
_ -> throwE SMPUnexpectedResponse
-- | Secure the SMP queue by adding a sender public key.
--
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#secure-queue-command
secureSMPQueue :: SMPClient -> RecipientPrivateKey -> RecipientId -> SenderPublicKey -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
secureSMPQueue c rpKey rId senderKey = okSMPCommand (Cmd SRecipient $ KEY senderKey) c rpKey rId
-- | Send SMP message.
--
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#send-message
sendSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> Maybe SenderPrivateKey -> SenderId -> MsgBody -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
sendSMPMessage c spKey sId msg =
sendSMPCommand c spKey sId (Cmd SSender $ SEND msg) >>= \case
Cmd _ OK -> return ()
_ -> throwE SMPUnexpectedResponse
-- | Acknowledge message delivery (server deletes the message).
--
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#acknowledge-message-delivery
ackSMPMessage :: SMPClient -> RecipientPrivateKey -> QueueId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
ackSMPMessage c@SMPClient {smpServer, msgQ} rpKey rId =
sendSMPCommand c (Just rpKey) rId (Cmd SRecipient ACK) >>= \case
@@ -221,9 +303,16 @@ ackSMPMessage c@SMPClient {smpServer, msgQ} rpKey rId =
lift . atomically $ writeTBQueue msgQ (smpServer, rId, cmd)
_ -> throwE SMPUnexpectedResponse
-- | Irreversibly suspend SMP queue.
-- The existing messages from the queue will still be delivered.
--
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#suspend-queue
suspendSMPQueue :: SMPClient -> RecipientPrivateKey -> QueueId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
suspendSMPQueue = okSMPCommand $ Cmd SRecipient OFF
-- | Irreversibly delete SMP queue and all messages in it.
--
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#delete-queue
deleteSMPQueue :: SMPClient -> RecipientPrivateKey -> QueueId -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO ()
deleteSMPQueue = okSMPCommand $ Cmd SRecipient DEL
@@ -233,6 +322,7 @@ okSMPCommand cmd c pKey qId =
Cmd _ OK -> return ()
_ -> throwE SMPUnexpectedResponse
-- | Send any SMP command ('Cmd' type).
sendSMPCommand :: SMPClient -> Maybe C.SafePrivateKey -> QueueId -> Cmd -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO Cmd
sendSMPCommand SMPClient {sndQ, sentCommands, clientCorrId, tcpTimeout} pKey qId cmd = do
corrId <- lift_ getNextCorrId
@@ -244,9 +334,8 @@ sendSMPCommand SMPClient {sndQ, sentCommands, clientCorrId, tcpTimeout} pKey qId
getNextCorrId :: STM CorrId
getNextCorrId = do
i <- (+ 1) <$> readTVar clientCorrId
writeTVar clientCorrId i
return . CorrId $ bshow i
i <- stateTVar clientCorrId $ \i -> (i, i + 1)
pure . CorrId $ bshow i
signTransmission :: ByteString -> ExceptT SMPClientError IO SignedRawTransmission
signTransmission t = case pKey of
+173 -35
View File
@@ -7,39 +7,52 @@
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
-- |
-- Module : Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
-- Copyright : (c) simplex.chat
-- License : AGPL-3
--
-- Maintainer : chat@simplex.chat
-- Stability : experimental
-- Portability : non-portable
--
-- This module provides cryptography implementation for SMP protocols based on
-- <https://hackage.haskell.org/package/cryptonite cryptonite package>.
module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
( PrivateKey (rsaPrivateKey),
SafePrivateKey, -- constructor is not exported
( -- * RSA keys
PrivateKey (rsaPrivateKey, publicKey),
SafePrivateKey (..), -- constructor is not exported
FullPrivateKey (..),
APrivateKey (..),
PublicKey (..),
Signature (..),
CryptoError (..),
SafeKeyPair,
FullKeyPair,
Key (..),
IV (..),
KeyHash (..),
generateKeyPair,
publicKey,
publicKey',
publicKeySize,
validKeySize,
safePrivateKey,
sign,
verify,
removePublicKey,
-- * E2E hybrid encryption scheme
encrypt,
decrypt,
-- * RSA OAEP encryption
encryptOAEP,
decryptOAEP,
-- * RSA PSS signing
Signature (..),
sign,
verify,
-- * AES256 AEAD-GCM scheme
Key (..),
IV (..),
encryptAES,
decryptAES,
serializePrivKey,
serializePubKey,
encodePubKey,
publicKeyHash,
sha256Hash,
privKeyP,
pubKeyP,
binaryPubKeyP,
authTagSize,
authTagToBS,
bsToAuthTag,
@@ -47,6 +60,23 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Crypto
randomIV,
aesKeyP,
ivP,
-- * Encoding of RSA keys
serializePrivKey,
serializePubKey,
serializePubKeyUri,
encodePubKey,
publicKeyHash,
privKeyP,
pubKeyP,
pubKeyUriP,
binaryPubKeyP,
-- * SHA256 hash
sha256Hash,
-- * Cryptography error type
CryptoError (..),
)
where
@@ -71,6 +101,7 @@ import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.Bifunctor (bimap, first)
import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA
import Data.ByteString.Base64 (decode, encode)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as U
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.ByteString.Internal (c2w, w2c)
@@ -80,70 +111,117 @@ import Data.X509
import Database.SQLite.Simple.FromField (FromField (..))
import Database.SQLite.Simple.ToField (ToField (..))
import Network.Transport.Internal (decodeWord32, encodeWord32)
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (base64P, blobFieldParser, parseAll)
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (base64P, base64UriP, blobFieldParser, parseAll, parseString)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (liftEitherError, (<$?>))
-- | A newtype of 'Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PublicKey'.
newtype PublicKey = PublicKey {rsaPublicKey :: R.PublicKey} deriving (Eq, Show)
-- | A newtype of 'Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PrivateKey', with PublicKey removed.
--
-- It is not possible to recover PublicKey from SafePrivateKey.
-- The constructor of this type is not exported.
newtype SafePrivateKey = SafePrivateKey {unPrivateKey :: R.PrivateKey} deriving (Eq, Show)
-- | A newtype of 'Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PrivateKey' (with PublicKey inside).
newtype FullPrivateKey = FullPrivateKey {unPrivateKey :: R.PrivateKey} deriving (Eq, Show)
-- | A newtype of 'Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PrivateKey' (PublicKey may be inside).
newtype APrivateKey = APrivateKey {unPrivateKey :: R.PrivateKey} deriving (Eq, Show)
-- | Type-class used for both private key types: SafePrivateKey and FullPrivateKey.
class PrivateKey k where
-- unwraps 'Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PrivateKey'
rsaPrivateKey :: k -> R.PrivateKey
-- equivalent to data type constructor, not exported
_privateKey :: R.PrivateKey -> k
-- smart constructor removing public key from SafePrivateKey but keeping it in FullPrivateKey
mkPrivateKey :: R.PrivateKey -> k
-- extracts public key from private key
publicKey :: k -> Maybe PublicKey
-- | Remove public key exponent from APrivateKey.
removePublicKey :: APrivateKey -> APrivateKey
removePublicKey (APrivateKey R.PrivateKey {private_pub = k, private_d}) =
APrivateKey $ unPrivateKey (safePrivateKey (R.public_size k, R.public_n k, private_d) :: SafePrivateKey)
instance PrivateKey SafePrivateKey where
rsaPrivateKey = unPrivateKey
_privateKey = SafePrivateKey
mkPrivateKey R.PrivateKey {private_pub = k, private_d} =
safePrivateKey (R.public_size k, R.public_n k, private_d)
publicKey _ = Nothing
instance PrivateKey FullPrivateKey where
rsaPrivateKey = unPrivateKey
_privateKey = FullPrivateKey
mkPrivateKey = FullPrivateKey
publicKey = Just . PublicKey . R.private_pub . rsaPrivateKey
instance PrivateKey APrivateKey where
rsaPrivateKey = unPrivateKey
_privateKey = APrivateKey
mkPrivateKey = APrivateKey
publicKey pk =
let k = R.private_pub $ rsaPrivateKey pk
in if R.public_e k == 0
then Nothing
else Just $ PublicKey k
instance IsString FullPrivateKey where
fromString = parseString (decode >=> decodePrivKey)
fromString = parseString $ decode >=> decodePrivKey
instance IsString PublicKey where
fromString = parseString (decode >=> decodePubKey)
parseString :: (ByteString -> Either String a) -> (String -> a)
parseString parse = either error id . parse . B.pack
fromString = parseString $ decode >=> decodePubKey
instance ToField SafePrivateKey where toField = toField . encodePrivKey
instance ToField APrivateKey where toField = toField . encodePrivKey
instance ToField PublicKey where toField = toField . encodePubKey
instance FromField SafePrivateKey where fromField = blobFieldParser binaryPrivKeyP
instance FromField APrivateKey where fromField = blobFieldParser binaryPrivKeyP
instance FromField PublicKey where fromField = blobFieldParser binaryPubKeyP
-- | Tuple of RSA 'PublicKey' and 'PrivateKey'.
type KeyPair k = (PublicKey, k)
-- | Tuple of RSA 'PublicKey' and 'SafePrivateKey'.
type SafeKeyPair = (PublicKey, SafePrivateKey)
-- | Tuple of RSA 'PublicKey' and 'FullPrivateKey'.
type FullKeyPair = (PublicKey, FullPrivateKey)
-- | RSA signature newtype.
newtype Signature = Signature {unSignature :: ByteString} deriving (Eq, Show)
instance IsString Signature where
fromString = Signature . fromString
newtype Verified = Verified ByteString deriving (Show)
-- | Various cryptographic or related errors.
data CryptoError
= RSAEncryptError R.Error
| RSADecryptError R.Error
| RSASignError R.Error
| AESCipherError CE.CryptoError
| CryptoIVError
| AESDecryptError
| CryptoLargeMsgError
| CryptoHeaderError String
= -- | RSA OAEP encryption error
RSAEncryptError R.Error
| -- | RSA OAEP decryption error
RSADecryptError R.Error
| -- | RSA PSS signature error
RSASignError R.Error
| -- | AES initialization error
AESCipherError CE.CryptoError
| -- | IV generation error
CryptoIVError
| -- | AES decryption error
AESDecryptError
| -- | message does not fit in SMP block
CryptoLargeMsgError
| -- | failure parsing RSA-encrypted message header
CryptoHeaderError String
deriving (Eq, Show, Exception)
pubExpRange :: Integer
@@ -155,6 +233,7 @@ aesKeySize = 256 `div` 8
authTagSize :: Int
authTagSize = 128 `div` 8
-- | Generate RSA key pair with either SafePrivateKey or FullPrivateKey.
generateKeyPair :: PrivateKey k => Int -> IO (KeyPair k)
generateKeyPair size = loop
where
@@ -170,8 +249,8 @@ generateKeyPair size = loop
privateKeySize :: PrivateKey k => k -> Int
privateKeySize = R.public_size . R.private_pub . rsaPrivateKey
publicKey :: FullPrivateKey -> PublicKey
publicKey = PublicKey . R.private_pub . rsaPrivateKey
publicKey' :: FullPrivateKey -> PublicKey
publicKey' = PublicKey . R.private_pub . rsaPrivateKey
publicKeySize :: PublicKey -> Int
publicKeySize = R.public_size . rsaPublicKey
@@ -180,6 +259,7 @@ validKeySize :: Int -> Bool
validKeySize = \case
128 -> True
256 -> True
384 -> True
512 -> True
_ -> False
@@ -190,10 +270,13 @@ data Header = Header
msgSize :: Int
}
-- | AES key newtype.
newtype Key = Key {unKey :: ByteString}
-- | IV bytes newtype.
newtype IV = IV {unIV :: ByteString}
-- | Key hash newtype.
newtype KeyHash = KeyHash {unKeyHash :: ByteString} deriving (Eq, Ord, Show)
instance IsString KeyHash where
@@ -203,9 +286,11 @@ instance ToField KeyHash where toField = toField . encode . unKeyHash
instance FromField KeyHash where fromField = blobFieldParser $ KeyHash <$> base64P
-- | Digest (hash) of binary X509 encoding of RSA public key.
publicKeyHash :: PublicKey -> KeyHash
publicKeyHash = KeyHash . sha256Hash . encodePubKey
-- | SHA256 digest.
sha256Hash :: ByteString -> ByteString
sha256Hash = BA.convert . (hash :: ByteString -> Digest SHA256)
@@ -221,15 +306,22 @@ headerP = do
msgSize <- fromIntegral . decodeWord32 <$> A.take 4
return Header {aesKey, ivBytes, authTag, msgSize}
-- | AES256 key parser.
aesKeyP :: Parser Key
aesKeyP = Key <$> A.take aesKeySize
-- | IV bytes parser.
ivP :: Parser IV
ivP = IV <$> A.take (ivSize @AES256)
parseHeader :: ByteString -> Either CryptoError Header
parseHeader = first CryptoHeaderError . parseAll headerP
-- * E2E hybrid encryption scheme
-- | E2E encrypt SMP agent messages.
--
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/rfcs/2021-01-26-crypto.md#e2e-encryption
encrypt :: PublicKey -> Int -> ByteString -> ExceptT CryptoError IO ByteString
encrypt k paddedSize msg = do
aesKey <- liftIO randomAesKey
@@ -239,6 +331,9 @@ encrypt k paddedSize msg = do
encHeader <- encryptOAEP k $ serializeHeader header
return $ encHeader <> msg'
-- | E2E decrypt SMP agent messages.
--
-- https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/rfcs/2021-01-26-crypto.md#e2e-encryption
decrypt :: PrivateKey k => k -> ByteString -> ExceptT CryptoError IO ByteString
decrypt pk msg'' = do
let (encHeader, msg') = B.splitAt (privateKeySize pk) msg''
@@ -247,6 +342,9 @@ decrypt pk msg'' = do
msg <- decryptAES aesKey ivBytes msg' authTag
return $ B.take msgSize msg
-- | AEAD-GCM encryption.
--
-- Used as part of hybrid E2E encryption scheme and for SMP transport blocks encryption.
encryptAES :: Key -> IV -> Int -> ByteString -> ExceptT CryptoError IO (AES.AuthTag, ByteString)
encryptAES aesKey ivBytes paddedSize msg = do
aead <- initAEAD @AES256 aesKey ivBytes
@@ -258,6 +356,9 @@ encryptAES aesKey ivBytes paddedSize msg = do
| len >= paddedSize = throwE CryptoLargeMsgError
| otherwise = return (msg <> B.replicate (paddedSize - len) '#')
-- | AEAD-GCM decryption.
--
-- Used as part of hybrid E2E encryption scheme and for SMP transport blocks decryption.
decryptAES :: Key -> IV -> ByteString -> AES.AuthTag -> ExceptT CryptoError IO ByteString
decryptAES aesKey ivBytes msg authTag = do
aead <- initAEAD @AES256 aesKey ivBytes
@@ -270,9 +371,11 @@ initAEAD (Key aesKey) (IV ivBytes) = do
cipher <- AES.cipherInit aesKey
AES.aeadInit AES.AEAD_GCM cipher iv
-- | Random AES256 key.
randomAesKey :: IO Key
randomAesKey = Key <$> getRandomBytes aesKeySize
-- | Random IV bytes for AES256 encryption.
randomIV :: IO IV
randomIV = IV <$> getRandomBytes (ivSize @AES256)
@@ -285,9 +388,11 @@ makeIV bs = maybeError CryptoIVError $ AES.makeIV bs
maybeError :: CryptoError -> Maybe a -> ExceptT CryptoError IO a
maybeError e = maybe (throwE e) return
-- | Convert AEAD 'AuthTag' to ByteString.
authTagToBS :: AES.AuthTag -> ByteString
authTagToBS = B.pack . map w2c . BA.unpack . AES.unAuthTag
-- | Convert ByteString to AEAD 'AuthTag'.
bsToAuthTag :: ByteString -> AES.AuthTag
bsToAuthTag = AES.AuthTag . BA.pack . map c2w . B.unpack
@@ -297,11 +402,17 @@ cryptoFailable = liftEither . first AESCipherError . CE.eitherCryptoError
oaepParams :: OAEP.OAEPParams SHA256 ByteString ByteString
oaepParams = OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA256
-- | RSA OAEP encryption.
--
-- Used as part of hybrid E2E encryption scheme and for SMP transport handshake.
encryptOAEP :: PublicKey -> ByteString -> ExceptT CryptoError IO ByteString
encryptOAEP (PublicKey k) aesKey =
liftEitherError RSAEncryptError $
OAEP.encrypt oaepParams k aesKey
-- | RSA OAEP decryption.
--
-- Used as part of hybrid E2E encryption scheme and for SMP transport handshake.
decryptOAEP :: PrivateKey k => k -> ByteString -> ExceptT CryptoError IO ByteString
decryptOAEP pk encKey =
liftEitherError RSADecryptError $
@@ -310,30 +421,53 @@ decryptOAEP pk encKey =
pssParams :: PSS.PSSParams SHA256 ByteString ByteString
pssParams = PSS.defaultPSSParams SHA256
-- | RSA PSS message signing.
--
-- Used by SMP clients to sign SMP commands and by SMP agents to sign messages.
sign :: PrivateKey k => k -> ByteString -> ExceptT CryptoError IO Signature
sign pk msg = ExceptT $ bimap RSASignError Signature <$> PSS.signSafer pssParams (rsaPrivateKey pk) msg
-- | RSA PSS signature verification.
--
-- Used by SMP servers to authorize SMP commands and by SMP agents to verify messages.
verify :: PublicKey -> Signature -> ByteString -> Bool
verify (PublicKey k) (Signature sig) msg = PSS.verify pssParams k msg sig
-- | Base-64 X509 encoding of RSA public key.
--
-- Used as part of SMP queue information (out-of-band message).
serializePubKey :: PublicKey -> ByteString
serializePubKey = ("rsa:" <>) . encode . encodePubKey
serializePubKeyUri :: PublicKey -> ByteString
serializePubKeyUri = ("rsa:" <>) . U.encode . encodePubKey
-- | Base-64 PKCS8 encoding of PSA private key.
--
-- Not used as part of SMP protocols.
serializePrivKey :: PrivateKey k => k -> ByteString
serializePrivKey = ("rsa:" <>) . encode . encodePrivKey
-- Base-64 X509 RSA public key parser.
pubKeyP :: Parser PublicKey
pubKeyP = decodePubKey <$?> ("rsa:" *> base64P)
pubKeyUriP :: Parser PublicKey
pubKeyUriP = decodePubKey <$?> ("rsa:" *> base64UriP)
-- Binary X509 RSA public key parser.
binaryPubKeyP :: Parser PublicKey
binaryPubKeyP = decodePubKey <$?> A.takeByteString
-- Base-64 PKCS8 RSA private key parser.
privKeyP :: PrivateKey k => Parser k
privKeyP = decodePrivKey <$?> ("rsa:" *> base64P)
-- Binary PKCS8 RSA private key parser.
binaryPrivKeyP :: PrivateKey k => Parser k
binaryPrivKeyP = decodePrivKey <$?> A.takeByteString
-- | Construct 'SafePrivateKey' from three numbers - used internally and in the tests.
safePrivateKey :: (Int, Integer, Integer) -> SafePrivateKey
safePrivateKey = SafePrivateKey . safeRsaPrivateKey
@@ -354,21 +488,25 @@ safeRsaPrivateKey (size, n, d) =
private_qinv = 0
}
-- Binary X509 encoding of 'PublicKey'.
encodePubKey :: PublicKey -> ByteString
encodePubKey = encodeKey . PubKeyRSA . rsaPublicKey
-- Binary PKCS8 encoding of 'PrivateKey'.
encodePrivKey :: PrivateKey k => k -> ByteString
encodePrivKey = encodeKey . PrivKeyRSA . rsaPrivateKey
encodeKey :: ASN1Object a => a -> ByteString
encodeKey k = toStrict . encodeASN1 DER $ toASN1 k []
-- Decoding of binary X509 'PublicKey'.
decodePubKey :: ByteString -> Either String PublicKey
decodePubKey =
decodeKey >=> \case
(PubKeyRSA k, []) -> Right $ PublicKey k
r -> keyError r
-- Decoding of binary PKCS8 'PrivateKey'.
decodePrivKey :: PrivateKey k => ByteString -> Either String k
decodePrivKey =
decodeKey >=> \case
+29 -8
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 (Parser)
import qualified Data.Attoparsec.ByteString.Char8 as A
import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import Data.ByteString.Base64
import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64.URL as U
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Char (isAlphaNum)
@@ -24,13 +25,27 @@ base64P :: Parser ByteString
base64P = decode <$?> base64StringP
base64StringP :: Parser ByteString
base64StringP = do
str <- A.takeWhile1 (\c -> isAlphaNum c || c == '+' || c == '/')
pad <- A.takeWhile (== '=')
pure $ str <> pad
base64StringP = paddedBase64 rawBase64P
base64UriP :: Parser ByteString
base64UriP = U.decode <$?> base64UriStringP
base64UriStringP :: Parser ByteString
base64UriStringP = paddedBase64 rawBase64UriP
paddedBase64 :: Parser ByteString -> Parser ByteString
paddedBase64 raw = (<>) <$> raw <*> pad
where
pad = A.takeWhile (== '=')
rawBase64P :: Parser ByteString
rawBase64P = A.takeWhile1 (\c -> isAlphaNum c || c == '+' || c == '/')
rawBase64UriP :: Parser ByteString
rawBase64UriP = A.takeWhile1 (\c -> isAlphaNum c || c == '-' || c == '_')
tsISO8601P :: Parser UTCTime
tsISO8601P = maybe (fail "timestamp") pure . parseISO8601 . B.unpack =<< A.takeTill (== ' ')
tsISO8601P = maybe (fail "timestamp") pure . parseISO8601 . B.unpack =<< A.takeTill wordEnd
parse :: Parser a -> e -> (ByteString -> Either e a)
parse parser err = first (const err) . parseAll parser
@@ -42,14 +57,20 @@ parseRead :: Read a => Parser ByteString -> Parser a
parseRead = (>>= maybe (fail "cannot read") pure . readMaybe . B.unpack)
parseRead1 :: Read a => Parser a
parseRead1 = parseRead $ A.takeTill (== ' ')
parseRead1 = parseRead $ A.takeTill wordEnd
parseRead2 :: Read a => Parser a
parseRead2 = parseRead $ do
w1 <- A.takeTill (== ' ') <* A.char ' '
w2 <- A.takeTill (== ' ')
w1 <- A.takeTill wordEnd <* A.char ' '
w2 <- A.takeTill wordEnd
pure $ w1 <> " " <> w2
wordEnd :: Char -> Bool
wordEnd c = c == ' ' || c == '\n'
parseString :: (ByteString -> Either String a) -> (String -> a)
parseString p = either error id . p . B.pack
blobFieldParser :: Typeable k => Parser k -> FieldParser k
blobFieldParser p = \case
f@(Field (SQLBlob b) _) ->
+126 -22
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,58 @@
{-# LANGUAGE UndecidableInstances #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-unticked-promoted-constructors #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol where
-- |
-- Module : Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
-- Copyright : (c) simplex.chat
-- License : AGPL-3
--
-- Maintainer : chat@simplex.chat
-- Stability : experimental
-- Portability : non-portable
--
-- Types, parsers, serializers and functions to send and receive SMP protocol commands and responses.
--
-- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md
module Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
( -- * SMP protocol types
Command (..),
Party (..),
Cmd (..),
SParty (..),
ErrorType (..),
CommandError (..),
Transmission,
SignedTransmission,
SignedTransmissionOrError,
RawTransmission,
SignedRawTransmission,
CorrId (..),
QueueId,
RecipientId,
SenderId,
RecipientPrivateKey,
RecipientPublicKey,
SenderPrivateKey,
SenderPublicKey,
Encoded,
MsgId,
MsgBody,
-- * Parse and serialize
serializeTransmission,
serializeCommand,
serializeErrorType,
transmissionP,
commandP,
errorTypeP,
-- * TCP transport functions
tPut,
tGet,
fromClient,
fromServer,
)
where
import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
import Control.Monad
@@ -29,13 +80,15 @@ import GHC.Generics (Generic)
import Generic.Random (genericArbitraryU)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (THandle, Transport, TransportError (..), tGetEncrypted, tPutEncrypted)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
import Test.QuickCheck (Arbitrary (..))
-- | SMP protocol participants.
data Party = Broker | Recipient | Sender
deriving (Show)
-- | Singleton types for SMP protocol participants.
data SParty :: Party -> Type where
SBroker :: SParty Broker
SRecipient :: SParty Recipient
@@ -43,28 +96,38 @@ data SParty :: Party -> Type where
deriving instance Show (SParty a)
-- | Type for command or response of any participant.
data Cmd = forall a. Cmd (SParty a) (Command a)
deriving instance Show Cmd
-- | SMP transmission without signature.
type Transmission = (CorrId, QueueId, Cmd)
-- | SMP transmission with signature.
type SignedTransmission = (C.Signature, Transmission)
type TransmissionOrError = (CorrId, QueueId, Either ErrorType Cmd)
-- | signed parsed transmission, with parsing error.
type SignedTransmissionOrError = (C.Signature, TransmissionOrError)
-- | unparsed SMP transmission with signature.
type RawTransmission = (ByteString, ByteString, ByteString, ByteString)
-- | unparsed SMP transmission with signature.
type SignedRawTransmission = (C.Signature, ByteString)
-- | SMP queue ID for the recipient.
type RecipientId = QueueId
-- | SMP queue ID for the sender.
type SenderId = QueueId
-- | SMP queue ID on the server.
type QueueId = Encoded
-- | Parameterized type for SMP protocol commands from all participants.
data Command (a :: Party) where
-- SMP recipient commands
NEW :: RecipientPublicKey -> Command Recipient
@@ -88,50 +151,78 @@ deriving instance Show (Command a)
deriving instance Eq (Command a)
-- | Base-64 encoded string.
type Encoded = ByteString
-- newtype to avoid accidentally changing order of transmission parts
-- | Transmission correlation ID.
--
-- A newtype to avoid accidentally changing order of transmission parts.
newtype CorrId = CorrId {bs :: ByteString} deriving (Eq, Ord, Show)
instance IsString CorrId where
fromString = CorrId . fromString
-- only used by Agent, kept here so its definition is close to respective public key
-- | Recipient's private key used by the recipient to authorize (sign) SMP commands.
--
-- Only used by SMP agent, kept here so its definition is close to respective public key.
type RecipientPrivateKey = C.SafePrivateKey
-- | Recipient's public key used by SMP server to verify authorization of SMP commands.
type RecipientPublicKey = C.PublicKey
-- only used by Agent, kept here so its definition is close to respective public key
-- | Sender's private key used by the recipient to authorize (sign) SMP commands.
--
-- Only used by SMP agent, kept here so its definition is close to respective public key.
type SenderPrivateKey = C.SafePrivateKey
-- | Sender's public key used by SMP server to verify authorization of SMP commands.
type SenderPublicKey = C.PublicKey
-- | SMP message server ID.
type MsgId = Encoded
-- | SMP message body.
type MsgBody = ByteString
-- | Type for protocol errors.
data ErrorType
= BLOCK
| CMD CommandError
| AUTH
| NO_MSG
| INTERNAL
| DUPLICATE_ -- TODO remove, not part of SMP protocol
= -- | incorrect block format, encoding or signature size
BLOCK
| -- | SMP command is unknown or has invalid syntax
CMD CommandError
| -- | command authorization error - bad signature or non-existing SMP queue
AUTH
| -- | SMP queue capacity is exceeded on the server
QUOTA
| -- | ACK command is sent without message to be acknowledged
NO_MSG
| -- | internal server error
INTERNAL
| -- | used internally, never returned by the server (to be removed)
DUPLICATE_ -- TODO remove, not part of SMP protocol
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show)
-- | SMP command error type.
data CommandError
= PROHIBITED
| KEY_SIZE
| SYNTAX
| NO_AUTH
| HAS_AUTH
| NO_QUEUE
= -- | server response sent from client or vice versa
PROHIBITED
| -- | bad RSA key size in NEW or KEY commands (only 1024, 2048 and 4096 bits keys are allowed)
KEY_SIZE
| -- | error parsing command
SYNTAX
| -- | transmission has no required credentials (signature or queue ID)
NO_AUTH
| -- | transmission has credentials that are not allowed for this command
HAS_AUTH
| -- | transmission has no required queue ID
NO_QUEUE
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show)
instance Arbitrary ErrorType where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary CommandError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
-- | SMP transmission parser.
transmissionP :: Parser RawTransmission
transmissionP = do
signature <- segment
@@ -142,6 +233,7 @@ transmissionP = do
where
segment = A.takeTill (== ' ') <* " "
-- | SMP command parser.
commandP :: Parser Cmd
commandP =
"NEW " *> newCmd
@@ -173,9 +265,12 @@ commandP =
serverError = Cmd SBroker . ERR <$> errorTypeP
-- TODO ignore the end of block, no need to parse it
-- | Parse SMP command.
parseCommand :: ByteString -> Either ErrorType Cmd
parseCommand = parse (commandP <* " " <* A.takeByteString) $ CMD SYNTAX
-- | Serialize SMP command.
serializeCommand :: Cmd -> ByteString
serializeCommand = \case
Cmd SRecipient (NEW rKey) -> "NEW " <> C.serializePubKey rKey
@@ -191,36 +286,45 @@ serializeCommand = \case
where
serializeMsg msgBody = bshow (B.length msgBody) <> " " <> msgBody <> " "
-- | SMP error parser.
errorTypeP :: Parser ErrorType
errorTypeP = "CMD " *> (CMD <$> parseRead1) <|> parseRead1
-- | Serialize SMP error.
serializeErrorType :: ErrorType -> ByteString
serializeErrorType = bshow
tPut :: THandle -> SignedRawTransmission -> IO (Either TransportError ())
-- | Send signed SMP transmission to TCP transport.
tPut :: Transport c => THandle c -> SignedRawTransmission -> IO (Either TransportError ())
tPut th (C.Signature sig, t) =
tPutEncrypted th $ encode sig <> " " <> t <> " "
-- | Serialize SMP transmission.
serializeTransmission :: Transmission -> ByteString
serializeTransmission (CorrId corrId, queueId, command) =
B.intercalate " " [corrId, encode queueId, serializeCommand command]
-- | Validate that it is an SMP client command, used with 'tGet' by 'Simplex.Messaging.Server'.
fromClient :: Cmd -> Either ErrorType Cmd
fromClient = \case
Cmd SBroker _ -> Left $ CMD PROHIBITED
cmd -> Right cmd
-- | Validate that it is an SMP server command, used with 'tGet' by 'Simplex.Messaging.Client'.
fromServer :: Cmd -> Either ErrorType Cmd
fromServer = \case
cmd@(Cmd SBroker _) -> Right cmd
_ -> Left $ CMD PROHIBITED
tGetParse :: THandle -> IO (Either TransportError RawTransmission)
-- | Receive and parse transmission from the TCP transport.
tGetParse :: Transport c => THandle c -> IO (Either TransportError RawTransmission)
tGetParse th = (>>= parse transmissionP TEBadBlock) <$> tGetEncrypted th
-- | get client and server transmissions
-- `fromParty` is used to limit allowed senders - `fromClient` or `fromServer` should be used
tGet :: forall m. MonadIO m => (Cmd -> Either ErrorType Cmd) -> THandle -> m SignedTransmissionOrError
-- | Receive client and server transmissions.
--
-- The first argument is used to limit allowed senders.
-- 'fromClient' or 'fromServer' should be used here.
tGet :: forall c m. (Transport c, MonadIO m) => (Cmd -> Either ErrorType Cmd) -> THandle c -> m SignedTransmissionOrError
tGet fromParty th = liftIO (tGetParse th) >>= decodeParseValidate
where
decodeParseValidate :: Either TransportError RawTransmission -> m SignedTransmissionOrError
+84 -31
View File
@@ -10,8 +10,20 @@
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-}
-- TODO move randomBytes to another module
module Simplex.Messaging.Server (runSMPServer, runSMPServerBlocking, randomBytes) where
-- |
-- Module : Simplex.Messaging.Server
-- Copyright : (c) simplex.chat
-- License : AGPL-3
--
-- Maintainer : chat@simplex.chat
-- Stability : experimental
-- Portability : non-portable
--
-- This module defines SMP protocol server with in-memory persistence
-- and optional append only log of SMP queue records.
--
-- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md
module Simplex.Messaging.Server (runSMPServer, runSMPServerBlocking) where
import Control.Concurrent.STM (stateTVar)
import Control.Monad
@@ -24,6 +36,7 @@ import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Functor (($>))
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Data.Time.Clock
import Network.Socket (ServiceName)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM
@@ -34,60 +47,93 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.STM (QueueStore)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
import Simplex.Messaging.Util
import UnliftIO.Async
import UnliftIO.Concurrent
import UnliftIO.Exception
import UnliftIO.IO
import UnliftIO.STM
-- | Runs an SMP server using passed configuration.
--
-- See a full server here: https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/apps/smp-server/Main.hs
runSMPServer :: (MonadRandom m, MonadUnliftIO m) => ServerConfig -> m ()
runSMPServer cfg = newEmptyTMVarIO >>= (`runSMPServerBlocking` cfg)
runSMPServer cfg = do
started <- newEmptyTMVarIO
runSMPServerBlocking started cfg
-- | Runs an SMP server using passed configuration with signalling.
--
-- This function uses passed TMVar to signal when the server is ready to accept TCP requests (True)
-- and when it is disconnected from the TCP socket once the server thread is killed (False).
runSMPServerBlocking :: (MonadRandom m, MonadUnliftIO m) => TMVar Bool -> ServerConfig -> m ()
runSMPServerBlocking started cfg@ServerConfig {tcpPort} = do
runSMPServerBlocking started cfg@ServerConfig {transports} = do
env <- newEnv cfg
runReaderT smpServer env
where
smpServer :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => m ()
smpServer :: (MonadUnliftIO m', MonadReader Env m') => m' ()
smpServer = do
s <- asks server
race_ (runTCPServer started tcpPort runClient) (serverThread s)
raceAny_ (serverThread s : map runServer transports)
`finally` withLog closeStoreLog
serverThread :: MonadUnliftIO m => Server -> m ()
serverThread Server {subscribedQ, subscribers} = forever . atomically $ do
(rId, clnt) <- readTBQueue subscribedQ
cs <- readTVar subscribers
case M.lookup rId cs of
Just Client {rcvQ} -> writeTBQueue rcvQ (CorrId B.empty, rId, Cmd SBroker END)
Nothing -> return ()
writeTVar subscribers $ M.insert rId clnt cs
runServer :: (MonadUnliftIO m', MonadReader Env m') => (ServiceName, ATransport) -> m' ()
runServer (tcpPort, ATransport t) = runTransportServer started tcpPort (runClient t)
runClient :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => Handle -> m ()
runClient h = do
serverThread :: MonadUnliftIO m' => Server -> m' ()
serverThread Server {subscribedQ, subscribers} = forever $ do
atomically updateSubscribers >>= \case
Just (rId, Client {rcvQ}) ->
void . forkIO . atomically $
writeTBQueue rcvQ (CorrId "", rId, Cmd SBroker END)
_ -> pure ()
where
updateSubscribers :: STM (Maybe (RecipientId, Client))
updateSubscribers = do
(rId, c) <- readTBQueue subscribedQ
stateTVar subscribers (\cs -> (M.lookup rId cs, M.insert rId c cs)) >>= \case
Just c' -> clientToBeNotified rId c c'
_ -> pure Nothing
clientToBeNotified :: RecipientId -> Client -> Client -> STM (Maybe (RecipientId, Client))
clientToBeNotified rId c c'@Client {connected}
| clientId c /= clientId c' = do
yes <- readTVar connected
pure $ if yes then Just (rId, c') else Nothing
| otherwise = pure Nothing
runClient :: (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => TProxy c -> c -> m ()
runClient _ h = do
keyPair <- asks serverKeyPair
liftIO (runExceptT $ serverHandshake h keyPair) >>= \case
ServerConfig {blockSize} <- asks config
liftIO (runExceptT $ serverHandshake h blockSize keyPair) >>= \case
Right th -> runClientTransport th
Left _ -> pure ()
runClientTransport :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => THandle -> m ()
runClientTransport :: (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => THandle c -> m ()
runClientTransport th = do
q <- asks $ tbqSize . config
c <- atomically $ newClient q
s <- asks server
c <- atomically $ newClient s q
raceAny_ [send th c, client c s, receive th c]
`finally` cancelSubscribers c
`finally` clientDisconnected c
cancelSubscribers :: MonadUnliftIO m => Client -> m ()
cancelSubscribers Client {subscriptions} =
readTVarIO subscriptions >>= mapM_ cancelSub
clientDisconnected :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => Client -> m ()
clientDisconnected c@Client {subscriptions, connected} = do
atomically $ writeTVar connected False
subs <- readTVarIO subscriptions
mapM_ cancelSub subs
cs <- asks $ subscribers . server
atomically . mapM_ (modifyTVar cs . M.update deleteCurrentClient) $ M.keys subs
where
deleteCurrentClient :: Client -> Maybe Client
deleteCurrentClient c'
| clientId c == clientId c' = Nothing
| otherwise = Just c'
cancelSub :: MonadUnliftIO m => Sub -> m ()
cancelSub = \case
Sub {subThread = SubThread t} -> killThread t
_ -> return ()
receive :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => THandle -> Client -> m ()
receive :: (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m, MonadReader Env m) => THandle c -> Client -> m ()
receive h Client {rcvQ} = forever $ do
(signature, (corrId, queueId, cmdOrError)) <- tGet fromClient h
t <- case cmdOrError of
@@ -95,7 +141,7 @@ receive h Client {rcvQ} = forever $ do
Right cmd -> verifyTransmission (signature, (corrId, queueId, cmd))
atomically $ writeTBQueue rcvQ t
send :: MonadUnliftIO m => THandle -> Client -> m ()
send :: (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m) => THandle c -> Client -> m ()
send h Client {sndQ} = forever $ do
t <- atomically $ readTBQueue sndQ
liftIO $ tPut h ("", serializeTransmission t)
@@ -133,6 +179,7 @@ verifyTransmission (sig, t@(corrId, queueId, cmd)) = do
cryptoVerify $ case sigLen of
128 -> dummyKey128
256 -> dummyKey256
384 -> dummyKey384
512 -> dummyKey512
_ -> dummyKey256
sigLen = B.length $ C.unSignature sig
@@ -145,6 +192,9 @@ dummyKey128 = "MIIBIDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ0AMIIBCAKBgQC2oeA7s4roXN5K2N6022I1/
dummyKey256 :: C.PublicKey
dummyKey256 = "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"
dummyKey384 :: C.PublicKey
dummyKey384 = "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"
dummyKey512 :: C.PublicKey
dummyKey512 = "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"
@@ -268,16 +318,19 @@ client clnt@Client {subscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ} Server {subscribedQ} =
QueueActive -> do
ms <- asks msgStore
msg <- mkMessage
quota <- asks $ msgQueueQuota . config
atomically $ do
q <- getMsgQueue ms (recipientId qr)
writeMsg q msg
return ok
q <- getMsgQueue ms (recipientId qr) quota
isFull q >>= \case
False -> writeMsg q msg $> ok
True -> pure $ err QUOTA
deliverMessage :: (MsgQueue -> STM (Maybe Message)) -> RecipientId -> Sub -> m Transmission
deliverMessage tryPeek rId = \case
Sub {subThread = NoSub} -> do
ms <- asks msgStore
q <- atomically $ getMsgQueue ms rId
quota <- asks $ msgQueueQuota . config
q <- atomically $ getMsgQueue ms rId quota
atomically (tryPeek q) >>= \case
Nothing -> forkSub q $> ok
Just msg -> atomically setDelivered $> mkResp corrId rId (msgCmd msg)
@@ -294,7 +347,7 @@ client clnt@Client {subscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ} Server {subscribedQ} =
subscriber :: MsgQueue -> m ()
subscriber q = atomically $ do
msg <- peekMsg q
writeTBQueue sndQ $ mkResp (CorrId B.empty) rId (msgCmd msg)
writeTBQueue sndQ $ mkResp (CorrId "") rId (msgCmd msg)
setSub (\s -> s {subThread = NoSub})
void setDelivered
+20 -9
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
module Simplex.Messaging.Server.Env.STM where
import Control.Concurrent (ThreadId)
import Control.Concurrent.STM (stateTVar)
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
import Crypto.Random
import Data.Map.Strict (Map)
@@ -18,15 +19,19 @@ import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.STM
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore (QueueRec (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.QueueStore.STM
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport)
import System.IO (IOMode (..))
import UnliftIO.STM
data ServerConfig = ServerConfig
{ tcpPort :: ServiceName,
{ transports :: [(ServiceName, ATransport)],
tbqSize :: Natural,
serverTbqSize :: Natural,
msgQueueQuota :: Natural,
queueIdBytes :: Int,
msgIdBytes :: Int,
storeLog :: Maybe (StoreLog 'ReadMode),
blockSize :: Int,
serverPrivateKey :: C.FullPrivateKey
-- serverId :: ByteString
}
@@ -43,13 +48,16 @@ data Env = Env
data Server = Server
{ subscribedQ :: TBQueue (RecipientId, Client),
subscribers :: TVar (Map RecipientId Client)
subscribers :: TVar (Map RecipientId Client),
nextClientId :: TVar Natural
}
data Client = Client
{ subscriptions :: TVar (Map RecipientId Sub),
rcvQ :: TBQueue Transmission,
sndQ :: TBQueue Transmission
sndQ :: TBQueue Transmission,
clientId :: Natural,
connected :: TVar Bool
}
data SubscriptionThread = NoSub | SubPending | SubThread ThreadId
@@ -63,14 +71,17 @@ newServer :: Natural -> STM Server
newServer qSize = do
subscribedQ <- newTBQueue qSize
subscribers <- newTVar M.empty
return Server {subscribedQ, subscribers}
nextClientId <- newTVar 0
return Server {subscribedQ, subscribers, nextClientId}
newClient :: Natural -> STM Client
newClient qSize = do
newClient :: Server -> Natural -> STM Client
newClient Server {nextClientId} qSize = do
subscriptions <- newTVar M.empty
rcvQ <- newTBQueue qSize
sndQ <- newTBQueue qSize
return Client {subscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ}
clientId <- stateTVar nextClientId $ \i -> (i, i + 1)
connected <- newTVar True
return Client {subscriptions, rcvQ, sndQ, clientId, connected}
newSubscription :: STM Sub
newSubscription = do
@@ -79,13 +90,13 @@ newSubscription = do
newEnv :: forall m. (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => ServerConfig -> m Env
newEnv config = do
server <- atomically $ newServer (tbqSize config)
server <- atomically $ newServer (serverTbqSize config)
queueStore <- atomically newQueueStore
msgStore <- atomically newMsgStore
idsDrg <- drgNew >>= newTVarIO
s' <- restoreQueues queueStore `mapM` storeLog (config :: ServerConfig)
let pk = serverPrivateKey config
serverKeyPair = (C.publicKey pk, pk)
serverKeyPair = (C.publicKey' pk, pk)
return Env {config, server, queueStore, msgStore, idsDrg, serverKeyPair, storeLog = s'}
where
restoreQueues :: QueueStore -> StoreLog 'ReadMode -> m (StoreLog 'WriteMode)
+3 -1
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
module Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore where
import Data.Time.Clock
import Numeric.Natural
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (Encoded, MsgBody, RecipientId)
data Message = Message
@@ -12,10 +13,11 @@ data Message = Message
}
class MonadMsgStore s q m | s -> q where
getMsgQueue :: s -> RecipientId -> m q
getMsgQueue :: s -> RecipientId -> Natural -> m q
delMsgQueue :: s -> RecipientId -> m ()
class MonadMsgQueue q m where
isFull :: q -> m Bool
writeMsg :: q -> Message -> m () -- non blocking
tryPeekMsg :: q -> m (Maybe Message) -- non blocking
peekMsg :: q -> m Message -- blocking
+12 -8
View File
@@ -8,11 +8,12 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore.STM where
import Data.Map.Strict (Map)
import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M
import Numeric.Natural
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (RecipientId)
import Simplex.Messaging.Server.MsgStore
import UnliftIO.STM
newtype MsgQueue = MsgQueue {msgQueue :: TQueue Message}
newtype MsgQueue = MsgQueue {msgQueue :: TBQueue Message}
newtype MsgStoreData = MsgStoreData {messages :: Map RecipientId MsgQueue}
@@ -22,13 +23,13 @@ newMsgStore :: STM STMMsgStore
newMsgStore = newTVar $ MsgStoreData M.empty
instance MonadMsgStore STMMsgStore MsgQueue STM where
getMsgQueue :: STMMsgStore -> RecipientId -> STM MsgQueue
getMsgQueue store rId = do
getMsgQueue :: STMMsgStore -> RecipientId -> Natural -> STM MsgQueue
getMsgQueue store rId quota = do
m <- messages <$> readTVar store
maybe (newQ m) return $ M.lookup rId m
where
newQ m' = do
q <- MsgQueue <$> newTQueue
q <- MsgQueue <$> newTBQueue quota
writeTVar store . MsgStoreData $ M.insert rId q m'
return q
@@ -37,15 +38,18 @@ instance MonadMsgStore STMMsgStore MsgQueue STM where
modifyTVar store $ MsgStoreData . M.delete rId . messages
instance MonadMsgQueue MsgQueue STM where
isFull :: MsgQueue -> STM Bool
isFull = isFullTBQueue . msgQueue
writeMsg :: MsgQueue -> Message -> STM ()
writeMsg = writeTQueue . msgQueue
writeMsg = writeTBQueue . msgQueue
tryPeekMsg :: MsgQueue -> STM (Maybe Message)
tryPeekMsg = tryPeekTQueue . msgQueue
tryPeekMsg = tryPeekTBQueue . msgQueue
peekMsg :: MsgQueue -> STM Message
peekMsg = peekTQueue . msgQueue
peekMsg = peekTBQueue . msgQueue
-- atomic delete (== read) last and peek next message if available
tryDelPeekMsg :: MsgQueue -> STM (Maybe Message)
tryDelPeekMsg (MsgQueue q) = tryReadTQueue q >> tryPeekTQueue q
tryDelPeekMsg (MsgQueue q) = tryReadTBQueue q >> tryPeekTBQueue q
+6
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ module Simplex.Messaging.Server.StoreLog
( StoreLog, -- constructors are not exported
openWriteStoreLog,
openReadStoreLog,
storeLogFilePath,
closeStoreLog,
logCreateQueue,
logSecureQueue,
@@ -88,6 +89,11 @@ openReadStoreLog f = do
doesFileExist f >>= (`unless` writeFile f "")
ReadStoreLog f <$> openFile f ReadMode
storeLogFilePath :: StoreLog a -> FilePath
storeLogFilePath = \case
WriteStoreLog f _ -> f
ReadStoreLog f _ -> f
closeStoreLog :: StoreLog a -> IO ()
closeStoreLog = \case
WriteStoreLog _ h -> hClose h
+206 -86
View File
@@ -9,8 +9,48 @@
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Transport where
-- |
-- Module : Simplex.Messaging.Transport
-- Copyright : (c) simplex.chat
-- License : AGPL-3
--
-- Maintainer : chat@simplex.chat
-- Stability : experimental
-- Portability : non-portable
--
-- This module defines basic TCP server and client and SMP protocol encrypted transport over TCP.
--
-- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#appendix-a
module Simplex.Messaging.Transport
( -- * Transport connection class
Transport (..),
TProxy (..),
ATransport (..),
-- * Transport over TCP
runTransportServer,
runTransportClient,
-- * TCP transport
TCP (..),
-- * SMP encrypted transport
THandle (..),
TransportError (..),
serverHandshake,
clientHandshake,
tPutEncrypted,
tGetEncrypted,
serializeTransportError,
transportErrorP,
currentSMPVersionStr,
-- * Trim trailing CR
trimCR,
)
where
import Control.Applicative ((<|>))
import Control.Monad.Except
@@ -24,8 +64,10 @@ import Data.ByteArray (xor)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Data.Functor (($>))
import Data.Maybe (fromMaybe)
import Data.Set (Set)
import qualified Data.Set as S
import Data.String
import Data.Word (Word32)
import GHC.Generics (Generic)
import GHC.IO.Exception (IOErrorType (..))
@@ -34,7 +76,7 @@ import Generic.Random (genericArbitraryU)
import Network.Socket
import Network.Transport.Internal (decodeNum16, decodeNum32, encodeEnum16, encodeEnum32, encodeWord32)
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parse, parseAll, parseRead1)
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parse, parseAll, parseRead1, parseString)
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow, liftError)
import System.IO
import System.IO.Error
@@ -42,17 +84,53 @@ import Test.QuickCheck (Arbitrary (..))
import UnliftIO.Concurrent
import UnliftIO.Exception (Exception, IOException)
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
import qualified UnliftIO.IO as IO
import UnliftIO.STM
-- * TCP transport
-- * Transport connection class
runTCPServer :: MonadUnliftIO m => TMVar Bool -> ServiceName -> (Handle -> m ()) -> m ()
runTCPServer started port server = do
class Transport c where
transport :: ATransport
transport = ATransport (TProxy @c)
transportName :: TProxy c -> String
-- | Upgrade client socket to connection (used in the server)
getServerConnection :: Socket -> IO c
-- | Upgrade server socket to connection (used in the client)
getClientConnection :: Socket -> IO c
-- | Close connection
closeConnection :: c -> IO ()
-- | Read fixed number of bytes from connection
cGet :: c -> Int -> IO ByteString
-- | Write bytes to connection
cPut :: c -> ByteString -> IO ()
-- | Receive ByteString from connection, allowing LF or CRLF termination.
getLn :: c -> IO ByteString
-- | Send ByteString to connection terminating it with CRLF.
putLn :: c -> ByteString -> IO ()
putLn c = cPut c . (<> "\r\n")
data TProxy c = TProxy
data ATransport = forall c. Transport c => ATransport (TProxy c)
-- * Transport over TCP
-- | Run transport server (plain TCP or WebSockets) on passed TCP port and signal when server started and stopped via passed TMVar.
--
-- All accepted connections are passed to the passed function.
runTransportServer :: (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m) => TMVar Bool -> ServiceName -> (c -> m ()) -> m ()
runTransportServer started port server = do
clients <- newTVarIO S.empty
E.bracket (liftIO $ startTCPServer started port) (liftIO . closeServer clients) \sock -> forever $ do
h <- liftIO $ acceptTCPConn sock
tid <- forkFinally (server h) (const $ IO.hClose h)
c <- liftIO $ acceptConnection sock
tid <- forkFinally (server c) (const $ liftIO $ closeConnection c)
atomically . modifyTVar clients $ S.insert tid
where
closeServer :: TVar (Set ThreadId) -> Socket -> IO ()
@@ -60,6 +138,8 @@ runTCPServer started port server = do
readTVarIO clients >>= mapM_ killThread
close sock
void . atomically $ tryPutTMVar started False
acceptConnection :: Transport c => Socket -> IO c
acceptConnection sock = accept sock >>= getServerConnection . fst
startTCPServer :: TMVar Bool -> ServiceName -> IO Socket
startTCPServer started port = withSocketsDo $ resolve >>= open >>= setStarted
@@ -74,17 +154,15 @@ startTCPServer started port = withSocketsDo $ resolve >>= open >>= setStarted
bind sock $ addrAddress addr
listen sock 1024
return sock
setStarted sock = atomically (putTMVar started True) >> pure sock
setStarted sock = atomically (tryPutTMVar started True) >> pure sock
acceptTCPConn :: Socket -> IO Handle
acceptTCPConn sock = accept sock >>= getSocketHandle . fst
-- | Connect to passed TCP host:port and pass handle to the client.
runTransportClient :: Transport c => MonadUnliftIO m => HostName -> ServiceName -> (c -> m a) -> m a
runTransportClient host port client = do
c <- liftIO $ startTCPClient host port
client c `E.finally` liftIO (closeConnection c)
runTCPClient :: MonadUnliftIO m => HostName -> ServiceName -> (Handle -> m a) -> m a
runTCPClient host port client = do
h <- liftIO $ startTCPClient host port
client h `E.finally` IO.hClose h
startTCPClient :: HostName -> ServiceName -> IO Handle
startTCPClient :: forall c. Transport c => HostName -> ServiceName -> IO c
startTCPClient host port = withSocketsDo $ resolve >>= tryOpen err
where
err :: IOException
@@ -95,16 +173,29 @@ startTCPClient host port = withSocketsDo $ resolve >>= tryOpen err
let hints = defaultHints {addrSocketType = Stream}
in getAddrInfo (Just hints) (Just host) (Just port)
tryOpen :: IOException -> [AddrInfo] -> IO Handle
tryOpen :: IOException -> [AddrInfo] -> IO c
tryOpen e [] = E.throwIO e
tryOpen _ (addr : as) =
E.try (open addr) >>= either (`tryOpen` as) pure
open :: AddrInfo -> IO Handle
open :: AddrInfo -> IO c
open addr = do
sock <- socket (addrFamily addr) (addrSocketType addr) (addrProtocol addr)
connect sock $ addrAddress addr
getSocketHandle sock
getClientConnection sock
-- * TCP transport
newtype TCP = TCP {tcpHandle :: Handle}
instance Transport TCP where
transportName _ = "TCP"
getServerConnection = fmap TCP . getSocketHandle
getClientConnection = getServerConnection
closeConnection = hClose . tcpHandle
cGet = B.hGet . tcpHandle
cPut = B.hPut . tcpHandle
getLn = fmap trimCR . B.hGetLine . tcpHandle
getSocketHandle :: Socket -> IO Handle
getSocketHandle conn = do
@@ -114,26 +205,27 @@ getSocketHandle conn = do
hSetBuffering h LineBuffering
return h
putLn :: Handle -> ByteString -> IO ()
putLn h = B.hPut h . (<> "\r\n")
getLn :: Handle -> IO ByteString
getLn h = trimCR <$> B.hGetLine h
-- | Trim trailing CR from ByteString.
trimCR :: ByteString -> ByteString
trimCR "" = ""
trimCR s = if B.last s == '\r' then B.init s else s
-- * Encrypted transport
-- * SMP encrypted transport
data SMPVersion = SMPVersion Int Int Int Int
deriving (Eq, Ord)
instance IsString SMPVersion where
fromString = parseString $ parseAll smpVersionP
major :: SMPVersion -> (Int, Int)
major (SMPVersion a b _ _) = (a, b)
currentSMPVersion :: SMPVersion
currentSMPVersion = SMPVersion 0 3 0 0
currentSMPVersion = "0.5.1.0"
currentSMPVersionStr :: ByteString
currentSMPVersionStr = serializeSMPVersion currentSMPVersion
serializeSMPVersion :: SMPVersion -> ByteString
serializeSMPVersion (SMPVersion a b c d) = B.intercalate "." [bshow a, bshow b, bshow c, bshow d]
@@ -143,8 +235,9 @@ smpVersionP =
let ver = A.decimal <* A.char '.'
in SMPVersion <$> ver <*> ver <*> ver <*> A.decimal
data THandle = THandle
{ handle :: Handle,
-- | The handle for SMP encrypted transport connection over Transport .
data THandle c = THandle
{ connection :: c,
sndKey :: SessionKey,
rcvKey :: SessionKey,
blockSize :: Int
@@ -162,29 +255,45 @@ data ClientHandshake = ClientHandshake
rcvKey :: SessionKey
}
-- | Error of SMP encrypted transport over TCP.
data TransportError
= TEBadBlock
| TEEncrypt
| TEDecrypt
| TEHandshake HandshakeError
= -- | error parsing transport block
TEBadBlock
| -- | block encryption error
TEEncrypt
| -- | block decryption error
TEDecrypt
| -- | transport handshake error
TEHandshake HandshakeError
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
-- | Transport handshake error.
data HandshakeError
= ENCRYPT
| DECRYPT
| VERSION
| RSA_KEY
| HEADER
| AES_KEYS
| BAD_HASH
| MAJOR_VERSION
| TERMINATED
= -- | encryption error
ENCRYPT
| -- | decryption error
DECRYPT
| -- | error parsing protocol version
VERSION
| -- | error parsing RSA key
RSA_KEY
| -- | error parsing server transport header or invalid block size
HEADER
| -- | error parsing AES keys
AES_KEYS
| -- | not matching RSA key hash
BAD_HASH
| -- | lower major agent version than protocol version
MAJOR_VERSION
| -- | TCP transport terminated
TERMINATED
deriving (Eq, Generic, Read, Show, Exception)
instance Arbitrary TransportError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
instance Arbitrary HandshakeError where arbitrary = genericArbitraryU
-- | SMP encrypted transport error parser.
transportErrorP :: Parser TransportError
transportErrorP =
"BLOCK" $> TEBadBlock
@@ -192,6 +301,7 @@ transportErrorP =
<|> "AES_DECRYPT" $> TEDecrypt
<|> TEHandshake <$> parseRead1
-- | Serialize SMP encrypted transport error.
serializeTransportError :: TransportError -> ByteString
serializeTransportError = \case
TEEncrypt -> "AES_ENCRYPT"
@@ -199,15 +309,17 @@ serializeTransportError = \case
TEBadBlock -> "BLOCK"
TEHandshake e -> bshow e
tPutEncrypted :: THandle -> ByteString -> IO (Either TransportError ())
tPutEncrypted THandle {handle = h, sndKey, blockSize} block =
-- | Encrypt and send block to SMP encrypted transport.
tPutEncrypted :: Transport c => THandle c -> ByteString -> IO (Either TransportError ())
tPutEncrypted THandle {connection = c, sndKey, blockSize} block =
encryptBlock sndKey (blockSize - C.authTagSize) block >>= \case
Left _ -> pure $ Left TEEncrypt
Right (authTag, msg) -> Right <$> B.hPut h (C.authTagToBS authTag <> msg)
Right (authTag, msg) -> Right <$> cPut c (C.authTagToBS authTag <> msg)
tGetEncrypted :: THandle -> IO (Either TransportError ByteString)
tGetEncrypted THandle {handle = h, rcvKey, blockSize} =
B.hGet h blockSize >>= decryptBlock rcvKey >>= \case
-- | Receive and decrypt block from SMP encrypted transport.
tGetEncrypted :: Transport c => THandle c -> IO (Either TransportError ByteString)
tGetEncrypted THandle {connection = c, rcvKey, blockSize} =
cGet c blockSize >>= decryptBlock rcvKey >>= \case
Left _ -> pure $ Left TEDecrypt
Right "" -> ioe_EOF
Right msg -> pure $ Right msg
@@ -232,55 +344,62 @@ makeNextIV SessionKey {baseIV, counter} = atomically $ do
(start, rest) = B.splitAt 4 $ C.unIV baseIV
iv c = C.IV $ (start `xor` encodeWord32 c) <> rest
-- | implements server transport handshake as per /rfcs/2021-01-26-crypto.md#transport-encryption
-- The numbers in function names refer to the steps in the document
serverHandshake :: Handle -> C.FullKeyPair -> ExceptT TransportError IO THandle
serverHandshake h (k, pk) = do
-- | Server SMP encrypted transport handshake.
--
-- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#appendix-a
--
-- The numbers in function names refer to the steps in the document.
serverHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> Int -> C.FullKeyPair -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle c)
serverHandshake c srvBlockSize (k, pk) = do
checkValidBlockSize srvBlockSize
liftIO sendHeaderAndPublicKey_1
encryptedKeys <- receiveEncryptedKeys_4
-- TODO server currently ignores blockSize returned by the client
-- this is reserved for future support of streams
ClientHandshake {blockSize = _, sndKey, rcvKey} <- decryptParseKeys_5 encryptedKeys
th <- liftIO $ transportHandle h rcvKey sndKey transportBlockSize -- keys are swapped here
ClientHandshake {blockSize, sndKey, rcvKey} <- decryptParseKeys_5 encryptedKeys
checkValidBlockSize blockSize
th <- liftIO $ transportHandle c rcvKey sndKey blockSize -- keys are swapped here
sendWelcome_6 th
pure th
where
sendHeaderAndPublicKey_1 :: IO ()
sendHeaderAndPublicKey_1 = do
let sKey = C.encodePubKey k
header = ServerHeader {blockSize = transportBlockSize, keySize = B.length sKey}
B.hPut h $ binaryServerHeader header <> sKey
header = ServerHeader {blockSize = srvBlockSize, keySize = B.length sKey}
cPut c $ binaryServerHeader header
cPut c sKey
receiveEncryptedKeys_4 :: ExceptT TransportError IO ByteString
receiveEncryptedKeys_4 =
liftIO (B.hGet h $ C.publicKeySize k) >>= \case
liftIO (cGet c $ C.publicKeySize k) >>= \case
"" -> throwE $ TEHandshake TERMINATED
ks -> pure ks
decryptParseKeys_5 :: ByteString -> ExceptT TransportError IO ClientHandshake
decryptParseKeys_5 encKeys =
liftError (const $ TEHandshake DECRYPT) (C.decryptOAEP pk encKeys)
>>= liftEither . parseClientHandshake
sendWelcome_6 :: THandle -> ExceptT TransportError IO ()
sendWelcome_6 th = ExceptT . tPutEncrypted th $ serializeSMPVersion currentSMPVersion <> " "
sendWelcome_6 :: THandle c -> ExceptT TransportError IO ()
sendWelcome_6 th = ExceptT . tPutEncrypted th $ currentSMPVersionStr <> " "
-- | implements client transport handshake as per /rfcs/2021-01-26-crypto.md#transport-encryption
-- The numbers in function names refer to the steps in the document
clientHandshake :: Handle -> Maybe C.KeyHash -> ExceptT TransportError IO THandle
clientHandshake h keyHash = do
-- | Client SMP encrypted transport handshake.
--
-- See https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#appendix-a
--
-- The numbers in function names refer to the steps in the document.
clientHandshake :: forall c. Transport c => c -> Maybe Int -> Maybe C.KeyHash -> ExceptT TransportError IO (THandle c)
clientHandshake c blkSize_ keyHash = do
mapM_ checkValidBlockSize blkSize_
(k, blkSize) <- getHeaderAndPublicKey_1_2
-- TODO currently client always uses the blkSize returned by the server
keys@ClientHandshake {sndKey, rcvKey} <- liftIO $ generateKeys_3 blkSize
sendEncryptedKeys_4 k keys
th <- liftIO $ transportHandle h sndKey rcvKey blkSize
let clientBlkSize = fromMaybe blkSize blkSize_
chs@ClientHandshake {sndKey, rcvKey} <- liftIO $ generateKeys_3 clientBlkSize
sendEncryptedKeys_4 k chs
th <- liftIO $ transportHandle c sndKey rcvKey clientBlkSize
getWelcome_6 th >>= checkVersion
pure th
where
getHeaderAndPublicKey_1_2 :: ExceptT TransportError IO (C.PublicKey, Int)
getHeaderAndPublicKey_1_2 = do
header <- liftIO (B.hGet h serverHeaderSize)
header <- liftIO (cGet c serverHeaderSize)
ServerHeader {blockSize, keySize} <- liftEither $ parse serverHeaderP (TEHandshake HEADER) header
when (blockSize < transportBlockSize || blockSize > maxTransportBlockSize) $
throwError $ TEHandshake HEADER
s <- liftIO $ B.hGet h keySize
checkValidBlockSize blockSize
s <- liftIO $ cGet c keySize
maybe (pure ()) (validateKeyHash_2 s) keyHash
key <- liftEither $ parseKey s
pure (key, blockSize)
@@ -298,10 +417,10 @@ clientHandshake h keyHash = do
baseIV <- C.randomIV
pure SessionKey {aesKey, baseIV, counter = undefined}
sendEncryptedKeys_4 :: C.PublicKey -> ClientHandshake -> ExceptT TransportError IO ()
sendEncryptedKeys_4 k keys =
liftError (const $ TEHandshake ENCRYPT) (C.encryptOAEP k $ serializeClientHandshake keys)
>>= liftIO . B.hPut h
getWelcome_6 :: THandle -> ExceptT TransportError IO SMPVersion
sendEncryptedKeys_4 k chs =
liftError (const $ TEHandshake ENCRYPT) (C.encryptOAEP k $ serializeClientHandshake chs)
>>= liftIO . cPut c
getWelcome_6 :: THandle c -> ExceptT TransportError IO SMPVersion
getWelcome_6 th = ExceptT $ (>>= parseSMPVersion) <$> tGetEncrypted th
parseSMPVersion :: ByteString -> Either TransportError SMPVersion
parseSMPVersion = first (const $ TEHandshake VERSION) . A.parseOnly (smpVersionP <* A.space)
@@ -310,17 +429,18 @@ clientHandshake h keyHash = do
when (major smpVersion > major currentSMPVersion) . throwE $
TEHandshake MAJOR_VERSION
checkValidBlockSize :: Int -> ExceptT TransportError IO ()
checkValidBlockSize blkSize =
when (blkSize `notElem` transportBlockSizes) . throwError $ TEHandshake HEADER
data ServerHeader = ServerHeader {blockSize :: Int, keySize :: Int}
deriving (Eq, Show)
binaryRsaTransport :: Int
binaryRsaTransport = 0
transportBlockSize :: Int
transportBlockSize = 4096
maxTransportBlockSize :: Int
maxTransportBlockSize = 65536
transportBlockSizes :: [Int]
transportBlockSizes = map (* 1024) [4, 8, 16, 32, 64]
serverHeaderSize :: Int
serverHeaderSize = 8
@@ -365,13 +485,13 @@ binaryRsaTransportP = binaryRsa =<< int16
parseClientHandshake :: ByteString -> Either TransportError ClientHandshake
parseClientHandshake = parse clientHandshakeP $ TEHandshake AES_KEYS
transportHandle :: Handle -> SessionKey -> SessionKey -> Int -> IO THandle
transportHandle h sk rk blockSize = do
transportHandle :: c -> SessionKey -> SessionKey -> Int -> IO (THandle c)
transportHandle c sk rk blockSize = do
sndCounter <- newTVarIO 0
rcvCounter <- newTVarIO 0
pure
THandle
{ handle = h,
{ connection = c,
sndKey = sk {counter = sndCounter},
rcvKey = rk {counter = rcvCounter},
blockSize
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
{-# LANGUAGE InstanceSigs #-}
module Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets (WS (..)) where
import qualified Control.Exception as E
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Network.Socket (Socket)
import Network.WebSockets
import Network.WebSockets.Stream (Stream)
import qualified Network.WebSockets.Stream as S
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (TProxy, Transport (..), TransportError (..), trimCR)
data WS = WS {wsStream :: Stream, wsConnection :: Connection}
websocketsOpts :: ConnectionOptions
websocketsOpts =
defaultConnectionOptions
{ connectionCompressionOptions = NoCompression,
connectionFramePayloadSizeLimit = SizeLimit 8192,
connectionMessageDataSizeLimit = SizeLimit 65536
}
instance Transport WS where
transportName :: TProxy WS -> String
transportName _ = "WebSockets"
getServerConnection :: Socket -> IO WS
getServerConnection sock = do
s <- S.makeSocketStream sock
WS s <$> acceptClientRequest s
where
acceptClientRequest :: Stream -> IO Connection
acceptClientRequest s = makePendingConnectionFromStream s websocketsOpts >>= acceptRequest
getClientConnection :: Socket -> IO WS
getClientConnection sock = do
s <- S.makeSocketStream sock
WS s <$> sendClientRequest s
where
sendClientRequest :: Stream -> IO Connection
sendClientRequest s = newClientConnection s "" "/" websocketsOpts []
closeConnection :: WS -> IO ()
closeConnection = S.close . wsStream
cGet :: WS -> Int -> IO ByteString
cGet c n = do
s <- receiveData (wsConnection c)
if B.length s == n
then pure s
else E.throwIO TEBadBlock
cPut :: WS -> ByteString -> IO ()
cPut = sendBinaryData . wsConnection
getLn :: WS -> IO ByteString
getLn c = do
s <- trimCR <$> receiveData (wsConnection c)
if B.null s || B.last s /= '\n'
then E.throwIO TEBadBlock
else pure $ B.init s
+11 -15
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
{-# LANGUAGE InstanceSigs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-orphans #-}
@@ -10,20 +9,6 @@ import Data.Bifunctor (first)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import UnliftIO.Async
import UnliftIO.Exception (Exception)
import qualified UnliftIO.Exception as E
newtype InternalException e = InternalException {unInternalException :: e}
deriving (Eq, Show)
instance Exception e => Exception (InternalException e)
instance (MonadUnliftIO m, Exception e) => MonadUnliftIO (ExceptT e m) where
withRunInIO :: ((forall a. ExceptT e m a -> IO a) -> IO b) -> ExceptT e m b
withRunInIO exceptToIO =
withExceptT unInternalException . ExceptT . E.try $
withRunInIO $ \run ->
exceptToIO $ run . (either (E.throwIO . InternalException) return <=< runExceptT)
raceAny_ :: MonadUnliftIO m => [m a] -> m ()
raceAny_ = r []
@@ -50,3 +35,14 @@ liftError f = liftEitherError f . runExceptT
liftEitherError :: (MonadIO m, MonadError e' m) => (e -> e') -> IO (Either e a) -> m a
liftEitherError f a = liftIOEither (first f <$> a)
tryError :: MonadError e m => m a -> m (Either e a)
tryError action = (Right <$> action) `catchError` (pure . Left)
ifM :: Monad m => m Bool -> m a -> m a -> m a
ifM ba t f = ba >>= \b -> if b then t else f
{-# INLINE ifM #-}
unlessM :: Monad m => m Bool -> m () -> m ()
unlessM b = ifM b $ pure ()
{-# INLINE unlessM #-}
-99
View File
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
# Errors
## Problems
- using numbers and strings to indicate errors (in protocol and in code) - ErrorType, AgentErrorType, TransportError
- re-using the same type in multiple contexts (with some constructors not applicable to all contexts) - ErrorType
## Error types
### ErrorType (Protocol.hs)
- BLOCK - incorrect block format, encoding or signature size
- CMD error - command is unknown or has invalid syntax, where `error` can be:
- PROHIBITED - server response sent from client or vice versa
- KEY_SIZE - bad RSA key size in NEW or KEY commands (only 1024, 2048 and 4096 bits keys are allowed)
- SYNTAX - error parsing command
- NO_AUTH - transmission has no required credentials (signature or queue ID)
- HAS_AUTH - transmission has not allowed credentials
- NO_QUEUE - transmission has not queue ID
- AUTH - command is not authorised (queue does not exist or signature verification failed).
- NO_MSG - acknowledging (ACK) the message without message
- INTERNAL - internal server error.
- DUPLICATE_ - it is used internally to signal that the queue ID is already used. This is NOT used in the protocol, instead INTERNAL is sent to the client. It has to be removed.
### AgentErrorType (Agent/Transmission.hs)
Some of these errors are not correctly serialized/parsed - see line 322 in Agent/Transmission.hs
- CMD e - command or response error
- PROHIBITED - server response sent as client command (and vice versa)
- SYNTAX - command is unknown or has invalid syntax.
- NO_CONN - connection is required in the command (and absent)
- SIZE - incorrect message size of messages (when parsing SEND and MSG)
- LARGE -- message does not fit SMP block
- CONN e - connection errors
- UNKNOWN - connection alias not in database
- DUPLICATE - connection alias already exists
- SIMPLEX - connection is simplex, but operation requires another queue
- SMP ErrorType - forwarding SMP errors (SMPServerError) to the agent client
- BROKER e - SMP server errors
- RESPONSE ErrorType - invalid SMP server response
- UNEXPECTED - unexpected response
- NETWORK - network TCP connection error
- TRANSPORT TransportError -- handshake or other transport error
- TIMEOUT - command response timeout
- AGENT e - errors of other agents
- A_MESSAGE - SMP message failed to parse
- A_PROHIBITED - SMP message is prohibited with the current queue status
- A_ENCRYPTION - cannot RSA/AES-decrypt or parse decrypted header
- A_SIGNATURE - invalid RSA signature
- INTERNAL ByteString - agent implementation or dependency error
### SMPClientError (Client.hs)
- SMPServerError ErrorType - this is correctly parsed server ERR response. This error is forwarded to the agent client as `ERR SMP err`
- SMPResponseError ErrorType - this is invalid server response that failed to parse - forwarded to the client as `ERR BROKER RESPONSE`.
- SMPUnexpectedResponse - different response from what is expected to a given command, e.g. server should respond `IDS` or `ERR` to `NEW` command, other responses would result in this error - forwarded to the client as `ERR BROKER UNEXPECTED`.
- SMPResponseTimeout - used for TCP connection and command response timeouts -> `ERR BROKER TIMEOUT`.
- SMPNetworkError - fails to establish TCP connection -> `ERR BROKER NETWORK`
- SMPTransportError e - fails connection handshake or some other transport error -> `ERR BROKER TRANSPORT e`
- SMPSignatureError C.CryptoError - error when cryptographically "signing" the command.
### StoreError (Agent/Store.hs)
- SEInternal ByteString - signals exceptions in store actions.
- SEConnNotFound - connection alias not found (or both queues absent).
- SEConnDuplicate - connection alias already used.
- SEBadConnType ConnType - wrong connection type, e.g. "send" connection when "receive" or "duplex" is expected, or vice versa. `updateRcvConnWithSndQueue` and `updateSndConnWithRcvQueue` do not allow duplex connections - they would also return this error.
- SEBadQueueStatus - the intention was to pass current expected queue status in methods, as we always know what it should be at any stage of the protocol, and in case it does not match use this error. **Currently not used**.
- SENotImplemented - used in `getMsg` that is not implemented/used.
### CryptoError (Crypto.hs)
- RSAEncryptError R.Error - RSA encryption error
- RSADecryptError R.Error - RSA decryption error
- RSASignError R.Error - RSA signature error
- AESCipherError CE.CryptoError - AES initialization error
- CryptoIVError - IV generation error
- AESDecryptError - AES decryption error
- CryptoLargeMsgError - message does not fit in SMP block
- CryptoHeaderError String - failure parsing RSA-encrypted message header
### TransportError (Transport.hs)
- TEBadBlock - error parsing block
- TEEncrypt - block encryption error
- TEDecrypt - block decryption error
- TEHandshake HandshakeError
### HandshakeError (Transport.hs)
- ENCRYPT - encryption error
- DECRYPT - decryption error
- VERSION - error parsing protocol version
- RSA_KEY - error parsing RSA key
- AES_KEYS - error parsing AES keys
- BAD_HASH - not matching RSA key hash
- MAJOR_VERSION - lower agent version than protocol version
- TERMINATED - transport terminated
+1 -3
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
#
# resolver: ./custom-snapshot.yaml
# resolver: https://example.com/snapshots/2018-01-01.yaml
resolver: lts-16.17
resolver: lts-18.21
# User packages to be built.
# Various formats can be used as shown in the example below.
@@ -36,9 +36,7 @@ packages:
#
extra-deps:
- cryptostore-0.2.1.0@sha256:9896e2984f36a1c8790f057fd5ce3da4cbcaf8aa73eb2d9277916886978c5b19,3881
- direct-sqlite-2.3.26@sha256:04e835402f1508abca383182023e4e2b9b86297b8533afbd4e57d1a5652e0c23,3718
- simple-logger-0.1.0@sha256:be8ede4bd251a9cac776533bae7fb643369ebd826eb948a9a18df1a8dd252ff8,1079
- sqlite-simple-0.4.18.0@sha256:3ceea56375c0a3590c814e411a4eb86943f8d31b93b110ca159c90689b6b39e5,3002
# - network-run-0.2.4@sha256:7dbb06def522dab413bce4a46af476820bffdff2071974736b06f52f4ab57c96,885
# - git: https://github.com/commercialhaskell/stack.git
# commit: e7b331f14bcffb8367cd58fbfc8b40ec7642100a
+347 -67
View File
@@ -2,50 +2,81 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
{-# LANGUAGE PostfixOperators #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-incomplete-uni-patterns #-}
module AgentTests where
module AgentTests (agentTests) where
import AgentTests.ConnectionRequestTests
import AgentTests.FunctionalAPITests (functionalAPITests)
import AgentTests.SQLiteTests (storeTests)
import Control.Concurrent
import Control.Monad (forM_)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import Network.HTTP.Types (urlEncode)
import SMPAgentClient
import SMPClient (testKeyHashStr)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Transmission
import SMPClient (testPort, testPort2, testStoreLogFile, withSmpServer, withSmpServerStoreLogOn)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol as A
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ErrorType (..), MsgBody)
import System.IO (Handle)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport (..), TProxy (..), Transport (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Util (bshow)
import System.Directory (removeFile)
import System.Timeout
import Test.Hspec
agentTests :: Spec
agentTests = do
agentTests :: ATransport -> Spec
agentTests (ATransport t) = do
describe "Connection request" connectionRequestTests
describe "Functional API" $ functionalAPITests (ATransport t)
describe "SQLite store" storeTests
describe "SMP agent protocol syntax" syntaxTests
describe "SMP agent protocol syntax" $ syntaxTests t
describe "Establishing duplex connection" do
it "should connect via one server and one agent" $
smpAgentTest2_1 testDuplexConnection
smpAgentTest2_1_1 $ testDuplexConnection t
it "should connect via one server and one agent (random IDs)" $
smpAgentTest2_1_1 $ testDuplexConnRandomIds t
it "should connect via one server and 2 agents" $
smpAgentTest2 testDuplexConnection
smpAgentTest2_2_1 $ testDuplexConnection t
it "should connect via one server and 2 agents (random IDs)" $
smpAgentTest2_2_1 $ testDuplexConnRandomIds t
it "should connect via 2 servers and 2 agents" $
smpAgentTest2_2_2 $ testDuplexConnection t
it "should connect via 2 servers and 2 agents (random IDs)" $
smpAgentTest2_2_2 $ testDuplexConnRandomIds t
describe "Establishing connections via `contact connection`" do
it "should connect via contact connection with one server and 3 agents" $
smpAgentTest3 $ testContactConnection t
it "should connect via contact connection with one server and 2 agents (random IDs)" $
smpAgentTest2_2_1 $ testContactConnRandomIds t
it "should support rejecting contact request" $
smpAgentTest2_2_1 $ testRejectContactRequest t
describe "Connection subscriptions" do
xit "should connect via one server and one agent" $
smpAgentTest3_1 testSubscription
it "should connect via one server and one agent" $
smpAgentTest3_1_1 $ testSubscription t
it "should send notifications to client when server disconnects" $
smpAgentServerTest testSubscrNotification
smpAgentServerTest $ testSubscrNotification t
describe "Message delivery" do
it "should deliver messages after losing server connection and re-connecting" $
smpAgentTest2_2_2_needs_server $ testMsgDeliveryServerRestart t
it "should deliver pending messages after agent restarting" $
smpAgentTest1_1_1 $ testMsgDeliveryAgentRestart t
it "should concurrently deliver messages to connections without blocking" $
smpAgentTest2_2_1 $ testConcurrentMsgDelivery t
it "should deliver messages if one of connections has quota exceeded" $
smpAgentTest2_2_1 $ testMsgDeliveryQuotaExceeded t
-- | simple test for one command with the expected response
(>#>) :: ARawTransmission -> ARawTransmission -> Expectation
command >#> response = smpAgentTest command `shouldReturn` response
-- | simple test for one command with a predicate for the expected response
(>#>=) :: ARawTransmission -> ((ByteString, ByteString, [ByteString]) -> Bool) -> Expectation
command >#>= p = smpAgentTest command >>= (`shouldSatisfy` p . \(cId, cAlias, cmd) -> (cId, cAlias, B.words cmd))
-- | receive message to handle `h`
(<#:) :: Transport c => c -> IO (ATransmissionOrError 'Agent)
(<#:) = tGet SAgent
-- | send transmission `t` to handle `h` and get response
(#:) :: Handle -> (ByteString, ByteString, ByteString) -> IO (ATransmissionOrError 'Agent)
h #: t = tPutRaw h t >> tGet SAgent h
(#:) :: Transport c => c -> (ByteString, ByteString, ByteString) -> IO (ATransmissionOrError 'Agent)
h #: t = tPutRaw h t >> (<#:) h
-- | action and expected response
-- `h #:t #> r` is the test that sends `t` to `h` and validates that the response is `r`
@@ -63,15 +94,15 @@ correctTransmission (corrId, cAlias, cmdOrErr) = case cmdOrErr of
Left e -> error $ show e
-- | receive message to handle `h` and validate that it is the expected one
(<#) :: Handle -> ATransmission 'Agent -> Expectation
h <# (corrId, cAlias, cmd) = tGet SAgent h `shouldReturn` (corrId, cAlias, Right cmd)
(<#) :: Transport c => c -> ATransmission 'Agent -> Expectation
h <# (corrId, cAlias, cmd) = (h <#:) `shouldReturn` (corrId, cAlias, Right cmd)
-- | receive message to handle `h` and validate it using predicate `p`
(<#=) :: Handle -> (ATransmission 'Agent -> Bool) -> Expectation
h <#= p = tGet SAgent h >>= (`shouldSatisfy` p . correctTransmission)
(<#=) :: Transport c => c -> (ATransmission 'Agent -> Bool) -> Expectation
h <#= p = (h <#:) >>= (`shouldSatisfy` p . correctTransmission)
-- | test that nothing is delivered to handle `h` during 10ms
(#:#) :: Handle -> String -> Expectation
(#:#) :: Transport c => c -> String -> Expectation
h #:# err = tryGet `shouldReturn` ()
where
tryGet =
@@ -80,79 +111,328 @@ h #:# err = tryGet `shouldReturn` ()
_ -> return ()
pattern Msg :: MsgBody -> ACommand 'Agent
pattern Msg msgBody <- MSG {msgBody, msgIntegrity = MsgOk}
pattern Msg msgBody <- MSG MsgMeta {integrity = MsgOk} msgBody
testDuplexConnection :: Handle -> Handle -> IO ()
testDuplexConnection alice bob = do
("1", "bob", Right (INV qInfo)) <- alice #: ("1", "bob", "NEW localhost:5000")
let qInfo' = serializeSmpQueueInfo qInfo
bob #: ("11", "alice", "JOIN " <> qInfo') #> ("11", "alice", CON)
testDuplexConnection :: Transport c => TProxy c -> c -> c -> IO ()
testDuplexConnection _ alice bob = do
("1", "bob", Right (INV cReq)) <- alice #: ("1", "bob", "NEW INV")
let cReq' = serializeConnReq cReq
bob #: ("11", "alice", "JOIN " <> cReq' <> " 14\nbob's connInfo") #> ("11", "alice", OK)
("", "bob", Right (CONF confId "bob's connInfo")) <- (alice <#:)
alice #: ("2", "bob", "LET " <> confId <> " 16\nalice's connInfo") #> ("2", "bob", OK)
bob <# ("", "alice", INFO "alice's connInfo")
bob <# ("", "alice", CON)
alice <# ("", "bob", CON)
alice #: ("2", "bob", "SEND :hello") =#> \case ("2", "bob", SENT 1) -> True; _ -> False
alice #: ("3", "bob", "SEND :how are you?") =#> \case ("3", "bob", SENT 2) -> True; _ -> False
alice #: ("3", "bob", "SEND :hello") #> ("3", "bob", MID 1)
alice <# ("", "bob", SENT 1)
bob <#= \case ("", "alice", Msg "hello") -> True; _ -> False
bob #: ("12", "alice", "ACK 1") #> ("12", "alice", OK)
alice #: ("4", "bob", "SEND :how are you?") #> ("4", "bob", MID 2)
alice <# ("", "bob", SENT 2)
bob <#= \case ("", "alice", Msg "how are you?") -> True; _ -> False
bob #: ("14", "alice", "SEND 9\nhello too") =#> \case ("14", "alice", SENT 3) -> True; _ -> False
bob #: ("13", "alice", "ACK 2") #> ("13", "alice", OK)
bob #: ("14", "alice", "SEND 9\nhello too") #> ("14", "alice", MID 3)
bob <# ("", "alice", SENT 3)
alice <#= \case ("", "bob", Msg "hello too") -> True; _ -> False
bob #: ("15", "alice", "SEND 9\nmessage 1") =#> \case ("15", "alice", SENT 4) -> True; _ -> False
alice #: ("3a", "bob", "ACK 3") #> ("3a", "bob", OK)
bob #: ("15", "alice", "SEND 9\nmessage 1") #> ("15", "alice", MID 4)
bob <# ("", "alice", SENT 4)
alice <#= \case ("", "bob", Msg "message 1") -> True; _ -> False
alice #: ("4a", "bob", "ACK 4") #> ("4a", "bob", OK)
alice #: ("5", "bob", "OFF") #> ("5", "bob", OK)
bob #: ("17", "alice", "SEND 9\nmessage 3") #> ("17", "alice", ERR (SMP AUTH))
bob #: ("17", "alice", "SEND 9\nmessage 3") #> ("17", "alice", MID 5)
bob <# ("", "alice", MERR 5 (SMP AUTH))
alice #: ("6", "bob", "DEL") #> ("6", "bob", OK)
alice #:# "nothing else should be delivered to alice"
testSubscription :: Handle -> Handle -> Handle -> IO ()
testSubscription alice1 alice2 bob = do
("1", "bob", Right (INV qInfo)) <- alice1 #: ("1", "bob", "NEW localhost:5000")
let qInfo' = serializeSmpQueueInfo qInfo
bob #: ("11", "alice", "JOIN " <> qInfo') #> ("11", "alice", CON)
bob #: ("12", "alice", "SEND 5\nhello") =#> \case ("12", "alice", SENT _) -> True; _ -> False
bob #: ("13", "alice", "SEND 11\nhello again") =#> \case ("13", "alice", SENT _) -> True; _ -> False
alice1 <# ("", "bob", CON)
testDuplexConnRandomIds :: Transport c => TProxy c -> c -> c -> IO ()
testDuplexConnRandomIds _ alice bob = do
("1", bobConn, Right (INV cReq)) <- alice #: ("1", "", "NEW INV")
let cReq' = serializeConnReq cReq
("11", aliceConn, Right OK) <- bob #: ("11", "", "JOIN " <> cReq' <> " 14\nbob's connInfo")
("", bobConn', Right (CONF confId "bob's connInfo")) <- (alice <#:)
bobConn' `shouldBe` bobConn
alice #: ("2", bobConn, "LET " <> confId <> " 16\nalice's connInfo") =#> \case ("2", c, OK) -> c == bobConn; _ -> False
bob <# ("", aliceConn, INFO "alice's connInfo")
bob <# ("", aliceConn, CON)
alice <# ("", bobConn, CON)
alice #: ("2", bobConn, "SEND :hello") #> ("2", bobConn, MID 1)
alice <# ("", bobConn, SENT 1)
bob <#= \case ("", c, Msg "hello") -> c == aliceConn; _ -> False
bob #: ("12", aliceConn, "ACK 1") #> ("12", aliceConn, OK)
alice #: ("3", bobConn, "SEND :how are you?") #> ("3", bobConn, MID 2)
alice <# ("", bobConn, SENT 2)
bob <#= \case ("", c, Msg "how are you?") -> c == aliceConn; _ -> False
bob #: ("13", aliceConn, "ACK 2") #> ("13", aliceConn, OK)
bob #: ("14", aliceConn, "SEND 9\nhello too") #> ("14", aliceConn, MID 3)
bob <# ("", aliceConn, SENT 3)
alice <#= \case ("", c, Msg "hello too") -> c == bobConn; _ -> False
alice #: ("3a", bobConn, "ACK 3") #> ("3a", bobConn, OK)
bob #: ("15", aliceConn, "SEND 9\nmessage 1") #> ("15", aliceConn, MID 4)
bob <# ("", aliceConn, SENT 4)
alice <#= \case ("", c, Msg "message 1") -> c == bobConn; _ -> False
alice #: ("4a", bobConn, "ACK 4") #> ("4a", bobConn, OK)
alice #: ("5", bobConn, "OFF") #> ("5", bobConn, OK)
bob #: ("17", aliceConn, "SEND 9\nmessage 3") #> ("17", aliceConn, MID 5)
bob <# ("", aliceConn, MERR 5 (SMP AUTH))
alice #: ("6", bobConn, "DEL") #> ("6", bobConn, OK)
alice #:# "nothing else should be delivered to alice"
testContactConnection :: Transport c => TProxy c -> c -> c -> c -> IO ()
testContactConnection _ alice bob tom = do
("1", "alice_contact", Right (INV cReq)) <- alice #: ("1", "alice_contact", "NEW CON")
let cReq' = serializeConnReq cReq
bob #: ("11", "alice", "JOIN " <> cReq' <> " 14\nbob's connInfo") #> ("11", "alice", OK)
("", "alice_contact", Right (REQ aInvId "bob's connInfo")) <- (alice <#:)
alice #: ("2", "bob", "ACPT " <> aInvId <> " 16\nalice's connInfo") #> ("2", "bob", OK)
("", "alice", Right (CONF bConfId "alice's connInfo")) <- (bob <#:)
bob #: ("12", "alice", "LET " <> bConfId <> " 16\nbob's connInfo 2") #> ("12", "alice", OK)
alice <# ("", "bob", INFO "bob's connInfo 2")
alice <# ("", "bob", CON)
bob <# ("", "alice", CON)
alice #: ("3", "bob", "SEND :hi") #> ("3", "bob", MID 1)
alice <# ("", "bob", SENT 1)
bob <#= \case ("", "alice", Msg "hi") -> True; _ -> False
bob #: ("13", "alice", "ACK 1") #> ("13", "alice", OK)
tom #: ("21", "alice", "JOIN " <> cReq' <> " 14\ntom's connInfo") #> ("21", "alice", OK)
("", "alice_contact", Right (REQ aInvId' "tom's connInfo")) <- (alice <#:)
alice #: ("4", "tom", "ACPT " <> aInvId' <> " 16\nalice's connInfo") #> ("4", "tom", OK)
("", "alice", Right (CONF tConfId "alice's connInfo")) <- (tom <#:)
tom #: ("22", "alice", "LET " <> tConfId <> " 16\ntom's connInfo 2") #> ("22", "alice", OK)
alice <# ("", "tom", INFO "tom's connInfo 2")
alice <# ("", "tom", CON)
tom <# ("", "alice", CON)
alice #: ("5", "tom", "SEND :hi there") #> ("5", "tom", MID 1)
alice <# ("", "tom", SENT 1)
tom <#= \case ("", "alice", Msg "hi there") -> True; _ -> False
tom #: ("23", "alice", "ACK 1") #> ("23", "alice", OK)
testContactConnRandomIds :: Transport c => TProxy c -> c -> c -> IO ()
testContactConnRandomIds _ alice bob = do
("1", aliceContact, Right (INV cReq)) <- alice #: ("1", "", "NEW CON")
let cReq' = serializeConnReq cReq
("11", aliceConn, Right OK) <- bob #: ("11", "", "JOIN " <> cReq' <> " 14\nbob's connInfo")
("", aliceContact', Right (REQ aInvId "bob's connInfo")) <- (alice <#:)
aliceContact' `shouldBe` aliceContact
("2", bobConn, Right OK) <- alice #: ("2", "", "ACPT " <> aInvId <> " 16\nalice's connInfo")
("", aliceConn', Right (CONF bConfId "alice's connInfo")) <- (bob <#:)
aliceConn' `shouldBe` aliceConn
bob #: ("12", aliceConn, "LET " <> bConfId <> " 16\nbob's connInfo 2") #> ("12", aliceConn, OK)
alice <# ("", bobConn, INFO "bob's connInfo 2")
alice <# ("", bobConn, CON)
bob <# ("", aliceConn, CON)
alice #: ("3", bobConn, "SEND :hi") #> ("3", bobConn, MID 1)
alice <# ("", bobConn, SENT 1)
bob <#= \case ("", c, Msg "hi") -> c == aliceConn; _ -> False
bob #: ("13", aliceConn, "ACK 1") #> ("13", aliceConn, OK)
testRejectContactRequest :: Transport c => TProxy c -> c -> c -> IO ()
testRejectContactRequest _ alice bob = do
("1", "a_contact", Right (INV cReq)) <- alice #: ("1", "a_contact", "NEW CON")
let cReq' = serializeConnReq cReq
bob #: ("11", "alice", "JOIN " <> cReq' <> " 10\nbob's info") #> ("11", "alice", OK)
("", "a_contact", Right (REQ aInvId "bob's info")) <- (alice <#:)
-- RJCT must use correct contact connection
alice #: ("2a", "bob", "RJCT " <> aInvId) #> ("2a", "bob", ERR $ CONN NOT_FOUND)
alice #: ("2b", "a_contact", "RJCT " <> aInvId) #> ("2b", "a_contact", OK)
alice #: ("3", "bob", "ACPT " <> aInvId <> " 12\nalice's info") #> ("3", "bob", ERR $ A.CMD PROHIBITED)
bob #:# "nothing should be delivered to bob"
testSubscription :: Transport c => TProxy c -> c -> c -> c -> IO ()
testSubscription _ alice1 alice2 bob = do
(alice1, "alice") `connect` (bob, "bob")
bob #: ("12", "alice", "SEND 5\nhello") #> ("12", "alice", MID 1)
bob <# ("", "alice", SENT 1)
alice1 <#= \case ("", "bob", Msg "hello") -> True; _ -> False
-- alice1 <#= \case ("", "bob", Msg "hello again") -> True; _ -> False
t <- tGet SAgent alice1
print t
t `shouldSatisfy` (\case ("", "bob", Msg "hello again") -> True; _ -> False) . correctTransmission
alice1 #: ("1", "bob", "ACK 1") #> ("1", "bob", OK)
bob #: ("13", "alice", "SEND 11\nhello again") #> ("13", "alice", MID 2)
bob <# ("", "alice", SENT 2)
alice1 <#= \case ("", "bob", Msg "hello again") -> True; _ -> False
alice1 #: ("2", "bob", "ACK 2") #> ("2", "bob", OK)
alice2 #: ("21", "bob", "SUB") #> ("21", "bob", OK)
alice1 <# ("", "bob", END)
bob #: ("14", "alice", "SEND 2\nhi") =#> \case ("14", "alice", SENT _) -> True; _ -> False
bob #: ("14", "alice", "SEND 2\nhi") #> ("14", "alice", MID 3)
bob <# ("", "alice", SENT 3)
alice2 <#= \case ("", "bob", Msg "hi") -> True; _ -> False
alice2 #: ("22", "bob", "ACK 3") #> ("22", "bob", OK)
alice1 #:# "nothing else should be delivered to alice1"
testSubscrNotification :: (ThreadId, ThreadId) -> Handle -> IO ()
testSubscrNotification (server, _) client = do
client #: ("1", "conn1", "NEW localhost:5000") =#> \case ("1", "conn1", INV _) -> True; _ -> False
testSubscrNotification :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (ThreadId, ThreadId) -> c -> IO ()
testSubscrNotification t (server, _) client = do
client #: ("1", "conn1", "NEW INV") =#> \case ("1", "conn1", INV {}) -> True; _ -> False
client #:# "nothing should be delivered to client before the server is killed"
killThread server
client <# ("", "conn1", END)
client <# ("", "conn1", DOWN)
withSmpServer (ATransport t) $
client <# ("", "conn1", ERR (SMP AUTH)) -- this new server does not have the queue
testMsgDeliveryServerRestart :: Transport c => TProxy c -> c -> c -> IO ()
testMsgDeliveryServerRestart t alice bob = do
withServer $ do
connect (alice, "alice") (bob, "bob")
bob #: ("1", "alice", "SEND 2\nhi") #> ("1", "alice", MID 1)
bob <# ("", "alice", SENT 1)
alice <#= \case ("", "bob", Msg "hi") -> True; _ -> False
alice #: ("11", "bob", "ACK 1") #> ("11", "bob", OK)
alice #:# "nothing else delivered before the server is killed"
alice <# ("", "bob", DOWN)
bob #: ("2", "alice", "SEND 11\nhello again") #> ("2", "alice", MID 2)
bob #:# "nothing else delivered before the server is restarted"
alice #:# "nothing else delivered before the server is restarted"
withServer $ do
bob <# ("", "alice", SENT 2)
alice <# ("", "bob", UP)
alice <#= \case ("", "bob", Msg "hello again") -> True; _ -> False
alice #: ("12", "bob", "ACK 2") #> ("12", "bob", OK)
removeFile testStoreLogFile
where
withServer test' = withSmpServerStoreLogOn (ATransport t) testPort2 (const test') `shouldReturn` ()
testMsgDeliveryAgentRestart :: Transport c => TProxy c -> c -> IO ()
testMsgDeliveryAgentRestart t bob = do
withAgent $ \alice -> do
withServer $ do
connect (bob, "bob") (alice, "alice")
alice #: ("1", "bob", "SEND 5\nhello") #> ("1", "bob", MID 1)
alice <# ("", "bob", SENT 1)
bob <#= \case ("", "alice", Msg "hello") -> True; _ -> False
bob #: ("11", "alice", "ACK 1") #> ("11", "alice", OK)
bob #:# "nothing else delivered before the server is down"
bob <# ("", "alice", DOWN)
alice #: ("2", "bob", "SEND 11\nhello again") #> ("2", "bob", MID 2)
alice #:# "nothing else delivered before the server is restarted"
bob #:# "nothing else delivered before the server is restarted"
withAgent $ \alice -> do
withServer $ do
tPutRaw alice ("3", "bob", "SUB")
alice <#= \case
(corrId, "bob", cmd) ->
(corrId == "3" && cmd == OK)
|| (corrId == "" && cmd == SENT 2)
_ -> False
bob <# ("", "alice", UP)
bob <#= \case ("", "alice", Msg "hello again") -> True; _ -> False
bob #: ("12", "alice", "ACK 2") #> ("12", "alice", OK)
removeFile testStoreLogFile
removeFile testDB
where
withServer test' = withSmpServerStoreLogOn (ATransport t) testPort2 (const test') `shouldReturn` ()
withAgent = withSmpAgentThreadOn_ (ATransport t) (agentTestPort, testPort, testDB) (pure ()) . const . testSMPAgentClientOn agentTestPort
testConcurrentMsgDelivery :: Transport c => TProxy c -> c -> c -> IO ()
testConcurrentMsgDelivery _ alice bob = do
connect (alice, "alice") (bob, "bob")
("1", "bob2", Right (INV cReq)) <- alice #: ("1", "bob2", "NEW INV")
let cReq' = serializeConnReq cReq
bob #: ("11", "alice2", "JOIN " <> cReq' <> " 14\nbob's connInfo") #> ("11", "alice2", OK)
("", "bob2", Right (CONF _confId "bob's connInfo")) <- (alice <#:)
-- below commands would be needed to accept bob's connection, but alice does not
-- alice #: ("2", "bob", "LET " <> _confId <> " 16\nalice's connInfo") #> ("2", "bob", OK)
-- bob <# ("", "alice", INFO "alice's connInfo")
-- bob <# ("", "alice", CON)
-- alice <# ("", "bob", CON)
-- the first connection should not be blocked by the second one
sendMessage (alice, "alice") (bob, "bob") "hello"
-- alice #: ("2", "bob", "SEND :hello") #> ("2", "bob", MID 1)
-- alice <# ("", "bob", SENT 1)
-- bob <#= \case ("", "alice", Msg "hello") -> True; _ -> False
-- bob #: ("12", "alice", "ACK 1") #> ("12", "alice", OK)
bob #: ("14", "alice", "SEND 9\nhello too") #> ("14", "alice", MID 2)
bob <# ("", "alice", SENT 2)
-- if delivery is blocked it won't go further
alice <#= \case ("", "bob", Msg "hello too") -> True; _ -> False
alice #: ("3", "bob", "ACK 2") #> ("3", "bob", OK)
testMsgDeliveryQuotaExceeded :: Transport c => TProxy c -> c -> c -> IO ()
testMsgDeliveryQuotaExceeded _ alice bob = do
connect (alice, "alice") (bob, "bob")
connect (alice, "alice2") (bob, "bob2")
forM_ [1 .. 4 :: Int] $ \i -> do
let corrId = bshow i
msg = "message " <> bshow i
(_, "bob", Right (MID mId)) <- alice #: (corrId, "bob", "SEND :" <> msg)
alice <#= \case ("", "bob", SENT m) -> m == mId; _ -> False
(_, "bob", Right (MID _)) <- alice #: ("5", "bob", "SEND :over quota")
alice #: ("1", "bob2", "SEND :hello") #> ("1", "bob2", MID 1)
-- if delivery is blocked it won't go further
alice <# ("", "bob2", SENT 1)
connect :: forall c. Transport c => (c, ByteString) -> (c, ByteString) -> IO ()
connect (h1, name1) (h2, name2) = do
("c1", _, Right (INV cReq)) <- h1 #: ("c1", name2, "NEW INV")
let cReq' = serializeConnReq cReq
h2 #: ("c2", name1, "JOIN " <> cReq' <> " 5\ninfo2") #> ("c2", name1, OK)
("", _, Right (CONF connId "info2")) <- (h1 <#:)
h1 #: ("c3", name2, "LET " <> connId <> " 5\ninfo1") #> ("c3", name2, OK)
h2 <# ("", name1, INFO "info1")
h2 <# ("", name1, CON)
h1 <# ("", name2, CON)
sendMessage :: Transport c => (c, ConnId) -> (c, ConnId) -> ByteString -> IO ()
sendMessage (h1, name1) (h2, name2) msg = do
("m1", name2', Right (MID mId)) <- h1 #: ("m1", name2, "SEND :" <> msg)
name2' `shouldBe` name2
h1 <#= \case ("", n, SENT m) -> n == name2 && m == mId; _ -> False
("", name1', Right (MSG MsgMeta {recipient = (msgId, _)} msg')) <- (h2 <#:)
name1' `shouldBe` name1
msg' `shouldBe` msg
h2 #: ("m2", name1, "ACK " <> bshow msgId) =#> \case ("m2", n, OK) -> n == name1; _ -> False
-- connect' :: forall c. Transport c => c -> c -> IO (ByteString, ByteString)
-- connect' h1 h2 = do
-- ("c1", conn2, Right (INV cReq)) <- h1 #: ("c1", "", "NEW INV")
-- let cReq' = serializeConnReq cReq
-- ("c2", conn1, Right OK) <- h2 #: ("c2", "", "JOIN " <> cReq' <> " 5\ninfo2")
-- ("", _, Right (REQ connId "info2")) <- (h1 <#:)
-- h1 #: ("c3", conn2, "ACPT " <> connId <> " 5\ninfo1") =#> \case ("c3", c, OK) -> c == conn2; _ -> False
-- h2 <# ("", conn1, INFO "info1")
-- h2 <# ("", conn1, CON)
-- h1 <# ("", conn2, CON)
-- pure (conn1, conn2)
samplePublicKey :: ByteString
samplePublicKey = "rsa: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"
samplePublicKey = "rsa:MIIBoDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAY0AMIIBiAKCAQEAtn1NI2tPoOGSGfad0aUg0tJ0kG2nzrIPGLiz8wb3dQSJC9xkRHyzHhEE8Kmy2cM4q7rNZIlLcm4M7oXOTe7SC4x59bLQG9bteZPKqXu9wk41hNamV25PWQ4zIcIRmZKETVGbwN7jFMpH7wxLdI1zzMArAPKXCDCJ5ctWh4OWDI6OR6AcCtEj-toCI6N6pjxxn5VigJtwiKhxYpoUJSdNM60wVEDCSUrZYBAuDH8pOxPfP-Tm4sokaFDTIG3QJFzOjC-_9nW4MUjAOFll9PCp9kaEFHJ_YmOYKMWNOCCPvLS6lxA83i0UaardkNLNoFS5paWfTlroxRwOC2T6PwO2ywKBgDjtXcSED61zK1seocQMyGRINnlWdhceD669kIHju_f6kAayvYKW3_lbJNXCmyinAccBosO08_0sUxvtuniIo18kfYJE0UmP1ReCjhMP-O-yOmwZJini_QelJk_Pez8IIDDWnY1qYQsN_q7ocjakOYrpGG7mig6JMFpDJtD6istR"
syntaxTests :: Spec
syntaxTests = do
syntaxTests :: forall c. Transport c => TProxy c -> Spec
syntaxTests t = do
it "unknown command" $ ("1", "5678", "HELLO") >#> ("1", "5678", "ERR CMD SYNTAX")
describe "NEW" do
describe "valid" do
-- TODO: ERROR no connection alias in the response (it does not generate it yet if not provided)
-- TODO: add tests with defined connection alias
xit "only server" $ ("211", "", "NEW localhost") >#>= \case ("211", "", "INV" : _) -> True; _ -> False
it "with port" $ ("212", "", "NEW localhost:5000") >#>= \case ("212", "", "INV" : _) -> True; _ -> False
xit "with keyHash" $ ("213", "", "NEW localhost#" <> testKeyHashStr) >#>= \case ("213", "", "INV" : _) -> True; _ -> False
it "with port and keyHash" $ ("214", "", "NEW localhost:5000#" <> testKeyHashStr) >#>= \case ("214", "", "INV" : _) -> True; _ -> False
it "with correct parameter" $ ("211", "", "NEW INV") >#>= \case ("211", _, "INV" : _) -> True; _ -> False
describe "invalid" do
-- TODO: add tests with defined connection alias
it "no parameters" $ ("221", "", "NEW") >#> ("221", "", "ERR CMD SYNTAX")
it "many parameters" $ ("222", "", "NEW localhost:5000 hi") >#> ("222", "", "ERR CMD SYNTAX")
it "invalid server keyHash" $ ("223", "", "NEW localhost:5000#1") >#> ("223", "", "ERR CMD SYNTAX")
it "with incorrect parameter" $ ("222", "", "NEW hi") >#> ("222", "", "ERR CMD SYNTAX")
describe "JOIN" do
describe "valid" do
-- TODO: ERROR no connection alias in the response (it does not generate it yet if not provided)
-- TODO: add tests with defined connection alias
it "using same server as in invitation" $
("311", "", "JOIN smp::localhost:5000::1234::" <> samplePublicKey) >#> ("311", "", "ERR SMP AUTH")
("311", "a", "JOIN https://simpex.chat/invitation#/?smp=smp%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A5000%2F1234-w%3D%3D%23&e2e=" <> urlEncode True samplePublicKey <> " 14\nbob's connInfo") >#> ("311", "a", "ERR SMP AUTH")
describe "invalid" do
-- TODO: JOIN is not merged yet - to be added
it "no parameters" $ ("321", "", "JOIN") >#> ("321", "", "ERR CMD SYNTAX")
where
-- simple test for one command with the expected response
(>#>) :: ARawTransmission -> ARawTransmission -> Expectation
command >#> response = smpAgentTest t command `shouldReturn` response
-- simple test for one command with a predicate for the expected response
(>#>=) :: ARawTransmission -> ((ByteString, ByteString, [ByteString]) -> Bool) -> Expectation
command >#>= p = smpAgentTest t command >>= (`shouldSatisfy` p . \(cId, cAlias, cmd) -> (cId, cAlias, B.words cmd))
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedLists #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
module AgentTests.ConnectionRequestTests where
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parseAll)
import Test.Hspec
uri :: String
uri = "smp.simplex.im"
srv :: SMPServer
srv =
SMPServer
{ host = "smp.simplex.im",
port = Just "5223",
keyHash = Just (C.KeyHash "\215m\248\251")
}
queue :: SMPQueueUri
queue =
SMPQueueUri
{ smpServer = srv,
senderId = "\215m\248\251",
serverVerifyKey = reservedServerKey
}
appServer :: ConnReqScheme
appServer = CRSAppServer "simplex.chat" Nothing
connectionRequest :: AConnectionRequest
connectionRequest =
ACR SCMInvitation . CRInvitation $
ConnReqData
{ crScheme = appServer,
crSmpQueues = [queue],
crEncryptKey = reservedServerKey
}
connectionRequestTests :: Spec
connectionRequestTests = do
describe "connection request parsing / serializing" $ do
it "should serialize SMP queue URIs" $ do
serializeSMPQueueUri queue {smpServer = srv {port = Nothing, keyHash = Nothing}}
`shouldBe` "smp://smp.simplex.im/1234-w==#"
serializeSMPQueueUri queue {smpServer = srv {keyHash = Nothing}}
`shouldBe` "smp://smp.simplex.im:5223/1234-w==#"
serializeSMPQueueUri queue {smpServer = srv {port = Nothing}}
`shouldBe` "smp://1234-w==@smp.simplex.im/1234-w==#"
serializeSMPQueueUri queue
`shouldBe` "smp://1234-w==@smp.simplex.im:5223/1234-w==#"
it "should parse SMP queue URIs" $ do
parseAll smpQueueUriP "smp://smp.simplex.im/1234-w==#"
`shouldBe` Right queue {smpServer = srv {port = Nothing, keyHash = Nothing}}
parseAll smpQueueUriP "smp://smp.simplex.im:5223/1234-w==#"
`shouldBe` Right queue {smpServer = srv {keyHash = Nothing}}
parseAll smpQueueUriP "smp://1234-w==@smp.simplex.im/1234-w==#"
`shouldBe` Right queue {smpServer = srv {port = Nothing}}
parseAll smpQueueUriP "smp://1234-w==@smp.simplex.im:5223/1234-w==#"
`shouldBe` Right queue
it "should serialize connection requests" $ do
serializeConnReq connectionRequest
`shouldBe` "https://simplex.chat/invitation#/?smp=smp%3A%2F%2F1234-w%3D%3D%40smp.simplex.im%3A5223%2F1234-w%3D%3D%23&e2e=rsa%3AMBowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADCQAwBgIBAAIBAA%3D%3D"
it "should parse connection requests" $ do
parseAll connReqP "https://simplex.chat/invitation#/?smp=smp%3A%2F%2F1234-w%3D%3D%40smp.simplex.im%3A5223%2F1234-w%3D%3D%23&e2e=rsa%3AMBowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADCQAwBgIBAAIBAA%3D%3D"
`shouldBe` Right connectionRequest
+163
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@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-}
{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-incomplete-uni-patterns #-}
module AgentTests.FunctionalAPITests (functionalAPITests) where
import Control.Monad.Except (ExceptT, runExceptT)
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
import SMPAgentClient
import SMPClient (withSmpServer)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite (dbFile)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ErrorType (..), MsgBody)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (ATransport (..))
import System.Timeout
import Test.Hspec
import UnliftIO.STM
(##>) :: MonadIO m => m (ATransmission 'Agent) -> ATransmission 'Agent -> m ()
a ##> t = a >>= \t' -> liftIO (t' `shouldBe` t)
(=##>) :: MonadIO m => m (ATransmission 'Agent) -> (ATransmission 'Agent -> Bool) -> m ()
a =##> p = a >>= \t -> liftIO (t `shouldSatisfy` p)
get :: MonadIO m => AgentClient -> m (ATransmission 'Agent)
get c = atomically (readTBQueue $ subQ c)
pattern Msg :: MsgBody -> ACommand 'Agent
pattern Msg msgBody <- MSG MsgMeta {integrity = MsgOk} msgBody
functionalAPITests :: ATransport -> Spec
functionalAPITests t = do
describe "Establishing duplex connection" $
it "should connect via one server using SMP agent clients" $
withSmpServer t testAgentClient
describe "Establishing connection asynchronously" $ do
it "should connect with initiating client going offline" $
withSmpServer t testAsyncInitiatingOffline
it "should connect with joining client going offline before its queue activation" $
withSmpServer t testAsyncJoiningOfflineBeforeActivation
-- TODO a valid test case but not trivial to implement, probably requires some agent rework
xit "should connect with joining client going offline after its queue activation" $
withSmpServer t testAsyncJoiningOfflineAfterActivation
it "should connect with both clients going offline" $
withSmpServer t testAsyncBothOffline
testAgentClient :: IO ()
testAgentClient = do
alice <- getSMPAgentClient cfg
bob <- getSMPAgentClient cfg {dbFile = testDB2}
Right () <- runExceptT $ do
(bobId, qInfo) <- createConnection alice SCMInvitation
aliceId <- joinConnection bob qInfo "bob's connInfo"
("", _, CONF confId "bob's connInfo") <- get alice
allowConnection alice bobId confId "alice's connInfo"
get alice ##> ("", bobId, CON)
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, INFO "alice's connInfo")
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, CON)
1 <- sendMessage alice bobId "hello"
get alice ##> ("", bobId, SENT 1)
2 <- sendMessage alice bobId "how are you?"
get alice ##> ("", bobId, SENT 2)
get bob =##> \case ("", c, Msg "hello") -> c == aliceId; _ -> False
ackMessage bob aliceId 1
get bob =##> \case ("", c, Msg "how are you?") -> c == aliceId; _ -> False
ackMessage bob aliceId 2
3 <- sendMessage bob aliceId "hello too"
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, SENT 3)
4 <- sendMessage bob aliceId "message 1"
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, SENT 4)
get alice =##> \case ("", c, Msg "hello too") -> c == bobId; _ -> False
ackMessage alice bobId 3
get alice =##> \case ("", c, Msg "message 1") -> c == bobId; _ -> False
ackMessage alice bobId 4
suspendConnection alice bobId
5 <- sendMessage bob aliceId "message 2"
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, MERR 5 (SMP AUTH))
deleteConnection alice bobId
liftIO $ noMessages alice "nothing else should be delivered to alice"
pure ()
where
noMessages :: AgentClient -> String -> Expectation
noMessages c err = tryGet `shouldReturn` ()
where
tryGet =
10000 `timeout` get c >>= \case
Just _ -> error err
_ -> return ()
testAsyncInitiatingOffline :: IO ()
testAsyncInitiatingOffline = do
alice <- getSMPAgentClient cfg
bob <- getSMPAgentClient cfg {dbFile = testDB2}
Right () <- runExceptT $ do
(bobId, cReq) <- createConnection alice SCMInvitation
disconnectAgentClient alice
aliceId <- joinConnection bob cReq "bob's connInfo"
alice' <- liftIO $ getSMPAgentClient cfg
subscribeConnection alice' bobId
("", _, CONF confId "bob's connInfo") <- get alice'
allowConnection alice' bobId confId "alice's connInfo"
get alice' ##> ("", bobId, CON)
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, INFO "alice's connInfo")
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, CON)
exchangeGreetings alice' bobId bob aliceId
pure ()
testAsyncJoiningOfflineBeforeActivation :: IO ()
testAsyncJoiningOfflineBeforeActivation = do
alice <- getSMPAgentClient cfg
bob <- getSMPAgentClient cfg {dbFile = testDB2}
Right () <- runExceptT $ do
(bobId, qInfo) <- createConnection alice SCMInvitation
aliceId <- joinConnection bob qInfo "bob's connInfo"
disconnectAgentClient bob
("", _, CONF confId "bob's connInfo") <- get alice
allowConnection alice bobId confId "alice's connInfo"
bob' <- liftIO $ getSMPAgentClient cfg {dbFile = testDB2}
subscribeConnection bob' aliceId
get alice ##> ("", bobId, CON)
get bob' ##> ("", aliceId, INFO "alice's connInfo")
get bob' ##> ("", aliceId, CON)
exchangeGreetings alice bobId bob' aliceId
pure ()
testAsyncJoiningOfflineAfterActivation :: IO ()
testAsyncJoiningOfflineAfterActivation = error "not implemented"
testAsyncBothOffline :: IO ()
testAsyncBothOffline = do
alice <- getSMPAgentClient cfg
bob <- getSMPAgentClient cfg {dbFile = testDB2}
Right () <- runExceptT $ do
(bobId, cReq) <- createConnection alice SCMInvitation
disconnectAgentClient alice
aliceId <- joinConnection bob cReq "bob's connInfo"
disconnectAgentClient bob
alice' <- liftIO $ getSMPAgentClient cfg
subscribeConnection alice' bobId
("", _, CONF confId "bob's connInfo") <- get alice'
allowConnection alice' bobId confId "alice's connInfo"
bob' <- liftIO $ getSMPAgentClient cfg {dbFile = testDB2}
subscribeConnection bob' aliceId
get alice' ##> ("", bobId, CON)
get bob' ##> ("", aliceId, INFO "alice's connInfo")
get bob' ##> ("", aliceId, CON)
exchangeGreetings alice' bobId bob' aliceId
pure ()
exchangeGreetings :: AgentClient -> ConnId -> AgentClient -> ConnId -> ExceptT AgentErrorType IO ()
exchangeGreetings alice bobId bob aliceId = do
1 <- sendMessage alice bobId "hello"
get alice ##> ("", bobId, SENT 1)
get bob =##> \case ("", c, Msg "hello") -> c == aliceId; _ -> False
ackMessage bob aliceId 1
2 <- sendMessage bob aliceId "hello too"
get bob ##> ("", aliceId, SENT 2)
get alice =##> \case ("", c, Msg "hello too") -> c == bobId; _ -> False
ackMessage alice bobId 2
+238 -152
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
{-# LANGUAGE BlockArguments #-}
{-# LANGUAGE DuplicateRecordFields #-}
{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE NamedFieldPuns #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE QuasiQuotes #-}
@@ -7,8 +8,12 @@
module AgentTests.SQLiteTests (storeTests) where
import Control.Concurrent.Async (concurrently_)
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Monad (replicateM_)
import Control.Monad.Except (ExceptT, runExceptT)
import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA as R
import Crypto.Random (drgNew)
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.Text as T
import Data.Text.Encoding (encodeUtf8)
@@ -17,11 +22,13 @@ import Data.Word (Word32)
import qualified Database.SQLite.Simple as DB
import Database.SQLite.Simple.QQ (sql)
import SMPClient (testKeyHash)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.ExceptT ()
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Transmission
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Store.SQLite.Migrations as Migrations
import qualified Simplex.Messaging.Crypto as C
import System.Random (Random (randomIO))
import System.Random
import Test.Hspec
import UnliftIO.Directory (removeFile)
@@ -30,18 +37,30 @@ testDB = "tests/tmp/smp-agent.test.db"
withStore :: SpecWith SQLiteStore -> Spec
withStore = before createStore . after removeStore
where
createStore :: IO SQLiteStore
createStore = do
-- Randomize DB file name to avoid SQLite IO errors supposedly caused by asynchronous
-- IO operations on multiple similarly named files; error seems to be environment specific
r <- randomIO :: IO Word32
createSQLiteStore $ testDB <> show r
removeStore :: SQLiteStore -> IO ()
removeStore store = do
DB.close $ dbConn store
removeFile $ dbFilePath store
withStore2 :: SpecWith (SQLiteStore, SQLiteStore) -> Spec
withStore2 = before connect2 . after (removeStore . fst)
where
connect2 :: IO (SQLiteStore, SQLiteStore)
connect2 = do
s1 <- createStore
s2 <- connectSQLiteStore (dbFilePath s1) 4
pure (s1, s2)
createStore :: IO SQLiteStore
createStore = do
-- Randomize DB file name to avoid SQLite IO errors supposedly caused by asynchronous
-- IO operations on multiple similarly named files; error seems to be environment specific
r <- randomIO :: IO Word32
createSQLiteStore (testDB <> show r) 4 Migrations.app
removeStore :: SQLiteStore -> IO ()
removeStore store = do
close store
removeFile $ dbFilePath store
where
close :: SQLiteStore -> IO ()
close st = mapM_ DB.close =<< atomically (flushTBQueue $ dbConnPool st)
returnsResult :: (Eq a, Eq e, Show a, Show e) => ExceptT e IO a -> a -> Expectation
action `returnsResult` r = runExceptT action `shouldReturn` Right r
@@ -51,51 +70,73 @@ action `throwsError` e = runExceptT action `shouldReturn` Left e
-- TODO add null port tests
storeTests :: Spec
storeTests = withStore do
describe "store setup" do
testCompiledThreadsafe
testForeignKeysEnabled
describe "store methods" do
describe "Queue and Connection management" do
describe "createRcvConn" do
testCreateRcvConn
testCreateRcvConnDuplicate
describe "createSndConn" do
testCreateSndConn
testCreateSndConnDuplicate
describe "getAllConnAliases" testGetAllConnAliases
describe "getRcvQueue" testGetRcvQueue
describe "deleteConn" do
testDeleteRcvConn
testDeleteSndConn
testDeleteDuplexConn
describe "upgradeRcvConnToDuplex" do
testUpgradeRcvConnToDuplex
describe "upgradeSndConnToDuplex" do
testUpgradeSndConnToDuplex
describe "set Queue status" do
describe "setRcvQueueStatus" do
testSetRcvQueueStatus
testSetRcvQueueStatusNoQueue
describe "setSndQueueStatus" do
testSetSndQueueStatus
testSetSndQueueStatusNoQueue
testSetQueueStatusDuplex
describe "Msg management" do
describe "create Msg" do
testCreateRcvMsg
testCreateSndMsg
testCreateRcvAndSndMsgs
storeTests = do
withStore2 do
describe "stress test" testConcurrentWrites
withStore do
describe "store setup" do
testCompiledThreadsafe
testForeignKeysEnabled
describe "store methods" do
describe "Queue and Connection management" do
describe "createRcvConn" do
testCreateRcvConn
testCreateRcvConnRandomId
testCreateRcvConnDuplicate
describe "createSndConn" do
testCreateSndConn
testCreateSndConnRandomID
testCreateSndConnDuplicate
describe "getAllConnIds" testGetAllConnIds
describe "getRcvConn" testGetRcvConn
describe "deleteConn" do
testDeleteRcvConn
testDeleteSndConn
testDeleteDuplexConn
describe "upgradeRcvConnToDuplex" do
testUpgradeRcvConnToDuplex
describe "upgradeSndConnToDuplex" do
testUpgradeSndConnToDuplex
describe "set Queue status" do
describe "setRcvQueueStatus" do
testSetRcvQueueStatus
testSetRcvQueueStatusNoQueue
describe "setSndQueueStatus" do
testSetSndQueueStatus
testSetSndQueueStatusNoQueue
testSetQueueStatusDuplex
describe "Msg management" do
describe "create Msg" do
testCreateRcvMsg
testCreateSndMsg
testCreateRcvAndSndMsgs
testConcurrentWrites :: SpecWith (SQLiteStore, SQLiteStore)
testConcurrentWrites =
it "should complete multiple concurrent write transactions w/t sqlite busy errors" $ \(s1, s2) -> do
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn s1 g cData1 rcvQueue1 SCMInvitation
let ConnData {connId} = cData1
concurrently_ (runTest s1 connId) (runTest s2 connId)
where
runTest :: SQLiteStore -> ConnId -> IO (Either StoreError ())
runTest store connId = runExceptT . replicateM_ 100 $ do
(internalId, internalRcvId, _, _) <- updateRcvIds store connId
let rcvMsgData = mkRcvMsgData internalId internalRcvId 0 "0" "hash_dummy"
createRcvMsg store connId rcvMsgData
testCompiledThreadsafe :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testCompiledThreadsafe = do
it "compiled sqlite library should be threadsafe" $ \store -> do
compileOptions <- DB.query_ (dbConn store) "pragma COMPILE_OPTIONS;" :: IO [[T.Text]]
testCompiledThreadsafe =
it "compiled sqlite library should be threadsafe" . withStoreConnection $ \db -> do
compileOptions <- DB.query_ db "pragma COMPILE_OPTIONS;" :: IO [[T.Text]]
compileOptions `shouldNotContain` [["THREADSAFE=0"]]
withStoreConnection :: (DB.Connection -> IO a) -> SQLiteStore -> IO a
withStoreConnection = flip withConnection
testForeignKeysEnabled :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testForeignKeysEnabled = do
it "foreign keys should be enabled" $ \store -> do
testForeignKeysEnabled =
it "foreign keys should be enabled" . withStoreConnection $ \db -> do
let inconsistentQuery =
[sql|
INSERT INTO connections
@@ -103,18 +144,19 @@ testForeignKeysEnabled = do
VALUES
("conn1", "smp.simplex.im", "5223", "1234", "smp.simplex.im", "5223", "2345");
|]
DB.execute_ (dbConn store) inconsistentQuery
DB.execute_ db inconsistentQuery
`shouldThrow` (\e -> DB.sqlError e == DB.ErrorConstraint)
cData1 :: ConnData
cData1 = ConnData {connId = "conn1"}
rcvQueue1 :: RcvQueue
rcvQueue1 =
RcvQueue
{ server = SMPServer "smp.simplex.im" (Just "5223") testKeyHash,
rcvId = "1234",
connAlias = "conn1",
rcvPrivateKey = C.safePrivateKey (1, 2, 3),
sndId = Just "2345",
sndKey = Nothing,
decryptKey = C.safePrivateKey (1, 2, 3),
verifyKey = Nothing,
status = New
@@ -125,74 +167,104 @@ sndQueue1 =
SndQueue
{ server = SMPServer "smp.simplex.im" (Just "5223") testKeyHash,
sndId = "3456",
connAlias = "conn1",
sndPrivateKey = C.safePrivateKey (1, 2, 3),
encryptKey = C.PublicKey $ R.PublicKey 1 2 3,
signKey = C.safePrivateKey (1, 2, 3),
signKey = C.APrivateKey $ C.unPrivateKey (C.safePrivateKey (1, 2, 3) :: C.SafePrivateKey),
status = New
}
testCreateRcvConn :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testCreateRcvConn = do
testCreateRcvConn =
it "should create RcvConnection and add SndQueue" $ \store -> do
createRcvConn store rcvQueue1
`returnsResult` ()
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
createRcvConn store g cData1 rcvQueue1 SCMInvitation
`returnsResult` "conn1"
getConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCRcv (RcvConnection "conn1" rcvQueue1)
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCRcv (RcvConnection cData1 rcvQueue1)
upgradeRcvConnToDuplex store "conn1" sndQueue1
`returnsResult` ()
getConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection "conn1" rcvQueue1 sndQueue1)
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection cData1 rcvQueue1 sndQueue1)
testCreateRcvConnRandomId :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testCreateRcvConnRandomId =
it "should create RcvConnection and add SndQueue with random ID" $ \store -> do
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
Right connId <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store g cData1 {connId = ""} rcvQueue1 SCMInvitation
getConn store connId
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCRcv (RcvConnection cData1 {connId} rcvQueue1)
upgradeRcvConnToDuplex store connId sndQueue1
`returnsResult` ()
getConn store connId
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection cData1 {connId} rcvQueue1 sndQueue1)
testCreateRcvConnDuplicate :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testCreateRcvConnDuplicate = do
testCreateRcvConnDuplicate =
it "should throw error on attempt to create duplicate RcvConnection" $ \store -> do
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store rcvQueue1
createRcvConn store rcvQueue1
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store g cData1 rcvQueue1 SCMInvitation
createRcvConn store g cData1 rcvQueue1 SCMInvitation
`throwsError` SEConnDuplicate
testCreateSndConn :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testCreateSndConn = do
testCreateSndConn =
it "should create SndConnection and add RcvQueue" $ \store -> do
createSndConn store sndQueue1
`returnsResult` ()
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
createSndConn store g cData1 sndQueue1
`returnsResult` "conn1"
getConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCSnd (SndConnection "conn1" sndQueue1)
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCSnd (SndConnection cData1 sndQueue1)
upgradeSndConnToDuplex store "conn1" rcvQueue1
`returnsResult` ()
getConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection "conn1" rcvQueue1 sndQueue1)
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection cData1 rcvQueue1 sndQueue1)
testCreateSndConnRandomID :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testCreateSndConnRandomID =
it "should create SndConnection and add RcvQueue with random ID" $ \store -> do
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
Right connId <- runExceptT $ createSndConn store g cData1 {connId = ""} sndQueue1
getConn store connId
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCSnd (SndConnection cData1 {connId} sndQueue1)
upgradeSndConnToDuplex store connId rcvQueue1
`returnsResult` ()
getConn store connId
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection cData1 {connId} rcvQueue1 sndQueue1)
testCreateSndConnDuplicate :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testCreateSndConnDuplicate = do
testCreateSndConnDuplicate =
it "should throw error on attempt to create duplicate SndConnection" $ \store -> do
_ <- runExceptT $ createSndConn store sndQueue1
createSndConn store sndQueue1
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
_ <- runExceptT $ createSndConn store g cData1 sndQueue1
createSndConn store g cData1 sndQueue1
`throwsError` SEConnDuplicate
testGetAllConnAliases :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testGetAllConnAliases = do
testGetAllConnIds :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testGetAllConnIds =
it "should get all conn aliases" $ \store -> do
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store rcvQueue1
_ <- runExceptT $ createSndConn store sndQueue1 {connAlias = "conn2"}
getAllConnAliases store
`returnsResult` ["conn1" :: ConnAlias, "conn2" :: ConnAlias]
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store g cData1 rcvQueue1 SCMInvitation
_ <- runExceptT $ createSndConn store g cData1 {connId = "conn2"} sndQueue1
getAllConnIds store
`returnsResult` ["conn1" :: ConnId, "conn2" :: ConnId]
testGetRcvQueue :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testGetRcvQueue = do
it "should get RcvQueue" $ \store -> do
testGetRcvConn :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testGetRcvConn =
it "should get connection using rcv queue id and server" $ \store -> do
let smpServer = SMPServer "smp.simplex.im" (Just "5223") testKeyHash
let recipientId = "1234"
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store rcvQueue1
getRcvQueue store smpServer recipientId
`returnsResult` rcvQueue1
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store g cData1 rcvQueue1 SCMInvitation
getRcvConn store smpServer recipientId
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCRcv (RcvConnection cData1 rcvQueue1)
testDeleteRcvConn :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testDeleteRcvConn = do
testDeleteRcvConn =
it "should create RcvConnection and delete it" $ \store -> do
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store rcvQueue1
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store g cData1 rcvQueue1 SCMInvitation
getConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCRcv (RcvConnection "conn1" rcvQueue1)
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCRcv (RcvConnection cData1 rcvQueue1)
deleteConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` ()
-- TODO check queues are deleted as well
@@ -200,11 +272,12 @@ testDeleteRcvConn = do
`throwsError` SEConnNotFound
testDeleteSndConn :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testDeleteSndConn = do
testDeleteSndConn =
it "should create SndConnection and delete it" $ \store -> do
_ <- runExceptT $ createSndConn store sndQueue1
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
_ <- runExceptT $ createSndConn store g cData1 sndQueue1
getConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCSnd (SndConnection "conn1" sndQueue1)
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCSnd (SndConnection cData1 sndQueue1)
deleteConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` ()
-- TODO check queues are deleted as well
@@ -212,12 +285,13 @@ testDeleteSndConn = do
`throwsError` SEConnNotFound
testDeleteDuplexConn :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testDeleteDuplexConn = do
testDeleteDuplexConn =
it "should create DuplexConnection and delete it" $ \store -> do
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store rcvQueue1
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store g cData1 rcvQueue1 SCMInvitation
_ <- runExceptT $ upgradeRcvConnToDuplex store "conn1" sndQueue1
getConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection "conn1" rcvQueue1 sndQueue1)
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection cData1 rcvQueue1 sndQueue1)
deleteConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` ()
-- TODO check queues are deleted as well
@@ -225,17 +299,17 @@ testDeleteDuplexConn = do
`throwsError` SEConnNotFound
testUpgradeRcvConnToDuplex :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testUpgradeRcvConnToDuplex = do
testUpgradeRcvConnToDuplex =
it "should throw error on attempt to add SndQueue to SndConnection or DuplexConnection" $ \store -> do
_ <- runExceptT $ createSndConn store sndQueue1
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
_ <- runExceptT $ createSndConn store g cData1 sndQueue1
let anotherSndQueue =
SndQueue
{ server = SMPServer "smp.simplex.im" (Just "5223") testKeyHash,
sndId = "2345",
connAlias = "conn1",
sndPrivateKey = C.safePrivateKey (1, 2, 3),
encryptKey = C.PublicKey $ R.PublicKey 1 2 3,
signKey = C.safePrivateKey (1, 2, 3),
signKey = C.APrivateKey $ C.unPrivateKey (C.safePrivateKey (1, 2, 3) :: C.SafePrivateKey),
status = New
}
upgradeRcvConnToDuplex store "conn1" anotherSndQueue
@@ -245,17 +319,16 @@ testUpgradeRcvConnToDuplex = do
`throwsError` SEBadConnType CDuplex
testUpgradeSndConnToDuplex :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testUpgradeSndConnToDuplex = do
testUpgradeSndConnToDuplex =
it "should throw error on attempt to add RcvQueue to RcvConnection or DuplexConnection" $ \store -> do
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store rcvQueue1
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store g cData1 rcvQueue1 SCMInvitation
let anotherRcvQueue =
RcvQueue
{ server = SMPServer "smp.simplex.im" (Just "5223") testKeyHash,
rcvId = "3456",
connAlias = "conn1",
rcvPrivateKey = C.safePrivateKey (1, 2, 3),
sndId = Just "4567",
sndKey = Nothing,
decryptKey = C.safePrivateKey (1, 2, 3),
verifyKey = Nothing,
status = New
@@ -267,51 +340,54 @@ testUpgradeSndConnToDuplex = do
`throwsError` SEBadConnType CDuplex
testSetRcvQueueStatus :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testSetRcvQueueStatus = do
testSetRcvQueueStatus =
it "should update status of RcvQueue" $ \store -> do
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store rcvQueue1
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store g cData1 rcvQueue1 SCMInvitation
getConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCRcv (RcvConnection "conn1" rcvQueue1)
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCRcv (RcvConnection cData1 rcvQueue1)
setRcvQueueStatus store rcvQueue1 Confirmed
`returnsResult` ()
getConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCRcv (RcvConnection "conn1" rcvQueue1 {status = Confirmed})
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCRcv (RcvConnection cData1 rcvQueue1 {status = Confirmed})
testSetSndQueueStatus :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testSetSndQueueStatus = do
testSetSndQueueStatus =
it "should update status of SndQueue" $ \store -> do
_ <- runExceptT $ createSndConn store sndQueue1
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
_ <- runExceptT $ createSndConn store g cData1 sndQueue1
getConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCSnd (SndConnection "conn1" sndQueue1)
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCSnd (SndConnection cData1 sndQueue1)
setSndQueueStatus store sndQueue1 Confirmed
`returnsResult` ()
getConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCSnd (SndConnection "conn1" sndQueue1 {status = Confirmed})
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCSnd (SndConnection cData1 sndQueue1 {status = Confirmed})
testSetQueueStatusDuplex :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testSetQueueStatusDuplex = do
testSetQueueStatusDuplex =
it "should update statuses of RcvQueue and SndQueue in DuplexConnection" $ \store -> do
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store rcvQueue1
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store g cData1 rcvQueue1 SCMInvitation
_ <- runExceptT $ upgradeRcvConnToDuplex store "conn1" sndQueue1
getConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection "conn1" rcvQueue1 sndQueue1)
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection cData1 rcvQueue1 sndQueue1)
setRcvQueueStatus store rcvQueue1 Secured
`returnsResult` ()
getConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection "conn1" rcvQueue1 {status = Secured} sndQueue1)
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection cData1 rcvQueue1 {status = Secured} sndQueue1)
setSndQueueStatus store sndQueue1 Confirmed
`returnsResult` ()
getConn store "conn1"
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection "conn1" rcvQueue1 {status = Secured} sndQueue1 {status = Confirmed})
`returnsResult` SomeConn SCDuplex (DuplexConnection cData1 rcvQueue1 {status = Secured} sndQueue1 {status = Confirmed})
testSetRcvQueueStatusNoQueue :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testSetRcvQueueStatusNoQueue = do
testSetRcvQueueStatusNoQueue =
xit "should throw error on attempt to update status of non-existent RcvQueue" $ \store -> do
setRcvQueueStatus store rcvQueue1 Confirmed
`throwsError` SEConnNotFound
testSetSndQueueStatusNoQueue :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testSetSndQueueStatusNoQueue = do
testSetSndQueueStatusNoQueue =
xit "should throw error on attempt to update status of non-existent SndQueue" $ \store -> do
setSndQueueStatus store sndQueue1 Confirmed
`throwsError` SEConnNotFound
@@ -325,31 +401,36 @@ ts = UTCTime (fromGregorian 2021 02 24) (secondsToDiffTime 0)
mkRcvMsgData :: InternalId -> InternalRcvId -> ExternalSndId -> BrokerId -> MsgHash -> RcvMsgData
mkRcvMsgData internalId internalRcvId externalSndId brokerId internalHash =
RcvMsgData
{ internalId,
internalRcvId,
internalTs = ts,
senderMeta = (externalSndId, ts),
brokerMeta = (brokerId, ts),
{ internalRcvId,
msgMeta =
MsgMeta
{ integrity = MsgOk,
recipient = (unId internalId, ts),
sender = (externalSndId, ts),
broker = (brokerId, ts)
},
msgBody = hw,
internalHash,
externalPrevSndHash = "hash_from_sender",
msgIntegrity = MsgOk
externalPrevSndHash = "hash_from_sender"
}
testCreateRcvMsg' :: SQLiteStore -> PrevExternalSndId -> PrevRcvMsgHash -> RcvQueue -> RcvMsgData -> Expectation
testCreateRcvMsg' store expectedPrevSndId expectedPrevHash rcvQueue rcvMsgData@RcvMsgData {..} = do
updateRcvIds store rcvQueue
`returnsResult` (internalId, internalRcvId, expectedPrevSndId, expectedPrevHash)
createRcvMsg store rcvQueue rcvMsgData
testCreateRcvMsg' :: SQLiteStore -> PrevExternalSndId -> PrevRcvMsgHash -> ConnId -> RcvMsgData -> Expectation
testCreateRcvMsg' st expectedPrevSndId expectedPrevHash connId rcvMsgData@RcvMsgData {..} = do
let MsgMeta {recipient = (internalId, _)} = msgMeta
updateRcvIds st connId
`returnsResult` (InternalId internalId, internalRcvId, expectedPrevSndId, expectedPrevHash)
createRcvMsg st connId rcvMsgData
`returnsResult` ()
testCreateRcvMsg :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testCreateRcvMsg = do
it "should reserve internal ids and create a RcvMsg" $ \store -> do
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store rcvQueue1
testCreateRcvMsg =
it "should reserve internal ids and create a RcvMsg" $ \st -> do
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
let ConnData {connId} = cData1
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn st g cData1 rcvQueue1 SCMInvitation
-- TODO getMsg to check message
testCreateRcvMsg' store 0 "" rcvQueue1 $ mkRcvMsgData (InternalId 1) (InternalRcvId 1) 1 "1" "hash_dummy"
testCreateRcvMsg' store 1 "hash_dummy" rcvQueue1 $ mkRcvMsgData (InternalId 2) (InternalRcvId 2) 2 "2" "new_hash_dummy"
testCreateRcvMsg' st 0 "" connId $ mkRcvMsgData (InternalId 1) (InternalRcvId 1) 1 "1" "hash_dummy"
testCreateRcvMsg' st 1 "hash_dummy" connId $ mkRcvMsgData (InternalId 2) (InternalRcvId 2) 2 "2" "new_hash_dummy"
mkSndMsgData :: InternalId -> InternalSndId -> MsgHash -> SndMsgData
mkSndMsgData internalId internalSndId internalHash =
@@ -358,32 +439,37 @@ mkSndMsgData internalId internalSndId internalHash =
internalSndId,
internalTs = ts,
msgBody = hw,
internalHash
internalHash,
previousMsgHash = internalHash
}
testCreateSndMsg' :: SQLiteStore -> PrevSndMsgHash -> SndQueue -> SndMsgData -> Expectation
testCreateSndMsg' store expectedPrevHash sndQueue sndMsgData@SndMsgData {..} = do
updateSndIds store sndQueue
testCreateSndMsg' :: SQLiteStore -> PrevSndMsgHash -> ConnId -> SndMsgData -> Expectation
testCreateSndMsg' store expectedPrevHash connId sndMsgData@SndMsgData {..} = do
updateSndIds store connId
`returnsResult` (internalId, internalSndId, expectedPrevHash)
createSndMsg store sndQueue sndMsgData
createSndMsg store connId sndMsgData
`returnsResult` ()
testCreateSndMsg :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testCreateSndMsg = do
testCreateSndMsg =
it "should create a SndMsg and return InternalId and PrevSndMsgHash" $ \store -> do
_ <- runExceptT $ createSndConn store sndQueue1
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
let ConnData {connId} = cData1
_ <- runExceptT $ createSndConn store g cData1 sndQueue1
-- TODO getMsg to check message
testCreateSndMsg' store "" sndQueue1 $ mkSndMsgData (InternalId 1) (InternalSndId 1) "hash_dummy"
testCreateSndMsg' store "hash_dummy" sndQueue1 $ mkSndMsgData (InternalId 2) (InternalSndId 2) "new_hash_dummy"
testCreateSndMsg' store "" connId $ mkSndMsgData (InternalId 1) (InternalSndId 1) "hash_dummy"
testCreateSndMsg' store "hash_dummy" connId $ mkSndMsgData (InternalId 2) (InternalSndId 2) "new_hash_dummy"
testCreateRcvAndSndMsgs :: SpecWith SQLiteStore
testCreateRcvAndSndMsgs = do
testCreateRcvAndSndMsgs =
it "should create multiple RcvMsg and SndMsg, correctly ordering internal Ids and returning previous state" $ \store -> do
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store rcvQueue1
g <- newTVarIO =<< drgNew
let ConnData {connId} = cData1
_ <- runExceptT $ createRcvConn store g cData1 rcvQueue1 SCMInvitation
_ <- runExceptT $ upgradeRcvConnToDuplex store "conn1" sndQueue1
testCreateRcvMsg' store 0 "" rcvQueue1 $ mkRcvMsgData (InternalId 1) (InternalRcvId 1) 1 "1" "rcv_hash_1"
testCreateRcvMsg' store 1 "rcv_hash_1" rcvQueue1 $ mkRcvMsgData (InternalId 2) (InternalRcvId 2) 2 "2" "rcv_hash_2"
testCreateSndMsg' store "" sndQueue1 $ mkSndMsgData (InternalId 3) (InternalSndId 1) "snd_hash_1"
testCreateRcvMsg' store 2 "rcv_hash_2" rcvQueue1 $ mkRcvMsgData (InternalId 4) (InternalRcvId 3) 3 "3" "rcv_hash_3"
testCreateSndMsg' store "snd_hash_1" sndQueue1 $ mkSndMsgData (InternalId 5) (InternalSndId 2) "snd_hash_2"
testCreateSndMsg' store "snd_hash_2" sndQueue1 $ mkSndMsgData (InternalId 6) (InternalSndId 3) "snd_hash_3"
testCreateRcvMsg' store 0 "" connId $ mkRcvMsgData (InternalId 1) (InternalRcvId 1) 1 "1" "rcv_hash_1"
testCreateRcvMsg' store 1 "rcv_hash_1" connId $ mkRcvMsgData (InternalId 2) (InternalRcvId 2) 2 "2" "rcv_hash_2"
testCreateSndMsg' store "" connId $ mkSndMsgData (InternalId 3) (InternalSndId 1) "snd_hash_1"
testCreateRcvMsg' store 2 "rcv_hash_2" connId $ mkRcvMsgData (InternalId 4) (InternalRcvId 3) 3 "3" "rcv_hash_3"
testCreateSndMsg' store "snd_hash_1" connId $ mkSndMsgData (InternalId 5) (InternalSndId 2) "snd_hash_2"
testCreateSndMsg' store "snd_hash_2" connId $ mkSndMsgData (InternalId 6) (InternalSndId 3) "snd_hash_3"
-128
View File
@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
{-# LANGUAGE BlockArguments #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
module MarkdownTests where
import Data.Text (Text)
import Simplex.Markdown
import System.Console.ANSI.Types
import Test.Hspec
markdownTests :: Spec
markdownTests = do
textFormat
secretText
textColor
textFormat :: Spec
textFormat = describe "text format (bold)" do
it "correct markdown" do
parseMarkdown "this is *bold formatted* text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> Markdown Bold "bold formatted" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "*bold formatted* text"
`shouldBe` Markdown Bold "bold formatted" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is *bold*"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> Markdown Bold "bold"
parseMarkdown " *bold* text"
`shouldBe` " " <> Markdown Bold "bold" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown " *bold* text"
`shouldBe` " " <> Markdown Bold "bold" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is *bold* "
`shouldBe` "this is " <> Markdown Bold "bold" <> " "
parseMarkdown "this is *bold* "
`shouldBe` "this is " <> Markdown Bold "bold" <> " "
it "ignored as markdown" do
parseMarkdown "this is * unformatted * text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> "* unformatted *" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is *unformatted * text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> "*unformatted *" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is * unformatted* text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> "* unformatted*" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is **unformatted** text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> "**" <> "unformatted** text"
parseMarkdown "this is*unformatted* text"
`shouldBe` "this is*unformatted* text"
parseMarkdown "this is *unformatted text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> "*unformatted text"
it "ignored internal markdown" do
parseMarkdown "this is *long _bold_ (not italic)* text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> Markdown Bold "long _bold_ (not italic)" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "snippet: `this is *bold text*`"
`shouldBe` "snippet: " <> Markdown Snippet "this is *bold text*"
secretText :: Spec
secretText = describe "secret text" do
it "correct markdown" do
parseMarkdown "this is #black_secret# text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> Markdown Secret "black_secret" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "##black_secret### text"
`shouldBe` Markdown Secret "#black_secret##" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is #black secret# text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> Markdown Secret "black secret" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "##black secret### text"
`shouldBe` Markdown Secret "#black secret##" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is #secret#"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> Markdown Secret "secret"
parseMarkdown " #secret# text"
`shouldBe` " " <> Markdown Secret "secret" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown " #secret# text"
`shouldBe` " " <> Markdown Secret "secret" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is #secret# "
`shouldBe` "this is " <> Markdown Secret "secret" <> " "
parseMarkdown "this is #secret# "
`shouldBe` "this is " <> Markdown Secret "secret" <> " "
it "ignored as markdown" do
parseMarkdown "this is # unformatted # text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> "# unformatted #" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is #unformatted # text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> "#unformatted #" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is # unformatted# text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> "# unformatted#" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is ## unformatted ## text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> "## unformatted ##" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is#unformatted# text"
`shouldBe` "this is#unformatted# text"
parseMarkdown "this is #unformatted text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> "#unformatted text"
it "ignored internal markdown" do
parseMarkdown "snippet: `this is #secret_text#`"
`shouldBe` "snippet: " <> Markdown Snippet "this is #secret_text#"
red :: Text -> Markdown
red = Markdown (Colored Red)
textColor :: Spec
textColor = describe "text color (red)" do
it "correct markdown" do
parseMarkdown "this is !1 red color! text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> red "red color" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "!1 red! text"
`shouldBe` red "red" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is !1 red!"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> red "red"
parseMarkdown " !1 red! text"
`shouldBe` " " <> red "red" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown " !1 red! text"
`shouldBe` " " <> red "red" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is !1 red! "
`shouldBe` "this is " <> red "red" <> " "
parseMarkdown "this is !1 red! "
`shouldBe` "this is " <> red "red" <> " "
it "ignored as markdown" do
parseMarkdown "this is !1 unformatted ! text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> "!1 unformatted !" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is !1 unformatted ! text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> "!1 unformatted !" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "this is !1 unformatted! text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> "!1 unformatted!" <> " " <> "text"
-- parseMarkdown "this is !!1 unformatted!! text"
-- `shouldBe` "this is " <> "!!1" <> "unformatted!! text"
parseMarkdown "this is!1 unformatted! text"
`shouldBe` "this is!1 unformatted! text"
parseMarkdown "this is !1 unformatted text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> "!1 unformatted text"
it "ignored internal markdown" do
parseMarkdown "this is !1 long *red* (not bold)! text"
`shouldBe` "this is " <> red "long *red* (not bold)" <> " " <> "text"
parseMarkdown "snippet: `this is !1 red text!`"
`shouldBe` "snippet: " <> Markdown Snippet "this is !1 red text!"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
module ProtocolErrorTests where
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Transmission (AgentErrorType, agentErrorTypeP, serializeAgentError)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol (AgentErrorType, agentErrorTypeP, serializeAgentError)
import Simplex.Messaging.Parsers (parseAll)
import Simplex.Messaging.Protocol (ErrorType, errorTypeP, serializeErrorType)
import Test.Hspec
+103 -50
View File
@@ -3,34 +3,45 @@
{-# LANGUAGE NumericUnderscores #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
module SMPAgentClient where
import Control.Monad.IO.Unlift
import Crypto.Random
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as L
import Network.Socket (HostName, ServiceName)
import SMPClient (serverBracket, testPort, withSmpServer, withSmpServerThreadOn)
import SMPClient
( serverBracket,
testKeyHash,
testPort,
testPort2,
withSmpServer,
withSmpServerOn,
withSmpServerThreadOn,
)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent (runSMPAgentBlocking)
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Env.SQLite
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Transmission
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.Protocol
import Simplex.Messaging.Agent.RetryInterval
import Simplex.Messaging.Client (SMPClientConfig (..), smpDefaultConfig)
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport
import Test.Hspec
import UnliftIO.Concurrent
import UnliftIO.Directory
import UnliftIO.IO
agentTestHost :: HostName
agentTestHost = "localhost"
agentTestPort :: ServiceName
agentTestPort = "5001"
agentTestPort = "5010"
agentTestPort2 :: ServiceName
agentTestPort2 = "5011"
agentTestPort3 :: ServiceName
agentTestPort3 = "5021"
agentTestPort3 = "5012"
testDB :: String
testDB = "tests/tmp/smp-agent.test.protocol.db"
@@ -41,104 +52,146 @@ testDB2 = "tests/tmp/smp-agent2.test.protocol.db"
testDB3 :: String
testDB3 = "tests/tmp/smp-agent3.test.protocol.db"
smpAgentTest :: ARawTransmission -> IO ARawTransmission
smpAgentTest cmd = runSmpAgentTest $ \h -> tPutRaw h cmd >> tGetRaw h
smpAgentTest :: forall c. Transport c => TProxy c -> ARawTransmission -> IO ARawTransmission
smpAgentTest _ cmd = runSmpAgentTest $ \(h :: c) -> tPutRaw h cmd >> tGetRaw h
runSmpAgentTest :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => (Handle -> m a) -> m a
runSmpAgentTest test = withSmpServer . withSmpAgent $ testSMPAgentClient test
runSmpAgentTest :: forall c m a. (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => (c -> m a) -> m a
runSmpAgentTest test = withSmpServer t . withSmpAgent t $ testSMPAgentClient test
where
t = transport @c
runSmpAgentServerTest :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => ((ThreadId, ThreadId) -> Handle -> m a) -> m a
runSmpAgentServerTest :: forall c m a. (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => ((ThreadId, ThreadId) -> c -> m a) -> m a
runSmpAgentServerTest test =
withSmpServerThreadOn testPort $
\server -> withSmpAgentThreadOn (agentTestPort, testDB) $
withSmpServerThreadOn t testPort $
\server -> withSmpAgentThreadOn t (agentTestPort, testPort, testDB) $
\agent -> testSMPAgentClient $ test (server, agent)
where
t = transport @c
smpAgentServerTest :: ((ThreadId, ThreadId) -> Handle -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentServerTest :: Transport c => ((ThreadId, ThreadId) -> c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentServerTest test' = runSmpAgentServerTest test' `shouldReturn` ()
runSmpAgentTestN :: forall m a. (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => [(ServiceName, String)] -> ([Handle] -> m a) -> m a
runSmpAgentTestN agents test = withSmpServer $ run agents []
runSmpAgentTestN :: forall c m a. (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => [(ServiceName, ServiceName, String)] -> ([c] -> m a) -> m a
runSmpAgentTestN agents test = withSmpServer t $ run agents []
where
run :: [(ServiceName, String)] -> [Handle] -> m a
run :: [(ServiceName, ServiceName, String)] -> [c] -> m a
run [] hs = test hs
run (a@(p, _) : as) hs = withSmpAgentOn a $ testSMPAgentClientOn p $ \h -> run as (h : hs)
run (a@(p, _, _) : as) hs = withSmpAgentOn t a $ testSMPAgentClientOn p $ \h -> run as (h : hs)
t = transport @c
runSmpAgentTestN_1 :: forall m a. (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => Int -> ([Handle] -> m a) -> m a
runSmpAgentTestN_1 nClients test = withSmpServer . withSmpAgent $ run nClients []
runSmpAgentTestN_1 :: forall c m a. (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => Int -> ([c] -> m a) -> m a
runSmpAgentTestN_1 nClients test = withSmpServer t . withSmpAgent t $ run nClients []
where
run :: Int -> [Handle] -> m a
run :: Int -> [c] -> m a
run 0 hs = test hs
run n hs = testSMPAgentClient $ \h -> run (n - 1) (h : hs)
t = transport @c
smpAgentTestN :: [(ServiceName, String)] -> ([Handle] -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTestN :: Transport c => [(ServiceName, ServiceName, String)] -> ([c] -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTestN agents test' = runSmpAgentTestN agents test' `shouldReturn` ()
smpAgentTestN_1 :: Int -> ([Handle] -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTestN_1 :: Transport c => Int -> ([c] -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTestN_1 n test' = runSmpAgentTestN_1 n test' `shouldReturn` ()
smpAgentTest2 :: (Handle -> Handle -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTest2 test' =
smpAgentTestN [(agentTestPort, testDB), (agentTestPort2, testDB2)] _test
smpAgentTest2_2_2 :: forall c. Transport c => (c -> c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTest2_2_2 test' =
withSmpServerOn (transport @c) testPort2 $
smpAgentTest2_2_2_needs_server test'
smpAgentTest2_2_2_needs_server :: forall c. Transport c => (c -> c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTest2_2_2_needs_server test' =
smpAgentTestN
[ (agentTestPort, testPort, testDB),
(agentTestPort2, testPort2, testDB2)
]
_test
where
_test [h1, h2] = test' h1 h2
_test _ = error "expected 2 handles"
smpAgentTest2_1 :: (Handle -> Handle -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTest2_1 test' = smpAgentTestN_1 2 _test
smpAgentTest2_2_1 :: Transport c => (c -> c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTest2_2_1 test' =
smpAgentTestN
[ (agentTestPort, testPort, testDB),
(agentTestPort2, testPort, testDB2)
]
_test
where
_test [h1, h2] = test' h1 h2
_test _ = error "expected 2 handles"
smpAgentTest3 :: (Handle -> Handle -> Handle -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTest2_1_1 :: Transport c => (c -> c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTest2_1_1 test' = smpAgentTestN_1 2 _test
where
_test [h1, h2] = test' h1 h2
_test _ = error "expected 2 handles"
smpAgentTest3 :: Transport c => (c -> c -> c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTest3 test' =
smpAgentTestN
[(agentTestPort, testDB), (agentTestPort2, testDB2), (agentTestPort3, testDB3)]
[ (agentTestPort, testPort, testDB),
(agentTestPort2, testPort, testDB2),
(agentTestPort3, testPort, testDB3)
]
_test
where
_test [h1, h2, h3] = test' h1 h2 h3
_test _ = error "expected 3 handles"
smpAgentTest3_1 :: (Handle -> Handle -> Handle -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTest3_1 test' = smpAgentTestN_1 3 _test
smpAgentTest3_1_1 :: Transport c => (c -> c -> c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTest3_1_1 test' = smpAgentTestN_1 3 _test
where
_test [h1, h2, h3] = test' h1 h2 h3
_test _ = error "expected 3 handles"
smpAgentTest1_1_1 :: forall c. Transport c => (c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpAgentTest1_1_1 test' =
smpAgentTestN
[(agentTestPort2, testPort2, testDB2)]
_test
where
_test [h] = test' h
_test _ = error "expected 1 handle"
cfg :: AgentConfig
cfg =
AgentConfig
defaultAgentConfig
{ tcpPort = agentTestPort,
rsaKeySize = 2048 `div` 8,
connIdBytes = 12,
smpServers = L.fromList ["localhost:5000#KXNE1m2E1m0lm92WGKet9CL6+lO742Vy5G6nsrkvgs8="],
tbqSize = 1,
dbFile = testDB,
smpCfg =
smpDefaultConfig
{ qSize = 1,
defaultPort = testPort,
defaultTransport = (testPort, transport @TCP),
tcpTimeout = 500_000
}
},
retryInterval = (retryInterval defaultAgentConfig) {initialInterval = 50_000}
}
withSmpAgentThreadOn :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => (ServiceName, String) -> (ThreadId -> m a) -> m a
withSmpAgentThreadOn (port', db') =
serverBracket
(\started -> runSMPAgentBlocking started cfg {tcpPort = port', dbFile = db'})
(removeFile db')
withSmpAgentThreadOn_ :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => ATransport -> (ServiceName, ServiceName, String) -> m () -> (ThreadId -> m a) -> m a
withSmpAgentThreadOn_ t (port', smpPort', db') afterProcess =
let cfg' = cfg {tcpPort = port', dbFile = db', smpServers = L.fromList [SMPServer "localhost" (Just smpPort') testKeyHash]}
in serverBracket
(\started -> runSMPAgentBlocking t started cfg')
afterProcess
withSmpAgentOn :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => (ServiceName, String) -> m a -> m a
withSmpAgentOn (port', db') = withSmpAgentThreadOn (port', db') . const
withSmpAgentThreadOn :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => ATransport -> (ServiceName, ServiceName, String) -> (ThreadId -> m a) -> m a
withSmpAgentThreadOn t a@(_, _, db') = withSmpAgentThreadOn_ t a $ removeFile db'
withSmpAgent :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => m a -> m a
withSmpAgent = withSmpAgentOn (agentTestPort, testDB)
withSmpAgentOn :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => ATransport -> (ServiceName, ServiceName, String) -> m a -> m a
withSmpAgentOn t (port', smpPort', db') = withSmpAgentThreadOn t (port', smpPort', db') . const
testSMPAgentClientOn :: MonadUnliftIO m => ServiceName -> (Handle -> m a) -> m a
withSmpAgent :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => ATransport -> m a -> m a
withSmpAgent t = withSmpAgentOn t (agentTestPort, testPort, testDB)
testSMPAgentClientOn :: (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m) => ServiceName -> (c -> m a) -> m a
testSMPAgentClientOn port' client = do
runTCPClient agentTestHost port' $ \h -> do
runTransportClient agentTestHost port' $ \h -> do
line <- liftIO $ getLn h
if line == "Welcome to SMP v0.2.0 agent"
if line == "Welcome to SMP agent v" <> currentSMPVersionStr
then client h
else error "not connected"
else error $ "wrong welcome message: " <> B.unpack line
testSMPAgentClient :: MonadUnliftIO m => (Handle -> m a) -> m a
testSMPAgentClient :: (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m) => (c -> m a) -> m a
testSMPAgentClient = testSMPAgentClientOn agentTestPort
+40 -30
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
{-# LANGUAGE NumericUnderscores #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
module SMPClient where
@@ -32,30 +33,39 @@ testHost = "localhost"
testPort :: ServiceName
testPort = "5000"
testPort2 :: ServiceName
testPort2 = "5001"
testKeyHashStr :: B.ByteString
testKeyHashStr = "KXNE1m2E1m0lm92WGKet9CL6+lO742Vy5G6nsrkvgs8="
testBlockSize :: Maybe Int
testBlockSize = Just 8192
testKeyHash :: Maybe C.KeyHash
testKeyHash = Just "KXNE1m2E1m0lm92WGKet9CL6+lO742Vy5G6nsrkvgs8="
testStoreLogFile :: FilePath
testStoreLogFile = "tests/tmp/smp-server-store.log"
testSMPClient :: MonadUnliftIO m => (THandle -> m a) -> m a
testSMPClient :: (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m) => (THandle c -> m a) -> m a
testSMPClient client =
runTCPClient testHost testPort $ \h ->
liftIO (runExceptT $ clientHandshake h testKeyHash) >>= \case
runTransportClient testHost testPort $ \h ->
liftIO (runExceptT $ clientHandshake h testBlockSize testKeyHash) >>= \case
Right th -> client th
Left e -> error $ show e
cfg :: ServerConfig
cfg =
ServerConfig
{ tcpPort = testPort,
{ transports = undefined,
tbqSize = 1,
serverTbqSize = 1,
msgQueueQuota = 4,
queueIdBytes = 12,
msgIdBytes = 6,
storeLog = Nothing,
blockSize = 8192,
serverPrivateKey =
-- full RSA private key (only for tests)
"MIIFIwIBAAKCAQEArZyrri/NAwt5buvYjwu+B/MQeJUszDBpRgVqNddlI9kNwDXu\
@@ -88,18 +98,18 @@ cfg =
\TmKzSAw7iVWwEUZR/PeiEKazqrpp9VU="
}
withSmpServerStoreLogOn :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => ServiceName -> (ThreadId -> m a) -> m a
withSmpServerStoreLogOn port client = do
withSmpServerStoreLogOn :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => ATransport -> ServiceName -> (ThreadId -> m a) -> m a
withSmpServerStoreLogOn t port client = do
s <- liftIO $ openReadStoreLog testStoreLogFile
serverBracket
(\started -> runSMPServerBlocking started cfg {tcpPort = port, storeLog = Just s})
(\started -> runSMPServerBlocking started cfg {transports = [(port, t)], storeLog = Just s})
(pure ())
client
withSmpServerThreadOn :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => ServiceName -> (ThreadId -> m a) -> m a
withSmpServerThreadOn port =
withSmpServerThreadOn :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => ATransport -> ServiceName -> (ThreadId -> m a) -> m a
withSmpServerThreadOn t port =
serverBracket
(\started -> runSMPServerBlocking started cfg {tcpPort = port})
(\started -> runSMPServerBlocking started cfg {transports = [(port, t)]})
(pure ())
serverBracket :: MonadUnliftIO m => (TMVar Bool -> m ()) -> m () -> (ThreadId -> m a) -> m a
@@ -115,49 +125,49 @@ serverBracket process afterProcess f = do
Nothing -> error $ "server did not " <> s
_ -> pure ()
withSmpServerOn :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => ServiceName -> m a -> m a
withSmpServerOn port = withSmpServerThreadOn port . const
withSmpServerOn :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => ATransport -> ServiceName -> m a -> m a
withSmpServerOn t port = withSmpServerThreadOn t port . const
withSmpServer :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => m a -> m a
withSmpServer = withSmpServerOn testPort
withSmpServer :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => ATransport -> m a -> m a
withSmpServer t = withSmpServerOn t testPort
runSmpTest :: (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => (THandle -> m a) -> m a
runSmpTest test = withSmpServer $ testSMPClient test
runSmpTest :: forall c m a. (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => (THandle c -> m a) -> m a
runSmpTest test = withSmpServer (transport @c) $ testSMPClient test
runSmpTestN :: forall m a. (MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => Int -> ([THandle] -> m a) -> m a
runSmpTestN nClients test = withSmpServer $ run nClients []
runSmpTestN :: forall c m a. (Transport c, MonadUnliftIO m, MonadRandom m) => Int -> ([THandle c] -> m a) -> m a
runSmpTestN nClients test = withSmpServer (transport @c) $ run nClients []
where
run :: Int -> [THandle] -> m a
run :: Int -> [THandle c] -> m a
run 0 hs = test hs
run n hs = testSMPClient $ \h -> run (n - 1) (h : hs)
smpServerTest :: RawTransmission -> IO RawTransmission
smpServerTest cmd = runSmpTest $ \h -> tPutRaw h cmd >> tGetRaw h
smpServerTest :: forall c. Transport c => TProxy c -> RawTransmission -> IO RawTransmission
smpServerTest _ cmd = runSmpTest $ \(h :: THandle c) -> tPutRaw h cmd >> tGetRaw h
smpTest :: (THandle -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpTest test' = runSmpTest test' `shouldReturn` ()
smpTest :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandle c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpTest _ test' = runSmpTest test' `shouldReturn` ()
smpTestN :: Int -> ([THandle] -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpTestN :: Transport c => Int -> ([THandle c] -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpTestN n test' = runSmpTestN n test' `shouldReturn` ()
smpTest2 :: (THandle -> THandle -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpTest2 test' = smpTestN 2 _test
smpTest2 :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandle c -> THandle c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpTest2 _ test' = smpTestN 2 _test
where
_test [h1, h2] = test' h1 h2
_test _ = error "expected 2 handles"
smpTest3 :: (THandle -> THandle -> THandle -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpTest3 test' = smpTestN 3 _test
smpTest3 :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandle c -> THandle c -> THandle c -> IO ()) -> Expectation
smpTest3 _ test' = smpTestN 3 _test
where
_test [h1, h2, h3] = test' h1 h2 h3
_test _ = error "expected 3 handles"
tPutRaw :: THandle -> RawTransmission -> IO ()
tPutRaw :: Transport c => THandle c -> RawTransmission -> IO ()
tPutRaw h (sig, corrId, queueId, command) = do
let t = B.intercalate " " [corrId, queueId, command]
void $ tPut h (C.Signature sig, t)
tGetRaw :: THandle -> IO RawTransmission
tGetRaw :: Transport c => THandle c -> IO RawTransmission
tGetRaw h = do
("", (CorrId corrId, qId, Right cmd)) <- tGet fromServer h
pure ("", corrId, encode qId, serializeCommand cmd)
+65 -42
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ module ServerTests where
import Control.Concurrent (ThreadId, killThread)
import Control.Concurrent.STM
import Control.Exception (SomeException, try)
import Control.Monad.Except (forM_, runExceptT)
import Control.Monad.Except (forM, forM_, runExceptT)
import Data.ByteString.Base64
import Data.ByteString.Char8 (ByteString)
import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B
@@ -28,25 +28,26 @@ import Test.Hspec
rsaKeySize :: Int
rsaKeySize = 2048 `div` 8
serverTests :: Spec
serverTests = do
describe "SMP syntax" syntaxTests
serverTests :: ATransport -> Spec
serverTests t = do
describe "SMP syntax" $ syntaxTests t
describe "SMP queues" do
describe "NEW and KEY commands, SEND messages" testCreateSecure
describe "NEW, OFF and DEL commands, SEND messages" testCreateDelete
describe "NEW and KEY commands, SEND messages" $ testCreateSecure t
describe "NEW, OFF and DEL commands, SEND messages" $ testCreateDelete t
describe "Stress test" $ stressTest t
describe "SMP messages" do
describe "duplex communication over 2 SMP connections" testDuplex
describe "switch subscription to another SMP queue" testSwitchSub
describe "Store log" testWithStoreLog
describe "Timing of AUTH error" testTiming
describe "duplex communication over 2 SMP connections" $ testDuplex t
describe "switch subscription to another SMP queue" $ testSwitchSub t
describe "Store log" $ testWithStoreLog t
describe "Timing of AUTH error" $ testTiming t
pattern Resp :: CorrId -> QueueId -> Command 'Broker -> SignedTransmissionOrError
pattern Resp corrId queueId command <- ("", (corrId, queueId, Right (Cmd SBroker command)))
sendRecv :: THandle -> (ByteString, ByteString, ByteString, ByteString) -> IO SignedTransmissionOrError
sendRecv :: Transport c => THandle c -> (ByteString, ByteString, ByteString, ByteString) -> IO SignedTransmissionOrError
sendRecv h (sgn, corrId, qId, cmd) = tPutRaw h (sgn, corrId, encode qId, cmd) >> tGet fromServer h
signSendRecv :: THandle -> C.SafePrivateKey -> (ByteString, ByteString, ByteString) -> IO SignedTransmissionOrError
signSendRecv :: Transport c => THandle c -> C.SafePrivateKey -> (ByteString, ByteString, ByteString) -> IO SignedTransmissionOrError
signSendRecv h pk (corrId, qId, cmd) = do
let t = B.intercalate " " [corrId, encode qId, cmd]
Right sig <- runExceptT $ C.sign pk t
@@ -56,16 +57,13 @@ signSendRecv h pk (corrId, qId, cmd) = do
cmdSEND :: ByteString -> ByteString
cmdSEND msg = serializeCommand (Cmd SSender . SEND $ msg)
(>#>) :: RawTransmission -> RawTransmission -> Expectation
command >#> response = smpServerTest command `shouldReturn` response
(#==) :: (HasCallStack, Eq a, Show a) => (a, a) -> String -> Assertion
(actual, expected) #== message = assertEqual message expected actual
testCreateSecure :: Spec
testCreateSecure =
testCreateSecure :: ATransport -> Spec
testCreateSecure (ATransport t) =
it "should create (NEW) and secure (KEY) queue" $
smpTest \h -> do
smpTest t $ \h -> do
(rPub, rKey) <- C.generateKeyPair rsaKeySize
Resp "abcd" rId1 (IDS rId sId) <- signSendRecv h rKey ("abcd", "", "NEW " <> C.serializePubKey rPub)
(rId1, "") #== "creates queue"
@@ -114,10 +112,10 @@ testCreateSecure =
Resp "dabc" _ err5 <- sendRecv h ("", "dabc", sId, "SEND 5 hello ")
(err5, ERR AUTH) #== "rejects unsigned SEND"
testCreateDelete :: Spec
testCreateDelete =
testCreateDelete :: ATransport -> Spec
testCreateDelete (ATransport t) =
it "should create (NEW), suspend (OFF) and delete (DEL) queue" $
smpTest2 \rh sh -> do
smpTest2 t $ \rh sh -> do
(rPub, rKey) <- C.generateKeyPair rsaKeySize
Resp "abcd" rId1 (IDS rId sId) <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("abcd", "", "NEW " <> C.serializePubKey rPub)
(rId1, "") #== "creates queue"
@@ -182,10 +180,26 @@ testCreateDelete =
Resp "cdab" _ err10 <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("cdab", rId, "SUB")
(err10, ERR AUTH) #== "rejects SUB when deleted"
testDuplex :: Spec
testDuplex =
stressTest :: ATransport -> Spec
stressTest (ATransport t) =
it "should create many queues, disconnect and re-connect" $
smpTest3 t $ \h1 h2 h3 -> do
(rPub, rKey) <- C.generateKeyPair rsaKeySize
rIds <- forM [1 .. 50 :: Int] . const $ do
Resp "" "" (IDS rId _) <- signSendRecv h1 rKey ("", "", "NEW " <> C.serializePubKey rPub)
pure rId
let subscribeQueues h = forM_ rIds $ \rId -> do
Resp "" rId' OK <- signSendRecv h rKey ("", rId, "SUB")
rId' `shouldBe` rId
closeConnection $ connection h1
subscribeQueues h2
closeConnection $ connection h2
subscribeQueues h3
testDuplex :: ATransport -> Spec
testDuplex (ATransport t) =
it "should create 2 simplex connections and exchange messages" $
smpTest2 \alice bob -> do
smpTest2 t $ \alice bob -> do
(arPub, arKey) <- C.generateKeyPair rsaKeySize
Resp "abcd" _ (IDS aRcv aSnd) <- signSendRecv alice arKey ("abcd", "", "NEW " <> C.serializePubKey arPub)
-- aSnd ID is passed to Bob out-of-band
@@ -232,10 +246,10 @@ testDuplex =
Resp "bcda" _ OK <- signSendRecv bob brKey ("bcda", bRcv, "ACK")
(msg5, "how are you bob") #== "message received from alice"
testSwitchSub :: Spec
testSwitchSub =
testSwitchSub :: ATransport -> Spec
testSwitchSub (ATransport t) =
it "should create simplex connections and switch subscription to another TCP connection" $
smpTest3 \rh1 rh2 sh -> do
smpTest3 t $ \rh1 rh2 sh -> do
(rPub, rKey) <- C.generateKeyPair rsaKeySize
Resp "abcd" _ (IDS rId sId) <- signSendRecv rh1 rKey ("abcd", "", "NEW " <> C.serializePubKey rPub)
Resp "bcda" _ ok1 <- sendRecv sh ("", "bcda", sId, "SEND 5 test1 ")
@@ -270,15 +284,15 @@ testSwitchSub =
Nothing -> return ()
Just _ -> error "nothing else is delivered to the 1st TCP connection"
testWithStoreLog :: Spec
testWithStoreLog =
testWithStoreLog :: ATransport -> Spec
testWithStoreLog at@(ATransport t) =
it "should store simplex queues to log and restore them after server restart" $ do
(sPub1, sKey1) <- C.generateKeyPair rsaKeySize
(sPub2, sKey2) <- C.generateKeyPair rsaKeySize
senderId1 <- newTVarIO ""
senderId2 <- newTVarIO ""
withSmpServerStoreLogOn testPort . runTest $ \h -> do
withSmpServerStoreLogOn at testPort . runTest t $ \h -> do
(sId1, _, _) <- createAndSecureQueue h sPub1
atomically $ writeTVar senderId1 sId1
Resp "bcda" _ OK <- signSendRecv h sKey1 ("bcda", sId1, "SEND 5 hello ")
@@ -294,13 +308,13 @@ testWithStoreLog =
logSize `shouldReturn` 5
withSmpServerThreadOn testPort . runTest $ \h -> do
withSmpServerThreadOn at testPort . runTest t $ \h -> do
sId1 <- readTVarIO senderId1
-- fails if store log is disabled
Resp "bcda" _ (ERR AUTH) <- signSendRecv h sKey1 ("bcda", sId1, "SEND 5 hello ")
pure ()
withSmpServerStoreLogOn testPort . runTest $ \h -> do
withSmpServerStoreLogOn at testPort . runTest t $ \h -> do
-- this queue is restored
sId1 <- readTVarIO senderId1
Resp "bcda" _ OK <- signSendRecv h sKey1 ("bcda", sId1, "SEND 5 hello ")
@@ -312,7 +326,7 @@ testWithStoreLog =
logSize `shouldReturn` 1
removeFile testStoreLogFile
where
createAndSecureQueue :: THandle -> SenderPublicKey -> IO (SenderId, RecipientId, C.SafePrivateKey)
createAndSecureQueue :: Transport c => THandle c -> SenderPublicKey -> IO (SenderId, RecipientId, C.SafePrivateKey)
createAndSecureQueue h sPub = do
(rPub, rKey) <- C.generateKeyPair rsaKeySize
Resp "abcd" "" (IDS rId sId) <- signSendRecv h rKey ("abcd", "", "NEW " <> C.serializePubKey rPub)
@@ -321,8 +335,8 @@ testWithStoreLog =
(rId', rId) #== "same queue ID"
pure (sId, rId, rKey)
runTest :: (THandle -> IO ()) -> ThreadId -> Expectation
runTest test' server = do
runTest :: Transport c => TProxy c -> (THandle c -> IO ()) -> ThreadId -> Expectation
runTest _ test' server = do
testSMPClient test' `shouldReturn` ()
killThread server
@@ -332,26 +346,33 @@ testWithStoreLog =
Right l -> pure l
Left (_ :: SomeException) -> logSize
testTiming :: Spec
testTiming =
testTiming :: ATransport -> Spec
testTiming (ATransport t) =
it "should have similar time for auth error, whether queue exists or not, for all key sizes" $
smpTest2 \rh sh ->
smpTest2 t $ \rh sh ->
mapM_
(testSameTiming rh sh)
[ (128, 128, 100),
(128, 256, 25),
(128, 384, 15),
-- (128, 512, 15),
(256, 128, 100),
(256, 256, 25)
(256, 256, 25),
(256, 384, 15),
-- (256, 512, 15),
(384, 128, 100),
(384, 256, 25),
(384, 384, 15)
-- (384, 512, 15),
-- (512, 128, 100),
-- (512, 256, 25),
-- (512, 384, 15),
-- (512, 512, 15)
]
where
timeRepeat n = fmap fst . timeItT . forM_ (replicate n ()) . const
similarTime t1 t2 = abs (t1 - t2) / t1 < 0.2 `shouldBe` True
testSameTiming :: THandle -> THandle -> (Int, Int, Int) -> Expectation
testSameTiming :: Transport c => THandle c -> THandle c -> (Int, Int, Int) -> Expectation
testSameTiming rh sh (senderKeySize, badKeySize, n) = do
(rPub, rKey) <- C.generateKeyPair rsaKeySize
Resp "abcd" "" (IDS rId sId) <- signSendRecv rh rKey ("abcd", "", "NEW " <> C.serializePubKey rPub)
@@ -377,8 +398,8 @@ samplePubKey = "rsa:MIIBoDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAY0AMIIBiAKCAQEAtn1NI2tPoOGSGfad
sampleSig :: ByteString
sampleSig = "\128\207*\159eq\220i!\"\157\161\130\184\226\246\232_\\\170`\180\160\230sI\154\197\211\252\SUB\246\206ELL\t9K\ESC\196?\128\215%\222\148\NAK;9\155f\164\217e\242\156\CAN9\253\r\170\174'w\211\228?\205)\215\150\255\247z\DC115\DC1{\bn\145\rKD,K\230\202d8\233\167|7y\t_S\EM\248\EOT\216\172\167d\181\224)\137\ACKo\197j#c\217\243\228.\167\228\205\144\vr\134"
syntaxTests :: Spec
syntaxTests = do
syntaxTests :: ATransport -> Spec
syntaxTests (ATransport t) = do
it "unknown command" $ ("", "abcd", "1234", "HELLO") >#> ("", "abcd", "1234", "ERR CMD SYNTAX")
describe "NEW" do
it "no parameters" $ (sampleSig, "bcda", "", "NEW") >#> ("", "bcda", "", "ERR CMD SYNTAX")
@@ -414,3 +435,5 @@ syntaxTests = do
it "wrong terminator" $ (sampleSig, "bcda", "12345678", cmd <> "=") >#> ("", "bcda", "12345678", "ERR CMD SYNTAX")
it "no signature" $ ("", "cdab", "12345678", cmd) >#> ("", "cdab", "12345678", "ERR CMD NO_AUTH")
it "no queue ID" $ (sampleSig, "dabc", "", cmd) >#> ("", "dabc", "", "ERR CMD NO_AUTH")
(>#>) :: RawTransmission -> RawTransmission -> Expectation
command >#> response = smpServerTest t command `shouldReturn` response
+8 -5
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
import AgentTests
import MarkdownTests
{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}
import AgentTests (agentTests)
import ProtocolErrorTests
import ServerTests
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport (TCP, Transport (..))
import Simplex.Messaging.Transport.WebSockets (WS)
import System.Directory (createDirectoryIfMissing, removeDirectoryRecursive)
import Test.Hspec
@@ -9,8 +12,8 @@ main :: IO ()
main = do
createDirectoryIfMissing False "tests/tmp"
hspec $ do
describe "SimpleX markdown" markdownTests
describe "Protocol errors" protocolErrorTests
describe "SMP server" serverTests
describe "SMP client agent" agentTests
describe "SMP server via TCP" $ serverTests (transport @TCP)
describe "SMP server via WebSockets" $ serverTests (transport @WS)
describe "SMP client agent" $ agentTests (transport @TCP)
removeDirectoryRecursive "tests/tmp"